THE BALANCE OF SEA POWER IN THE EARLY MODERN ERA (1648–1713)

by

Izidor Janžekovič

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Supervisor: László Kontler

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Author: Izidor Janžekovič

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Abstract

The balance of power was one of the founding ideas of the emerging inter-state system in the early modern era. This idea, however, has been analysed mostly in relation to land powers on the European continent, while the historiography has failed to properly recognize its naval aspect so far. This omission seems strange, considering that the contemporaries conceptualized and measured absolute and relative sea power. This study focuses on how the practice and theory of the balance-of-power idea were applied on the high seas and specifically among sea powers in the early modern era. Moreover, since state and sea powers were intertwined, it also shows how states reacted to other states' decreasing or increasing sea power.

Warships or ships of the line were the most important instruments of naval warfare and key to any assessment of sea power. The contemporaries focused on the number of warships and their size based on the number of guns per ship. Detailed tables of fleets with the number of warships and guns for the major engagements show the equality or balance of sea power. As warships were costly to build and maintain at sea, all the states always had limited capacity. The author argues that attaining and maintaining the balance of sea power in the seventeenth century was not just an abstract idea, but also an interactive process.

The study concentrates on the period between the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Peace of Utrecht (1713). During this period, the focus is on the three major European conflicts, which also had their global dimensions. The Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652–1674) were one of the key naval and economic confrontations in the early modern era. In the early stages, the War of the Grand Alliance (1688–1697) was a serious naval challenge to the 'maritime powers' of England and the Dutch Republic by France. The War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713) dealt a blow to French naval ambitions, weakened the relative Dutch sea power and cemented the English naval supremacy in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

The author used a three-level methodology, drawing on different types of sources, to assess the balance of sea power in the early modern era. He sought to identify the 'actual' sea power (ship lists), the practical and political strategies for achieving or maintaining the balance (international treaties and diplomatic correspondence), and the development of the idea of the balance of sea power in the legal and theoretical realm (texts by jurists and philosophers). The contemporaries were aware of the potentials and limits of sea power, so that the relative and actual naval strength of states was often discussed. The author argues that there was a real or naval balance of sea power between the different fleets, that the balance of sea power was acknowledged in the international alliance treaties, and that the balance of sea power became an element of early modern political discourse.

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Introduction

'I can therefore conclude that at some unexpected moment the enemies of France managed to stir up the whole of Europe to destroy the sole counterweight capable of guaranteeing its continental and maritime balance, so the international law no longer exists, [although] it existed in the previous period, when no power dared to have incurred universal hatred and reprobation by the manifestation of such a design.'[1]

These zealous words were written by Napoleon's pamphleteer and publicist Alexandre Maurice Blanc de Lanautte, Comte d'Hauterive (1754–1830). After his less than triumphant return from Egypt and the *coup d'État du 18 brumaire an VIII* (9 November 1799), Napoleon asked Hauterive to pen a manifesto addressed to nations abroad.[2] The pamphlet *De l'état de la France, à la fin de l'an VIII* (1800) predictably stirred criticism from abroad.[3] Hauterive abundantly argued that Napoleon had to unite Europe against England (sic!),[4] in order to reduce the English supremacy at sea and reintroduce the balance of sea power in Europe. The focus of this study is to find out whether a balance of sea power ever existed in the early modern era, how the titular balance of sea power was wrecked, and how the balance-of-sea-power discourse affected the relevant treaties, treatises and theoretical texts.

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[1] Comte d'Hauterive, *De l'état de la France, à la fin de l'an VIII* (Paris: Henrics, 1800), 57–58. Nota bene, Henrics published at least two editions of the pamphlet in the autumn of 1800 (*brumaire an 9*) and the pagination does not align. Comte d'Hauterive, *De l'état de la France, à la fin de l'an VIII* (Paris: Henrics, 1800), 44. Henceforth, I am using the French edition that I referenced first with my own translation, although there is an early English translation, which was published only a few months after the original. Citizen Hauterive, *State of the French Republic at the End of Year VIII*, translated by Lewis Goldsmith (London: J. S. Jordan, 1801), 44.

[2] It was translated into English by the infamous pro- and anti-Napoleonic, at different times, publicist Lewis Goldsmith. Lewis Goldsmith, *The Crimes of Cabinets: or, A Review of Their Plans and Aggressions for the Annihilation of the Liberties of France, and the Dismemberment of Her Territories* (London: J. S. Jordan, 1801).

[3] In Prussia, the answer came from Friedrich Gentz, *Von dem politischen Zustande von Europa vor und nach der Französischen Revolution* (Berlin: Heinrich Frölich, 1801). This response was quickly translated into English. Friedrich Gentz, *On the state of Europe before and after the French revolution* (London: J. Hatchard, 1802). The major British response to Hauterive came a year after that. Thomas Brooke Clarke, *A Historical and Political View of the Disorganization of Europe* (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1803).

[4] Napoleon always called Great Britain or later the United Kingdom England. Andrew Roberts, *Napoleon: A Life* (New York: Viking Press, 2014), 291.

Hauterive pointed to the 'public law' or international law in the 'previous period,' when there arguably was 'continental and maritime balance.' Hauterive recognized the Treaty of Westphalia as the point when the international law and the two balances were established. Since 1648, Hauterive argued, 'we have seen all the states of the Continent fighting for its balance of power against France, the only great nation which during a hundred years has incessantly made sacrifices to maintain it.' Moreover, 'we have seen all the states of the Continent seconding the efforts of England to destroy the sea power of France.' However, 'England has failed, even to this moment, in the dearest of its projects, that of crushing the maritime independence and power of Europe.'[5] In Hauterive's analysis, ordered and backed by Napoleon, Britain destroyed the European 'continental and maritime balance.'

Figure 1. François Gérard, Signature of the Concordat between France and the Holy See, 15 July 1801. Hauterive, a clerk in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is in the background, the second from the right.

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[5] Hauterive, *De l'état de la France*, 40–41, 56–57. The English translation takes many liberties, as was common in the early modern translations. For example, instead of the phrase 'all the states of the Continent' (*tous les Etats du continent*) in the French original, the English translation used 'all Europe.' Hauterive, *State of the French Republic*, 30–31, 43. Albert Vandal, *Napoléon et Alexandre Ier: l'alliance russe sous le premier Empire*, 3rd edition (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1893), I, 3.

2

This was not the first time that Napoleon emphasized the enmity between the Continent and the British supremacy at sea. As he fought in Italy, he claimed that the British 'smile with pleasure at the woes of the Continent.'[6] Napoleon was not the only revolutionary who had such spiteful sentiments. Paul Barras, one of the Directors, claimed that the British navy completely pushed the French navy from the open seas. Thus, in early 1798, Barras ordered Napoleon to 'go and capture that gigantic corsair who infests the seas. Go and chain up that gigantic freebooter who oppresses the oceans. Go and chastise in London outrages left too long unpunished.'[7] Napoleon knew that the French navy could not challenge the British navy, so he proposed the ill-fated invasion of Egypt, to hurt the British overseas trade.

Napoleon and the French were not particularly original with the accusation of Britain ruling the seas. Among many others, Benjamin Franklin argued against the British privateering. In relation to the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–84), he noted that 'surely there never was a more unjust War; it is manifestly such from their own Manifesto. The Spirit of Rapine dictated it; […] but if it be a good Definition of a Pirate, that he [Capt. Jones] is *Hostis humani Generis*, they are much more Pirates than he, having already made great Progress towards being at War with all the World.'[8] The unrestricted privateering of merchant ships of *neutral* states was behind the alliances against Britain. The two most famous examples were the First League of Armed Neutrality (1780–83) and the Second League of Armed Neutrality (1800–01).[9]

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[6] Denis Arthur Bingham (ed.), *A Selection from the Letters and Despatches of the First Napoleon: With Explanatory Notes*, 3 vols. (London: Chapman and Hall, 1884), I, 142. Roberts, *Napoleon*, 132.

[7] Bingham (ed.), *A Selection*, I, 65–66. John Holland Rose, *The Life of Napoleon I*, 2 vols. (London: George Bell & Sons, 1904), I, 173. Roberts, *Napoleon*, 156.

[8] To Dumas, 18 January 1781. *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, 43 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954–), XXXIV, 287–89. This stance is somewhat ironic, since Franklin earlier supported the privateering against the British ships. Moreover, in 1779, the most famous American Revolutionary privateer, Captain John Paul Jones, renamed the gifted French vessel into *Bonhomme Richard* in honour of Franklin's famous alter ego, Poor Richard.

[9] James Brown Scott (ed.), *The Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918). Richard Pares, *Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights (1739–1763)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938). Isabel de Madariaga, *Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 1780* (London: Hollis and Carter, 1962). Stephen Neff, *The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). Isaac Nakhimovsky, 'Vattel's theory of the international order: Commerce and the balance of power in the Law of Nations', *History of European Ideas* 33 (2007): 157–173. Koen Stapelbroek, 'Universal Society, Commerce and the Rights of Neutral Trade: Martin Hübner, Emer de Vattel and Ferdinando Galiani', *COLLeGIUM: Studies Across Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences* 3 (2008): 63–89.

Even before the French and American Revolutions, such thinking became more and more common in Europe.[10] The extraction of wealth from colonies grew in importance and their worth to the mother countries became more palpable. Thus, having sea power, i.e., a naval and merchant fleet, became a key element of power politics. As the Abbot Guillaume Thomas Raynal (1713–96) noted in his best-selling analysis and synthesis of the commercial and colonial expansion of Europe across the world, *Histoire des deux Indes*, 'on the continent [Europe], the balance of power has passed to the maritime nations.'[11]

Early modern navies were 'the largest, the costliest and technically the most advanced organizations of their day.'[12] If, in the early 1640s, Richelieu could still claim that the 'dominion of this element [sea] had never been assured to anyone,'[13] this was about to change with the new technology and tactics. The Dutch, English, and French, intently followed the progress of their allies' or enemies' sea power, and often responded to the naval policies of their foes and friends. The sea power started to play an important role in the national and trade policies, so states started establishing standing or, better said, floating navies.

This study presents in comparative perspective the balance-of-sea-power practices and thinking in the early modern era. The title and the concept is a combination of two concepts, i.e., the balance of power and sea power, which I briefly present below, and then provide the methodology for determining the common denominator. Both concepts have been studied separately for centuries, so it is key to understand the basic elements of both to understand the mindset of the contemporaries. However, although it had been discussed in the early modern era, the balance of sea power has not been accorded the same attention.

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[10] Martin Hübner, *De la saisie des batimens neutres, ou Du Droit qu'ont les Nations Belligérantes d'arrêter les Navires des Peuples Amis*, 2 vols. (The Hague: s.n., 1759).

[11] Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, *Histoire philosophique et politique des etablissemens et du commerce des europeens dans les deux Indes*, 10 vols. (Geneva: Jean-Leonard Pellet, 1781), X, 140.

[12] N.A.M. Rodger, *The Admiralty* (Lavenham: T. Dalton, 1979), x.

[13] '*La Mer est celui de tous les Héritages sur lequel tous les Souverains prétendent plus de part… L'Empire de cet Element ne fut jamais bien assuré à Personne.*' Richelieu, *Testament Politique d'Armand Du Plessis, Cardinal Duc de Richelieu*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Henry Desbordes, 1688), I, 116.

The Balance of Power

> 'Hence arose that famous scheme of the political equilibrium or balance of power; by which is understood such a disposition of things, as no power is able absolutely to predominate, or to prescribe laws to others.'[14]

The balance of power is one of those ideas that evades a simple definition. According to the famous jurist Emmerich de Vattel (1714–67), 'Europe forms a political system, a body […] and the perpetual negotiations make Europe a kind of a republic, the members of which, though independent, unite, through the ties of common interest, for the maintenance of order and liberty. Hence arose that famous scheme of the political equilibrium or balance of power.'[15] Vattel defined the balance of power as the opposition to any predominant power. The balance of power was often used as an antonym to universal monarchy, which did not mean the actual possession of the whole world, but the predominant power or state, which could force or dictate the laws and rules, according to its interests, to every other state.

Vattel copied this sentiment from Voltaire's history of Louis XIV. Voltaire thought that the 'Christian Europe (including Russia),' much sooner than in the time of Louis XIV, had been 'a kind of great republic divided into several states [...] all with the same principles of public law and politics, unknown in other parts of the world.' According to such principles, European states 'especially agree in the wise policy of keeping between them, as far as they can, an equal balance of power.'[16] However, the views of what constituted the balance of power in a certain moment depended on the interested states and thinkers.

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[14] Emmerich de Vattel, *Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle*, 2 vols. (London: s.n., 1758), II, 40. Emmerich de Vattel, *The Law of Nations: Or, Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns*, 2 vols. (London: J. Newbery et al., 1760), II, 19.

[15] Vattel, *Le droit des gens*, II, 40. Vattel, *The Law of Nations*, II, 19.

[16] Voltaire, L*e siècle de Louis XIV* (Berlin: C. F. Henning, 1751), 11–12. Martin Kahle, *La Balance de l'Europe considereé comme la regle de la paix et de la guerre* (Berlin: Schmid, 1744).

Although Vattel's definition of the balance-of-power idea is a few generations younger than the focus of my study, it perfectly encapsulates the view of the European public in the long seventeenth century as well. The definition is unclear, but it reflects the ambiguous views of the balance-of-power idea. More than a century ago, Albert F. Pollard used a hyperbolic exercise to illustrate the abundance of meanings. He checked the different meanings of *balance* (20), *of* (63), and *power* (18) in *Oxford English Dictionary*. He did not feel the need to compute all the different definitions of the 'balance of power' (22,680). Pollard just wanted to express his frustration that 'it is used not only in different senses by different people, or in different senses by the same people at different times, but in different senses by the same person at the same time.'[17] This study does not try to define the balance of power any better than Vattel already had, but I highlight its international spread, its discursive value, and its increasing importance between the Treaties of Westphalia and Utrecht.

Although the true dawn of the balance of power concept was in the Renaissance, many thinkers saw the origin of the principle in ancient Greece. The question that they tried to answer was whether the Ancients had followed the principle of the balance of power even before it was first noted by the Moderns.[18] For David Hume (1711–76), the balance of power was based so much on 'common sense and obvious reasoning' that it was surely present in 'antiquity, where we find, in other particulars, so many marks of deep penetration and discernment.'[19] Jonathan Swift (1667–1745) came to a similar conclusion some fifty years earlier.[20] Early modern thinkers were looking for traces of balance-of-power practices in classical texts.[21]

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[17] Albert Frederick Pollard, 'The Balance of Power', *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs* 2 (1923): 51–64, at 58.

[18] Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: History & Theory* (London: Routledge, 1996), 24–9.

[19] David Hume, 'Of the Balance of Power', in Eugene F. Miller (ed.), *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, Revised Edition* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), 332–341, at 337–38.

[20] Jonathan Swift, *A Discourse of the Contests and Dissentions between the Nobles and the Commons in Athens and Rome* (London: John Nutt, 1701), 5–6, 48–9.

[21] William Wohlforth, *et al.*, 'Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History', *European Journal of International Relations*, 13 (2) (2007): 155–85. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 'The End of Balance-of-Power Theory? A Comment on Wohlforth et al.'s "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History"', *European Journal of International Relations* 15 (2009): 347–80.

The balance-of-power concept was a relatively fresh idea in Renaissance Europe in contrast to the 'medieval' idea of universal monarchy.[22] A diplomat at the Burgundian and French courts, Philippe de Commines (1447–1511), wrote his memoirs, which were a contemplative history of his time. He depicted Europe as a system of rivaling states. In a Christian tradition, he wrote that God created such a system to control the aspirations of (neighboring!) states for the sake of justice. Being in constant conflict, Scotland was balanced by England, England by France, Portugal by Spain, Venice by Florence, etc. Commines wrote only about Europe because he did not have enough data for Africa and Asia, although he had 'heard that they are not exempted from factions and wars.'[23]

Many Italian writers in the early sixteenth century nostalgically looked back on the time before France invaded Italy in 1494, and started the Italian Wars (1494–1559). Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) saw the preceding period as a golden age 'when Italy was in a certain way balanced.'[24] The first explicit mention occurred in another early modern bestseller, *Storia d'Italia*, written in the 1530s by the diplomat and historian Francesco Guicciardini (1483–1540).[25] Writers referred to Guicciardini and his example of Lorenzo the Magnificent when introducing the balance-of-power idea. Thus, these historical works were important for the contemporaries' understanding of the balance-of-power idea in the early modern era.[26]

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[22] E.W. Nelson, 'Origins of the Balance of Power', *Medievalia et Humanistica* 1 (1943): 124–42.

[23] Philippe de Commines, *The memoirs of Philip de Commines, Lord of Argenton, containing the histories of Louis XI and Charles VIII* (London: G. Bell, 1877), 378–84. This was a very influential history book in the early modern era and the future monarchs read it. For example, Louis XIV intimately knew Commines's memoirs already by the age of fourteen. Robert Lacour-Gayet, *L'Education politique de Louis XIV* (Paris: Hachette, 1898), 96–106, 202. Pascale Mormiche, *Devenir prince: l'école du pouvoir en France, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles* (Paris: CNRS, 2009), 204, 423. Philip Mansel, *King of the World: The Life of Louis XIV* (London: Allen Lane, 2019), 51.

[24] Machiavelli, *Il Principe e altri scritti politici di Niccolò Machiavelli* (Florence: Barbèra, 1862 [1532]), 140. Erica Benner, *Machiavelli's Prince: A New Reading* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 249. Peter Savigear, 'European Political Philosophy and the Theory of International Relations', in *Approaches and Theory in International Relations*, ed. Trevor Taylor (London, New York: Longman, 1978), 32–53, 37.

[25] Francesco Guicciardini, *La historia di Italia* (Florence: Lorenzo Torrentino, 1561), 2. Harald Kleinschmidt, *The Nemesis of Power: A History of International Relations Theories* (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), 117. Sidney Alexander, 'Introduction', in Francesco Guicciardini, *The History of Italy* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1969), xvii. Roberto Ridolfi, *Genesi della storia d'Italia guicciardiniana* (Florence: L. S. Olschki, 1939), 7–23.

[26] Izidor Janžekovič, 'The Balance of Power in the Renaissance', *History of Political Thought* XL (2019): 607–630.

The 'transfer' of the balance-of-power idea was expedited by the translations of Machiavelli, Guicciardini, and Commines. Guicciardini's *History of Italy* was the third most translated 'modern history book' (in contrast to 'ancient history books' such as Herodotus and Thucydides) in early modern Europe. Guicciardini's *Storia d'Italia* was first printed in the original Italian in 1561, and by the end of the century there were numerous editions (over forty!) and translations into Latin (1566), French (1568), German (1574), English (1579), Spanish (1581) and Dutch (1599), so the whole Europe was reading it.[27] Guicciardini's *History of Italy* was translated nine times; Commines held the first place as he was translated eleven times.[28] Reading Guicciardini's description of *unbalanced* Italy after the French invasion in 1494 influenced future generations to accept the concept of the balance of power.

Figure 2. The illustrated initial of the first chapter of the first book of the first edition of Guicciardini's *Storia d'Italia* (1561). The personification of Divine Justice holds a sword in the right hand and the scales in the left.

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[27] Vincent Luciani, *Francesco Guicciardini and His European Reputation* (New York: Karl Otto, 1936).
[28] Peter Burke, 'Translating Histories', in *Cultural Translation in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Burke and Hsia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 125–41, at 129, 134–6.

The translator of Guicciardini into English and queen's advisor, Geoffrey Fenton (1539–1608), flattered his boss, Queen Elizabeth I, in the preface: 'God [...] has put into your hands the balance of power and justice, to poise and counterpoise at your will the actions and counsels of all the Christian kingdomes of your time.'[29] Herein was the internal paradox of the balance-of-power idea. It was supposed to protect against any power dictating the rules to others or the whole system, yet Fenton and many others supported their monarchs' ability and power to control other states, if it fitted their interests.

Guicciardini and Italian thinkers were not the only sources of inspiration for the balance-of-power thinking. Alfred Vagts pointed out that this political principle had been appropriated from other areas, such as philosophy, art, sciences, and religion.[30] Writers borrowed the principles of contrast and harmony from music, the balance of four bodily humours or fluids from ancient medicine, balanced accounts from bookkeeping, etc. There was something universal in the concept of balance and its representation as the scales. The scales were often associated with the ideas of justice and righteousness.

After France had finished her religious wars in the late sixteenth century, her power started to rise in the first half of the seventeenth century. During this time, French writers contributed to the balance-of-power formulation. The conflict between Spain and France fixed the image of a two-sided balance in the form of scales. Thus, Duke Henri de Rohan (1579–1638) described Spain and France as 'two poles' (*come le deux Poles*). Spain and France could only gain power at the expense of each other, as in a classic zero-sum game. However, in order for this general system to work, other rulers had to join for the common good.[31] Rohan's influential book was also repeatedly referenced later in the later seventeenth century.

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[29] Francesco Guicciardini, *The History of Guicciardin, conteining the vvares of Italie and other partes, continued for many yeares vunder sundry Kings and Princes*, translated by Geffray Fenton (London: Thomas Vautroullier, 1579), iii.

[30] Alfred Vagts, 'The Balance of Power – Growth of an Idea', *World Politics* 1 (1948): 82–101, at 87–9, 93.

[31] Henri de Rohan, *De l'intérest des princes et estats de la Chréstienté* (Paris: s.n., 1639), 104–31. Ernst B. Haas, 'The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda', *World Politics* 5 (1953): 442–77, at 448.

The balance-of-power idea also played a crucial role in international law.[32] Nowadays, the concept is seen as outdated, but the former generations of jurists saw the balance of power as an integral part of international law, i.e., the Law of Nations. To be fair, the concept was sometimes criticized as a hindrance to international peace and order, or even as the cause or excuse for wars.[33] Jean-Baptiste le Rond d'Alembert wrote in a letter to Frederick the Great on 30 July 1781: 'In time of war, men talk of nothing but the balance of power, throughout Europe; though there is another balance at least of equal efficacy, and equally proper for the preservation of each power; which is the balance of blunders [*équilibre des sottises*].'[34]

The balance-of-power idea has been a core term in the international diplomacy for the last five hundred years. The concept was nominally the 'solution' to the problems of 'anarchical' inter-state politics.[35] In the seventeenth century, the term became the *habitus* of international relations.[36] Not surprisingly, the views of who tried to keep or break the fragile balance were varied and abundant, depending on the state interests in particular situation. For every thinker advocating balance of power as the foundation of the international order, there has been another who claimed that balance of power was an excuse for war.[37]

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[32] Per Maurseth, 'Balance-Of-Power Thinking from The Renaissance to the French Revolution', *Journal of Peace Research* 1 (1964): 120–36. Quincy Wright, 'International Law and the Balance of Power', *The American Journal of International Law* 37 (1943): 97–103. Gaston Zeller, 'Le principe d'équilibre dans la politique internationale avant 1789', *Revue Historique* 215 (1956): 25–37.

[33] Johann Jacob Moser, *Grund-Sätze des jetzt üblichen Europäischen Völcker-Rechts in Friedens-Zeiten* (Hanau: s.n., 1750). Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts von Europa* (Altona: David Iversen, 1758). Alfred Vagts and Detlev Vagts, 'The Balance of Power in International Law: A History of an Idea', *The American Journal of International Law*, 73 (1979): 555–80.

[34] Frederic II, *Posthumous Works of Frederic II., King of Prussia*, Vol. XII (Correspondence: Letters between Frederic II. and Mess. d'Alembert, de Condorcet, Grimm and d'Arget), trans. Thomas Holcroft (London: G.G.J. and J. Robinson, 1789), 287–8.

[35] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977). See also other key works on international relations, such as Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1949). Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957). Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). For their use of the balance of power theories see Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[36] For habitus see Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 72–95.

[37] Herbert Butterfield, s.v. 'Balance of Power', in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Scribner, 1973), I, 179–188.

The modern international relations theory and practice did not instill any order in the use of the concept, although there were many noble and not completely unsuccessful attempts. For example, Inis Claude recognized five distinct meanings of the balance-of-power phrase in use at the time,[38] while Martin Wight distinguished nine complementary explanations.[39] There has been a rich tradition of international relations experts who delved into different mathematical models and establishing formulas for establishing the balance of power idea, especially since the 1960s, but none truly took hold. The issue of trust and distrust in international relations has also received a lot of attention in recent times.[40]

There were several challenges to the original simplistic theory of the balance of power, which I intend to apply in my study. Paul W. Schroeder and Randall L. Schweller introduced the term 'bandwagoning' for states that prefer joining rather than countering the hegemon.[41] Stephen Walt showed that countries usually do not join forces against the most powerful, but against the most threatening state; hence the 'balance of threats.'[42] William Thompson and Jack S. Levy contrasted the balance of power doctrines for land and sea hegemons, but it was less applicable to sea powers, according to their study.[43] I challenge this conclusion in my dissertation, but I first have to clarify what sea power was and how it was measured.

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[38] Inis Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962).

[39] Martin Wight, 'The Balance of Power', in *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays on the Theory of International Politics*, eds. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), 149–175.

[40] Peter Schröder, *Trust in Early Modern International Political Thought, 1598–1713* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). R. Ammicht Quinn, 'Trust Generating Security Generating Trust: An Ethical Perspective on a Secularized Discourse', *Behemoth, A Journal on Civilisation* 8 (2015): 109–125.

[41] Paul W. Schroeder, 'Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory', *International Security* 19 (1994): 108–48. Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In', *International Security* 19 (1994): 72–107.

[42] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Although his theory was based on the analysis of the contemporary Middle East, it is useful for the historians of early modern Europe. The balance of threats is not to be confused with the 'balance of terror.' The latter term was introduced by the Canadian foreign minister and later Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Lester Pearson, in 1955 to describe the nuclear rivalry between the US and USSR: 'the balance of terror has succeeded the balance of power.' A.J.C. Edwards, *Nuclear Weapons: The Balance of Terror, the Quest for Peace* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986), 238.

[43] Jack S. Levy, William R. Thompson, 'Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 1495–1999', *Security Studies* 14 (2005): 1–33. Jack S. Levy, William R. Thompson, 'Balancing on Land and at Sea – Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power', *International Security* 35 (2010): 7–43. David Blagden, Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, 'Sea Powers, Continental Powers, and Balancing Theory [with Reply]', *International Security* 36 (2011): 190–202.

Sea Power

'That a Spirit of Commerce, and strength at Sea to protect it, are the most certain marks of the Greatness of Empire, deduced from an undeniable *Sorites*; That whoever Commands the Ocean, Commands the Trade of the World, and whoever Commands the Trade of the World, Commands the Riches of the World, and whoever is Master of That, Commands the World itself.'[44]

The most famous definition of sea power comes from John Evelyn's unfinished history of the just finished Anglo-Dutch Wars from 1674. In a text about the strengths of states, Francis Bacon (1561–1626) has already defined sea power half a century earlier. Bacon wrote that 'he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will […] the vantage of strength at sea is great […] and because the wealth of both Indies seems, in great part, but an accessory to the command of the seas.'[45] Bacon noted Cicero's adage '*Qui mare teneat, eum necesse esse rerum potiri*,'[46] which was used on Evelyn's title page, coming full circle. The intention of this paragraph is to show the interrelatedness of the 'command of the seas' or 'ocean' with the command of the trade and wealth. When early modern Europeans talked about sea power, they thought of one or both of these elements, i.e., the naval fleet and merchant marine,[47] as I show below.

There were many names for sea power at the time: sea power, dominion of the sea, seapower, command of the sea, and naval strength, to name just a few. It referred back to the

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[44] John Evelyn, *Navigation and Commerce, Their Original and Progress Containing a Succinct Account of Traffick in General* (London: Benj. Tooke, 1674), 15. Some, including the National Maritime Museum in London, wrongly ascribe the quote to Walter Raleigh. The latter only briefly discussed sea power in ancient history. Walter Raleigh, *The History of the World* (London: Walter Burre, 1614), 314, 360, 696.

[45] Francis Bacon, 'Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates', in *Essays, Civil and Moral*, ed. Charles W. Eliot (New York, 1909–14 [1625]), 11.

[46] '[…] whoever holds the sea is sure to be master.' Cic. Att. 10.8.

[47] This also includes fishing vessels, which played an important role in the early modern sea power. Therefore, under merchant or trade vessels, I understand any private or non-naval ship.

classical idea of 'thalassocracy' (θαλασσοκρατία) or 'rule of the sea'.[48] Already in the ancient Greece and Rome, they viewed certain states as having the exclusive control of the seas. The idea of the transfer of sea power or seapower had strong roots, as Eusebius already incorporated it in his universal history, giving the 'List of Thalassocracies' from Lydians to Aegina.[49] This idea of *translatio imperii* has been very influential ever since.

One of the most influential texts on sea power was written by Alfred Thayer Mahan. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783* (1890) had a big impact on the development of naval history.[50] Mahan recognized the general lack of historical knowledge of sea power. He started his book with 1660, 'when the sailing-ship era, with its distinctive features, had fairly begun.'[51] He never explicitly defined sea power, but in his view, it depended on the battlefleet as the key force and naval strategy, the focus of beating the main fleet of the enemy in open sea battle, and the restricted value of privateering.

Many have criticized Mahan's *magnum opus* ever since he published it. Usually, the critics focused on the fact that he overemphasized the influence of sea powers over land powers, and that his view of sea power was too limited for the early modern era. Cognizant of the role of technological changes and different types of naval warfare, Sir Julian Stafford Corbett presented *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. If Mahan's theory relied on the concentration of battlefleet in order to destroy the enemies' battlefleet in a decisive battle, Corbett's argument could be summarized as either securing control of the sea by destroying enemy warships or preventing the enemy from gaining control of the sea through a naval blockade.[52]

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[48] Thucydides I.143,20. Arnaldo Momigliano, 'Sea-Power in Greek Thought', *The Classical Review* 58 (1944): 1–7. For the use of ancient Greek models about sea power in the early modern era see Beatrice Heuser, 'Regina Maris and the Command of the Sea: The Sixteenth Century Origins of Modern Maritime Strategy', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40 (2017): 225–62.
[49] John Myres, 'On the 'List of Thalassocracies' in Eusebius', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 26 (1906): 84–130.
[50] He wanted to have similar influence as Clausewitz or Jomini had for land power in the nineteenth century. He wanted US to emulate Britain's past naval policies. Peter Karsten, 'The Nature of "Influence": Roosevelt, Mahan and the Concept of Sea Power', *American Quarterly* 23 (1971): 585–600.
[51] Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1890), vi. Robert Seager, *Alfred Thayer Mahan: the Man and His Letters* (Annapolis.: Naval Institute Press, 1977).
[52] Julian Stafford Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (London: Longmans, Green, 1911).

After World War II, there have been many books written about the sea power, because it had such an impact on the outcome of the war. This was both in the Pacific where the American battlefleets ultimately defeated the Japanese, and in the Atlantic where the Allies ensured the relatively safe transport of hundreds of thousands of merchant ships in convoys.[53] William Livezey's book on Mahan's theories became a classic in its own.[54] Admiral Sir Herbert William Richmond understood sea power as 'that form of national strength which enables its possessor to send his armies and commerce across those stretches of sea and ocean.'[55] Such military understanding of sea power was understandably influenced by the Second World War, as it focused on amphibious actions and sending armies across the sea.

In his book, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, Paul M. Kennedy explicitly challenged Mahan's view of the influence of sea power on British and international history. Kennedy wanted to encompass the wider national, international, economic, political, and strategical framework of sea power. British economic prosperity based on global trade and strong debt system were key for the rise of Royal Navy. However, Kennedy also recognized that there were many restrictions of the British sea power, even at its peak in the nineteenth century. He understood the limits of sea power by stating that 'command of the sea never implied a total possession of oceanic waters: this is both physically impossible and strategically unnecessary.'[56] Command of the sea implied the control of the routes to colonies and ports; more importantly still, it meant being able to prevent the passage to your enemies. Therefore, Kennedy, also building on Corbett's work, provided a more 'balanced' view of the influence of sea power in the international relations of the last 500 years.

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[53] Herbert Richmond, *The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 1558-1727* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953). E. B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, *Sea Power: A Naval History* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960).

[54] William E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947).

[55] Herbert W. Richmond, *Statesmen and Sea Power: Based on the Ford Lectures Delivered in the University of Oxford in the Michaelmas Term, 1943* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), ix.

[56] Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Allen Lane, 1976), 2. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987).

William Thompson and George Modelski used a quantitative method to comparatively 'rank' the navies since the Renaissance. This book came from the tradition of international relations, but it had a useful discussion on the intersection of geopolitics and sea power in relation to world-systems. The authors were also mindful of the economic and political background when discussing the statistical data. They saw the book's key goal as 'providing an empirical test for the validity of one perspective on international relations.'[57] This 'one perspective' was the theory of the long cycle of world politics.

The late and great Jan Glete also stressed the importance of strong economy for strong navies, trade and the costs of competing with other nations. Glete's seminal comparative study *Navies and Nations* was 'concerned with the growth in size of the state-owned navies, the production and technical development of warships and the balance of power at sea in the epoch of gun-armed warships powered by sails and oars.'[58] Even more broadly and globally, Fernand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein and others analyzed sea powers and their economies, especially how the centre of 'world-economy' moved from Amsterdam to London.[59]

Andrew Lambert recently underscored an important distinction between sea power and seapower. According to Lambert, sea power was any state or nation with a navy (Portugal, Spain, France), while seapowers also had a maritime culture and an inclusive political system. Lambert presented the transfer of seapower from Venice to the Netherlands and Britain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, respectively.[60] In my study, I focus on sea powers or states with strategic navies, although maritime culture proved desicive at times.

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[57] George Modelski, William R. Thompson, *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1988), xi.

[58] Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860*, 2 vols. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993), I, 3.

[59] Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century, Vol. III: The Perspective of the World* (London: William Collins Sons & Co., 1984), 89–385. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

[60] Andrew Lambert, *Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern World* (London: Yale University Press, 2019).

The building of sea power was tied to the economic consolidation of states and the newly established standing navies. In the early seventeenth century, the navy was one of the tools of the state building process, not just one of the functions of the already built and consolidated state.[61] Navies, like any state-controlled armed forces, were expected to protect against domestic insurgents, private raiders and foreign invasions. Statesmen wanted to build powerful fleets not only for strategic purposes, but also to use them as tools of foreign policy and instruments of prestige for domestic audiences.[62] This led to international conflicts and tensions that further solidified the fiscal-naval states at home. Paradoxically, this competition fostered vigilance and cooperation in an international alliance system.

The most powerful tool of sea power in the early modern period was the warship, i.e., the ship of the line or the Man-of-War. The literature often contains the phrase that 'warships were the most complex industrial products of the seventeenth century.'[63] In the mid-seventeenth century, the merchant vessels converted into warships eventually became obsolete. The so-called 'military revolution afloat' introduced the line-ahead battle tactics.[64] Sturdy state warships exchanged 'broadsides,' but they were seldom sunk in open battles; the ships were more likely to fall victim to storms, fire, reefs and shoals, than to cannon fire. There were other types of vessels used by navies, such as fireships,[65] frigates, ketches, yachts, but none of them defined sea power in early modern Europe as much as the warship.

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[61] Izidor Janžekovič, 'The Rise of State Navies in the Early Seventeenth Century: A Historiographical Study', *Journal for Maritime Research* 22 (2020): 183–208. Benjamin W. D. Redding, *The English and French Navies, 1500–1650: Expansion, Organisation and State-Building* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2022).

[62] David Davies, Alan James, Gijs Rommelse (eds.), *Ideologies of Western Naval Power, c. 1500–1815* (London: Routledge, 2019).

[63] Frank Fox, *Great Ships: The Battle Fleet of King Charles II* (Greenwich: Conway Maritime Press, 1980), 11. Angus Konstam, *Warships of the Anglo-Dutch Wars 1652–74* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011), 23.

[64] Palmer's concept of the 'military revolution afloat' has been contested and challenged. M. A. J. Palmer, 'The 'Military Revolution' Afloat: The Era of the Anglo-Dutch Wars and the Transition to Modern Warfare at Sea', *War in History* 4 (1997): 123–49. N. A. M. Rodger, 'From the 'military revolution' to the 'fiscal-naval state'.' *Journal for Maritime Research* 13 (2011): 119–128. J. F. Guilmartin, 'The Military Revolution in Warfare at Sea During the Early Modern Era: Technological Origins, Operational Outcomes and Strategic Consequences.' *Journal for Maritime Research* 13 (2011): 129–137. Gijs Rommelse, 'An Early Modern Naval Revolution? The Relationship between "Economic Reason of State" and Maritime Warfare', *Journal for Maritime Research* 13 (2011): 138–50.

[65] Peter Kirsch, *Fireship: The Terror Weapon of the Age of Sail* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2009).

In the era of sailing warships, state navies were compared based on the number of warships, their size and firepower. The notion that higher numbers of warships with larger guns match with stronger fleets was a persistent premise. There were several other unquantifiable factors, such as experience, leadership, weather,[66] training, morale, etc. Recently, Dagomar Degroot argued that even the changing climate during the Little Ice Age decisively influenced the outcome of the sea battles.[67] However, following the line-of-battle or line-ahead tactics, the fleet with more warships with more and heavier guns would win an open battle.[68] As the influential Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz stated, 'superiority of numbers admittedly is the most important factor in the outcome of an engagement.'[69]

Another factor overlooked by researchers when comparing the relative strength of the various fleets is the speed of warship construction. At the time, the Dutch generally built their (smaller) warships much faster than the English,[70] and the contemporaries knew this.[71] The Dutch could also initially build their vessels 40 to 50 per cent cheaper than the English could in the seventeenth century, because the Zuiderzee was the hub of timber trade in Europe.[72] In comparison to the already strong state navies in England and the Dutch Republic, the French fleet became a threat only by the Third Anglo-Dutch War, but it then had the numerically largest fleet until the end of the seventeenth century.

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[66] For the role of the weather in naval warfare see N. A. M. Rodger, 'Weather, Geography and Naval Power in the Age of Sail', *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 22 (1999): 178–200.

[67] Dagomar Degroot, ''Never Such Weather Known in These Seas': Climatic Fluctuations and the Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century, 1652–1674', *Environment and History* 20 (2014): 239–73. Dagomar Degroot, *The Frigid Golden Age: Climate Change, the Little Ice Age, and the Dutch Republic, 1560–1720* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

[68] N. A. M. Rodger, 'The Development of Broadside Gunnery, 1450–1650', *The Mariner's Mirror* 82 (1996): 301–24. R. E. J. Weber, 'The Introduction of the Single Line Ahead as a Battle Formation by the Dutch 1665–1666', *The Mariner's Mirror* 73 (1987): 5–19.

[69] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 194. The early modern Europeans also understood this basic rule, as Louis XIV's secretary, the Président Rose, stated that 'God is on the side of the big squadrons and the big battalions against the small ones, and the same for armies.' Bertrand Fonck, *Le Maréchal de Luxembourg et le commandement des armées sous Louis XIV* (Seyssel, 2014), 490.

[70] Konstam, *Warships of the Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 23–24. Andrew Lambert, *War at Sea in the Age of Sail* (London: Cassell, 2000), 34–38.

[71] Roger Coke, *England's Improvements in two parts* (London: Henry Brome, 1675), unpaginated Preface, 81–82.

[72] R. W. Unger, *Dutch Shipbuilding before 1800* (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1978), 36–40.

Figure 3. Comparison of the English and Dutch warships with relatively similar firepower, as depicted by Willem van de Velde the Elder. The 80-gun first-rate three-decker *Royal Charles* (above), formerly *Naseby*, and the 72-gun warship *Eendracht* (below). The former destroyed the latter during the Battle of Lowestoft in 1665, while the Dutch took *Royal Charles* during the Raid on the Medway in 1667.

Another important factor was the weight of the guns' shot. In general, the more guns a ship had, the more heavy guns it had.[73] Every warship had a variety of calibres, but in the interest of stability, the largest guns had to be in the lower decks. The English had more and larger guns with heavier shots than the Dutch. Therefore, the English warships generally fired heavier broadsides than the Dutch. However, because the heavier English warships had larger guns, the lowest deck and gunports were closer to the waterline. Thus, even in moderate winds, the largest guns on the lee side were useless.[74] In the Dutch ships, on the other hand, the lower gun decks and gunports were slightly higher above the waterline, which was sufficient to allow them to be used in less agreeable weather.[75] Moreover, because the larger guns were more difficult to handle and slower to load, the Dutch had a slightly higher rate of fire.

In the second half of the seventeenth century, warships below a certain tonnage gradually became too weak to withstand the firing of big guns and too light to hold enough heavy guns to respond efficiently. As the analysis of ship lists shows, there was an increase in the size and minimum number of guns that warships had to have in order to be fit for combat. Thus, any comparative model needs to take into account this increase in the number of guns for the battleworthy warships. For instance, Modelski and Thompson counted all ships with guns until 1655, only ships with more than 30 guns until 1670, only those with more than 40 guns until 1690, and only those with more than 50 guns afterwards.[76]

However, based on my analysis of ship lists and international treaties, I adjusted this model to better reflect the reality. I counted all ships in the First Anglo-Dutch War in the 1650s, when the line of battle was gradually introduced, and battles often ended in a messy *mêlée*.[77]

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[73] J. D. Davies, *Pepys's Navy: Ships, Men & Warfare, 1649–1689* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2008).

[74] Carlo M. Cipolla, *Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion, 1400–1700* (London: Collins, 1965), 36–41. Lambert, *War at Sea*, 41.

[75] Konstam, *Warships of the Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 31–32.

[76] Modelski, Thompson, *Seapower in Global Politics*, 50–72.

[77] Nota bene, I call the 'warships' in the First Anglo-Dutch War 'ships with guns', because many were confiscated and converted merchant ships, especially in the Dutch fleet. In the 1660s, when both fleets understood and followed the line-ahead tactic, there was almost no impressed merchantmen.

Thereafter and until 1667, I only counted warships with more than 30 guns. Then, from 1668 to 1672, based on the 1668 Triple Alliance treaty, only warships with more than 36 guns. By 1673, this jumped to only warships with more than 42 guns. Obviously, they realized during the first year of the Third Anglo-Dutch War that they needed bigger warships with more guns. The same trend continued after that, until the warship needed at least 50 guns to be worthy to stand in the line of battle.[78] Indeed, the tendency towards bigger warships was apparent and pan-European in the seventeenth century.

	1648–1654	1655–1667	1668–1672	1673–1688	1689–1713
Minimum Number of Guns per Battleworthy Warship	all ships with guns	30	36	42	50

Table 1. The number of guns needed for warships to be battleworthy.

Naval warfare was a battle of attrition, both tactically and strategically. Every battle depended on combatants taking out or eliminating as many of the enemies' ships, guns, and seamen as possible, and protecting their own. The more seamen and guns were eliminated on a warship, the less effectively such warship could fight back. It eventually had to sail away or be towed away, if its rigging was damaged and it had not sunk before that.[79] Moreover, naval warfare was limited strategically by the lack of states' funds, in both materiel and manpower. In the three Anglo-Dutch Wars, due to the high financial costs of maintaining fleets, the open sea battles always took place within the first two campaign seasons, so neither nation could rely on building new warships and using them during the ongoing conflict.

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[78] This model is by no means perfect, as there are several minor divergences. It is used only as a guideline.
[79] Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power*, 1–24. Richard Harding, *Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650–1830* (London: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 37–38. Lambert, *War at Sea in the Age of Sail*, 41–43.

The Balance of Sea Power

Yet, despite the balance of power having been analyzed in depth and despite the pervasiveness of thinking about sea power, the two have so far not been sufficiently linked to consider the balance of sea power in the early modern era. There have been a few studies that reflect on the 'balance of sea power' in the twentieth century, usually focusing on the interwar international treaties that tried to bring naval parity and regulation, such as the Washington Naval Treaty or the Five-Power Treaty of 1922, the First London Naval Treaty of 1930, and the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936.[80] For instance, the Washington Naval Treaty numerically assessed the capabilities and strength of the five most powerful (Allied) sea powers (United Kingdom, United States, Japan, France, Italy).[81] It determined their mutual strength ratios based on the different classes of ships and their tonnage as 5:5:3:1.75:1.75, respectively.[82] Below I show how the early modern Anglo-Dutch alliance treaties tried to attain their mutual strength ratios based on their sea power in a similar vein.

However, there is no subfield focusing on the balance of sea power in the early modern era. This seems rather strange, as the tendency toward balance encouraged early modern sea power states to cooperate and remain vigilant. States struggled to reach or breach the balance by building up their own naval forces, destroying the naval forces of their enemies, and allying

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[80] John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan (eds.), *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain And America in the Twentieth Century* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989). Geoffrey Till (ed.), *Seapower: Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 1994). Rolf Hobson, *Imperialism at Sea: Naval Strategic Thought, the Ideology of Sea Power, and the Tirpitz Plan, 1875–1914* (Leiden: Brill, 2021). Today, the South China Sea is a new area for the balance-of-sea-power strategies between the Chinese navy and the only truly global blue-water navy in the world today, the American navy. David Gompert, *Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013).

[81] This is not to say that the outcome was unanimously accepted or without any protests. Perhaps the most glaring ommission from the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty was Russia or later the Soviet Union, which was still embroiled in the brutal Russian Civil War (1917–23). However, in 1924, at the Rome disarmament conference for the non-signatory states, the Soviet Union argued that it had the right to be on par with the fleets of the UK and the US. David Woodward, *The Russians at Sea* (London: William Kimber, 1965), 16.

[82] Not everyone was happy with the ratio, especially the British, who did not feel that the American navy was on par with the Royal Navy; indeed, the American navy would be on par and surpass the British only during the Second World War. J. R. Ferris, '"It is our business in the navy to command the seas": The Last Decade of British Maritime Supremacy, 1919–1929', in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy (eds.), *Far-Flung Lines: Studies in Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurma* (London: Routledge, 1997), 124–170.

with the naval forces of other sea powers. Because naval armed forces became essential features of power, the contemporaries compared and measured fleets in numerical terms. Often, when this was unattainable, the sea powers resorted to privateering,[83] which was a low-risk and potentially high-reward investment for the states; it was not low-risk for the privateers. While my focus is on the naval engagements and international discourse related to them, I also provide the key numbers related to the number of seized ships.

The important question is how or if at all the practice and the theory of the balance of power applied to international waters. How did the states measure each other's powers at sea? How did the states react to the perceived increase or decrease of other sea powers? I employ a three-level methodology. Firstly, I am interested in the 'actual' sea power or, much better said, its materiality as well as its perceived state (based on ship lists). Secondly, I study the practical and political strategies of reaching or keeping the balance (international treaties and diplomatic correspondence). Thirdly, I analyse the development of the balance-of-sea-power idea in the legal and theoretical sphere (pamphlets and texts by jurists, historians, and philosophers).

Ship lists have been studied in various countries and for various navies, yet little has been done comparatively across states and navies to compare them.[84] The methodology for comparing sea powers has not yet been well established, so comparing different types of sources, such as ship lists, international treaties, and pamphlets, to see an interdependence between such texts may result in some interesting findings. There were several things that early modern Europeans measured relating to warships, such as number of warships, guns, seamen, etc. The statesmen were aware that foreign agents and 'intelligencers' were attentive to the writing and publication of such texts, and this influenced the texts themselves.

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[83] Donald Petrie, *The Prize Game: Lawful Looting on the High Seas in the Days of Fighting Sail* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999). Virginia W. Lunsford, *Piracy and Privateering in the Golden Age Netherlands* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). N. A. M. Rodger, 'The Law and Language of Private Naval Warfare', *The Mariner's Mirror* 100 (2014): 5–16.

[84] Modelski, Thompson, *Seapower in Global Politics*. Glete, *Navies and Nations*.

However, for the early modern era, it is impossible to provide detailed numerical data with statistical certainty and one can expect necessarily approximate results. The method is mainly comparative, i.e., I contrast and examine the navies of the three strongest European sea powers in the seventeenth century comparatively, i.e., England, France and the Dutch Republic. France with around 20 million inhabitants was the largest country in early modern Europe, excluding the Ottoman Empire. France had almost the double population of both England with about 5.5 million and the Netherlands with little less than 2 million people. Although my focus is on the sea powers of England, France and the 'Netherlands,' the demography also played an important role in assessing each other's strengths.

		1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1750	1800
1	Scandinavia	2,500	1,400	1,500	2,400	2,900	3,600	5,250
2	England (Wales)	4,500	2,700	3,500	4,450	5,450	6,300	9,250
3	Scotland	1,000	700	800	1,000	1,200	1,260	1,630
4	Ireland	1,400	700	800	1,000	1,900	3,120	5,200
5	Netherlands	800	600	950	1,500	1,950	1,950	2,100
6	Belgium	1,400	1,200	1,300	1,300	1,900	2,300	2,900
7	France	16,000	12,000	15,000	18,500	21,500	24,600	29,000
8	Italy	12,500	8,000	9,000	13,300	13,500	15,500	18,100
9	Spain	5,500	4,500	5,000	6,800	7,400	9,300	10,500
10	Portugal	1,300	1,050	1,200	1,300	2,000	2,600	2,900
11	Switzerland	800	500	800	1,000	1,200	1,300	1,700
12	Austria (Hungary)	10,000	9,000	11,500	12,800	15,500	18,300	24,300
13	Germany	13,000	8,000	11,000	16,200	14,100	17,500	24,500
14	Poland	2,000	1,500	2,000	2,500	2,800	3,700	4,300
15	Balkans	6,000	5,000	5,500	7,000	8,550	9,900	12,000
16	Russia (European)	15,000	11,000	15,000	16,000	13,000	22,000	35,000
	EUROPE	93,700	67,850	84,850	107,050	114,850	143,230	188,630

Table 2. Europe's population from 1300 to 1800 (my emphasis).[85]

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[85] Anne McCants, 'Historical Demography', in Hamish Scott (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Early Modern European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 119–44, at 125.

To ask the right questions and see what the sources can tell us in a comparative manner across Europe, one has to consider different types of sources in such an interdisciplinary study. The main 'numerical' written sources to ascertain the strength of navies in early modern Europe were ship lists. Ship lists provide numerical data about warships of states and give quantitative clues on the relative strength of sea powers and their relative status. Tonnage, armament (guns) and crew were usually, but not always, given.[86] Admiralties specified the size of warships, the strength of their hulls, and the position of gun batteries on one, two or three decks.[87] The one constant and the thing that most impressed the contemporaries was the number of guns on warship. Thus, it is also my primary focus in assessing sea power.

However, there are limits. Since not all states had or have regular ship lists, a year over year analysis is impossible. For example, the *Ministerie van Marine*, which held the archives of the five Dutch admiralties, caught fire on 8 January 1844, so most of the Dutch naval sources are lost. Moreover, different states had different measurement units and different (rate) systems of listing warships, so I use the 'universal' numerical comparisons. Sea powers deflated and inflated the seize of their navies in order to be perceived as less or more strong, based on the specific strategy or goal. It was also a matter of prestige and representation, because the perception of strength was often as important as the real strength.[88] Nevertheless, political leaders were aware of the real and relative strengths of other sea powers.

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[86] Glete, *Navies and Nations*, 93–100. R. C. Anderson, *Lists of Men-of-War, 1650–1700; Part I: English Ships, 1649–1702* (London: Society for Nautical Research, 1966). Hj. Börjeson, P. Holck, H. Szymanski, W. Vogel, *Lists of Men-of-War 1650–1700; Part III: Swedish Ships, Danish-Norwegian Ships, German Ships* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1936). J. J. Colledge, Ben Warlow. *Ships of the Royal Navy: The Complete Record of All Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy from the 15th Century to the Present* (London: Chatham, 2006). Alain Demerliac, *La Marine de Louis XIV: nomenclature des vaisseaux du Roi-soleil de 1661 à 1715* (Nice: Omega, 1992). Alain Demerliac, *La Marine de Louis XV: nomenclature des navires français de 1715 à 1774* (Nice: Omega, 1995). Pierre Le Conte, *Lists of Men-of-War 1650–1700; Part II: French ships, 1648–1700* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1935). A. Vreugdenhil, *Lists of Men-of-War, 1650–1700; Part IV: Ships of the United Netherlands, 1648–1702* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1938).

[87] In very rare cases, ships had a 'fourth deck', like the Spanish warship *Nuestra Señora de la Santísima Trinidad*. Rif Winfield, John M. Tredrea, Enrique García-Torralba Pérez, Manuel Blasco Felip, *Spanish Warships in the Age of Sail 1700—1860: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2023).

[88] Cf. the international 'competition' to have the largest warship in the first half of the seventeenth century. B. W. D. Redding, 'A Ship 'For Which Great Neptune Raves': The Sovereign of the Seas, la Couronne and seventeenth-century international competition over warship design.' *The Mariner's Mirror* 104 (2018): 402–422.

I also analysed the relevant diplomatic correspondence and international treaties to see the influence of sea power on the strategies of states and alliances. I read all the major European international treaties from 1648 to 1713.[89] In addition to writing diaries and memoirs, the key political leaders, diplomats and admirals maintained an impressive correspondence with each other. It would be impossible to cover all of it in entirety in one lifetime, so I focused on the relevant letters discussing naval and international affairs. International communication at the time was multi-lingual, from Latin and Dutch to French and English, among many other languages. Early modern diplomatic history has come a long way and it now also incorporates intelligencers, intermediary agents, and ambassadresses.[90]

I also scrutinized the main pamphlets and philosophical tracts in the three countries from 1648 to 1713. The political strategies of reaching or breaching the balance can be better understood by knowing the discourse behind the propaganda texts that were usually written just before the war and exaggerated opponents' sea power to heighten the perception of threat. The legal and philosophical theories were influenced by the realities and practicalities of the first two levels. The field of international law and, more specifically, maritime law was developing.[91] The balance-of-sea-power idea is contrasted with other key ideas in international law at the time, such as preventive and just war, the rights of neutral states, and free trade.

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[89] My main source for the international treaties was Clive Parry (ed.), *The Consolidated Treaty Series*, 243 vols. (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1969–1980), I–XXIX. If not specifically stated, the translations from Latin, French, German, Italian, and Spanish are my own. See also Christian L. Wiktor, *Multilateral Treaty Calendar, 1648–1995* (The Hague, M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1998).

[90] Jan Hennings, Tracey A. Sowerby (eds.), *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World, ca. 1410–1800* (London, New York: Routledge, 2017). Tracey A. Sowerby, 'Early Modern Diplomatic History', *History Compass* 9 (2016): 441–56. Christine Isom-Verhaaren, 'Shifting identities: foreign state servants in France and the Ottoman empire', *Journal of Early Modern History* 8 (2004): 109–34.

[91] Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, trans. G. L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press, 2003). Anthony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Stéphane Beaulac, *The Power of Language in theMaking of International Law: The Word 'Sovereignty' in Bodin and Vattel and the Myth of Westphalia* (Leiden: Brill, 2004). Wilhelm G. Grewe, *The Epochs of International Law*, rev. and trans. Michael Byers (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000). Martti Koskenniemi, 'International Law and raison d'e´tat: Rethinking the Prehistory of International Law', in Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (eds.), *The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 297–339. Alexander Orakhelashvili, 'The Idea of European International Law', *European Journal of International Law* 17 (2006): 315–47.

I analyzed the three sea powers between the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Peace of Utrecht (1713) by focusing on three seminal conflicts: the Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652–1674), the War of the Grand Alliance (1688–1697), and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714).[92] The Anglo-Dutch Wars between the two key sea powers and seapowers at the time, England and the Dutch Republic, were the key naval and commercial confrontation in early modern Europe. The second and third examples are from the end of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the War of the Grand Alliance (1688–1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14). Both conflicts were mostly fought on the European continent, so I also include the basic information on the military operations to make it abundantly clear that naval affairs were not happening in vacuum. Moreover, the close and personal ties between political leaders and mercantilist trade meant that the rivalry was exported across the world.

The early modern balance of sea power is discerned through a three-level analysis, ranging from the most concrete and material (shipwrecks) to the most abstract (theoretical texts). The first level looks at the actual and perceived numerical balance by comparing the number of warships and guns for the major sea battles.[93] The second level deals with the practical and political balance by studying international treaties and diplomatic writing between the main naval states. The third level presents the discursive, philosophical and juristic balance by unearthing the main ideas and theories about the balance of sea power. Clearly, all three are interconnected, so this division should serve solely as a schematic model.

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[92] Nota bene, the wars are named differently in different countries and languages. For example, the Anglo-Dutch Wars are also called 'the English Sea Wars' (*Engelse zeeoorlogen*) in Dutch. The same wars have many different names in the same language. For instance, the War of the Grand Alliance is also known as the Nine Years' War, because of obvious reasons. As a rule, I used the most commonly used English expressions for all wars and major battles. Furthermore, the dates for wars in literature often do not align, because different countries entered the wars at different times or years. For example, the War of the Spanish Succesion is often dated between 1702 and 1713, when Britain and the Dutch Republic were fighting with France and Spain. However, Imperial forces fought the war from 1701 to 1714. All the dates in the dissertation are NS, except if explicitly stated otherwise.

[93] The tables are based on the ship lists in Rif Winfield, *British Warships in the Age of Sail 1603–1714: Designs, Construction, Careers and Fates* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2009). James Bender, *Dutch Warships in the Age of Sail 1600–1714: Designs, Construction, Careers and Fates* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2014). Rif Winfield, Stephen S. Roberts, *French Warships in the Age of Sail 1626–1786: Designs, Construction, Careers and Fates* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2017).

To exemplify the interconnectedness of the three levels, the case of Santa Catarina is helpful. In 1603, off Singapore, a large 1500-ton Portuguese merchant ship *Santa Catarina* was seized by the three ships of the newly established Dutch East India Company (VOC). The sales from the rich prize were so high that they increased VOC's capital by more than 50%. Understandably, the Portuguese wanted the ship and the cargo back, so the issue came in front of the court in The Hague. To justify their actions and the 'lawful prize', the VOC hired a young jurist, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), who wrote *De Jure Praedae* (1604), and then anonymously published the part of it as *Mare Liberum* (1609).[94]

Figure 4. A Dutch illustration of the capture of Santa Catarina in February 1603 by three VOC ships in the Strait of Malacca or the Singapore Straits.[95]

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[94] Martine Julia Van Ittersum, 'Hugo Grotius in Context: Van Heemskerck's Capture of the 'Santa Catarina' and Its Justification in 'De Jure Praedae' (1604–1606).' *Asian Journal of Social Science* 31 (2003): 511–548. Peter Borschberg, *Hugo Grotius, the Portuguese and Free Trade in the East Indies* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011). Peter Borschberg, 'The Seizure of the Santa Catarina off Singapore: The Portuguese Empire in Asia, VOC Politics and the Origins of the Dutch-Johor Alliance (1602–c. 1616)', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 33 (2002): 31–62. The seizure of the Santa Catarina was one of the key moments for the international relations in the early modern era, and was often referenced in later diplomatic correspondence and theoretical writings.

[95] Anon., *Corte ende sekere beschrijvinghe van 't veroveren der rijcke ende gheweldige krake, comende uytet gheweste van China, door den Admirael Jacobus Heemskercke* (Middelburg: Richard Schilders, 1604).

To approach it with my three-level analysis, I would check: 1. the ship lists with cargo and armaments of Santa Catarina and the three VOC ships; 2. the diplomatic correspondence and potential treaties that preceded and followed the seizure of the ship; 3. the intellectual texts and ideas by Hugo Grotius and the reactions of other early modern thinkers. This particular case and the texts that were produced surrounding it had a major impact on the maritime law in the early modern era. Another interesting aspect to discern is whether the thinking about sea power was influenced more from below or above, i.e., more from seamen and captains or philosophers and jurists.[96]

I start the study with the Peace of Westphalia, since this was the period of 'continental and maritime balance,' according to Hauterive. To ascertain the maritime, commercial and colonial conflict, one has to dig deeper in the background of the 'jealousy of trade.' Then, I delve into the key maritime conflict of the early modern era, the Anglo-Dutch Wars. By the Third Anglo-Dutch War and the 1670s, France became the main threat on the continent, which also affected its sea power. Thus, in the War of the Grand Alliance and the War of the Spanish Succession, due to the majority fighting happening on land and shifting priorities, France gradually lost its naval edge. I argue that attaining and maintaining the balance of sea power in the seventeenth century was not just an abstract idea, but also an interactive process.

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[96] Knowledge production in the early modern era was not limited to 'men of science,' but included a large network of merchants, seamen, missionaries, soldiers, etc. Different agendas have to be recognized in different 'contact zones.' Kapil Raj, *Relocating Modern Science: Circulation and the Construction of Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650–1900* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Harold J. Cook, *Matters of Exchange: Commerce, Medicine, and Science in the Dutch Golden Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). John Paul Ghobrial, *The Whispers of Cities: Information Flows in Istanbul, London, and Paris in the Age of William Trumbull* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Joad Raymond, Noah Moxham (eds.), *News Networks in Early Modern Europe* (Boston, Leiden: Brill, 2016).

The Peace of Westphalia and the Jealousy of Trade

'In line with the judgment of all scholars of international law, the Treaty of Westphalia in the mid-seventeenth century founded the international law of the modern era.'[97]

Hauterive referenced the Peace of Westphalia in his infamous manifesto as the pinnacle of harmonious international relations in Europe. He claimed that 'this treaty assigned the place to each [state] in the great political balance of Europe.'[98] Hauterive was far from first or last to cite the Peace of Westphalia as the defining treaty of their own or a preceding era – practically every major post-1648 treaty referred back to the Peace of Westphalia. As for scholars of international law, the Peace of Westphalia indeed became a significant point in the history of international relations, and even Jean-Jacques Rousseau praised it before Hauterive.[99]

Even today, the Peace of Westphalia holds a special place in the history of international law. Several collections of international treaties start with Westphalia. The general editor of the massive 243-volumes series, Clive Parry, stated in the Preface of the first volume that 1648 was 'classically regarded as the date of the foundation of the modern system of States.'[100] In 1948, 300 years after it had been concluded and as the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* was accepted, the Treaty of Westphalia was described as the foundation of the balance-of-power idea in Europe and as 'the first great European or world charter.'[101]

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[97] '*Au jugement de tous les publicistes, le traité de Westphalie fonda, au milieu du dix-septième siècle, le droit public des tems modernes.*' Hauterive, *De l'état de la France*, 3. I translated the word '*publicistes*' here in its archaic meaning as scholars of public or international law, based on the context of the writing. The latter, meaning *le droit public*, I translated as international law, again based on the context of his writing. Jeremy Bentham developed the phrase *international law* in the 1780s. Hidemi Suganami, 'A Note on the Origin of the Word "International",' *British Journal of International Studies* 4 (1978): 226–32. David Armitage, 'Globalizing Jeremy Bentham,' *History of Political Thought* 32 (2011): 63–82.

[98] Hauterive, *De l'état de la France*, 3-4.

[99] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe and the State of War*, trans. C. E. Vaughan (London: Constable and Company Limited, 1917), 55.

[100] Parry (ed.), *The Consolidated Treaty Series, 1648–1918*.

[101] Leo Gross, 'The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948,' *The American Journal of International Law* 42 (1948): 20–41, 20. Vagts, Vagts. 'The Balance of Power in International Law', 560. Evan Luard, *The Balance of Power: the System of International Relations, 1648–1815* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992). Klaus Malettke, *Hegemonie –*

However, since one of Hauterive's key goals was to expose the 'decline of international law' and the destruction of the maritime balance after 1648, he wanted to show how the English attained their domination at sea. Hauterive argued that before the Peace of Westphalia, 'these novelties [advantages of sea trade] were still in the future,' and 'the politics did not see the system of Sea to be of general interest; it was neither a subject of discord nor an object of ambition. All the sea powers of Europe, with the exception of England, participated in the long negotiations for the important treaty of 1648, and nothing pertaining to the maritime interests was discussed.' Hauterive concluded that the absence of England showed that 'at that time, the politics of the Continent was everything, and the system of Sea nothing.'[102]

The affairs of sea powers (*les puissances maritimes*) were indeed not the primary focus of the two main Treaties of Westphalia, Treaty of Münster and Treaty of Osnabrück, signed on 24 October 1648. This should not be surprising as the treaties mostly dealt with the territorial and religious affairs in the Holy Roman Empire. Yet, the sea is explicitly mentioned in both treaties in relation to free trade and navigation. It was stated that 'there shall be an entire Liberty and Freedom of Commerce, and a free and safe Passage thro all Places by Sea and Land.'[103] This, again, went back to the long tradition of free trade being protected by the law of nature, which was for instance already acknowledged in Magna Carta.[104]

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multipolares System – Gleichgewicht: 1648/1659–1713/14 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2012). For a more critical approach towards the Peace of Westphalia see Derek Croxton, 'The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,' *The International History Review* 21 (1999): 569–591. Andreas Osiander, 'Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,' *International Organization* 55 (2001): 251–287. Sebastian Schmidt, 'To Order the Minds of Scholars: The Discourse of the Peace of Westphalia in International Relations Literature,' *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 601–623.

[102] '[…] *suffit pour prouver que dans ce tems la politique continentale était tout, et le système maritime rien*.' Hauterive, *De l'état de la France*, 24–25.

[103] '[…] *ut plena sit commerciorum libertas et transitus ubique locorum terra marique tutus adeoque*.' IPO, IX/2. IPM, 68. The project *Acta Pacis Westphalicae* digitised the treaties (in original Latin and various translations), instructions, protocols and correspondences related to the Westphalian Congress and the Peace of Westphalia: http://www.pax-westphalica.de/index.html (15 December 2023). I used the Latin originals from 24 October 1648 and the English translations from 1713 (IPO) and 1710 (IPM).

[104] Article 41 of the Magna Carta, which was slowly gaining its mythical status in the seventeenth century, stated: 'All merchants are to be safe and secure in leaving England and entering England, and in staying and travelling in England, both by land and by water, to buy and sell free from all maletotes by the ancient and rightful customs, except, in time of war, such as come from an enemy country.' J. C. Holt, *Magna Carta*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 388–389.

Any text on early modern international law has to reference the 'father of international law,' Hugo Grotius.[105] Yet, one of the defining events in the history of the balance of sea power happened much before his time. After Christopher Columbus returned to Spain in 1493, Pope Alexander VI issued the so-called Bulls of Donation, dividing the newly discovered lands and world into two halves between Portugal and Spain. Although the extent of sovereignty given was later disputed, in *Dudum siquidem*, the Pope granted 'full and free power, authority, and jurisdiction of every kind' over 'all islands and mainlands whatsoever.'[106] The papal bulls also explicitly excluded other (Christian) states from going to or trading in those places. The bulls formed a basis for the Treaty of Tordesillas less than a year later, in 1494.[107]

Figure 5. The demarcation lines of the Treaties of Tordesillas (1494) and Zaragoza (1529), based on the Papal Bulls of 1493. The attentive observer observes that even these lines were not followed religiously, since Spain seized the Philippines.

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[105] Maurice Bourquin, 'Grotius est-il le père du droit des gens?', in idem, *Grandes figures et grandes oeuvres juridiques* (Geneva, 1948), 77–99. Wilhelm G. Grewe, 'Grotius – Vater der Völkerrechts?', *Der Staat* 23 (1984): 161–78. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, Adam Roberts (eds.), *Hugo Grotius and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

[106] Frances G. Davenport, Charles Oscar Paullin (eds.), *European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and Its Dependencies* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1929), 79–83.

[107] Davenport, Paullin (eds.), *European Treaties*, 84–100. In 1529, the Treaty of Zaragoza extended the division to cover also the Eastern Hemisphere. Ibid., 169–198.

These bulls and treaties perfectly epitomize the transition from the medieval 'spiritual' approach to the (early) modern inter-state way of solving disputes.[108] Portugal and Spain more or less respected the Pope's demarcation, since it also benefited them. However, England, France and later the Dutch Republic ignored it,[109] even before the Reformation further challenged the Pope's temporal power. Among other things, Grotius attacked these papal donations. According to him, 'following the opinion of all men of sound judgment, it is sufficiently well recognized that the Pope is not the temporal lord of the earth, and certainly not of the sea.' Moreover, 'it is also a fact universally recognized that the Pope has no authority to commit acts repugnant to the law of nature.'[110]

It is exactly to nature and the law of nature that Grotius relied when establishing *mare liberum*. No sovereign before the Iberian monarchs in the late fifteenth century ever tried to claim ownership of high seas, effectively establishing *mare clausum*, because it seemed impossible or unnatural to hold it. Perhaps the most famous comparison Grotius made was with the air. He argued that air 'is not susceptible of occupation; and second its common use is destined for all men. For the same reasons the sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries.'[111]

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[108] Simon P. Kennedy, *Reforming the Law of Nature: The Secularisation of Political Thought, 1532–1682* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2022).

[109] John Horace Parry, *The Age of Reconnaissance: Discovery, Exploration, and Settlement, 1450–1650* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1981). Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Gabriel Paquette, *The European Seaborne Empires: From the Thirty Years' War to the Age of Revolutions* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2019), 61–76.

[110] Hugo Grotius, *De jure praedae commentarius* (The Hague, 1868 [1604]). Anon. [Hugo Grotius], *Mare Liberum sive de iure quod Batavis competit ad Indicana commercia dissertation* (Leiden, 1609). Hugo Grotius, *The Freedom of the Seas*, trans. Ralph Van Deman Magoffin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1916), 45–46. This was the first published English translation of Grotius's influential treatise. However, already in the early 1610s, the promoter of English colonization of North America Richard Hakluyt translated the book, though it remained in manuscript form until 2004. Hugo Grotius, *The Free Sea*, trans. Richard Hakluyt, ed. David Armitage (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 2004). On the deeper foundations of the law of nations and the law of nature see Benedict Kingsbury, Benjamin Straumann (eds.), *The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Law of Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

[111] Grotius, *The Freedom of the Seas*, 28. Cornelius F. Murphy, 'The Grotian Vision of World Order', *American Journal of International Law* 76 (1982): 477–498.

Grotius had put free trade and navigation at the center of international law. He argued that 'I shall base my argument on the following most specific and unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Nations, called a primary rule or first principle, the spirit of which is self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it.'[112] Grotius also defended the practice of free trade as one of the key rules of international law in his *opus magnum*, *De Jure belli ac pacis libri tres* (1625). He went beyond the high seas and argued that even 'Lands, Rivers, and such parts of the Sea as are held by any Prince or People in propriety, ought to lye open and free to all such as have occasion to pass over them upon any just and lawful cause.'[113] Thus, excluding armies, navies, and armed forces in general, Grotius propagated the idea of free trade and free navigation.

As shown above, Grotius was not just an objective jurist writing on free trade and free navigation, but he was also an ardent advocate. He was hired by the Dutch East India Company and served the policies of States General in his early career, before he had to unceremoniously escape from Loevestein Castle in a book chest in 1621. Recently, Grotius has justly been recognised as a propagandist writer who defended the Dutch colonial and imperial interests.[114] However, this should not mean that other writers and jurists were any less conflicted in the politics of their states. In this battle of minds, the key question to ask is *cui bono*, who stands to benefit. In the case of Grotius, the Dutch East India Company wanted to continue trading and raiding in the *Portuguese* East Indies. Thus, the booklet was revised by Grotius and published in April 1609, just as the Twelve Years' Truce was successfully concluded.[115]

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[112] Grotius, *The Freedom of the Seas*, 7.

[113] Hugo Grotius, *His Three Books Treating of the Rights of War & Peace*, trans. William Evans (London: Thomas Basset, 1682), 83.

[114] Peter Borschberg, 'Hugo Grotius' Theory of Trans-Oceanic Trade Regulation: Revisiting Mare Liberum (1609),' *Itinerario* 29 (2005): 31–53. Eric Wilson, 'Erasing the Corporate Sovereign, Inter-Textuality and an Alternative Explanation for the Publication of Hugo Grotius' Mare Liberum (1609),' *Itinerario* 30 (2006): 78–103.

[115] Martine Julia van Ittersum, 'Preparing Mare Liberum for the Press: Hugo Grotius' Rewriting of Chapter 12 of De iure praedae in November-December 1608,' in Hans Blom (ed.), *Property, Piracy and Punishment: Hugo Grotius on War and Booty in De iure praedae* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 246–280.

Even before Grotius published his book anonymously, the States of Holland on 15 March 1608 endorsed an unofficial proclamation, obliging themselves never 'in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, withdraw, surrender, or renounce the freedom of the seas, everywhere and in all regions of the world.'[116] This quickly became their open policy, as the States General publicly declared in 1645 that 'the existence, welfare and reputation of the State consists in navigation and maritime trade.'[117] Willem Usselincx, the father of the Dutch West India Company (WIC), likewise noted that according to '*Iure gentium*,' all nations have the 'freedoms & priviledges of Trading and Traffiquing, whereof without all doubt the free use and benefit of the Sea, of the aire, and of traffick throughout all the world.'[118]

Although these texts and declarations primarily targeted Portugal, in personal union with Spain from 1580 to 1640, they were to prove a backdrop to future tensions with England and France. At the time, England and the Dutch Republic were still (Protestant) allies, and in 1596 even France joined this Triple Alliance against Spain. Among other things, the Dutch helped the English defeat the Spanish Armada in 1588, and Elizabeth I sent an army to fight on the Dutch side against Spain in August 1585 to prevent the fall of Antwerp.[119] The English reinforcements were too late, because Antwerp fell to the Spanish forces on 17 August 1585. Nonetheless, the Dutch blocked the River Scheldt, prevented any international trade to Antwerp and channelled it to Amsterdam. The maintenance of this blockade proved to be one of the neuralgic subjects for the Dutch Republic and Europe in the next couple of centuries.[120]

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[116] Ram Prakash Anand, *Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea: History of International Law Revisited* (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1983), 96.

[117] C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire: 1600–1800* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 103.

[118] Willem Usselincx, *Bedenckinghen over den staet vande Vereenichde Nederlanden* (Amsterdam: s.n., 1608). Willem Usselincx, *More Excellent Observations of the Estate and Affaires of Holland. In a Discourse, Shewing How Necessarie and Convenient It Is* (London: Nicholas Bourne, Thomas Archer, 1622), 2–3.

[119] Charles Wilson, *Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1970). Paul Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars: War, Government and Society in Tudor England, 1544–1604* (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2003). Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker, *Armada: The Spanish Enterprise and England's Deliverance in 1588* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2023).

[120] Frits Doeleman, 'Zeggenschap op de Honte', *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis* 43 (1975): 24–43. Alain Wijffels, 'Flanders and the Scheldt Question: A Mirror of the Law of International Relations and its Actors', *Sartoniana* 15 (2002): 213–280.

The conflict on the high seas was one of the key elements of the Eighty Years' War or the Dutch Revolt (1568–1648), which ultimately tipped the balance in the Dutch favour. Spain was the most powerful sea power in the sixteenth century, so the contemporary Europeans were surprised to see the Dutch winning the major sea battles, like the Battle of Gibraltar in 1607, and gaining the control of the seas by the early seventeenth century. Moreover, in 1639, during the Battle of the Downs, the Dutch fleet under Admiral Maarten Tromp (1598–1653) decisively defeated the sixth and final Spanish Armada under Admiral Antonio de Oquendo.[121] This strengthened the Dutch naval supremacy, and removed any serious Spanish threat from the sea.

Since there was no clear distinction between the combatants and civilians at the time, privateering or seizing the enemy merchant ships was an acceptable *modus operandi* during war. Practically every major sea power has a national hero, who was a privateer at some point in their lives, such as Francis Drake, Jean Bart, John Paul Jones, etc. Spain avoided the direct confrontations with the Dutch fleet and relied on the Spanish privateers or Dunkirkers to harass the Dutch trade. The Dutch adapted by hiring several privateers of their own, including the famous Piet Heyn (1577–1629), who in 1628 managed to seize the Spanish treasure fleet in the Cuban bay of Matanzas with an estimated 11.5 million guilders of gross proceeds.[122]

The colonies and markets in the East and West Indies were one of the rewards of the sea power in the seventeenth century. As mentioned above, the Dutch penetration and challenge to the Iberian supremacy in the East Indies was behind some of the crucial texts on the international maritime law. However, it was not just a struggle between the Dutch and the Portuguese, because other sea powers expanded as well. England and the English merchants

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[121] M. G. de Boer, *Tromp en de armada van 1639* (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1941). Robert Stradling, 'Catastrophe and Recovery: The Defeat of Spain, 1639–43', *History* 64 (1979): 205–219. Robert Stradling, *The Armada of Flanders: Spanish Maritime Policy and European War, 1568–1668* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
[122] Samuel Pierre l'Honoré Naber, Irene Aloha Wright (eds.), *Piet Heyn en de Zilvervloot: Bescheiden uit Nederlandsche en Spaansche Archieven* (Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon, 1928), 193. Wim Klooster, *The Dutch Moment: War, Trade, and Settlement in the Seventeenth-Century Atlantic World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), 45–46.

also did not recognize the Treaties of Tordesillas and Zaragoza, so they also wanted a share of the global trade. This inevitably led to the conflicts with the Dutch in the East Indies, the peak of which was the infamous Amboyna massacre in 1623, when several English merchants were tortured and executed on Ambon Island. It plagued the Anglo-Dutch relations for decades.[123]

The Anglo-Dutch struggle for sea power has often been depicted as a conflict between two worldviews, the clash between the Dutch *mare liberum* and the British *mare clausum*.[124] Grotius's *Mare liberum* was condemned by the Church and the Iberian kingdoms,[125] but not before it was attacked by the British jurists. The Scottish professor of law William Welwood argued that the sea could be partitioned and that territorial waters need to be off bounds to foreigners, especially to the Dutch fishers. Yet, he agreed that 'that part of the maine Sea or great Ocean, which is farre removed from the just and due bounds above mentioned, properly perteyning to the nearest Lands of every Nation. Atq; ita esto mare vastum liberrimum,' i.e. that boundless sea should be most free.[126] Welwood, like Grotius before him, did not write in a vacuum. Therefore, on the instigation of English Queen Anne, Welwood published the chapter attacking Grotius in Latin as its own booklet.[127]

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[123] Although it was formally resolved after the First Anglo-Dutch War in 1654, the bad feelings still persisted, as the numerous anti-Dutch pamphlets in England emphasized the tyranny of the Dutch. Even in 1673, John Dryden wrote a poem about it. John Dryden, *Amboyna, or the Cruelties of the Dutch to the English Merchants* (London: Henry Herringman, 1673). D. K. Bassett, 'The 'Amboyna Massacre' of 1623', *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 1 (1960): 1–19.

[124] Charles Wilson, *Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars* (London; New York: Longmans, Green, 1957), 35–38. C. R. Boxer, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 17th Century, 1652–1674* (London: National Maritime Museum, 1974), 2–3. J. P. Sigmond, W. Th. Kloek, *Sea Battles and Naval Heroes in the 17th-Century Dutch Republic* (Amsterdam: Rijksmuseum, 2007), 79.

[125] Already by January 1610, it was put on the infamous *Index librorum prohibitorum*. Franz Heinrich Reusch, *Der Index der verbotenen Bücher*, 2 vols. (Bonn: M. Cohen and Son, 1883–85), II, 102. Justo Seraphim de Freitas, *De justo imperio lusitanorum asiatico* (Valladolid: Jerónimo Morillo, 1625). Juan Solórzano Pereira, *Disputatio de Indiarum jure sive de justa Indiarum occidentalium inquisitione* (Madrid: Francisco Martinez, 1629). Charles H. Alexandrowicz, 'Freitas Versus Grotius', in David Armitage (ed.), *Theories of Empire, 1450–1800* (London: Ashgate, 1998), 239–259. José Antonio Martínez Torres, '«Gobernar el Mundo». La polémica *Mare Liberum versus Mare Clausum* en las Indias Orientales (1603–1625)»', *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 74 (2017): 71–96.

[126] William Welwood, *An Abridgement of All Sea-Lawes* (London: Thomas Man, 1613), 61–72.

[127] William Welwood, *De dominio maris, iuribusque ad dominium praecipue spectantibus assertio brevis et methodica* (London, 1615). J. D. Alsop, 'William Welwood, Anne of Denmark and the Sovereignty of the Sea,' *The Scottish Historical Review* 59 (1980): 171–74.

The English protests did not affect solely the fishing industry or the 'territorial waters,' but included also the long-distance trade with the East Indies. The mercantilist author Robert Kayll noted that 'the sea is large enough, and hath roome enough for us all.' Yet, the 'Hollander' were excluded, and England had to intervene against the Dutch fishers and traders. Moreover, he claimed that the 'increase of shipping' will 'have added both strength and glory to the kingdome.'[128] Kayll defended the new organisation of the English East India Company (EIC), founded in 1600 as a joint-stock corporation, but he attacked its trading activities and monopolies.[129] In his opinion, these diminished, rather than improved, England's sea power.

However, the debate within England was lively and some British writers also defended the Dutch traders and *mare liberum*. The diplomat and colonial investor Dudley Digges replied to Kayll writing that England should become 'a staple of commerce for all the world.' He advocated for a more 'cosmopolitan' Protestant position, where the strong English fleet was needed for the 'good of Christendom,' and that the Dutch were the 'best assured friends.'[130] At this time, the Dutch Republic, even if already a trade and fishing rival to England, was still a Protestant ally against what was effectively seen as the Catholic Spanish universal monarchy.

However, the most famous response came with the clear statement in the title. The English jurist John Selden (1584–1654), whom Grotius himself described as 'the Glory of the English Nation,'[131] wrote a response to Grotius. He started writing a response a few years later (around 1618), but his major work *Mare clausum* was not allowed to be published by King

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[128] Robert Kayll, *The Trades Increase* (London: N. Okes, 1615), 1, 14. Gerard Malynes, *The Center of The Circle of Commerce. Or, A Refutation of a Treatise, Intituled the Circle of Commerce, or the Ballance of Trade* (London: Nicholas Bourne, 1623).

[129] K. N. Chaudhuri, *The English East India Company: The Study of an Early Joint-Stock Company, 1600–1640* (London: Cass, 1965). Sushil Chaudhury, *Merchants, Companies, and Trade: Europe and Asia in the Early Modern Era* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Anthony Farrington, *Trading Places: The East India Company and Asia, 1600–1834* (London: British Library, 2002).

[130] Dudley Digges, *The Defence of Trade* (London: John Barnes, 1615), 3–5, 23. Edward Misselden, *The Circle of Commerce. Or the Ballance of Trade, in Defence of Free Trade: Opposed to Malynes Little Fish and His Great Whale, and Poized against Them in the Scale* (London: Nicholas Bourne, 1623).

[131] Ofir Haivry, *John Selden and the Western Political Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1–107.

James I lest he agonize the King of Denmark. He was allowed to publish it during the time of Charles I's great shipbuilding program in the 1630s. To drive the point of 'closed seas' home, in 1637, a 100-gun *Sovereign of the Seas* was launched.[132]

Selden noted that England should close the 'British Seas' and keep the British harbours to British ships, propagating for protectionist policies. Furthermore, he extended the limits of British Seas up to 'the very Shores or Ports of the Neighbor-Princes beyond-Sea […] Ocean to bee placed at the utmost extent of those most spacious Seas, which are possest by the English, Scots, and Irish.'[133] Grotius, who was the Swedish ambassador in Paris from 1634, decided not to respond publicly, since he did not want to argue against his employer's claims of the dominion of the Baltic Sea. Moreover, he also did not wish to reply due to his private resentments towards the Dutch authorities, after he had to leave Holland again in 1632.[134]

English claims for the sovereignty of their seas were not just a philosophical platitude or an empty threat in the seventeenth century. In 1605, after the 'undeclared war' between Spain and England had ended a year before, the English Admiral William Monson shot at the Dutch warship in the Channel, because it did not lower its flag. Monson argued that the English king required 'such rights and duties as have formerly belonged to his progenitors.'[135] The Dutch were not the only target. In 1603, Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully, was on his way to England when three warning shots were fired against their ship, because they did not lower the flag to recognise James I's 'sovereignty of the seas.' Sully was shocked by this 'insult,' as he wrote in his *Memoires*.[136] The French pride was still healing almost forty years later, when

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[132] Fox, *Great Ships*, 33–37. Redding, 'A Ship 'For Which Great Neptune Raves'.

[133] John Selden, *Mare Clausum seu De dominio maris libri duo* (London: Richard Meighen, 1635). John Selden, *Of the Dominion or Ownership of the Sea*, trans. Marchamont Nedham (London: William Du-Gard, 1652), 459.

[134] For the fuller background to the international debate see Martine Julia van Ittersum, 'Debating the Free Sea in London, Paris, The Hague and Venice: the publication of John Selden's Mare Clausum (1635) and its diplomatic repercussions in Western Europe,' *History of European Ideas* 47 (2021): 1193–1210.

[135] Thomas Wemyss Fulton, *The Sovereignty of the Sea: An Historical Account of the Claims of England to the Dominion of the British Seas, and of the Evolution of the Territorial Waters: With Special Reference to the Rights of Fishing and the Naval Salute* (Edinburgh; London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1911), 205–6.

[136] Maximilien de Béthune Sully, *Memoires des sages et royalles oeconomies d'Estat, domestiques, politiques, et militaires de Henry le Grand* (Amsterdam: Alethinosgraphe de Clearetimelee et al., 1638), 173.

Cardinal Richelieu noted in his *Testament politique*: 'The shots that pierce the ship also pierce the heart of the good Frenchmen.'[137]

These two cases display the heightened rivalry on the seas that was enhanced by the strict imposition of the British 'sovereignty.' This claim was an unprecedented declaration of the English Crown. It was internal – it had not been given to the English monarchs by any other potential authority, such as the Pope or any international tribunal. Fulton showed that the English Crown reserved, albeit infrequently, the right to the 'sovereignty over the seas' from the Middle Ages.[138] However, Sebastian Sobecki discovered that the seas referenced in the Middle Ages were only 'territorial waters' of England.[139] It was in the early seventeenth century, when the Stuarts started imposing this practice more broadly and rigorously. Foreign ships had to lower their topsail and strike their flag.

At the first glance, with some glaring exceptions, the two states defended different positions – the Dutch 'free seas' was set against the English 'closed seas.' Nevertheless, the changing circumstances changed their positions. When the Dutch reached a relative monopoly in some places in the East Indies in the 1610s, the free-sea doctrine was thrown out the window. Grotius himself adapted to the new reality. In a somewhat surreal scene, in March 1613, when he was in England trying to solve the enduring Anglo-Dutch conflict over the fisheries and access to the East Indies, Grotius had to argue against the main arguments of *Mare liberum*, which was used by the English negotiators.[140] Therefore, as has been noted by many historians before, the different philosophers' or jurists' thoughts towards the sea cannot be separated from the specific state and specific national interests of the time.

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[137] '[…] *perçant le Vaisseau percerent le Cœur aux bons François* […]' Richelieu, *Testament Politique*, I, 117–19. Richelieu's *Testament* was first published in the 1680s, but he supposedly wrote it before his death in 1642. Robert Knecht, *Richelieu* (London: Longman, 1991), 155. Fulton, *The Sovereignty of the Sea*, 204–5.
[138] Fulton, *The Sovereignty of the Sea*.
[139] Sebastian Sobecki, *The Sea and Medieval English Literature* (Cambridge, UK; Rochester, NY: D.S. Brewer, 2008), 140–43. N. A. M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660–1649* (London: Harper Collins, National Maritime Museum, 1997), 380–83.
[140] Karl Zemanek, 'Was Hugo Grotius Really in Favour of the Freedom of the Seas?,' *Journal of the History of International Law* 1 (1999): 48–60. Anand, *Origin and Development*, 96–97.

In the early seventeenth century, the states and navies were becoming more and more intertwined.[141] The above-mentioned Usselincx recognised that 'all good Patriots ought to encourage one the other […] liberally to contribute their money for the setting forth of this Fleet […], which next unto God, will be a soveraigne meanes to holde the Enemy in ballance and keepe us and all our neighbours and friends, in peace without any feare, if in mans judgement and consideration, there be any security to be had.'[142] He showed the role of navies to be 'a soveraigne meanes to holde the Enemy in ballance.' The balance of sea power implied having a powerful fleet and strong merchant fleet, which operates around the world.

Thinkers at the time started to use the balance-of-power concept in their texts more and more. In *Dutch Survey* (1625), the London merchant William Crosse described the conflict between Spain and the Dutch Republic as 'Comparative Ballancing.'[143] Francis Bacon wanted a preventive war or 'just quarrell' against Spain on the side of the Dutch, in order to ensure 'the Ballancing of the forces betweene the Kings Majestie and the King of Spaine.' Bacon gave an historical example, describing the foreign policies of Emperor Charles V, English King Henry VIII, and French King Francis I. They 'were in their times so provident, as scarce a palme of ground could be gotten by either of the three, but that the other two would be sure to doe their best to set the Ballance of Europe upright againe.'[144] Already in 1619, as Bacon argued for war against Spain, he stated that the accession of James VI and I 'hat made us an entire island, which by nature is the best fortification.' When assessing the friendly Dutch, Bacon noted that they were 'the powerfullest nation at the sea that now is in the world.'[145]

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[141] Janžekovič, 'The rise of state navies.' Redding, *The English and French Navies*.

[142] Usselincx, *Bedenckinghen over Den Staet*. Usselincx, *More Excellent Observations of Holland*, 33.

[143] William Crosse, *The Dutch Survey: Wherein Are Related and Truly Discoursed, the Chiefest Losses and Acquirements, Which Have Past Betweene the Dutch and the Spaniards, in These Last Foure Yeares Warres of the Netherlands, with a Comparatiue Ballancing and Estimation* (London: Nathaniel Butter, 1625).

[144] Francis Bacon, *Considerations Touching a Warre with Spaine* (London: s.n., 1629), unpaginated.

[145] Francis Bacon, 'A Short View to be taken of Great Britain and Spain', in *The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon Including all his Occasional Works*, ed. James Spedding, 7 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1861–74), VII, 22–28, 24. Samuel Garrett Zeitlin, 'Francis Bacon on religious warfare', *Global Intellectual History* 6 (2021), 158–189. Samuel Garrett Zeitlin, 'Eutopia of Empire: Francis Bacon's *Short View* and the Imperial and Colonial Background to the New Atlantis', *Political Research Quarterly* 76 (2023): 1012–1023.

However, some thinkers tried to tip the balance too far in their favour, which could lead to the balance-of-power counterpart, as they saw it at the time, the universal monarchy.[146] In 1641, the English merchant Henry Robinson advocated for Selden's closed seas, and 'unlesse wee show ourselves sole Soveraigne of the Sea, and with our Trident Scepter give lawes (whilst we may) to all Nations there, wee must receive them from others.'[147] Thus, Robinson's programmatic goal, albeit seemingly defensive and preventive, was in clear violation of the balance of power and neared universal monarchy, following the above-mentioned definition of the balance of power provided by Emmerich de Vattel. It was in the middle of the seventeenth century, when the key reference treaties of international law were concluded.

Although the main two Treaties of Westphalia did not really affect sea power, there was one treaty signed in Westphalia in 1648 that contained several important articles limiting free trade. The Spanish-Dutch Treaty of Peace from 30 January 1648 signed at Münster was very important for the wider European international relations. Some historians do not include this treaty into the Peace of Westphalia, because it did not involve the resolution of the Thirty Years' War. However, even major collections of peace treaties from the early modern era and today include it.[148] In addition to Spain recognizing the Dutch independence and the *uti possidetis* principle, it established the free trade between the two nations, as did the majority of other international treaties from the time. In Article IV, it specified that the 'subjects and inhabitants' of both polities could 'frequent one another's countries, and there exercise their traffic and commerce in all safety, as well by sea and fresh waters, as by land.'[149]

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[146] Martin van Gelderen, 'Universal Monarchy, the Rights of War and Peace and the Balance of Power: Europe's Quest for Civil Order,' in H.-Á Persson, B. Stråth (eds.), *Reflections on Europe: Defining a Political Order in Time and Space* (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2007), 49–71.

[147] Henry Robinson, *Englands Safetie in Trades Encrease* (London: Nicholas Bourne, 1641), 20. David Ormrod, *The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, 1650–1770* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 46.

[148] Charles Jenkinson (ed.), *A Collection of All the Treaties of Peace, Alliance and Commerce between Great Britain and Other Powers, From the Treaty signed at Munster in 1648, to the Treaties signed at Paris in 1783*, 3 vols (London: J. Debrett, 1785).

[149] '*Liberumque ipsis sit venire et manere in ditionibus alterutrius, ibique exercere negotia et commercia in omni securitate, tam mari aliisque aquis quam terra.*' Jenkinson (ed.), *A Collection of All the Treaties*, I, 13–14.

However, this *mare liberum* was limited to Europe or mother countries,[150] and it explicitly excluded the colonies, where *mare clausum* prevailed. Article V argued that 'the Spaniards shall keep their navigation to the East-Indies, in the same manner they hold it at present, without being at liberty to go further; and the inhabitants of these Low Countries shall not frequent the places which the Castilians have in the East-Indies.'[151] Article VI expanded it to the West-Indies, where 'the subjects of the said Lord the King shall not sail to, or trade in those [harbours] held and possessed by the said Lords and States, nor the subjects of the said Lords and States sail to or trade in those held and possessed by the said Lord the King.'[152] This jealousy of trade, as David Hume later called it, was commonplace at the time.[153]

Figure 6. Gerard ter Borch, The Swearing of the Ratification of the Treaty of Münster.

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[150] Even in Europe, the trade was not completely free. In article XIV, Spain recognized that the river Scheldt and consequently Antwerp were closed by the Dutch to any trade.
[151] Jenkinson (ed.), *A Collection of All the Treaties*, I, 14.
[152] Jenkinson (ed.), *A Collection of All the Treaties*, I, 14.
[153] David Hume, 'Of the Jealousy of Trade,' in Eugene F. Miller (ed.), *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, Revised Edition (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), 327–331. Istvan Hont, *Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation State in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press, 2005).

Moreover, the *Particular Article, concerning navigation and commerce* was added to the Treaty a few days later, on 4 February 1648. It established free trade with friendly and neutral states of both states. However, there was one exception to this free trade, which even the neutral states had to abide. It was forbidden 'without permission to carry to the declared enemies of the said Lord the King [of Spain], prohibited or contraband goods or merchandise.'[154] To enforce this, the treaty established the right to inspect certain ships in certain places. Since it was specifically prohibited to carry arms to 'the declared enemies' of Spain, this specific article targeted the Dutch trade with France.[155]

In the 1640s and 1650s, France was not in best shape. In 1635, still riding relatively high during the rule of Louis XIII and especially Richelieu, France declared war on Spain, and a year later France allied with Sweden to enter the Thirty Years' War against the Holy Roman Empire. Although the latter war ended in October 1648, the war with Spain was still raging on, partly due to the Dutch decision for a separate peace with Spain. Moreover, between 1648 and 1653, France experienced a series of civil wars or the Fronde.[156] Spain used this situation and supported the opposition. In 1650, in return for Estenay, Philip IV promised to send 5,000 armed men, of which 2,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, to Mademoiselle de Longueville and Marshal Turenne against Cardinal Mazarin.[157] This treaty still did not explicitly mention any naval support to be given by Spain to the 'rebels.'

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[154] Jenkinson (ed.), *A Collection of All the Treaties*, I, 42–44. Even though it was very broad, or exactly because of it, they had to correct it a couple of years later in 1650. The Dutch probably wanted reassurances that they can trade with the French, as long as they are not supplying weapons or contrabands. Treaty between Spain and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 17 December 1650.

[155] Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). René Vermeir, *In staat van oorlog: Filips IV en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1629–1648* (Maastricht: Shaker, 2001). Olaf van Nimwegen, *The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions 1588–1688* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2010).

[156] A. Lloyd Moote, *The Revolt of the Judges – The Parlement of Paris and the Fronde 1643–1652* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971). Orest A. Ranum, *The Fronde: A French Revolution, 1648–1652* (New York: WW Norton, 1993). Michel Pernot, *La Fronde* (Paris, Éditions de Fallois, 1994).

[157] Treaty of Alliance between the King of Spain, the Duchess of Longueville, and Marshal Turenne, signed at Estenay, 30 April 1650.

This changed in 1651, as the allies changed, and Turenne and Condé switched sides. The Spanish king practically copied the Treaty of Estenay of 30 April 1650 and only substituted Marshal Turenne with the Prince of Condé. Among other things, Philip IV now promised to send to Bourdeaux or nearby a fleet of 30 warships, armed, equipped, and with marines ready to fight. If the enemies had more ships, the Spanish king had promised to strengthen his fleet accordingly with all the vessels that were at his disposal.[158] This acknowledgment of constant or interactive balancing was becoming more common in the alliance treaties. Moreover, in comparison to the 1650 treaty, the naval affairs were now front and centre.

The reason for the centrality of naval affairs was that the French king and Mazarin were not sitting idly. In October 1650, Mazarin, in lieu of the young Louis, signed the Treaty between the King of France and the Prince of Orange at The Hague. Mazarin promised to field an army of 10,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry to attack Bruges, while the William II promised to break with Spain and field 10,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry to attack Antwerp. William II also obliged himself to keep a fleet of 50 well-equipped vessels in the Channel from May until the end of November 1651, and who will stay at or hold the sea (*et qui tiendra la Mer*) to act against Spain as well as against the 'English rebels.'[159] This treaty even had a broader significance, since they both broke with Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) and tried to re-establish the 'king of England,' i.e. Prince Charles, to the English throne. Yet, this treaty and the Dutch fleet were never used, because William II died only two weeks after signing the treaty.

At the time, the Dutch built most warships for France. France still had to develop an appropriate infrastructure to maintain a large navy, which started under Richelieu, but was put on hold during the *de facto* rule of Mazarin and the Fronde.[160] Nevertheless, at the time,

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[158] Treaty between the King of Spain and the Prince of Conde, the Prince of Conti and their Allies, signed at Madrid, 6 November 1651.

[159] Articles of a Treaty between the King of France and the Prince of Orange, signed at The Hague, 20 October 1650.

[160] Alan James, 'The development of French naval policy in the seventeenth century: Richelieu's early aims and ambitions,' *French History* 12 (1998): 384–402. Alan James, *Navy and Government in Early Modern France,*

although religiously and governmentally distinct, England was not worried about the French fleet, which only became a threat by the late 1660s and 1670s. In 1652, the famous diarist John Evelyn remarked that 'on the Ocean, I confess, both their Shipping and Traffique have been alike trivial,' but they may soon build more ships and 'stand in a bolder competition with their Neighbors.'[161] England was not worried about France and its sea power, since it preoccupied itself with itself, Spain and the Dutch Republic in the mid-seventeenth century.

During the English Civil War in the 1640s or the broader Wars of the Three Kingdoms (1639–1653),[162] England's trade to the Baltic dried up, while the Dutch achieved trade dominance after they had concluded peace with Spain in January 1648.[163] An anonymous English pamphleteer, most likely Owen Feltham, vented that 'nothing can quiet them [the Dutch] but money and liberty, which having gotten, they abuse both.' Key criticism, however, was that 'their shipping is their Babel they boast of, for the glory of their Nation; it is (indeed) wonderful, and they will have it so. But, we may well hope, they will never be potent by Land, lest they shew us how doggedlie they can insult where they get the masterie. Their Navies are the scourge of Spain, and pills wherewith they purge the Indies. Nature hath not bred them so active by Land as others; but at Sea they are Water-Devills, and attempt things incredible.'[164]

The tensions between the Protestant powerhouses were building up already before they turned into open war in 1652. An anonymous pamphleteer argued that the Dutch were getting the riches in the British seas, which allows them the superior shipping services, on which the

1572–1661 (London: Royal Historical Society, 2004). Alan James, 'Les arsenaux de marine en France avant Colbert,' *Dix-Septième Siècle* 253 (2011): 658–71. Redding, *The English and French Navies*.

[161] John Evelyn, *The state of France, as it stood in the IXth yeer of* […] *Lewis XIIII* (London, 1652), 86.

[162] Jonathan Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-century English political instability in European context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Michael Braddick, *God's Fury, England's Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars* (London: Penguin, 2009). John Morrill, *The nature of the English Revolution* (London: Routledge, 2014).

[163] Jonathan I. Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

[164] Anon. (Owen Feltham), *Three moneths obseruations of the Low-countries, especially Holland: Containing a brief description of the country, customes, religions, manners, and dispositions of the people* (London: s.n., 1648), 18–20.

English merchants depended. He claimed that the Dutch want 'the whole trade of Christendome into their hands, not only Transportation, but also the Command of the Seas.'[165] The Dutch share of the sea trade in Europe indeed increased from around 16 per cent in 1500 to roughly 40 per cent by 1670.[166] Since many merchants were sitting in the Long Parliament and close to the Council of State, the interests of merchants became synonymous with the interests of the state, not unlike in the Dutch Republic.

The political leaders were aware that trade and its related income were important part of state and sea power. In 1650, when the apparent decline of the British trade was becoming painfully obvious, the British statesmen argued that 'for recovery of trade and commerce, the merchants need encouragement and protection from the state, at home and abroad according to the practice of the lords of the United Provinces who are so vigilant over their traffic that, upon the least complaint of obstruction, they use all means, either by treaty or force, to remove it.'[167] The comparisons with their former ally were becoming more common, but Cromwell's plan of the Protestant union between the two republics failed to manifest.

The imbalance of sea power was not just a matter of different perspectives, but it was becoming a dangerous reality for the English Commonwealth. In 1650, there were already thirteen Dutch merchant ships in the Baltic for every English vessel; by 1651, it jumped to fifty to one.[168] In a similar vein, the goldsmith and merchant Thomas Violet advocated that 'wee must match the Dutch at their own weapons […] and by this waie you will make England truly

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[165] Anon., *A Cleare and Evident Way for Enriching the Nations of England and Ireland and for Setting Very Great Numbers of Poore on Work* (London: John Saywell, 1650), 17. The author may have been John Keymer, the important Jacobean projector. John Cramsie, 'Commercial Projects and the Fiscal Policy of James VI and I,' *The Historical Journal* 43 (2000): 345–64, at 349.

[166] Jan de Vries and A. M. van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 403. Jan Luiten van Zanden, Milja van Tielhof, 'Roots of Growth and Productivity Change in Dutch Shipping Industry, 1500–1800', *Explorations in Economic History* 46 (2009): 389–403, 390. Wilson, *Profit and Power*.

[167] Calendar of State Papers, Domestic: Interregnum, 1650, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1876), 180.

[168] N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815* (London: Allen Lane, National Maritime Museum, 2004), 6–7.

the Empress of the Sea, when everie Sea-Port-Town will bee an Amsterdam.'[169] Similarly, the

Secretary Sir John Borough's posthumous work contended that 'Princes may have Sovereignty

of the several parts of the sea – in the passage, fishing & shores thereof.'[170] The 'jealousy of

trade' shaped the relations between European sea powers in the next decades.

The belligerent mercantilists stept up. The English intellectual and member of the

Invisible College, Benjamin Worsley, claimed that the Dutch pose a threat to the English

shipping. At the time, the Dutch, according to him, exceeded the Spanish danger of universal

monarchy. The Dutch supposedly planned 'to laie a foundation to themselves for ingrossing

the Universal Trade, not onely of Christendom, but indeed, of the greater part of the known

world.' Moreover, the Dutch desired to strengthen themselves 'by their potencie at Sea, in

strength and multitude of Shipping.'[171] This led to what would be called today economic

nationalism or protectionism, and acceptance of an act that sent shock waves through Europe.

Since sea power, trade and state were interwoven, the English state needed to break the

Dutch monopoly on shipping. Thus, the infamous Navigation Act was passed in October 1651.

It restricted foreign shipping in areas under British control and demanded mostly domestic

crews on these ships (75%).[172] It clearly targeted the Dutch shipping, even though many

English traders used and preferred the cheaper Dutch shipping as well. The English started a

propaganda campaign around the 'sovereignty of the seas,' and it was not a coincidence that in

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[169] Thomas Violet, *The Advancement of Merchandize: Or, Certain Propositions for the Improvement of the Trade of the Common-Wealth* (London: Council of State, 1651), 10–11. Thomas Leng, 'Commercial Conflict and Regulation in the Discourse of Trade in Seventeenth-Century England,' *The Historical Journal* 48 (2005): 933–54, at 941–42.

[170] John Borough, *The Soveraignty of the British Seas: Proved by Records, History, and the Municipall Lawes of This Kingdome* (London: Humphrey Moseley, 1651), 1–3.

[171] Benjamin Worsley, *The Advocate; or, A Narrative of the State and Condition of Things between the English and Dutch Nation, in Relation to Trade* (London: Council of State, 1651), 1–2, 6–7. Benjamin Worsley, *Free Ports, the Nature and Necessitie of Them Stated* (London: Council of State, 1652), 2.

[172] An Act for increase of Shipping, and Encouragement of the Navigation of this Nation (London: Parliament of England, 1651). J. E. Farnell, 'The Navigation Act of 1651, the First Dutch War, and the London Merchant Community,' *Economic History Review* 16, no. 3 (1964): 439–54. Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 714–15.

1652, Selden's *opus magnum* was translated into English.[173] The question of the state intervention or prevention of the trade of the neutral states with the belligerents was a major apple of discord in the early modern era.

During the English Civil War (1642–51), the navy and fleet officers were mostly on the parliamentarian side.[174] After the war, Cromwell started a bold campaign to upgrade the navy. On the other side, after 1648, the Dutch state sold off the majority of its largest warships. Thus, the English came to have more purpose-built warships. The Dutch, on the other hand, had more large merchant ships, which they quickly re-purposed for warships. More crucially, the English seized hundreds of Dutch prizes, before the war was declared.[175] The English also started seizing several Swedish and other ships, although they were officially neutral.[176]

It is ironic perhaps that the most famous supporter of *laissez-faire* capitalism supported the protectionist Navigation Acts. In *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith emphasized that 'defence […] is of much more importance than opulence,' and that 'the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England.'[177] He rightly interpreted the Navigation Acts to be the result of the 'national animosity at that particular time aimed at […] the diminution of the naval power of Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the

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[173] Selden, *Of the Dominion or Ownership of the Sea*. The English published an argument for why the Venetians claim the ownership of the Adriatic Sea. Anon., *Dominium Maris: Or, The Dominion of the Sea. Expressing the Title, Which the Venetians Pretend unto the Sole Dominion, and Absolute Sovereigntie of the Adriatick Sea, Commonly Called the Gulph of Venice* (London: s.n., 1652).

[174] John Rowland Powell, *The Navy in the English Civil War* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1962). Richard J. Blakemore and Elaine Murphy, *British Civil Wars at Sea, 1638–1653* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2018). Michael James Lea-O'Mahoney, *The Navy in the English Civil Wars*, PhD Thesis (Exeter: University of Exeter, 2011). It was of course not without its tensions. D. E. Kennedy, 'The English Naval Revolt of 1648', *The English Historical Review* 77 (1962): 247–56. R. C. Anderson, 'The Royalists at Sea', *The Mariner's Mirror* 14 (1928): 320–338.

[175] Simon Groenveld, 'The English Civil Wars as a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1640–1652,' *Historical Journal* 30 (1987): 541–66. Bernard Capp, *Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648–1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). Rommelse, 'The role of mercantilism'.

[176] Steve Murdoch, ''Breaching Neutrality': English prize-taking and Swedish neutrality in the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1651–1654', *The Mariner's Mirror* 105 (2019): 134–147.

[177] Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (London: Strahan, 1776), II, 46.

security of England.'[178] In fact, *The Wealth of Nations* is full of direct and indirect support for state interventions.

Even 149 years later, Hauterive noted that the Navigation Act of 1651 started the decline of international law in Europe. According to him, when Cromwell proclaimed the 'Navigation Act, […] he placed the trade of his nation in a position of constant enmity and jealousy with regard to the trade of all other peoples.' He continued that 'this Act was certainly offensive in its imperative injunctions,' but it did not attract much attention of 'the men who then governed in Europe' or only late protests. He argued that 'the English then had reason to think that none of the peoples of Europe were opposed to them interfering alone in the general law of the sea.' According to him, this was 'the first source of the claims that they have since dared to declare; one of the first causes of these feelings of pride which the [English] nation in its actions and individuals in their private conduct do not fear to show to foreign nations who have not yet done anything to repress them.'[179] As stated above, the harassing of neutral states was a source of conflict between Britain and other sea powers in early modern Europe.

Perhaps not too surprisingly, Hauterive also blamed Cromwell for breaking the Westphalian order. Hauterive, similarly as Bethel and others before him, blamed Cromwell who, according to him, was 'the true founder of the maritime system, the true author of the European sea wars.' Hauterive continued that 'this dark conjurer, ambitious and distrustful, who above all loved conspiracy and violence, considered the isolated position of England and the active and tenacious character of men which inhabit it, and conceived the idea of establishing their manufacturing in a permanent state of contradiction and of war with all its industries, to separate forever their interests to the interests of Europe.'[180]

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[178] Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, II, 45.
[179] Hauterive, *De l'état de la France*, 27–28.
[180] Hauterive, *De l'état de la France*, 26.

However, as shown previously, state intervention and *maria clausa* did not start with the infamous Navigation Act. In 1648, the Dutch concluded a Treaty touching Brazil with Portugal. In Article IX, the Dutch wanted to keep the recently conquered harbours and forts in Africa, saying that 'West India Company remains in possession of all places on the coasts of South Africa, situated between the Kingdom of Luanda and Benguela […] without the Portuguese having any place on the seaside between them.' Moreover, in article XI, 'in order that in this no fraud be made, the Portuguese ships cannot approach any harbours, rivers, bahias or other rivelets/little streams, except the port of the city St. Paulo in Luanda and they are not even allowed to transport their slaves in any other city than St Paulo.'[181] This Dutch state intervention was of limited threat to other nations, as it dealt with Portuguese and Dutch possessions outside Europe.

There was another treaty that struck closer to European hearts. In October 1649, Denmark and the Dutch Republic signed the Treaty of Defensive Alliance.[182] In the 'supplementary' Treaty for the Redemption of the Sound Dues between Denmark and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague on the same day, concluded for 36 years or until 1685, it was said that 'all Dutch ships can enter the Sound without paying any Sound Dues.' This would not be a problem if it would not also specifically state that no other nation could receive this benefit.[183] Thus, others had to pay the tolls and were in a disadvantage. It was *mare liberum* for the Dutch merchants, and not necessarily *mare clausum* for the rest, but the access was definitely more limited.

The Dutch were considering a response to the Navigation Act, which also affected the Dutch trade. The Dutch and English views were not that far apart, as the Dutch argued that the

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[181] Treaty touching Brazil etc. between Portugal and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague.
[182] Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Denmark and the Netherlands, Articles IV, V.
[183] Treaty for the Redemption of the Sound Dues between Denmark and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, article IX. The Dutch paid 350,000 Dutch pounds for this privilege.

'maritime war' was allowed, if it protected the (Dutch) freedom of trade.[184] The Dutch Republic followed a pragmatic approach, since the Dutch were aware of their delicate geographical position. The Commonwealth Captain Nicholas Foster stated that Britain surrounded the Dutch Republic 'like an eagle's wings extended over her body.'[185] Many were shocked that the States General would even consider the maritime war in this belligerent and anarchical international society of states of *bellum omnium contra omnes*.

In one of the most famous early modern treatises of political philosophy, *Leviathan* (1651),[186] Thomas Hobbes did not dwell long on the international affairs or international law.[187] He argued that he did not have to say much, 'because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing,' in so far as 'every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body.'[188] Extracting from this identification of the law of nature with the law of nations, which had a long tradition (cf. Thomas Aquinas, Suárez, Grotius), Hobbes understood the international relations as akin to his bellicose state of nature. Thus, 'Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War.'[189]

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[184] Catherine Secretan, '"True Freedom" and the Dutch Tradition of Republicanism,' *Republics of Letters: A Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics, and the Arts* 2 (2010): 82–92, 91.
[185] C. T. Atkinson and Samuel Rawson Gardiner (eds.), *Letters and Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, 1652–1654*, 6 vols. (London: Navy Records Society, 1899), I, 31–32.
[186] The poetic title itself can be telling, as it references the sea monster, Leviathan, in the Bible. This in itself could be relevant, because Hobbes could have chosen its counterpart from the Book of Job, the land monster or Behemoth. However, considering that Hobbes chose the symbols of temporal power on the famous frontispiece from land, such as a castle and cavalry, one needs to tread carefully with such speculations.
[187] David Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 59–74.
[188] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan, or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil* (London: Andrew Crooke, 1651), 185.
[189] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 63.

In a similar warlike way, Hobbes already discussed international relations in his earlier works, when he was in exile in Paris during the 1640s as a tutor to the future king Charles II. In *De cive* (1642), he argued that 'there are two maxims which are surely both true: Man is a God to man, and Man is a wolf to Man. The former is true of the relations of citizens with each other, the latter of relations between commonwealths.'[190] Hobbes also briefly addressed the international trade. In the *Elements of Law* (1640), he claimed that 'men allow commerce and traffic indifferently to one another.'[191] In the long tradition of the law of nature, he argued that trade should be unhindered, implying that reason or common sense spoke against it, because it was unenforceable in the state of nature.[192]

Since Hobbes did not spend too much time on international affairs, he also did not dive deep into the affairs of sea powers. Perhaps his most important contribution in this sense came even earlier than his books on political philosophy in the 1640s and 1650s, the translation of Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian War* (1629). Similarly as for his more famous *Leviathan* later, he provided a very telling frontispiece. In Hobbes's classical dialectical fashion, Sparta or Lacedaemon and Athens are on the opposite sides. In a somewhat surreal scene, the Spartans in close-order phalanx on land are attacking the Athenians on ships at sea.[193]

As Thucydides understood and the early modern Europeans read, he perceived the true cause of the Peloponnesian War 'to bee the growth of the Athenian power, which putting the Lacedaemonians into feare, necessitated the Warre.'[194] In the recent analysis of the last 500 years of conflicts in world history, Graham Allison counted sixteen major examples when the

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[190] Thomas Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, ed. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3. '*Profecto utrumque verè dictum est,/ Homo homini Deus, & Homo homini Lupus./ Illud si concives inter se; Hoc, si civitates comparemus.*' Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive: The Latin Version*, ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 73. François Tricaud, '"Homo homini Deus", "Homo homini Lupus": Recherche des Sources des deux Formules de Hobbes,' in Reinhart Koselleck, Roman Schnur (eds.), *Hobbes-Forschungen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1969), 61–70.
[191] Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies, 2nd ed. (London: Cass, 1969), 87.
[192] Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought*, 65.
[193] Thucydides, *Eight Bookes of the Peloponnesian Warre*, trans. Thomas Hobbes (London: Hen. Seile, 1629).
[194] Thucydides, *Eight Bookes of the Peloponnesian Warre*, 14.

rising powers have threatened the rising powers. Based on these historical patterns, these systemic dynamics often led to the so-called Thucydides's Trap or the violent confrontation between the rivals.[195] Out of the sixteen cases of the potential Thucydides's Trap, twelve ended in a major conflict, including the two analysed in my study, the Anglo-Dutch conflict and the Anglo-French conflict with wider alliances.

Figure 7. Hobbes's iconic frontispiece of Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian War*.[196]

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[195] Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides's Trap?* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2017).
[196] Thucydides, *Eight Bookes of the Peloponnesian Warre*, trans. Thomas Hobbes (London: Richard Mynne, 1634).

The Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652–1674)

'The English are going to attack a mountain of gold; we have to face one of iron.'[197]

Adriaan Pauw (1585–1653), the Grand Pensionary of Holland and the key negotiator of the Treaty of Münster in 1648, captured the true nature of the Anglo-Dutch conflict. In the spring of 1652, Pauw was in London trying to find a peaceful resolution, when he remarked on the key distinction between the two republics. This distinction referred to the two elements of sea power – gold for money or trade and iron for guns or warships. The Anglo-Dutch Wars in the seventeenth century were fought due to the imbalance of sea power. Lately, Steven Pincus has challenged the view that the main *casus belli* were mercantile, by emphasizing ideological reasons in both states.[198] The so-called integrated understanding prevails today, incorporating all the potential and not mutually exclusive factors that led to the conflict.[199]

The battles between the most potent maritime states at the time were fought almost exclusively at sea in a series of three wars (1652–54, 1665–67, and 1672–74). But, the wars also had a less-known land component. In the second war, the principality of Münster was a combatant, and in the third, the French invasion of the Netherlands was the main theater of war. Since my focus is on sea power and sea battles, I only hint at the land operations in the overview. All three wars lasted 'only' around two years or had two campaign seasons, since it was too expensive to maintain the operational fleet in action, especially for England at the time.

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[197] '*De Engelsche gaen tegens een gouden berg aen; de onse ter contrarie tegen een Ysere.*' Lieuwe van Aitzema, *Saken van Staet en Oorlogh, in, ende omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden*, 6 vols (The Hague: Johan Veely et al., 1669), III, 721. Gijs Rommelse, 'Mountains of Iron and Gold: Mercantilist Ideology in Anglo-Dutch Relations (1650–1674),' in David Onnekink, Gijs Rommelse (eds.), *Ideology and Foreign Policy in Early Modern Europe (1650–1750)* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 243–66. The phrase could be commonplace in the Dutch Republic, as it was arguably already used in 1638 to define the war with Spain. Michiel George de Boer, *Het Proefjaar van Maarten Harpertsz. Tromp, 1637–1639* (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche UItg. Maatschappij, 1946), 97.

[198] Steven Pincus, *Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650–1668* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[199] Gijs Rommelse, 'The Role of Mercantilism in Anglo-Dutch Political Relations, 1650–74', *The Economic History Review* 63 (2010): 591–611.

What follows is not a complete operational overview of the wars,[200] let alone the multiple and complex causes that led to them,[201] but their presentation through the balance-of-power practice and theory. The key target for both fleets was the Dutch trade, the one aiming to protect it and the other to destroy it. Even though the main theater of wars was in the Channel and the North Sea, with important operations also in the Baltic and the Mediterranean, I also include the conflicts in the colonies across the globe, where England, the Dutch Republic, and France were fighting for dominance, trade privileges, and ultimately sea power.

Figure 8. The main operations and battles occurred in the Channel and the North Sea.

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[200] Boxer, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*. J. R. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century* (London; New York: Longman, 1996). Palmer, 'The 'Military Revolution' Afloat.' Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 1–32, 65–94, 136–180.

[201] For a short historiographical overview with further references see Roger Downing, Gijs Rommelse, *A fearful gentleman: Sir George Downing in The Hague 1658–1672* (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2011), 9–14. Rommelse, 'Mountains of Iron and Gold'.

The aim is to present the basic tenets of sea power, the opposing fleets during the main battles, and the results of privateering. I assembled the tables of fleets for the major open sea battles with the total number of warships and guns, and the average number of guns per warship. Although influential, there are no tables for Holmes's Bonfire and Medway Raid, as they were not open sea battles. I also surveyed the diplomatic correspondence to discern the relevant letters containing the balance-of-power idea, as it related to sea power. The shifting of the balance of sea power in England's favor was decided due to geography, i.e., the Dutch exposure to the French land invasion. I argue that attaining and maintaining the balance of sea power in the seventeenth century was not just an abstract idea, but also an interactive process.

The First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–54) and the Balance of Sea Power in the Baltic

Although they thought of themselves as the superior sea powers, both states, England and the Dutch Republic, stepped into the war without any pre-established strategic scheme. The English privateers expanded the seizures of Dutch merchant ships from 12 vessels taken in 1648, 22 in 1649, 50 in 1650, 126 in 1651 and 106 in the first months of 1652.[202] The States General settled in March 1652 to safeguard the Dutch shipping in the Channel by hiring and outfitting 150 merchant ships as warships by 1 April.[203] Although the aim was unrealistic in such a short time and for the fragmented Dutch admiralties, it was a provocative program and additional impetus for the coming conflict. The Dutch protected their program by claiming that 'the preparation of Shipe in England preceded those of Holland.'[204]

The first battle of the First Anglo-Dutch War had occurred before the war was declared, so neither fleet was at their full operational power.[205] On 29 May 1652, the two fleets met off Dover and, due to the confusion in relation to rendering salutes, engaged in the Battle of Dover or Goodwin Sands. The English under the 'General-at-Sea' Robert Blake (1598–1657) had fewer ships (24), but they were more heavily armed, while the Dutch convoy fleet under Tromp had more less-heavily-armed ships (41). On average, the larger English ships had about five guns more per ship than the Dutch (Table 3), many of which were converted merchantmen.[206]

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[202] Groenveld, 'English Civil Wars', at 561, 565–6. The infamous Dunkirk privateers or Dunkirkers, who had about hundred warships at their peak, never inflicted such losses to the Dutch trade during the Dutch Revolt or the Eighty Years' War. A. P. van Vliet, 'The influence of Dunkirk privateering on the North Sea (herring) fishery during the years 1580–1650,' in J. Roding and L. Heerma van Voss (eds.), *The North Sea and Culture (1550–1800)* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 150–165.

[203] HNA 1.01.02.5548. The English claimed that the Dutch planned to equip 300 warships against England. Anon., A declaration of the states of Holland, concerning the Parliament of England: with the rising of the Dutch-men, their seting forth three hundred sayl of ships to be reveng'd upon the English (London: George Horton, 1652).

[204] Anon., *An ansvver to the declaration of the imaginary Parliament of the unknowne Common-wealth of England* (Rotterdam: John Pieterson, 1652), 12. Johan E. Elias, *Schetsen Uit de Geschiedenis van Ons Zeewezen*, 6 vols. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1916), II, 1–40. Atkinson and Gardiner (eds.), *Letters and Papers*, I, 57–169. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 11–12.

[205] For an earlier skirmish off Start Point, on 22 May 1652, see William Laird Clowes, *The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present* (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1898), II, 143–144.

[206] William H. Dixon, *Robert Blake: Admiral and General at Sea* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1852), 191–197.

English Fleet		Dutch Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with Guns: 24	Total Number of Guns: 862	Total Number of Warships with Guns: 41	Total Number of Guns: 1273
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 36		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 31

Table 3. The Battle of Dover.

There were conflicting records of who shot first, and what happened during the five-hour battle, as reported in the pamphlets.[207] Although the English managed to take two Dutch prizes, it was a characteristic early modern sea battle with no obvious victor.[208] The chaos of the first fight was in fact typical of all battles in the three Anglo-Dutch Wars, but especially during the First War, when melee or close range tactics still prevailed. There were many indecisive battles, and the foes were constantly gaining and losing the upper hand.

It was after this confusing battle that the above-mentioned Adriaan Pauw was sent to London to prevent the outbreak of the war. However, the Rump was beyond reconciliation and the war was declared a few weeks later. The reasons, in addition to the Battle of Dover, were the Dutch ingratitude, the Dutch limiting the English trade, and notably the breaking 'of the unquestionable Right of this Nation to the Dominion and Superiority of the adjacent Seas.' The Commonwealth 'held it their Duty, thus compelled and necessitated into a most unwelcome War begun upon them, to defend themselves.'[209] The Dutch replied with manifestos of their own and justified their actions in many languages, addressing the wider European public.[210]

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[207] Anon., *An exact and perfect relation relation of the terrible, and bloudy fight: between the English and Dutch fleets* (London: Robert Wood, 1652). Anon., *Bondigh en waerachtigh verhael van 'tgene onlancx is voor-gevallen tusschen d'Engelsche onder* [...] *Blake, ende de Hollantsche armade, onder* (Amsterdam, 1652).

[208] D. R. Hainsworth, Christine Churches, *The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars, 1652–1674* (Stroud: Sutton Pub., 1998), 3–6. Michael A. Palmer, *Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 39–41. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 11–12.

[209] *A Declaration of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England, Relating to the Affairs and Proceedings between this Commonwealth and the States General of the United Provinces of the Low-Countreys* (London: Parliament of England, 1652), 9, 14. Guillaume Scheybels, *Raisons ou motifs par lesquels les Anglois soûtiennent pouvoir justement faire la guerre aux Hollandois* (Brussels: s.n., 1652). William Cobbett (ed.), *The Parliamentary History of England, from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803* (London: Longman et al., 1806), III, 1177–79.

[210] *Hollandtsche Mercurius: behelzende het ghedenckweerdighste in Christenrijck* (Haarlem: Pieter Casteleyn, 1652), III, 76–78. *Manifeste ou Declaration, Des Hauts & puissans Seigneurs les Estats Generaux des Provinces*

The first phase of the war was just a continuation of the established pre-war policies. The English attacked the Dutch trade, while the Dutch protected their merchant ships in convoys. Both states split their navies into smaller squadrons. Blake was ordered towards the Shetland Islands to intercept the homeward bound Dutch merchant ships and fishing fleet. Tromp followed Blake's fleet to the North, but due to bad weather his fleet was scattered, and several ships sank, so there was no open battle between the two admirals.[211] Admiral George Ayscue (1616–1672) remained in the Channel to control the Dover Straits, while the Dutch gathered a smaller squadron of mostly converted merchant vessels under Vice-Commodore Michiel de Ruyter (1607–1676).[212]

In 1652, the English strategy was limiting the Dutch trade. In the days before the Battle of Plymouth, De Ruyter with his smaller squadron chased his former friend Ayscue's larger squadron,[213] but Ayscue did not want to engage the Dutch fleet without the additional reward of taking merchant vessels. On 26 August 1652, Ayscue attacked the convoy of Dutch merchant ships and the squadron under De Ruyter going through the Channel. Although Ayscue had by all reports the numerical superiority, De Ruyter chased him off. There were considerable casualties among the crew on both sides, but neither side lost any ships. Yet, Ayscue retreated and had to let the convoy pass. This was a shameful outcome for Ayscue, who was relieved of his naval command,[214] while this was the first of many mythic 'victories' for De Ruyter, who was nicknamed the 'Sea Lion.'[215]

Unies des Pays-Bas (The Hague: Staten Generaal, 1652). *Antwort Auff die Ausfuhrung Oder auff das Manifest Eines eingebildeten Parlamentes der unbekandten Regierung in Engelland* (Sine loco: s.n., 1652).

[211] Atkinson and Gardiner (eds.), *Letters and Papers*, I, 299–431, II, 1–216.

[212] Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 115–116.

[213] No complete list exists for the English squadron, but all reports state that Ayscue had over 40 ships, which were on average more heavily armed than the Dutch. De Ruyter's squadron had anywhere from 22 to 30 ships, but they were less heavily armed. Bender, *Dutch Warships*.

[214] In the 1650s, Ayscue served in the Swedish Navy and only returned to England after the Restoration in 1660. John Campbell, *Lives of the British Admirals: Containing a New and Accurate Naval History, from the Earliest Periods*, 4 vols. (London: G. G. J. and J. Robinsons, 1785), II, 264–274. Peter Le Fevre, 'Sir George Ayscue, Commonwealth and Restoration Admiral', *The Mariner's Mirror* 68 (1982): 189–202.

[215] Ronald Prud'homme van Reine, *Rechterhand van Nederland: Biographie van Michiel Adrianszoon de Ruyter* (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1996).

At the same time, the hostilities occurred in other strategic parts of the world, including the Baltic and the Mediterranean. In August 1652, around twenty English merchantmen came to Helsingør. The Danish king Frederick III, officially allied with the Dutch, allowed at least eighteen of these English merchantmen to enter the port in Copenhagen. A Dutch squadron of nine warships arrived by early September and entered the Baltic. Then, when a squadron of eighteen English warships under Captain Bell arrived in late September to relieve the merchantmen, the Danish government did not allow them to enter the Baltic, so the English had to return with the disembarked sailors but without the merchant ships. The Dutch and the Danish effectively excluded the English from the trade in the Baltic.[216]

In the Mediterranean, on 8 September 1652, the Dutch attacked the incoming English squadron at the Battle of Elba or Monte Cristo.[217] The small Dutch squadron of ten ships under Galen attacked the even smaller English squadron of eight ships under Captain Richard Badiley (four were hired merchantmen, which did not enter into the fray). This was the only battle, albeit small, in the First Anglo-Dutch War, where the Dutch had a clear numerical superiority of the average guns per ship; the Dutch had around three guns more per ship than the English. Yet, it was in no means a decisive encounter as the Dutch successfully boarded and captured only one ship, *Phoenix*, which was recaptured by the English two months later.[218]

France was not directly or indirectly involved in the First Anglo-Dutch War. The only exception to this statement was the action off Calais. On 14 September 1652, when De Ruyter was gathering the Dutch merchant vessels in the Channel and escorting them to the ports, Blake returned from the North and attacked a weak convoy of French ships. As shown, in the early

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[216] R. C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Baltic during the Sailing-Ship Epoch, 1522–1850* (London: C. Gilbert-Wood, 1910), 71–72. John D. Grainger, *The British Navy in the Baltic* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2014).

[217] The battle was named after the two infamous islands in the Tyrrhenian Sea, one made famous for the short imprisonment of the French Emperor, and the other for the title of a novel about the long imprisonment of the fictional French sailor, later to become Count (although he was imprisoned in the equally infamous Château d'If off Marseille). Alexandre Dumas, *Le Comte de Monte-Cristo*, 8 vols. (Brussels: Société belge de librairie Hauman et ce, 1845–1846). Evan Wilson, 'The Monster from Elba: Napoleon's escape reconsidered', *The Mariner's Mirror* 107 (2021): 265–279.

[218] John D. Grainger, *The British Navy in the Mediterranean* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2017), 35.

1650s, the French navy was practically non-existent. This prevented the French from reinforcing Dunkirk and relieving it, as it was under siege from the Spanish army. The city was forced to surrender, and the French could do nothing but complain to the regicide Republic.[219]

Although the primary Dutch goal was to protect trade, the Dutch leaders realized that this was impossible without directly engaging the English fleet. Due to his poor performance during the summer and internal politics,[220] the Dutch replaced the popular Tromp with his unpopular rival Admiral Witte de With (1599–1658), who followed a more aggressive approach.[221] Yet, de With failed to command respect in his sea-officers and had to push through the order to engage the superior English force. The morale was an important unquantifiable factor, and the Dutch confidence in their superiority wavered.

The first proper large-scale battle of the First Anglo-Dutch War was the Battle of the Kentish Knock on 8 October 1652. The fleets were numerically balanced only on surface, since the English warships had more than seven guns more on average than the Dutch warships. The English fleet had 45 ships with an average of 39 guns per ship, while the Dutch had 47 ships with 32 guns per ship on average (Table 4). With superior firepower and weather gauge, the English under Blake defeated the internally divided and poorly disciplined Dutch fleet under De With. Yet, because the battle started in late afternoon at around 4 or 5 pm (in October), the darkness saved the Dutch from a bigger defeat, and they only lost three ships.[222] In many sea battles of the Anglo-Dutch Wars, the night enabled the losing fleet to escape.

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[219] C. D. Curtis, 'Blake and Vendôme', *The Mariner's Mirror* 21 (1935): 56–60. J. R. Powell, 'Blake's Capture of the French Fleet before Calais on 4 September 1652', *The Mariner's Mirror* 48 (1962): 192–207. J. R. Powell, *Robert Blake, General-at-Sea* (London: Collins, 1972), 165–168. Michael Baumber, *General-at-Sea: Robert Blake and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution in Naval Warfare* (London: J. Murray, 1989), 139–140. Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, 71.

[220] One of the reasons for his temporary recall was also that Tromp was an Orangist, so the (Republican) Regents distrusted him. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 116–117.

[221] J. C. M. Warnsinck, *Drie zeventiende-eeuwsche admiraals: Piet Heyn, Witte de With, Jan Evertsen* (Amsterdam: P. N. van Kampen, 1938). Anne Doedens, *Witte de With 1599–1658: wereldwijde strijd op zee in de Gouden Eeuw* (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2008).

[222] Atkinson and Gardiner (eds.), *Letters and Papers*, II, 268–298. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 14. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 117–18.

English Fleet		Dutch Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with Guns: 45	Total Number of Guns: 1741	Total Number of Warships with Guns: 47	Total Number of Guns: 1506
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 39		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 32

Table 4. The Battle of the Kentish Knock.

The European diplomats in The Hague were shocked. The Swedish ambassador, Harald Appelboom, noted that 'until now, people claimed that the Dutch could sail, tack and fire faster than the English, but [Admiral Witte] de With writes that they have found it otherwise.'[223] The English were so confident in their success that they laid up half the fleet during winter, and sent a small squadron to the Mediterranean. On the other side, instead of recognizing the structural weaknesses of the Dutch navy, the States General looked for a personal scapegoat for the defeat.[224] De With was fired, and the *Bestevaer* Tromp was reinstated as the Dutch Admiral.[225] Tromp sailed out, escorting the merchant convoy, despite the late season for fighting on the seas, since winters did a lot of damage to the ships.

The financial aspect of the conflict should not be overlooked. Blake and the Council were aware of the Dutch movements, but they failed to respond accordingly. This was the result of the English financial problems, which led to a delay in seamen's wages and uproar among them. On the other hand, the Dutch had practically unlimited resources, since they more or less controlled the trade with the Baltic. Tromp's orders were to convoy the merchant ships through the Channel and bring the homebound vessels safely to the Dutch ports. However, he could only attack the English fleet if it was weaker than his own.

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[223] '*Man hafwer här för detta sustinerat att Hollenderne skulle myckitt snällare och snarare kunna segla, wända och skiutha än de Engelske, men de Witte skrifwer att nu hafwa befunnett contrarium.*' H. T. Colenbrander (ed.), *Bescheiden uit vreemde archieven omtrent de groote Nederlandsche zeeoorlogen 1652–1676* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1919), I, 25. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 14.

[224] Atkinson and Gardiner (eds.), *Letters and Papers*, II, 305–309.

[225] Ronald Prud'homme van Reine, *Schittering en schandaal: Biografie van Maerten en Cornelis Tromp* (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 2001).

On 10 December 1652, the two fleets engaged in the Battle at Dungeness. The weaker English fleet had more than 35 ships with around 37 guns per ship on average, while the Dutch had more than 64 ships with an average of around 31 guns per ship (Table 5). This was still a melee style of fighting – at one time four ships, the English *Anthony Bonaventure* and *Garland*, and the Dutch *Brederode* and *Hollandia*, were tied together with seamen shooting and boarding other ships. Although the Dutch won, their weaker broadsides did not do any real damage to the sturdy English ships, of which only the *Garland* and *Bonaventure* were lost.[226] Like the Dutch at the Kentish Knock, the English escaped under the cover of darkness. The victory allowed the Dutch convoys to safely enter the Dutch ports.[227]

English Fleet		Dutch Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with Guns: 35	Total Number of Guns: 1286	Total Number of Warships with Guns: 64	Total Number of Guns: 1986
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 37		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 31

Table 5. The Battle of Dungeness.

In the First Anglo-Dutch War, both fleets had problems with morale and discipline, due to many (impressed) merchantmen. During the Battle of Dungeness, several captains on both sides failed to join the fight. Although *Triumph* was saved by *Garland*, Blake initially received little help from other English ships, when the Dutch ships tried to grapple it. Likewise, despite the numerical superiority, De Ruyter was the only Dutch captain who tried to attack the bulk

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[226] Tromp wanted to pursue Blake in the Medway and offered 50 Flemish pounds to any pilot who would dare to navigate the dangerous waters of the Thames. No one accepted his lucrative yet dangerous offer, so it was only in 1667 that the Dutch executed such a maneuver during the Raid on the Medway.

[227] Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power*, 109. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 121–22. The myth spread later that a broom was hoisted on Tromp's mast representing him *sweeping away* the English from the Channel. The source of this improbable myth was the biography of Monck by his army chaplain. Thomas Gumble, *The Life of General Monck, Duke of Albemarle* (London, 1671), 57. At the time, broom hoisted to the masthead meant that the ship was for sale, so it would not make much sense. Edgar K. Thompson, 'Lashing Broom to the Fore Topmast', *The Mariner's Mirror* 59 (1973): 441–42. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 15.

of English ships, but he had to retreat, because no other Dutch ship followed him. After the reports of the poor discipline during the battle came in, the Rump Parliament increased wages for the sailors and issued a new code, the *Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea*.[228]

Other states tracked the actions of the war. Before the second season started, the Dutch Republic and Denmark concluded a Treaty of Alliance in early 1653, reiterating the 1649 treaty.[229] The treaty noted that the 'Government of England troubled all kings, republics, princes and cities with the interruption of the shipping and trade of the Netherlands on sea.' They discussed how eighteen English warships passed the Sound and threatened free trade in the Baltic Sea.[230] So, the Danish king promised to employ twenty warships 'for the security of their ships, the passage and places in the Baltic Sea.' It noted that 'this treaty will last until free shipping and trade have been re-established and the perturbators of this have been brought back to reason.'[231] They would go as far as Kattegat or Skagerrak, the two straits between the North Sea and the Sound, because the Danish king did not want to go beyond the Baltic.

There was no real break in the winter, but within their means and established strategies both fleets were ready for the second season of fighting. From 28 February to 2 March 1653, the Three Days' Battle of Portland in the English Channel was the turning point of the war. Both fleets were numerically balanced, 82 English ships against the 80 Dutch ships. However, the English ships had on average six guns more than the Dutch (Table 6). Blake's isolated division of sturdy and larger ships managed to withstand Tromp's, since the broadsides from smaller ships did not really make a dent in the English ships. The Dutch lost nine warships, more than twenty merchantmen and endured heavy casualties, as they reportedly lost over

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[228] Julian Stafford Corbett (ed.), *Fighting Instructions, 1530–1816* (London: Navy Records Society, 1905), 93.
[229] Johan E. Elias, *Schetsen uit de geschiedenis van ons zeewezen* ('s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1925), III. R. C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Baltic* (London: C. Gilbert-Wood, 1910). R. C. Anderson, 'Denmark and the First Anglo-Dutch War,' *The Mariner's Mirror* 53 (1967): 55–62. C. E. Hill, *The Danish Sound Dues and the Command of the Baltic* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1926).
[230] Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Baltic*, 71–73.
[231] The Treaty of Alliance between Denmark and the Netherlands, signed at Copenhagen, 8 February 1653.

3,500 men.[232] The English managed to blockade them, but with superior seamanship, Tromp saved most of his fleet and about half of the merchant ships in a daring and lucky night escape.

English Fleet		Dutch Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with Guns: 82	Total Number of Guns: 2984	Total Number of Warships with Guns: 80	Total Number of Guns: 2428
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 36		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 30

Table 6. The Three Days' Battle of Portland.

The Dutch temporarily tilted the balance in their favor in other regions, although with smaller impact. The situation in the Mediterranean was critical, as both states wanted the larger share of the Levant trade.[233] The squadron of English, mostly hired merchantmen was supposed to challenge the Dutch primacy in the Mediterranean. On 14 March 1653, the Dutch Commodore Johan van Galen won the Battle of Leghorn (Livorno) off the Italian coast.[234] Cornelis Tromp, son of Tromp, participated in the battle as a captain and later became a famous admiral himself. After this victory, the Dutch controlled sea trade in the Mediterranean.[235]

Although European states followed the Anglo-Dutch War, the key concern on the Continent was the war between Spain and France. After England won the Battle of Portland, the French resident in London, de Bordeaux, wrote to the French Secretary of State, Henri-Auguste de Loménie, Count of Brienne, on 10 April 1653, concerning Cromwell potentially attacking Spain as an ally of France. According to him, 'we should consider England as a state

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[232] Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 125–127. The English won, but they saw that they could not really use their full firepower potential, so this led to the above-mentioned tactical changes and Fighting Instructions, i.e. the 'Instructions for the better ordering of the Fleet in Fighting.' Corbett (ed.), *Fighting Instructions*.

[233] R. C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559–1853* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 121–184.

[234] R. C. Anderson, 'English Fleet-Lists in the First Dutch War', *The Mariner's Mirror* 24 (1938): 429–450.

[235] *Hollandtsche Victorye, Verkregen op de Engelsche Door den Manhaften Zee-heldt Jan van Galen* (Leiden: Willem van Rijnenburgh, 1653). R. C. Anderson, 'The First Dutch War in the Mediterranean', *The Mariner's Mirror* 49 (1963): 241–265. Sigmond, Kloek, *Sea Battles*, 82–91. Palmer, *Command at Sea*, 43.

capable of tilting the balance.'[236] Thinking of alliances was one of the key contexts in which the balance-of-power idea was used constantly. In another anonymous letter of intelligence from Paris on 25 October 1653, the claim was repeated, saying that 'in fact, their presence is more necessary there than here, because it is important to hold the Spaniards in balance.'[237]

The Spanish diplomacy, on the other hand, focused on the Dutch. On 12 June 1653, the first Spanish resident ambassador in The Hague, Antoine Brun, wrote to the States General that Spain did not want the Dutch to ally with France. This potential Franco-Dutch alliance could 'furnish sufficient arguments for his majesty to find out reciprocal precautions and preventions, to which his majesty would never hearken nor think on till now.' Brun even referenced that the peace of 1648 should not be threatened and that 'they will now by their ordinary prudence put all things into an equal balance.' Thus, 'neither directly nor indirectly should they put any marks of partiality between the two crowns, nor give occasion of offence and resentment to the king his master by any manner of damage whatsoever.'[238] However, neither England nor the Dutch Republic were in any position to allocate any resources to another war.

By early June, both fleets were at full operational strength. On 12 and 13 June 1653, during the Battle of the Gabbard, the English had 101 ships, while the Dutch had 104 ships. Following the fixed trend, the English ships had on average more than eight guns more than the Dutch (Table 7). Although the adoption of the line-ahead tactic had limited effect in 1653, it gave the English the crucial edge. The Dutch fleet, on the other hand, still followed the melee tactics, with Tromp relying on his superior seamanship. Due to good weather, the English ships fired heavier broadsides, killing and wounding men on the upper decks, while the Dutch could

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[236] '…*& que nous devions considerer l'Angleterre comme l'estat, qui est capable de faire pancher la balance.*' Thomas Birch (ed.), *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe* [henceforth Thurloe State Papers] (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), I, 233.

[237] '*En effect leur presence est pour encore plus necessaire là qu'icy; car il leur importe de tenir les Espagnols en balance, & divertir le nouveau siege qu'ils meditent. C'est tout le fruict qu'elles pretendent de la tentative, qu'on fait contre St. Menehoud, avec moins d'espoir de la prendre que de rencontrer occasion de clorre la campaigne par quelque combat, si mons. le prince y vient au secours en resolution d'attaquer les François dans leurs advantages.*' Thurloe State Papers, I, 544.

[238] Thurloe State Papers, I, 142.

not close and board the English. The English sank ten Dutch ships and took eleven. This victory also allowed the English to blockade the Dutch ports.[239]

English Fleet		Dutch Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with Guns: 101	Total Number of Guns: 3822	Total Number of Warships with Guns: 104	Total Number of Guns: 3085
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 38		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 30

Table 7. The Battle of the Gabbard.

Figure 9. Heerman Witmont, Battle of the Gabbard. This grisaille shows the engagement between the two most powerful ships of each fleet, the *Brederode* of 54 guns against the *Resolution* (former and later *Prince Royal*) of 88 guns.

Tromp understood the consequences of this tactical development. This signified that as long as the English maintained its line-ahead arrangement, the less heavily built Dutch fleet would fight at a disadvantage. Tromp vocally requested changes and wrote a letter to the States General on 14 June 1653 from *Brederode*. He warned that 'the enemies this morning in our

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[239] Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 128–130.

presence being recruited unto the number of far above one hundred stout ships of war,' so he was in 'great necessity of ammunition.' Still henceforth, 'the state hath nothing to expect but affronts, humanely spoken, considering the present strength of the enemies.'[240] Claiming such high numbers was not a hyperbole anymore. Only a few weeks later, Tromp noted again that 'the ships and guns of our fleet are too slender and small in comparison of those of the enemy, and so we want greater ships and greater guns, as also number of men.'[241]

The experienced admiral tried to use different types of ships to his advantage and adopted asymmetric warfare. In the final battle of the First Anglo-Dutch War, at the Battle of Scheveningen on 10 August 1653 both fleets had 106 ships, but the English had on average more than six guns more than the Dutch (Table 8). Tromp tried to break the English line by using fireships. After some initial success, the English fleet was able to regain the initiative, pound their way to victory with superior firepower and kill Tromp in the process.[242] Apart from quantitative losses, the qualitative loss of a skilled leader was immense. Witte de With said to the States General, 'I can and must say that the English are now our masters and command the sea.'[243] However, England achieved only a Pyrrhic victory; they needed to repair their warships and temporarily lifted the blockade.[244] This allowed the lucrative VOC vessels to return to Dutch ports, and allowed the Dutch to also claim 'victory.'

English Fleet		Dutch Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with Guns: 106	Total Number of Guns: 3937	Total Number of Warships with Guns: 106	Total Number of Guns: 3305
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 37		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 31

Table 8. The Battle of Scheveningen.

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[240] Thurloe State Papers, I, 170–171.
[241] Thurloe State Papers, I, 339.
[242] Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 131–32.
[243] Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 17.
[244] TNA ADM 7/674.

Figure 10. Willem van de Welde the Elder, *Zeeslag bij Ter Heide* (Scheveningen) in 1653, painted in 1657. In such sea battles, so much gun smoke covered the air that visibility was very limited and it enhanced to the chaotic nature of the naval warfare.

The news of the Dutch defeat had an immediate effect on the Dutch allies and enemies. In one month and a half after the defeat, Denmark annulled the 1649 Treaty for the Redemption of the Sound Dues for the Dutch Republic and restored the tariffs.[245] The Danes recognized the limited Dutch sea power and reneged earlier exemptions for the defeated Dutch, although they signed another alliance treaty less than eight months before. In November, Sweden considered allying with England to go against the Dutch-Danish pact. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Dutch had to surrender Recife to the Portuguese Governor of Pernambuco.[246]

Just before the final defeat in August 1653, on 23 July, the young Johan de Witt (1625–1672) was elected the Grand Pensionary of Holland, effectively making him the leader of the Dutch Republic, considering the role of Holland. De Witt claimed that 'any war is an obstacle

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[245] The Treaty between Denmark and the Netherlands signed at Copenhagen, 26 September 1653.
[246] The Capitulations between the Portuguese and Netherlands forces, signed at Torbada, 26 January 1654.

to freedom.'[247] Although the official policy of the Dutch Republic was peace for the benefits of trade, De Witt understood the importance of a strong navy for trade.[248] In 1653, the States General directed the building of 60 new two-decked warships, armed with at least forty or sixty guns; most of them still had no more than 54 guns like *Brederode*. Crucially, these 60 new warships were state property, so individual admiralties could not sell them after the war, as they did after earlier conflicts.[249] Although it was too late to change the outcome of the First Anglo-Dutch War, it brought the Dutch fleet to parity with the English by the next war.

Privateering was a very important aspect of the Anglo-Dutch Wars, since it affected one of the sinews of sea power, trade. The First Anglo-Dutch War was a disaster for the Dutch, as they arguably lost over 1,250 merchant ships to English privateers;[250] the Dutch took 300 to 400 smaller English merchant ships. With thousands of merchant ships at sea, the Dutch were unable to protect their trade from the predatory English raids in the Channel nor could they retaliate effectively since the English shipping was much smaller.[251] Defeat at sea meant that trade, the lifeblood of the Republic, was practically choked off. At the same time, the royalist privateers still operated a robust *guerre de course* against the English trade.[252]

The English were better prepared for privateering, as seen in the intelligence reports. An anonymous intelligencer for the English in The Hague wrote on 4 February 1654 that 'our

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[247] '[…] *alle oorlogh is een beletsel vande exercitie vande vryheyt.*' Johan de Witt, *Deductie, ofte declaratie van de Staten van Hollandt ende West-Vrieslandt* (The Hague: weduwe en erven Hillebrant Jacobsz. van Wouw, 1654), 36. Herbert Harvey Rowen, *John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1625–1672* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), 383–84. Eco Haitsma Mulier, 'The Language of Seventeenth-Century Republicanism in the United Provinces: Dutch or European?,' in Anthony Pagden (ed.), *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 179–96.

[248] Johanna K. Oudendijk, *Johan De Witt en de Zeemacht* (Amsterdam: N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1944), 3–56.

[249] Johan Engelbert Elias, *De vlootbouw in Nederland in de eerste helft der 17e eeuw, 1596–1655* (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche uitgeversmaatschappij, 1933). J. R. Bruijn, *The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), 59–63.

[250] Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 29. The exact numbers are not known, but the safe estimates lie between 1,000 and 1,500 captured Dutch merchant vessels by the English privateers and warships. Bruijn, *The Dutch Navy*, 62.

[251] Cromwell knew that commerce was the 'soul and welfare' or the *salus populi* for the Dutch nation. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 85.

[252] Jack Abernethy, 'Flying the late King's Colours': Royalist privateering during the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1652–1654', *The Mariner's Mirror* 109 (2023): 19–37.

fleet, to the number of forty ships, is gone to the coast of St. Helen's [near Liverpool]; a like

number cruiseth upon the French coast, against the rovers of Brest.' The English were also

aware of the Dutch shipbuilding plans, 'fitting out at Tilbury Hope a new fleet, viz. 15 of sixty,

and 15 of forty guns, wherewith the Soverain is to go to sea. But it is hoped, that the peace will

alter the design of this armament to something else. They are still bringing in daily a vast many

prizes.' However, he concluded that 'the chief thing, which every body gives now by his

attention to, is the peace between the two republicks.'[253]

Figure 11. In February 1654, an intelligencer in the Dutch Republic sent this ship list to London. The warships are listed with guns for the Dutch admiralties and where they 'go out.'

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[253] Thurloe State Papers, II, 39–53.

The Treaty of Westminster from April 1654 concluded the First Anglo-Dutch War. The terms of the treaty were relatively gracious for the Dutch, considering their crushing defeats in 1653. The treaty recognized a 'firm and inviolable Peace,' defense of common rights 'by Sea and Land,' and free trade in Asia.[254] It also stated that 'the ships of the United Provinces shall strike their flag to the men of war of the republic of England in the British seas, as has been heretofore accustomed.' Furthermore, 'it is agreed that all injuries, charges, and damages that either party has sustained from the other since the 18/28 of May, 1652, shall be blotted out and forgotten.'[255] This *oblivion* or amnesty was an important aspect of early modern treaties. Because the potential calculations of all the damages could take years of accounting and litigation, they usually reached such pragmatic (ab)solutions.

The peace also included the secret exclusion of the Houses of Orange and Stuart from power. This could not be done publicly in the Dutch Republic where the landward provinces, with their strong aristocratic representation, could block it. Thus, De Witt acted only through the States of Holland to secure the Act of Seclusion.[256] It stated that 'they think proper never to elect any prince of Orange, or any of their issue, for their stadtholder or admiral of their provinces.'[257] Although the States General elected these officers, it would be impossible for anyone to hold them without the consent of the largest and richest province (Holland).[258]

In connection to the Act of Seclusion, in August 1654, Johan de Witt published *Deductie* or Deduction. In the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, deductions were elaborate statements or speeches designed to defend a specific perspective. Since several provinces, especially Zeeland, Groningen, and Friesland, attacked Holland and De Witt regarding the

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[254] The Treaty between England and the Netherlands, signed at Westminster, 5 April 1654.

[255] Règlement pursuant to the Treaty of Peace between England and the Netherlands, 30 August 1654.

[256] David Onnekink, Gijs Rommelse, *The Dutch in the Early Modern World: A History of a Global Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 100. The 'secret' article did not remain secret for long.

[257] Secret Article of Declaration between England and Holland and West Friesland, signed at The Hague, 4 May 1654.

[258] John B. Wolf, *Toward a European Balance of Power, 1620–1715* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970), 37–38.

legality and morality of acting against the House of Orange, he had to justify the Act of Seclusion. De Witt presented the history of the Dutch Republic and showed how the new Act did not violate the Union of Utrecht. He argued that hereditary power was contrary to '*de Ware Vrijheid*' or True Freedom. Among other things, De Witt also wrote that 'navigation and commerce [are] the soul and sheer subsistence of the state.'[259]

Only a few days after the treaty was signed in London, in a letter of intelligence from the Dutch Republic on 24 April 1654, John Adams wrote that 'some wise men are of opinion, that it will not be ballanced without a new war; the reason is, because many of our grandees are partners in the East India company.'[260] This was a perfect synopsis for the inherently ambiguous balance of power. The gun smoke had not scattered yet, and Adams already foretold a new war that would be fought since the relationship had not been balanced. As often the case with the balance-of-power theory, what constituted a just balance depended on the outlook.

In the months following the signing of the Treaty of Westminster, England signed trade treaties with several states. All treaties noted that the trade was supposed to be free, but with the caveat for the Navigation Act. It was clear who the main commercial rival of the English was, since the treaties explicitly or implicitly referenced the Dutch. The treaty with Portugal stated that 'whereas the King did by his rescript of the 21st of January 1641, grant to the Dutch free liberty of trade to all his dominions, the people of the republic of England shall use and enjoy the same liberty.'[261] The treaty with the Danish king also explicitly mentioned the Dutch, noting that 'the people of the republic shall not in any of the King's dominions pay any greater or other duties than the Dutch or any other nations pay.'[262]

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[259] De Witt, *Deductie*. This Deduction made him many enemies among the Orangist faction within the Dutch Republic. Serge ter Braake, *De Deductie van Johan de Witt: manifest van de ware vrijheid uit 1654* (Arnhem: Sonsbeek Publishers, 2009). Luc Panhuysen, *De ware vrijheid: de levens van Johan en Cornelis de Witt*, 6th edition (Amsterdam and Antwerp: Uitgeverij Atlas, 2007).

[260] Thurloe State Papers, II, 219–233.

[261] The Treaty between England and Portugal, signed at Westminster, 10 (20) July 1654.

[262] The Treaty between England and Denmark, signed at Westminster, 15 September 1654.

Throughout the 1650s, England's politics in the Baltic Sea was more inclined to Sweden. In the treaty with Sweden, 'all impediments to navigation and commerce shall be instantly removed on both sides […] trade shall be absolutely free and unconfined in their respective dominions, and the subjects have all the privileges, exemptions, and immunities, which any foreigners have in either.' So, although the Dutch were not mentioned here explicitly, it was quite clear who was the main target. The treaty added that 'the present treaty shall derogate nothing from the rights of dominion either claim in their respective seas.'[263] Both England and Sweden were claiming the sovereignty 'in their respective seas.'

After the First Anglo-Dutch War concluded, the resources freed both states to become involved in broader European conflicts.[264] England had to choose between Spain and France. Cromwell had to make a difficult decision between which one to back and which one to attack. On 15 May 1654, an intelligencer wrote from Paris to London that 'the wisest of them do much desire an agreement between his highness [Cromwell] and France.' The potential Anglo-French alliance would 'balance the things, that the weakness of the present government of France may last, whereof both England and they would draw all the advantage, which could be imagined in this conjuncture.'[265] Thus, Cromwell went to war against Spain in 1654, but not as an open French ally. In their trade treaty, the logic of the balance of sea power was present as 'free and impartial equality shall be preserved in the commerce of the two nations.'[266]

The decision to support France was later harshly criticized with the benefit of hindsight. For instance, in 1668, Slingsby Bethel (1617–1697), although a known republican, published a pamphlet that criticized Cromwell, who 'neglected all our golden opportunities, misimproved the Victory God had given us over the United Netherlands.' Moreover, 'contrary to our Interest,

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[263] The Treaty between England and Sweden, signed at Uppsala, 11 April 1654.
[264] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance*, 39–40.
[265] Thurloe State Papers, II, 259–272.
[266] The Trade Treaty between Great Britain and France, signed at Westminster, 3 November 1655. A year later, the Dutch joined this commercial treaty. The Accession of the Netherlands to the Treaty between England and France of (3) November 1655, effected at Paris, 20 April 1656.

[he] made an unjust Warr with Spain, and an impollitick League with France, bringing the first thereby under, and making the latter too great for Christendome.' Consequently, this led to the breaking of 'the balance betwixt the two Crowns of Spain, and France.'[267] Bethel wanted a dynamic foreign policy with no fixed alliances and following the common sense of always going against the stronger. However, in the early 1650s, France had to capitulate several cities to Spain, just finished the Fronde, and arguably was or at least seemed a weaker party.[268]

At first, Cromwell attacked the Spanish trade and colonies without officially allying with France. In May 1655, England invaded and occupied Jamaica. However, France wanted English support in Europe. In spring 1656, William Lockhart, the English Ambassador to Paris, wrote to secretary and spymaster John Thurloe (1616–68) that he 'consithered that the advantages would arise to England from his highnesse haveing a interest in the continent, might over-ballance the disadvantage of condescending to some little particulars, that they had so tenaciously stuck upon.' Moreover, he warned that 'if the Spanyard were not vigorosly attacked in Flanders, (which I did not see the French in a condition to doe without your assistance) that they might have spared a considerable body of men for the carrying on Ch. Stewart's designs against England.'[269] The exiled (King) Charles (II) was a neuralgic point for Cromwell.

Indeed, Spain also allied with 'England,' i.e. the exiled (King) Charles (II). In the years after his exile from Britain, Charles had been living in Paris on Louis's grant until 1654, when he had to leave France for the Spanish Netherlands. In 1656, Charles signed the Treaty of Brussels with Spain. The Spanish king Philip IV promised to help Charles to get back on the English throne with 4,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry for the invasion of England. On the other

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[267] Slingsby Bethel, *The World's Mistake in Oliver Cromwell, or, A Short Political Discourse: Shewing That Cromwell's Mal-Administration, during His Four Years and Nine Moneths Pretended Protectorship, Layed the Foundation of Our Present Condition in the Decay of Trade* (London: s.n., 1668), 3–4.

[268] Jean-Nicolas de Parival, *The history of this iron age wherein is set down the true state of Europe as it was in the year 1500: also, the original and causes of all the warres, and commotions that have happened: together with a description of the most memorable battels, sieges, actions and transactions, both in court and camp from that time till this present year 1656*, translated by B. Harris (London: E. Tyler, 1656).

[269] Thurloe State Papers, VI, 100–116.

hand, once Charles was reinstated, he had to help Spain with 'twelve warships, two with 60 guns, two with 50 guns, four with 36 guns, the most part of them bronze, manned all the said twelve ships at least at the rate of three Sailors per gun.'[270] This alliance treaty already shows how ships below certain firepower were not deemed battleworthy, although they still used warships with less than 36 guns. Charles also promised to return any colonies that the English have taken from Spain since 1630 (Jamaica), which Charles II never did.

The public opinion in England was very pro-French in the 1650s.[271] In spring 1657, the Protestant Puritan Cromwell openly allied with the Catholic Cardinal Mazarin against Spain.[272] Both also obliged themselves to help one another with troops, money and ships. Cromwell had to deliver 36 to 40 strong warships to France.[273] They divided their spheres of interest; France got the potentially conquered territories in Spain, while England could keep conquered cities in the Spanish Netherlands. Cromwell favored trade and sea power, and he was not interested in the power on the Continent. Yet, in 1658, the combined Franco-English army under Marshal Turenne besieged and took Dunkirk, the most important Spanish privateer base.[274]

The Dutch worried about the English in Dunkirk. Only a month after Dunkirk fell into the English hands, the new English resident in The Hague, George Downing (1623–84), wrote a report to Thurloe. Downing wrote that 'as for Dunkerk, he [De Witt] sayd, that it was true,

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[270] '…*doce Navios de Guerra, dos de à sesenta piezas de cañon, dos de à cinquenta, quatro de à treinta y seis, la mayor parte de ellas de bronce, tripulados todos los dichos doce Navios por lo menos à razon de tres Marineros por pieza de cañon*' The Secret Treaty between Spain and England, signed at Brussels, 12 April 1656.

[271] Robert Cotton, *Warrs with forregin princes dangerous to our common-wealth: or, Reasons for forreign wars answered With a list of all the confederates from Henry the firsts reign to the end of Queen Elizabeth. Proving, that the kings of England always preferred unjust peace, before the justest warre* (London: William Shears, 1657). Anon., *The grand differences between France, Spain, and the Empire with their severall titles, claimes, and pretences to each others dominions, discussed and stated / by an impartiall hand; very necessary for the cleare understanding of the present commotions, and the great affaires of Europe* (London: Henry Herringman, 1657). Anon., *A Judicious view of the businesses which are at this time between France and the house of Austria. Most usefull, to know the present posture of the affairs of all Christendom* (London: Henry Herringman, 1657).

[272] The Treaty between France and England, 23 March 1657.

[273] The Treaty between France and England, signed at Paris, 9 May 1657.

[274] The Treaty between France and England, signed at Paris, 28 March 1658. Ironically, the English action against the French relieving force in 1652 allowed the Spaniards to conquer Dunkirk. One of the reasons for holding Dunkirk was also to limit the damage done by the privateers. Charles Harding Firth, 'Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders, 1657–1662', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* XVII (1902): 67–119.

that, while it was in the hands of the Spanyards, by piratry, it had done great mischiefe to particular persons; but more than that it could never doe, the king of Spain being very weake at sea.' However, 'being in the hands of English, who have such a navell strength, it might in time, in case of a rupture, become dangerous to the very foundations of their state.' Downing replied 'that if they [the Dutch] would quit their new maxime of ballancing all the world, with which they have thriven very ill, and keep to their old maxime, which their first prince of Orange left them, of continuing well with and depending upon England.'[275] In this context, the Dutch 'new maxime of ballancing' implied giving laws to other states and was negative, while their 'old maxime' of 'depending upon England' was positive.

The Anglo-Dutch conflict had its echoes in the East Indies. An incident between the Dutch warship and an English East Indiaman *Society* in April 1657 reached London in January 1658.[276] According to his speech, Cromwell 'was much incensed, considering it an affront to the English nation.' Yet, he expressed a Realpolitik understanding of international politics. He noted that if the English 'claim supremacy here in the Ocean, and the Dutch have accepted it, it is not reasonable that they [the Dutch] should lord it in Indian waters as well, where they [the English] have no possessions and where the Dutch dominate.' Moreover, 'if the English claim to search the Dutch to prevent them carrying Spanish goods, they cannot complain if the Dutch retaliate by taking care that they do not oblige their open enemies the Portuguese in any way.'[277] Still, Cromwell partially blamed the Dutch for using the Anglo-Spanish War, since Spain closed its harbors to the English traders, and the Dutch merchants took over their share of the trade. Cromwell claimed that the Dutch were 'a people who preferred gain to godliness.'[278]

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[275] Thurloe State Papers, VI, 245–253.
[276] Ethel Bruce Sainsbury, William Foster (eds.), *A Calendar of the Court Minutes, etc., of the East India Company, 1655–1659* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916), 215–217.
[277] 'Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, 8 February 1658', *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1931), XXXI, 157–169. In the same speech, he did not forget to accuse the Dutch that they cherished 'a secret and most ardent devotion for the interests of the Spaniards.'
[278] Charles Harding Firth, *The Last Years of the Protectorate, 1656–1658* (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1909), II, 25–28.

During the Anglo-Spanish War (1654–1660), the English merchantmen were raided by the Spanish Dunkirkers, and the unrecognized privateering by the Dutch and French in the Channel. The English suffered significant losses. Bethel later noted that the privateers captured 1,500 English merchant ships during the 'Spanish War.'[279] Though he likely exaggerated, it was a considerable loss. By 1659, practically every English merchant was demanding peace. Cromwell was faced with a difficult decision, but his contemporaries changed the tune to 'Make Wars with Dutchmen, peace with Spain,/ Then we shall have money and Trading again.'[280] It allowed the Dutch to regain the trade advantage it had lost during the First War.

The war between France and Spain ended with the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. In general, 1659 was considered as the final nail in the coffin of the declining Spanish Empire and the rise of France, although it was a treaty between equals. As David Parrott noted, 'the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees were more obviously a compromise reflecting an existing balance of forces than a military *diktat* imposed by victorious powers.'[281] France received some territorial gains and strengthened its frontiers in the south and north. Part of the settlement was also a marriage treaty between Louis XIV and the Infanta, Maria Theresa of Spain, who had to renounce all claims to the Spanish throne for herself and her heirs.[282] This marriage and the (undelivered) dowry would later cause several conflicts.

Another major conflict was happening in the Baltic. England and the Dutch Republic became involved in a conflict between Denmark and Sweden, the Second Northern War (1655–1660).[283] It was not in English or Dutch interests that either Scandinavian state possess the Baltic exclusively. In an anonymous letter of intelligence from The Hague to London in August 1655, it was stated that 'if Amsterdam looks for a true equality between Sweden and Denmark,

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279 Bethel, *The World's Mistake in Oliver Cromwell*, 9.
280 Anon., *King Charles his glory, and rebels shame* (London: s.n., 1660).
281 Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, 77–78.
282 The Treaty between France and Spain, signed at the Isle of Pheasants, 7 November 1659. The Contract of Marriage between the King of France and the Infanta Maria Teresa of Spain, signed at Paris, 7 November 1659.
283 The conflict was broader and it included Poland and Brandenburg that fought against Sweden on the continent.

they should aid Sweden to win the rest of the East Sea: because then the Swedes and Danes would be truly equal.' Moreover, 'the States of Amsterdam (as well as the Protector) would know with little difficulty how to make the balance go in whatever direction they wanted.'[284] The balance of power was used as propaganda to diminish the potential overbearing power.

At the time, Denmark controlled the entrance into the Baltic, the Sound, and it was allied with the Dutch. Therefore, England concluded a treaty with Sweden on 17 July 1656. This treaty was interesting, because it explicitly listed what was considered contraband, prohibited to ship to the England's belligerent, Spain.[285] Among many types of weapons, they added 'pitch, tar, hemp, cables, sailcloth, or masts,' which shows how strategic the shipbuilding materials were.[286] In response to this alliance, some two months later, the Dutch confirmed their alliance with Denmark to ensure free trade in the Baltic Sea. This was a response to the Swedish designs of conquering the city of Danzig, which was often mentioned in diplomatic dispatches. The Dutch promised to use warships to keep Danzig free.[287]

England also considered taking a more active role in the Baltic. On 18 January 1658, Thurloe wrote to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, Henry Cromwell, that 'the affaires of the East doe remeyne much in one posture; if there be any alteration, it is, that the Swede seemes to declyne, all Prussia beinge in danger to be taken from hym.' Thurloe continued that 'the Dutch are alsoe arminge against hym, and will have a very great fleet ready by the springe. This occasions his highnes to sett forth alsoe a very great fleet, that wee may be some ballance to these states, and to defend our owne comonwealth. Our necessities of money will be encreased by this, and the parliament can only help us.'[288] As in any classical arms, or in this case naval,

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[284] Thurloe State Papers, III, 690–706.
[285] The Treaty between Sweden and England, signed at London, 17 July 1656.
[286] The Convention relating to the second Article in the Treaty betwixt Sweden and England, signed at Westminster, 17 July 1656.
[287] The Treaty between Denmark and the Netherlands, signed at Copenhagen, 16 August 1656. They also revived the redemption of Sound Dues for the Dutch. The Treaty between Denmark and the Netherlands, signed at Copenhagen, 27 June 1657. Denmark also allied with Poland against the expansion of Sweden, as they were also exposed on the land. The Treaty between Denmark and Poland, signed at Copenhagen, 28 July 1657.
[288] Thurloe State Papers, VII, 586–594.

race, both states were attentive of each other arming. England had no money to wage another war, but Oliver Cromwell sent a squadron of ships to the Baltic to try to balance the Dutch.

In February 1658, Swedish army crossed the frozen straits and took the Danish island of Zealand. After this crushing defeat, Denmark sued for peace. The preliminary peace that (temporarily) ended the war between Frederick III and Charles X Gustav was achieved soon thereafter. England and the Dutch Republic were assigned as mediators to ensure the safe ratification of the treaty. The Treaty of Roskilde from March 1658 was agreeable to the English and Dutch, but not to the combatants, as Denmark lost the provinces of Bornholm, Blekinge, Bohuslän, Trøndelag, and Scania, while Sweden had to stop its onslaught.[289] Both England and the Dutch Republic broke their alliances to show sincerity for this balanced outcome.

However, the hostilities between Denmark and Sweden did not end there, as neither side was happy with the Treaty of Roskilde. Although the Baltic was important to England, it was essential to the Dutch Republic. At the time, the Dutch commercial fleet still outnumbered the English by more than ten to one.[290] In March 1658, Thurloe wrote to Downing that he was concerned with the news that 48 Dutch 'ships of warre' were readied, although he was not sure where they were planning to go, 'either to us, or Sweden, or both; viz. to hinder us in Flanders, and the Swede in the Baltique sea.'[291] A couple of weeks later, Downing had to 'pray informe yourselfe what strength De Ruyter's ships are of, whither they are bound, and when the rest of their fleet will be ready, and what their number and strength will certeinely be.'[292] Diplomats were aware and wanted to know the sea power of other states.

The diplomats discussed the animosity in the Baltic, with England trying to limit the ambitions of her former ally. On 17 July 1658, Downing wrote to Thurloe that 'the jealousy, which the king of Swethland gives of his intentions to besiege Dantzick, by sending shipps

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[289] The Preliminary Treaty between Sweden and Denmark, signed at Taastrup, 18 February 1658.
[290] Wilson, *Profit and Power*, 42.
[291] Thurloe State Papers, VII, 31–32.
[292] Thurloe State Papers, VII, 55–64.

before the towne, doth great hurt here.' Downing criticized the Lord Protector, because the Swedish king persuaded Cromwell to work 'to his advantage, and the prejudice of England.' It was clear to Downing that it was against England's interest 'that any one person should be so powerfull in the Baltick sea, whereby, in case of rupture with Swethland, England shall be put to such extremityes for the commodityes of that sea, beside the danger of invasion from him, when so powerfull at land and sea.'[293] The diplomats realized that it would be imprudent and even foolish to let one power rule alone in the Baltic and control both sides of the Sound. The Dutch sent a fleet and army to protect the Danish against the invading enemy, as soon as they heard that the Swedish army and navy were on the move.

Figure 12. Frederik Christian Lund, The Dutch fleet enters the Sound on 8 November 1658, past Kronborg Castle, which was already under Swedish occupation. The Dutch fleet kept close to the other side of the Sound, thus out of reach of the Kronborg cannons.

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[293] Thurloe State Papers, VII, 245–253. On the other hand, Downing praised Cromwell's positive management of France, which worked 'to the advantage of England; for that, sayth he, France can get nothing by this alliance soe considerable as to counterballance the hazard they run by giving the English a footing upon the continent.'

Already in the early summer of 1658, the Swedish king Charles X Gustav attacked and besieged Copenhagen, without any declaration of war. On 8 November 1658, during the Battle of the Sound, the Dutch fleet under the Admiral Jacob van Wassenaer Obdam had 41 warships, while the Swedish fleet had 45 warships. Although the Swedes fought hard, the Dutch had the weather gauge, and the Swedish fleet had to end the blockade of Copenhagen. The Dutch lost only one ship to the Swedish five, *Brederode* with Vice Admiral Witte de With, while they managed to capture four Swedish ships and destroy one. The casualties in men were high on both sides. De Witt instructed Obdam that he had to protect Copenhagen against anyone trying to take it, which implicitly also meant the English, if they helped the former Swedish allies.[294] The English fleet observed the battle from the distance and did not engage.

On 2 December 1658, Downing wrote to secretary Thurloe again concerning the power (im)balance between Sweden and Denmark in the Baltic Sea. He argued that his Dutch source told him that 'unless those two kingdoms be somewhat evenly ballanced in their power, they would be perpetually in war, and consequently this state put to a perpetual charge in defending the one of them.'[295] This balance-of-power argument was in contrast to the perennial imperial argument that empires, universal monarchies or any superior states force peace through their superior power. The search for the balance of sea power in the Baltic was one of the crucial themes in the Anglo-Dutch conflict in the mid-seventeenth century. Both states needed the Baltic trade and they understood how expensive and exhaustive the new war would be.

However, on the same day, Downing expanded his criticism of the Dutch by claiming that 'the truth is, they would give the law to all Europe, and not receive it from any, and have England, and France, and every body else, steer after their compass.' Moreover, 'their north pole is their traffick, measuring all things only by that, without any other considerations

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[294] Jan Glete, *Swedish Naval Administration, 1521–1721: Resource Flows and Organisational Capabilities* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 180.
[295] Thurloe State Papers, VII, 522–529.

whatsoever, and in which they are not willing any body else should have the least share.'[296] This suspected capability to dictate law to others (in Europe) was considered the biggest threat at the time, and in clear violation of Vattel's definition of the balance of power.

Contemporaries thought that Denmark lost too much to be able to balance Sweden. On 7 July 1659, Willem Nieupoort, the Dutch ambassador to England, wrote to the Council of State of England that both states needed 'to settle the peace betwixt the two Northern kings.' With a new peace, 'thereby the king of Denmark might in some measure be able to balance the great power of Sweden,' which was not only just but also in 'true interest of England, as well as the state of the United Provinces.'[297] A week later, Nieupoort wrote that 'the balance and the counterpoise between the Northern kings and kingdoms hath been very prudently always maintained by the states and princes interested in the preservation of the liberty and just freedom of the navigation and commerce in the Baltic Sea.'[298]

Both England and the Dutch Republic were content with the outcome of the balanced truce in the Baltic. On 10 August 1659, even the English commissioners in the Sound reported to Thurloe that it was 'not only the just cause of an oppressed prince, but our own interest, which was nearly concerned in maintaining Denmark, to be a balance to the power of Sweden.' They continued that if Sweden got 'the intire mastery of the Sound and the Baltic sea, [it] would prove troublesome to all his neighbours, which should have occasion to trade there.'[299] There was a general content among the European states that 'the Northern crowns [were] balanced, [and] the free commerce of the East sea maintained.'[300]

Sweden, following the *vae victis* rule, did not want to give away any new conquests. Tensions were high and, with the four fleets in the Baltic in 1659, there was a high chance for

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[296] Thurloe State Papers, VII, 522–529.
[297] Thurloe State Papers, VII, 688.
[298] Thurloe State Papers, VII, 695.
[299] Thurloe State Papers, VII, 719–736.
[300] Thurloe State Papers, VII, 736–752.

escalation. A special treaty was signed between England, France and the Dutch Republic to force peace in the Baltic, by sending the Anglo-Dutch fleet to force this treaty.[301] In the spring of 1660, the peace was settled with a series of treaties (Oliva, Copenhagen, Cardis), which ended the Second Northern War. There were standard articles on the 'perpetual and irrevocable peace' (*perpetua & irrevocabilis Pax*),[302] and the Dutch Republic was the peace's guarantor.

The interactive balancing and shifting of the balance of sea power was on the minds of European statesmen and seamen. As seen from the above example in the Baltic, the struggle for the balance of sea power between England and the Dutch Republic also had its proxy wars. By the mid-seventeenth century, the concept of the balance of power had become central for solving conflicts in Europe. It was discussed among the diplomats, statesmen, and intelligencers. As contemporaries saw it, it was prudence and often providence, which maintained the balance of power among states.

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[301] The Treaty between France, England and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 21 May 1659. The Treaty between England and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 24 July 1659.
[302] The Treaty of Peace between Sweden and Denmark, signed at Copenhagen, 27 May 1660.

The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–67) and the Triple Alliance (1668)

In 1660, after decades of war, Europe was at peace. The Treaties of Westphalia, Pyrenees and Oliva more or less pacified the whole Continent. This peace, however, did not sit well with the plans of Louis XIV, who started ruling alone on 10 March 1661, a day after Mazarin had died. In his *Mémoires* intended for his son, Louis wrote that it was 'unfortunate to have a peace more profound than anyone had seen in centuries […] at my age, the pleasure of being at the head of my armies made me desire for a little more action abroad.' He continued that 'peace was established with my neighbors evidently for as long as I would wish to maintain it.'[303] Louis analyzed the international relations and said that France did not need to fear Spain, England was amical to France, while the Dutch Republic was focused only on their trade. However, for the rest of his life, France would be the most feared state in Europe.[304]

It was with the Restoration in 1660 that the international priorities started to shift in England. Perhaps the most famous English diarist was on the ship, which brought Charles II from The Hague to Dover in May 1660. On 25 September, noting the shift of foreign focus, the secretary of the Navy Board, Samuel Pepys, discussed with his colleagues that 'the interest of this Kingdom [is] to have a peace with Spain and a war with France and Holland.'[305] At the coronation of Charles II in 1661, the procession in London passed beneath a triumphal gateway known as the Mariner's Gate. The arch contained a depiction of Neptune with the inscription, 'to the British Neptune, Charles II, by whose decision the seas are either free or closed.'[306]

[303] '*C'eût été sans doute mal jouir d'une si parfaite tranquillité, qu'on rencontrerait quelquefois à peine en plusieurs siècles, que de ne la pas employer au seul usage qui me la pouvait faire estimer, pendant que mon âge et le plaisir d'être à la tête de mes armées, m'auraient fait souhaiter un peu plus d'affaires au-dehors.*' Louis XIV, *Mémoires* (Paris: Tallandier, 2007), 60.
[304] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance*, 2.
[305] Samuel Pepys, Diary, 25 September 1660.
[306] The inscription was in Latin: '*NEPTUNO BRITANNICO, CAROLO II, CUIUS ARBITRIO MARE VEL LIBERUM, VEL CLAUSUM.*' John Ogilby, *The Entertainment of His Most Excellent Majestie Charles II, in his passage through the city of London to his coronation containing an exact accompt of the whole solemnity, the triumphal arches, and cavalcade, delineated in sculpture, the speeches and impresses illustrated from antiquity: to these is added, a brief narrative of His Majestie's solemn coronation* (London: s.n., 1662), 51.

The Dutch, on the other hand, were also becoming more afraid of their former allies, the French and the English, than their former Catholic masters, the Spaniards. The Dutch Republic did not want France on its southern border and wanted a proper *barrier*. Even more problematic was the question of Antwerp, as France could insist on the reopening of the Scheldt River for international trade, which the Dutch moved to Amsterdam in 1585. If Antwerp became part of France, the French king would not tolerate such unilateral limitations.[307] The Dutch *raison d'état* in the next decades was the policy that it was good to have France as a friend, but not as a neighbor, following the old adage, *Gallus amicus, sed non vicinus*.

The Baltic Sea was still an important focus for the European trade. England concluded a commercial treaty with Denmark. Merchants from England did not need to pay higher 'customs, tributes, tolls, and other duties […] than as the people of the United Provinces of the Netherlands […] they shall enjoy the same liberties, immunities and privileges.' Moreover, if the Dutch get a better deal in the future, the English automatically get the same privileges.[308] England also concluded a commercial treaty with Sweden. The treaty included the article on respecting each other claims to the dominion of the sea, as 'this present Treaty and Confederation shall in nothing derogate from any pre-eminence, right or dominion of either Confederate within any His own seas, channels, or waters.'[309]

The English were not the only commercial rivals threatening the Dutch trade supremacy. France was becoming more active in the Baltic Sea. In the commercial treaty between France and Sweden, the Swedish king should 'force' his merchants to buy salt, wine and other similar goods in France. The French king promised that they would be sold cheaper to them than to the Dutch and other foreign nations.[310] Louis XIV also signed a commercial

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[307] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance*, 31.
[308] The Treaty between Great Britain and Denmark, signed at Whitehall, 13 February 1661.
[309] The Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and Sweden, signed at Whitehall, 21 October 1661.
[310] The Treaty of Alliance between France and Sweden, signed at Fontainebleau, 24 September 1661. The Treaty of Commerce between France and Sweden, signed at Stockholm, 30 December 1662. The Treaty of Renewal of Alliance between France and Sweden, signed at Stockholm, 3 January 1663.

treaty with Denmark for the same trade privileges that the English and Dutch merchants had.[311] Since France was becoming the third sea power at the time, it had to mention both states, while England only competed with the Dutch Republic at the time. In an alliance treaty, both states promised to provide 'exactly the same number of troops and the same requirements of war' (*eodem plane copiarum numero iisdemque requisitis bellicis*) to defend the Treaty of Westphalia.[312] Alliance treaties of the time often included such interactive balancing.

The colonies started to affect the balance of sea power. The Dutch were at war with Portugal in the East Indies since VOC was established in 1598. As Downing mentioned in a letter, the Portuguese West and East India Companies opposed the peace with the Dutch Republic and wanted the English to control the Dutch. The latter 'have greatly profitted thereby, having during this warr taken many considerable places from the Portugal, made themselves sole masters of those places, which afforded the cinnamon, and some other spices; whereby they have that trade wholly in their own hands, and can set the price as they please.' Moreover, the Dutch wanted to send soldiers to the East Indies to throw the Portuguese out. This was a threat to England, since 'then (whereas the English and Portugal together are able in some measure to ballance the Dutch in those parts) the English will be left alone, and be so inconsiderable, in comparison of them, as I doubt they will be forced to give over that trade.'[313] The contemporaries always discussed the potential alliances through the state interest and the balance of power perspective, which also included the balance of sea power.

Arguably the oldest alliance in the world was renewed in 1661,[314] when England allied with Portugal through marriage and a military alliance. Portugal gave England 'the City and Castle of Tangier.'[315] If the English seized any of the towns that the Dutch took from the

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[311] The Treaty between Denmark and France, signed at Paris, 14 February 1663.
[312] The Treaty of Alliance between France and Denmark, signed at Paris, 3 August 1663.
[313] Thurloe State Papers, VII, 847–860.
[314] The Anglo-Portuguese military alliance has been in force since 1386.
[315] The Treaty of Marriage between Charles II and the Princess Catherina, Infanta of Portugal, 23 June 1661. Enid M. G. Routh, *Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost* (London: John Murray, 1912). E. Chappell, *The Tangier*

Portuguese, the English could keep them. Charles II also promised to protect the Portuguese interests as his own. In the event of war, the English king obliged himself to send '10 good Ships of War […] to obey the orders of the King of Portugal.' This was especially crucial if the Spanish king decided to blockade or besiege any of the Portuguese ports. Then, the British king had to 'afford timely assistance of Men and Shipping, according to the exigency of the circumstances, and proportionable to the necessity of the King of Portugal.'[316] As we have seen, the interactive process of mutual obligations depended on the balance of threats. However, this Anglo-Portuguese alliance did not prove particularly beneficial to the Portuguese, who had to sign a humiliating treaty with the Dutch less than two months later.[317]

Figure 13. Wenceslas Hollar, The English Tangier, ca. 1670. England kept Tangier from 1661 to 1684, when it realized that it was too expensive to hold its 'first standing army' and defend it against the Moroccan attacks. In 1684, the English blew up the defensive works and evacuated its English population.

Papers of Samuel Pepys (London: Navy Records Society, 1935). A. J. Smithers, *The Tangier Campaign: The Birth of the British Army* (Stroud, 2003).

[316] The Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at Whitehall, 23 June 1661.

[317] The Treaty of Peace and Alliance between Portugal and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 6 August 1661.

In France in 1661, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619–83) became the new First Minister of State and Controller-General of Finances. In the next decades, with the mercantilist policies of *Colbertism*, Colbert reformed and strengthened the treasury. The French government tripled the net revenue from 32 million livres in 1661 to 93.5 million livres in 1683. This increasing national income was necessary for the increasing expenditure on the royal court in Versailles and on armed forces. Colbert curtailed expenditure, encouraged domestic production, founded several commercial companies for colonial trade and supported domestic merchants by raising tarrifs.[318] Most importantly, as a Navy Secretary from 1669, he started arguably the most ambitious shipbuilding program in the seventeenth century, considering the starting point.[319]

Since he feared the potential alliance of Dutch and English sea powers against him, Louis was ready for an alliance with one of them. This was based on Colbert's idea that any combination of two of three sea powers could crush the third.[320] In April 1662, the Dutch and the French signed a defensive alliance treaty. It had the usual articles about mutual help in the case of an attack. The exact help was supposed to be specified in separate articles, including 'all strength of *Gens de Guerre* and Marines.' The attacked party could decide in which form they wanted to take the assistance, be it in soldiers, money, or a part in soldiers and part in vessels, arms, munition of war, money, or other things.[321] In October of the same year, England sold Dunkirk to France,[322] without consulting with the Dutch, which they did not like, but assumed that the alliance treaty with France would enable access to it.[323]

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[318] Philippe Minard, *La fortune du colbertisme: État et industrie dans la France des Lumières* (Paris: Fayard, 1998). Olivier Pastré, *La méthode Colbert ou Le patriotisme économique efficace* (Paris, Perrin, 2006). Daniel Dessert, *Le royaume de monsieur Colbert, 1661–1683* (Paris: Perrin, 2007). François d'Aubert, *Colbert: la vertu usurpée* (Paris: Perrin, 2010). Marie-Laure Legay, *La banqueroute de l'État royal: la gestion des finances publiques de Colbert à la Révolution française* (Paris: EHESS, 2011).

[319] Daniel Dessert, *La Royale: Vaisseaux et marins du Roi Soleil* (Paris: Fayard, 1996).

[320] Pierre Clément (ed.), *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert* (Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1861–82), III, 208.

[321] The Treaty between France and the Netherlands, signed at Paris, 27 April 1662.

[322] The Treaty between Great Britain and France, signed at London, 27 October 1662. The British would return to Dunkirk in 1712 and in 1940.

[323] Clyde L. Grose, 'The Dunkirk Money, 1662', *The Journal of Modern History* 5 (1933): 1–18, at 5. Wolf, *Toward a European Balance*, 42–43.

The Restoration government had a more coherent mercantilist policy in the early 1660s. The 1660 Navigation Act specified commodities to which it applied and it ordered that foreign ships had to be registered in England.[324] Downing was one of the authors of the mercantilist English policies and he did not want any leniency towards the Dutch. In a letter to Edward Hyde, 1st Earl of Clarendon, Downing noted that the English limiting the Dutch trade was 'of all the world the greatest thorne in their [the Dutch] side.'[325] This was unlikely, as it mostly affected the Dutch Baltic trade, where the English merchants did not profit, 'but all this navigation is fallen into the hands of the Danes and the Swedes.' Downing also protested the obvious hypocrisy in the Dutch argument of the free trade, arguing that 'it is *mare liberum* in the British seas, but *mare clausum* on the coast of Africa and in the E. Indies.'[326]

Around the time of making these treaties, the Dutch Republic was at its peak. In 1662, the main propaganda text of the Dutch Golden Age, *Interest van Holland*, was published by the businessman and radical republican Pieter de la Court, but with a substantial help from Johan de Witt.[327] The main argument of the book was that the republican style of government was preferred to the monarchical, arguing that the House of Orange should never be allowed to return to power. Court claimed that 'all Republicks thrive and flourish far more in Arts, Manufacture, Traffick, Populousness and Strength, than the Dominions and Cities of Monarchs: for where there is Liberty, there will be riches and People.'[328]

However, the text also had a foreign aspect and audience, so it addressed international issues. Court claimed that 'if we consider the States of Europe in their present Condition, 'tis

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[324] *An Act for the Encourageing and increasing of Shipping and Navigation* (London: s.n., 1660). A few years later, the Act was extended. *An Act for the Encouragement of Trade* (London: s.n., 1663). Charles II also appointed the first Council of Trade of sixty-two Commissioners. Wilson, *Profit and Power*, 97–100.

[325] Downing to Clarendon, 18 August 1662. Quoted in Rowen, *De Witt*, 449.

[326] Downing to Bennet, 25 December 1663. Quoted in Nicolaas Japikse, *Der verwikkelingen tusschen de Republiek en Engeland van 1660–1665* (Leiden: S.C. van Doesburgh, 1900), 103.

[327] Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 759–760.

[328] Pieter de la Court, *Interest van Holland, ofte, Gronden van Hollands-welvaren* (Amsterdam: Joan. Cyprianus vander Gracht, 1662). The first and later English translations only noted De Witt as the author. Johan de Witt, *The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and West-Friesland* (London, 1702), 6–7.

true, all Republicks being founded on Peace and Trade, have the same Interest with Holland, to preserve and maintain Peace on every side.' As he stated, the 'Interest of Holland consists in Peace, because our Fisheries, Trade, Navigation, and Manufactures will increase more by Peace than War, and that these are the Pillars on which our State is founded.' Following from this conclusion, he recognized that 'no Alliances, except such as are grounded upon mutual Fear and Defence against a much superior Power, can be profitable for Holland.'[329] Thus, he argued for one of the key premises of the balance-of-power principle, alliance with a weaker party against a stronger state or the more threatening power.

However, at the peak of its power and with the Dutch Republic as the dominant superpower, Court and De Witt were critical of the balance-of-power principle and the preventive war. As a rule, any superpower wanted to keep *status quo*. Thus, Court tried to answer the question 'whether we should make War […] to hold the Ballance of Europe.' The latter was 'another great piece of Folly […] in which often for fear of a future and sharper War, they [the Dutch merchants] will be contriving to ballance the States of Europe.' Moreover, 'for if Holland takes care to provide every thing necessary, and then stands in its own Defence; it is not to be overpowered by any Potentate on Earth. If we run to quench every Fire, for fear the War should pass over others, and kindle in our own Buildings, we shall certainly consume ourselves by degrees, and by our own Actions be ruined.' Court summarized, 'Holland taking due care of things is so powerful as not to be conquered by any, except perhaps by England, if that Nation shall be willing to ruin itself.'[330]

Arguably the clearest example of interactive balancing or at least a contemporary analysis of such balancing is seen in the chapters of potential alliances with other states. Court

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[329] Witt, *The True Interest*, 263–64. Arthur Weststeijn, *Commercial Republicanism in the Dutch Golden Age: The Political Thought of Johan & Pieter de La Court* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

[330] Witt, *The True Interest*, 240–41. The conclusion that the Dutch should only fear England was echoed almost a century later, when David Hume wrote his famous essay on the jealousy of trade. Hume, 'Of the Jealousy of Trade', 330–331.

especially highlighted 'the three great Powers of France, Spain, and England.' Court argued that since they know 'how much we are concerned for Peace, neither of them fear us, but we must fear them.' Therefore, it was very important 'that we behave ourselves very prudently towards them, as to the point of Alliances.' This was to be done 'to consider how much Good and Evil those three Kingdoms may receive or suffer from the Hollanders, and likewise what Good or Evil can befall Holland by each of them.'[331]

Court first briefly presented the main details of the French economy and armed forces. He provided a list of goods that France exported, since he rightly assumed that it was not known as a big exporter, in contrast to England and the Dutch Republic. However, the vast majority of these goods were shipped on Dutch (and 'some few English') ships.[332] France 'cannot attack us by Land, nor by Sea, for want of good Shipping, and on account of the danger of our Coast.'[333] France could severely damage the Dutch trade in the Mediterranean, 'where, by reason of our remote situation, we cannot without great expence overpower them in Shipping.' Nevertheless, the Dutch could respond by destroying the French colonial trade, since France has 'no Ships of War that dare keep the Sea against ours.'[334] In less than a decade, that was going to change, as France started a large shipbuilding programme.

According to Court's analysis, Spain's economy was based on their colonies. However, 'it is well known that Spain during our Wars, lost most of their Naval Forces; and that we during our peace, have for the most part beat the Eastern Merchants and English out of that Trade.' So, 'it is likewise certain, that Holland by its naval Strength, is able wonderfully to encumber and perplex this whole dispers'd Body in time of War.' Then, Court compared to

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[331] Witt, *The True Interest*, 269.

[332] This was also one of the many accusations levelled by Downing against any leniency towards the Dutch, because they 'being assured never to be visited or troubled by His Majesties shipps of warre, they will certainly thereby become what they do desire to be, viz. the common carriers of the world.' Downing to Clarendon, 12 February 1664 OS.

[333] This fatal mistake of underestimating the potential of the French land invasion was going to come back to haunt Johan de Witt in 1672.

[334] Witt, *The True Interest*, 269–274.

how and what both states would lose, and that the Dutch losses could be offset by 'the plundering and burning of his Citys in Spain, and the losing his Gallions at Sea to ballance it.' The Dutch should also not ally with Spain against any other state, 'since the greatest quiet of this State consists in this, That France be formidable to Spain, and England a Friend to us.'[335]

Understandably, England received the most attention. Court recognized that 'this mighty Island' was 'situated in the midst of Europe', so homebound vessels from the colonies could not avoid it. England was by 'its exceeding convenient Situation, to have the Dominion of the Sea.' However, it was in the English interest to keep peace with Holland and to keep their trade. The Dutch could limit their trade to the East Indies and in the Mediterranean. He concluded 'that the English cannot make War upon us but by Sea,' but it would be too expensive, as 'those [naval] Wars must be carried on purely with Mony, because Naval Power cannot subsist by plundering, and quartering in an Enemys Country.'[336] He concluded 'that our only Safety is grounded upon the increase of our Naval Strength to such a Degree, that the English Fleets may either be over-ballanced by ours, or not able to hurt us.'[337] So, Court explicitly considered on how to balance the enemy sea power, by increasing their own sea power or 'Naval Strength.'

Court argued that no offensive alliances were beneficial to the Dutch, except perhaps an alliance with England against France. Any offensive alliance would only make England more powerful to the Dutch, 'for in so doing we should make our selves considerably weaker, and England stronger; who having that Thorn pull'd out of their Foot, might afterwards with less fear oppress and trample upon us.'[338] In conclusion, 'the truth is, since England is more formidable to us than any Country in the whole Universe, it were an unpardonable Fault in us,

[335] Witt, *The True Interest*, 275–277.
[336] Although less fatal and less wrong than underestimating the French land invasion, the naval war with England was by all means feasible to England at the time, albeit they could indeed not afford a long war.
[337] Witt, *The True Interest*, 278–289. Court presented the Dutch fleet as three or four times more potent as it was earlier. Court, *Interest van Holland*, 135–36.
[338] This was to prove fateful, when De Witt concluded the Triple Alliance with England and Sweden in 1668.

to make them yet more formidable to our selves.'[339] Clearly, the greatest *Golden Age* Dutch thinker, Pieter de la Court, thought through the balance of sea power perspective.

Both England and the Dutch Republic were cautious and took care of their navies. They were in an open arms race and frequent news was spread of each state ordering a new batch of warships, which spurred the other state to build more new warships. In May 1660, when Charles II returned to England, the Royal Navy had more than 90 large warships.[340] The English ships were still bigger and better armed than the Dutch warships.[341] There was a lot of *fake news* circling around; e.g., an English informer wrote to Whitehall inflating the Dutch navy to 200 vessels.[342] Already in 1653, the Dutch began a warship-building program, and by the mid-1660s, the Dutch fleet was at least numerically even to the English fleet. Merchant ships converted into warships no longer shaped the bulk of the Dutch navy.[343] However, although they were faster and more maneuverable, they were still on average armed with fewer and smaller guns than the English vessels.

The international jealousy of trade against the Dutch was strong in England in the early 1660s. Perhaps the most famous English economic pamphlet published at the time was Thomas Mun's *England's Treasure by Foreign Trade*, which Charles Wilson called 'the Bible of later mercantilists.'[344] Mun argued that 'the ordinary means […] to encrease our wealth and treasure is by forraign trade, wherein wee must observe this rule; to sell more to strangers yearly than wee consume of theirs in value.'[345] Mun espoused the golden mercantilist rule, to have the positive balance of trade. Statesmen, diplomats and merchants were more direct as to who their main competitor was. Monck claimed that 'what we want is more of the trade that the Dutch

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[339] Witt, *The True Interest*, 278–289.
[340] TNA ADM 106/3117. TNA PRO 30/24/7.
[341] TNA SP 109/4. Davies, *Pepys's Navy*. J. D. Davies, *Kings of the Sea: Charles II, James II and the Royal Navy* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2017).
[342] Japikse, *Der verwikkelingen*, 225.
[343] Vreugdenhil (ed.), *Lists of Men-of-War*. Bruijn, *The Dutch Navy*, 77–78.
[344] Charles Wilson, *Mercantilism* (London: Historical Association, 1958), 11.
[345] Thomas Mun, *Englands treasure by forraign trade: or the inbalance of our forraign trade is the rule for our treasure* (London: Richard Ford, 1664), 7–8.

now have.'[346] In his diary, Pepys noted that merchant George Cocke said to him that 'the trade of the world is too little for us two, therefore one must down.'[347] Thus, the balance of sea power discussions also involved the debates on the other aspect of sea power, trade.

The cause for the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War was related to the colonies. The Dutch managed to take the West African coast from the Portuguese in the early seventeenth century. In 1664, Admiral Robert Holmes was capturing the Dutch West African forts and WIC merchant ships,[348] to improve the conditions for the recently founded Royal African Company (1660).[349] The English pamphlet stated that they were forced into action 'from the Dutch by depredations at Sea […] by declaring their Dominion, and inhibiting Commerce against the Law of Nations.'[350] The Dutch reacted and sent De Ruyter to reconquer the forts on the African coast.[351] On the other side of the Atlantic, the English fleet under Richard Nicholls managed to take New Amsterdam, which was renamed New York, after James, the Duke of York.[352]

Even before the war was officially declared in March 1665, both states were already issuing the letters of marque. On the other hand, after the declaration of war, both Ambassadors, Van Gogh and Downing, stayed at their posts in London and The Hague respectively. England also allied with Sweden, because it needed to push the Dutch out of the Baltic Sea. In the preamble of what turned out to be more of a commercial treaty than anything else, it stated that they wanted 'for their mutual good and security to conclude a closer friendship, and to frame

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[346] Wilson, *Profit and Power*, 107.
[347] Pepys Diary, 2 February 1664 OS, Diary, V, 35–36.
[348] Richard Ollard, *Man of War: Sir Robert Holmes and the Restoration Navy* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1969).
[349] It was originally called the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa. Kenneth Gordon Davies, *The Royal African Company* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1957).
[350] W. W., *The English and Dutch Affairs Displayed to the Life: Both in Matters of Warr, State, and Merchandize, How Far the English Engaged in their Defence against the Most Potent Monarchy of Spain, and How Ill the Dutch Have since Requited the English for Their Extraordinary Favours* (London: Edward Thomas, 1664), 51–52.
[351] By December 1664, it was clear even in London that the English were defeated in Africa. Pepys heard 'fully the news of our being beaten to dirt at Guinny, by De Ruyter with his fleete.' 22 December 1664 OS, Diary, V, 352–353.
[352] Henry L. Schoolcraft, 'The Capture of New Amsterdam,' *The English Historical Review* 22 (1907): 674–93. Charles Wilson, 'Who captured New Amsterdam?', *The English Historical Review* 72 (1957): 469–474.

the terms of alliance.'[353] More importantly, England allied with the Bishop of Münster, so the latter was ready to invade the Dutch Republic with 20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.[354]

The English hoped for an early decisive victory and a short war. At the Battle of Lowestoft on 13 June 1665, the English fleet had 88 warships with more than 30 guns and the Dutch fleet had 96 warships with more than 30 guns; the average warship of both fleets had about 48 and 47 guns respectively (Table 9). Therefore, they were relatively equal in strength. However, constant good weather allowed the English to use the heaviest guns. Seventeen Dutch warships were sunk or captured, including the Dutch flagship *Eendracht* with Admiral Obdam, and more than 5,000 men were killed, wounded or captured.[355] Although the English fleet did not destroy the Dutch fleet, the battle aroused great interest in Europe,[356] and England again considered itself a superior sea power. England started seizing neutral ships again. However, even in England, the Lord Chancellor of Charles II, Edward Hyde, 1st Earl of Clarendon (1609–1674), resented this 'very foolish discourse of many of getting dominion of the whole seas.'[357] Wise contemporaries were aware of the balance of sea power, and they understood that the international community would not respond well to any claims of dominion.

English Fleet		Dutch Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with more than 30 Guns: 88	Total Number of Guns: 4212	Total Number of Warships with more than 30 Guns: 96	Total Number of Guns: 4553
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 48		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 47

Table 9. The Battle of Lowestoft.

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[353] The Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Sweden, signed at Stockholm, 1 March 1665. SP 103/69. Secret Article, providing for the annulment of the so-called Treaty of Elucidation, i.e. the Treaty of 29 September 1659 between Sweden and the Netherlands.

[354] Alliance between Great Britain and Münster, signed at London, 13 June 1665.

[355] Michael Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492–2015* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2017), 45.

[356] Spain was said to be 'chilled with fear' as the seas were now 'reduced to servitude by the overweening power' of the Royal Navy and feared that their American colonies could be the next goal. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 160.

[357] Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 158–60. Sigmond, Kloek, *Sea Battles*, 114–17.

The Dutch lost the battle but not the war and were not decisively defeated. Within a few weeks after the defeat, Johan de Witt set sails with the Dutch fleet to spike the fighting spirit.[358] The Dutch Republic was the leading world trader and had almost limitless financial capital. Dutch economic base had to be the next target, so England tried to ally with Denmark as well. The English saw that if they closed the Baltic, it could be catastrophic for Dutch economy. With an oral agreement with the Danish king, Friderick III, the English navy attacked a convoy of VOC vessels in the neutral port of Bergen in August 1665. After the Dutch cancelled the Danish debts and provided subsidies, Friderick changed his mind. Moreover, the Danish commander of the fortress over Bergen was not aware of any oral agreement, so they fired on English ships, which eventually had to retreat.[359]

France was in no hurry to honor the 1662 alliance with the Dutch. Only after Lowestoft, which could enable England to become the sole master of the seas, did Louis help the Dutch, albeit in limited capacity, even if it was not as little as the Dutch thought.[360] Sweden was persuaded by a substantial French bribe to remain neutral, despite England's diplomatic efforts and the Anglo-Swedish alliance on the eve of the war. The result was the effective closing of the Baltic for the English trade. When the Dutch Republic was invaded in Gelderland in September 1665, Louis forced the Bishop of Münster to withdraw and sue for peace,[361] and he ordered his navy in the Mediterranean to the Atlantic to support the Dutch fleet. Although it got there too late to have a significant part in the fighting, the French did lose a few ships.[362]

In early 1666, the Dutch Republic allied with Denmark. It specified the reasons for the alliance, hyperbolicaly stating that in the previous year the English had taken 1,665 neutral

[358] Rowen, *John de Witt*, 574–97.
[359] Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 160–61.
[360] Nicolaas Japikse, 'Louis XIV et la guerre anglo-hollandaise de 1665–1667,' *Revue historique* XCVIII (1908), 22–60. Georges Pagès, 'À propos de la guerre anglo-hollandaise de 1665–1667', *Revue historique* XCVIII (1908), 61–71.
[361] The Treaty of Peace between the Netherlands and Münster, signed at Cleves, 18 April 1666.
[362] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance*, 44.

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merchant vessels in the North, again arguing against the British practice of seizing neutral ships. The Danish king obliged himself to have in commission 'fourteen good warships, well-equipped and supplied with everything.' Eight out of those fourteen warships needed to have 42 guns. If Sweden later joined the alliance, the distribution would rearrange. In such event, Denmark would not need to supply 40 warships, but only 20 and the States General only had to provide half the sum, i.e. 300,000 écus, meaning that Sweden would bring at least 20 warships to the hold.[363] It was such strategic calculations that proved the interactive balancing process, in addition to looking for other allies on the Continent.[364]

Meanwhile, the Dutch ally France played a double game. In early 1666, France finally declared war on England. France was afraid of the potential maritime coalition between the Dutch Republic and England. Nevertheless, the English understood the limit of French sea power at the time. As the first Secretary of the Royal Society and one of the foremost intelligencers, Henry Oldenburg, wrote to Richard Boyle, 'I am apt to believe, that France will prove a broken reed to them [the Dutch]; and that at last, seeing the Seapower of England, they will strike in with them, for a share in Trade.'[365] Thence, the operations were haunted by the so-called 'phantom fleet,' the French fleet, so called because it influenced the strategies but it never actively engaged in the battles during the Second Anglo-Dutch War. For Louis XIV warned his admiral and cousin, the Duke of Beaufort, that his key goal was to keep his freshly built fleet safe (*en sureté*) and to avoid direct confrontations with England.[366]

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[363] The Treaty between Denmark-Norway and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 11 February 1666.

[364] The Dutch allied with the Duchy of Brunswick-Lüneburg and Brandenburg. The Treaty of Alliance between the Dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 9 September 1665. The Defensive Alliance between Brandenburg and the Netherlands, signed at Cleves, 16 February 1666. The Defensive Alliance between Sweden and Brandenburg, signed at Stockholm, 27 March 1666.

[365] Robert Boyle, *The Correspondence of Robert Boyle*, eds. Michael Hunter, Antonio Clericuzio, Lawrence Principe, 6 vols. (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2001), II, 541.

[366] '*Je desire que vous mettiez mon armée navalle en sureté soit dans la rade de Brest soit ailleurs où vous estimerez pour le mieux, en sorte qu'elle ne puisse estre forcée au combat contre des forces inégales […] en observant que vous devez toujours conserver jusques au nombre de 30 ou 35 vaisseaux avec 10 bruslots en estat de combattre.*' Louis in a letter to his cousin, duke de Beaufort, 28 September 1666. Colenbrander (ed.), *Bescheiden*, I, 505–6.

In June 1666, the English and Dutch fleets engaged in the Four Days' Battle involving over 160 ships, although not all at the same time. One English squadron was waiting to block the French 'phantom fleet,' which never came. The English fleet had 79 warships with more than 30 guns and the Dutch fleet had 84 warships with more than 30 guns; the average warship of both fleets had about 53 and 54 guns, respectively (Table 10). The Dutch gained the advantage and won, but they too had to repair their warships after the battle. The English fleet had to flee into the fog, although both fleets had used up all their ammunition. During the battle, ten English ships were sunk or captured, about 2,500 men were killed or wounded, and 2,000 were taken prisoner, while the Dutch lost four ships and 2,500 killed or wounded.[367]

English Fleet		Dutch Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with more than 30 Guns: 79	Total Number of Guns: 4204	Total Number of Warships with more than 30 Guns: 84	Total Number of Guns: 4531
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 53		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 54

Table 10. The Four Days' Battle.

Figure 14. Willem van de Velde the Elder, Battle council on the *De Zeven Provinciën*.

[367] Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts*, 45. Frank Fox, *The Four Days' Battle of 1666: The Greatest Sea Fight of the Age of Sail* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2018).

The Dutch *victory* was not decisive and the English refitted their fleet relatively quickly. De Witt wanted De Ruyter, in coordination with the French fleet, to carry out the secret plan of attacking the Chatham dockyards. However, due to bad weather and that the French fleet did not show up, the landing was delayed. On 4 August 1666, exactly two months after the Four Days' Battle, during the St. James' Day Battle or the Two Days' Battle, the English fleet had 87 warships with more than 30 guns and the Dutch had 77 warships with more than 30 guns; both fleets averaged 55 guns per warship (Table 11). The English fleet under the command of Prince Rupert and George Monck won a victory over the Dutch fleet led by De Ruyter. Although the Dutch casualties were initially deemed enormous, it turned out that the Dutch only lost two ships and 1,200 killed or seriously wounded.[368]

English Fleet		Dutch Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with more than 30 Guns: 87	Total Number of Guns: 4789	Total Number of Warships with more than 30 Guns: 77	Total Number of Guns: 4247
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 55		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 55

Table 11. The St. James' Day Battle.

Figure 15. Wenceslaus Hollar, the idealized depiction of the St. James' Day Battle.

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[368] Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 171. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 72–76.

Since the distinction between the combatants and non-combatants was less than clear in the early modern era, the enemy's commerce was also a legitimate target. While the Dutch fleet had to go in their ports to repair and refit their ships, the English were free to roam the Dutch coast. In mid-August 1666, the fleet of Robert Holmes wrecked around 150 Dutch merchant vessels in what became known as Holmes' bonfire and sacked the town of Ter Schelling,[369] which was a cause of tension in the future. This was 'the most effective English economic warfare against the Dutch in three wars.'[370]

Figure 16. Willem van de Velde the Elder, 'Holmes's Bonfire,' or the burning of Dutch merchant ships between Terschelling and Vlieland, 19 August 1666.

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[369] Ollard, *Man of War*. Anne Doedens and Jan Houter, *1666: De ramp van Vlieland en Terschelling* (Franeker: Uitgeverij Van Wijnen, 2013).

[370] Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 72–76. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 170–71.

During the Second Anglo-Dutch War, England and London specifically were hit by two disasters. First came the Great Plague, which wreaked havoc in 1665 and 1666. Then came the Great Fire in London in September 1666. Some rumors spread that the Dutch enemy agents and the Catholic terrorists spread the fire. Some foreigners were attacked by the violent mobs, such as a Frenchman whose house was destroyed by the rabble. Many contemporaries argued that this was the punishment of God.[371] These two disasters, in addition to the financial mismanagement, prevented Charles II from putting out his fleet in 1667.

Parallel trade or privateering war raged. The English privateers captured French ships as 'lawful prizes,' but the French took more profitable English vessels in the Mediterranean.[372] In comparison to the first war, it was a commercial letdown for the English. The Dutch privateers captured more profitable prizes than the English, despite the great imbalance in the number of merchant ships at risk.[373] De Witt successfully directed the Dutch navies, which were better prepared to protect commerce. However, the Dutch trade also suffered, so both states wanted peace. Negotiations began at Breda in March 1667, but neither side was willing to call for an end of hostilities, so the negotiations were halting and slow.[374]

Across the Atlantic, 'satellite' campaigns were taking place. An anchored French merchant fleet was attacked at Fort St Pierre in June 1667 by the English warships under Admiral Sir John Harman. The English won and practically destroyed the whole French merchant fleet in the Caribbean.[375] The islands in the West Indies were an important goal, market and potential colonies for any sea power. As mentioned above, in the early modern era,

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[371] Daniel Defoe, *History of the Plague in London* (New York: American Book Co., 1894). James Leasor, *The Plague and the Fire* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962). A. Lloyd Moote, Dorothy C. Moote, *The Great Plague: The Story of London's Most Deadly Year* (London: John Hopkins University Press, 2008). Stephen Porter, *The Great Plague of London* (Gloucestershire: Amberley Publishing, 2012).
[372] Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 71–72. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 166–67.
[373] J. R. Bruijn, 'Dutch Privateering during the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars', in *The Low Countries History Yearbook 1978: Acta Historiae Neerlandicae XI* (Dordrecht: Springer, 1979), 79–93. Lunsford, *Piracy and Privateering*. Gijs Rommelse, 'Privateering as a language of international politics: English and French privateering against the Dutch Republic, 1655–1665', *Journal for Maritime Research* 17 (2015): 183–194.
[374] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance*, 45-46
[375] Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 78.

the privateers were not an alternative to state navies – they supplemented the state fleets, and statesmen often used the privateers and letters of marque to (indirectly) operate in distant seas, and put pressure on enemies' economies.

Regardless of the economic success of Holmes' Bonfire and its consequences for the Dutch, the Royal Navy lacked the funds to put the fleet to sea in 1667.[376] The Dutch knew that and decided to make use of English carelessness. The Dutch warships went up the Medway, took the *Royal Charles*,[377] and burnt the three largest warships, the *Royal James*, *Loyal London*, and *Royal Oak*. Edward Gregory wrote that 'the destruction of these three stately and glorious ships of ours was the most dismal spectacle my eyes ever beheld, and it certainly made the heart of every true Englishman bleed, to see such three Argos lost.'[378] One month after the raid, on 19 July 1667, Pepys noted in his diary that Sir W. Batten cried in despair, 'by God, I think the Devil shits Dutchmen!'[379] Ten days later, on 29 July 1667, Pepys wrote: 'Thus in all things, in wisdom, courage, force, knowledge of our own streams, and success, the Dutch have the best of us, and do end the war with victory on their side.'[380]

On 31 July 1667, the English and Dutch signed the Treaty of Breda. Both states won and lost something at the peace table. The Treaty of Breda contained the typical articles on the 'firm, and inviolable Peace, sincere Friendship, a nearer and straiter Alliance and Union,' free trade in Europe but not Asia. They followed the principle of *uti possidetis*, effectively from 20 May 1667. The English retained New Netherland, an area from the future colonies of Pennsylvania to Massachusetts. The Dutch, on the other hand, held to Run, Fort Cormantin and

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[376] ADM 106/3117.

[377] The stern carving of the royal arms from the *Royal Charles* are still on display in Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam.

[378] Colenbrander (ed.), *Bescheiden*, I, 580.

[379] Robert Latham, William Matthews (eds.), *The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A New and Complete Transcription*, 11 vols. (London: Bell, 1970). Sigmond, Kloek, *Sea Battles*, 128–38.

[380] P. G. Roger, *The Dutch in the Medway* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2017).

Surinam.[381] Most importantly, in a further commercial treaty, England had to revoke its 'right' to intercept and search the Dutch neutral vessels, when the Dutch were neutral.[382]

Statesmen considered the balance of sea power in another treaty. The Dutch added a few articles 'to weigh in an Equal Ballance, and thereby exactly to adjust all and every thing.' The treaty argued that 'it may be feared, the Inhabitants and Subjects of both Parties may fall back again into new Quarrels and Dissentions, and the Differences now composed may bleed afresh, if they be not bound up by some certain Laws about those things which concern Navigation and the use of Trade.'[383] Therefore, they wanted to set a fixed balance to prevent wars that was impossible in the (early) globalized world.

Even before the Treaty of Breda was signed and even before the Dutch attacked in Medway, France started the War of Devolution (1667–68). The French lawyers discovered the so-called law of devolution in some provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, which would allow Marie Theresa to inherit them, although she was explicitly disinherited in the marriage treaty in 1659. Louis XIV drew up an elaborate statement of the rights of his wife to certain territories in the Spanish Netherlands, and, it was translated into several languages, to be presented to Europe and read at various courts.[384] Moreover, France also occupied Franche-Comté in the winter 1667–68, so the whole Europe was in turmoil.

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[381] The Treaty of Peace and Alliance between Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at Breda, 31 July 1667. Denmark and France were also officially in war with Great Britain, so they also signed special peace treaties.

[382] The Treaty of Commerce between England and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 17 February 1668.

[383] *Articles touching Navigation & Commerce* (London: s.n., 1667). The Treaty between Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at Breda, 31 July 1667.

[384] The original was written in Latin. Anon., *Reginae Christianissimae iura in Ducatum Brabantiae, et alios ditionis Hispanicae principatus & Observationes sive responsio ad duos Tractatus Bruxellis editos adversus Reginae Christianissimae Jus in Brabantiam* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1667). Anon., *Traité des droits de la Reyne très chrestiene sur divers estats de la monarchie d'Espagne* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1667). Anon., *Tratado de los derechos de la Reyna christianissima , sobre varios Estados de la monarquia de España* (Paris, 1667). Anon., *Vertoning van de rechten der Christelijkste koningin op verscheide staten van de Spaansche monarchien* (Amsterdam: Jacob Vinkel, 1667). Anon., *Dialogue sur les droits de la Reyne Tres-Chrestienne* (Paris, 1667). *A dialogve concerning the rights of the most Christian Qveene, Translated out of French into English* (Paris: Sebastien Cramoisy, 1667). Later it was reprinted in London. Anon., *A Dialogue concerning the rights of Her Most Christian Majesty* (London: Thomas Newcomb, 1667). It was also reprinted in other major European hubs, such as Geneva, Leipzig, Madrid, and Amsterdam.

Louis XIV and his expansion encouraged thinkers to reflect on the nature of the balance of power. The influential Habsburg diplomat François-Paul de Lisola (1613–74) penned *The Shield of State* in 1667. He realized that his Habsburg and Catholic perspective was partial, so he explicitly noted that 'I will consider my self in this Article no more then as a simple Citizen of the World.' Moreover, 'to shelter my self the better from all suspicions of Partialitie,' Lisola stated that he was going to use only the 'French Authors,' specifically the above-mentioned 'Duke [Henri] of Rohan.' He summarized Rohan well by claiming that 'there are two Powers in Christendom which be like the two Poles, from whence all the Influences of Peace and War do descend upon the other States.' Lisola continued studying Rohan's 'Maxime to regulate the Conduct of all other Princes, That their principal Interest is to hold the Balance so equally betwixt these two Great Monarchies' of France and Austria/Spain. Furthermore, 'neither of them, either by the way of Arms or Negotiation, may ever come to prevail notablie; and that in this Equality doth solely consist the Repose and Safety of all the rest.'[385]

Lisola contrasted the providential rise of Austria and the 'unjust Emulation' of France or 'this Chimerical Monster.' Lisola charged Louis XIV to want 'universal monarchy' while accusing the Habsburgs of such 'universal' aspirations and convincing Europe of 'this Artifice.' Lisola argued that 'many have been mistaken by a false supposition, that the Power and the Designs of Spain were more to be apprehended then those of France; and that by this very Reason of State they were obliged to put the Counterpoise into the French Scale of the Balance.'[386] Lisola wanted for European leaders to ally against the expansive French tendencies and maintain the balance between Spain and France to preserve the general peace in Europe.[387]

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[385] François Paul de Lisola, *The Buckler of State and Justice against the Design Manifestly Discovered of the Universal Monarchy, under the Vain Pretext of the Queen of France, Her Pretensions* (London: Richard Royston, 1667), 276–279. Lisola spent almost two years in England from 1666 to 1668.

[386] Lisola, *The Buckler of State and Justice*, 276–279.

[387] François Paul de Lisola, *Bouclier d'Estat et Justice: contre le dessein manifestement decouvert de la Monarchie Universelle* (Brussels: Foppor, 1668). Marcus Baumann, *Das publizistische Werk des kaiserlichen Diplomaten Franz Paul Freiherr von Lisola (1613–1674): Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von absolutistischem Staat, Öffentlichkeit und Mächtepolitik in der frühen Neuzeit* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994).

Lisola's 'balanced' ideas caused the European public opinion to shift from anti-Spanish to anti-French, including in England.[388] This was when Bethel analyzed Cromwell's actions and his alliance with France in the 'dishonest Warr with Spain.' He directly blasted Cromwell, as mentioned above, but indirectly scolded Charles II who supported Louis XIV.[389] Bethel noted that Cromwell had argued that he fought only for 'the advancement of the Protestant Cause, and the honour of this Nation,' but these 'were either fraudulent, or he was ignorant in Forreign affairs.' He continued that the best 'way to increase, or preserve the reformed Interest in France […] was by keeping the balance betwixt Spain and France even.' However, 'by overthrowing the ballance in his Warr with Spain, and joyning with France, he [Cromwell] freed the French King from his fears of Spain, inabled him to subdue all Factions at home.'[390]

Bethel knew that England was not powerful enough to counter France on its own, so it had to seek allies to keep the balance. Thus, England, '(by our strength which Trade will increase) To make use of it, together with the helps that God and Nature hath given us in our Situation, and otherwise, in keeping the Ballance amongst our Neighbours.' He contrasted the development of Holland, which was able to sustain the whole state, i.e., the other six provinces, and oppose Great Britain. He questioned 'what might we do, if Trade were improved, who have much more advantages for it, than they have.' As mentioned above, with the war against Spain, Cromwell was successful only in 'breaking the Ballance of Europe.'[391]

This was the intellectual backdrop to the shifting balance of power. France was becoming the main hegemon that needed to be contained or 'balanced.' Parliament pushed Charles II into the Triple Alliance with the Dutch Republic and Sweden to stop the *universalist* French goals. William Temple, the English resident in Brussels, travelled to The Hague twice,

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[388] Mark Goldie and Charles-Edouard Levillain, "François-Paul de Lisola and English Opposition to Louis XIV," *The Historical Journal* 63 (2020): 559–580.
[389] Ryan Walter, 'Slingsby Bethel's Analysis of State Interests', *History of European Ideas* 41 (2015): 489–506.
[390] Bethel, *The World's Mistake in Oliver Cromwell*, 4.
[391] Bethel, *The World's Mistake in Oliver Cromwell*, 8–11.

in late 1667, to form the Triple Alliance between England, the Dutch Republic and Sweden.[392] The 'perpetual Defensive League' of January 1668 specified how many warships and guns each of them needed to deter war and 'acts of Hostility.' England and the Dutch Republic each had to provide 'forty Ships of War well equipped, of which fourteen to carry between 60 and 80 Guns, and 400 men apiece one with another (18.000 pounds/month); Fourteen others, from 40 to 60 Guns, and at least 300 men apiece one with another (14.000 pounds/month); and none of the rest to carry less than 36 Guns, and 150 men (6.000 pounds/month).'[393]

Figure 17. The Dutch allegorical drawing of the Triple Alliance. Depicted are Charles II, Johan de Witt and the young Charles XI of Sweden holding hands. Warships were at anchor in the background to ensure the balance of sea power in Europe.

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[392] William Temple to his brother, Sir John Temple, 2 January 1668 (OS). William Temple, *The Works of Sir William Temple* (London: J. Clarke, 1757), I, 313.

[393] *A Perpetual League of Mutual Defence and Allyance* (London, s.n., 1668). The Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 23 January 1668.

This Treaty of the '*perpetual Defensive League*' of 1668 was an explicit contemporary recognition of the balance of sea power between England and the Dutch Republic. Moreover, the treaty was published, so that France would get the not too subtle message and would be deterred from further aggression. As already seen from the analysis of ship lists, only warships with a certain number of guns were considered capable of fighting in a line of battle. By distributing the potential war effort equally between the two partners in terms of materiel and men, they accepted the 'balanced' reality or the balance of sea power.[394]

The architect of the Triple Alliance, William Temple, went against his king's pro-French and pro-Catholic stance. Temple cautioned Charles II on the threat that a powerful France posed Europe by implying the balance-of-power idea. The Triple Alliance never needed to fight. The war potential of these three states and Spain was deterrent enough to push Louis XIV to peace. Louis XIV was not happy that the Dutch betrayed the 1662 alliance, while he declined the secret offer by Charles II to attack the Dutch in December 1667. England, with its isolated position, gradually became a balancer or *bouncer* on the European continent.[395]

Many contemporaries suspected that Charles II intentionally allied with the Dutch, so that Louis XIV would break their 1662 alliance.[396] The French ambassador to Stockholm, Pomponne, tried to understand Charles' motivation. He questioned why he joined the Triple Alliance and whether he 'had in mind vengeance upon them [the Dutch] or upon France.' However, as his 'hatred against Holland' was 'greater than against us, I have always believed that the good understanding which London made show of maintaining with Holland was only an artifice in order to drive her further and further from France.' So, 'having once been deprived

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[394] The interwar treaties limiting the sea powers in the 1920s and 1930s were similar. They tried to limit the sea powers based on the main measurement of sea power at the time, the different classes of warships and their tonnage, while it was the number of warships and the number of guns in 1668.

[395] Michael Sheehan, 'The Place of the Balancer in Balance of Power Theory', *Review of International Studies* 15, no. 2: Special Issue on the Balance of Power (1989): 123–34.

[396] Abraham de Wicquefort, *Histoire des Provinces Unies des Pais-Bas*, edited by E. Lenting and C.A. Chais van Buren (Amsterdam, 1861–74), II, 177.

of that great support, she would remain exposed to a vengeance which necessity alone constrained England to dissimulate.'[397] Although he did not trust Charles's sudden change of heart, De Witt could not afford the French taking the Spanish Netherlands with the potential consequences. He had two bad options and took what he thought was the lesser of two evils.

Then, the Dutch, English and French concluded a tri-partite treaty to force Spain to peace. In the preamble, it stated that it was meant for the 'reestablishment of public peace.' France had to return Franche-Comté for some forts in the Spanish Netherlands. If Spain did not accept peace on these terms, the English king and the States General 'shall employ all their forces by sea and land to oblige Spain to make peace upon the conditions aforesaid.'[398] Spain had no alternative but to sign the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in May 1668. The English and Dutch assured the Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo, the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, of peace and that they would unite their land and sea forces in defense of Spain.[399]

After ending another gruesome war, De Witt and Temple debated on the nature of their alliance and the mutual 'reasonable equality' (*egalité raissonable*), which was a 'true foundation of goodwill and friendship' (*vray fondement de bienviellance et d'amitié*).[400] Although both states were allied, they took interest in each other's fleets.[401] Temple understood the balance-of-sea-power politics that worked inside the broader European balance-of-power politics. He foresaw that other states could legitimately attack England if it ever breached the 'balance.' The switch in alliances was key to the balance-of-power principle of not having long-term allies or enemies but being vigilant and adjusting them in relation to the situation.

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[397] Pomponne, *La relation de mon ambassade en Hollande (1669–1671)*, edited by Herbert H. Rowen (Utrecht: Kemink, 1955), 64.

[398] The Treaty between France, Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at St. Germain-en-Laye, 15 April 1668.

[399] The Treaty of Peace between France and Spain, signed at Aix-la-Chapelle, 2 May 1668.

[400] R. Fruin, N. Japikse, G.W. Kernkamp (eds.), *Brieven aan en Brieven van Johan de Witt* (Amsterdam: J. Müller, 1906–1913), 398–99, 433–37.

[401] Anon., 'Queerys to Bee Answered', MS Rawlinson A 195, fol. 7 (Bodleian, Oxford). In 1670, famously, Colbert sent the young marine officer, Pierre Arnoul, to the ports of England and the Dutch Republic to copy the best practices. Arnoul's report is full of vivid descriptions and depictions of ports, ships and warships. Pierre Arnoul, *Remarques faictes par le sieur Arnoul sur la marine d'Hollande et d'Angleterre dans le voyage qu'il fit en l'année 1670, par ordre de Monseigneur Colbert*, MS (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris).

The Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672–74) and the Franco-Dutch War (1672–78)

The immediate cause for the outbreak of the Third Anglo-Dutch War and the Franco-Dutch War in 1672 can be traced back to the Triple Alliance. The warnings that the Franco-Dutch alliance soured were omnipresent. When the Dutch Ambassador to Paris, Coenraad van Beuningen (1622–93), returned from his failed mission of reconciliation, he noted that there was in France 'a firm resolution to complete the conquest of the Low Countries if the king of Spain should die.' He also stated that 'there was in France profound dissatisfaction with this State, without any concealing of the king's intention to take revenge without fail for what has been done here.' Moreover, he ominously prophesized 'that enemies will be raised against this State from every side, those already her foes will receive support, factions will be fomented by which this State may be divided, and an effort will be made to ruin its trade.'[402]

De Witt faced an insurmountable task. He wanted to keep the Triple Alliance alive, so he had to include England and Sweden in the negotiations over the Spanish Netherlands. However, Louis XIV wanted at least part of the territories that he conquered during the War of Devolution, while De Witt suggested an independent republic or cantonment, which Louis declined. Louis was gradually winning England and Sweden away from the Triple Alliance. Since De Witt tried to please both sides at the same time, he ended up isolated, because his 'allies' allied against him. Pomponne assured Louis that the Triple Alliance was getting weaker, by saying that 'only this is sure, as Your Majesty sees more clearly than anyone else, that the Triple Alliance, near as it still is to its origins, is growing neither in the mutual comprehension of its members nor, consequently, in its strength.'[403]

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[402] Wicquefort to Lionne, 18 October 1668. Arch. étr., Holl., vol. 88, fo. 257. Abraham de Wicquefort became Lionne's principal intelligencer in the Dutch Republic after Estrades had left. Christian Friedrich Haje (ed.), *De geheime correspondentie van Abraham de Wicquefort met den Franschen Minister de Lionne* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1901). In fact, Wicquefort wrote reports to several European courts.

[403] Pomponne to Louis XIV, 5 December 1669, Arch. étr., Holl., vol. 89, fos. 433–34. Rowen, *Ambassador Prepares for War*, 98.

Charles II and Louis XIV both disliked the Dutch Republic. They both felt humiliated in 1667 and 1668. Even before the previous war ended, England and France had resented the Dutch meteoric rise in just a few decades. Yet, even Downing understood that the Dutch could not be blamed for their failure to match them in the number of merchant and fishing vessels built, in technological advances such as their flyboat and fluyt, lower freight rates, and superior quality control.[404] Charles and Louis were both angry and started negotiations for an alliance practically immediately after the previous war ended, actually even before it ended.

On the other hand, Colbert wished to strike at the source of Dutch sea power, their trade, which produced 'their strength and the wealth of their people and sailors.'[405] The superior trade situation of the Dutch did not sit well with France and Europe.[406] Colbert's brother Colbert de Croissy protested to Pomponne that the Dutch had 15,000 (more likely 9,000) of the 20,000 merchantmen in Europe, when the French had 500 or 600.[407] Colbert argued that 'as long as they [the Dutch] will be masters of commerce, their land and sea forces will always increase and will make them so powerful that they will be able to make themselves the arbiters of war in Europe and give such bounds as they please to justice and to all the purposes of kings.'[408] Colbert knew that the East Indian cargoes gave the Dutch 'great means to ruin the commerce which all other nations in Europe strive to have with those lands and place them above all apprehensions.'[409] Yet, despite the relative rise of the French trade, Colbert knew 'there is no power or diligence in the world which can prevent Holland from having almost all of it.'[410]

[404] Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade*. Israel, *The Dutch Republic*.
[405] Colbert to Pomponne, 15 March 1669. Bib. Ars., MS 4586, fos. 3–4.
[406] Pomponne argued that 'it seems that all Europe reawakened at the same time from the profound slumber into which Holland had cast them.' Pomponne, *La relation de mon ambassade en Hollande*, 36–37, 44–45.
[407] Colbert de Croissy to Pomponne, 21 March 1669. Clément (ed.), *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert*, VII, 463–64.
[408] Colbert to French consuls abroad, 15 March 1669, Clément (ed.), *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert*, II, 453. Colbert, 'Dissertation', ibid., VI, 264.
[409] Colbert to Pomponne, 12 July, 19 July, 7 August 1669. Bib. Ars., MS 4586, fos. 47, 51, 57.
[410] Colbert to Pomponne, 13 September 1669. Bib. Ars., MS 4586, fo. 61. See also Colbert's memorandum 'Proposals on the advantages which may be drawn from that States of Holland for increasing the trade of the realm' (8 July 1672).

Pomponne told De Witt that the Dutch 'departed from their true interest,' by breaking their alliance. De Witt noted that the Dutch wanted the barrier in the Spanish Netherlands, on which their safety and liberty depended.[411] Pomponne replied that 'if I were a Dutchman […] I might well view with anxiety the power of France so nearby, but I should look with much greater fear on the means by which I might be made safe from it. Being unable to keep France at a distance and having only Spain, England and Sweden to set against her, I should consider it a much lesser peril to place my trust in an ally whose affection and assistance I had always known, rather than trust myself wholly to powers, some irreconcilable, others frequently enemies, and several newly offended.'[412] Pomponne repeated this argument of the Dutch fear of having French as neighbors to the French resident at Regensburg, Robert de Gravel.[413]

The Dutch knew that France was becoming inimical and wanted to respond. Yet, Pomponne's main mission was to convince the Dutch that France would not seek retribution,[414] while Colbert de Croissy, Louis XIV's ambassador to London, was courting Charles II. Louis XIV, or as Pomponne called him the 'unquestioned arbiter of Europe,'[415] had to overcome the fears of European states at France's immense power. Although Charles II was on paper loyal, De Witt was dubious of his fidelity and ability to support the Triple Alliance. De Witt even looked to Spain for the mutual guarantees of their territories, although not everyone in the Netherlands was willing to accept the Spanish guarantees. De Witt also listened to the suggestions of the imperial envoy Lisola for the Dutch-Habsburg alliance.[416]

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[411] The same applied to England, as De Witt said: 'Not England! We do not want her in Flanders!' Pomponne to Louis XIV, 25 April 1669. Arch. étr., Holl., vol. 89, fos. 147–49. Rowen, *Ambassador Prepares for War*, 67–68.
[412] Pomponne to Louis XIV, 7 March 1669. Arch. étr., Holl., vol. 89, fos. 73–76.
[413] Pomponne to Robert de Gravel, 12 March 1669. Arch. étr., Holl., vol. 89, fo. 86. Pomponne also said that 'genuine illness may be cured, but not fear […] What I do know is that any man of good sense, seeing this state join with those who are really its enemies and turn away from a tried and faithful friend who is alone capable of protecting it, will conclude that fear of a danger is often more hurtful than the danger itself, and that it is like jumping over the side of a cliff to avoid seeing a shadow or a phantom.'
[414] Louis André, Émile Bourgeois (eds.), *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France: depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française: Hollande* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1899), I, 271.
[415] Pomponne to Louis XIV, 28 February 1669. Arch. étr., Holl., vol. 89, fos. 58–60.
[416] Rowen, *Ambassador Prepares for War*, 32–33.

What Louis and his ministers were able to achieve in the next couple of years was described by many as a diplomatic masterpiece. Louis managed to persuade the majority of Dutch allies to turn against the Dutch, especially England and Sweden, the two allies from the Triple Alliance. The chief architect of this success was the French Foreign Minister, Hugues de Lionne (1611–1671), who managed to keep the plans and negotiations secret for a very long time. Even his minister to the Dutch Republic at the time and his later successor, Pomponne, who Keith Feiling called 'the greatest of French envoys,'[417] was kept in the dark.

Figure 18. Medal commemorating the destruction of the Triple Alliance (1672). On the front, there is a bust of Louis XIV, and on the reverse, Hercules breaks three arrows on his knee.

The diplomats were discussing the potentialities of states to defend or attack. Pomponne assured Lionne that the Dutch resources were not inexhaustible and that they would find it hard to cover the costs of all allies, since their territories were too small. He also stated that 'in wartime it would be easy to destroy at sea the sources of a power which resides only in the freedom of trade.' On the other hand, Pomponne also warned about the Dutch resilience, saying that 'they will bring to it the diligence, steadiness and even stubbornness almost always

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[417] Keith Feiling, *British Foreign Policy: 1660–1672* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1930), 193. Even contemporaries praised him. Bishop Gilbert Burnet's contemporary description of him as a man of 'great probity.' Gilbert Burnet, *History of My Own Time*, edited by Osmund Airy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897), I, 548. Pomponne, *La relation de mon ambassade en Hollande*.

characteristic of republics fighting in self-defense.'[418] This was Machiavelli's reason for preferring the city militias instead of mercenaries, although he himself had mixed results with this theory and learnt the hard way that it was more complex than that.

Despite the work that William Temple invested into the Triple Alliance, in June 1670, Louis XIV and Charles II agreed on the Secret Treaty of Dover, creating an alliance against the Dutch. In the fifth article, they agreed 'to declare and wage war jointly with all their forces by land and sea […] to reduce the power of a nation which […] even has the insolence to aim now at setting itself up as sovereign arbiter and judge of all other potentates.'[419] France intended to attack the Dutch Republic by land with the assistance of 6,000 English soldiers. On the naval side, the combined fleet consisted of over 50 large English warships and 30 French warships, for a combined total of over 80 large warships. The French vessels were supposed to serve as an auxiliary squadron led by a French vice-admiral, who had to obey the orders of James, the Duke of York. They also wanted to attract Denmark and Sweden in alliance against the Dutch, as well as Cologne, Brandenburg, Münster, arguably even the Empire and Spain.

In late December 1670, another Anglo-French alliance treaty was published, apparently for creating the impression that the secret Treaty of Dover of the same year had never been entered into. It was practically the same treaty with the same wording, but without articles II (reintroduction of Catholicism in England) and IV (French inheritance of the Spanish lands).[420] The treaty was ratified in both countries in January 1671, and the declaration of war was pushed to 1672. De Witt was still living in fantasy that France would never allow the English on the European continent, 'a nation which France and her neighbors must strongly seek to keep apart

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[418] Pomponne to Lionne, 9 May 1669. Arch. étr., Holl., vol. 89, fos. 173–74. There were even calls for a preventive war against France in the Dutch Republic. Rowen, *Ambassador Prepares for War*, 72.

[419] The Treaty between Great Britain and France, signed at Dover, 1 June 1670. Ronald Hutton, 'The Making of the Secret Treaty of Dover, 1668–1670', *Historical Journal* 29 (1986): 297–318.

[420] Accordingly, other articles were also rearranged, so article on the Dutch was not the 5th, but the 3th, specific article on the war on the sea was not 7th, but 5th. The Treaty between Great Britain and France, signed at Whitehall, 31 December 1670.

from the rest of the world.'[421] The Dutch Ambassador to London, Beuningen, was negligent, as he blindly believed Charles II's assurances of his loyalty to the Triple Alliance.[422]

The Dutch tried to get both parliaments in London and The Hague to confirm and ratify the treaties of alliance. As Pomponne reported, the Dutch used compelling arguments, such as the 'reason of state which is common to them.' Moreover, the common 'reason of state' demanded 'a close and mutual friendship between two powers already bound to each other as neighbors, by religion and by like interest in trade.' Thus, when these countries were united, they could 'lay down the law for all the seas and share between themselves alone the advantages of shipping.'[423] Therefore, they would be breaking the balance-of-power idea, but it did not matter, because they would be doing it themselves. The concept of the 'reason of state' (*ragione di Stato*) was another great political concept that Europe adopted from Renaissance Italy.[424] The reason of state became a crucial component of international political language, although it did not necessarily contradict with inter-state relations on the model of (personal) friendship.[425]

Throughout 1671 and 1672, France signed several (offensive) alliance treaties with the German states, where the principle of interactive balancing was evident. In the alliance treaty with the Duchy of Brunswick-Lüneburg, the help in an event of an attack was supposed to be 'proportional and equal to the danger' (*proportionné & égal au danger*).[426] In February 1672,

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[421] Pomponne to Louis XIV and Lionne, 28 August 1670, Arch. étr., Holl., vol. 90, fos. 296–300. Pomponne, *La relation de mon ambassade en Hollande*, 139–43. Rowen, *Ambassador Prepares for War*, 143–144. Pomponne later claimed in his *Memoires* that France had narrowly escaped a perilous position. He noted that 'even if the king had conquered the rest of Holland, it is my opinion that his conquests would have been disadvantageous if these lands had passed into the hands of the English.' England would have become 'absolute mistress of the seas, and she would have had a foothold on the mainland in the best country in the world.' This was something 'France always had much reason to prevent.' Pomponne, *Mémoires*, II, 484–85. Rowen, *Ambassador Prepares for War*, 180.

[422] Another factor was the public opinion, which was more anti-French than anti-Dutch by the late 1660s.

[423] Pomponne to Louis XIV, 19 February 1671, Arch. étr., Holl., vol. 91, fos. 75–78. Rowen, *Ambassador Prepares for War*, 165–166.

[424] Giovanni Botero, *Della ragion di stato libri dieci, con tre libri delle cause della grandezza, e magnificenza delle Città* (Venice: Gioliti, 1589).

[425] Anikó Kellner, *Affectionate interests and interested affections: the normative language of early seventeenth century interstate relations*, PhD thesis (Budapest: Central European University, 2012).

[426] The Treaty between France and Brunswick-Lüneburg, signed at Cologne, 23 October 1671. The alliance treaty with Cologne was even more specifically oriented towards the Dutch. It stated that 'if all the forces of the Dutch, or indeed the greater part, should move against the army of the Elector, or against the prince of the confederates,

an alliance between England and France was confirmed. The English king promised to bring 6,000 infantry on the continent, but had to postpone it to 1673. The French auxiliary fleet had to consist of at least 30 warships and 10 fireships.[427] At the same time, France took the other ally from the Triple Alliance, Sweden. The logic of the balance of threats was visible, as the Swedish king had to provide 'an army composed from infantry and cavalry, which will be considerable and proportional to the necessity of the times and danger.'[428] The only semi-reliable ally the Dutch had at that time was Brandenburg.[429]

The balance of power did not allow for any trade dominance, as it usually translated into more money, more warships, and ultimately more sea power. Although trade deficit was not the primary reason, it was also not immaterial. The English mercantilist writer, Roger Coke, published the *Discourse of Trade* in 1670 and he contrasted the 'decaying English trade' with the 'prospering Dutch trade.'[430] When comparing the raw numbers, the Dutch definitely had the upper hand. The trade imbalance was still an issue.[431] However, the key reason for the third Anglo-Dutch war was not to decrease the Dutch trade, but rather resulted from political reasons, because the merchants in England opposed the war. Charles II wanted to be financially independent from the Parliament, like his cousin Louis XIV.[432]

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the King will send as many auxiliary forces as will be equal in repulsing the enemy.' The Alliance between France and Cologne, signed at Brühl, 2 January 1672.

[427] The Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and France, signed at Whitehall, 12 February 1672. This was soon made public. The Treaty for a Strict Union of Interests between France and England, signed at the Camp of Hesurick, 16 July 1672. In April 1672, Bishop of Munster accepted the same obligations towards France as were binding by Treaty (see 2 January) upon the Elector of Cologne. The Offensive Alliance between France and Münster, signed at Coesfeld, 3 April 1672.

[428] The Renewal etc. of Alliance between France and Sweden, signed at Stockholm, 14 April 1672. It further clarified that they respected the Peace of Westphalia and that no German state should intervene on the side of the Dutch, including the Empire. Louis was aware of the public perception of his invasion.

[429] The Treaty of Assistance and Mutual Defence between Brandenburg and the Netherlands, signed at Cologne-on-Spree, 26 April 1672. Spain was officially an ally, but it proved an unreliable one. The Act of Alliance between Spain and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 17 December 1671.

[430] Roger Coke, *A Discourse of Trade: In Two Parts: The First Treats of the Reason of the Decay of the Strength, Wealth, and Trade of England, the Latter, of the Growth and Increase of the Dutch Trade above the English* (London: H. Brome et al., 1670).

[431] *An Act for the incouragement of the Greeneland and Eastland Trades, and for the better secureing the Plantation Trade* (London: s.n., 1673).

[432] Richard Harding, *The Evolution of the Sailing Navy, 1509–1815* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 97.

The concept of universal monarchy was identical with tyranny in early modern Europe. Because the English public generally opposed to the war, Charles II argued that 'the States of Holland are England's eternal enemy, both by interest and inclination.' He stated that 'we have found the danger of being against the king of France, therefore we joined with him, and he has succeeded beyond expectation.' Charles presented the States General as 'the common enemies to all monarchies' and that their existence could lead to the formation of a 'universal empire as great as Rome.'[433] This analogy with (ancient) Rome was probably not coincidental, since the English disliked the (Papal) Rome even more. However, as already his contemporaries understood, by allying with France, Charles II went against the balance of power idea.

It was at this time, in late 1671 and early 1672, that the German polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) came up with a 'diversion,' the Egyptian Plan. It was written on the instigation of his master, the Archbishop of Mainz. In March 1672, only a week before Louis declared war, Leibniz came to the French court to present the plan in person. Louis wanted Mainz to use his influence to convince the other German states not to interfere in the war. Leibniz did not give up on the plan, because he wrote the summary of it in the summer of 1672. Among many political and religious reasons for the invasion of Egypt, Leibniz mentioned that Egypt would confer domination of the seas and of the world. This would unite the Christian nations in Europe against the Muslims.[434] When Pomponne became the French foreign minister, after Lionne had died in 1671, he commented that 'I have nothing to say about the plans for a holy war, but you know that they have ceased to be in fashion since St. Louis.'[435]

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[433] *Journals of the House of Lords, Beginning Anno Decimo Octavo Caroli Secundi, 1666* (London: House of Lords, 1771), 524–27. Jones, *Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 198–99. Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 85. The idea of the republican empire has not been addressed properly in historiography so far.

[434] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe* (Berlin: Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1926), Series 4, Vol. 1, 220. Lloyd Strickland, 'Leibniz's Egypt Plan (1671–1672): from holy war to ecumenism', *Intellectual History Review* 26 (2016): 461–476.

[435] G. Guhrauer, *Kurmainz in der Epoche von 1672* (Hamburg, 1839), I, 294. Paul Ritter, *Leibniz Aegyptischer Plan* (Darmstadt, 1930). Rowen noted that 'the proposal for a new crusade was indeed more academic and lifeless than a pure intellectual exercise.' He concluded that 'if it had not been for the merited fame of Leibniz in the realm of thought, his plan would have stayed buried and deservedly forgotten.' Rowen, *Ambassador*, 11.

The jurists also addressed the balance of power. Leibniz's Saxon compatriot,[436] Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694), wrote his *magnum opus* on international law at the University of Lund in Sweden, explicitly building on Grotius. He was also sceptical about the notion of a just preventive war against a stronger state based on the balance of power. Pufendorf claimed that 'in general, the Causes of every War, and especially of the offensive, ought to be evident, and without Mixture of Doubt and Uncertainty.' Then, based on Grotius, he gave a list of unjust causes of war, 'some of them are manifestly unlawful' (avarice, ambition, and vainglory), while 'others of them have some Colour to be thought lawful, tho' it be but weak and faint.'[437]

It was under the latter, i.e., the unclearly unjust causes of war, that he (and Grotius) put the balance of power or 'Fears, which arise from the Strength and Power of Neighbours.' Pufendorf deemed it reasonable to think of the potential invasion, 'for Experience hath often proved it true, that Mens Desires of being great increase in Proportion to their Strength and Power. And it is natural for Men to be suspicious, and afraid of their oppress'd, whenever they apprehend that there is an Over-balance of Power in their Neighbours.'[438]

Pufendorf noted that there were two sorts of alliances, the equal and the unequal. The 'Equal Leagues' were 'alike on both Sides […], or, in proportion to the Strength of either Party, on both Sides equal.' Moreover, 'neither of the Parties is obliged to harder Conditions, or left any Way obnoxious to the other.' For him, the 'Equal Leagues' in wars had to agree 'that both the Confederates shall turnish out an equal Aid of Men and Ships, and other Necessaries for War.' Then, there were 'Unequal Leagues,' and 'these are when either the Promises are

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[436] Although they both studied at Leipzig, Leibniz privately opposed Pufendorf in practically every discipline, from the philosophy of law to history. Detlef Döring, 'Leibniz's critique of Pufendorf: A dispute in the eve of the Enlightenment', in Marcelo Dascal (ed.), *The Practice of Reason: Leibniz and his Controversies* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2010), 245–272.

[437] Samuel Pufendorf, *De Jure Naturae et Gentium* (Lund: Junghans, 1672), 1161–62. A synopsis of this long and heavy book appeared next year, following the evergreen wisdom that one has to strike the iron while it is hot. Samuel Pufendorf, *De officio hominis et civis iuxta legem naturalem* (Lund: Junghans, 1673). Samuel Pufendorf, *Of Law of Nature and Nations*, 4th edition, translated by Basil Kennett (London: J. Walthoe et al., 1729), 835–837.

[438] Pufendorf, *Of Law of Nature and Nations*, 835–837.

unequal; or when either of the Parties is obliged to harder Conditions. The Promises may be unequal, either with regard to the superior, or inferior Confederate.'[439]

Pufendorf questioned, 'suppose two Parties both Allies, and Confederates to a Third, make War upon one another, which of them the third Confederate ought to assist?' According to him, the state interests always determine if a Prince should enter into alliance, 'for that Consideration ought to over-balance.' All states look to 'secure their own Interest. For it is certainly the highest Pitch of Baseness possible, to sacrifice a Friend to save myself. And therefore in all Leagues of War, it is look'd upon to be a very important Article, that no one of the Confederates shall make a separate Peace with the common Enemy, excluding the rest of the Allies. Though 'tis reasonable this Article should be understood with this Limitation, supposing the other Confederate, or Confederates, do not refuse to comply with fair Terms and proper Overtures of Peace.'[440] These passages clearly demonstrate the deep connection between the balance-of-power principle and the seventeenth-century understanding of natural law, especially in relation to legitimacy or the just causes of war for safety and peace.

War was officially declared in March 1672 because the feud about the 'sovereignty of the seas' and 'Dutch ingratitude' could not be resolved.[441] The naval strategy of England was similar as it was in the earlier wars, wrecking the Dutch fleet and blockading the Dutch coast from international trade. The added element was the invasion of a land army, but this seemed an overambitious plan already at the time. The Dutch naval strategy, however, was very different from previous wars. Dutch Admiral, Michiel de Ruyter,[442] needed to evade open

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[439] Pufendorf, *Of Law of Nature and Nations*, 858.
[440] Pufendorf, *Of Law of Nature and Nations*, 860. According to Pufendorf, truces between states can be respected in Europe, yet ignored beyond Europe. As he said, 'those Nations in Europe, that have Plantations in the East or West-Indies, may make a Truce, that shall be of Force only in Europe, and continue the War all the while in the Indies.' Ibid., 850.
[441] Clément (ed.), *Lettres, instructions, et mémoires de Colbert*, VI, 287.
[442] Similar as Tromp, De Ruyter was considered a brilliant naval commander even by his enemies. An unnamed English officer said: '*Is dat een Admiraal! Dat's een Admiraal, een Kapitein, een Stuurman, een matroos ene en soldat. Ja die man, die Heldt, is da talles te gelyk.*' This praise appears in a biography written by De Ruyter's son-in-law. Geeraert Brandt, *Het leven en bedryf van den Heere Michiel de Ruiter, hertog, ridder, &c. L. Admiraal Generaal van Hollandt en Westvrieslandt* (Amsterdam: Wolfgang et al., 1687), 675.

battles, keep his fleet and threaten the potential invasion from the sea.[443] Mahan argued that they were bound to the tactic 'by the desperate odds under which they were fighting; but they did not use their shoals as a mere shelter – warfare they waged was the defensive-offensive.'[444] This defensive strategy was part of a sea denial doctrine or the *fleet-in-being*, which could not control the sea due to the superior naval forces of its enemy or enemies.[445]

Thus, to maintain the balance of sea power, De Ruyter adapted his strategy to more asymmetrical tactics. However, even with a numerically inferior fleet, De Ruyter still managed to check the Anglo-French fleet and thwarted the English invasion. In the first sea battle of the Third Anglo-Dutch War, the Battle of Solebay on 7 June 1672, the fleets were already very imbalanced, although the ratio was even higher in the later battles. The Anglo-French fleet had 80 large warships with more than 36 guns and the Dutch fleet had 62 large warships with more than 36 guns; on average, the Anglo-French warships had 61 guns in contrast to 60 guns on the Dutch warships (Table 12). The Dutch fleet surprised the anchored Anglo-French fleet at Southwold in Suffolk. When the Dutch lost the weather gauge in the afternoon, they had to retreat. However, the Dutch only lost *Jozua* (54) and *Stavoren* (48), while the Anglo-French fleet lost four ships, including the flagship *Royal James* (100). There were no further sea battles in 1672 because of bad weather. Ironically, bad weather prevented the English invasion of the Netherlands, when in 1688 the wind helped the Dutch invasion of England.[446] Despite the outcome being a tie at best, Charles II had the Royal Navy review to celebrate what he claimed was a naval victory at Solebay against the Dutch; Louis XIV had a similar interpretation.[447]

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[443] Harding, *Evolution of the Sailing Navy*, 97–98.
[444] Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power*, 144.
[445] Admiral Arthur Herbert, 1st Earl of Torrington (1648–1716), introduced the term in 1690, when he was challenged by the numerically superior French navy. He proposed to keep his fleet safe and to directly engage the enemy, until the numbers would be more favourable. William S. Maltby, 'The Origins of a Global Strategy: England from 1558 to 1713', in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (eds.), *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 151–177, at 159–160.
[446] Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 81–82.
[447] Steve Dunn, *The Power and the Glory: Royal Navy Fleet Reviews from Earliest Times to 2005* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2021).

Anglo-French Fleet		Dutch Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with more than 36 Guns: 80	Total Number of Guns: 4878	Total Number of Warships with more than 36 Guns: 62	Total Number of Guns: 3730
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 61		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 60

Table 12. The Battle of Solebay.

Figure 19. The French medal celebrating the 'naval victory' at Solebay. Louis XIV commemorated several of his 'naval victories' with medals.[448] Perhaps not too surprisingly, he did not bestow the same 'honour' to his 'naval defeats.'

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[448] *Médailles sur les principaux événements du règne de Louis le Grand* (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1702).

Despite the successful Dutch defense at sea, the key theatre of war was the French invasion on land. The first skirmishes started in May 1672, but Louis XIV with a 120,000-strong army crossed the Rhine into Netherlands in June,[449] only a few days after the Battle of Solebay. As seen from the *Interest van Holland*, De Witt underestimated the potential of the French land invasion, so he said that 'the fatherland is now lost.'[450] France knew how disorganized the Dutch army was and the border folded in weeks. The Dutch saved themselves by opening their sluices, flooding the low-lying parts of the country and cutting off the French from Holland.[451] The sea power in this case quite literally defeated the land power. Still, it was an absolute failure for De Witt brothers, who were ousted from office, publicly murdered, and perhaps even cannibalized in August in The Hague.[452] William of Orange was nominated as the new stadtholder, ending the 'True Freedom' regime.

The Anglo-French naval alliance proved only somewhat useful. The combined Anglo-French fleet had around 80 large warships. Yet, the clear impracticalities and logistical concerns of coordinating the tactical movements with different languages, signaling and fighting instructions diminished the numerical advantage. Louis XIV wrote orders for his new admiral, Comte d'Estrées, and he was to guarantee harmonious action. He wanted the French fleet 'to equal or even surpass the English in bravery, steadiness and expertise.'[453] This stance was a clear departure from his instructions in the Second Anglo-Dutch war when France was a nominal Dutch ally but almost completely inactive.

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[449] Because the Prince-Bishopric of Münster and the Archbishop of Cologne were French allies, Louis XIV could bypass the Spanish Netherlands.

[450] Luc Panhuysen, *Rampjaar 1672: Hoe de Republiek aan de ondergang ontsnapte* (Amsterdam: Atlas, 2009), 135.

[451] Two Princes of Orange, Maurice and his half-brother Frederick Henry, devised and built a system of water-based defenses in the late 1620s and 1630s. They constructed sluices in dikes, while forts were built at strategic points, which covered the dikes along the water line. In addition to natural bodies of water, like the North Sea, it could engulf Holland with water and almost turn it into an island. The Dutch Water Line stopped the French army in 1672, but due to freezing temperatures in the winter, it almost froze over. This happened in the winter of 1794–95, which allowed the Revolutionary France to cross it and conquer the Dutch Republic, ending its independence.

[452] Rowen, *John de Witt*, 798–894. I. J. Roorda, *Het Rampjaar 1672* (Bussum: Fibula-Van Dishoeck, 1971).

[453] Colenbrander (ed.), *Bescheiden*, II, 81–87, 208–12. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 189–90.

However, even with these instructions, the Anglo-French cooperation was far from ideal and the perception the English had of their allies was deteriorating. In 1673, during the First Battle of Schooneveld in early June,[454] the Anglo-French fleet, which had 24 large warships more and more heavily armed than the Dutch, wanted to destroy the Dutch navy. As is evident from the ship lists, only warships with more than 42 guns were now admitted into the line of battle. The Anglo-French fleet had 76 large warships with more than 42 guns and the Dutch fleet had 52 large warships with more than 42 guns; on average, the Anglo-French warships had 63 guns in contrast to 61 guns on the Dutch warships (Table 13). De Ruyter's defensive-offensive tactic worked well and he kept the balance at sea. English Admiral Rupert argued that the French deliberately did not attack at sea, so that the English and the Dutch would harm each other and France could become the superior sea power.[455]

Anglo-French Fleet		Dutch Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with more than 42 Guns: 76	Total Number of Guns: 4780	Total Number of Warships with more than 42 Guns: 52	Total Number of Guns: 3172
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 63		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 61

Table 13. The First Battle of Schooneveld.

Only a week later, on 14 June, during the Second Battle of Schooneveld, the balance did not change much. Two English warships of 70 guns and one French warship of 56 guns departed, while one English ship of 70 guns arrived. A slightly more significant difference was in the Dutch fleet, where three ships of 66, 54 and 48 guns departed, and two larger ships of 84 and 82 guns arrived. The Anglo-French fleet had 74 large warships with more than 42 guns

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[454] See the different recollections in R. C. Anderson, ed., *Journals and Narratives of the Third Dutch War* (London: Navy Records Society, 1946). J. R. Bruijn (ed.), *De oorlogvoering ter zee in 1673 in journalen en andere stukken* (Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1966).
[455] Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 190–91, 208–11.

and the Dutch fleet had 51 large warships with more than 42 guns; on average, the Anglo-French warships had 63 guns in contrast to ca. 62 guns on the Dutch warships (Table 14). The outcome of the battle was another tie, but it was a strategic victory for the Dutch, as they kept the English invasion force away from the Dutch coast.

Anglo-French Fleet		Dutch Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with more than 42 Guns: 74	Total Number of Guns: 4640	Total Number of Warships with more than 42 Guns: 51	Total Number of Guns: 3170
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 63		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 62

Table 14. The Second Battle of Schooneveld.

De Ruyter saw that his defensive tactics worked, so he wanted to keep this defensible position. On the other hand, Rupert put to sea again in late July, and wanted to draw De Ruyter away from Schooneveld. Because the homeward Dutch VOC treasure fleet was returning, William instructed De Ruyter to protect the merchant ships. This was not a wrong strategic decision, because the English could seize the rich merchant ships and potentially get enough money to continue the war.[456] The Battle of Texel on 21 August 1673 was the last battle of the allied Anglo-French fleet. Of large warships with more than 42 guns, the Anglo-French fleet had 83, while the Dutch fleet had 60; on average, the Anglo-French warships had ca. 62 guns in contrast to ca. 60 guns on the Dutch warships (Table 15).

Even though he was seriously outnumbered, De Ruyter managed to gain the weather gauge and separated the (French) van with his van from the main Allied fleet, so the French fleet could not participate significantly in the battle. The Dutch fleet was able to focus on the English centre and rear divisions. Sir Edward Spragge, commanding the rear English division

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[456] Reine, *Rechterhand van Nederland*, 268–272.

had a personal vendetta with the Dutch Rear Admiral Cornelis Tromp, with whom fought so fiercely that they both had to change ships three times; Spragge drowned on the third attempt, as he was transported to a fresh ship. This distraction allowed an inferior but superiorly handled Dutch fleet to prevail. Although no side lost any major warship, the Allies had to withdraw with some severely damaged warships and more casualties.[457]

Anglo-French Fleet		Dutch Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with more than 42 Guns: 85	Total Number of Guns: 5284	Total Number of Warships with more than 42 Guns: 60	Total Number of Guns: 3648
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 62		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 61

Table 15. The Battle of Texel.

Many Dutch privateers fought and seized great prizes, especially in English coastal waters. Privateers from Zeeland were infamous for working in packs. These losses represented a stark contrast with the First and Second Anglo-Dutch Wars. In the First War, many Dutch merchant ships were seized, albeit they were mainly smaller vessels. In the Second War, the number of prizes taken on both sides was relatively balanced, but it hurt the English trade more. In the Third War, however, the English losses were much higher.[458] Parliament thought that there was an obvious nefarious 'design' by Louis XIV, which was only strengthened when he again went to war against Spain in October 1673.[459]

By late 1673, public pressure for peace was strong. In France, Colbert was dismayed at the French diminishing financial returns and wanted a quick end of hostilities. On the other hand, the French Secretary of State for War, François Michel Le Tellier, Marquis de Louvois

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[457] Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 85.
[458] Bruijn, 'Dutch Privateering.' Lunsford, *Piracy*.
[459] Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 208–11.

(1641–1691), wanted the war to continue. Cologne and Münster were out of the war by 1673 in exchange for some territories, and the Dutch paying for their troops.[460] By 1674, Lionne's alliances proved useless. Many allies even became France's foes – by 1674, only Sweden remained France's ally.[461] Louis blamed Pomponne for lacking the *élan* of his predecessor.[462] However, the 'Grand Alliance' against Louis XIV was also relatively weak, even though alliance treaties explicitly specified how many armed forces each ally had to provide.[463] Only Brandenburg respected the alliance treaty and won some battles, while the other German principalities and the Habsburgs (with its problems in Hungary) failed to affect the war in a meaningful way.[464]

In England, the anti-French public opinion accentuated the uselessness of the Anglo-French alliance and the unreliability of France as naval partner. The English Parliament agreed that France's inaction was not coincidental but a key part of French strategy: 'the interest of the king of England is to keep France from being too great on the Continent, and the French interest is to keep us from being masters of the sea; the French have pursued that interest well.'[465] The English parliament and public openly opposed the war from the start, so many pamphlets were written and published at the time.[466]

'English Presbyterian' in 1672 noted that 'the Peace of England depends on the peace of Europe and this peace depends on the perpetual opposition between Spain and France.'[467] Therefore, the aim was not peace in itself, but a perpetual and balanced opposition between

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[460] The Articles of Peace between Cologne and Munster, and the Netherlands, signed at Cologne, 15 Sept. 1673.
[461] Carl Friedrich, Charles Blitzer, *The Age of Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), 175–188.
[462] Primi Visconti, *Mémoires sur la cour de Louis XIV*, ed. trans. Jean Lemoine (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1908), 34–35.
[463] The Treaty of Alliance between the Empire and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 25 July 1672. The Defensive Alliance between the Empire, Denmark-Norway, Brandenburg, signed at Brunswick, 22 September 1672. The Treaty of Alliance between Spain and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 30 August 1673.
[464] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance*, 55–56.
[465] Cobbett (ed.), *The Parliamentary History of England*, IV, 602.
[466] Steven Pincus, 'From butterboxes to wooden shoes: the shift in English popular sentiment from anti-Dutch to anti-French in the 1670s', *The Historical Journal* 38 (1995): 333–361.
[467] Anon., *Traité politique sur les mouvemens presens de l'Angleterre contre ses interests et ses maximes fondamentales* (Ville Franche: s.n., 1672).

France and Spain, as argued by Rohan. Similar to Lisola, an anonymous writer stated that 'in this dangerous Crisis of Affairs, it has pleas'd Divine Providence to leave England the Arbitresse of the Fate of Europe.'[468] Since England was an island, supposedly it had no interest on the Continent, so it could unbiasedly take care of the European balance. Moreover, in 1673, Lisola issued 'an appeal to England,' written in French, and called on England to join the new anti-French coalition to reset the European balance.[469] Charles II again ran out of money without a victory, so he was forced to negotiate.

In February 1674, the separate peace, or the Treaty of Westminster was signed. Many articles were identical to earlier treaties, such as 'a firm, sincere and inviolable peace, union and friendship.' It stated that 'since not only the wealth but even the tranquillity of both nations chiefly depends on the mutual and undisturbed freedom of navigation and commerce, nothing therefore ought to be more taken care of by both parties than a just and equal regulation of commerce, and especially in the East Indies.' Both states agreed to appoint 'an equal number of commissioners on both sides' and negotiate in London a commercial treaty. Otherwise, after three months, it would go to the arbitration of the Queen Regent of Spain and both would have to accept what she decided.[470]

The Dutch agreed to honor the English 'flag called the Jack, in any of the seas from the Cape called Finisterre, to the middle point of the land called van Staten, in Norway' by 'striking their own flag and lowering their topsail.' It also had a secret article, which prohibited England from sending any forces or help in any form to France. Thomas W. Fulton noted that the article

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[468] Anon., *The Present State of Christendome and the Interest of England, with a Regard to France* (London: H. Brome, 1677), 26. Maurseth, 'Balance-of-Power Thinking', 123–24.

[469] François Paul de Lisola, *Appel de l'Angleterre touchant la Secrete cabale ou assemblée a Whithael à & envers le grand conseil de la nation, se trouvant la noblesse & la communeauté assemblée* (Amsterdam: La vefue de feu J. Bruynink, 1673). Moreover, Lisola's *Buckler of State* was republished in England in 1673. François Paul Lisola, *The buckler of state and justice against the design manifestly discovered of the universal monarchy under the vain pretext of the Queen of France, her pretensions* (London: Richard Royston, 1673).

[470] The Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at Westminster, 19 February 1674. See also the later commercial treaty. The Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between England and the Netherlands, signed at London, 10 December 1674.

on the flag had been included in many Anglo-Dutch treaties until 1784, but that it was only a formality.[471] England also allowed the flow of contraband weapons to aid the Dutch in their ongoing fight against France. Charles II not only signed a separate peace but also sealed an alliance by giving the Duke of York's daughter, the future English queen Mary, in marriage to William of Orange. Ironically, this marriage paved the way for the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and to the eventual end of the Stuart dynasty in England.

Since England concluded a separate peace treaty in February 1674, and the Dutch Republic concluded an alliance with Spain in December 1675, the naval theatre of war moved to the Mediterranean. Among many other things, the Dutch-Spanish alliance treaty also included a naval aspect. The Dutch promised to send six warships from 64 to 80 guns, six warships from 60 to 70 guns, six warships from 44 to 54 guns, six patches from 10 to 16 guns (*six Pataches de dix à seize Pieces*), and two frigates of provision of 26 to 28 guns, with six fireships (*Brulots*). These ships had to be equipped and manned with at least 6,000 sailors, 1,300 guns, and supplied for eight months with all ammunition for war and all the necessary victuals. Spain had to pay for the majority of costs, the Dutch to cover the rest.[472]

However, Louis used the anti-Spanish rebellion in Sicily and the French navy controlled the waters around the rebellious island. On 22 April 1676, the French fleet under Admiral Abraham Duquesne defeated the allied Dutch-Spanish fleet under De Ruyter in the Battle of Etna (also the Battle of Augusta or Agosta). The French fleet had 29 warships and the Dutch-Spanish fleet had 27 warships; on average, the French warships had ca. 58 guns in contrast to ca. 55 guns on the Dutch-Spanish warships (Table 16). After the death of De Ruyter at Etna, the larger French fleet under Duquense drove the demoralized Dutch-Spanish fleet into Palermo in June 1676. A well-handled attack, directed by Tourville, drove them onshore, where

[471] Fulton, *The Sovereignty of the Sea*, 21, 508.
[472] The Articles of a Treaty between Spain and the Netherlands, December 1675. The Defensive Alliance between Spain and the Netherlands and the Palatinate, signed at The Hague, 26 March 1676.

they were destroyed by fireships. Colbert's French fleet had won its first major victory. In 1676, the French traveler Jean-Baptiste Tavernier flattered Louis in his travelogue by stating that 'you are destined to command the entire universe.'[473]

French Fleet		Dutch-Spanish Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with more than 34 Guns: 29	Total Number of Guns: 1674	Total Number of Warships with more than 34 Guns: 27	Total Number of Guns: 1480
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 58		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 55

Table 16. The Battle of Etna or Augusta.

But, this success in the Mediterranean did not last for long and it ironically led to their downfall. England became worried about the French competition with England's Levant trade. English public opinion was concerned with the rise of the French sea power, and Parliament started a large shipbuilding program in 1677. In the Epistle to the Reader, Andrew Yarranton, former officer in the Parliamentary Army and company promoter, warned that 'the great danger might ensue in breaking the Ballance of Europe, it being then so indifferently settled.' In relation to France continuing the war with the Netherlands, he considered 'the Balance […] now broke.'[474] He concluded that although the Dutch were England's primary trade rivals, Europe should rally against Louis XIV to reset the balance. The English merchants took advantage of the Franco-Dutch War to extend their trade. After William of Orange married the niece of Charles II, Mary, in 1677, England joined the defensive alliance with the Netherlands in 1678.

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[473] Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, *Les Six Voyages de Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Ecuyer, Baron d'Aubonne, en Turquie, en Perse, et aux Indes*, 6 vols. (Rouen, 1724 [1676]), II, 177, VI, ii.

[474] Andrew Yarranton, *England's improvement by sea and land To out-do the Dutch without fighting, to pay debts without moneys, to set at work all the poor of England with the growth of our own lands* (London: Andrew Yarranton, 1677). Marchamont Nedham, *Christianissimus Christiandus: or reasons for a reduction of France to a more Christian state in Europe* (London: Jonathan Edwin, 1678).

Although Charles II wanted to remain neutral after the separate peace of 1674, the pressure was building to bring England into the war against France. By early 1678, the English and the Dutch reached an agreement to force peace.[475] In an alliance treaty between England and the Dutch Republic from July 1678, both states consented to act 'with all their united force,' but the former 'shall furnish one third more by sea than the States [of Holland], and they one third more by land than his Majesty.'[476] This just proves how practical and interactive the manifestation of the balancing process had become by that time. Since the Dutch had to direct their defensive capabilities to land to counter the French onslaught, they now needed to provide one third less maritime forces, and one third more land forces.

France was again forced to peace and had to sign the Treaty of Nijmegen.[477] Only two weeks after the Anglo-Dutch alliance had been concluded on 26 July 1678, France and the Dutch Republic signed a peace treaty. A series of treaties known as the Peace of Nijmegen were signed in 1678 and 1679.[478] In the treaty between France and the Dutch Republic, the English king served as a mediator. Here, again, the verb *to restore*, in reference to several previous treaties, reigned supreme.[479] The French agreed to withdraw some clauses of Colbert's tariffs of 1667. However, France received Franche-Comté, which they occupied for a second time in 1674, after Louis had to return it in 1668. Since it was far from the Dutch frontiers and the Spaniards could not defend it, Franche-Comté was given to Louis.[480]

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[475] The Treaty of Defensive Alliance between England and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 10 January 1678. The Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at Westminster, 3 March 1678.

[476] The Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 26 July 1678.

[477] Although this Treaty does not claim the same glory as Westphalia or Utrecht, one element of it resonates more in the general public than any other peace treaty. The French Baroque composer Marc-Antoine Charpentier composed a Te Deum in reverence to this Peace, and the prelude, *Marche en rondeau*, is used as the theme of the fanfare for the Eurovision Song Contest.

[478] The Treaty of Peace between France and the Netherlands, signed at Nimeguen, 10 August 1678. The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between France and the Netherlands, signed at Nimeguen, 10 August 1678. The Treaty of Peace between France and Spain, signed at Nimeguen, 17 September 1678. The Peace between the Empire, Austria and France, signed at Nimeguen, 5 February 1679.

[479] Izidor Janžekovič, 'The Balance of Power from the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the War of the Spanish Succession and the Peace of Utrecht (1713)', *History of European Ideas* 49 (2023): 561–579.

[480] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance*, 61–63.

The Franco-Dutch War also had its proxy war in the Baltic. This proxy war started due to the fact that Sweden was allied with France, while the Dutch Republic concluded an alliance with Denmark in 1675. The Danes wanted to retrieve Scania, which they had to cede to Sweden in the Treaty of Roskilde in 1658. In September 1679, the Peace of Lund between Denmark and Sweden, under French sponsorship, ended the Scanian War (1675–79).[481] The warring states even concluded a defensive alliance, where they explicitly stated naval provisions. Each had to send ten warships (*dix Vaisseaux de Guerre*), of which three were to be very large from 60 to 90 guns with at least 1,050 men, three of middle status from 40 to 60 with at least 700 men, and three smaller ones from 24 to 40 with at least 800 men (sic!). Besides that, the fleet had to be equipped with vessels of provision, smaller vessels, and two fireships.[482] As usual for the time, to make peace and alliance more durable, they included a marriage treaty.[483]

Figure 20. The Battle of Køge Bay (1677) is considered as the greatest Danish naval victory.

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[481] The Armistice between Sweden and Denmark, signed at Lund, 30 August 1679. The Peace between France, also on behalf of Sweden, and Denmark, signed at Fontainebleau, 2 September 1679. The Treaty of Peace between Sweden and Denmark, signed at Lund, 26 September 1679.

[482] The Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Sweden and Denmark, signed at Lund, 7 October 1679. *Le Mercure hollandois, Contenant les choses les plus remarquables detoutes de la terre, arrivées en l'an 1679* (Amsterdam: Henry & Theodore Boom, 1681), 391–403. Considering that the smaller ships with less guns were supposed to have more men than the middle ships, they were probably intended to be used as transport ships.

[483] The Treaty of marriage between Charles XI, King of Sweden, and Ulrica Eleonora, Princess of Denmark, signed at Lund, 21 December 1679.

Since the Dutch Republic was in turmoil and relative decline after the *Rampjaar* of 1672, many thinkers deliberated on the domestic and foreign causes for it. Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), one of the most radical philosophers of the early modern era,[484] is not known for his analyses of international relations and law. Moreover, even Spinoza did not think that his ideas on classical international law were particularly original. In the introduction to the Political Treatise, he argued that 'when I applied my mind to Politics, I didn't intend to advance anything new or unheard of, but only to demonstrate the things which agree best with practice, in a certain and indubitable way.'[485] Gustav Adolf Walz and Adolf Menzel have read his texts as denying the international law altogether.[486] Yet, recently Spinoza has been called the 'pre-thinker of a procedural theory of a confederation of states.'[487]

In the third chapter of his posthumously published *Political Treatise* (1677), titled '*Of the Right of Supreme Authorities*,' Spinoza started by stating that the international situation was similar to that of the (Hobbesian) state of nature. He rejected the universalist approach to international law of Francisco Vitoria, Francisco Suarez and Hugo Grotius. For Spinoza, there was no common good binding the states in the state of nature. On the contrary, it was formed by the particular interests of states. He defined the state's 'own well-being' or interest as 'supreme law.'[488] Spinoza recognized the two basic characteristics of the international law, the

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[484] Steven Nadler, s.v. 'Baruch Spinoza', in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2023): https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/. Henry Allison, *Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). Etienne Balibar, *Spinoza and Politics* (London: Verso, 1998). Michael Della Rocca (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). Justin Steinberg, *Spinoza's Political Psychology: The Taming of Fortune and Fear* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). Jonathan I. Israel, *Spinoza: Life and Legacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).

[485] Spinoza, *Political Treatise*, 1/4.

[486] Adolf Menzel, 'Spinoza und das Völkerrecht', *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht* 2 (1908): 17–30. Adolf Menzel, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Staatslehre* (Vienna: Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, 1929), 410. Gustaf Adolf Walz, *Wesen des Völkerrechts und Kritik der Völkerrechtsleugner* (Stuttgart, 1930), 18–26. Arthur Nussbaum, *A Concise History of the Law of Nations* (New York, 1947), 114. Manfred Walther, 'Die Staatslehre Spinozas: Die (Neu-)Entdeckung der politischen Philosophie Spinozas durch Adolf Menzel', *Der Staat* 42 (2003): 284–298.

[487] Tilmann Altwicker, 'Spinoza's Theory of International Relations (TP, Chapter 3, §§ 11–18)', in *Naturalism and Democracy: A Commentary on Spinoza's "Political Treatise" in the Context of His System*, edited by Wolfgang Bartuschat, Stephan Kirste, and Manfred Walther (Leiden: Brill, 2019): 57–67, at 58.

[488] Spinoza, *Political Treatise*, 3/14.

states' rights to wage war, and the non-binding essence of international treaties. As for the states' rights to wage war, the states were limited to their means, and the states' natural rights reach as far as their power (*potentia*), arguing that might makes right.[489]

Considering the non-binding essence of international treaties, Spinoza argued that there were two types of treaties, the non-aggression pacts, entered out of 'fear of loss,' and the trade agreements, entered out of 'hope of profit.' He thought that 'if either Commonwealth loses its hope or fear, it is once again its own master, and the chain by which the Commonwealths were bound to one another is broken of its own accord. So each Commonwealth has a complete right to dissolve the alliance whenever it wants to.'[490] Thus, international relations were dictated by the shifting alliances, changing national interest and prudence.

On the other hand, Spinoza introduced the concept of 'the common will of the allies.' Known for his 'geometric method' of rational thinking,[491] he understood that the states come together in alliances for making themselves collectively more powerful, usually against the more threatening state or alliance of states. Participating nations were 'led as if by one mind' on the international scene.[492] International state of peace could be established based on treaties between states. Yet, Spinoza did not envisage a world state, but a confederation or alliance of sovereign individual states. Spinoza's relatively pessimistic theory of power was based on the realisation that states make peace when they were threatened.

The Third Anglo-Dutch War and the Franco-Dutch War in the 1670s exposed the fragility of the Dutch sea power and the Dutch Republic itself. The exposed land border needed

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[489] Spinoza, *Political Treatise*, 3/2, 3/13, 2/4. He did mention some limitations for the use of power in war (*ius in bello*) later in the text. Thus, war could only be fought for peace (6/35) and there were rules for conquering cities (9/13). Altwicker, 'Spinoza's Theory of International Relations,' 59–60.

[490] Spinoza, *Political Treatise*, 3/14. Spinoza recognized the general right of states to end unfavorable treaties. The change of circumstances could be completely subjective to break the treaty. Tilmann Altwicker, 'The International Legal Argument in Spinoza', in Stefan Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein, and David Roth-Isigkeit (eds.), *System, Order, and International Law: The Early History of International Legal Thought from Machiavelli to Hegel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 183–198.

[491] Edwin Curley, *Behind the Geometric Method* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Valtteri Viljanen, *Spinoza's Geometry of Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[492] Spinoza, *Political Treatise*, 3/12, 3/16, 2/16. Altwicker, 'Spinoza's Theory of International Relations,' 62–64.

protection, so the Dutch needed to sacrifice part of their sea power to enhance their land power and land defenses. The Dutch Republic lacked the resources to match the ever-larger fleets of France and England, while William of Orange was forced to sacrifice Dutch maritime interests to support the land war. On the other hand, the French also faced a dilemma, since Colbert wanted to supplant the Dutch in world trade, but Louis wanted the land conquests, specifically in the Spanish Netherlands. England, free from any major conflict in Europe since early 1674, enhanced her relative and absolute trading position, and consequently sea power. However, the contest for the balance of sea power was far from decided in the 1670s.

The War of the Grand Alliance (1688–97)

After the Treaties of Nijmegen had been signed in 1678 and 1679, the border disputes did not end. In the early 1680s, Louis XIV organised several 'Chambers of Reunion' to determine which neighbouring territories were once legal dependencies of his recognised conquests. This led to the relatively short War of the Reunions (1683–84) against Spain, Genoa, and the Empire, which was already in a war against the Ottomans. Although several alliances were formed in the early 1680s, some with articles specifying naval obligations,[493] the other states, including the Dutch Republic and England, remained neutral because of other priorities or French bribes. Among other places, Louis annexed Casale, Strasbourg and Luxembourg to France in the Twenty Years' Truce of Ratisbon or Regensburg.[494]

The contemporaries pointed out that Louis had annexed more land since 1679 than he had gained at Nijmegen.[495] It was at these tense times, when the Ottomans were besieging Vienna, and the 'Christendom' tried to get behind the Habsburgs,[496] with the glaring exception of France (and many other states), that Leibniz wrote 'beyond doubt his most brilliant and entertaining political work.'[497] Leibniz wrote a satire about Louis's designs for universal monarchy with an ironic title, *Mars Christianissimus*, playing with the official title of the French kings.[498] Since Louis was 'the most Christian King,' Leibniz stated that he had to guided

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[493] The Convention between the Emperor, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 16 February 1683. It stated that, in addition to 6,000 infantry, each party had to provide twelve well-armed and well-equipped warships, of the following order: two first-rates with more than 80 guns, four second-rates with more than 70 guns, four third-rates with more than 60 guns, and two fourth-rates with more than 36 guns. The Emperor was exempt because he practically had no navy. On the other side, France also thought of its naval support and trade in its relationship with Denmark. The Treaty of Alliance and Subsidy between Denmark and France, signed at Copenhagen, 16 November 1683.

[494] The Truce for Twenty Years between the Empire and France, signed at Ratisbon, 15 August 1684.

[495] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance of Power*, 68, 149

[496] The Offensive and Defensive Alliance between the Emperor, Poland and Venice, signed at Linz, 5 March 1684. In the treaty, Venice was said to have 'the very powerful naval fleet' (*potentissima maritima Classe*), which was of course limited to the Mediterranean.

[497] Leibniz, 'Mars Christianissimus', in ibid., *Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 121–145, at 121.

[498] It was written in Latin, but Leibniz, who spent a few months on the court of Louis XIV in 1672, as mentioned when he presented his Egyptian plan, translated it into French himself. Anon. (Leibniz), *Mars Christianissimus*

by Holy Spirit. As he 'discerned' in this satire, 'all of the rules of politics cease with respect to this great prince, and though it seems that he does many things against the order of prudence, he is seen nonetheless to succeed, because the good Spirit is with him.' Moreover, all kings and princes 'are obliged in conscience to defer completely to him, to recognize him as arbiter of their quarrels, and to leave to him the direction of the general affairs of Christendom.'[499]

By the early 1680s, Colbert and his son built the numerically most powerful navy that could oppose the combined Anglo-Dutch fleet.[500] Moreover, the French trade companies in India, West Africa and America became tough competitors to the English and Dutch merchants. Colbert made France the enemy that the Dutch Republic had been a couple of decades earlier, and the contemporaries took notice of it. An anonymous author, when describing the recent rise of France and how to counter it through the balance-of-power concept, argued 'that which is the Crown of this perfection, and may be the strongest stay of it, is the Naval force now added to the other strengths of that powerful Monarchy.' This 'Naval force' now 'equals, if it be not an overballance to, either England or Holland.' Moreover, 'there was never before any example upon Earth of a Triumvirate of mighty Nations in a vicinity of neighbourhood one to another, and bordering upon the same Seas, equally powerful in Naval strength.'[501] Thus, this anonymous author suggested that the sea power of France equalled the sea powers of England and Holland, explicitly arguing for the tripartite balance of sea power.

The question of alliances was essential. The author warned that France 'had grow to an over-ballance to England in Naval force' and that 'there is no separate Kingdom or State in Europe sufficient to ballance the weighty Body of the French Monarchy.' In his opinion, France

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Autore Germano Gallo-Graeco, Ou Apologie des Armes du Roy Tres-Chrestien Contre Les Chrestiens (Cologne: Le Bon, 1684). It was quickly translated into other major European languages. Anon., *Mars Christianissimus Autore Germano Gallo-Græco: or, an apology for the most Christian King's taking up arms against the Christians* (London: R. Bentley and S. Magnes, 1684). Anon., *Der Allerchristlichste Mars, ausgerüstet von Germano Gallo-Graeco: Oder Schutz-Schrifft des Allerchristl. Königs Waffen wider die Christen* (1685).

[499] Leibniz, 'Mars Christianissimus', 129, 131, 135.

[500] Archives nationales, Marine B/5/2/1, L'État de la marine de 1660 à 1696. Bnf, Rotschild 2364.

[501] Anon., *Discourses upon the modern affairs of Europe tending to prove that the illustrious French monarchy may be reduced to terms of greater moderation* (London: s.n., 1680), 3.

was already a more powerful sea power than England at the time. Thus, 'there must be a new fond of Power and Interest raised up, sufficient to keep the ballance of Europe from being called back into a Chaos, out of which the French may form an Universal Monarchy.' He concluded that 'this can by no means better be done than by England and the United Provinces, entring into a new League, for the mutual and reciprocal defence of themselves, and their Confederates […] and for restraining the further growth and increase of the French Monarchy.'[502] However, Charles II was not interested in a new Anglo-Dutch alliance and took the French money, so it was only in 1685 under James II that their alliance was renewed.[503]

The interactive nature of the balance of sea power between these three sea powers was known. As the anonymous author continued, the 'consequence of which must of necessity in time to come, be, a perpetual emulation and jealousy, greater, by how much either an Union or division of three is more perfect than of any other number.' Thus, 'it must necessarily come to pass, either that some two of the three shall alternately, or by turns fight against the third; Or that two of the three shall agree to extinguish the power of the third, that themselves may remain in indifferent terms, without jealousy one of another.' For France to achieve 'that huge designe of ambition for the universal Monarchy,' it needed one of the following three things, 'to bring Holland under a kind of feudal protection of that Crown, by which means they might serve themselves of their Ships and Seamen: Or to make themselves masters of the Spanish Netherlands: Or lastly to grow great in Naval strength at home.'[504]

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[502] Anon., *Discourses upon the modern affairs of Europe*, 8–9.

[503] The Treaty for the Renewal of the Alliance between Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at Windsor, 17 August 1685. At the same time, in a sign of the Dutch decline, the Dutch had to sign a humiliating treaty with Brandenburg, where they had to pay reparations for the war in the 1670s for fighting on their side. The Treaty of Accommodation between Brandenburg and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 23 August 1685. In the colonies, the Anglo-French animosity was pacified with a special treaty. The Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and France for a Neutrality in America, signed at Whitehall, 16 November 1686.

[504] Anon., *Discourses upon the modern affairs of Europe*, 3. Even within France, there were some critical voices. For example, the French novelist and pamphleteer, Gatien de Courtilz de Sandras, wrote the scathing review of what he called the 'French intrigues.' Gatien de Courtilz de Sandras, *French intrigues; or, The history of their delusory promises since the Pyrenæan treaty Printed in French at Cologne, and now made English* (London: W. Hensman, 1685). Sandras is perhaps more famous for his semi-fictionalized memoirs of the famous musketeer d'Artagnan, from which Alexandre Dumas based his depiction of d'Artagnan in *The Three Musketeers*.

In the 1680s, the French navy focused its operations in the Mediterranean. His first targets were the North African city states, which often pillaged European coastal towns or ships and captured Christian slaves. In retaliation, the French bombarded Algiers and Tripoli multiple times in the 1680s with a new type of ship, the *galiote à bombes*. It was the deployment of his sea power against 'La Superba,' which caused a major outcry in Europe. In May 1684, the new Secretary for Navy, Jean-Baptiste Antoine Colbert, Marquis of Seignelay (1651–1690), the eldest son of Colbert, personally witnessed the massive bombardment of Genoa. The French fleet of twenty galleys and 54 other ships fired around 16,000 cannonballs and grenades, destroying around 1,000 houses, while the majority of population escaped in the surrounding hills.[505] The harsh and humiliating treatment of Genoa,[506] excluded from the above-mentioned Twenty Years' Truce, cemented Louis's image as a tyrant.

Figure 21. The bombardment of Algiers in 1682 by Admiral Abraham Duquesne.

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[505] Giovanni Paolo Marana, *Dialogue de Genes et d'Algers, Villes Foudroyées par les Armes Invincibles de Louis le Grand, l'année 1684* (Amsterdam: Henry Desbordes, 1685). Olivia Ayme, 'Le Dialogue de Genes et d'Algers de G. P. Marana, outil de propagande au service de l'hégémonie française en Méditerranée', *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 86 (2013): 65–73.

[506] The Articles accorded by France to the Republic of Genoa, signed at Versailles, 12 February 1685. The Genoese also had to lower the number of their galleys to the same number as they had three years earlier.

However, despite Colberts continuing to build the French sea power in the 1680s, it was struck an important blow by a seemingly unrelated policy. Louis started implementing a series of aggressive anti-Huguenot policies since 1681, especially including the Dragonnades of quartering of the bad-mannered dragoons in Huguenot households to force their conversion into Catholicism. This led to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the expulsion of Huguenots from France in 1685.[507] Around 130,000 to 150,000 Huguenot refugees succeeded to leave France, among them also perhaps one sixth to one fifth of the manpower of the French navy. Moreover, these fleeing men not only weakened the French sea power, but they also strengthened the English and Dutch sea powers, the future Louis's enemies.[508]

The expansive tendencies of Louis XIV pushed his opponents to ally.[509] Especially in Germany, they felt threatened by the recent French conquests, so they formed an alliance in the summer of 1686 in Augsburg, i.e. the League of Augsburg. Each polity had to provide a certain amount of soldiers, infantry and cavalry, so they could oppose the French army.[510] Since this was explicitly an Imperial alliance, it did not involve any stipulations about the naval aspect of the defence. In September 1688, when Louis invaded the Rhenish Palatinate and attacked Philippsburg, starting the Nine Years' War or the War of the Grand Alliance (1688–1697), the Grand Alliance ironically had not been formed yet. Although it had been debated who prompted whom to act first,[511] France devastated the Rhineland, and 'considering the greatness

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[507] Élisabeth Labrousse, *La révocation de l'édit de Nantes* (Paris: Payot, 1990). Marianne Carbonnier-Burkard, Patrick Cabanel, *Une histoire des protestants en France XVIe-XXe siècle* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1998).

[508] John A. Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714* (London: Longman, 1999), 178. Dessert, *La Royale*, 214.

[509] Louis was sometimes called the 'Turk' or 'Nero' for his aggressive and devastating campaigns. Anon., *Die Französische Staats-Regirung ... Und bißhero von König Ludwigen dem Vierzehenden mit gantz unchristlichen aus der Ottomannischen Academie/ denen Alcoranischen Lehrsätzen gemäß* (Sine loco: s.n., 1689). Anon., *Nero gallicanus, or, The true pourtraicture of Lewis XIV wherein the present war with France is justified, from the necessity of reducing that most Christian king to a more Christian temper* (London: R. Taylor, 1690). Pärtel Piirimäe, 'Russia, the Turks and Europe: Legitimation of War and the Formation of European Identity in the Early Modern Period', *Journal of Early Modern History 11* (2007): 63–86, at 75–76.

[510] The Alliance between the Empire, Spain, Sweden, the Bavarian, Franconian and Suabian Circles, and the Princes of the Upper Rhine and Saxony, signed at Augsburg, 6 July 1686. At the time, most of the troops fought against the Ottomans on the lower Danube, so the real power of the League of Augsburg was questionable at best.

[511] Symcox argued that France followed a defensive strategy, in response to the League of Augsburg, which was seen as a hostile act and an official casus belli in 1688. Geoffrey Symcox, 'Louis XIV and the outbreak of the Nine Years' War', in Ronald Hatton (ed.), *Louis XIV and Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1976), 179–212, at 188.

of the common danger which threatens all Christendom,' the Grand Alliance between the Empire, England, the Dutch Republic and Spain was signed in 1689.[512]

In the meantime, the troubles started brewing across the Channel. In 1688, the Catholic English king James II was very unpopular, and his opposition grew stronger. The Parliament was conciliatory at the start, because the relatively old James II had no legitimate (male) successor, so they hoped for a quick succession by one of his two daughters, married to the Protestant Dutch and Danish kings. When James II got a legitimate male heir in the summer of 1688 and started limiting the privileges of the Anglican Church, the position of the Parliament changed. Louis XIV learned about the plot that threatened his cousin, but James II refused to believe that his son-in-law, William of Orange, would turn against him. James had even refused the aid that Louis had offered earlier in the year, as he wanted to be independent from France.[513]

In France, they perceived the Dutch actions as threatening. France warned the Dutch not to interfere in the English affairs as 'the bonds of friendship and the alliance he has with the King of Great Britain, would […] oblige him to come to his rescue.'[514] The new Minister for Foreign Affairs since 1679, Colbert de Croissy, wrote to the Dutch ambassador to Paris, Willem van Wasenaar-Sterrenburg, saying that 'the armament of the State, both at sea as on land, alarmed all their neighbours.' He noted that the Dutch must have 'a design on England or on France,' and that 'they wanted to start the most cruel and unjust war against the King of England that was ever heard of.' Wassenaar declined this interpretation of events and argued that it had been Louis XIV, 'who came down the Rhine with his army, and had so many troops

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For the plethora of different reasons and interpretations see David Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years, 1672–1713* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 66.

[512] The Offensive and Defensive Alliance between the Emperor and the Netherlands, signed at Vienna, 12 May 1689. When Emperor Leopold managed to overcome his concerns over accepting the Protestant William III as the English king, Great Britain became party by virtue of an Act of Accession, dated 20 December 1689. Other states joined this explicitly anti-French coalition in the next years, including Savoy (1690), Brandenburg and Bavaria (1691), Brunswick-Lüneburg (1692), and many others.

[513] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance of Power*, 92–94, 104–105.

[514] Jean Antoine de Mesmes [Comte d'Avaux], *Memoires*, dated 9 September 1688 (Sine loco: s.n., 1688), 1–2.

along the frontiers of the state, which occupied the bishopric of Cologne.'[515] Thus, the Dutch indeed prepared their navy and army to prevent another 1672.[516]

The analysis of the Dutch pamphlets shows that the potential invasion and union with England was bitterly debated, albeit there were not as many pamphlets printed in 1688 as during and after the *Rampjaar* in 1672. It has been convincingly argued that the aim of William's actions was to keep or restore the balance of power in Europe.[517] The Dutch sources are plagued by the anxiety over the potential Anglo-French alliance, also due to religion and with the backdrop of the prosecution of Huguenots in France. In the *Reasons for parting*, published on 26 October, William wanted 'to relieve her [England] of the fear of her neighbours, and to tone down the tyrannical pride of some, and to stabilize our liberty, and also religion.'[518] Even earlier, on 10 October 1688, William explained the reasons for going to England, claiming that he worked 'for preserving of the Protestant religion and for restoring the laws and liberties of England, Scotland and Ireland.'[519] There have been many interpretations of the causes for war, ranging from the role played by the French *guerre de commerce*, dynastic ambitions, the liberties of Europe and defence of Protestantism, but the strategic interpretation of William fighting for the balance of power is still dominant.[520]

Although the plot was well planned politically and militarily, it still needed some luck in the shape of the uncharacteristic easterly winds. This prevented the English navy from leaving the Thames estuary and potentially thwarting the Dutch invasion.[521] William's army of

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[515] Wassenaar to Fagel, 7 October 1688. HNA, 3.01.18, 217.
[516] List of the Dutch Warships with details 1688–89. NMM, PST/72.
[517] Simon Groenveld, '"J'equìppe une flotte très considerable": the Dutch side of the Glorious Revolution', in Robert Beddard (ed.), *The Revolutions of 1688* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 213–45. Wout Troost, 'De buitelandse politiek van Willem III en het begin van de Britse evenwichtspolitiek', in R. van den Berg et al. (eds.), *Jaarboek Oranje-Nassau Museum 2002* (Rotterdam: Oranje-Nassau Museum, 2003).
[518] *Resolutie inhoudende de redenen die haer Hooghe Mogende hebben bewogen, om Syne Hoogheydt, in person near Engelandt overgaende, met schepen ende militie te assisteren*, dated 26 October 1688 (The Hague: Jacobus Scheltus, 1688), 1.
[519] William, *The declaration of His Highnes William Henry* (The Hague: Arnold Leers, 1688), passim.
[520] Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years' War*, 65–66, 85.
[521] Edwad Barzillai Powley, *The English Navy in the Revolution of 1688* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

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15,000 men on a fleet of around 300 vessels landed unopposed in Torbay on 5 November.[522]

Indecision from James II and his flight sealed his fate. The throne was declared vacant by the

Parliament,[523] so William of Orange and his wife Mary Stuart could take it, becoming William

III and Mary II.[524] The role of navy was crucial to England's strength,[525] as there was still a

threat of the French or Catholic invasion, this time from James II, who still had many supporters

in England. Louis XIV was also playing a double game. The French navy allowed William to

cross the Channel undisturbed, as Louis expected another protracted Civil War to unfold in

England, which would give Louis open hands for his European ambitions.[526] At the time, Louis

was also faced with a tough decision. He could have used the relatively weak position of the

Dutch Republic and attack it, but he decided for an attack in the Rhineland and the Empire to

relieve his unofficial ally, the Ottoman Empire and prevent its total collapse.

Many pamphleteers influenced the public opinion, and the issues of religion and balance

were crucial in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, especially in a broader international

perspective.[527] George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, went back to the fourteenth and fifteenth

centuries, 'when England was the over-Ballancing Power of Christendom, and that either by

Inheritance or Conquest, the better part of France receiv'd Laws from us,'[528] but that (Catholic)

France was the main threat in the late seventeenth century. In this sense, 'over-Ballancing

Power' meant too powerful, as it enabled England (under Edward III and Henry V) to inherit

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[522] Torbay was coincidentally also the harbor where Napoleon stayed, before he was 'shipped' to St Helena in 1815. This was the closest that Napoleon ever got to the English soil.

[523] Henry Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William III* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977).

[524] Lucile Pinkham, *William III and the Respectable Revolution: The Part Played by William of Orange in the Revolution of 1688* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954). Robert Beddard (ed.), *The Revolutions of 1688: The Andrew Browning Lectures 1988* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011). Tony Claydon, *William III and the Godly Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[525] TNA, London, ADM 8/2, ADM 8/3, ADM 8/4, ADM 8/5.

[526] Sheehan, *The Balance of Power*, 48–49.

[527] Anon., *The Ballance adjusted, or, The interest of church and state weighed and considered upon this revolution* (Sine loco: s.n., 1688).

[528] George Saville Halifax, *The character of a trimmer his opinion of I. The laws and government, II. Protestant religion, III. The papists, IV. Foreign affairs* (London: s.n., 1688), 31.

or conquer 'the better part of France', which 'receiv'd Laws from us.' Again, Vattel's definition fits perfectly for the early modern interpretation of the balance of power.

Many pamphleteers, similar as the statesmen of the time, saw the foreign politics as the extension of the domestic politics. Opposing France and restoring the balance in Europe was the main goal at the time. Peter Pett stated that 'we shall be forced still to look out sharp to keep the ballance of Power exact in the whole World abroad.'[529] William III, similar to Bethel and Lisola, said that the opposition to France was inevitable because France was too powerful. Although William did not explicitly mention the balance of power, Wout Troost showed that his concern for the 'liberty of Europe' could be understood as following 'a balance-of-power policy *avant la lettre*.'[530] Another pamphlet praised the Anglo-Dutch alliance, as 'Christendom may be restor'd to a general and lasting Peace […] by bringing the Protestants of Europe to such an equal Ballance, that no one may be easily able to oppress the Rest.'[531]

Louis fulfilled his earlier threat and declared war on the Netherlands in November 1688, although he was still embroiled in the Rhineland. In March 1689, the Dutch Republic declared war on France.[532] The War of the Grand Alliance was also the start of what would later become known as the Second Hundred Years' War between England and France and lasted until the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.[533] On 29 April 1689, England and the Dutch Republic concluded a special alliance treaty, where they dictated how much naval forces each had to provide. England was supposed to 'fit out 50 large men of war, 15 frigates, and 8 fireships, in which

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[529] Peter Pett, *Happy Future State of England, or, A discourse by way of a letter to the late Earl of Anglesey* (London: s.n., 1688), 195.

[530] Wout Troost, 'To restore and preserve the liberty of Europe': William III's ideas on foreign policy', in *Ideology and Foreign Policy in Early Modern Europe (1650–1750)*, eds. David Onnekink and Gijs Rommelse (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 283–304, here 283. Hermann Meinberg, *Das Gleichgewichtssystem Wilhelms III. und die englische Handelspolitik* (Berlin: Unger, 1869).

[531] Anon., *The happy union of England and Holland, or, The advantageous consequences of the alliance of the Crown of Great Britain with the States General of the United Provinces* (London, Richard Baldwin, 1689). Anon., *The means to free Europe from the French usurpation and the advantages which the union of the Christian princes has produced, to preserve it from the power of an anti-Christian prince* (London: R. Bently, 1689).

[532] *A declaration of war by the States-General against the French, Hague, 12 March 1689* (Edinburgh: s.n., 1698).

[533] François Crouzet, 'The Second Hundred Years War: Some Reflections', *French History* 10 (1996): 432–450.

shall be 15,500 effective men.' On the other hand, the Dutch Republic had to 'furnish 30 great men of war, 9 frigates, and 4 fire-ships, all of them carrying 10,572 effective men.'[534] Such detailed numbers were not even provided in the interwar naval treaties.

The longer original treaty was of course much more telling, as it stated the strength of particular ships used in the line of battle. The English had to provide 50 warships, of these 1 second-rate, 17 third-rates, and 32 fourth-rates. The Dutch had to prepare 30 warships, of which 8 having 70-80 guns, 7 having 60-70 guns, and 15 having 50-60 guns. The whole fleet was under the nominal leadership of the English. Each squadron had to have the mixed English and Dutch ships, proportional to the fleet size (50:30).[535] The Dutch navy now played the same secondary role that the French navy played to the English navy in the 1670 Treaty of Dover just before the Third Anglo-Dutch War; the ratio was even the same, 50:30.

Thomas Manley echoed such interactive balancing. Previously, rulers 'maintain'd the power of Christendom in an equal Ballance, dexterously throwing their Arms into that Scale which appeared lightest, knowing they secured thereby their own Peace, and Government.' Manley even tried to put such politics further back in the past and used the invented tradition by describing the 210-years of English rulers who followed this 'fundamental Interest of Princes.' However, according to Manley, this was not enough anymore, as long 'as the just balance is so much ruined' and France threatened Holland. If Holland fell, England would soon follow because it was too weak to confront France alone. Thus, an offensive preventive war against France was necessary to ensure the 'Ballance of Christendom.'[536]

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[534] The Treaty between Great Britain and the Netherlands concerning the fitting out of a Fleet, signed at Whitehall, 29 April 1689. Jenkinson, I, 279. See also The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at Whitehall, 24 August 1689. This treaty and its fleet distribution was referenced also during the War of the Spanish Succession, even as late as 1711. TNA, London, SP 84/237.

[535] Jean Dumont (ed.), *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens* (Amsterdam: P. Brunel et al., 1726–31), VII, ii, 222. They intended to split the two fleets in three separate squadrons, the first squadron of 50 large warships, six frigates and eight fireships for the Mediterranean Sea, the second squadron of 30 large warships, eight frigates and four fireships for the Irish Sea and the Channel, and the third squadron of ten frigates for the pass of Calais and Dover and covering the English coast.

[536] Thomas Manley, *The Present State of Europe Briefly Examined and found Languishing Occasioned by the Greatness of the French Monarchy* (London: Richard Balderin, 1689), 2–3, 14.

In the meantime, Louis sent supplies and troops to Ireland to support James II. On 11 May 1689, there was a relatively small naval battle between the French and English fleets. The English squadron had thirteen warships with more than 50 guns and the French squadron had 16 warships with more than 50 guns; the average warship of the English squadron had about four guns more per ship (Table 17). The skirmish was indecisive, although the French squadron had to return to its bases, but the French could land both the supplies and the 'English king,' James II, in Ireland. There was relatively little naval action in the summer and fall of 1689.[537] William III hired 7,000 'seasoned' men from Denmark (6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry with officers) with 'escort' of six warships: four with 300 men and at least 40 guns and two with 250 men and at least 30 guns.[538]

English Fleet		French Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with more than 50 Guns: 13	Total Number of Guns: 782	Total Number of Warships with more than 50 Guns: 16	Total Number of Guns: 898
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 60		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 56

Table 17. The Battle of Bantry Bay.

During the War of the Grand Alliance, the subjects of both states were explicitly prohibited from trading with France.[539] In the preamble of another Anglo-Dutch treaty, it stated that they wanted 'to do as much damage as possibly they can to the common enemy, in order to bring him to agree to a just and equitable peace, and to comply with such conditions as may restore the tranquillity and repose of Christendom.' Moreover, 'it is necessary for this end, that

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[537] Edward B. Powley, *The Naval Side of King William's War* (London: John Baker Publishers, 1972). John Childs, *The Williamite Wars in Ireland, 1688–1691* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007).
[538] The Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Denmark, signed at Copenhagen, 15 August 1689.
[539] George Norman Clark, *The Dutch Alliance and the War Against French Trade, 1688–1697* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1923). Patrick Crowhurst, *The Defence of British Trade, 1689–1815* (Folkerstone: Wm Dawson & Sons Ltd, 1977).

they should make use of all their forces, and more particularly order matters so, as effectually to interrupt and break off all trade and commerce with the most Christian King's subjects.' In order to achieve this goal, they 'have ordered their fleets to sail towards the coast of France, and to block up all the ports, havens and roads belonging to the most Christian King.'[540]

It was at this time that a character, who had been in the background before, stepped to the forefront with the Glorious Revolution. John Locke (1632–1704) came back from the exile in Holland in 1689. It was in these and next years that he finished writing his most significant texts, although he was already active before; for instance, he travelled widely and, in addition to several declined offers, he even helped on an (unsuccessful) diplomatic mission to get Brandenburg as an English ally during the Second Anglo-Dutch War in late 1665 and early 1666.[541] In November 1689, Locke published his most famous work, the *Two Treatises of Government*, which were also affected by the contemporary events as other above-mentioned works. He wanted the *Two Treatises* 'to establish the Throne of our Great Restorer, Our present King William […] And to justifie to the World, the People of England, whose love of their Just and Natural Rights, with their Resolution to preserve them, saved the Nation just when it was on the very brink of Slavery and Ruine.'[542] Although these and other contextual reasons were real, especially since he started writing the work during the Exclusion Crisis of 1679–81,[543] the text addressed other evergreen political problems, which speaks to its longevity.

John Locke, as David Armitage and many others have discerned, did not spill too much ink on the theory of international relations and international law.[544] In a way, Locke was very

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[540] The Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands concerning the Prohibition of Commerce with France, signed at London, 22 August 1689.

[541] Roger Woolhouse, *Locke: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[542] John Locke, 'The Preface', in ibid., *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 137. The original was published anonymously in late 1689, but with the year 1690.

[543] There is some debate as to in which years exactly Locke started writing the *Two Treatises*, but it is accepted that it was around a decade before its publication. Richard Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government* (Princeton: Princeton University Press,. 1986).

[544] David Armitage, 'John Locke's international thought', in ibid., *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 75–89.

similar to Thomas Hobbes in comparing the state of international relations to the state of nature, but his conception of the state of nature was much less belligerent.[545] Moreover, as he claimed in the *Two Treatises*, the positive acts or agreements between states determine the difference between the state of nature and the state of war. Therefore, the states recognized the other states' jurisdiction, territoriality and sovereignty over those territories. The only two primitive or unclaimed commons were the waste uncultivated lands (i.e., as he as the secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations claimed for the colonies) and 'the Ocean, that great and still remaining Common of Mankind.' Yet, even the sea could be claimed if it was 'tilled' or fished.

Locke's most important contribution to the topic of international relations was his least accepted and debated about. In his opinion, in addition to the legislative and executive power, the Commonwealth also possessed the 'Federative Power.' This was Locke's invention and he defined it as 'the Power every Man naturally had before he entered into Society.' It contained 'the Power of War and Peace, Leagues and Alliances, and all the Transactions, with all Persons and Communities without the Commonwealth.' Because this authority had no precedent, it was 'left to the Prudence and Wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the publick good.'[546] In summary, he argued that the king (and king alone!) could and should decide which alliances to form, in a way defending the alliances with the Catholic Spain and Empire.[547]

That the balance of sea power had shifted to England can also be seen in the tripartite (unratified) alliance treaty between England, the Dutch Republic and Denmark in 1690. As was often the case for such treaties during the war, the number of troops and warships were listed

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[545] In one of his earlier unpublished works from the mid-1670s, Locke claimed that 'all this general consent derived from contract does not prove a natural law, but should rather be called the law of nations [jus gentium], which is not imposed by the law of nature but has been suggested to men by common expediency [communis utilitas].' The manuscript was first published in 1954. John Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature and Associated Writings*, ed. W. von Leyden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), 162.

[546] Locke, *Two Treatises*, II. 143–48.

[547] In the spring of 1690, Locke wrote his only essay dedicated to foreign relations. He defended William III's 'delivery [of England] from popery and slavery.' Moreover, he argued that if James II 'ever returne, under what pretences soever, Jesuits must governe and France be our master.' James Farr and Clayton Roberts, 'John Locke on the Glorious Revolution: A Rediscovered Document', *Historical Journal* 28 (1985): 385–98, at 395–8.

in the secret articles. These stated that England had to provide ten warships, of which three to have 60 to 80 guns, four 40 to 60 guns, and other three at least 36 guns. The Dutch Republic, on the other hand, had to send six warships, of which two to have 60 to 80 guns, two 40 to 60 guns, and the other two to have at least 36 guns.[548] This again hinted at the decline of Dutch sea power, as the established ratio was 50:30 or in this case 10:6 in England's favour.

The French sea power increased immensely in the decades before the war, but it was divided into two parts. The ships from both parts of the French navy, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, managed to join their forces at Brest under Vice Admiral Comte de Tourville (1642–1701). Since the numerical superiority was on the French side, the allied admiral, Arthur Herbert, Earl of Torrington, did not want to risk an open battle. Similar as De Ruyter in the Third Anglo-Dutch War, Torrington relied on the fleet-in-being tactics, which would keep its fleet safe and prevent the French from invading England. However, while William III was fighting in Ireland, Torrington's opponents at the court of Queen Mary convinced her that Torrington was too cautious. Thus, he received orders to engage the enemy directly.[549]

The two navies clashed near Beachy Head in July 1690.[550] Tourville's goal was to annihilate the Anglo-Dutch fleet. The French fleet had 56 warships with more than 50 guns against the Anglo-Dutch fleet of 52 warships with more than 50 guns (Table 18). Although the Anglo-Dutch warships had on average about two guns more than the French warships, the overall firepower tilted to the French side. Torrington tried to follow a cautious tactics, as he refused to close the line and engage the French. However, the Dutch in the van wanted an open battle and in the end, the superior French firepower won the day for Tourville. After the French

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[548] The Treaty of Alliance between GB, Denmark and the Netherlands, signed at Copenhagen, 3 November 1690.
[549] Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*. Lambert, *War at Sea in the Age of Sail*, 84.
[550] Het Nationaal Archief in The Hague holds several ship lists from 1689. HNA, The Hague, 1.01.47.37 (ship list from 28 October 1689 and printed ship list from 17 July 1690). HNA, The Hague, 1.01.02.5627 (ship list from October 1689): »gecombineerde Vloot« with English ships. HNA, The Hague, 1.01.47.07: Lyste van de koninglijcke Engelse schepen van oorlogh (list of English warships near the Dutch coast in 1690). HNA, The Hague, 1.01.02.5629 (ship lists from July to December 1690).

hammered the Dutch warships, Torrington escaped past the French, and lost the ten mostly damaged Dutch warships.[551]

Anglo-Dutch Fleet		French Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with more than 50 Guns: 52	Total Number of Guns: 3654	Total Number of Warships with more than 50 Guns: 56	Total Number of Guns: 3820
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 70		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 68

Table 18. The Battle of Beachy Head.

The French fleet was victorious at Beachy Head, but it was forced to return to French ports due to the spreading diseases onboard the French warships. William III won a decisive victory over the Jacobites at the Boyne on 11 July 1690, only a day after his fleet was defeated at Beachy Head. In control of the sea, the French were able to convoy James and his army back to France; a maneuver that proved the sea power of the French king, but left Ireland in the hands of William III. France scored another land victory in Flanders at the Battle of Fleurus and another victory over the Spanish-Savoyard army in Italy. Moreover, the Turks recaptured Belgrade in October 1690 from the Imperial army. Nevertheless, France could not use these victories to occupy the Spanish Netherlands, as no enemy sued for peace.[552]

The Battle of Beachy Head provoked disputes between the English and Dutch, and damaged the reputation of the English admiral. In the end, Torrington was blamed for this defeat, in order to save the alliance with the Dutch, who were not happy that the English squadrons did not actively engage in the battle. The English strengthened their naval support system to expand the operational abilities of their fleet and achieve sea power supremacy. With the expanding empire and trade, the Royal Navy had to be operational the whole year. The

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[551] Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*; Lambert, *War at Sea in the Age of Sail*, 84.
[552] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance of Power*, 109.

greatest problem for the British navy was the shortage of manpower, which they often had to press into service, but they consequently crippled their merchants and trade. The demands for seamen by the Royal Navy were rising constantly, especially during wars.[553]

The 'victories' at Bantry Bay and Beachy Head were a tribute to Seignelay, the eldest son of eponymous Colbert, who followed his father's steps in creating a great sea power. The fall of 1690 and the spring of 1691 was a period of crisis for the enemies of France, so William III assembled his allies in a conference at The Hague to formulate a common plan for the war against France.[554] The problems for France started, as Seignelay died in November 1690 and Louvois in July 1691. The French diplomats tried to persuade the neutral Baltic powers to mediate in the war, but the allies did not want to hear any proposals for peace on French terms, except those respecting the borders of the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees.[555]

However, the shift also started to happen with the allies, when Denmark decided to be neutral.[556] In March 1691, Denmark and Sweden signed a commercial treaty agreeing on the free trade as neutral states. They referenced the defensive Alliance of 1 February 1690,[557] where they both wanted to protect free trade and shipping according to the principles of international law. The damages done by the belligerent sides in the war should be compensated.[558] A week later, Denmark signed a neutrality treaty with France. If anyone threatened their free trade, the Danish navy would sail out (still only in the Baltic Sea!) with a fleet of fifteen warships with at least 40 to 50 guns, and France promised to pay for it, trouble the Dutch, and send an equal

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[553] Michael Duffy (ed.), *Parameters of British Naval Power, 1650–1850* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1992), 4–11.
[554] Jeremy Black, *European International Relations 1648–1815* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2002).
[555] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance of Power*, 110–113.
[556] The above-mentioned 1690 alliance treaty between Denmark, England, and the Dutch Republic was never ratified, so officially Denmark was never part of this (Grand) Alliance.
[557] The Defensive Alliance for Five Years between Denmark and Sweden, signed at Stockholm, 1 February 1690.
[558] The Treaty between Denmark-Norway and Sweden for the Maintenance of their Free Trade as Neutral Powers, signed at Stockholm, 10 March 1691.

number of ships to the Baltic.[559] Denmark's decision was debated in the next years and the

states tried to organize a compensation system, but also extended the list of contraband.[560]

At the time, neutral states trading with the 'enemies' were not considered lawful prizes,

except if they were carrying contraband, such as arms, munitions, and naval stores. The Dutch

recognized the right to 'open seas' and offered to compensate the Danish merchants, whose

ships were taken by the Dutch privateers;[561] a year later, the Dutch reached a similar treaty with

Portugal.[562] At the same time, the Dutch Republic, England and Denmark reached a treaty

allowing Denmark to continue to trade with France, except with the contraband, as long as the

English and Dutch subjects can trade in the Baltic. Tar was added as a contraband, showing its

strategic shipbuilding value.[563]

In 1692, the French planned a double thrust, the siege of Namur and a descent on

England with James II in command. The French decisively won on land at Namur and won

another striking victory at Steenkerque that left no doubt about the French superiority on land.

However, since William's navy was not destroyed, this victory could not be used to impose

peace on the Grand Alliance.[564] By 1692, Louis gathered an army for invading England. The

French prepared for another open sea battle that would pave the way for the invasion army.

Louis also counted on many English officers that felt their loyalties lay with the Stuart dynasty,

i.e., the male side of the Stuart family or James II.

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[559] The Treaty of Neutrality between Denmark and France, signed at Copenhagen, 17 March 1691.

[560] The Convention between Denmark-Norway and the Netherlands concerning Compensation for the Danish and Norwegian Ships captured by Dutch Privateers, signed at Copenhagen, 30 June 1691. Since June 1691, Denmark was only allowed to trade with one French port. The Provisional Treaty between GB, Denmark and the Netherlands regarding Navigation and Commerce of their Subjects in France or elsewhere, signed at Copenhagen, 30 June 1691. The Treaty between Great Britain and the Netherlands on the Subject of Vessels Captured and Recaptured, signed at Whitehall, 22 October 1691. In 1692, Denmark decided to send Danish troops to fight against the Ottomans. The Treaty between the Emperor and Denmark, signed at Copenhagen, 15 March 1692.

[561] The Convention between Denmark-Norway and the Netherlands concerning Compensation for the Danish and Norwegian Ships captured by Dutch Privateers, signed at Copenhagen, 30 June 1691.

[562] Treaty between the Netherlands and Portugal respecting Portuguese Prizes, signed at The Hague, 22 May 1692.

[563] The Provisional Treaty between GB, Denmark and the Netherlands regarding Navigation and Commerce of their Subjects in France or elsewhere, signed at Copenhagen, 30 June 1691.

[564] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance of Power*, 113–114.

At sea, the Anglo-Dutch navy achieved a striking success. With Seignelay's death, the French navy lost its energetic advocate in the council; neither Louis nor the soldier-diplomat Jules-Louis Bolé de Chamlay, aide to Louvois and later Barbezieux at the Ministry of War, sympathized with or understood the problems of the navy. Even the new Secretary of State of the Navy, Louis Phélypeaux, Marquis of Phélypeaux (1643–1727, in office from 1690 to 1699), on his own admission, knew little or nothing about the navy. Similar to Torrington in 1690, Tourville was instructed to fight against a more powerful enemy. The squadron from Toulon did not reach Brest before the battle, so Tourville was short of warships, guns, and seamen.[565] On 29 May 1692, he saw the Anglo-Dutch fleet near Barfleur.[566] Tourville on his flagship *Le Soleil Royal* engaged the English Admiral Russell's *Britannia*. The English had much higher firepower, so Tourville's fleet was literally decimated, including his flagship *Le Soleil Royal*.

Anglo-Dutch Fleet		French Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with more than 50 Guns: 79	Total Number of Guns: 5758	Total Number of Warships with more than 50 Guns: 44	Total Number of Guns: 3146
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 73		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 72

Table 19. The Battle of Barfleur.

The Anglo-Dutch fleet spotted the French fleet escaping for Brest the following day, so Admiral Russell and Dutch Lieutenant-Admiral van Allemond ordered a pursuit. Twenty French warships managed to escape safely, but fifteen were left behind near the Normandy coast. Three French warships ran aground at Cherbourg and twelve took shelter at La Hougue, in the sight of the French invasion army on land, so James II saw what was to be the greatest

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[565] Lambert, *War at Sea in the Age of Sail*, 84–85.
[566] TNA, ADM 7/550A, 'Exact List of Their Majesties and the Dutch Fleet Design'd for the Year, 1692, For the Line of Battle.' The list included warships of both fleets: English had to provide warship for two divisions, while the Dutch one division. See also Archives nationales, Marine B/5/3, Etat de la Marine, for the French battlefleet.

French naval defeat of the war, and an end of his dreams of a quick return to the English throne. Admiral Sir George Rooke attacked and sank the great but already beaten French warships. On 22 May 1692, Louis's fleet was decimated at La Hougue by boats and fireships. The French fleet had no safe port in the Channel.[567] The naval victories at Barfleur and La Hogue were celebrated with a naval review.[568]

Figure 22. The Dutch pamphlet celebrating the Anglo-Dutch victory.

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[567] Lambert, *War at Sea in the Age of Sail*, 85–86.
[568] Dunn, *The Power and the Glory*. The other two times that William III prepared a royal review was for the Treaty of Ryswick and honoring Tsar Peter the Great on his visit.

This defeat and sinking of fifteen great warships at La Hougue was a serious strike for French sea power. Nevertheless, they were quickly replaced, as France built dozens of new warships in 1691 and 1692. In 1695, the French navy almost doubled in comparison to its 1690 tonnage. However, the strategic goal of the French navy changed after 1692, and they never used this numerically superior fleet for an open battle. France changed its strategy from fleet attacks to trade raiding.[569] This was the so-called *guerre de course* strategy and it attacked the economy of the enemy sea power, as trade was always the source of states' sea power, as John Evelyn clearly expressed in the above-mentioned definition of sea power. On 28 June 1693, off the Spanish coast, Tourville managed to take the 80 ships of the Anglo-Dutch Smyrna convoy, which was a serious blow to the allied economies; in London, it was deemed the worst financial catastrophe since the Great Fire. However, it did not throw either state out of the war and it did not significantly help the depleted French treasury. Moreover, due to famine and financial crisis in 1693 and 1694, France needed to focus her very limited resources to the land forces. Thus, France's sea power was severely limited and grounded, quite literally.[570]

The allies also had to respond and adapt their strategy and shifted their fleet to include smaller cruising ships for commerce protection. They needed to operate also in the Mediterranean, so they joined their sea powers with Spain. According to the 1692 alliance treaty, Spain had to put on sea in the Mediterranean a fleet of at least sixteen large warships (*seize grands Vaisseaux de Guerre*), four fireships (*Brulots*), and 25 galleys (*Galeres*). This is a key distinction, as galleys were still important fighting vessels in the Mediterranean, while the English and Dutch practically had none. The further article stated that such ships needed to have 60 guns (*pieces de Canon*) with 60 balls for each gun (*bales pour chaque piece de Canon*) and 25,000 pounds of powder (*livres de poudre*), proportioned to 60 guns. On the other hand,

[569] Duffy (ed.), *Parameters of British Naval Power*, 2–3.
[570] Lambert, *War at Sea in the Age of Sail*, 86–87. Wolf, *Toward a European Balance of Power*, 113–114.

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the Anglo-Dutch fleet had to consist of sixteen large warships of the same force, four fireships and all equipped with all necessities of war and able to sustain on sea for ten months and longer if needed.[571] This was important, as they wanted to limit the French trade with the Levant.

When France stopped trying to engage the allied fleet in an open battle and used the asymmetrical tactics of targeting trading vessels, the English and the Dutch responded by attacking the French trade in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. France was less exposed, because it still did not have such significant overseas trade or colonies as the 'maritime powers' at the time.[572] Surprisingly, France even signed a commercial treaty with Spain in 1694.[573] Jean Bart was arguably the most well-known French privateer and he gained a legendary status.[574] Although French privateering was annoying to the allied trade, it never threatened the Anglo-Dutch dominance of sea trade, the key resource for their navies and armies.

The issue of free trade was on contemporaries' minds. As mentioned above, Denmark and Sweden, the neutral powers, had the most interest to keep the trade free.[575] This did not bode well with England and many pamphlets were written regarding the actions of Denmark. Robert Molesworth argued that 'since the present Wars with France, and our strict Union with the Hollanders, they [the Danish] have shown themselves extreme jealous of our Greatness at Sea, fearing lest we should ingross and command the whole Trade of the World.' Furthermore, 'to keep the balance of Sea Power even, as to secure the liberty of their Commerce, which brings them in great Gains, they will leave no Stone unturned to do us a Mischief, in order to

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[571] The Treaty between Spain, the Netherlands and GB for the junction of their Fleets in the Mediterranean, signed at The Hague, 31 October 1692. Interestingly, it also specified other essential ship elements, such as sail trimmings, large cables, and other essentials. They had to be provisioned to keep at sea for ten months and longer if necessary, with a base at Port Mahon.

[572] Duffy (ed.), *Parameters of British Naval Power*, 5.

[573] The Treaty of Commerce and Good Correspondence between France and Spain, signed at the Isle of Pheasants, 24 August 1694.

[574] Louis Lemaire, *Jean Bart 1650–1702* (Dunkerque, Éditions Beffrois, 1983). Michel Delebarre, *Jean Bart: la légende du corsaire* (Neuilly-sur-Seine: Michel Lafon, 2002). Patrick Villiers, *Jean Bart: corsaire du roi soleil* (Paris: Fayard, 2013).

[575] The Treaty between Denmark and Sweden concerning Measures for the Maintenance of Free Trade between them, signed at Stockholm, 17 March 1693.

humble us to such a degree as may put them out of fears, that we shall give law to the Ocean.'[576] As seen here, the balance of sea power implied the same thing as the balance of power, i.e., the avoidance of a too powerful state trying to unilaterally impose rules on other states. In this case, and not for the last time, England unilaterally denied the neutral Denmark to trade with France.

Despite internal tensions, the alliance had strong armies, the control over the seas and far greater financial means. The first negotiations between the combatants started already in The Hague in 1693, but the English and Dutch rejected the French conditions. As an anonymous pamphleteer (probably Daniel Defoe) wrote at the time, it was 'the general Interest of all Christendom to resettle the House of Austria in a sort of equality with France. This Equilibrium is necessary for the Security of the People, and even for that of the Soveraigns too.' However, it was 'the particular Interest of England to re-establish this Equality, that she may have the Ballance in her hand, and turn it to which side she pleases.'[577]

England should use this position 'to maintain the Empire of the Sea, which we have regained the possession of in so glorious a manner, but even to enable us to decide the success of Wars and the Conditions for the future.' Moreover, 'the Nation begins already to recover in Europe the Rank which she ought to hold. Our Fleets are Mistresses of the two Seas; the Security of our Commerce is perfectly re-establish'd; we have seen the French reduced to a necessity of letting their Maritime Towns in the Ocean be burnt, while their Fleet is shut up, and as it were imprisoned in a Port of the Mediterranean, to avoid the being attack'd by ours.'[578] In this pamphlet, the author clearly saw the continental balance as a condition to maintain the British sea power superiority. Thus, the balance of power kept the imbalance of sea power.

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[576] Robert Molesworth, *An account of Denmark, as it was in the year 1692* (London: Timothy Goodwin, 1694). See also Anon., *Denmark vindicated being an answer to a late treatise called An account of Denmark, as it was in the year 1692* (London: Tho. Newborough and Ed. Mory, 1694).

[577] Anon. [Daniel Defoe?], *Reflexions upon the conditions of peace offer'd by France, and the means to be employed for the procuring of better* (London: Matt. Wotton, 1694), 29.

[578] Anon., *Reflexions upon the conditions of peace*, 29.

The old rivals, England and the Dutch Republic, were also not completely united despite the personal union and the common ruler in William (III). The English pamphlet, reprinted from 1673, reminded the public of the past Dutch offenses against the English interests and subjects. Thus, the leading Jacobite propagandist Charles Leslie recognized that 'the Fleet are the Walls of England. To Command at Sea, not to make Conquests by Land, is the true Interest of England.' He compared 'them [the Dutch] to Carthage; and us to Rome, that is, that it was impossible both should stand upon a Ballance; that if we do not master their Trade, they will ours. They or We must truckle. One must and will give the Law to the other. There's no Compounding, where the Contest is for the Trade of the whole World.'[579] As seen, the balance of sea power was crumbling, and England used the superior position.

The English were also not happy with the unequal distribution of the warships among the two allies. The political pamphleteer, known as 'the Plotter,' as he participated in many plots on both sides, Robert Ferguson, was furious with this unequal ratio. The Dutch could better protect their trade, because 'of that small and unequal Quota and Proportion of Ships of War, that in respect of our much greater Number of Ships of that kind they supply and furnish to the forming and constituting the Confederate and United Fleet of both Nations.' Ferguson continued that this despite 'their Number of Land Forces is not much encreased towards the support of the present War, above what it used to be in time of Peace.' Meanwhile, we 'by furnishing so many Ships of War to the Royal Navy, did leave our selves destitute of such a Number of Ships of War, as might in the Quality of Cruisers and Convoys in all Seas as well as in the Chanel have covered and defended our trafficking Vessels; and as we have in consequence thereof lost above 4000 trading Ships to the empoverishing of the Kingdom.'[580]

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[579] Charles Leslie, *Delenda Carthago, or, The true interest of England in relation to France and Holland* (London: s.n., 1695), 1–3.
[580] Robert Ferguson, *A brief account of some of the late incroachments and depredations of the Dutch upon the English and of a few of those many advantages which by fraud and violence they have made of the British nations since the revolution, and of the means enabling them thereunto* (London: s.n., 1695), 48–49.

The English Admiralty also restructured its fleet by giving priority to cruisers and convoy escorts. England strictly limited itself to the balance of power on the continent, but as the dominant sea power, it had no interest to support the concept of the balance of sea power(s), not unlike the Dutch Republic in the 1660s. The Anglo-Dutch warships bombarded and blocked the privateers at St Malo, Dunkirk, and Calais. However, since these warships were not designed for long stretches of times at sea and blockades, they could not carry enough provisions, stores, spare gear and ammunition for longer engagements away from bases. Effective sea power would necessitate bigger warships.[581]

In December 1696, nearing the end of the war, the two sea powers of England and the Dutch Republic forced Denmark to join the alliance against France. This was not the last time that Denmark was forced to abandon their (armed) neutrality, as similar issue happened in the early 1800s. They 'renewed' the 1690 alliance, although Denmark never ratified that alliance treaty. Danish trade with the French merchants was explicitly prohibited. Denmark also had to send an unspecified number of warships. Moreover, it had to block the French warships from seeking shelter in their ports. However, for these damages and the lack of trade, both states were willing to pay Denmark the sum of 200,000 Imperial thalers.[582]

In accordance with Nys's thesis that the hegemon in Europe produced fewer balance-of-power texts, France was the target of criticisms of other 'foreign' balance-of-power writers.[583] Solange Rameix comparatively examined the significance of the pulpit for war propaganda in the 1690s. She found out that, in fact, the French crown was much less concerned to justify its actions, in contrast to the regime of William III, which sought legitimacy using

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[581] Lambert, *War at Sea in the Age of Sail*, 88.
[582] The Convention between Denmark and Great Britain and the Netherlands respecting the Execution of the unratified Alliance of 3 November 1690, signed at The Hague, 3 December 1696.
[583] Ernest Nys, 'La Théorie de l'Equilibre Européen', *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée* 25 (1893): 34–57.

the argument of just war.[584] However, some French thinkers thought through the balance-of-power perspective. In the posthumously published instructions on the royal duties, François de Fénelon propagated alliances that would maintain balance in Europe. In contrast to other writers though, he did not want other states to acquire too much power to threaten France: 'To hinder one's neighbor from becoming too strong is not to do harm; it is to guarantee one's self and one's neighbor from subjection; in a word it is to work for liberty, tranquility, and public safety […] This attention to the maintenance of a kind of equality and equilibrium between neighboring states is what assures peace for all.'[585]

In France, it was England who was threatening the balance of power by claiming the 'dominion of the Sea, and to impose Conditions upon all others.' The above-mentioned Gatien de Courtilz de Sandras wrote comparatively about the rival naval policies in the last decades. For him, Colbert defended his naval program and supposedly challenged Louis. He claimed that it was 'your setting out new Ships on the Ocean, and in the Mediterranean, which made all Europe think, that in a little time you would be in a Condition, not only to dispute the Empire of the Sea with the English, but with any other Nation whatever.' The whole Europe thought that 'you intended to dispute that Dominion, which belongs only to him that is strongest.'[586] The cruel Realpolitik was even more cruel when it came to sea power.

The Treaty of Turin between France and Savoy in 1696 was a beginning of an end to the war.[587] The stalemate on the Flanders frontier was weighing hard on all the belligerent powers, and Louis realized that he would be reasonable to recognize some of the claims of his

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[584] Solange Rameix, 'Justifying war: churchmen and war in France and England during the Nine Years' War (1688–1697)', in *Ideology and Foreign Policy in Early Modern Europe (1650–1750)*, eds. David Onnekink and Gijs Rommelse (Farnham: Ashgate), 181–196.

[585] François de Fenelon, 'Examen de conscience sur les devoirs de la royauté', in idem, *Oeuvres diverses de Fénelon* (Paris: Lefèvre, 1824), 215–274, at 260, 263.

[586] Gatien Courtilz de Sandras, *The political testament of M. Jean Baptist Colbert, minister and Secretary of State wherein is contain'd all that hath pass'd under the reign of Lewis the XIV unto the year 1684: with remarks upon the government of the kingdom of France* (London: R. Bentley, 1695).

[587] The Treaty of Peace between France and Savoy, signed at Turin, 29 August 1696. The Treaty between the Emperor and Spain and Savoy (and France) for a Suspension of Arms in Italy, signed at Vigevano, 7 October 1696. Wolf, *Toward a European Balance of Power*, 116–117.

opponents. Louis XIV's Colonel of the Gardes Françaises, the Maréchal de Boufflers, started the preliminary negotiations with the William III's favourite Hans Willem Bentinck, Earl of Portland. Louis was willing to 'sacrifice' James II and renounce the Jacobite claim to the English throne, by recognizing William III as the English king. Louis also knew that he had to surrender some territories he gained since 1678, but he wished to limit these concessions as much as possible. The neutral Swedish government mediated the negotiations at Ryswick.[588]

Even before the end of the war, Louis XIV's proposal for peace and conditions were publicized. Louis was willing to give the Dutch important commercial benefits that would end the discriminating Colbert tariffs against the Dutch merchants. Of equal importance was the allowance that the Dutch troops occupy some of the forts in the Spanish Netherlands, the so-called Barrier Towns. Louis was also willing to recognize William III as the king of England.[589] The English and Dutch were satisfied with these terms, and they were willing to force their allies to accept a peace that did not quite fulfil either German or Spanish ambitions.[590]

The war ended in September 1697 with another series of treaties, i.e., the Peace of Ryswick. It again established the cessation of hostilities and 'an universal perpetual peace, and a true and sincere friendship.'[591] Once again, *status quo ante* (*bellum*) was key in the treaties with its representative verb *to restore* in various forms. The peace conditions meant a serious block to French ambitions, which again had to confirm the Treaties of Westphalia and Nijmegen. Louis recognized William III, and gave the Dutch a series of forts in Flanders.[592]

[588] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance of Power*, 118.
[589] Anon., *The French King's proposal for peace: In a letter from the Hague, July 13* (London, 1696). Anon., *Articles of peace offered by the crown of France* (London: s.n., 1696). Anon., *Preliminary articles (or propositions for a general peace) between His Most Christian Majesty and the several allies* (London: E. Whitlock, 1696).
[590] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance of Power*, 119–121.
[591] *Articles of peace between the most serene and mighty Prince William the Third, King of Great-Britain, and the most serene and mighty Prince Lewis the Fourteenth the most Christian King, concluded in the Royal Pallace at Ryswicke the 10/20. day of September, 1697* (London, 1697). The Treaty of Peace between France and the Netherlands, signed at Ryswick, 20 September 1697. The Treaty of Peace between France and Great Britain, signed at Ryswick, 20 September 1697. The Treaty of Peace between France and Spain, signed at Ryswick, 20 September 1697. The Armistice between the Empire and France, signed at Ryswick, 23 September 1697. The Treaty of Peace between the Empire and France, signed at Ryswick, 30 October 1697.
[592] Black, *European International Relations 1648–1815*, 98–100.

Just right after the conclusion of the Peace of Ryswick in September and October 1697, the English Parliament discussed the new 'Balance of Europe.' On 7 December 1697, in an Address to be presented to his Majesty, the House of Commons were exhilarated about 'a Peace so honourable and advantageous to the Nation.' Moreover, by concluding this advantageous peace, 'the Honour your Majesty has restored to England, of holding the Balance of Europe, gives your Subjects great Content.'[593] At the same time, the English printed the ship list of the Royal Navy as a message to the foreign nations.[594] This was another step towards England incorporating the ideology of the balance of power in Europe or becoming an offshore balancer, i.e., the bouncer, on the European continent. Many interpreted that as trying to impose their will on all others, and thus breaking the balance of power. This will become even more explicit in the months and years leading to the next great European war.

[593] *Journal of the House of Commons* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802–), 7 December 1697. Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics*.
[594] *A Compleat List of the Royal Navy of England, And of the Ships and Vessels belonging thereunto this 31st. of December, 1697 with their Rates and Number of Guns* (London: s.n., 1697).

The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714)

The Spanish Succession was a topic that troubled Europe ever since Charles II of Spain was born in 1661. Most famous for his physical disabilities and surviving several severe sicknesses, like smallpox, measles, and rubella, he constantly disappointed his fellow rulers by staying alive. Nevertheless, his surprising longevity and endurance did not prevent the European rulers from speculating about the fate of the Spanish crown. Already in January 1668, during the War of Devolution, Louis XIV and Leopold I secretly decided that 'some remedy was found necessary, but none [seemed] more fitting, and, from its most excellent purpose more excusable, than that a partition should be made just now of the eventual inheritance in case of the death aforesaid, never to be sufficiently lamented.'[595]

The question remained open, as long as Charles II of Spain was alive. In 1689, during the War of the Grand Alliance, William III, in the name of both England and the Dutch Republic, recognized that Emperor Leopold's younger son, the Archduke Charles (1685–1740), would succeed Charles II of Spain, if he died during the war.[596] However, this changed with the Peace of Ryswick, and Leopold knew that Europe or other powers would not allow him to unite the Spanish and Austrian crowns, as they were under Charles V in the sixteenth century, when Spain was the dominant (sea) power in Europe. In 1698, Charles II of Spain was still ill and childless, and there were pro-Austrian and pro-French factions in Madrid.[597]

However, the fate of Spain was not decided in Madrid or El Escorial. The two most powerful European rulers at the time, Louis XIV and William III, were settling the sensitive

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[595] The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between France and Austria, signed at Vienna, 19 January 1668. The following year, after another 'miraculous recovery' of young Charles II of Spain, Van Beuningen even said that 'the whole state of Europe is to be pitied when its peace depends upon the pleurisy or other illness of a child.' Lionne to Pomponne, 8 March 1669, Bib. Ars., MS 4712, fo. 36. Pomponne to Lionne, 28 March 1669, Arch. étr., Holl., vol. 89, fo. 108.

[596] The Offensive and Defensive Alliance between the Emperor and the Netherlands, signed at Vienna, 12 May 1689.

[597] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance of Power*, 124–129.

issue not too sensitively. On 11 October 1698, without consulting Spain or Austria, the First

Partition Treaty or the Treaty of The Hague was concluded.[598] According to this treaty, the

young Joseph Ferdinand Wittelsbach (1692–99), son of the Bavarian king and elector, was to

take the Spanish crown. Louis (1661–1711), the eldest son of Louis XIV and the Grand

Dauphin, would receive the Spanish lands in Italy, while the Archduke Charles would get the

Spanish Netherlands. Thus, neither imperial Austria nor France would gain too much power.

The terms were relatively equitable between the rival parties. However, Emperor Leopold and

the Spanish nobility, who were somewhat shocked that nobody had asked them and the still

living king, were not satisfied with the division of the entire Spanish Empire.

The first try failed when the intended beneficiary, Joseph Ferdinand, suddenly died a

few months later, in February 1699. In 1699, the Empire ended the war with the Ottomans.[599]

A year later, in early 1700, Louis XIV and William III prepared the Second Partition Treaty or

the Treaty of London.[600] In it, the Grand Dauphin would get Naples, Sicily, and Lorraine, while

the Archduke Charles the rest of the Spanish Empire. The goal of William III was to strengthen

Austria as a counterweight to France. England, France, and the Dutch Republic agreed, but

Leopold refused, even though his second son, Archduke Charles, was to be the next Spanish

king. Leopold did not want to divide the Spanish empire, as an influential Imperial pamphlet

argued.[601] On the other side, an anonymous author (likely Daniel Defoe) wrote a pamphlet in

favour of the partition, claiming that 'a just Ballance of Power is the Life of Peace.'[602]

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[598] The First Treaty of Partition between France, Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 11 October 1698.

[599] The Treaty of Peace between the Emperor and Turkey, signed at Carlowitz, 26 January 1699.

[600] The Second Treaty of Partition between France, Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at London, 25 March 1700. John Rule, 'The Partition Treaties, 1698–1700: A European View', in *Redefining William III: The Impact of the King-Stadholder in International Context*, edited by David Onnekink and Esther Mijers (London: Routledge, 2007), 91–105. Black, *European International Relations 1648–1815*, 100–101.

[601] Anon., *Partage du Lion de la Fable* (Cologne: Pierre Marteau, 1700). Anon., *The partition of the lion in the fable, verified in the partition of the Spanish monarchy. Or, a defence of the Emperor's title to the crown of Spain, and the Dominions thereunto belonging. With an account of the methods us'd by France, to procure from the late King of Spain a will in favour of the Duke of Anjou by Forgery and Violence* (London: A. Baldwin, 1701).

[602] Anon., *The two great questions considered* (London: s.n., 1700), 10. Tony Claydon, *Europe and the Making of England, 1660–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 195.

Louis XIV played a double game, as he was lobbying for his grandson Philippe, duc d'Anjou (1683–1746), to become the new Spanish king. He might be acceptable to the Spanish nobility, because he was not the presumptive heir to the French throne. Moreover, he had support within Spain, where they wanted to keep the empire undivided. In June 1700, the Council of State in Madrid chose Philippe as the heir to the Spanish throne. The Pope also supported this choice, ironically to keep the peace in Europe. In October 1700, a new will named Philippe as successor with an undivided kingdom. On All Saints' Day, 1 November 1700, only days after signing the new will, Charles II of Spain died. Louis again had to make a tough choice, but French rejection of the will would have meant that Spain fell to Austria.[603]

Louis was concerned about the reaction throughout Europe and gave instructions to his grandson: 'Be a good Spaniard, that is your first duty, but remember that you are a Frenchman born and preserve the union between the two nations. That is the way to make them happy and to preserve the peace of Europe.'[604] Emperor Leopold prepared for war, while William III bowed to the parliamentary pressure and recognized Philip V as the new Spanish king. For the time being, Philip V was considered the legitimate Spanish king, with the exception of Vienna. Then, Louis made several strategic and diplomatic mistakes in 1701. He occupied the Spanish Netherlands, restricted the Anglo-Dutch trade with the Spanish Empire, and on the deathbed of James II in September recognised the Jacobite succession in England,[605] against the advice of his council and in clear violation of the Treaty of Ryswick.

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[603] Black, *Eighteenth Century Europe*, 279–280.

[604] Christophe Levantal, *La route royale: le voyage de Philippe V et de ses frères de Sceaux à la frontière d'Espagne: décembre 1700–janvier 1701* (Paris: Communication & tradition, 1996), 25–26. Bayle St. John (ed.), *Memoirs of the Duke of Saint Simon*, 3 vols. (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1876), 183.

[605] Only a few months before, the Act of Settlement of 1701 was passed, ensuring the Protestant succession of the English, and after 1707 the British throne. William III was widowed, ill and childless, and his successor Queen Anne as well, so the parliamentarians planned the succession already in the 1690s. In the end, they settled for Sophia of Hanover, granddaughter of James I, and her Protestant descendants. Since Sophia died only a few weeks before Queen Anne in 1714, the succession passed to the next in line. Therefore, in 1714, when her son, George I, became the British king, he was 52nd in line to the throne, but the nearest Protestant, not married to a Catholic, following the Act of Settlement of 1701.

Figure 23. The famous portrait of Louis XIV, painted around 1701 by Hyacinthe Rigaud at the request of Louis's grandson, King Philip V of Spain (r. 1700–46). King Louis liked the portrait so much that he kept it in Versailles. Justice holding a sword and a set of scales is painted on the pillar near the sceptre and crown.

In the meantime, Louis prepared for the conflict with Leopold. He signed a series of alliance treaties with Bavaria, Venice, Cologne, Savoy, Portugal.[606] In the alliance treaty with Portugal from 1701, it stated that Portugal was not allowed to give shelter to the English and Dutch warships. However, if Portugal was attacked because of the treaty, Spain and France promised to provide thirty well-armed and well-manned warships, and Portugal obliged itself to sustain twelve warships.[607] Although these were intended to secure his position, they were weak alliances. If Louis had recognised the interests of sea powers, i.e., the problem of Jacobite succession and the Barrier towns, the will would have been accepted, as it indeed was.

On the other side, in 1701, the (Second) Grand Alliance was concluded. As noted in the preamble, if this succession occurred, 'the free intercourse of navigation and commerce which the English and Dutch have in the Mediterranean, the Indies and other places, will be utterly destroyed.' And, 'the French and Spaniards, being thus united, will within a short time become so formidable to all, that they may easily assume to themselves the dominion over all Europe.' This potential Franco-Spanish monarchy would be 'oppressing the liberty of Europe, and taking away the freedom of commerce.' Thus, the allies 'thought a strict conjunction and alliance between themselves, necessary for repelling the greatness of the common danger.' However, in Article VI, the English and the Dutch were explicitly allowed to 'seize by their forces what lands and cities they can, belonging to the Spanish dominions in the Indies.'[608] By the end of 1701, Prince Eugene of Savoy had already started the war on the Imperial side, before England or the Dutch republic declared war on France in 1702.[609]

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[606] The Treaty of Mutual Alliance between France and Spain, and Mantua, signed at Venice, 24 February 1701. The Treaty of League between France and Spain, and Savoy, signed at Turin, 6 April 1701. The Treaty of Alliance between Bavaria and France, signed at Versailles, 7 April 1701.
[607] The Treaty of Alliance between France, Spain and Portugal, 1701. The Treaty of Mutual Alliance between Portugal and Spain, signed at Lisbon, 18 June 1701. The size and number of guns on warships were not specified.
[608] The Second Grand Alliance between the Emperor, Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 7 September 1701. Many other states joined later, especially the German states.
[609] Wolf, *Toward a European Balance of Power*, 138–140. George Clark, 'From the Nine Years War to the War of the Spanish Succession', in *New Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), VI, 381–409. Michael Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence, 1683–1797* (London: Routledge, 2003). Henry Kamen, *The War of Succession in Spain, 1700–15* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969).

England and the Dutch Republic specified the mutual obligations. In the preamble, they repeated that France 'had become so formidable that according to the unanimous consent of everyone, Europe was in imminent danger of losing its liberty and suffering the harsh yoke of a universal Monarchy.' They reiterated the articles 7, 8, 9, and 10 from the 1678 alliance treaty, affirming that they wanted to act jointly or separately, and that there would be no separate peace. This was a defensive and offensive alliance, as they explicitly allowed preventive war. It also referred back to the alliance treaty of 29 April 1689, concerning the type of naval cooperation.[610] As mentioned above, this meant the ratio was 50:30 in England's favour.

Even before the declaration of war, William III addressed the House of Commons in 1701 to support his action with the appeal that 'if you do in good earnest desire to see England hold the balance of Europe,' then 'England ought to take in the preservation of the liberty of Europe.'[611] This struggle found its way into the general public, that is, not only into pamphlets but also into newspapers. The *London Gazette* published speeches advocating the king's policy and the 'Balance of the Power of Europe.'[612] In another issue, they praised the king's 'Glorious Design of Re-establishing a just Ballance of Power in Europe.'[613]

The balance-of-power concept had been used almost daily in the British Parliament in the months leading to the war. Parliament 'asked' William III 'that You will enter into Alliances with all those Princes and States who are willing to unite for the Preservation of the Balance of Europe,' in order that it 'may effectually conduce to the Honour and Safety of England, the Preservation of the Protestant Religion, and the Peace of Europe.'[614] The House of Lords reiterated the main reason for the balance of power, which was 'to prevent the

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[610] The Particular and Perpetual Alliance between Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 11 November 1701.
[611] Cobbett (ed.), *The Parliamentary History*, V, 1329–1331.
[612] *The London Gazette*, 1 January–5 January 1701.
[613] *The London Gazette*, 13 November 1701. Ratcliffe, *Oxford Treasury of Sayings and Quotations*, 235.
[614] Journal of the House of Lords (London, 1767–), 13 February 1701. Practically the same sentiment was repeated four days later. Journal of the House of Lords, 17 February 1701.

Umbrage which might be taken by uniting too many Dominions under One Prince, especially such a Prince, as, without any Additions, was formidable to all Europe.' Thus, England should 'sufficiently support His [the Emperor's] Interests, or the just Balance of Europe.'[615] The earlier wars were also interpreted through these balance-of-power glasses. So, 'for many Years past, there hath been a long and expensive War, both by Sea and Land, carried on by His Majesty and His Allies, against the French King, for the preserving the Balance of Europe, and for preventing the Growth of the immoderate Power of the said French King.'[616]

Peace and balance in Europe were now vital to the English commercial and economic interests, since it wanted to keep the *status quo*. The English mercantilist Charles Davenant (1656–1714) of the Whig opposition wrote an essay on the balance of power. According to him, England must play the classic role of the holder of balance, which was not only in England's interest, but also 'in the interest of Europe.'[617] He asserted that 'for many years we have pretended to hold the balance of Europe, and the body of the people will neither think it consistent with our honour nor our safety to quit that post.'[618] He justified the pre-emptive war based on the balance of trade, since otherwise France would assume supremacy in trade with Spain and Turkey. Davenant justified war against France to 'defend Europe.'[619] Like the Dutch Republic in the 1660s, peace was vital to British commercial interests, so the crisis over the Spanish and Hannoverian Succession was also a matter of British commercial hegemony.[620]

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[615] Journal of the House of Lords, 15 March 1701.

[616] Journal of the House of Lords, 9 May 1701.

[617] Charles Davenant, *Essays Upon I. The Balance of Power; II. The Right of Making War, Peace and Alliances; III. Universal Monarchy* (London: James Knapton, 1701), 301. In the same year, in March 1701, he was associated with French agents. It was suspected, but not proven, that the French government tried to bribe him to promote French interests and provide information. The French agent did recommend that he be bribed, but there is no evidence that this bribe was actually offered or accepted. This connection greatly dented his reputation, which may be the reason for two harsh texts against France in the same year. D. Waddell, 'Charles Davenant (1656–1714): A Biographical Sketch', *The Economic History Review* 11 (1958): 279–88, at 283.

[618] Davenant, *Essays Upon I. The Balance of Power*, 302; with more than 200 years of history of English kings as balancers from Henry VII (1457–1509, king from 1485) to the Glorious Revolution (1688) pp. 302–316. For another Whig propagandist in this period see Jens Metzdorf, *Politik – Propaganda – Patronage*: *Francis Hare und die englische Publizistik im spanischen Erbfolgekrieg* (Mainz: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009).

[619] Davenant, *Essays Upon I. The Balance of Power*, 359.

[620] Maurseth, *Balance-of-Power Thinking*, 126–127.

In March 1702, William III died, and his sister-in-law, Queen Anne (1665–1714), succeeded him.[621] The House of Lords vowed their 'zealous and firm Resolutions to support Your undoubted Right and Title, and the Succession of the Protestant Line, as by Law established, against all Your Enemies whatsoever.' They 'being sensible our great Loss is no otherwise to be repaired, to ourselves or our Confederates, but by a most sincere and vigorous Adherence to Your Majesty and Your Allies, in the Prosecution of those Measures already entered into, to reduce the exorbitant Power of France.' Moreover, they wanted 'such a Balance of Power and Interest, as may effectually secure the Liberties of Europe.'[622] More importantly for the outcome of the war, John Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough, took over the command of the English army on the Continent.[623]

Much of the diplomatic correspondence at the time endorsed the preventive war to limit the growth of a neighbouring power, and many saw it as a just *casus belli*. In April 1702, the allies agreed to declare war on France on the same day.[624] They referenced the third article of the alliance of 7 September 1701, where they gave two months for a peaceful resolution, but the French king only managed to strengthen his position, by occupying Cologne and Liège. Thus, in early May 1702, the allies declared war. Queen Anne declared war against Louis XIV and Philip V, who had been recognised as the legitimate King of Spain by the Parliament. England published the declaration calling the war a response to the 'French taking' of the Spanish crown and 'for preserving the Liberty and Balance of Europe, and for Reducing the Exorbitant Power of France.'[625] By October 1702, Marlborough already recaptured Liège.[626]

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[621] Queen Anne had a succession problem of her own, as her seventeen pregnancies ended in either miscarriages, stillborn babies, or the son dying very young. Anne Somerset, *Queen Anne: the Politics of Passion* (New York: HarperPress, 2012).

[622] Journal of the House of Lords, 8 March 1702. Similar in Journal of the House of Lords, 12 March 1702.

[623] Richard Holmes, *Marlborough: England's Fragile Genius* (New York: Harper Press, 2003). Gerald W. L. Nicholson, *Marlborough and the War of the Spanish Succession* (Melbourne: Hassell Street Press, 2021).

[624] The Agreement between the Emperor, Great Britain and the Netherlands for Declaring War on France on the same day, signed at The Hague, 18 April 1702.

[625] *Her Majesty's Declaration of War against France and Spain* (London: s.n., 1702).

[626] The Capitulation of Liège between France and Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed before Liège, 14 October 1702.

Marlborough saw the advantages of an aggressive naval strategy, as he discussed with his friend, the First Lord of the Treasury, Sidney Godolphin (1645–1712).[627] The goal was to capture ports and impede Spanish and French trade by trying to force a major naval battle on the open sea. The Anglo-Dutch navy sailed out with 50 warships under the command of Admirals Rooke and Allemond. Their mission was to 'reduce and take the town and island of Cadiz, or any other place belonging to Spain or France.'[628] Cadiz had a strategic position for all naval operations in the Mediterranean, so it was bombarded. Yet, on 26 September 1702, the siege of Cadiz failed, but not before it left a terrible impression on the locals, who noted the 'scandalous conduct of Ormonde's troops, who plundered Santa Maria to the bare walls, sacked the churches with heretical glee, raped women, and even nuns.'[629]

Nevertheless, the failure of one action led to the unpredictable success of the other. The Spanish treasure fleet sailed from Mexico to Europe in 1702 under the cover of 30 French warships. The French escaped a heavy defeat off Cape Santa Maria,[630] because some British commanders refused to fight.[631] News that this treasure convoy with the Franco-Spanish escort had taken refuge and a defensive position in Vigo Bay reached the returning Anglo-Dutch fleet. On 13 October 1702, Rooke and some 27 warships stormed into Vigo harbour, broke the defensive boom, and destroyed the Franco-Spanish escort fleet.[632] Success was limited, however, as most of the treasure had already been landed before Rooke's attack.

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[627] Jamel Ostwald, 'Creating the British Way of War: English strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession', in Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich (eds.), *Successful Strategies: Triumphing in War and Peace from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 100–129, at 107–108. Roy A. Sundstrom, *Sidney Godolphin: Servant of the State* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1992).

[628] Arthur Parnell, *The War of the Succession in Spain: During the Reign of Queen Anne, 1702–1711* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1905), 23.

[629] George Macaulay Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne: Blenheim* (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1931), 265.

[630] Shinsuke Satsuma, *Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century: Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic* (Martlesham: Boydell & Brewer, 2013).

[631] There was court martial for the 'cowardly commanders' and Queen Anne refused to pardon them. Even Jean-Baptiste du Casse wrote to John Benbow regarding their execution: 'As for your cowardly Captains, hang them, for, by Heaven, they deserve it.' Ernest Harold Jenkins, *A History of the French Navy, from its beginnings to the present day* (London: Macdonald & Jane's, 1973), 96.

[632] HCA 30/774, TNA 38/616 and TNA 38/617 for the list of captured ships and goods with their appraised values.

Figure 24. Ludolf Bakhuizen, The Battle of Vigo Bay in 1702.

One of the indirect consequences of this Anglo-Dutch victory was Portugal's rethinking of its strategic position.[633] The English intelligencer wrote from Lisbon to London outlining the reasons for the change of hearts in Portugal. As he noted, 'the French have no fleets at sea, and we are in possession of these seas, and these people [the Portuguese] can have no trade but under our protection. Though their trade is certainly beneficial to us, yet 'tis so more to Portugal. All their gold, sugars and tobaccos are the returns of our own manufacturers, which our people give them on credit, to be paid for upon the return of the Brazil trade. Three parts of the corn expended here and all the dried fish is imported by the English, so it is plain these people live by us.'[634] Portugal was important, because the Anglo-Dutch warships would get a friendly naval base closer to the Mediterranean.

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[633] A. D. Francis, 'Portugal and the Grand Alliance', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 38 (1965): 71–93.

[634] Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne*, 299–300.

Seeing the defeat at Vigo, Portugal decided to switch camps and joined the Grand Alliance in May 1703. The vast majority of the alliance treaty was dedicated to land forces, as Portugal was exposed on its land border against the potential Franco-Spanish land invasion. Articles XVII and XVIII were dedicated to the maritime concerns, since 'the maritime powers shall be obliged to have and keep a sufficient number of men of war on the lea-coasts, and in the harbours of Portugal, to protect the said coasts and harbours, and the trade and merchant-fleets from hostilities.' In the case of an enemy attack, the Anglo-Dutch alliance promised 'to send such a number of men of war to Portugal as shall be equal, and even superior to the ships and forces of the enemy.'[635] Again, it was a matter of interactive balancing and calculation as to decide what was the appropriate response to the attack.

In 1703, the war also entered another stage and the great allies explicitly decided to cut the trade with France.[636] However, on 26 November 1703, the most dangerous enemy of early modern fleets, the weather, namely the Great Tempest of 1703, devastated the Royal Navy and several ports. Daniel Defoe stated that some coastal towns were 'most miserably torn to pieces, and made the very Picture of Desolation, that it lookt as if an Enemy had Sackt it.'[637] Many great warships sank, including *Vanguard*, *Restoration*, *Mary* and *Northumberland*, with thousands of dead seamen. Defoe viewed these catastrophic losses of naval forces and personnel as a penalty for their poor performance against the Franco-Spanish armies.

The international jurists were still working on a solution to the international relations and international law on the high seas. As shown above, especially the issue of sovereignty in relation to the 'coastal waters' was proving to be troublesome. In 1703, the Dutch jurist

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[635] The Defensive and Offensive Alliance between the Emperor and Portugal (and Spain), and Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at Lisbon, 16 May 1703. The Anglo-Dutch alliance was also reaffirmed with the same 50:30 ratio for the warships. The Treaty between Great Britain and the Netherlands for the Renewal of Former Treaties, signed at Westminster, 9 June 1703. The fact that these alliances were repeatedly confirmed shows how much trust or distrust the allies have in each other's honest interests.
[636] The Convention between the Emperor, Great Britain and the Netherlands for the Prohibition of Commerce and Exchange of Correspondence with France, signed at The Hague, 11 April 1703.
[637] Daniel Defoe, *The Storm; or, a Collection of the most remarkable casualties and disasters which happen'd in the late dreadful tempest, both by sea and land* (London: G Sawbridge, 1704), 104.

Cornelius van Bynkershoek (1673–1743) devised a formula on how to determine the extent of jurisdiction at sea in his *De dominio maris*. He expanded Grotius's proposed rule that the domination of the coastal waters should extend only as far as could be effectively controlled. Thus, Bynkershoek invented a practical method and restricted the maritime jurisdiction to the distance within which cannon range could effectively protect the coast, 'the power of land ends where the power of arms ends.'[638] This 'cannon shot rule' became universally adopted, but it was the Italian Ferdinando Galiani (1728–1787), who later developed the practical calculation of the best guns at the time to come to the three-mile limit.[639]

In the summer of 1704, while Marlborough managed to decisively defeat the Franco-Bavarian army at the Battle of Blenheim, Admiral Rooke was stationed off the coast of Portugal, trying to meet the French squadron coming from Brest, but it managed to elude him. A 26-year-old royal bastard, Louis Alexandre, the Comte de Toulouse, commanded the French fleet. Unfavourable winds drove him back, causing 'as much damage to yards, masts and sails, as a battle.'[640] The French squadron did not attempt to attack Lisbon or the ships on its way south. Portugal was worried when Rooke sailed away, for the 1703 alliance treaty assured its protection by the presence of an Anglo-Dutch squadron of warships off the Tejo.

The Allies' next target was Gibraltar, which was weakly guarded by the Spanish soldiers. It was obvious that Gibraltar should have been used to deny the Allied warships safe passage through the strait.[641] The gunners of the garrison fired some shots, but the Anglo-Dutch warships entered the harbour and shot at the fortress with heavy guns, causing great damage to

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[638] '[…] *alioquin generaliter dicendum esset, potestatem terrae finiri, ubi finitur armorum vis; etenim haec, ut diximus, possessionem tuetur.*' Cornelius van Bynkershoek, *De dominio maris dissertatio* (Leiden: J. van Kerckhem, 1744), 364.

[639] Bernard G. Heinzen, 'The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the Seas', *Stanford Law Review* 11 (1959): 597–664. Tullio Scovazzi, 'The Frontier in the Historical Development of the International Law of the Sea', in *Frontiers in International Environmental Law: Oceans and Climate Challenges* (Leiden: Brill, 2021), 217–243, at 224–25.

[640] David Francis, *The First Peninsula War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), 107.

[641] George Hills, *Rock of Contention: A History of Gibraltar* (London: Hale, 1974). William Godfrey Fothergill Jackson, *The Rock of the Gibraltarians: A History of Gibraltar*, 2nd edition (Gibraltar: Gibraltar Books, 1990).

the fortress but few casualties. The marines landed and captured Gibraltar in early August 1704.[642] In London, the capture of Gibraltar was described as 'a footing for the King of Spain [Charles III, i.e., for the Archduke Charles] in the strongest fort belonging to that country, and of great use to us for securing our trade and interrupting of the enemy's.'[643] The 'alternative' interest of securing trade and consequently sea power was openly debated.

Figure 25. A print of the Anglo-Dutch capture of Gibraltar (1704).

When the Allies took Gibraltar, the French deployed their main fleet. Admiral Toulouse set out from Toulon to challenge Rooke's hold on the straits. On 24 August 1704, the two fleets fought off Málaga. Rooke had 54 warships, while Toulouse had 51 warships (Table 20). Descriptions of the battle are vague, contradictory, and biased. When the two fleets engaged off Málaga in the morning, they were practically equal in strength. However, the Allied warships were short on victuals and ammunition, being on sea for the last six months and

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[642] The Capitulation between Great Britain, and Spain and France, signed at Gibraltar, 4 August 1704.

[643] Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne*, 415.

having bombarded Gibraltar. The two powerful fleets shot at each other for a full day and many ships had to be towed out of the line of battle. Nevertheless, no ships were lost on either side during the battle.[644] The battle, while fiercely contested, was inconclusive. Although Toulouse wanted to engage the battered Anglo-Dutch fleet, which was low on ammunition, again, his senior officers convinced him to return to Toulon.[645] After the battle, the French and Spanish never seriously challenged the Anglo-Dutch fleet to an open naval battle.

Anglo-Dutch Fleet		French Fleet	
Total Number of Warships with more than 50 Guns: 54	Total Number of Guns: 3780	Total Number of Warships with more than 50 Guns: 51	Total Number of Guns: 3606
	Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 70		Average Number of Guns per Warship: ca. 71

Table 20. The Battle off Málaga.

Figure 26. Isaac Sailmaker, *The Battle of Málaga*.

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[644] Lambert, *War at Sea in the Age of Sail*, 88–90.
[645] Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 169–70, 203–04. Tunstall, *Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail*, 66–67. The only warship lost at the time was the Dutch flagship *Albemarle*, but it blew up by accident in the Bay of Gibraltar, taking almost the entire crew with it.

The French and the Spanish knew that they needed to retake Gibraltar, if they wanted to control the entrance and exit of the Mediterranean. The Franco-Spanish land and sea forces attacked Gibraltar from September 1704 to May 1705. Marshal de Tessé knew that he could not take Gibraltar if the allies could reach and relieve it from the sea. Because Gibraltar was not a permanent English station at the time, Admiral Sir John Leake with a fleet of 35 English, Dutch and Portuguese warships had to come from Lisbon to relieve the harbour.[646] On the other side, Admiral de Pointis had only five warships in the Bay of Gibraltar, so the ensuing Battle of Marbella or the Battle of Cabrita Point, which took place on 21 March 1705, was an outright allied victory, which effectively saved Gibraltar for the allies, and eventually Britain.[647]

In England, the role of the public opinion became more and more important. Daniel Defoe was hired by the Foreign Secretary and later 'Prime Minister' Robert Harley (1661–1724) as a propagandist to support England's involvement in the war, although he had previously opposed it. In 1704, Defoe began anonymously publishing the weekly *A Review of the Affairs of France: and of all Europe*, in which he reported on the foreign issues, especially on the War of the Spanish Succession, often in the context of the idea of the balance of power.[648] In the beginning, it was an eight-page weekly periodical, but its publication frequency rose to bi-weekly and, after a year, to three times a week, published each Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday. It was published without interruption until the end of war in 1713.

Defoe said that Britain 'made much ado about in the World' because of the balance of power,[649] but the concept was 'little understood.'[650] Defoe, as his predecessors debating the balance of power idea, defended the constant vigilance because, according to the nature of the balance, there can be neither constant allies nor constant enemies – the strength of an ally

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[646] Campbell, *Lives of the admirals*, IV, 35.

[647] David S. T. Blackmore, *Warfare on the Mediterranean in the Age of Sail: a History, 1571–1866* (London: McFarland, 2011). Clowes, *The Royal Navy*, II, 406–407.

[648] Daniel Defoe, *A Review of the Affairs of France*, ed. John McVeagh (London, Pickering and Chatto, 2003).

[649] Defoe, *A Review of the Affairs of France*, 23 September 1704.

[650] Defoe, *A Review of the Affairs of France*, 19 April 1709.

increases with the defeat of an enemy, and thus becomes an object of concern, and so on. Defoe always asked himself the question 'WHAT'S NEXT?' He argued that 'obviously, this is the general interest […] balance, which is our goal and the true meaning of the current constellation of powers in Europe.' Moreover, 'every Power, which over balances the rest, makes itself a Nuisance to its Neighbours. Europe being divided into a great Variety of separate Governments and Constitutions; the Safety of the whole consists in a due Distribution of Power, so shared to every Part or Branch of Government, that no one may be able to oppress and destroy the rest.'[651]

The House of Lords still discussed the European politics through the balance-of-power perspective. They argued that 'nothing can be more evident, than that, if the French King continues Master of the Spanish Monarchy, the Balance of Power in Europe is utterly destroyed; and He will be able in a short Time to engross the Trade, and the Wealth, of the World.'[652] This, in accordance with Evelyn's definition of sea power, directly threatened the English and Dutch sea powers. A few days later, they also claimed that 'no Peace can be lasting, safe, and honourable, till the Spanish Monarchy be fixed in the House of Austria, and France reduced to such a Degree, that the Balance of Power in Europe be again restored.'[653] Meanwhile, Great Britain and the Dutch Republic affirmed the Hanoverian Succession in Britain, as they 'consider'd of what Importance it is to the Quiet and Safety of their Kingdoms and Dominions, and to the publick Tranquillity.'[654]

Despite the defeat of the Allied army in the Battle of Almanza on 25 April 1707 and the Franco-Spanish operations to retake Barcelona,[655] the Spanish problems waited until the Emperor dealt with the acute matters in southern Italy and the ongoing rebellion in Hungary.[656]

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[651] Defoe, *A Review of the Affairs of France*, 1 June 1706.
[652] Journal of the House of Lords, 27 October 1705.
[653] Journal of the House of Lords, 31 October 1705. See also Journal of the House of Lords, 22 December 1707.
[654] The Treaty between Great Britain and the Netherlands for Securing the Protestant Succession, 1706.
[655] C. T. Atkinson, 'The Peninsula Second Front in the War of the Spanish Succession', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 22 (1944): 223–33.
[656] Ágnes R. Várkonyi, 'Hungarian Independence and the European Balance of Power', in *Europica varietas, Hungarica varietas: 1526–1762: selected studies* (Budapest: Akademi Kiado, 2000), 175–187.

The ambassador of Empire to the Dutch Republic, Count Philip Ludwig Sinzendorf, wrote to Marlborough on 21 May 1707, assuring him that 'as we are masters of the sea, that city [Barcelona] can always be provisioned by the fleet, and the enemy will not be able to besiege it, for want of heavy artillery.'[657]

Domination in the Mediterranean was a tacit yet generally accepted goal of the sea powers. Thus, the potential capture of Toulon and the destruction of the French fleet would go a long way toward achieving that goal. The campaign started in June 1707, when 35,000 Imperial and Savoyard men advanced towards Toulon.[658] The admiral had strict orders to take Toulon, but the overall operation failed and the Allies were forced to withdraw.[659] However, fearing defeat at sea, the French disabled their own Mediterranean fleet to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. Louis XIV did not have the time or the money to rearm his navy, even if he wanted to challenge the sea powers again.

Naval strategy in the Mediterranean had evolved, in correspondence with the development of the war. The commercial treaty between the Britain and 'Spain,' i.e. the Archduke Charles, afforded the British that they could escort the convoy of 10 British cargo ships, each of the capacity of 500 tons, or 5,000 tons altogether, to trade in the Spanish (East) Indies.[660] This very advantageous arrangement for future trade was signed, so that after the war an Anglo-Spanish trading company would be formed, while the French merchants would remain excluded from the Indies. Charles could not afford to reject this proposal as he was too dependent on British money and armed forces.

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[657] William Coxe, *Memoirs of John, duke of Marlborough, with his original correspondence: collected from the family records at Blenheim, and other authentic sources; illustrated with portraits, maps and military plans* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1820), II, 66.

[658] Geoffrey Symcox, *Victor Amadeus II: Absolutism in the Savoyard State, 1675–1730* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

[659] C. T. Atkinson, 'Gleanings from the Cathcart MSS', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 29 (1951): 20–25, 64–68, 97–103. James Falkner, *The War of the Spanish Succession 1701–1714* (London: Pen and Sword Military, 2015), 198.

[660] The Treaty of Peace and Commerce between Great Britain and Spain, signed at Barcelona, 10 July 1707.

The Dutch, on the other hand, were much less pleased, for there were no trade benefits for them. This was in violation of their alliance, which stated that neither state should try to get any benefits at the expense of other allies. Nevertheless, the British warships controlled the Mediterranean, so London had no qualms about exploiting this fact. Both sides, the English and the Dutch, thought that they were carrying the heavier side of the burden in the alliance. While the English emphasised their naval contribution, the Dutch highlighted their land and financial contributions. Marlborough wrote to Robert Harley that 'our friends [the Dutch] will not venture, unless we have an advantage which our enemies will be careful not to give.'[661]

Louis also prepared a diversionary action on sea from his more urgent land actions. He organised an invasion of Scotland to exploit the local discontent againt the Acts of Union 1707. Louis supported the Jacobite 'Old Pretender', James Francis Edward Stuart (1688–1766), for the English king. However, 18 warships under the command of Admiral George Byng blocked the French port.[662] Queen Anne argued in March 1708 that 'we take this occasion to let you know that Our Fleet is now at sea and much increased since our last. The Dutch Fleet is in great forwardness, and both are so disposed that Our Enemies cannot reasonably hope to escape an Engagement.'[663] Still, *Chef d'Escadre*, Claude de Forbin (1656–1733), slipped through the blockade and headed for the coast of Scotland, but decided that the invasion was not worth the risk. It was another devastating defeat for the ill-prepared and ill-fated Jacobites.[664]

Louis was unable to rebuild his Mediterranean fleet, but the allies did not know that, and wanted to be ready. Marlborough wrote to Stanhope that 'I am so entirely convinced that nothing can be done effectually without the Fleet, that I conjure you if possible to take Port

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[661] Winston Churchill, *Marlborough, His Life and Times*, 4 vols. (London: George G. Harrap, 1933–38), II, 265.
[662] John B. Hattendorf, 'Byng, George, first Viscount Torrington', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
[663] Beatrice Curtis Brown (ed.), *The Letters and Diplomatic Instructions of Queen Anne* (London, Cassell, 1935), 242–3.
[664] John Hely Owen, *War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938). Daniel Szechi, *The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688–1788*, 2nd edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019).

Mahon.'[665] Archduke Charles in Barcelona echoed the orders to Stanhope and Leake to take the place 'that the fleet may be more secure in those seas and better security of my person; and likewise to guard the transports for the subsistence of my army.'[666] The allied troops and seamen took Cagliari and Sardinia without fighting. Admiral Stanhope felt that he had accomplished his task with the capture of Sardinia and returned to England.

As mentioned above, sea power was based on trade, and the trade interests of Britain played an important role in the war operations. Minorca, like Gibraltar earlier, was secured by the allies on behalf of the Archduke Charles in 1708. However, Britain had no intention of relinquishing control of the island, having in mind the promotion of trade in the Levant. By the end of the year, formal orders from London confirmed the British commitment to occupy Port Mahon. As Stanhope noted, 'England ought never to part with this island, which will give the law to the Mediterranean both in time of war and peace.'[667] As mentioned above, the balance-of-power depended on the perspective. For Stanhope, 'giving law(s)' to others was a positive, since he was giving them; indeed, the problem was 'receiving laws' from others.

Stanhope convinced the Archduke Charles (III) to back the British occupation of Port Mahon 'as some sort of security for all our expenses in the peninsula.'[668] The Dutch resented the British encroachments, in which they had no share. Yet, the Dutch themselves demanded a larger Barrier, so Stanhope did not worry about their protests. He noted that he hoped 'the Dutch will always be our friends but if they should ever be otherwise, they will never be able to carry on their trade with the Levant without our leave.'[669] Stanhope, and others, understood the strategic value of possessing Gibraltar and Port Mahon for the trade in the Mediterranean.

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[665] Basil Williams, *Stanhope: A Study in Eighteenth-century War and Diplomacy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), 72. John B. Hattendorf, *A Study in the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1701–1713*, PhD thesis (Oxford: University of Oxford, 1979).
[666] Williams, *Stanhope: A Study*, 72.
[667] H. T. Dickinson, 'The Capture of Minorca 1708', *The Mariner's Mirror* 51 (1965): 195–204.
[668] Dickinson, 'The Capture of Minorca 1708'.
[669] Williams, *Stanhope: A Study*, 80.

During the war, pragmatic considerations led to a significant shift in the balance-of-power discussions. Emperor Leopold died in 1705 and was succeeded by his son Joseph I (1678–1711). The latter led the war forward to secure the Spanish crown for his younger brother, the Archduke Charles.[670] However, when Joseph I died in 1711 without an heir, his brother succeeded him to the imperial throne as Charles VI. The Allies thus realized that with their victory they could place the Austrian or Habsburg emperor on the Spanish throne, which would not be much better than a united Franco-Spanish crown. The emergence of Austria as a potential threat to European liberties led to a reassessment of the role of the balance.[671]

Thus, in late 1711, another great Irish writer, Jonathan Swift (1667–1745), also a distant cousin and a secretary to William Temple when he retired, wrote a book describing the 'conduct of the Allies.' This was a direct attack on the Dutch, used to defend the British in retiring from the war. Swift was working in the service of the government when he warned that 'to have the Empire and Spanish Monarchy united in the same Person, is a dreadful Consideration, and directly opposite to that wise Principle, on which the Eighth Article of the Grand Alliance is founded.' [672] Swift wanted to make a strong case for concluding a separate peace treaty with France, so Foreign Secretary Bolingbroke helped draft the text.[673]

In fact, Bolingbroke was already conducting secret negotiations with French Foreign Minister Torcy. The two countries signed a preliminary peace as early as the fall of 1711. The French king 'has been persuaded that the excess of power would be contrary to the good and

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[670] Charles W. Ingrao, *In Quest & Crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1979).

[671] Sheehan, *The Balance of Power*, 105–106.

[672] Jonathan Swift, *The Conduct of the Allies and of the Late Ministry in Beginning and Carrying on the Present War* (London, 1711), 39. A. D. MacLachlan, 'The Road to Peace, 1710–13', in G. Holmes (ed.), *Britain after the Glorious Revolution* (London, 1969), 197–215.

[673] The book was extremely popular and sold as many as 11,000 copies in just over two months, until the end of January 1712. Geoffrey Holmes, *British Politics in the Age of Anne* (London: Macmillan, 1967), 79. Edward Gregg, *Queen Anne* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 346. John H. Elliott, 'The Road to Utrecht: War and Peace', in Trevor J. Dadson (ed.), Britain, Spain and the Treaty of Utrecht 1713–2013 (London: Routledge, 2014), 1–6. On the role of Bolingbroke see Doohwan Ahn, 'Lord Bolingbroke's history of British foreign policy, 1492–1753', *History of European Ideas* 49 (2023): 972–994.

general peace of Europe.' He also ascertained that the commerce should be re-established and maintained to the advantage of both Britain and Holland. Moreover, the Barrier forts had to be established for the Dutch and Spanish Netherlands.[674] The allies were unaware of these treaties, and still considered the British their allies.

The success of Swift's book was crucial in convincing the (English) public to support peace. In June 1712, Lords argued that 'France and Spain are now more effectually divided than ever; and thus, by the Blessing of God, will a real Balance of Power be fixed in Europe, and remain liable to as few Accidents as human Affairs can be exempted from.'[675] The former reasons that the House of Austria should get Spain disappeared with the death of Emperor Joseph. Moreover, they recognized the role Britain played, as 'our Burdens would be at least continued, if not increased; the present Opportunity would be irrecoverably lost, of Britain's establishing a real Balance of Power in Europe, and improving our own Commerce.'[676]

In January 1712, a congress opened at Utrecht to formalise the talks that had taken place to achieve peace. The most pressing issue was the separation of the two crowns of France and Spain. France and Britain agreed on terms that suited them best, while the Dutch had to 'jostle with the Austrians for such broken meats as they would find under the conference table,'[677] since the French and the British finalised their peace treaty already in October 1711. Britain was granted 'most favoured nation' status in trade with Spain and the Spanish Empire, Gibraltar, Minorca, profits in North America, fisheries, and fur trade.[678] The British war goals were achieved, namely the separation of the French and Spanish crowns, the recognition of the Hannoverian Succession, and an advantageous trade treaty, and with it an increased sea power.

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[674] The Preliminary Articles for a Treaty of Peace between France and Great Britain, signed at London, 8 October 1711. Despite these separate talks, the English signed another alliance treaty with the Dutch. The Confirmation of Treaties between Great Britain and the Netherlands, signed at London, 22 December 1711.
[675] Journal of the House of Lords, 6 June 1712.
[676] Journal of the House of Lords, 21 June 1712.
[677] John Philipps Kenyon, *Stuart England* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 329.
[678] Thomas J. Schaeper, 'French and English Trade after Utrecht', *Journal for Eighteenth Century Studies* 9 (1986): 1–18. Linda Frey, Marsha Frey (eds.), *The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession: An Historical and Critical Dictionary* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995).

On 11 April 1713, the Treaty of Utrecht between Great Britain and France was signed, which still did not have a reference to the balance of power.[679] The first explicit reference to the balance of power in an international treaty came in a treaty between Britain and Spain in July.[680] The explicit goal of Utrecht was 'to settle and establish the Peace and Tranquility of Christendom by an equal Balance of Power [*justo Potentiae Aequilibrio*] (which is the best and most solid Foundation of a mutual Friendship, and of a Concord which will be lasting on all sides).'[681] Thus, both Spanish and French kings renounced each other crowns for themselves and their heirs. This renunciation of the combination of the crowns of France and Spain was crucial for the European stability, as they saw it. The Treaty of Utrecht brought a new system of balance of power to Europe and to the eighteenth century.[682] The balance of power was now fully legitimised as a principle for interstate politics.

In 1714, in one of the last speeches to the House of Lords, only months before she died, Queen Anne exclaimed that 'it was the Glory of the Wisest and Greatest of My Predecessors [William III], to hold the Balance of Europe; and to keep it equal, by casting in Their Weight, as Necessity required. By this Conduct, They enriched the Kingdom, and rendered Themselves dreadful to Their Enemies, and useful to Their Friends: I have proceeded on the same Principle; and I doubt not but My Successors will follow these Examples.'[683] A few months later, the Empire also signed a peace treaty with Spain and France.[684]

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[679] The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between France and Great Britain, signed at Utrecht, 11 April 1713.
[680] The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Great Britain and Spain, signed at Utrecht, 13 July 1713. Kleinschmidt, *The Nemesis of Power*, 124–125. Heinz Duchhardt, *Balance of Power und Pentarchie 1700–1785* (Weimar, Stuttgart: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1999). Renger E. de Bruin, Cornelis van der Haven, Lotte Jensen, and David Onnekink (eds.), *Performances of Peace: Utrecht 1713* (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
[681] Treaty of Peace and Amity, article II.
[682] Jonathan Swift, *The History of the Last Session of Parliament: And of the Peace of Utrecht* (London, 1714). Frederik Dhondt, Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy: Franco-British Diplomacy afterthe Peace of Utrecht (London, 2015). Frederik Dhondt, 'The Law of Nations and Declarations of War after the Peace of Utrecht', *History of European Ideas* 42 (2016): 329–349.
[683] Journal of the House of Lords, 2 March 1714.
[684] The Treaty of Peace between the Emperor and Spain, and France, signed at Baden in Ergau, 7 September 1714.

Figure 27. The frontispiece of Augustinus Freschot, *Histoire amoureuse et badine du congres et de la ville d'Utrecht en plusieurs lettres écrites par le domestique d'un des plenipotentiaires à un de ses amis* (1713).

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The British turned their backs on their former allies to build a world empire based on trade and being the strongest sea power. Britain 'pushed an extension of her sea power.'[685] Britain was fixated on its sea power, while the Dutch had to take the heavier blows on land to control Louis XIV.[686] Bacon's definition of the advantages of sea power proved right, as 'he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will.'[687] From 1727 to 1867, the British government's preamble to the annual Mutiny Acts, the annual ordinances for the management, supply and financing of the British Army, described the goal of the British army to 'maintain the balance of power in Europe.'[688]

However, not everyone was so exhilarated about the peace. Charles Irénée Castel de Saint Pierre, or more commonly known as Abbé de Saint Pierre, already wrote a bestselling pamphlet or 'memoir' during the negotiations.[689] Saint Pierre distributed several 'drafts' of his plan in 1711 and 1712. He wanted to propose a perpetual peace and criticized the balance of power as a foundation of peace. He argued that there were two main reasons for the current war, the fear of the too powerful France, and the lack of a sufficient safety for free trade, 'either that from America through Cadiz, or the one through the Mediterranean, these two trades make the half of the revenues of England and Holland.'[690]

What Saint Pierre suggested at the time, was quite revolutionary, as it involved collective security, beyond the specific alliances. He proposed to establish a European Union (*l'Union Européenne*) as a contrast to the current system of the balance between the House of

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[685] Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power*, 61–2.

[686] Olaf van Nimwegen, *De Veertigjarige Oorlog 1672–1712: de strijd van de Nederlanders tegen de Zonnekoning* (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2020).

[687] Bacon, 'Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates', 11.

[688] Vagts, Vagts, 'The Balance of Power in International Law', 561.

[689] Anon. [Charles Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre], *Memoires pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe* (Cologne: Jaques le Pacifique, 1712). The first edition was actually anonymous, and it was only in 1713 that the author became known. Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe* (Utrecht: A. Schouten, 1713). This book was one of the most referenced international relations book of the eighteenth century. Isaac Nakhimovsky, *The Closed Commercial State: Perpetual Peace and Commercial Society from Rousseau to Fichte* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

[690] Saint-Pierre, *Memoire pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe* (1711). Houghton Library, Harvard.

France and the House of Austria. He formed this plan based on similar contemporary examples of the 'unions' in the Holy Roman Empire, Switzerland and the Dutch Republic. This European Union would be permanent and consist of eighteen principal European sovereignties, from Portugal to Muscovy, with each having one vote. This European society (*la Societé Européenne*) was supposed to ensure perpetual peace with a common diet or parliament, where the common questions and border disputes would be discussed.[691]

The influence of his plan was immense and the main points were already discussed in 1712. A short anonymous pamphlet or *A Speech for a Lasting Peace, Written in November 1711* was published in London, which explicitly attacked the balance of power, using the logic and wording of Saint Pierre. The author noted 'that this so much Celebrated, Political Measure, of Ballancing the other Powers of Europe, as in Two Scales; is a mistaken Notion.' However, when it came to the distribution of the colonies and trade, the major part 'is to be the Share of Britain.' According to the speech, it would also be better if Britain were the guarantor of Spanish trade, and not 'France, which has so great a Naval Force.' Even in relation to the Dutch, the new Barrier towns would add provinces to the original seven, and this new Dutch government 'perhaps would be less Dangerous to Britain in Matter of Trade, than these Countries are, as now Govern'd.' Interestingly, the author also mentioned 'the Tyrannies exercised on the Account of Trade, of which, 'tis not one Nation only that is Guilty, has of late Years, surpass'd the Tyranny of all absolute Princes.'[692] This 'Tyrannies exercised on the Account of Trade' definitively shifted the balance of sea power into Britain's favour, by establishing an obvious imbalance of sea power.

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[691] Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour perpetuer la paix et le commerce en Europe. Augmenté des conferences tenuës à Utrechte, des nouveaux Interêts des Princes: Ensemble, des Differens qui pourroient naítre entr'eux, des Avantages qu'ils trouveroient à executer ce dessein; & des Réponses aux Objections* (Utrecht: Antoine Schouten, 1713).

[692] Anon., *A Project for Establishing the General Peace of Europe, By a more Equal Partition than has hitherto been proposed* (London: s.n., 1712).

Conclusion

Coming back full circle to the beginning, was there a balance of sea power in the early modern era, as Hauterive declared? Nobody believed his claims that France was the one trying to establish the balance of sea power. John Quincy Adams reviewed Hauterive's pamphlet and stated that it was 'the mixture of truth & falsehood, of ingenious argument & sophistry.' Adams claimed that when Hauterive described 'the rise & progress of the maritime & commercial States system, the source of prosperity to England […] all the furies of hatred combine to mix their blackest colours.' Adams rightly argued against Hauterive's claims that it was Cromwell, who devised such a maritime system, for none had 'such distant foresight into futurity.' In relation to the Navigation Act, 'there is no reason to suppose, that its authors were aware of its remote & permanent consequences, more than all the rest of Europe.'[693]

Adams went on with the review of Hauterive's analysis of the Navigation Act. He noted that 'the Dutch alone considered it as hostile by its immediate application to themselves, but the influence it was destined to produce upon the prosperity of England, & upon the history of Europe was foreseen by no man—That it made England prosper is now universally recognized. That prosperity has made England sometimes proud, arrogant & oppressive to other nations, anxious to engross all commerce to herself, & ever apt to encroach upon that of others, is true. To guard & defend themselves by pacific & lawful concert against this disposition, is the right & interest of the other nations, but they must above all things be cautious not to be substitute, instead of these principles of self defence, the inextinguishable virulence, & unbounded rancour instigated by the feeling of the deadliest national antipathies.'[694]

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[693] John Quincy Adams to John Adams, 21 April 1801. Adams Family Papers, Letterbooks.
[694] John Quincy Adams to John Adams, 21 April 1801. Adams Family Papers, Letterbooks. Ironically, only a few years later, the US and the UK would fight the War of 1812, arguably because of the British restrictions on the American (neutral) trade and the impressment of American sailors as British subjects. Andrew Lambert, *The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812* (London: Faber and Faber, 2012).

Although his motives were clear to the contemporaries, Hauterive raised an interesting point, which has been neglected in historiography so far. When discussing the early modern sea powers or power politics in general, the transfer of (sea) power from one state to another, or from one metropolis to another, is always the focus. While these traditional analyses are not necessarily wrong, they tend to miss the periods or aspects of power politics, when the outcome was far from certain. Although the concepts of the balance of power and sea power have been studied ad nauseam, no one has combined them to analyse the balance of sea power in the early modern era, when the supremacy was not by any means definitely determined.

Since I scrutinised the period between the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), my primary research subjects were England, the Dutch Republic and France. Even contemporaries recognized these three states as the primary sea powers or a 'Triumvirate of mighty Nations […] equally powerful in Naval strength,' as a pamphleteer argued in 1680. However, it would be wrong or too simplistic to analyse these three (sea) powers in a vacuum, so I included other major states involved in the major wars and international relations of the period. It is impossible to comprehend the balance of (sea) power without acknowledging the influence of Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, Sweden, and other states.

I searched for the balance of sea power on three levels, the naval, the diplomatic, and the discursive. The analysis of ship lists for the major sea battles in the studied period showed that for many battles, there was indeed a relative numerical balance between the fleets or the alliances of fleets. The First Anglo-Dutch War was an exception, when England had a clear advantage in the number of warships and especially in the number of guns, in contrast to the Dutch Republic. Acknowledging this disparity, the large Dutch shipbuilding programme of the 1650s and 1660s brought the two navies to parity by the start of the Second Anglo-Dutch War in 1665. Since it was expensive and costly to maintain a fleet at sea, considering the financial and work force restraints, there were limits to the size of the battle fleets.

France joined the fray with Colbert and started an even more impressive shipbuilding programme in 1661, building some of the largest warships of the era. In a manner of two to three decades, it became numerically the largest sea power in Europe. For two years and only for two years, from 1690 to 1692, France controlled the seas. However, Louis XIV chose to focus his strategy on the operations on land, in the Spanish Netherlands and in the Rhineland, so his navy was not his primary focus. It could still face the combined Anglo-Dutch fleet in the Mediterranean in the early eighteenth century, but it could not seriously challenge the Anglo-Dutch fleet in the Channel or the Atlantic, so it never even tried again under the Sun King.

The analysis of the ship lists also showed that the number of guns needed on warships gradually increased in the second half of the seventeenth century. Before the line-ahead tactics became predominant in the 1650s and 1660s, practically all warships could potentially participate in open sea battles. However, after the new tactics became common, the standard for allowing the warship into the line of battle was higher, as every ship had to maintain the heavy broadsides by the enemy warships, so it would not break the line and expose the whole fleet. Although there were fewer warships in total participating in the battles, these warships had more guns and could withstand heavier broadsides for longer (Table 21).

	Battle of Portland in 1653		Battle of Lowestoft in 1665		Four Days' Battle in 1666		Battle of Solebay in 1672	
	English	Dutch	English	Dutch	English	Dutch	Anglo-French	Dutch
Total Number of Warships	82	80	88	96	79	84	74	62
Total Number of Guns	2,948	2,428	4,212	4,553	4,204	4,531	4,650	3,772
Average Number of Guns per Warship	36	30	48	47	53	54	63	61

Table 21. Comparison of fleet strengths in some of the most famous sea battles.

The balance of sea power was also recognized diplomatically. Several alliance treaties established the numerical requirements for allies, using a very interactive process of searching for the necessary force to thwart the threat. These usually listed the number of armed forces, the money required to maintain them, and the duration of their enlistment. When it came to the naval elements, this primarily focused on the number of warships and the number of guns, although it sometimes also listed the number of seamen and the money. For example, the Triple Alliance of 1668 established the exact balance of sea power between England and the Dutch Republic, as they both had to contribute the exact same amount of warships to thwart France.

However, it gradually started to fall in favour or responsibility of England. For the Dutch Republic to thwart the French land invasion in 1672 and 1673, it had to redirect part of its funds to the army. This weakened the Dutch sea power, which faced the combined Anglo-French fleet in 1672 and 1673. The Anglo-Dutch alliance treaty of 1678 already reflects the decline of the Dutch sea power. The Dutch Republic had to contribute one third less by sea, so it could contribute one third more by land, as opposed to England. This decline continued due to the aggressive tendencies of Louis XIV on land, so it got even worse for the Dutch. The further alliance treaties from 1689 and 1701 dictated the ratio of 5 to 3, in England's favour.

Maritime culture and tradition of seapowers, like England and the Dutch Republic, had enormous influence. For example, when discussing the 'ethnic stereotypes' of early modern Europeans, the English and the Dutch were usually recognized as maritime nations.[695] In the *Laconic Mirror of Europe*, the English were described as the 'chief' or 'principal at sea' (*archithalassus*), while the Dutch were described only as 'powerful at sea' (*in oceano potens*). The French, on the other hand were only known as 'crafty' or 'cunning' (*astutus*).[696]

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[695] Izidor Janžekovič, 'Ethnic 'stereotypes' in early modern Europe: Russian and Ottoman national costumes', *History and Anthropology* (2022): 1–25.

[696] Martin Engelbrecht, *Laconicum Europae speculum* (Augsburg: s.n., 1730). Franz K. Stanzel, *Europäer – ein imagologischer Essay*, 2nd edition (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1998). Franz K. Stanzel (ed.), *Europäischer Völkerspiegel: Imagologisch-ethnographische Studien zu den Völkertafeln des frühen 18. Jahrhunderts* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1999).

By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Dutch navy became second-rate, and it could not compete with the British or the French navies any longer. During the war, Britain managed to acquire the strategic naval bases in the Mediterranean, Gibraltar and Port Mahon, so it could better control the trade in the Mediterranean. The Royal Navy gradually acquired the supremacy of the seas and its navy was often on par with the combined navies of its enemies. The British did not fail to note their superior sea power to domestic and foreign audience. In 1740, the 'guardian angels' first sang 'Rule, Britannia! [Britannia] rule the waves.'

Figure 28. The frontispiece of William Sutherland's *Britain's Glory* (1729) displayed the sheer numerical strength or superiority of the Royal Navy in the early eighteenth century.

The pamphlet writers, jurists and philosophers also discussed the balance of sea power. This was usually absorbed in the broader discussions of the balance of power in Europe. One of the main questions related to power politics at the time was alliance building and breaking, which several jurists and philosophers tackled. However, the discussions also specifically touched sea powers. The contemporaries understood the two aspects of sea power in the early modern era, iron for warships and gold for trade. Often the shipbuilding programme in one country stimulated the shipbuilding programme in another, not unlike the modern arms races.

The balance of sea power was also acknowledged in relation to privateering, especially against the neutral powers. Privateering against the trade of the enemy state was allowed and accepted at the time. It was the seizing and checking of the neutral ships for contraband, which disturbed the neutral states. For instance, in relation to the neutral Denmark trading with enemy France in the 1690s, Robert Molesworth argued that the Danes wanted 'to keep the balance of Sea Power even,' and that they wanted to be relieved 'of fears, that we shall give law to the Ocean.' This would be in clear violation of Vattel's definition of the balance of power, because the early modern Europeans feared the potential universal monarchy dictating laws to others, be it on land or at sea. To defend from such threat, they argued for the balance of (sea) power.

If I may paraphrase the medieval historiographical concept, the perceived *translatio imperii maris* between sea powers has often been used by the great historians: from Venice and Spain to the Netherlands and Great Britain, or their dominant capitalist cities. However, my detailed study showed that the situation was far more complicated and transition less than definitive. The nature of naval warfare and navies in the long seventeenth century drove sea powers toward an implicit and sometimes to an explicit balance. I showed that the balance of sea power was a practical and naval reality, that it was acknowledged in the international alliance treaties, and that it became an element of early modern political discourse.

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