

Social Divisions, Party Systems, and Political Change in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey: A Historical Analysis

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Declaration

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Abstract

The dominant approach in the literature of cleavages and party systems explains the history of politics in Turkey as a stable and cultural struggle of a centre and a periphery. It is argued that secular, nationalist, bureaucratic, elite forces of the founding ideology, and their representative parties constitute the centre. Various dissidents, namely Islamic, Kurdish, civilian, and popular forces, and their parties constitute the periphery.

Prominent scholars of this literature claimed that this division originates in the social formation of the Ottoman Empire. It was claimed that the conflict between despotic state and peasants, and the absolute dominance of the former over the latter was the defining character of the empire. Consequently, the disconnected character of centre and periphery was manifested in party systems after the transition to democracy.

Although this is a popular explanation, such historical arguments concerning socio-political change/stability have not been demonstrated empirically and systematically in a longitudinal study. This study aims to address this gap critically by explaining the history of formation and evolution of cleavage and party system structures in Turkey.

The second chapter engages with the claim of the stable despotic centre in the Ottoman Empire, and of the disconnection between centre and periphery in specific. Firstly, it is argued that Ottoman Empire shared certain essential characteristics of feudalism with its western counterparts, and sultan's power relied on the feudal ruling classes in the periphery. Secondly, the breaking-up of the feudal order and the radical social transformation of the 17th and 18th centuries are explained. It is argued that sultan's power declined vis-a-vis other actors of ruling classes. Thirdly, the peculiarities of the modern-state-making processes of the 19th and 20th centuries were explained through the interaction between the Western powers' expanding hegemony, the multicultural yet hierarchical legacy of the empire, and the emerging Muslim and non-Muslim bourgeoisie. Fourthly, it is argued that the provincial commercial and landholding bourgeoisie constituted the social base of the Turkish War of Independence.

The third and fourth chapters explain the party systems, and historical alignment and de-alignment processes. It is argued that at least five main party systems emerged during the multi-party era based on the relevant number of parties, structures of ideological dimensions, and the extent of polarization. Institutional changes, societal changes related to deepening of capitalist path of development, and agential factors became the causes of party system change. The first party system

(1950-1960) is defined as polarized two-party system that is ideologically divided between secular modernization legacy and an agrarian conservative populism. The second party system (1961-1980) is defined as polarized multi-party system that is divided into two ideological dimensions. These dimensions are called pro-secular modernization and pro-Islamic nativist modernization (1), and economic left and McCarthyist right (2). The third party system (1983-1991) was called moderately multi-party system with a predominant party, and has one ideological dimension: Neoliberal conservatism and economic populism. Both fourth (1991-2002) and the fifth (2002-2023) party systems had two ideological dimensions: pro-secular versus pro-Islamic modernization (1), and multiculturalist pro-Kurdish politics versus mono-ethnic status-quo (2). The former is defined as polarized multi-party system with relative balance of parties, and the latter is defined as polarized multiparty system with a predominant party.

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Debate

The first democratic elections with sufficient competitiveness and universal suffrage in Turkey was held in 1950. Since then, Turkish democracy has been interrupted by military interventions such as the 1960 and 1980 coups, and the 1971 and 1997 memorandums. Failed coup attempts such as the ones in 1962, 1963, 1971 and 2016 took place. The democratic regime has also experienced elected and highly authoritarian governments such as the Democrat Party (DP) in the 1950s and Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 2010s and 2020s. The country also experienced the almost-civil war conditions between right-wing and left-wing militants in the late 70s, and the armed conflict with the PKK in the 90s and the related long state of emergencies in the eastern part of the country. Understandably, the failure of democratic consolidation for decades has made the question *why Turkey does not democratize* a major question in academic and public debates.

A literature that Aytürk named the *Post-Kemalism Paradigm*¹ started to emerge in the 1980s following the despotic 1980 military coup which had championed the ‘Atatürkist’ ideology. The Post-Kemalism literature expanded in the 90s and became not only hegemonic but also highly politicized in the 2000s. This popularization and politicization were parallel to AKP’s accession to power in 2002. In this period, the party accelerated the European Union accession process and initiated meetings or implemented certain reforms regarding the issues such as the Kurdish Question, the Alevi Question, and the headscarf question. On the other hand, the party backed the high-profile trials against members of the military and civilian bureaucracy as well as journalists. It also implemented referendums and legislations to alter and dominate the structure of the judiciary. In such a conjuncture, Aytürk argues that the Post-Kemalism paradigm became a large confederation of conservative/Islamist right, liberals, a part of the left, and the pro-Kurdish politics.²

Scholars who contributed to the post-Kemalism literature questioned the premises of the earlier modernization literature which essentially had treated the Young Turk and Kemalist rules as “liberalizing autocracies”³ towards democracy. Modernization literature had regarded the Kemalist reforms as proto -democratic steps to replace the old traditional-Islamic institutions, most

¹ İlker Aytürk, “Post-Post-Kemalizm: Yeni Bir Paradigmayı Beklerken,” *Birikim*, November 2015, 34–48.

² Aytürk, 27.

³ For the liberalising autocracy concept see Carsten Q. Schneider and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the Components of Democratization,” *Democratization* 11, No. 5 (2004): 59–90,.

importantly the Islamic legal system and state structure, with secular-modern institutions. These new institutions were argued to construct a common national identity and a consciousness of citizenship, and to grant women enfranchisement.

The post-Kemalism literature, on the other hand, criticized⁴ Kemalism for constructing a monistic and ethnic national identity that excludes non-Turkish ethnic groups, primarily the Kurds⁵. It was criticized to implement a top-down, tutelary political system where military-civilian bureaucracy acted as the forces of tutelage against the popular/democratic forces. This criticism also regarded the *etatist* developmentalist policies of the mono-party government between 1923-1950 as an example of corporatism which emulates the interwar fascist regimes.⁶ Another criticism of the post-Kemalism literature was that the Kemalist secularism excludes women from the public sphere with its cultural policies such as the ban on headscarves in civil service and universities.⁷ In short, the post-Kemalism literature deconstructed and criticized many conclusions of the earlier modernization literature, and it placed Kemalism/Ataturkism at the core of the debate why Turkey does not democratize.

Within this wave of post-Kemalism paradigm, an explanatory framework that proposed an answer to this question emerged. This framework, which I will call here *the centre-periphery framework*, argues that “the history of the Turkish democratic struggle since 1950 is the history of struggle between popular power and the Kemalist/state power.”⁸ This view regards the history of Turkish politics as a continuous, uni-dimensional and a cultural struggle of a centre and a periphery. Accordingly, the secular, nationalist, bureaucratic, elite forces, and their parties, as the followers of the state and nation-building ideology, constitute the centre. On the other hand, the Islamic, the Kurdish, the pro-democratic, the popular forces and their parties, as the dissidents of the founding ideology, is claimed to constitute the periphery. The interventions of military and judiciary in politics is perceived in this narrative as restoration projects of the centre against the popular and democratic advancements of the periphery. The implication of the centre-periphery theories for the party system in the 2000s was that the AKP represented the democratic periphery against the secular centre which was mainly represented by Republican People’s Party (CHP) and civilian and military bureaucracy. The corollary of this argument was that as the forces of the periphery eliminates the

⁴ Aytürk, 25.

⁵ Büşra Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de “Resmî Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu : (1929-1937)*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009).

⁶ Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1990).

⁷ Nilüfer Göle, *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling*, (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2004).

⁸ İhsan D. Dağı, *Turkey: Between Democracy and Militarism: Post Kemalist Perspectives*, (Ankara: Orion, 2008), 78.

forces of the centre, the regime would end up in a consolidated democracy. From such a point of view, for example, Insel considered the election victory of AKP in 2002 as a sign of “normalizing democracy” for the Turkish regime which had been under the authoritarian influence of the military and civilian bureaucracy since the 1980 military coup.⁹

However, at least since 2015, scholars and renowned democracy indexes commonly argue that the direction of the regime was towards autocracy, not towards democracy.¹⁰ Moreover, such authoritarian drift took place despite full civilian control of AKP over the military. Some scholars even labelled the cleavage structure of the late 2010s as *democracy – authoritarianism cleavage*¹¹ where AKP fell in the authoritarian side.

This dissertation does not deal with the question why Turkey does not democratize. Its goal is to identify and explain the formation and change of the main social and political divisions and party systems in a macro-historical analysis of Turkey. Nonetheless, the centre-periphery framework stands out as the dominant theory in this literature regardless of its implications for democratization. Although the dissertation is not designed in a way to refute solely the arguments of the centre-periphery framework one by one, it critically engages with the main arguments of this framework throughout the text. At this point, I will introduce the main arguments of the centre-periphery framework. I treat this framework as an *ideal type*. This means that, the framework consists of several scholars’ works who have contributed to various aspects of the problem and with nuanced arguments or by employing different concepts. Therefore, the features that will be introduced below cannot be reduced to each and every scholar’s specific argument.

1.2 The Centre-Periphery Framework

The centre-periphery framework was introduced in the literature on Turkish politics by renowned sociologist Serif Mardin in 1973 in a *Daedalus* article named *Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?*¹² Drawing on the theories of Shils and Lipset & Rokkan, Mardin proposed a

⁹ Ahmet Insel. ‘The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey.’ *South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, No. 2–3 (July 1, 2003):293–308.

¹⁰ E.g. Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu, “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey,” *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 9 (September 2016): 1581–1606, Ergun Özbudun, “Turkey’s Judiciary and the Drift Toward Competitive Authoritarianism,” *The International Spectator* 50, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 42–55.

¹¹ Orçun Selçuk and Dilara Hekimci, “The Rise of the Democracy – Authoritarianism Cleavage and Opposition Coordination in Turkey (2014–2019)”. *Democratization* 27, No. 8 (August 10, 2020): 1496–1514.

¹² Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?,” *Daedalus* 102, no. 1, (1973): 169–90.

historical framework to understand the formation of cleavages in the Ottoman Empire, and the structures of party systems in the 50s and 60s in the Republic of Turkey.

Mardin argues that the character of the political competition in Western Europe has been multi-dimensional, and it was shaped in a long process of multi-dimensional confrontations and compromises of different societal groups. This process occurred as a result of the integration of the peripheral groups such as feudal nobility, bourgeoisie, and later industrial labour into representative politics over time. On the other hand, Mardin argues that the character of the cleavages in the Ottoman society was unidimensional. The sultan and his household bureaucracy constituted the “despotic centre”. The centre prevented the emergence of peripheral forces as autonomous groups with legal statuses. It constantly opted to crush any social group that rises in the periphery rather than including them in the polity through social contracts where mutual recognition of rights is guaranteed. Thus, the centre had a clear dominance over the periphery over time, and a unidimensional and unidirectional relationship set the characteristics of Turkish politics in the long term. The patrimonial state structure and the disconnection between the centre and periphery distinguished Turkish politics from the Western models.

Mardin argues that the despotic centre primarily came to mean for peasants the extraction of the surplus of their production. In addition to this material confrontation, the high and the low cultures of the centre and the periphery grew remotely. The educational institutions of the centre were closed to common people to a great extent. This isolation reduced the chances of mobility from the periphery to the centre. In such social conditions, the Islamic culture and its institutions appeared as the only element that partially connected these two remote cultures. As the empire went into a decline around the 17th and 18th century, the material exploitation of the periphery by the centre increased. Mardin calls this period the transition from *sultanism* to *oriental despotism*. Simultaneously, cultural Westernization of the central bureaucracy within the modernization attempts took place in the 19th century. This also sharpened the cultural contrast between the centre and the periphery as Islam became identified more with the periphery. The Islamic culture unified the higher and the lower classes of the periphery against the westernizing bureaucrats of the centre. The expansion of the market relations in the country and the bureaucratic centralization enhanced the importance of the notables of the periphery. Peripheral notables emerged as the mediators of the relations of peasants to the markets and the state.

Mardin argues that the Young Turk and the Kemalist revolutions did not alter the unidimensional and disconnected sociocultural cleavage structure either. The peasants were not mobilized against the provincial notables through policies such as land reform under the mono-party rule of CHP.

This contrasted to the cases such as the Russian and Chinese revolutions. United through an Islamic culture, the lower and the upper classes of the periphery continued their alliance against the culturally westernized forces of the centre. After the transition to the multi-party regime in 1946, a group of elites split from CHP and founded the Democrat Party (DP). Although DP was founded by the former CHP members, it managed to appeal to the peripheral forces by promising to liberalize religious practices, de-bureaucratize the country, and bring new services to the peasants. Consequently, the party system emerged as the manifestation of the conflict between the secular and bureaucratic centre which was represented by CHP, and the Islamic and democratic periphery which was represented by DP in the 1950s. The 1960 coup that toppled the DP government underlined the ongoing cleavage, and the 1971 military memorandum was identified with the centre by the periphery.¹³

A few years before Mardin, another scholar, İdris Küçükömer, introduced a similar scheme about the divisions in Turkish politics in his semi-academic but highly influential book *Westernization and Alienation of the Order*.¹⁴ He labelled the two historically stable camps as the “people’s front” and the “bureaucratic front”. The first camp originated in the coalition of the Janissaries, shopkeepers and clergy in the 18th century. This “people’s front” was represented respectively by Prince Sabahaddin’s side of the Young Turks and the Liberal Entente during the Constitutional Monarchy Era; by the Second Group in the assembly during the Independence War; by Progressive Republican Party, Free Party, Democrat Party, and Justice Party in the Republic Era. On the other hand, the second camp originated in the pro-west/laicite bureaucratic tradition. The camp was represented respectively by the Union and Progress Party (İTC) during the Constitutional Monarchy Era, by the First Group during the Independence War, by CHP and the 1960 military coup in the republic era.

¹³ Mardin, 186.

¹⁴ İdris Küçükömer. *Düzenin Yabancılaşması-Batılama*. (Ankara:Bağlam, 1994): 72.

Table 1: Küçükömer's scheme for the political cleavages in Ottoman Empire-Turkey

Left Side; comes from the coalition of Janissary-shopkeeper-clergy; is based on the pro-East/Islamist <i>people front</i>	Right Side; represents the pro-West/laic <i>bureaucratic</i> tradition
Prince Sabahaddin's side of the Young Turks	Union and Progress Party's side of the Young Turks
Liberal Entente	Union and Progress Party
The Second Group in the first Grand Assembly	The First Group in the first Grand Assembly
Progressive Republican Party	Republican People's Party
Free Party	Republican People's Party and National Unity Committee
Democrat Party	Republican People's Party and National Unity Committee
Justice Party	Republican People's Party (with left-of-centre policy)

Kahraman extends this stable centre-periphery framework to the 2000s.¹⁵ He divides the history of Turkish politics since the beginning of the 20th century into sixteen period where the power rotates between the centre and the periphery. Kahraman also labels the DP period (1950-60), the Justice Party (AP) period (1965-1971) as the periods of the “domination of periphery” and/or the “democratic reaction”. The Motherland Party (ANAP) period (1983-1991), and the AKP period (2002 onwards) are labelled as the periods of domination of periphery and/or democratic reaction. On the other hand, the period between 1908 and 1950, the military interventions of 1960, 1971, 1980 are labelled as the “domination of the center”.

The centre-periphery framework implies that *continuity*, not rupture, of the despotic bureaucratic class-versus-subordinate popular classes is the dominant feature of the Turkish social and political system. The continuities/similarities rather than the ruptures/differences characterize the relationship between the pre-modern era, the absolutist period of the early 19th century, the grand viziers' rule in the mid-19th century (the *Babüli* period), the constitutional monarchy period of Sultan Abdulhamid, the Young Turks period, CHP's mono-party rule in the Republic Era, and the military coups and judicial action in the multiparty period. It is claimed that this continuity is first and foremost about the stable conflict between the state forces and societal forces. Clearly, such approaches consider state and society as two substantial entities. They treat different class bases, ideological and policy orientations of different governments negligible, or, at best, secondary to the master conflict. Massive demographical changes such as urbanization and decline of the rural

¹⁵ Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Türk Siyasetinin Yapısal Analizi - I*, 1st. Ed. (İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2008) 182.

population from 80 percent at the turn of the 20th century to 10 percent in the 2010s, industrialization and the proliferation of social classes do not disrupt the continuity and dominance of the master conflict according to this approach.

Since the centre-periphery framework identifies one remarkable historical conflict, this situates the history of party systems in Turkey in a highly *unique* position compared to other countries. For the other countries, the comparative literature identifies rising, falling, overlapping and crosscutting cleavages throughout the history such as liberal-conservative, left-right, authoritarian-libertarian. Therefore, to have one determining stable cleavage implies *the uniqueness of Turkey*. Obviously, such a unique outcome requires unique causes. The refined examples of the scholarship find the causes of this unique outcome in the unique social formation of the Ottoman Empire and in its legacy. Mardin's seminal article does such a historical exploration. He claims that Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire experienced fundamentally different social formations in the pre-capitalist era. Feudalism was the dominant social system in the West. The defining character of this system is that there are aristocratic intermediary classes between the monarch and the peasants. On the other hand, the social system in the Ottoman Empire was not feudalism. It could be termed, with some nuances from each other, as *Oriental despotism* or *patrimonialism* or *sultanism*. What these concepts imply is that there were no autonomous intermediary classes such as nobility between the sultan and the peasants in this system. The political system was highly centralized, and the sultan had unrivalled power over its subjects. The centre prevented the emergence of peripheral forces as autonomous groups with legal and recognized statuses as in the case of the feudal lords. Thus, the centre had a clear dominance over the periphery over time; and a unidimensional and unidirectional relationship set the unique patrimonial characteristic of the Turkish society in the long term. It is claimed that the Turkish modernization did not alter this subordination but rather consolidated it in the hands of the modern bureaucratic class. On the other hand, the character of the political competition in Western Europe has been multi-dimensional as argued above. And it was shaped in a long process of multi-dimensional confrontations and compromises of different societal groups such as feudal nobility, bourgeoisie, and later industrial labour.

Thus, it was claimed that such a “strong state tradition”¹⁶ and the subjection of the society to the state made the disconnection between the centre and periphery the main characteristic of Turkish politics. It was also the feature that distinguished Turkish politics from the Western models according to Mardin. The idea of the uniqueness of the Ottoman social system and its unique legacy

¹⁶ Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Beverly, North HumberSide : Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Eothen Press ; Distributed in the U.S.A. by Humanities Press, 1985).

for the structure of Turkish democracy was not unique to Mardin. The uniqueness of the Ottoman social system was the major implication of the “The Asiatic Mode of Production” (AMP) debate which became popular in the 60s in Turkey. The AMP concept takes place in Marx’s newspaper articles on India where he speculates that India and some other oriental societies have a fundamentally different mode of production in the pre-capitalist era than the feudalism of the West. Briefly, Marx argued that property relations in India, Iran and Turkey had been stagnant for a long time. Sophisticated division of labour did not emerge in these societies because they were mostly composed of closed village communities. The width of the lands in the East also had a negative impact for the emergence of sophisticated division of labour in these societies. In fact, Marx did not publish any book during his life which focuses on this concept, and the concept did not have a major place in Marx’s major works.¹⁷ Later, the official view of the Soviet Union in the Stalin era became that the mode of production in Russia and China were not AMP but a form of feudalism. The AMP concept became popular in the de-Stalinization period. Karl Wittfogel, who was a former communist and later an anti-communist, published the *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*¹⁸ in 1957. He argued that a ruling class which managed to control the means of production in the absence of private property relations dominated the Russian society in the pre-capitalist era. This Czarist bureaucratic class was replaced by the Communist Party’s civil servants in the 20th century. The implication was that *continuity*, not rupture, between the Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union was the prominent feature of the power relations and the social structure in the country. The AMP debate became popular also in Turkey in the 60s in such a context. Divitçioğlu’s¹⁹ arguments and Küçükömer’s arguments which were introduced above also drew on this framework. In sum, the uniqueness of the Ottoman social system which was claimed to have left a unique legacy for the party system became an important assumption for the centre-periphery framework.

The framework portrays a sociological centre, its founding ideology, and its representative political institutions. The sociological centre is the bureaucratic class/ civil servants; the ideology is secularism and Turkish ethno-nationalism; and its representative political institutions are CHP and the parties of its lineage, military and judiciary bureaucracy. The framework also portrays a sociological periphery, its dissident ideology, and its representative institutions. Rural and urban popular classes are united through an Islamic/conservative ideology, and these constitute the sociological basis of the periphery. Additionally, Kurds and Alevi are regarded as elements of the

¹⁷ Halil Akkurt, “Türkiye Solunda Osmanlı Toplum Yapısı Tartışmaları (1960-1980),” 2017, 32–35.

¹⁸ Karl A. Wittfogel, “Oriental Despotism,” *Sociologus* 3, no. 2 (1953): 96–108.

¹⁹ Sencer Divitçioğlu, *Asya Üretim Tarzı ve Osmanlı Toplumunu*, 1st Ed. (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2010).

periphery as the dissidents of the founding ideology. The representative political institutions of the periphery are identified with the largest party that competes against CHP. These are Democrat Party, Justice Party, Motherland Party and Justice and Development Party chronologically. Yet, it should be noted that Mardin states in the end of his seminal 1973 article that “[t]here is evidence both of new cleavages and of differentiation within the periphery”.²⁰ He argues that possible realignments of the organized labour, Kurds, and Alevis could change the cleavage structure. On the other hand, the *neo* versions of the framework treats new forms of alignments and confrontations negligible and emphasize on the continuity of the unidimensional cleavage.

1.3 Broader Literature of Social and Political Change in Turkey

Neither the post-Kemalist approaches, nor the centre-periphery framework can be treated as the founding theories of the approaches to the formation and change of socio-political divisions and conflicts in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. Three other sets of approaches should be mentioned here. I will call them the *modernization paradigm*, the *international macro-structures paradigm*, and the *social-history paradigm*.²¹ These literatures do not necessarily consist of studies that aim to explain a whole history of formation and change of social and political structures, divisions or party systems in Turkey. While some studies focus on the 19th century Ottoman Empire, others focus on the Young Turk period or the early Republican period or 1980s. Others focus on the long transformations between the 19th and the 20th centuries. What is important here is to reveal the main assumptions, causal mechanisms, and the unit of analysis of these paradigms. They are not mutually exclusive and many of the studies lie somewhere between these paradigms.

Arguably, the framework that dominated the literature before the rise of the post-Kemalist approaches and centre-periphery framework was the *modernization paradigm*. This approach regards the social and political history of Turkey as the conflict between the *modernizers/reformers/progressives* and the *traditionalists/conservatives/reactionaries*. It treats the social forces such as clergy, janissary-artisans and local notables as reactionary forces who resist against the progressive forces of the pro-(Western)-modernization bureaucracy.²² Accordingly, the Ottoman Empire started to stagnate after the reign of Suleiman I, and then constantly *declined* until the 19th century. Only through the reforms that were initiated by the enlightened monarch/leader or the enlightened bureaucracy, this

²⁰ Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” 187

²¹ Cf. Cem Emrence, *Remapping the Ottoman Middle East: Modernity, Imperial Bureaucracy, and the Islamic State*, Library of Ottoman Studies (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012).

²² Mehmet Mert Sunar, *Cauldron of Dissent: A Study of the Janissary Corps, 1807-1826*, 2006. 4-9

decline process was reversed. The determinant agent of change in this narrative becomes, again, the central state in a *stagnant oriental society*. Some odd versions of this literature, for example, go as far to depict Turks as people who “lack a racial skill about commerce”²³ to point to the stagnancy of the society and its inability to bring about a bottom-up political change. The modernization approaches converge on the state-centricism of the centre-periphery framework. They commonly imply that undeveloped/traditional countries catch up to the Western countries by adopting certain Western institutions, and usually in certain sequences.²⁴ But there are different versions of the paradigm. Some of them points to the reforms of the Ottoman sultans and bureaucrats of the Reorganization (*Tanzimat*) period of the 19th century as the turning point. The Kemalist versions designate the leadership of Atatürk and the reforms of the Atatürk period as the (positive) turning point.²⁵ Others embrace the modernization paradigm but critically pay attention to the disturbances that stem from extreme culturally-Westernist deviations.²⁶

The second set of approaches is the *international macro-structures* paradigm. This literature points out the impact of expanding western capitalism and imperialism as the cause of socio-political formations and change. They are typically influenced by the *dependencia* or the *World-systems* literatures.²⁷ Some of these scholars point at the negative effects of dependency²⁸, others emphasize both positive and negative effects.²⁹ Others falsify the argued impact of the international macro-structures although they operate within this literature.³⁰ Explicitly or implicitly, some of these approaches also regard the state or bureaucracy, which are considered as the agent of change on the surface, as externally dependent and internally independent policymakers. The third set of approaches is the *social-history* paradigm. As opposed to the modernization and the international macro-structures paradigms, studies in this paradigm focus on the actions of the social groups or

²³ Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, *Osmanlı'yı Müslümanlaştırmak*, 1st Ed., (İstanbul: İletişim, 2015). 40

²⁴ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (London: Collier-MacMillan, 1958). ; Dankwart A. Rustow, “Atatürk as Founder of a State,” *Daedalus* 97, no. 3 (1968): 793–828.

²⁵ Emre Kongar, *Devrim Tarihi ve Toplum Bilim Açısından Atatürk*, 8th ed (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003).

²⁶ Kemal H. Karpat, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması: Osmanlı Devleti'nin Son Döneminde Kimlik, Devlet, İnanç ve Cemaatin Yeniden Yapılandırılması*, 5th Ed. (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2013).

²⁷ See Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).; Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Duke University Press, 2004).; Andre Gunder Frank, “Development of Underdevelopment or Underdevelopment of Development in China,” *Modern China* 4, no. 3 (1978): 341–50.

²⁸ Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar: State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, 17. ed, 77 14 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2011).

²⁹ Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century*, SUNY Series in Middle Eastern Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

³⁰ Erik Jan Zürcher, *İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye’de Etnik Çatışma*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005).89

classes, to their alliances, conflicts, or ways of resistance. They emphasize the internal factors such as social groups and their agency instead of or in addition to the external factors.³¹

The next section briefly introduces the comparative literature of cleavage and party system formation and change. Firstly, the section crystallizes the “uniqueness of Turkey” approach of the centre-periphery with a comparative perspective. Secondly, it introduces some of the major methodological approaches to the subject.

1.4 The Comparative Literature on the Formation and Change of Cleavages and Party Systems

Earlier in the comparative literature of cleavages and party systems, the academic focus was rather on the social roots of party systems. Scholars who researched the Western democracies sought the determinants of party competition in *social cleavages*. According to Lipset and Rokkan³², two pioneers of the literature, two macro-causal factors, namely the construction of nation-state and industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries, lie behind the party systems of the 20th century Western Europe. Their model argues that, initially, the construction of nation-state made the central forces conflict with the subordinate ethnic forces of the periphery and the Church.³³ Later, the industrial revolution gave rise to the conflicting interests of the agriculture sector and industry on the one hand, and employers and labourers on the other hand. Alliances across cleavages of these cultural and economic dimensions, which converged with the introduction of universal suffrage, manifested themselves in different kinds of party systems in the 19th century. In Britain and Germany, Conservative-Agrarian alliance vs. Liberal-Urban alliance constituted the party systems initially. Later, together with the mergers between the landowning bourgeoisie and the urban bourgeoisie and in their interests turned the axis of party competition to class conflict in both countries.³⁴ In France, Italy, and Spain, on the other hand, rural-urban cleavages did not translate into party oppositions. Party oppositions in these countries were rather based on alignments across state-church and owners-tenants cleavages. Lipset and Rokkan concluded that after the

³¹ Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*, 2nd ed, New Approaches to European History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).; Mehmet Mert Sunar, *Cauldron of Dissent: A Study of the Janissary Corps, 1807-1826*, 2006.

³² Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1977).

³³ Inglehart.181-182

³⁴ Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York : Free Press, 1967., n.d.

achievement of a certain level of nationalization and standardization of culture, class cleavage replaced the dominance of previous social cleavages all over Western Europe in the 21st century. And this constituted the basis of party systems of the 1960s and onwards.

Since the seminal model emerged, the *cleavage approach* has been a major focus of research in the party systems literature. Scholars reformulated the concept and offered new empirical techniques as the survey data proliferated since the 70s. One major development in the cleavage approach was the “value-turn”. Ronald Inglehart proposed such an account in his seminal study in 1977³⁵. He argued that the variables of the *pre-industrial* context such as religion, language group, race; and the variables of the *industrial* context such as class position, income, occupation, education³⁶ are not as effective to explain the political cleavages in the *post-industrial* context as before because of the rising “post-materialist” values. It is argued that a new value-cleavage, commonly referred as *authoritarian-libertarian*³⁷, cuts across the old left-right cleavage, and it structures the new party systems and party competition in Western Europe, and explains the emergence of new political divides such as *left-libertarian* parties and *populist-right* parties.

Scholars who researched the structures of party system in the third wave democracies of Central and Eastern Europe also identified similar patterns of party systems in the region. Kitschelt et al.³⁸ demonstrated that the political parties in the party systems of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland situate in the two-dimensional ideological space which is composed of protectionism versus market-liberalism on the one hand, and secular libertarianism versus religious authoritarianism on the other hand.³⁹ However, different than Western Europe, the dominant pattern in the region seems to be that a party combines either secular-libertarian values with pro-market policies, or combine religious-authoritarian values with economic protectionist policies.⁴⁰

In brief, firstly, enfranchisement was succeeded by the emergence of class and religious cleavages and politics in Western Europe. Secondly, the expansion of middle-class along with post-material values resulted in the decline of cleavage politics and the rise of value politics. The determinants for the formation and change of the party systems in Latin America differed from that of Western

³⁵ Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*.

³⁶ Inglehart.

³⁷ Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

³⁸ Herbert Kitschelt, ed., *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation*, (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

³⁹ Kitschelt.; Hanspeter Kriesi, “The Transformation of Cleavage Politics,” *European Journal of Political Research* 33, no. 2 (1998): 165–85, <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006861430369>.

⁴⁰ Note that Toka et al. argues that secular libertarian – religious authoritarian dimension is less relevant for Czech Republic. One may argue that this is related to the high levels of overall secularization in the country.

Europe. This diverse outcome had structural-economic causes in the developing world such as the relatively small size of urban population, the industry and industrial labour they had, all of which were impediments for the rise of class politics.⁴¹ In contrast to Western Europe where class-mass parties succeeded enfranchisement, the norm in Latin America has been the “catch-all” type for the parties with a left-wing agenda. Labor-mobilizing parties had to expand towards middle-classes with populist discourses that appeal both to lower and middle classes for electoral success in the import-substitution-industrialization era.⁴² Moreover, the decline of the class cleavage in the developing world did not build on the shrinking of the working class in favour of the middle class. In contrast to Western Europe, class inequalities deepened in Latin America together with the decline of class politics. This resulted in the rise of elitist politics and catch-all party types that draw less on ideology or class-interest but more on clientelism and charisma to mobilize masses.⁴³

Scholars of Latin American politics also took attention to the non-sociological factors that explain the changes in the party systems. Mainwaring identified that Brazil had seven distinct party systems since the 1830s.⁴⁴ He argued that one of the reasons for this unstable trajectory of the party system was the actions and preferences of the state elite, mainly the military. The state elite directly shaped the party system either by dissolving it completely through coup d'états or by implementing partial party bans. But they also shaped the party system by deciding on the political institutions such as the election system.⁴⁵ Other scholars working on the non-Western world pointed to the role of “agency”, that is the ability (and constraints) of the parties to reshape the cleavages and the party systems. Enyedi's⁴⁶ work on the transformation of the Hungarian political landscape offers such an account. Fidesz Party which set off as a left-liberal and anti-communist party transformed itself over time to a right-wing party by changing its strategic decisions on who to ally with and which electorate to appeal to. As it transformed itself and managed to forge alliances between social groups which were previously apart, it naturally affected other parties' electoral appeals and bases, and consequently got to transform the whole structure of political cleavages and the party system. In brief, scholars pointed to the sociological, institutional, and agential factors to explain the

⁴¹ Robert H. Dix, “Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America,” *Comparative Politics* 22, no. 1 (October 1989): 23.

⁴² Adam Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy*, Studies in Marxism and Social Theory (Cambridge London New York Paris: Cambridge university press, 1991).

⁴³ Kenneth M. Roberts, “Social Inequalities Without Class Cleavages in Latin America's Neoliberal Era,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36, no. 4 (December 2002): 3–33.

⁴⁴ Scott Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999). 5

⁴⁵ Mainwaring.

⁴⁶ Zsolt Enyedi, “The Role of Agency in Cleavage Formation,” *European Journal of Political Research* 44, no. 5 (August 2005): 697–720.

formation and re-formation of the cleavage structures and party systems in the third wave of democracies.

1.5 Concepts, Research Questions and Techniques

The main goal of this study is to identify the main socio-political divisions in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, the party systems in the multiparty period, and explain their formation and change historically. The most general argument is that there is not a unique, historical, continuous, master conflict such as the dominant central bureaucratic class against the subordinate popular classes. Each period since the Ottoman Empire has its peculiar class conflicts and alliances. The pre-modern era shares the essential features of Western feudalism. The socio-political divisions change as market relations develop in the pre-modern era, and the dimensions of the party systems get complicated as capitalist relations deepen. As I stated above, my dissertation is not designed in a way to refute solely the theses of the centre-periphery framework, but I will engage with its arguments throughout the text.

The second chapter discusses extensively the social and political order of the Ottoman Empire, its change and its legacy. I will introduce the outline of the social and political order of the Ottoman Empire in its classical era in the 16th century. Then I will explain the breaking-up of the traditional order between the 16th and 18th centuries. I will highlight the internal factors and the impact of peasant rebellions in Anatolia. I discuss the increasing monetization, the expansion of market relations, the increasing social mobility, the changing class relations, and the development of centrifugal forces. The subsequent sections of the second chapter engage with the 19th and early 20th centuries. On the one hand, I explain the modernization reforms as consequences of the major social changes of the previous centuries. On the other hand, I bring the Western expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire as the external factor into the picture and explain its impact on the Ottoman modernization. The final section of the second chapter introduces the social divisions and political developments in the Young Turk period.

Overall, the second chapter engages with the following questions of the literature. It questions if the Ottoman Empire had a unique mode of production (e.g. Asiatic/Oriental) that is supposed to have left a unique despotic legacy. My analysis will argue that the Ottoman social order classifies as a feudal one for its essential characteristics. The chapter questions if the sultan was despotic/omnipotent regarding its power. I will argue that his power depended on a balance of social forces. The claim of disconnection between the centre and periphery is also discussed. I

argue that the connection between the forces of the centre and the forces of the periphery increased from the 17th century as the market relations intensified. Finally, this chapter will show peculiar social conflicts of the Ottoman modernization and the legacy to the republic.

The third chapter introduces the social and political changes in the mono-party rule. The ideologies of the parties that compose the party systems will be discussed in this chapter chronologically between 1950 and 2023. Each subsection will present the main social and political context that the party system is placed on. The *ideological* dimensions of the party systems will be deduced to check if the number of dimensions could be reduced to one, and if it is centre - periphery. Also, this chapter will check the ideological positions of the military and bureaucracy vis-à-vis the parties in different periods. Thereby, I will test if and when the bureaucracy converges with the so-called centre parties and the so-called periphery parties. Briefly, the chapter addresses the following questions: What are the different party system patterns regarding the relevant number of parties, ideological positions of the parties, and their ideological distances to each other?

The fourth chapter will assess the *sociological* dimensions of the party systems. This chapter analyses historical alignment and dealignment processes of different social groups with the parties and tests the theses of the centre periphery framework. Specifically, it asks the following questions. What are the historical alignment and dealignment processes between parties and social groups regarding demographical characteristics and value-orientations? The following sections elaborate on the methods and concepts that are used in the third and fourth chapters.

1.5.1 Party systems and its analysis

The third chapter will present a comprehensive historical analysis of the party systems in Turkey between 1950 and 2023. Briefly, party systems are the “structures of party competition and cooperation”.⁴⁷ These concern the structure of electoral competition, i.e., who appeals to which social group; and the competition for government and legislation, i.e., who forms the government, opposition, and blocs in legislation. Depending on the patterns of these interactions, there occurs different party system types. In other words, party system type is regarded as an indicator of patterns of interaction between the electorate, parties, and laws for offices in a polity. There is not one type of criteria that all scholars agree upon to classify different party systems. Yet, two approaches are more prominent. I refer to them as the *arithmetical approach* and the *ideological approach*.

⁴⁷ Jan-Erik Lane and Paul Pennings, *Comparing Party System Change*, 1 ed. (Routledge, 2003).5

The *arithmetical approach* is interested in the number and relative sizes of parties in the legislation and government. Duverger's⁴⁸ typology of *two-party* and *multi-party systems*, and Almond's⁴⁹ typology of *homogenized* and *fragmented political cultures* constitutes the early examples of this approach. The *ideological approach* to party system, originally introduced by Sartori, is interested in the *modality* of party positions on the ideological space. In this approach, party system type is supposed to indicate not only the number of parties in competition but also the extent and mode of polarization between them. Accordingly, the approach looks into parties' ideologies and ideological distances in the polity space that underlies the party competition.

My analysis in the third chapter will build on both approaches. To identify the salient ideological aspects and policies of the relevant parties that constitute the party systems, firstly I reviewed election manifestos and party programs of the relevant parties between 1950 and 2023. Having in mind that party manifestos do not always reflect what the political leaders stand for and propagate for in reality, I also qualitatively analysed their discourses from the historical data that I derived from the Milliyet daily newspaper archives. For that, I surveyed the issues of the Milliyet daily newspaper since 1950 and noted down the speeches of the political leaders of the relevant parties. Then I coded the salient policy positions and discourses under different policy domains. These are (1) external relations, (2) economy, (3) political system, institutions and freedoms, (4) nationhood and cultural policies⁵⁰. These are based on the seven policy domains that Budge et al. employed in their "saliency" approach to ideology and policy analysis. For practicability in qualitative analysis, I clustered their original domains of "freedom and democracy" and "government" together and named it "political system, institutions and freedoms". I analysed the original "social groups" and "welfare and quality of life" domains both within my economy and nationhood domains.

Such a chronological research also will help to identify the emergence and fading moments of the policy issues that make to the agenda of the political parties and party system. Each section (period) of the third chapter will introduce a background of international and domestic politics, economic conditions, and institutions upon which the political parties operate. Then the salient ideological and policy positions of parties will be discussed in comparison to each other. Finally, I will visualize the relative positions of the relevant parties in the party system on an ideological space for each period.

⁴⁸ Maurice Duverger, ed., *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, University Paperbacks 82 (London: Methuen, 1978).

⁴⁹ Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Development," *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 2 (1970): 529–31.

⁵⁰ Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl, eds., *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1987).

1.5.2 Cleavages and its analysis

The fourth chapter analyses the sociological roots of the parties since 1950. Analysis of cleavages as patterns of historical socio-political divisions are made with regards to positional and temporal structures of these divisions.⁵¹ Position-wise, a group becomes a distinct socio-political entity when it possesses three social properties: distinct socio-demographic characteristics, distinct value-orientations, and a distinct political organization.⁵² Socio-demographics are social characteristics that define a person's position in a society in "objective" terms. These can be age, sex, race, ethnicity, religion, denomination, education, place of residence, occupation, class, income etc. Value-orientations are social characteristics that define a person's position in a society in "subjective" terms. These values might be about or stem from religiosity, political ideologies, the opinions on economy, gender, environment, international relations etc. A distinct political organization primarily means political parties in modern times although political party is only one form of institutionalized socio-political behaviour. If the co-existence of distinct socio-demographic characteristics and value-orientations is enclosed by a political party, then an "alignment" occurs. However, an alignment is necessary but not sufficient to call a socio-political division as a full cleavage. Cleavage, as a demanding concept, requires an alignment to be observed consistently over time. Therefore, patterns of positional and temporal structures make a cleavage together.

If an alignment between a distinct social group characteristic (demographical and ideological) and a particular political party ceases to exist over time, then two possible socio-political changes might occur. Either that social group characteristic does not align with any other party at all and disappear completely or it aligns with a different party. *Dealignment* explains the former process and *realignment* explains the latter process.

⁵¹ Kevin Deegan-Krause and Zsolt Enyedi, "Agency and the Structure of Party Competition: Alignment, Stability and the Role of Political Elites," *West European Politics* 33, no. 3 (May 2010): 686–710.

⁵² Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, "Cleavage Systems," in *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates, 1885–1985*. (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 215.

Table 2: Deegan-Krause & Enyedi's typology for the relationship between social group characteristics and party choice⁵³

		Temporal Structure: Stability	
		Relationship between past and present political behaviour:	
		Yes	No
Positional Structure: Alignment	Yes	Cleavage	Re-alignment
	No	Inertia	De-alignment
Relationship between political behaviour and particular social characteristics			

Historical sociological data to analyse the cleavage structures in Turkey is limited. The only oldest available raw data (of World Values Survey) dates to 1990. For the period between 1990 and 2023, I will use World Values Survey (WVS) series. For the period before 1990, I will use survey data that I found in the Milliyet newspaper archives and in old studies.

My analysis of cleavage is twofold. Firstly, it will explore if a party base distinguishes from the other parties with regards to any of the demographical or ideological features mentioned above. I will look at the descriptive statistics for each category within each party. Secondly, I will look at the temporal dimension, the realignment and dealignment processes, which will show the durability of these distinct social features within the bases of each party.

⁵³ Deegan-Krause & Enyedi.689

2 WHICH LEGACY? TRADITIONAL ORDER OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND PHASES OF CHANGE

2.1 The Ottoman Empire at the End of its Classical Era

This section will introduce the interconnected economic, military, and administrative system, and the cultural institutions and ideology of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century which is regarded as its classical era. The main social, political and cultural divisions will be revealed. I will have two goals. The broader goal is to introduce an initial state of the society to be able to explain the social and political change of the subsequent periods. I will introduce the multi-ethnic, multi-religious, agrarian character of the empire, as well as its Islamic ideology and legal system. The specific goal is to engage with the claim that the Ottomans uniquely had a despotic/omnipotent central state which remained as a legacy to the modern era. My argument will be that the social order of the Ottoman Empire shared crucial features of the feudal relations of production. Those are, first, to keep the subjects, either peasant, urbanite or nomad under control and immobile in a hierarchical order through an intermediary class of elites while extracting the surplus from their production. The second feature is to pay the intermediary elite's service through the right of tax farming in kind in an unmonetized pre-modern economy. The third feature is to provide hereditary rights *in practice*. The fourth is to provide greater autonomy to the local elite of distant provinces which sometimes comes with hereditary rights.⁵⁴

2.1.1 The interconnected economic-military-administrative order and divisions

Like all pre-capitalist agrarian feudal societies, the Ottoman society was essentially divided into two classes in its classical age.⁵⁵ The subject majority who were the producers and the taxpayers, and the ruling minority who appropriated the surplus of the production and were exempt from paying tax in return for services to the state. The ruling class was named *askeri* (literally meaning *military men*), but it comprised all military groups, bureaucrats, and clergy from the highest vizier in the capital to the lowest Muslim soldier in town. The subject class was named *reaya* (*flock*) and composed of peasants living in villages mostly, but also the artisans and shopkeepers living in

⁵⁴ Cf. E. Attila Aytekin, *Üretim, Düzenleme, İsyan: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Toprak Meselesi, Arazi Hukuku ve Köylülük*, 1. ed (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2022).

⁵⁵ John F. Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode of Production*, 1. ed (London New York: Verso, 1993).

towns, and pastoral nomads.⁵⁶ The ruling minority had the monopoly of the right to bear arms whereas the subject majority could neither bear arms nor ride a horse.⁵⁷

The Ottoman Empire spread over parts of Asia, Europe and Africa at its geographical height at the 16th and 17th century. The state implemented different administrative, military, and financial rules in different regions under its authority for reasons such as security and distance. There were mainly four categories of regions based on their administrative, military and financial status.⁵⁸

The first group of regions comprised the relatively centralized provinces where the standard fief (*dirlik*), administration, law, and military systems of the centre were established more commonly. These provinces were mainly central and western Anatolia and the Balkans. These standard practices, especially the fief system, decreased in the eastern Anatolia, Mesopotamia and Arab regions as the distance from the capital increased.⁵⁹ The second group of regions consisted of semi-autonomous Arab provinces such as Algeria, Baghdad, Egypt, Habesh, Lahsa, Tripoli, Tunisia which were far from Istanbul. In these provinces, existing local elite continued their rule, but they were subject to the Ottoman governor appointed from the centre. Instead of conscription, these provinces paid annual taxes in cash (*salyane*).⁶⁰ The third group (*ocaklık* and *yurtluk*) consisted some of the regions in Eastern Anatolia and Mesopotamia. Semi-nomadic lifestyle of the Kurds was prevalent, and not many developed cities existed in these regions. The state authorized the chieftains as the rulers of their tribes, and their rule was hereditary. Their obligation to the state was to send soldiers during the time of the war and patrol the mountainous borders with Persia. The fourth group of regions comprised the vassal states such as Crimea Khanate, Dubrovnik, Moldavia, Transylvania, Wallachia. They were fully autonomous in their internal affairs. The rulers were selected internally for the recognition and approval of the sultan. They paid annual tribute to the state and sent soldiers during the military campaigns.

The Ottoman state divided the agricultural land into three main categories according to the status of ownership. These were the state lands (*miri*), private lands (*milik*), and the lands that belonged to charitable endowments (*vakıf*). Among these, state-owned lands made 80 percent of the total in the classical age.⁶¹ In other words, relations of private property were not prevalent at least regarding the legal ownership status. In principle, state lands could not be bought and sold freely. Lands

⁵⁶ Haldon.160

⁵⁷ Oğuz Oyan, *Feodalizmden Kapitalizme, Osmanlı'dan Türkiye'ye*, 1. ed (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2016).76

⁵⁸ İlber Ortaylı, *Türkiye Teşkilât ve İdare Tarihi*, 2. ed, (Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 2008).250-260

⁵⁹ Ortaylı.133

⁶⁰ Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *XIV-XVII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlılarda Devlet Teşkilâtı ve Sosyal Yapı*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991).77

⁶¹ Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadî Tarihi: 1500-1914*, 13. ed, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2021).55

changed hands only under state control. Cultivated state lands were divided into three categories as *has*, *zeamet* and *timar* according to the amount of tax revenues they generate. The sultan directly collected part of the tax revenues of these lands and granted the right to collect the rest of it to various members of the local and central rulers in compensation for their service to the state. In 1528, of all tax revenues of the cultivated lands, 51 percent went to the sultan, 37 percent went to the low or high members of the ruling class, and most of the remaining 12 percent went to the charitable endowments.⁶² The revenue that was allotted to the sultan constituted the largest part of the central treasury's income. The rest of the treasury came from the taxes levied on merchants, customs, and mines. Regarding the expenditures of the centre, the greater part of the central treasury was distributed to the janissaries and other household troops as salaries.

I remarked that 37 percent of the tax revenues that were generated from the cultivated lands were collected by the members of the ruling class in 1528. These were mainly royal family members, viziers and other central administrators, provincial governors (*beylerbeyi*), city governors (*sancakbeyi*), Shari jurist (*kadi*), and police (*subaşı*) and fief-holding cavalrymen (*sipahi*) of towns and villages. The provincial governors, city governors, and cavalrymen in towns and villages had to provide security in the administrative unit they lived in, and train other cavalrymen for the wartime in return for the right to collect the tax revenues of the fiefs in kind. Through such an interconnected administrative, financial, and military system of fiefs, the state ensured security in the provinces and kept peasants under control. The state met the expenses of the administrative and military personnel and had a huge provincial army for the time of the war. The Ottoman provincial army reached 87 thousand men at its height at the time of Suleiman I in the 16th century. On the other hand, the central army (janissaries and other household troops) consisted of 16 thousand men.⁶³

As I indicated above, the ownership of the lands of the fiefs belonged to the state legally. The fief-holding cavalrymen and other administrators had the right to collect the tax revenues of those lands, but they did not have the ownership. This was claimed to be an essential contrast with the feudal system of the West where the knights/barons had a heritable fief with legal ownership rights.⁶⁴ However, despite the lack of legal regulation, the fiefs were hereditary in the Ottoman Empire in practice as well.⁶⁵ The Christian fief-holding nobles in the Balkans were allowed to keep their position after the Ottomans conquered their lands. The fief-holders were not ordinary civil servants that primarily represent the authority of the centre in the provinces. Their relation to the

⁶² Halil İnalçık, "Timar," in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2012), <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/timar>.

⁶³ Halil İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klasik Çağ (1300-1600)*, 20.ed (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2003), 120-121.

⁶⁴ Ortaylı, *Türkiye Teşkilât ve İdare Tarihi*.124

⁶⁵ Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode of Production*.169

peasants was that of a supreme noble lord. They had their mansion, their household people, and their armed men.⁶⁶

The peasant had some obligations to the fief-holders (*sipahi*) such as working on his farm one to three days and carrying his tithes to the market. Therefore, the peasants desired to move to and work in sultan's fiefs where they did not have forced labour duties.⁶⁷ But certain forced labour duties in sipahi's lands were also forbidden by laws. Although the peasants did not have the ownership of the land, they and their descendants had the right to use the land as long as they cultivated it and paid their taxes. To leave the lands and move somewhere else was forbidden by laws. However, if the peasant ran away, only the Islamic jurist, not the sipahi, could decide if he can be forced to return to the land or not. The peasant could pay a certain amount of money as compensation to not to return.⁶⁸ In short, the fief-holders in the provinces constituted the Ottoman intermediary noble class between the sultan and the peasants.⁶⁹ The peasants' position was better than the *serfs* of European Feudalism and perhaps it was closer to that of a *freeman*. The existence of Islamic jurists in towns appointed by the centre was a security against sipahi's abuse. But the peasants had certain duties towards the sipahis which were specified in sultan's decrees. There were also unregistered landless men and share-cropper slaves whose status was below the ordinary peasants (*reaya*) who were registered in a fief and had the right of use of lands. The landless men worked as temporary agricultural labour. And if they stayed three years in the same place, they were registered as *reaya*. The share-cropper slaves were either war prisoners or purchased slaves. They worked in private property type of lands since the owner of such lands could not find *reaya* easily to employ.

The urban population of the subject class who lived in the cities comprised of merchants, artisans and shopkeepers as middle classes, and apprentices, wagers, and slaves as lower classes. The city dwellers were more privileged than the peasants because they were exempted from military service, some of the taxes and forced labour duties that the peasants had.⁷⁰ A big part of the urban population was organized under guilds. These guilds were autonomous in their internal affairs. The guilds had a steward (*kethüda*) and a *sheikh* as secular and spiritual leaders respectively. The state liaised with Kethüda as the representative of the shopkeepers and artisans and collected the taxes

⁶⁶ Attila Aytekin, "Kapitalistleşme ve Merkezileşme Kavşağında," in *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat*, 3. ed (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2019), 37.

⁶⁷ Ortaçlı, *Türkiye Teşkilât ve İdare Tarihi*.130

⁶⁸ İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klasik Çağ (1300-1600)*, 115–16.

⁶⁹ E. Attila Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations, Property and Law: An Analysis of the Land Code of 1858 in the Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 6 (November 2009): 37

⁷⁰ Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1976).150

through him. The titles of artisan and kethüda became hereditary over time. Kethüdas also acted as secular leaders in neighbourhoods alongside with the religious leader, the Imams.⁷¹

Nomads or semi-nomads living in the Balkan Mountains, eastern Anatolia, southern Caucasus, and Arab deserts comprised the third category of the subjects. They were organized under their chiefs and had internal autonomy. The chief was recognized by the state and liaised to deliver the tax of the tribe. Nomads engaged in animal raising. They were also conscripted for military service or authorized to patrol the borders.⁷²

Overall, the subjects, either peasant, urbanite or nomad were kept under control in a hierarchical order through intermediary elite classes. They needed official permission of the state to pass from one position to another. Stability, not mobility, was the norm for the subjects.

2.1.2 Cultural order and divisions

The previous section introduced the administrative and financial system, the land regime and revealed the main social classes. I indicated that the ruling class was comprised of the sultan and the central bureaucracy and the militarymen, and the fief-holding provincial rulers. And the subject class was comprised of the peasants in villages mostly, but also of the shopkeepers and artisans in the cities, and of the pastoral nomads. This section introduces the ideology, legal system and the institutions of culture of the Ottoman Empire and reveals the position of the socio-cultural groups vis-à-vis each other and state.

The Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state, and, in theory, it practiced the Islamic law. The Islamic law emerged with the birth of Islam and the first Islamic state under the rule of the prophet Mohammed in the 7th century. The traditional state of the Islamic law was completed mostly in the following three centuries with the private work of prominent Islamic scholars.⁷³ The two main sources of the Islamic law that these scholars used in their work were the Quran and the prophet Muhammad's Islamic way of life and legal precedent (*Sunna*). Political and theological divisions among the followers of Islam led to the emergence of the two main branches of Islam as Sunni and Shia Islam. Within Sunni Islam, four main schools of law/jurisprudence (*madhab*) emerged as a result of Islamic scholars' study of the Quran and Sunna. These were Hanefi, Maliki, Shafi,

⁷¹ İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klasik Çağ (1300-1600)*, 157–167.

⁷² Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*.151

⁷³ Mehmet Akif Aydın, *Türk Hukuk Tarihi*, Gözden geçirilmiş 18. ed (İstanbul: Beta Basım Yayım Dağıtım, 2021).43-63

Hanbali schools. The Ottoman state embraced the Sunni-Hanafi school and practiced its codebooks in its court system exclusively since the 16th century.⁷⁴

The Islamic religion encircles all aspects of human life. It especially regulates in detail the sphere of private law such as family law, inheritance law, property law, obligations law, and commercial law. On the other hand, it leaves more space to the lawmaker/ruler in the field of public law which includes state organization, administration law, penal law and tax law. In theory, the Islamic law is above all the authorities including the ruler of the Islamic state. The ruler of the Islamic state is considered legitimate only if he practices the Islamic law. He is supposed to obey and execute the Islamic law, and only legislate in the fields that the Islamic law allows.⁷⁵ This permitted field is called the custom law (*örfi hukuk*) in the Ottoman legal system. In practice, the Ottoman sultans indeed acted in the name of Islam and as the ruler of the Islamic state. Islam was the ideology and the source of legitimization of the Ottoman state. Most of the sultans' legislations were in the fields of penal law and fiscal law where Islam left a large area of authority to the ruler to legislate.⁷⁶ However, sultans' legislations did not only emerge in the fields that the Islamic law left blank and authorized the ruler to legislate. Custom laws sometimes conflicted with the Sharia laws and overruled them.⁷⁷ Custom laws especially dominated the fields of land tenure, taxation, and penal law.⁷⁸ They were more severe than the Sharia laws in the field of penal law.⁷⁹ In summary, the sultan was the supreme authority in the Ottoman Empire in practice, and he ruled for Islam. The official and the supreme culture, the legal norms, the ideology, and the identity that the Ottoman sultans and the state embraced in the traditional period were Sunni-Hanafi Islam.

In addition to the state ideology and the basic laws, Islam shaped the judicial system, education, religious service and endowments and social/charitable activities that the state sponsored, and the internal boundaries of the Ottoman society and the relationship between the communities and between the state and communities.

⁷⁴ Aydın, *Türk Hukuk Tarihi*, 92&97. Note 1: Mülteka of İbrahim el-Halebi became the standard Sunni-Hanafi codebook in the Ottoman Qadi courts to a large extent since the 16th century. Also Ebussuud's Maruzat became the binding book of Fatwa. Note 2: The state also appointed Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali second jurists and Muftis to places where Hanafi sect is not common.

⁷⁵ Aydın, 120.

⁷⁶ Aydın, 73 & 77.

⁷⁷ Aydın, *Türk Hukuk Tarihi*, 59&76&127&297. Note: There are typical examples for the cases that the custom law overruled the Shari law. Fratricide is against Sharia. The sultans killed their brothers since Mehmed II (1432-1481) to stay as the only option for the throne. The Ottomans implemented custom law rather than the Shari law in inheritance. And the penal codes and some severe examples of punishments conflicted and overruled the Shari penal codes.

⁷⁸ Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 224.

⁷⁹ Aydın, *Türk Hukuk Tarihi*, 76 & 203.

The standard courts in the Ottoman Empire were the Sharia courts in towns that were administered by an Islamic jurist (*kadi*). These jurists adjudicated legal cases based on the two sources of laws. These are the Islamic law that is based on Sunni-Hanafi jurisprudence (*fıkıh*), and the sultan's law/custom law.⁸⁰ In addition to the main judicial task, the Islamic jurist carried out certain administrative tasks in towns such as helping to collect the taxes or conveying local demands to the centre. Although these courts adjudicated based on the Islamic law (in addition to the sultan's laws), all the subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim, could apply to these courts.

Places of worship constituted the other important aspect of the state-religion relationship in the Ottoman society. Mosques and dervish lodges (*tekke* or *zaviye*) were the main centres for worship. In towns and cities, Imams were appointed to mosques by the sultan's licence upon the request of the Islamic jurist of the town or the people's request.⁸¹ Imams acted as community leaders in villages and small neighbourhoods. Also, they were the authority to officialise (Islamic) marriages in their neighbourhoods/villages. Usually Imams took over the duty from their fathers in villages.⁸² Religious orders (*tariqa*) which gathered around a sheikh in Islamic monasteries/lodges (*tekke* or *zaviye*) constituted the other, 'private', centres of worship and Islamic education. Some of these orders such as Naqshbandi, Qadiri, Bektasi, Mevlevi spread over all regions in Anatolia and the Balkans. The Islamic lodges also functioned as centres of charity and carried out certain social services. They supplied food for the poor. Some Tekkes accommodated travellers. Others served as sport centres such as the Tekke of wrestlers or archers.⁸³

Islam played a central role in education. Apart from the central royal schools (*enderun*), there were two types of schools for common Muslim people. The first one was primary level schools (*sıbyan mektebi*) for children. These schools were nothing more than a Quran course where one can learn the Quran and reading and writing along with it. Usually these schools were located in a lodge inside a mosque complex.⁸⁴ The second type of schools for common people were higher level Islamic schools (*madrasa*). One had to get an education in these schools to become a member of the clergy and of the ruling class (*askeri*) as an Islamic jurist, an Imam, or a Mufti. In addition to

⁸⁰ İlber Ortaylı, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Kadı" (TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2001), <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/kadi#2-osmanli-devletinde-kadi>.

⁸¹ Gökmen Ertan, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Din Görevlilerinin Göreve Atanma ve Görevden Alınması: Manisa-Demirci Örneği(1690-1830)," *Diyanet İlmî Dergi* XLII, no. 4 (n.d.): 109–20.

⁸² Kemal Beydilli, *Osmanlı Devletinde İmamlar ve Bir İmanın Günlüğü*, 3. ed,(İstanbul: Pınar, 2018).

⁸³ Hür Mahmut Yücer, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf: 19. Yüzyıl*, 1. ed, (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2003).51-69

⁸⁴ Abbas Çelik, "Hatıralarla Sıbyan Mektebi," *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, no. 27 (2007): 126–35.

the Quran and Islamic law, one could learn courses like basic algebra, literature, and logic in madrasas.⁸⁵

The maintenance of mosques, lodges/monasteries of religious orders, Islamic schools (madrasa), and the allowances of clerics or sheiks were provided through the revenue generated from the state lands allocated for religious organizations and charity (*waqf*). Rather than collecting taxes from the *waqf* lands, state allocated the revenue to be spent for the expenditures and maintenance of these institutions. That is how the state indirectly sponsored the Islamic social institutions and also how clerics and institutions of religion were bound to the state.

Finally, Islamic law and the supremacy of the Sunni-Hanafî norms and ideology created certain internal boundaries within the society. Two categories of culture appeared vis-à-vis the supreme Sunni-Hanafi identity. The first category was the “people of scripture” (*ehl-i kitap*), namely Christian and Jewish people of the Empire. The second category was non-Sunni and non-Judeo-Christian groups of the empire such as Alevis, Yazidis, Druzes, and Shia Arabs and various Islamic orders that were considered unorthodox to the supreme Sunni-Hanafi Islamic identity of the state.

As the Sunni-Hanafi ideology of the state consolidated in the 16th century, the state labelled the groups that it perceived as unorthodox as “heretic,” “apostate” or “rejectionist”⁸⁶. These labels meant to delegitimize the existence of the groups. The communities that were labelled as such faced persecution and harassment especially when the Ottomans felt that religious identity coalesced with a political threat. Mass persecutions Alevis faced during the Ottoman-Safavid conflicts in the 16th century is the most notable example of this kind. Thousands of Alevis were massacred at the time, and Alevism(s) developed as an atomized, and isolated rural culture.⁸⁷ Especially this period was a historic turn for the Sunnification of the state identity.

Christians and Jews, on the other hand, were not labelled as heretic or apostate. Although their conversion to Islam was incentivized and welcomed, they were not exposed to brute force for conversion in general. Based on the Islamic law, Christians and Jews were referred to as the “protected” (*zimmi*) by the state and allowed to maintain their religion and traditions. However, their inferiority and subordination to the dominant cultural identity were institutionalized in many aspects of everyday life. Most importantly, Christians and Jews had to pay a head-tax (*cizye*) which

⁸⁵ Mehmet İpşirli, “Medrese,” in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 2003, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/medrese#2-osmanli-donemi>.

⁸⁶ Ottoman state coded these groups as heretic, apostate or rejectionist (“zındık”, “mülhid”, “rafizi” respectively). See Cakmak, 2018, p.13&16

⁸⁷ Martin van Bruinessen, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevîlik: Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlik Mücadeleleri*, 11. ed, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2015).7

Muslims did not pay. Head-tax was important for the state. It constituted the second biggest source of income of the treasury.⁸⁸ On the other hand, non-Muslims were exempt from conscription since the head-tax was considered as the compensation for the exemption. Non-Muslims could not take place in the central administration either since this would mean to rule over Muslim people. But they kept their fiefs and acted as rulers in the provinces. As the Islamic identity consolidated since the 16th century and through the 17th and 18th centuries, laws that stipulate hierarchy got stricter. Christians and Jews were not allowed to build new churches or repair the old ones as a norm⁸⁹. They could not testify against Muslims in courts. The state set dress-codes for Muslims and non-Muslims. Accordingly, non-Muslims were not allowed to wear white in specific and brighter colours in general since these colours indicated superiority.⁹⁰ Non-Muslims were not allowed to bear arms and ride a horse.⁹¹ But these regulations were not practiced by the rich merchant non-Muslim people. They dressed like Muslims and could ride a horse.⁹² Official regulations forbade the height of non-Muslims' houses to be higher than the Muslim houses.⁹³ Conversion to Islam was free and encouraged but conversion to Christianity was a crime that was punished on the grounds of apostasy. A Muslim man could marry a non-Muslim woman, but the opposite was not permitted. In short, Ottoman state's institutions and regulations which were based on the Islamic ideology of the state created a hierarchy between different socio-cultural groups of the Empire which could be felt in several aspects of daily life. On the other hand, class position, i.e., being rich or poor, overruled certain hierarchical practices that stem from the laws.

This hierarchy was complemented by the policy of segregation. Segregated neighbourhoods (*mahalle*) were the most important tool for isolating communities. The villages were mostly composed of one ethno-religious group, and the cities was divided into quarters according to religion such as the Muslim quarter, the Jewish quarter, the Greek quarter and the Armenian quarter. There were mixed neighbourhoods and streets, but the norm was segregation. A Christian congregation would object to Jews moving to its neighbourhood. Social pressure within the ethno-religious communities against establishing personal inter-religious ties was high. A woman isolated from the broader public sphere did not need to speak any language other than her native one. For example, Rozen argued that “a Jewish woman who spoke Turkish was assumed to be mixing in the

⁸⁸ Ahmet Tabakoğlu, “Resim,” in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, n.d., <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/resim--vergi>.

⁸⁹ Heather J. Sharkey, *A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Middle East*, The Contemporary Middle East 6 (NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2017).136

⁹⁰ Sharkey, 90.

⁹¹ Sharkey,164.

⁹² İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klasik Çağ (1300-1600)*, 157.

⁹³ Macit Kenanoğlu, “Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi ve Gayrimüslümlerin Hukuki Statüleri 1453-1856” (PhD Thesis, İstanbul, Marmara University, 2001), 426.

wrong circles”.⁹⁴ As a result, in many places, a member of the non-Muslim congregation could live his/her entire life without having to speak any other language.⁹⁵ Main social institutions such as places of worship, schools, soup kitchens were located in each unit of settlement. Encounters from all religious and ethnic groups were held on mostly in two occasions: for trade and entertainment. The places for these were market halls, coffee houses, taverns, and brothels⁹⁶. In short, Ottoman institutions aimed towards reproducing segregation of different cultural communities.

Finally, despite the hierarchy and segregation, the Ottoman state provided selective and limited tolerance for cultural congregational affairs. The congregations that were granted limited autonomy were the Greek-Orthodox community, the Armenian-Apostolate community and the Jewish community. Greek and Armenian Patriarchs and Chief Rabbis were authorized, as the elite and the leaders, to carry out educational, religious, and charity services of the community. They were also given some judicial authority to carry out issues concerning private law such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. But they usually functioned as pre-modern institutions of ‘arbitration’ because Sharia courts and Islamic laws were open to non-Muslims, and they frequently went to these courts when the dispute was not resolved within the community.⁹⁷ In summary, what is commonly referred to as the “millet system” did not imply a system of *imperium in imperio*, that is a comprehensive autonomy in legislation, execution, and judiciary given to the community. Rather, the autonomy concerned the areas of civil law, cultural-religious activities, and adjudication in the form of arbitration by the clerical community leaders. The universal, supreme and binding law for all the communities was the sultan’s law and Islamic law.

Women had a subordinate position compared to men in the Ottoman society typical to other premodern societies. Polygamy for men was allowed for men by Sharia and Ottoman laws but this was rare in practice. The norm was monogamy.⁹⁸ Rate of polygamy was around 5-10 percent in cities and less than that in villages. Women had the right of inheritance, but their share was half of a man in the same position. They could apply to the Shari courts. But two women’s witness testimony were equal to that of one man in financial cases.⁹⁹ Women could not work in the public service such as in administration or legal system. But they were employed in silk and wool spinning

⁹⁴ Minna Rozen, “The Ottoman Jews,” *The Cambridge History of Turkey* 3 (2006): 260.

⁹⁵ Rozen, 261.

⁹⁶ Sharkey, *A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Middle East*, 92.

⁹⁷ Kenanoğlu, “Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi ve Gayrimüslümlerin Hukuki Statüleri 1453-1856,” 338.

⁹⁸ Suraiya Faroqhi, *Osmanlı Kültürü ve Gündelik Yaşam: Ortaçağdan Yirminci Yüzyıla*, 7.ed (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2011).117

⁹⁹ Mehmet Akif Aydın, “Kadın,” in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 2001, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/kadin#2-islamda-kadin>.

in towns.¹⁰⁰ In general, women had a subordinate position like in other pre-modern societies, but they had certain protected legal rights and they actively participated in social life.

In brief, the Ottoman Empire in its traditional era was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. Hierarchies existed between men and women, Muslim and non-Muslim, orthodox and unorthodox religious beliefs, economic and administrative ruling classes and subordinate classes. The state had a religious ideology and the sultan acted in the name of Islam. The sultan's decrees and the traditional Sharia norms of Sunni-Hanafi Islam constituted the laws of the state. In addition to the judiciary, Islam was the source of the education system, and organizations of religious service and charity. Its laws also drew the hierarchical boundaries between different groups in the society where the Sunni-Hanafi Islam was at the top. While the state recognized certain group rights of the Christian and Jewish communities, the non-Sunni and non-Judeo-Christian groups (i.e. Alevis) were not recognized and culturally institutionalized. The norm for the inter-group relationships was segregation.

2.2 The Second Empire: The Breaking-up of the Traditional Order and the Major Social Change between the 16th and 18th centuries

I introduced the interconnected economic, administrative, military, and financial order of the Ottoman Empire in its classical age in the previous section. The fief-system was at the junction point of this order. The fief-holding cavalymen had an administrative function in the provinces. In the time of peace, they secured that the peasants are tied to the lands and stay immobile. And they constituted the provincial military power in time of war. They were not salaried by the imperial centre despite their administrative and military duties. But they made their income through the right of tax farming in kind in a feudal economy which was not monetized much. This order started to break in the late 16th century and early 17th century, and the Ottoman Empire underwent a major socioeconomic transformation. Tezcan called the new era that started at this turn as the *Second Empire* pointing that the transformation was such a major rupture.¹⁰¹ His implication is that this new era was the Ottoman *early modernity*.

The broader goal of this section is to introduce the major social and political change in the Ottoman Empire in the 17th and 18th centuries. More specifically, I will emphasize the following

¹⁰⁰ İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klasik Çağ (1300-1600)*, 166.

¹⁰¹ Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10.

developments which are contrary to the conventional literature. Firstly, I will argue that a crucial domestic factor as the peasant rebellions broke up the traditional order and the relatively immobile social order of the status-quo ante. This contrasts to the view that depicts the Ottoman society as a stagnant society till the top-down modernization reforms of the 19th and 20th century. Secondly, I will argue that the Ottoman sultan was not despotic/omnipotent and the ultimate source of authority. Instead, his power and career were based on the balance of rising social forces. Thirdly, I will emphasize the connectedness and partnership between the forces of the centre and the forces of the periphery as a defining feature of the empire in a period where the market relations and monetization are on the rise. This will contrast the disconnectedness and subordination claim.

2.2.1 The great social upheaval

Arguably, the massive peasant rebellions that were named *Celali Rebellions* and massive population movements could be picked as the series of events that determined this critical juncture. Studies on the Ottoman registers from different corners of Anatolia pointed to a massive depopulation in rural settlements between the last quarter of the 16th and first half of the 17th century. Various official registers of the time show that at least 50 percent of the rural population abandoned their settlements.¹⁰² This indicates the extent of the social turmoil of the period. The external and internal causes, their interaction, and the consequences of this social turmoil and the profound transformation of the period are explained below.

The Ottomans started to lose their superiority in the international relations in the late 16th century.¹⁰³ They lost the Battle of Lepanto, which was the then-greatest navy battle in the Mediterranean history, against the Holy League of Spain, Venice, and the Papacy in 1571. The Ottomans had a series of battles against the Habsburgs in the western end between 1593 and 1606, and against the Safavids in the eastern end between 1578 and 1590 and between 1603 and 1618. These wars which sometimes occurred simultaneously on both fronts were exhaustive for the state. Considering the technical capacity in logistics and related costs of the time, these wars also marked the fact that the empire reached its natural borders for war-making and that to increase revenues through expansion were about to end. With the rise of England and the Netherlands in the

¹⁰² Oktay Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia: Amasya 1576-1643*, The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage, volume 61 (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 4. Note that the decline in the population in the districts that the author publishes are 65% in Antakya, 88% in Bozok, 83% in Canik, 90% in Harput, 50% in Manyas, and 68% in Tokat.

¹⁰³ Halil İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klasik Çağ (1300-1600)*, 20.ed (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2003).47-51

Mediterranean with their superior navies, the Ottomans lost their dominance in the Mediterranean, and their control over their territories in Africa and the Levant weakened. The East India Company was founded in 1600 and the Indian trade was gradually moved away from the Ottoman lands to the Atlantic by the English and the Dutch. Simultaneously, the Russians started to take over the trade between Europe and the Central Asia from the Ottoman Empire.

This all meant a loss of income for the Ottoman economy. Two other external developments also affected the internal dynamics of the empire. These were *the price revolution* and the developments in the art of war. The price revolution was the inflationary change in Spain and then in Europe caused by the inflow of gold and silver from the New World. This made an inflationary pressure also in the Ottoman economy in the end of the 16th century. The other factor was the increasing importance of the musket-wielding infantry in combat vis-à-vis the cavalry in Europe. This incentivized the states to invest more in central, standing, regularly trained, and infantry-based armies, and less in provincial cavalymen. So did the Ottoman state.

To expand the standing army both in the centre and in the peripheral stations led to two developments. The Ottomans started to recruit soldiers (*sekbân*) from the Muslim subjects. This was a major change in the relatively immobile, two-class social order. The freeborn Muslim subjects got the opportunity to be part of the standing army and, therefore, of the ruling class which was only a possibility for the converted-Christian slaves (*devshirme*) before. The classical order aimed to keep the peasants immobile and under control of the fief-holding provincial cavalymen. Some of these soldiers of reaya origin also became a source for peasant uprisings when they were unemployed after the wars. They were easily recruited by the provincial rulers who rebelled against the centre. The second development which stemmed from expanding the standing army was that the Ottomans increased the direct taxes on the peasants to meet the expenses of the increasing central army. The frequent wars also fed this need.¹⁰⁴ This increased the pressure on the peasants who were also exploited more by the provincial fief-holding cavalymen whose economic and social position was in decay.

An unprecedented inflation in the 16th century also fed the social turmoil. The value of the Ottoman currency (*akçe*) had been relatively stable since the 14th century. However, it had an inflationary trend in the 16th century. The first reason was domestic. The Ottoman dominancy until the early 16th century brought about the expansion of market relations and growth. In return, this led to a population growth in the first half of the 16th century. Nonetheless, the agricultural production stayed behind the population growth. This made a *population pressure* on the rural social order and

¹⁰⁴ Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye iktisadî tarihi*, 122.

pushed the excessive population to abandon the villages. The second reason of the inflation was *the price revolution* in Europe and the inflow of coins to the Ottoman lands as mentioned above. These two factors made an inflationary pressure in the second half of the 16th century. The Ottomans debased the silver coins and introduced more coins in the market in 1585. This devaluation of the coin caused an unprecedented inflation, and the prices doubled. Overall, the prices increased six times from the beginning of the 16th century to the end of the century.¹⁰⁵ This inflation affected mostly the wage-earners such as the janissaries but also the provincial cavalymen who were dependent upon the market prices. The provincial cavalymen holding the fiefs increased the pressure on the peasants which, in return, fed the peasant uprising. Some of the cavalymen also joined and led the peasant gangs.

These internal and external factors, and their interactions were the causes of the peasant rebellions and massive population movement of the late 16th and 17th century. This social turmoil caused the breaking-up of the traditional feudal order and the relatively immobile two-class social structure.¹⁰⁶ The increasing mobility between rural and urban, subject class and ruling class changed the structure of class relations and politics of the upcoming centuries.

2.2.2 The rise of local notables (ayan) in provinces

I mentioned that to compete with the military system of their contemporaries, the Ottoman state gradually switched from a military system that is predominantly based on fief-holding provincial cavalymen to a system that is predominantly based on salaried janissaries and mercenaries. The number of janissaries went up from sixteen thousand in the mid-16th century to thirty-seven thousand in the early 17th century.¹⁰⁷ The state's need for cash kept increasing both because of the expansion of the salaried army and the long wars in the western and eastern fronts. In such a context, the palace extended the tax system that it already had been implementing in the remote provinces to Anatolia and the Balkans. This tax method, named *iltizam*, was to auction the tax-farming right of a particular state land (*miri*) to a highest bidder for a fixed period with the condition that the bidder pays part of the price in cash.

Simultaneously, centrifugal forces started to gain power in the late 16th and 17th century. Local elites and notables started to increase their administrative and financial power in the provinces. The long

¹⁰⁵ Pamuk, 115–18.

¹⁰⁶ E. Attila Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations, Property and Law: An Analysis of the Land Code of 1858 in the Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 6 (November 2009): 4.

¹⁰⁷ İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klasik Çağ (1300-1600)*, 53.

wars and the declining control of the centre in the provinces, the social turmoil and the peasant uprisings created a power vacuum and security concerns in the provinces. The local elites, mostly of ruling class origin, stepped up to fill this gap. They started to recruit the emerging mercenaries of subject origin (*sekbân*) and of landless peasants. Thus, they started to have a military power in the provinces during the power vacuum. They also increased their wealth by appropriating the lands that were abandoned during the uprisings and lootings.¹⁰⁸

In such a context, the rising local elite started to collect the outsourced tax farming rights in the provinces.¹⁰⁹ Initially, the duration of such contracts was limited by laws and could go up to fifteen years. Then, in 1695, a lifelong contract system, named *malikane*, was introduced. The system also permitted subcontracting the tax-farming right to a third party. *Malikane* system developed throughout the 18th century. The contracts were mostly purchased by the state officials, governors, and the members of the royal family who lived in Istanbul. Concurrently, a class of guarantors for the contracts emerged in the capital. This class evolved into professional creditors and financial capital in time. The *malikane* owners subcontracted the tax-farming right of the lands that they had purchased to the provincial notables who lived in the region of those lands. Thus, a network of business between the central elite and the provincial elite emerged.

A currency named *kuruş* emerged in the late 17th century, and it gradually became the common imperial currency in the Balkans, Anatolia, Syria and Iraq by replacing the regional currencies.¹¹⁰ This also marked the integration and intensification of the market relations and the monetization of this period. These developments represented a major rupture with the atomized, fief-based economy of the provinces of the previous centuries. Overall, market relations, monetization, and credit-lending relations expanded unprecedentedly throughout the empire. The provincial notables, known as *ayan*, collected the *malikane* subcontracts in the provinces and gained significant economic power. They also acquired many of the administrative duties of the Islamic jurists who were appointed from the center in the towns. Consequently, *ayans* attained financial, administrative, and military authority in the provinces, and rose as a significant class in the 18th century. The relationship between the *ayans* and the commoners in their administrative areas were not unidirectional and top-down. The community was able to elect their *ayan* among the candidates in

¹⁰⁸ Ortaylı, *Türkiye Teşkilât ve İdare Tarihi*, 364–67.

¹⁰⁹ Mehmet Genç, “İltizam” (TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2000), <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/iltizam--vergi>.

¹¹⁰ Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).159

some regions although these elections were very rudimental type of elections.¹¹¹ Not all the *ayans* had the same authority or power. Some of them gained so much power that the centre had to establish a kind of relationship that can be called partnership. Others had less power, and the centre tried to dominate them.

The class relations in the imperial centre and in the cities also started to transform since the late 16th century. These concerned the complex relations within the ruling class of the sultan, the viziers and pashas, the clergy, and the janissaries. But it also concerned the relationship between the ruling class and the city-dweller subjects.

2.2.3 The rise of vizier and pashas in the centre

Power relations in the centre also started to transform. The sultans transformed from warrior-sultans to sedentary sultans.¹¹² The power, which had been concentrated on the sultans and in the palace as the spatial indicator of the former, dispersed as the administration and division of labour got more sophisticated. The viziers, pashas and their households moved out of the palace to their new headquarters. These households grew remarkably in size by recruiting their own servants and soldiers which in turn consolidated their power. They tried to expand their power through marriages, most importantly with the royal family, because they also competed with each other. Nearly half of the appointments in the government offices throughout the empire were filled by people who were raised in the household of a vizier or pasha in the second half of the 17th century.¹¹³

Factionalism that emerged in the imperial centre between different central elite reflected on the provinces as well. As mentioned above, the tax-farming contracts became an economic source of their rising power of the central elite. The sub-contraction system became another tool of the political factions in the centre to found partnerships with the peripheral forces. These relationships were not unidirectional. They were not dictated from the centre over the peripheral forces. The provincial notables acted as entrepreneurs. They sent their moneylender-merchants and

¹¹¹ Ali Yaycioglu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions* (Stanford University Press, 2016), 140.

¹¹² Carter Vaughn Findley, "Political Culture and the Great Households," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 63–80.

¹¹³ Rifaat Ali Abou-El-Haj, "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 94, no. 4 (October 1974): 438,

representatives to the centre to actively lobby and negotiate about the contracts and the administrative, fiscal, and military services they can provide.¹¹⁴

2.2.4 The rise of clergy (ulema) and the fusion of secular and Sharia realms

The other change in the class relations concern the relationship between the sultan and the clergy. The clergy improved its power vis-à-vis the sultan and his feudal-patrimonial position in this transformation period. The Ottoman law was outlined earlier. I explained that Shari law and Custom law were the two sources of the Ottoman law. From an agent-based perspective, these two corresponded to the authority domains of the clergy and the sultan respectively. Briefly, I argued that the two laws coexisted and had a certain division of labour regarding the branches of law in principle. In this division of labour, the Sharia law was concerned more with the branches of private law such as family law, inheritance law, property law, obligations law, and commercial law while the Custom law was concerned more with the branches of public law such as state organization, administration law, penal law and tax law. In a sense, Shari laws concerned the subject-subject relations whereas the Custom law concerned the ruling class-subject relations. The Custom law which is based on sultans' decrees sometimes disagreed with and overruled the Shari laws. This also symbolized the superiority of the sultan's authority over the clergy's authority. In the 16th century, these two domains started to unify as initially the sultan intervened in the Sharia domain, and in return, the clergy intervened in the Custom law domain. Finally, a decree in 1696 announced the unification of the two domains under the Sharia domain by stating that "all public and private affairs are completely and exclusively regulated" by the Sharia.¹¹⁵

Two related social developments that were explained in this section affected the transformation of the relationship between the Shari law and the Custom law, and therefore, transformed the position of the clergy vis-à-vis the sultan. These were the expansion of the market relations and monetization, and the involvement of the subjects in the ruling class along with the breaking of the immobile two-class social structure.¹¹⁶ Both of the developments required new regulations in the subject-subject relations (private law), and ruler-subject relations (public law).

The kind of endowments, named 'cash *vakıf*', which lend money to entrepreneurs and consumers with interest boomed in the 16th century. These kinds of endowments did not exist in the Islamic

¹¹⁴ Yaycioglu, *Partners of the Empire*, 113.

¹¹⁵ Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, 27.

¹¹⁶ Tezcan, 30.

world before the Ottomans since interest was forbidden in Sharia. The issue became controversial in the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century. While some Ottoman jurists approved these endowments based on some non-dominant interpretations of the early Hanafi jurists¹¹⁷, others attempted to outlaw them. Finally, Suleiman I had to intervene. He issued a legal decree in 1548 in favour of the cash endowments, and explicitly indicated his position in his appointment letters of the Islamic jurists. Tezcan argues that the sultan's decree points to the cause that the dynasty lost its financial autonomy in the new social order and started to rely on social forces such as tax-farmers for cash to meet the administrative and military expenses.¹¹⁸ Therefore, he had to resolve the conflict between Sharia and cash. In his analysis of this process, Tezcan concludes that while the sultan involved in the domain of Sharia, he indirectly invited the clergy into his domain of law since these two domains gradually united.¹¹⁹

The second development that transformed the relationship between the Sharia law and the Custom law concerned the breaking of the immobile two-class social structure and the increasing mobility of the subjects towards the ruling class. The imperial centre increased the role of the clergy in social affairs. It regulated and standardized the functioning of the courts over the empire lands in a hierarchical order. Thus, the role and the position of the elite clergy in the capital also increased. Elite clergy families emerged along with their hereditary and accumulating wealth. An Islamic jurist acted both as an administrator and a legalist in his district in the provinces. This symbolized the merger of public and private law, and custom law and Shari law as well.¹²⁰ Overall, the sultan extended its authority in the Sharia domain and started to enclose the two previously separate domains and expanded the role of the clergy class in the administration domain in the 16th century. In return, the clergy started to rise as a class, and it also started to exert authority vis-à-vis the sultan and his feudal-patrimonial rule.

2.2.5 The rise of janissary-shopkeepers-urban-workers

I stated above that the size of the standing army significantly increased in the 16th century. While the Janissaries had been recruited from the converted Christian slaves in a system called *devshirme* earlier, Muslim subjects of peasant and urban lower-class origin were recruited in the standing central army from the 16th century on. The increasing burden on the treasury and the inflation-

¹¹⁷ Tezcan, 32. Example: Hanafi jurist Zufar (775 a.d)

¹¹⁸ Tezcan, 33.

¹¹⁹ Tezcan, 34.

¹²⁰ Tezcan, 35-37.

devaluation spiral that was elaborated above deteriorated the economic situation of the waged janissaries. To adapt to these conditions, janissaries started to get involved in the economic activities of the urban life in the 17th century. Initially, the craftsmen and shopkeepers who had been organized in guilds resisted the entrance of the outsiders to the market. This caused a conflict between the established shopkeepers and janissaries. The janissaries and other outsiders worked in simple jobs that did not require skills or guild permission such as transportation. But, in time, janissaries used their power coming from being soldiers and carrying out the police function to get jobs and trade monopolies in the 16th and 17th centuries. They worked as merchants, artisans, shopkeepers, street peddlers, and wage workers. By 1660, they already had a remarkable presence in the guilds.¹²¹

By the early 19th century, they were mixed in the commercial class of the cities so well that many of the janissary-shopkeepers were not distinguishable from the other shopkeepers.¹²² They monopolized some sectors such as construction, portage, and boating in Istanbul. And they allocated the jobs to unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the city by getting a commission over their wages. Through such ways, they aligned with the lowest and the most insecure strata of the urban population.¹²³ The janissaries could resist fixed-price orders of the government on the basic commodities by organizing the shopkeepers.¹²⁴ As the janissaries got involved in commerce, the military discipline and military organization deteriorated. The pay tickets of the janissaries were sold and bought in the market.

2.2.6 Class relations in the rebellions and politics

Alliances and conflicts between the sultan household, vizier and pasha households, local notables, clergy, janissaries, and the popular classes shaped the developments in politics in the 17th and 18th centuries. Rebellions, and execution and punishment of the prominent elite including the sultans became the events that crystallized the structures of these alignments and conflicts. The decline of the sultan's position vis-à-vis the other forces in the 17th century was initially marked by the execution of a sultan, Osman II, in a rebellion in 1622 for the first time. Some factions of the pashas, clergy and janissaries forged an alliance and rebelled when the sultan prepared to have a

¹²¹ Sunar, *Cauldron of Dissent*, 2006, 40.

¹²² Sunar, 48.

¹²³ Sunar, 73.

¹²⁴ Sunar, 80.

pilgrimage journey to Mecca. Their thought was that the sultan had aimed to establish a new army in Anatolia to abolish the janissaries, and the pilgrimage was a cover to realize his plan.

The rebellion became successful, and the sultan was executed. The 1703 rebellion, known as *the Edirne incident*, demonstrated once more that the alliances and balance of power among the elite forces determine the actual authority. Sultan Mustafa II moved his household from Istanbul to Edirne for a long time, and the rumours spread that the capital would be moved to Edirne permanently. His aim was to reconcentrate power in the imperial household by weakening the alliances of pashas, viziers, and their economic and political network. The pashas and the mid-rank clergy were uneasy with the power of the chief mufti (*seyhülislam*) Feyzullah Efendi who had his men holding high offices. The dissident elite group organized the janissaries, the shopkeepers, the religious school students, and they initiated the rebellion. Consequently, they managed to execute the chief mufti, dethrone Sultan Mustafa II and throne Ahmed III instead.¹²⁵

Despite their differences, the rebellions in 1730, 1807 and 1808 also showed some similar patterns regarding the power relations between different social and political forces.¹²⁶ The rebellions pointed to the rebellious potential of the popular classes under the burden of heavy taxes and in the time of economic crises. They also showed the janissaries' capacity to align with these popular classes such as shopkeepers, guilds and insecure lower strata of the society who recently migrated to the city. The rebellions also showed that, in a period when European states concentrated power in the hands of the monarchs, the power of the sultan was limited and dependent on the alliances and conflicts between different factions of viziers and pashas, clergy, provincial notables, janissaries, and the popular dependents that these forces can mobilize.¹²⁷

2.3 The Rise of the West and the Ottoman Modernization in the 19th Century: The *Re-organization (Tanzimat)* and Abdulhamid Periods

The previous section explained the breaking-up of the feudal order, the increasing monetization and the expansion of market relations, the increasing social mobility, and the changing class relations in the 17th and 18th centuries in the Ottoman Empire. I explained the rise of social forces

¹²⁵ Abdülkadir Özcan, "Edirne Vakası" (TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1994), <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/edirne-vakasi>.

¹²⁶ Note that 1730 rebellion is known as the Patrona Rebellion; the 1807 rebellion is known as the Kabakci Mustafa rebellion; and the 1808 Alemdar Incident

¹²⁷ Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*, 2nd ed, New Approaches to European History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 43.

both in the capital and provinces, the intensification of their partnerships and connections, but also the conflicts of factions. These developments continued and intensified in the 19th century. And they constituted the internal dynamics of the 19th century reforms. This section brings a determining external factor into the picture. That is the expansion of the European Great Powers at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and the peripheralization of the empire. The interaction of this with the conflicts of the rising classes domestically, together with the peculiar ethno-religious configuration of the empire, shaped the social and political developments in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

The section will emphasize the economic differentiation of the Muslim and non-Muslim urban middle classes with the positive impact of the Western forces on the latter. The conventional view portrays the class map of the empire as the western forces, their non-Muslim bourgeoisie partners, the Ottoman bureaucracy, and the peasants in the 19th century. It explains the modernization reforms as a function of the conflict between the Ottoman bureaucracy and the external threats. After I acknowledge the importance of the external interventions, I will highlight the internal dynamics. These are the already-expanding market relations and social mobility, the interests of Muslim provincial elite and the bourgeoisie, and the immigration to the Ottoman lands.

2.3.1 The great expansion of the Great Powers at the expense of the Ottoman Empire

The defeat in the Battle of Vienna in 1683 marked the beginning of the retreat of the Ottomans from central Europe and its westernmost regions gradually. The Ottomans surrendered, inter alia, Hungary, Transylvania, Croatia, Slovenia, northern Serbia, and Wallachia to the Habsburgs with the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. Russians started to expand towards the Black Sea in the north. A series of wars took place between the Ottomans and the Russians in the 18th century. The Ottomans lost their monopoly of Black Sea trade while the Russians accessed to the Black Sea with the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774. The Crimea Khanate became independent from the Ottomans in this treaty, and it was annexed by the Russians nine years later. Serbia became semi-independent in 1817. Greece became independent in 1830.

The Ottoman Empire and Poland were the two states whose central state income were the lowest in Europe at the turn of the 19th century.¹²⁸ The failure in revenue extraction to the central treasury affected Ottomans' military competency. Throughout the 19th century, the Ottoman centre faced

¹²⁸ Kıvanç Karaman and Şevket Pamuk, "Osmanlı Bütçeleri ve Mali Yapının Evrimi: Avrupa Devletleriyle Bir Karşılaştırma," *Toplumsal Tarih Dergisi*, no. 191 (2009): 26–33.

a survival problem even in its capital. The Russian army reached sixty-eight kilometres away from Istanbul in the Russo-Turkish War in 1828-29 and stepped into the outskirts of the capital in 1878. The forces of the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Mehmed Ali Pasha, marched into western Anatolia in 1833 with the threat of marching further into the capital. In this context, the imperial centre tried to take advantage of the rivalries between the powers that posed a threat to itself, and established alliances with one against another in different times for survival. Symmetrically, different European powers aimed to ally with the Ottoman Empire in different times to keep the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean to their interests. Karl Marx remarked on this power games known as *the Eastern Question* in a newspaper article that “England cannot afford to allow Russia to become the possessor of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus”.¹²⁹

Power games for the hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean had several aspects. The Ottomans allied with Britain against Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt in 1798. Egypt’s powerful Ottoman governor, Mehmed Ali Pasha, helped the sultan to suppress the Greek rebellion in 1824. But then, British, French, and Russian navies annihilated Mehmed Ali’s Egyptian navy at Navarino in 1827 to provide the independence of Greece. Mehmed Ali Pasha demanded the governorship of Syria from the Ottomans for his service, but the sultan declined it. Upon the decline, Mehmed Ali’s son marched into Anatolia, defeated the Ottoman forces, and posed a close threat to the capital in 1833. This time the sultan asked for help from the European powers. The British declined the offer. It was Russia who landed their troops in Istanbul to help, and in return, they received privileged rights for the use of the Bosphorus.

But the Ottoman Empire’s primary target in foreign diplomacy was to ally with Great Britain in the 19th century. The rationale for such an alliance for each side was the Russian expansion in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Formally or informally, this alliance was in place till the last quarter of the 19th century. The Ottomans signed a liberal trade agreement with the British in 1838 to have them at their back against Egypt, but also against Russia. Russians and British attacked the Egyptian forces in the Levant and forced Mehmed Ali to sign the Convention of London to limit Mehmed Ali’s authority only to Egypt.

As expected, tensions between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire increased, and the Crimean War erupted in 1853. The reasons on the surface were Russia’s uneasiness for Catholic Church’s control over the sacred places in Jerusalem, and Ottomans’ rejection to surrender Hungarian and Polish nationalist leaders of the 1848 revolutions such as Lajos Kossuth and Jozef

¹²⁹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “The Russian Menace to Europe,” 1853, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/subject/russia/crimean-war.htm>.

Bem (later Murad Pasha) who had sought refuge in the Ottoman lands.¹³⁰ The Russians also had sought for rights to intervene in the legal matters of the Greek Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France decided to support the Ottomans in this war to stop the Russian advance in the Balkans and Mediterranean. Consequently, Russians were defeated in the Crimean War. In return, French and British also demanded reforms from the Ottomans for the civil and religious rights of the Christian subjects of the Empire as indicated in the Vienna Protocol of 1854.

When Abdulhamid II acceded to the throne in 1876, the balance of power in Europe, and the Ottoman state's relationship with the European powers had been changing substantially. Firstly, the German Empire under the leadership of Prussia emerged as the dominant power of the continental Europe in 1871 after defeating France and securing the unification of the German states. This would make Britain and France not as indispensable as before for the Ottomans. Secondly, Russia broke the post-Crimean War status-quo thanks to its alliance with Prussia, and therefore restored its naval rights in the Black Sea. Thirdly, the Suez Canal was launched in Egypt in 1869, and this led the British to prioritize Egypt's partnership over the Ottomans in the Eastern trade and in its geopolitical rivalry with Russia.¹³¹ British then occupied Egypt in 1882. Another rupture with the relationship of the Ottomans and Britain and other states stemmed from the problems in the Balkans. The Ottomans levied higher taxes in the Balkan provinces to compensate the declining tax revenues stemmed from the great famine of 1873 and 1874 in Anatolia.¹³² This became an important factor for the uprisings of the Christian peasants in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria. The nationalist ideologies had been on the rise and these movements managed to steer the peasant uprisings into a nationalist direction. Austro-Hungary Empire pressured for extensive reforms in Bosnia. Russia pressured for autonomy in Bulgaria.

Ottoman state's effort to proclaim the 1876 constitution and the first national parliament fell short of these demands. Backed by Russia, both Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire due to the unrest in Bosnia. Ottoman forces defeated the Serbian and Montenegrin forces and suppressed the Bulgarian rebellion with brute force. The effective propaganda of the opposition leader Gladstone in Britain who depicted the "Turkish race" as "the one great anti-human specimen of humanity" managed to turn the British public opinion against the Ottoman Empire.¹³³ In the absence of Britain's backing for the Ottomans, and after the tacit approval of

¹³⁰ İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 21. Aug (Istanbul: Hil Yayın, 1987), 90.

¹³¹ M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton University Press, 2008), 110.

¹³² Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2012), 114.

¹³³ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 110.

Austro-Hungarian Empire, Russia declared war on the Ottomans. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 resulted with a clear defeat of the Ottomans.

The Congress of Berlin that convened after the war, and rebellions had effective consequences for the new period. Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro gained independence. Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia, and Britain occupied Cyprus. While the northern part of Bulgaria gained full autonomy, the southern part remained as an Ottoman province with a Christian governor. Batumi, Kars and Ardahan in the Eastern Anatolia were ceded to Russia. Finally, the Armenian Patriarch demanded autonomy in the six provinces of Eastern Anatolia with the claim that the Armenian population was higher in the region than the Muslims. Consequently, the treaty forced the Ottoman Empire to enact reforms in favour of the Armenians in eastern Anatolia and other Christian peoples in Macedonia.

The 19th century transformation took place in such an international environment. Briefly, the rivalry between Russia and England in the near East framed the Ottoman Empire's possibilities and constraints till the last quarter of the century. Then the rise of Germany and Britain's changing policy towards the unity of the empire shaped the conditions for the Ottoman's strategic decisions in foreign policy.

2.3.2 The cost of the alliances and defeats: concessions, peripheralization, and demographic change

To ask for an alliance to a powerful state for protection from another threat had a vital consequence for the Ottoman state known as capitulations (*abdname*). Capitulations included political and economic rights such as obtaining lower tariffs for merchants, using state's trade routes, opening consulates, protecting Christian clerics, pilgrims and individuals who are affiliated to the foreign mission and adjudicate the disputes among them, and issuing citizenship in the consulates.¹³⁴ Initially, the state considered these capitulations as instruments to establish good relations and maintain cooperation with the ally states in Europe against the rival ones. For example, France which was the Ottoman state's main ally against the Habsburgs enjoyed these privileges in the 16th and 17th centuries. Nonetheless, with the military defeats and the weakening of the state in the 18th century, the European states took these privileges by enforcement.

¹³⁴ Halil İnalçık, "Osmanlı'nın Avrupa İle Barışıklığı: Kapitülasyonlar ve Ticaret.," *Doğu, Batı*, 2003, 55–81.

The Habsburg Empire received the capitulations in the Passarowitz Treaty in 1718 after defeating the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. The Russian state received these privileges in the Kucuk Kaynarca Treaty in 1774 after defeating the Ottoman state in Crimea. British made an extensive free trade agreement with the Anglo-Ottoman Treaty in 1838. Yet, they already had custom exemptions since the beginning of the century. This treaty could be considered as a codification and security of the ongoing privileges.¹³⁵ By the end of the 19th century, all the major powers of Europe gained capitulations from the Ottoman state.

Firstly, these capitulations prevented the state to have an independent foreign trade policy. In other words, the state had to follow a liberal trade policy instead of a mercantilist policy. Secondly, they hindered the possibility to protect and develop baby industries, especially the manufactures of cotton and wool, in the domestic market in the free market conditions against cheap manufactured products of the west.¹³⁶ The markets of the empire flooded with the manufactured goods in the mid-19th century. Thirdly, they created inequalities between the western merchants and Ottoman merchants, and also between different groups within the Ottoman society.

Thousands of European merchants (*Levantine*s) settled in the port cities of the Ottoman Mediterranean to enjoy the privileges. Britain, France, and Russia proclaimed to be the protectors of the Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire respectively. The consulates were very effective in the Ottoman capital and pressured for certain policies. Throughout the 18th century, the consulates gradually issued protection documents and passports to hundreds of thousands Ottoman non-Muslim subjects who mediated businesses of the western companies in the Ottoman empire.¹³⁷ These merchants became exempt from certain taxes that other subjects had to pay, and they took advantage of lower tariffs in trade in the Ottoman lands. They also became subject to the consulate courts for business disputes. The state tried to level this situation by granting similar trade privileges to other non-Muslim merchants in the western trade who did not have privileges, and to Muslim merchants in the eastern trade in the late 18th century.¹³⁸ The state also tried to provide equality between the Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman subjects whose legal and socio-cultural statuses had been regulated hierarchically based on the Islamic law in the classical era.

¹³⁵ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*.86

¹³⁶ Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye iktisadî tarihi.*, 209

¹³⁷ İnalçık, "Osmanlı'nın Avrupa İle Barışıklığı: Kapitülasyonlar ve Ticaret." 71; Keyder, *Türkiye'de devlet ve sınıflar*.33

¹³⁸ İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klasik Çağ (1300-1600)*, 73.

As a result of the increasing political and economic relations with the European states, there emerged a privileged non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie in the western cities of the empire. Specifically, the Ottoman-Greeks became dominant in foreign trade sector, and the Ottoman-Armenians and Levantines became dominant in the finance sector.¹³⁹ Below is an estimation regarding the ownership in sectors by ethnicity in the mainland Ottoman Empire in 1912.¹⁴⁰

Table 3: Business ownership by ethnicity (%) in 1912

	Turks	Greeks	Armenians	Others	Total
International trade	15	43	23	19	100
Industry and crafts	12	49	30	10	100
Professions	14	44	22	20	100

Thus, by the 19th century, a part of the upper class of the non-Muslim population emerged as a mediator class who established the economic and social relationship between the Ottoman peasants and the foreign entrepreneurs.¹⁴¹

Western enterprises also made direct investments. They bought lands in various regions in Anatolia. One third of the lands around İzmir in western Anatolia was owned by foreign capital for some time in the end of the 19th century.¹⁴² But these enterprises were not very profitable compared to other colonies because of lack of sufficient, cheap labour to employ. Nonetheless, western Anatolia, Istanbul and the Marmara region, eastern part of the Black Sea region integrated well with the world markets by the mid-19th century. These regions involved in agricultural production for export.

Keyder argues that the “class map” of the empire in the early 19th century was composed of peasants, bureaucrats and this non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie that mediated between the foreign entrepreneurs and Ottoman subjects. Yet this portrait of the class map of the empire is incomplete. Firstly, it is true that the non-Muslim bourgeoisie dominated the international trade, industry, and finance sectors towards the late 19th century. On the other hand, the Muslim merchants dominated the domestic trade. And the domestic trade overwhelmingly outweighed the

¹³⁹ Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, 1988, 21

¹⁴⁰ Charles Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa* (London: Routledge, 2010). 90

¹⁴¹ Çağlar Keyder and Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar: State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, 17. ed, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2011). 31-34

¹⁴² Kemal H. Karpat, *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi, 1800-2012*, 1. ed, 50 (İstanbul: Timaş, 2012). 36

foreign trade. Quataert argues that one of the reasons why the literature understates the domestic trade, and, therefore, the existence of Muslim merchants and Muslim bourgeoisie in general is because of lack of macro data as opposed to the case of external trade. He states that the sum value of the internal trade of only three relatively minor Ottoman cities -Diyarbakır, Musul, and Harput- equalled about 5 percent of the foreign trade. Thus, he comes to the conclusion that the internal trade volume of the commercial centres such as Istanbul, Edirne, Salonica, Beirut, Damascus, and Aleppo easily overweigh the total foreign trade.¹⁴³

Secondly, there emerged a class of *absentee landlords* among the Muslim notables in the provinces in the 17th and 18th centuries who obtained large amount of lands, and lived off of the rent of their lands.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, a Muslim upper class consolidated in the provinces throughout the 19th century. These had their bureaucrat-entrepreneur partners in the capital as explained in the previous section. These networks of business also included moneylender-merchants who acted as mediators between the provincial Muslim bourgeoisie and bureaucrat-entrepreneurs in the capital.

Finally, the empire shrank into Anatolia territorially as it lost lands in the Balkans, Black Sea and Caucasia. Defeats in these regions resulted in massive deportations of the Muslim people alongside massacres. As a result, ethnic and religious composition of the Ottoman population also significantly changed. 5 to 7 million Muslim refugees immigrated to the Ottoman lands between 1783 and 1913.¹⁴⁵ The Muslim population in Anatolia increased from some 60 percent¹⁴⁶ in the beginning of the 19th century to 80 percent¹⁴⁷ at the end of the century. This had two important impacts on the social relations. Firstly, it expanded the size of Muslim peasants in Anatolia. The state allocated lands as private property to the newcomers. This significantly increased the agricultural production and commerce. This expansion led to the growth of the Muslim middle classes and mid-size notables in the cities as well. Secondly, the expulsion and migration increased the Islamic-nationalistic sentiments and resentment among the expelled Muslim immigrants.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*. 129-132

¹⁴⁴ Ortaylı, *Türkiye Teşkilât ve İdare Tarihi*, 359.

¹⁴⁵ Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*, 117.

¹⁴⁶ Fuat Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi: İttihat ve Terakki'nin Etnisite Mühendisliği, 1913-1918*, 1. ed, 225 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), 48.

¹⁴⁷ Cem Behar, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun ve Türkiye'nin Nüfusu: 1500-1927*, Tarihi İstatistikler Dizisi 2 (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1996). Calculation is mine based on Behar's compilation of the official Ottoman censuses.

¹⁴⁸ Kemal H. Karpat, *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi, 1800-2012*, 1. ed (İstanbul: Timaş, 2012).77

2.3.3 Centralization and modern-state-making

The Ottoman state was a non-centralized pre-modern state at the turn of the 19th century. The imperial centre did not possess the monopoly on the use of force in its territory. Factions of viziers and pasha households, and clergy in the capital, and provincial notables as the partners of the centre's factions had networks for the contracts of lifetime tax farms. Through extracting those revenues, provincial notables kept personal armies in the provinces. They were partners with the factions in the centre, but they were the actual rulers in the provinces. The janissary-guilds in the centre also comprised a political force with urban popular support that constrained the actions of the state at their expense. The state was unable to extract tax revenues to the centre sufficiently to build a competitive state capacity and military. Therefore, the 19th century in the Ottoman Empire had to develop primarily as the history of (modern)-state making as a response to the external threats by reversing the administrative, fiscal, and military weakness of the centre.

Although the zeitgeist was in favour of the centrifugal forces, the power struggle and partnership had continued between the centre and the provinces in the 17th and 18th century. As argued previously, the killing of Osman II in 1622 and the dethronement of Mustafa II in 1703 stemmed from the sultans' attempts to restore power in their hands. Similarly, the centre made attempts to become involved in the process of the provincial notables' accession to authority in the second half of the 18th century. A decree in 1784 stated that only the grand vizier's letter could authorize someone to be a provincial notable. This was to take this appointment authority from the hands of the governors who could use, and indeed used, this authority in return for economic interest. The centre also attempted to crack the power of the provincial notables by nominally abolishing the *ayanship* and authorize stewards.¹⁴⁹ This attempt did not work either in the conditions of the war with the Russians in the late 18th century.

Arguably the first comprehensive attempt for modernization and restoration of the centre's power vis-à-vis the local notables, janissaries, and their partners in the ruling class started with the New Order (*Nizam-ı Cedid*) reform program of Selim III in the late 18th century. As part of this program, the New Order troops were founded and trained in a modern fashion. The new army succeeded in a battle against the French troops in the Levant in 1799. Selim III also established new economic policies and a separate treasury (*iradî cedid*) to finance the reforms and the new army. Two main goals were to extract the revenues to the centre, and to monetize the state expenditures rather than giving out tax farming rights. Regarding the former, the state gradually retained the tax farms of

¹⁴⁹ Yaycioglu, *Partners of the Empire*.137

the deceased holders rather than reselling them, and, thus, aimed to liquidate the tax farm and sub-contracting of the tax farm system gradually. Regarding the latter, the state started to pay cash salaries to its personnel rather than granting tax farming rights.¹⁵⁰ Selim III's centralization and modernization attempts were supported by some provincial notables, and opposed by some other provincial notables, janissaries-guilds and the urban popular classes who were under the janissary influence.

Finally, a rebellion erupted in the capital in 1807. The clergy and janissaries collaborated as before. The latter mobilized the shopkeepers and the urban lower classes who considered the New Order and the increasing taxes as threats to their lives. The rebellion succeeded and Selim III was dethroned, and Mustafa IV was throned instead. The statesmen behind the New Order reforms sought refuge in the provincial notable of Ruse, Alemdar Mustafa. Alemdar Pasha was the most powerful force in the empire at that time with his army of 30 thousand men.¹⁵¹ He would not wish the centre's New Order plan to weaken his provincial power, nevertheless he was a supporter of the reforms. One of the reasons was Russians' march into the Balkans. This was a greater threat for his authority. Therefore, he would prefer a stronger Ottoman centre with a strong army at his back.¹⁵² Consequently, Alemdar Pasha marched into Istanbul with his army to re-throne Selim III. Before he reached Selim III, the opponent faction in the palace executed Selim III upon the order of the new sultan. They also aimed to execute the other and the only remaining male member of the dynasty, Mahmud Efendi, to secure the rule of Mustafa IV. But they failed to do so. Alemdar Pasha managed to rescue Mahmud Efendi and declared him the new sultan. In return, Mahmud II made him his grand vizier. Alemdar Pasha had suppressed the rebellious faction and secured the fate of the reform movement. Yet, the rebel coalition struck back some months later, and killed him at the first opportunity. The opposing coalition abolished the new troops and the new treasury of the New Order program in 1808. Meanwhile, Mahmud II executed Mustafa IV, and remained as the only male person of the dynasty. The rebel coalition did not dare to kill Mahmud II although some of them suggested to replace the Ottoman dynasty with the Crimean Khan, and some other mentioned to bring a female member of the Ottoman dynasty to the throne.¹⁵³ Both were signs of the fact that the Ottoman dynasty was neither almighty nor indispensable in the sight of the political forces in a modernizing world.

¹⁵⁰ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 46.

¹⁵¹ Hanioglu, 56

¹⁵² Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 54.

¹⁵³ Sunar, *Cauldron of Dissent*, 2006.159

Mahmud II took over the reform goals of the New Order. But he was patient with the janissaries and to build a new modern army. He gradually appointed loyal men to the critical positions in the clergy hierarchy and sent the dissidents in exile. He continued Selim III's policy to retain the tax farms of the deceased holders rather than reselling them. The centre confiscated (*müsadere*) the wealth of the deceased notables on many occasions. He appointed loyal provincial notables as statesmen albeit by taking away their notable titles. On the other hand, he crushed the disobedient notables whenever he could. He resettled some of the Anatolian notable families in the Balkans, and vice versa. Consequently, he got most of the provincial notables subjected to his authority by 1820.¹⁵⁴ Finally, he managed to disband the janissary corps in Istanbul by brute force in 1826. Thousands of janissaries, who was deprived of the previous support of clergy and other forces, were killed in this incident in Istanbul. The Bektashi order which was affiliated to the janissaries was banned, and its tekkes were transferred to the Naqshbandi order. The power of the guilds was cracked. Subsequently, Sultan Mahmud attempted to establish a new central army in modern standards. Nonetheless, due to lack of trained military officers and a strong central budget, the ongoing threat of the Great Powers and strong distant pashas such as Mehmet Ali in Egypt, the full modernization of the Ottoman army would occur gradually until the First World War.¹⁵⁵

Mahmud II aimed to establish direct rule in the Kurdish regions as well. This would mean to replace the rule of the Kurdish chieftains with the governors appointed from the centre. Naturally this became a direct threat to the autonomous Kurdish emirates which had been organized as confederations of tribes for centuries. After the central state's attempt to abolish the Kurdish emirates, two of the largest emirates, those of Mir Muhammad's and Mir Bedirhan's, and their tribes rebelled. Both were suppressed by 1838.¹⁵⁶ The Ottomans increased the central control in the Kurdish regions by abolishing all the emirates.

Religious centralization also started in this period. A decree in 1812 obligated the Islamic religious orders to hierarchically organize their branches across the country as they become subject to the main lodge in Istanbul which is under the scrutiny of the state. The orders also had to take the confirmation of the head of clergy (*seyhülislam*) when they appoint a sheikh to a lodge in the provinces.¹⁵⁷ In 1840, the state centralized the collection of the taxes of the lands of the religious foundations (*vakıf*) through which the religious orders used to provide their revenues. Later these

¹⁵⁴ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 60–61.

¹⁵⁵ Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 69.

¹⁵⁶ Martin van Bruinessen, *Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet.*, 8. ed (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013).275

¹⁵⁷ Bilgin Aydın, "Meclis-i Meşayih" (TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2003), <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/meclis-i-mesayih>.

revenues were partly transferred to the main treasury due to the financial needs of the state¹⁵⁸. Such centralization measures weakened the Islamic religious orders/congregations, caused disappearance of the small ones, and made the others culturally subject to the state. Therefore, the state started to have greater discretion in deciding which orders to support and which ones to let die.

State authority was established as provincial notables with political and military power and autonomous rulers were taken under control and janissary corps were disbanded. Fiscal centralization was achieved to some extent by virtue of administrative control. In return, the new, modern army was founded. The new army was mainly recruited from Anatolian Turkish peasants throughout the century.¹⁵⁹ Initially the service time was 12 years. Then this was reduced in the mid-century reforms to less than five years officially; however, it took around 10 years on occasions because of the endless wars.¹⁶⁰ The long service was a reason of the relative economic deprivation of the Turkish subjects of Anatolia throughout the century.

One of the most important impacts of the Mahmud II for the subsequent era was the emergence of a bureaucracy tradition which operated on a legal-rational authority like their western counterparts. During Mahmud II's rule, the first modern military and judicial schools were established to raise a modern type of bureaucrat. The imperial council (*divan-ı hümayun*) was abolished, and, instead, modern ministries were founded. This led to division of labour and professionalization in bureaucracy. An advisory council was founded to deal with legislative and judicial issues on a regular basis (*Meclis-i Vala-yi Ahkam-i Adliyye*). This reform became one of the very first steps towards division of powers and emergence of legislation. Its legislations were implemented by the sultan.¹⁶¹ Mahmud II banned fief-income for bureaucrats and put them on payroll to some extent. Also, he removed the tradition to confiscate the properties (*musadere*) of bureaucrats as a way of punishment which had been a common practice previously in the Ottoman state. Therefore, bureaucrats' right to property was guaranteed. It can be argued that especially

¹⁵⁸ Zekeriya Işık, "XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Toplumunda Sosyo-Ekonomik Değişim Süreci ve Tarikatlar," *Hitit Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 8, no. 2 (January 4, 2016): 556.; Şerif Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1996), 39.

¹⁵⁹ Israel Gershoni, Y. Hakan Erdem, and Ursula Woköck, eds., *Histories of the Modern Middle East: New Directions* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

¹⁶⁰ Erik Jan Zürcher, "The Ottoman Conscription System, 1844–1914," *International Review of Social History* 43, no. 3 (December 1998): 437–49.

¹⁶¹ Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, "Divan-ı Hümayun'dan Meclis-i Mebusan'a Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Yasama," in *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, 1. baskı, Phoenix Türkiye Tarih Dizisi (Kızılay, Ankara: Phoenix, 2006), 261.

these last two reforms made bureaucrats identify themselves with the interests of the state apparatus.

The change of the number of civil officials in the Ottoman state shows the extent of the change in the state capacity in the 19th century. While it was around 2000 persons at the end of the 18th century, this number reached to thirty-five to fifty thousand persons at the beginning of the 20th century. The size of the army increased from 24 thousand in 1837 to 120 thousand in 1880.¹⁶² After the rise of modern and skilled bureaucrats and the death of Mahmud II in 1839, the centre of power in Istanbul shifted from the palace to the grand vizier's office (*bab-i ali*) in the period between 1839 and 1871. The grand vizier's office continued the state's efforts towards centralization and other reforms of modernization.

Abdülhamid II who acceded to the throne in 1876 constructed a highly personalized and repressive regime but continued to increase the centre's capacity. The state's capabilities to penetrate into the country increased significantly in his period. Railroads and telegram lines reached all the major provinces, and modern primary and secondary schools were built all over the country. By the end of his reign, the length of the railroads reached three times, and telegram lines increased 1.5 times the length of when he assented to power.¹⁶³

Education became one of the tools of the nationhood project during Abdülhamid's period. Modern primary and secondary schools which offer non-Islamic courses in addition to the Islamic ones proliferated across the country in this period. Prior to this era, the only form of primary education for common Muslim people in the Ottoman Empire was non-compulsory traditional schools/Quran courses (*sıbyan mektebi*). These courses were carried out typically in a lodge in the mosque complex. The first modern type of schools (*iptidaiye*) in primary level which included secular courses was introduced in 1872 during the reign of Abdülhamit II.¹⁶⁴ By the end of Abdülhamit's reign in 1908, there were around ten thousand public and private primary level school around 150 secondary level schools, and around 10 tertiary level faculties¹⁶⁵. Centralization, the increasing state presence in the provinces, created new possibilities for cultural projects to mould

¹⁶² Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*, 62–63.

¹⁶³ Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*.227

¹⁶⁴ Mehmet Ö Alkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Eğitim ve Eğitim İstatistikleri, 1839-1924," in *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Bilgi ve İstatistik*, ed. Halil İnalçık and Şevket Pamuk (Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 2000), 219.

¹⁶⁵ Nuri Güçtekin, "Osmanlı Devleti'nin 1907-1908 Dönemine Ait Eğitim İstatistiği," *Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları* 11, no. 22 (2012). Note: Calculation is mine. Primary level includes İptidaiye and Rüşdiyes; secondary level includes İdadis; tertiary level includes higher education. Islamic, Greek and Armenian schools, both public and private is included.

the nationhood. Also, the school expansion raised a sizeable generation of literate middle class in the cities.

2.3.4 Expanding capitalist relations and domestic market integration

The previous section explained the process of breaking-up the feudal relations since the late 16th century. I argued that the fundamental changes were the increasing monetization, market relations, credit-debt relations, commodification, trade, and inheritance of the lands. This trend intensified in the 19th century when the Ottoman economy was integrating into the world markets. The centre cracked the economic power of some of the provincial notables by retaining the tax farm of the deceased notables or by confiscating their properties. But this only meant to crack the power of the notables who also had political and/or military power in the provinces or even larger areas. Other medium-scale provincial elites without political power continued to possess their lands which they had been possessing for a long time.¹⁶⁶ The new provincial elite was based in mid-size rural towns.¹⁶⁷ And they would assert their political influence in the local councils that were established in the second half of the 19th century. While the fief-system had been diminishing since the 16th century, these local elites gradually captured more lands which were legally state-owned.

Conflicts between the landholding elite and the cultivators on what is supposed to be public land took place throughout the 19th century since the rural elite violated the state's and peasants' rights. This caused several peasant rebellions and disturbances in Anatolia and the Balkans. Although understated compared to nationalist motives, these disturbances were one of the reasons of the Bulgarian uprisings of the 19th century.¹⁶⁸ The reformer statesmen of the 19th century aimed to regulate these conflicts by introducing private property rights and obligations. Additionally, as the Ottoman market was opened to the European capital, the foreign entrepreneurs also started to show interest in mining and agriculture in the Ottoman lands. Consequently, the Ottomans enacted a series of laws concerning private property relations between 1841 and 1869. The most prominent one of these was the Land Code of 1858. After the enactment of the law, around 70 percent of the state-owned lands (*miri*) became private property rapidly.¹⁶⁹ The law aimed to protect the rights of the small peasantry. However, the local elite whose knowledge of law and relationship with the

¹⁶⁶ Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*, 200.

¹⁶⁷ Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, Studies in Middle Eastern History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 94.

¹⁶⁸ E. Attila AYTEKIN, "Agrarian Relations, Property and Law: An Analysis of the Land Code of 1858 in the Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 6 (November 2009): 935–51.

¹⁶⁹ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 168–70.

local civil servants was better, appropriated lands that were not allocated to them by trickery in several places.¹⁷⁰ Such misconducts were more common in the Arab and Kurdish regions in the Fertile Crescent where tribal relations were widespread.¹⁷¹ Therefore, large landownership and landless peasantry became remarkable forms of classes especially in these regions in the east. In brief, on the one hand, the 1858 code was a consequence and codification of the developing market relations of the last two centuries. The lands had already been bought and sold in the market.¹⁷² And the code legalized it. On the other hand, the code had consequences. It consolidated the economic power of the provincial notables by legalizing their ownership status. But it also intensified capitalist market relations in the country.

Mahmud II's abolition of the janissaries in 1826 was a blow to the guilds. Janissaries had been organized in the guilds and lived as shopkeepers in the time of peace. Therefore, the guilds had a military power to back their demands and to resist the policies that they did not welcome. The abolition of the janissaries was in favour of the expansion of market relations. Fixed price (*narh*) obligation in the markets was removed in 1865, except meat and bread.¹⁷³

Another important step in economic liberalization and building an integrated domestic market was to remove the internal customs. The European merchants who had been granted capitulations were exempt from domestic customs. So were the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects who had European passports and protection documents. This had been creating a disadvantage for the other domestic merchants in the mid-19th century. Although, the revenues of internal customs that were extracted from domestic merchants were one of the leading sources for the treasury, the Ottomans removed most of them until 1874.¹⁷⁴ The last internal customs was removed in 1909.¹⁷⁵ This increased the competitive power of the merchants that are involved in domestic trade. These were overwhelmingly Muslim.

Another factor that significantly increased the market integration and the intensification of market production in Anatolia was the railroads. I indicated that the length of railroads increased three times during Abdulhamid's rule. This incorporated central Anatolia to the trade network.

¹⁷⁰ Ortaylı, 128.; Karpaz, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması*, 94.

¹⁷¹ Bruinessen, *Ağa, şeyh, devlet = Agha, shaikh and state*, 281–82.

¹⁷² Attila Aytekin, "Kapitalistleşme ve Merkezileşme Kavşağında," in *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat*, 3. ed (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2019), 57.; Ortaylı, *Türkiye Teşkilât ve İdare Tarihi*, 359.

¹⁷³ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 164.

¹⁷⁴ Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye iktisadî tarihi*, 203–6.

¹⁷⁵ Toprak, 1995, p.23

Consequently, only eastern and south-eastern Anatolia became relatively unintegrated to the broader markets in Anatolia at the turn of the 20th century.¹⁷⁶

In short, the reforms for market integration and fostering capitalist relations continued and intensified in the 19th century. The external factors had a role in the developments. But they also corresponded to the needs of local elite. These were mainly the provincial notables in towns without political or military power, and big merchants. On the other hand, the reforms took place at the expense of other local forces. These were the janissaries-guilds and the urban lower class, the big provincial notables who had political and military power, and the peasants whose right to land deteriorated in favour of provincial notables.

2.3.5 The advent of civil and political rights, and political competition

The imperial edict of 1839 (*Hatt-i Serif*) guaranteed security for the lives, honour and property of all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the empire. This aimed to be a response to ill-treatment and abuse of the subjects by the central and local authorities. A professional police organization was founded in 1845. Torture and use of violence against the subjects were outlawed. In practice, the government started to inspect such incidents more closely and punished the governors or notables who resorted to violence against peasants.¹⁷⁷ Length of compulsory military service for peasants which was arbitrary previously and could take 10-15 years with reserve time was fixed at five years in 1843.¹⁷⁸ The Istanbul slave market was abolished in 1846, trading Circassian slaves and African slaves were banned in 1854 and 1857 respectively.¹⁷⁹

I stated in the previous section that the provincial notables were elected in some regions by the community in the 18th century. This was a bottom-up development, and the centre recognized and aimed to regulate it. An important step towards political participation in the 19th century was the foundation of local councils in 1840 in a regulated way by the centre. These councils consisted of Muslim and non-Muslim notables of the region but also civil servants of the central state. They were authorized to take decisions on certain administrative, judicial, and financial matters (most importantly tax issues) of their region.¹⁸⁰ This first attempt in 1840 failed in two years due to lack

¹⁷⁶ Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye iktisadî tarihi*, 218.

¹⁷⁷ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 77.

¹⁷⁸ Ed Engelhardt and Ali Reşat, *Tanzimat ve Türkiye*, 1. Baskı (İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 1999), 119.

¹⁷⁹ Y. Hakan Erdem and Bahar Tırnakçı, *Osmanlıda Köleliğin Sonu: 1800-1909*, 1. ed (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004), 123–46.

¹⁸⁰ Halil İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri," in *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, 1. Baskı (Kızılay, Ankara: Phoenix, 2006), 112.

of trained civil servants to run these councils. Nonetheless, the system established gradually since 1849 with the foundation of provincial councils (*eyalet meclisi*) in the centres of provinces.¹⁸¹ Local councils were not only steps towards inclusion of people, albeit the provincial elite, in the administration but also first attempts towards egalitarianism among Muslim and non-Muslim people to include members of all ethno-religious groups.

Reforms of political participation also took place in the capital. To carry out the New Order reforms and in sultan's quest for popular support for them, the advisory council (*Meclisi Meşveret*) started to convene more frequently and with more people (e.g: 200) in the end of the 18th century. In addition to the pashas and viziers, both upper and lower strata of clergy, janissary-shopkeepers, and stewards of the guilds joined these councils.¹⁸² Later, during the reign of Mahmud II in the first half of the 19th century, an advisory council (*Meclis-i Vela-yı Ahkam-ı Adliye*) was established. As a novelty, this council monopolized the legislative authority, and this institutionalized throughout the 19th century.¹⁸³ The reforms regarding political participation reached the ultimate point in the 19th century with the proclamation of the first Ottoman constitution which stipulated the launch of the first Ottoman Parliament in 1876.

Mahmud II established a relatively centralized and absolutist rule when he died in 1839. I indicated above that the locus of power shifted from the sultan's household to grand viziers' office (*babiali*) after he died. Mustafa Resid Pasha initially, and Ali and Fuad Pashas later dominated the administration in practice throughout the Reorganization period. They were the architects of the reforms and some pathbreaking transformations. Ali and Fuad Pashas ruled with an iron fist. Some scholars labelled their rule as *enlightened despotism*.¹⁸⁴ Some prominent figures like Husrev Pasha were politically conservative and against the reforms or their pace.¹⁸⁵ Some others like Nedim Pasha advocated to return the executive power to the sultan's household. Other pashas like Ahmed Cevdet Pasha were culturally conservative and aimed to harmonize the western-origin codes and methods with traditional Islamic laws in their works of legislation.¹⁸⁶ The civil code of 1868-1876 (*Mecelle*) was a product of such an approach. Ali Pasha executed the culturally progressive reforms and political representation on the local level. On the other hand, he was against the idea of a

¹⁸¹ Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, "Divan-ı Hümayun'dan Meclis-i Mebusan'a Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Yasama," in *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, 1. Baskı, (Kızılay, Ankara: Phoenix, 2006), 264.

¹⁸² Ali Akyıldız, "Meclis-i Meşveret" (TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2003), <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/meclis-i-mesveret>.

¹⁸³ Seyitdanlıoğlu, "Divan-ı Hümayun'dan Meclis-i Mebusan'a Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Yasama," 189.

¹⁸⁴ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 76.

¹⁸⁵ Ortaylı, 180

¹⁸⁶ Ortaylı, 141; Note: A remarkable contrast is that Ali Pasha aimed to adopt the French Civil code. His justification was that the code was adopted in Egypt and it benefited the country.

representation in the national level. One of his reasons was that such a representation of the Ottoman ethno-religious groups would lead to the collapse of the empire.¹⁸⁷

A prominent group of opposition was the *New Ottomans*. The New Ottomans community was founded by young intellectuals and low-rank bureaucrats in 1865. Their rise and impact were partly a consequence of the emergence of a relatively large public sphere and civilian press in the 19th century. The main places for socialization and public debate in Istanbul was the coffee houses. There were around 2500 coffeehouses in Istanbul in the first half of the 19th century. This meant that there was one coffeehouse for every six or seven shops.¹⁸⁸ A literate strata in the society started to emerge thanks to the modern schools of the Reorganization period. Regarding the press, first public and private newspapers in Turkish also emerged in this period in 1831 and 1840 respectively. Introduction of the telegram intensified the spread of news between provinces and countries. The private newspapers that the New Ottomans members wrote became an effective locus of opposition in the 1860s. The New Ottomans did not have a holistic ideology, but they opposed the despotic rule of Ali Pasha and commonly propagated for a couple of themes. These were to establish a national parliament, to eliminate the foreign intervention in the domestic affairs for the Christian peoples' affairs, to make reforms but not in a secular fashion but in a way that is compatible with Sharia.¹⁸⁹ That way the New Ottomans thought that the decline of the empire could be reversed. Their style was patriotic. While they thought that the unity and solidarity between the ethno-religious groups of the empire should be achieved through parliamentarism, they also highlighted the rights of the Muslim nation of the empire in a conjuncture of separatist nationalism of the Christian groups.

The members of the New Ottomans were sent to exile by Ali Pasha, but they returned to the capital after his death in 1871. The constitutionalist high-ranked bureaucrats like Midhat Pasha and the New Ottomans increased their influence in the capital in this period. Constitutionalist and pro-parliamentary ideas and movements in Bulgaria, Egypt, Lebanon, Montenegro, Serbia, Romania, Tunisia, and the consulates and press of the Western countries in Istanbul were also influencing the public opinion in the capital.¹⁹⁰ Finally, the constitutionalist faction overthrew Sultan Abdulaziz who had rejected to proclaim a constitution and a parliament. After a brief rule of Sultan Murad, who had to leave the throne for mental reasons, the constitutionalists agreed with then-heir

¹⁸⁷ Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*.27

¹⁸⁸ Cengiz Kırılı, "19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Kamuoyu," in *Osmanlı Kahvehaneleri: Mekân, Sosyalleşme, İktidar*, ed. Ahmet Yaşar, 1. ed, İnsan ve Toplum Dizisi 44 (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2009), 100.

¹⁸⁹ Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*, 58.

¹⁹⁰ Mardin, 42.;Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 211.;M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 113–14.

Abdulhamid to accede to the throne and proclaim the constitution. The sultan bargained on the articles of the constitution. The drafting commission included bureaucrats and elites who were either against constitutional monarchy and parliament or hesitant about it. Finally, the sultan accepted a draft that does not restrict his authority as in a proper constitutional monarchy setting. According to the final draft, he would appoint the ministers. The ministers would be responsible to him, and not to the parliament. The parliament could debate a bill, but it had to be proposed by the government. Finally, the sultan could exile anyone who posed a high security threat like an insurrection.¹⁹¹

Consequently, the sultan proclaimed the first Ottoman constitution (*Kanuni Esasi*) in 1876. The first national elections were held. The election laws were consociational in the sense that it stipulated a quota in each province for Muslim and non-Muslim categories proportional to their population. The election laws also stipulated the condition to have certain amount of wealth, to be male and to learn Turkish in four years if he does not know it already. Finally, the first Ottoman parliament convened in 1877 with 115 members. Out of 115, there were 69 Muslim and 46 non-Muslim members. Technically, the constitution fell short of a constitutional monarchy that would reduce the power of the monarch to a relatively symbolic level. Consequently, Sultan Abdulhamid suspended the parliament in 1878 during the Russo-Turkish War. This started the authoritarian rule of Abdulhamid which continued till the 1908 Young Turk revolution.

2.3.6 The quest for a modern nationhood project

The increasing social mobility, intensifying central state-society relations in the centralization era required a new nationhood project and a state ideology. There was a peculiarity in the Ottoman case at this crossroads. Firstly, the traditional ideology hierarchically divided the society along the ethno-religious lines where the Sunni-Muslim identity was on top. Secondly, this nationhood project converged with the subordination of the Ottoman empire by the Great Powers. The consequences of this were discussed above. The position of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and the non-Muslim urban middle class increased relatively compared to Muslim notables, bourgeoisie, landholders and middle class. The increasing wealth reflected on the urban life as the non-Muslim urban middle class started to differentiate from the urban Muslim middle class. This differentiation was complemented and consolidated with the cultural differentiation as the non-Muslim middle

¹⁹¹ Mehmet Akif Aydın, “Kanuni Esasi” (TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2001), <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/kanun-i-esasi>.

classes started to get education in schools either opened by the Western countries or in western style.¹⁹² Part of this bourgeoisie and literate class supported nationalism and separation. These factors created resentment among Muslim middle class in the cities which was also expanding with the Muslim immigrants which were expelled from the former Ottoman lands. Also, Muslim peasants encountered non-Muslim Ottoman bourgeoisie in their ordinary credit-debt relations as market relations were expanding.¹⁹³ These were platforms of possible conflicts in social relations such as the confiscation of land against liability. Its parallel was also the case for non-Muslim peasants. Non-Muslim peasants were under constant threat of Muslim landowners and Kurdish semi-nomadic tribes, especially in the eastern Anatolia.

Such an ethno-class configuration in the relations of production had a peculiar impact on the nature of the socio-political conflict in the empire. It downplayed class cleavage, and it put forward ethno-religious cleavage which already had a long tradition of being a marker for social division in the Ottoman society. The Ottoman state searched for new state ideologies and nationhood projects in these conditions throughout the 19th century. As I stated above, the Muslim population in Anatolia increased from some 60 percent¹⁹⁴ in the beginning of the century to 80 percent¹⁹⁵ at the end of the century. This changing demographic factor in favour of the Muslim population, along with the immigrants' resentment, also shaped the changing character of the nationhood project.

The movement towards equal citizenship of the Ottoman subjects from different religions started in Mahmud II's era. This policy that I will call *Ottoman nationalism* or *Ottomanism* emerged as a response to the internal and external pressures in the age of nationalism in a society which had been operating with a traditional Islamic ideology that was based on hierarchies and duties of different religious groups. Mahmud II's statement that "I notice my Muslim subject in mosque, Christian subject in church, Jewish subject in synagogue"¹⁹⁶ was an initial indication of this ideology. A decree in 1829 made it obligatory for all state officials to wear a Fez, which is a red cylindrical peakless hat. The broader goal of the clothing law was that the subjects would embrace it. This would break the centuries long Islamic-Ottoman rule that promotes different apparel and appearance for Muslims and non-Muslims. Therefore, it was a step towards equality of the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects.

¹⁹² Kurt, 2021, p.34-38

¹⁹³ Ümit Kurt, *The Armenians of Aintab: The Economics of Genocide in an Ottoman Province* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2021), 63.

¹⁹⁴ Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin şifresi*, 48.

¹⁹⁵ **Calculation is mine based on:** Behar, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun ve Türkiye'nin Nüfusu*.

¹⁹⁶ Engelhardt, *Tanzimat ve Türkiye*. 41

The Reform Edict of 1856 proclaimed to abolish head-tax (*cizye*) for non-Muslims and made all the subjects obliged to pay the same amount of tax regardless of religion. However, in practice, non-Muslims opted to not get conscripted and continue to pay a tax as a compensation. Conscription for non-Muslims would actually start only in 1908.¹⁹⁷ In this period, non-Muslims gained the right to build new place of worship, hospitals, schools, apartments and to repair the old ones. The freedom to build, sell and buy new apartments would also mean to ease the segregation principle between communities through separate neighbourhoods. Non-Muslims were granted the right to become civil servants. Subsequently, non-Muslims also gained the right to enter state schools to become civil servants. They gained the right to open new schools and have education in their own languages. Secular tribunals (*Nizamiye mahkemeleri*) were founded to adjudicate cases between Muslims and non-Muslims, and non-Muslims gained the right to bear testimony in the courts. Capital punishment for converting to Christianity for a Muslim was removed. Converting to another denomination became a right. Finally, the dress code that forces Muslims and non-Muslims to wear differently was eased.¹⁹⁸

The nationhood ideology started to shift from Ottomanism to Islamic nationalism towards the end of the 19th century. Initially, Abdulhamid II continued the reforms. Non-Muslims' involvement in bureaucracy had a peak in the first period of the Abdülhamid period until 1894 and declined afterwards.¹⁹⁹ Later, Sunni-Hanafi identity of the state was institutionalized. The title Caliphate started to be used frequently. Friday prayers of the sultan became a regular state ceremony.²⁰⁰ The weight of religion increased in the curriculum of schools.²⁰¹ Loyalty to the sultan was emphasised in education. Praying for Abdülhamid was one of the rituals in education.²⁰² The Sunni identity of the state also reflected on the historiography. Sunnification of Anatolia and the cleansing of Alevis in history to secure order and unity was praised.²⁰³ The teaching material stated Islam and Hanafi jurisprudence as the dominant religion and sects. Due to the fear of the Armenian committees²⁰⁴ activities to incite the Armenian peasants to create an uprising in the region, Abdülhamid armed

¹⁹⁷ Zürcher, "The Ottoman Conscription System, 1844–1914."

¹⁹⁸ Ufuk Gülsoy, "Islahat Fermanı" (TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1999), <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/islahat-fermani>.

¹⁹⁹ Abdülhamit Kırmızı, "II. Abdülhamid'in Hıristiyan Memurları," in *Sultan II. Abdülhamid Han ve Dönemi*, ed. Halil İbrahim Erbay, 1. ed, TBMM Milli Saraylar, Yayın no. 125 (Doğumunun 174. yılında Sultan II. Abdülhamid Han ve dönemi uluslararası sempozyumu, İstanbul: TBMM Milli Saraylar, 2017).

²⁰⁰ Selim Deringil, *Simgeden Millete: II. Abdülhamid'den Mustafa Kemal'e Devlet ve Millet*, 1. Baskı, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007).58

²⁰¹ Lütfi Budak, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne İlkokul Programları (1870-1936)," *International Journal Of Turkish Literature Culture Education* 3, no. 3/1 (January 1, 2014): 377–377.

²⁰² Mehmet Ö. Alkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Modernleşme ve Eğitim," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 6, no. 12 (2008): 9–84.

²⁰³ Alkan, 43

²⁰⁴ The Armenian revolutionary organizations, namely the Dashnak and the Hunchak movements.

some of the semi-nomadic Kurdish tribes. The persecution of Armenians by this armed militia, known as Hamidiye Light Cavalry, started in this period. As the trust between the communities deteriorated after the Berlin conference further, mass killings took place between 1894 and 1897.²⁰⁵

2.3.7 Secularization of laws

To adopt new laws and regulations regarding civil and political rights, and nationhood throughout the 19th century also had an inherent meaning: To move away from the traditional Islamic law in favour of secular laws. It was explained in the previous century that the secular authority already interfered in the significant matters of the Sharia realm such as the issue of financial interest. Therefore, the secular involvement was not novel. However, it intensified in the 19th century. And the imperial centre did not always aim to harmonize the two realms or legitimize a code through the Islamic sources and culture. The French penal code of 1810 was adopted as the new penal code in 1851 with substantive changes. Certain elements of the traditional Sharia law such as full legal age, polygamy, law of retaliation were also included in the new penal code.

To abolish the head-tax for non-Muslims and their involvement in the administration, and therefore to administer over the Muslims, were critical ruptures from the Sharia laws. The property law of 1858 represented another rupture with the tradition of Sharia and sultans' laws since it marked the beginning of private property and inheritance laws that are in line with the tradition of the Roman law.²⁰⁶ The greatest challenge for disestablishment of religious laws arose in the making of civil law. Clergy and traditionalist statesmen resisted the adoption of a Western civil code as in the cases for commercial law and penal code. Consequently, a commission of local jurists (*Mecelle*) led by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha initiated a novel attempt to make a contemporary civil code based on Sunni-Hanafi jurisprudence. The commission delivered codes of obligations and property before it got suspended in 1883 by Abdulhamid II.²⁰⁷ Therefore, civil code remained in the realm of Sharia until the Republic reforms.

These developments inherently took away some of the jurisdiction of the Islamic judges and clergy. The first courts that were not adjudicated by Islamic judges was the commercial courts that were formed in 1800-1801. A mixed council that is composed of Ottoman and foreign merchants were

²⁰⁵ Deringil, *Simgeden Millete*, 204–14.

²⁰⁶ İhtar Gözaydın, "Modernleşme ve Batıcılık," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce*, ed. Murat Belge, 1. Baskı (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 287–88.

²⁰⁷ Gözaydın, 289.

authorized to resolve the commercial cases.²⁰⁸ These courts evolved to a council that operated under the Ministry of Commerce in Istanbul in 1838.²⁰⁹ Other secular commercial courts were formed under governorships in various cities while the council in Istanbul began to appear as the superior court. Finally, a commercial code that was based on the French commercial law was adopted in 1850.²¹⁰ Administration of the Sharia courts which had been under the authority of the grand vizier was given to the authority of the head of clergy (*şeyhülislam*) during Mahmud's reign. This was the beginning of the administrative separation of Sharia courts and secular courts. Also, it meant to restrict the judicial and legislative realm of the clergy. In that vein, Mahmud also abandoned the tradition to receive the advice of the head of the clergy in his legislations.²¹¹ The judicial authority of the clergy was limited to family law with the foundation of Ministry of Justice in 1870. Although political Islam and Muslim nationalism increased as ideologies and discourse of legitimization during Abdulhamid's rule, he did not reverse the secular legacy of the previous period. Further secularization reforms would continue in the Young Turk and Kemalist periods.

2.4 The Young Turks and the Collapse of the Empire

The previous section explained the major social and political aspects of the Ottoman modernization in the 19th century. I explained the abolition of janissaries and big provincial notables, the subordination of clergy, and rationalization of bureaucracy. I emphasized the rise of non-Muslim commercial and landowning bourgeoisie and the rise of mid-size local notables (*eşraf*) as landowning Muslim bourgeoisie in the provinces. Additionally, I noted the proliferation of modern schools especially in Abdulhamid's period in the end of the century where a sizeable new generation of literate Muslim lower-middle class was raised. I explained the quest of the trajectory of the modern nationhood as a consequence of the impact of economic and cultural differentiation between Muslim and non-Muslim middle classes, massively changing demographical structure, and the resentment between ethno-religious groups. The Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the Great War (1914-1918) and the Turkish War of Independence (1918-1922) intensified these conflicts and finally brought the catastrophic end of the Ottoman Empire.

²⁰⁸ Ekrem Buğra Ekinci, *Osmanlı Mahkemeleri: Tanzimat ve Sonrası*, 6 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: Arı Sanat Yayınları, 2004), 99.

²⁰⁹ Ekinci, 101.

²¹⁰ Ekinci, 104.

²¹¹ Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 17. Baskı, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2012), 174–77.

2.4.1 The 1908 revolution

I stated in the previous section that Abdulhamid II suspended the short-lived first Ottoman parliament in 1878. This started his absolutist rule which survived until the 1908 revolution. This long autocratic rule generated various dissident groups in the empire. Briefly, there were three sets of opposition in the first decade of the 20th century. The first set of opposition was the nationalist and anti-absolutist guerrilla movements and clandestine organizations in the Balkans and Anatolia. These movements were able to mobilize peasants of their ethnicity such as Albanians, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians who were under pressure of heavy taxes of either the local notables or the centre. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (*Dashnaktsutyun*) was an effective one of this kind of organizations. The second set consisted of the anti-absolutist clandestine organizations whose members comprised mostly the Ottoman civil servants, military officers, and intellectuals. The most effective of this set of organizations was the Committee of Union of Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti - ITC*). Many of the founders of the Republic of Turkey including Mustafa Kemal were also a member of this organization. The third set of opposition was the spontaneous tax revolts of peasants and/or provincial Muslim middle class that were held in several cities of Anatolia between 1906 and 1908.²¹²

The burden of the taxes that started to become unbearable for the peasants, shopkeepers, artisans, and merchants turned into massive civil disobedience actions in several cities of Anatolia by 1906.²¹³ Typically, crowds led by the local notables of cities marched to the official buildings, occupied the telegraph offices, and sent collective petitions to the state in these protests. More importantly, they refused to pay their taxes in several places. ITC already had seventeen secret branches and many more cells inside and outside the country by 1907.²¹⁴ It had 2250 members by 1908²¹⁵. Its members were actively involved in the protests and tried to influence them. ITC, Dashnak, and some other organizations including Prince Sabahaddin's "the League for Private Initiative and Decentralization" convened a congress in Paris in 1907 and decided to unite their actions to mobilize the masses and overthrow the Abdulhamid regime. To illustrate the extent of the social turmoil, in an incident, a thousand Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the ITC militants together had an armed conflict with the government's soldiers in Van.²¹⁶ ITC secretly organized

²¹² Ateş Uslu and Attila AYTEKİN, "Burjuva Devriminin ve Savaşının Belirsiz Sınırlarında," in *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat*, 3. ed (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2019), 123.

²¹³ Aykut KANSU, *1908 Devrimi*, 1. ed, 52 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 1995).

²¹⁴ KANSU, 62

²¹⁵ M. ŞÜKRÜ HANIOĞLU, "The Second Constitutional Period, 1908–1918," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 77.

²¹⁶ KANSU, 79-80

within the armies, especially in Macedonia, but also in Anatolia. By 1907, soldiers started to uprising in several regions for their delayed payments and bad conditions. ITC and other revolutionary organizations were already under the influence of the constitutionalist revolutions in Russia (1905) and Iran (1906). The Reval meeting between Britain and Russia over the Macedonian Question in 1908 triggered the final revolutionary action.

The ITC officers within the third army, based in Salonica, fled to the mountains to start a guerrilla movement to reinstate the 1876 constitution and re-open the parliament. Their thought was that they could prevent the partition of Macedonia and dissolution of the empire in a constitutional setting. The military units which had been sent by the sultan to suppress the revolutionaries also defected to the unionists' side with the general discontent with the regime and the propaganda of the unionists within them. Consequently, the sultan accepted to reinstate the constitution and reopen the parliament in July 1908.

The electoral rules stipulated two-stage elections. Voters elected the second electors, and the second electors elected the deputies. Women, and citizens who did not have a sufficient level of wealth to pay taxes could not vote. The elections resulted in an ITC majority in the parliament. ITC benefited from being the most organized group in the country. By 1909, it had 850 thousand members and 360 branches in the country.²¹⁷ However, its parliament group was far from party discipline because party politics was novel in the country and candidate-leadership relations were relatively loose. Roughly three groups of ITC deputies emerged in the parliament according to their proximity to the party leadership in their ideology and policy orientations.²¹⁸ They acted independently on several occasions whereas they pursued more strictly the party's decision in votes of confidence. According to Kansu, only around one-sixth of the ITC members in the parliament acted according to party discipline.²¹⁹ Therefore, the power struggle in the parliament became fierce.

A pro-sultan counter-revolutionary attempt took place soon after the convention of the parliament. The ITC military wing suppressed the attempt, and Sultan Abdulhamid was dethroned this time. A series of articles of the 1876 constitution which had made it fall short of a constitutional monarchy was amended in 1909. Only then the legal-formal authority of the sultan significantly declined. The Liberal Entente, an umbrella party for the dissidents that was formed in 1911, seriously challenged the ITC domination. The power shifted between ITC and the opposition throughout the Turkish-Italian War of 1911 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. Finally, ITC staged

²¹⁷ Hanioglu, "The Second Constitutional Period, 1908–1918," 160.

²¹⁸ Kansu, *1908 Devrimi*, 351.

²¹⁹ Kansu, 352

a putsch in 1913. Only then did the party start to control the government and the army extensively through new appointments to critical positions. It repressed all the opposition, controlled the whole parliament that was composed after the 1913-14 elections, and ruled the country single-handedly through the First World War.²²⁰

2.4.2 ITC's ideological orientations, social alliances, and its dissidents

ITC's greatest challenge was to find a new social contract in the zeitgeist of transition to nation-states in Europe and the Middle East. The legacy of the 19th century was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire with nationalist uprisings, internal armed conflicts and increasing Muslim population due to the mass immigration of the Muslims who were expelled from their homelands. The state-subject and subject-subject relations had been organized hierarchically in a confessional form in the traditional order of the Ottoman Empire. This started to change in the 19th century as explained in the previous section. Reforms towards equality between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects were rapidly enacted especially after the 1858 edict. Secular public institutions and laws started to replace the Islamic ones. Consociational arrangements were made in representative institutions. Yet, there were still many domains that were organized in confessional and communitarian patterns. The head-tax was abolished, and the non-Muslims had the right and obligation to join the army. But in practice, the non-Muslim people paid the same tax with a different name. Education was still in the domain of the congregations. Moreover, Abdulhamid consolidated some of the communitarian patterns. He formed interpersonal relationships with the community leaders and chieftains. Through that he aimed to secure their loyalty to the state as a community. To establish cavalrymen units out of Kurdish tribes in the east was a consequence of this approach. Relationship to the palace was an important factor for business careers.

ITC's aim after the revolution was to transform these traditional structures into modern nation-state structures. The party aimed to remove privileges and obligations which had been institutionalized with communitarian and interpersonal norms in the ancien regime. This was the monist-egalitarian aspect of ITC's ideology. Conscription for non-Muslims started in 1909. ITC aimed to establish mixed education for all the ethno-religious groups except religious education.²²¹ This meant to establish a common language, and this would be Turkish. The congregations,

²²⁰ Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 168–69.

²²¹ Kansu, *1908 Devrimi*, 222.

especially the Greek community, objected to these goals. Consequently, the final program of ITC promised separate schools for primary level and mixed schools for upper levels.

ITC restarted the processes of secular control of the traditional Islamic institutions of the state, and of disestablishment of religion from state affairs. Shari courts were given under the authority of the Ministry of Justice. The head of clergy was removed from the Council of Ministers. The High Board of Public Foundations (*evkaf idaresi*) which controls the finance of the places of worship and religious orders was taken from the authority of the head of clergy and given to the authority of the cabinet. The traditional religious schools (*madrasa*) were given to the authority of the Ministry of Education.²²² Women gained the right to be employed in public institutions. Until the ITC rule, they could only be teachers in school for girls.

Initially, ITC pursued a liberal economic policy. Freedom of movement was provided by removing the condition to have a licence to travel freely within the country in 1908. Internal customs were removed fully in 1909. The economy minister of the party, Mehmed Cavid, supported a liberal foreign trade against a protectionist and a pro-industry policy.²²³ He believed that to remove the barriers of free enterprise which were a legacy of the Abdulhamid's authoritarian rule would be sufficient for the development of the country. These views were welcomed by the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce.²²⁴ Consequently, the initial economically liberal environment of the post-revolution period benefited mostly the non-Muslim and the foreign bourgeoisie, who already had a good amount of capital stock.²²⁵ Most of the new enterprises opened in this period belonged to these groups. In other words, the Muslim entrepreneurs lagged behind, again.

The Balkan Wars were clearly a turning point for several aspects of the ITC ideology and policies, and also the forms of conflict in the country. The Muslim peoples comprised the majority, albeit with a narrow margin (51 percent), in the last European provinces of the Ottoman Empire.²²⁶ Together with Anatolia, these lands had been the heart of the empire for centuries. Around 300 thousand Muslims were expelled to Turkey²²⁷ between 1912 and 1915. Istanbul streets were flooded with these immigrants. The loss of the Balkans was catastrophic for ITC and the society in many ways. It boosted the Muslim and Turkish nationalist sentiments.

²²² Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 459.

²²³ Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Milli İktisat, 1908-1918*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı 1995), 31.

²²⁴ Toprak, 85.

²²⁵ Toprak, 66.

²²⁶ Justin McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün: Osmanlı Müslümanlarının Etnik Kırımı, 1821-1922*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2018), 142.

²²⁷ McCharthy, 181.

The pendulum shifted from Ottoman nationalism to Islamic and Turkish nationalism for ITC. The terms “Turkish government” and “Turkish army” began to be used by the officials.²²⁸ Historiography in schools which had linked the genesis of the nation to the birth of Islam changed. Turks were portrayed as people originated in central Asia that have a distinct (and secular) history than the history of Islam.²²⁹

Economic policies also moved away from liberalism. The economic views of Friedrich List and the German historical school, which had already been shared by some circles in Young Turk intelligentsia, prevailed over liberal policies in this period. When the World War started in 1914, ITC removed the capitulations unilaterally, and transitioned to a protectionist foreign policy. The privileged foreign enterprises were taken under control, and some of them got nationalized.²³⁰ ITC organized all the small Muslim shopkeeper and artisan associations under one society and took it under control.²³¹ The party actively supported new Muslim/Turkish enterprises in its new neo-mercantilist policy. Consequently, the number of Muslim corporations tripled by the end of the war.²³² While the enterprises mostly belonged to the non-Muslim Ottomans prior to the World War, the Turkish-Islamic group predominated at the end of the war.

Two important events for the primitive capital accumulation of the Muslim bourgeoisie were the boycott movements and the confiscation of the properties of the deported Armenians. The boycott movement started as a civilian reaction in 1908 when the Austro-Hungarian Empire officially annexed Bosnia and the Bulgarian Principality declared independence. Muslim provincial bourgeoisie, workers, and local members of ITC participated in these protests. The second boycott action started against Greece regarding some discontent of the Muslims in Crete. This boycott affected the Ottoman Greeks because the import products from Greece were sold mostly in their shops.²³³ The third wave of the mass boycotts took place after the Balkan Wars. This time it directly targeted primarily the Ottoman Greeks, but also the Ottoman Armenians and Bulgarians.²³⁴ In brief, the boycott movement appeared as a bottom-up social movement that complemented and affected the economic nationalism/neo-mercantilism of the government which aimed to nurture the Muslim/Turkish bourgeoisie. The second occasion for the primitive capital accumulation for

²²⁸ Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, 435.

²²⁹ Gurkan, 2017, p.219, *Türkiye’de İlkokullarda Tarih Eğitimi*

²³⁰ Toprak, *Türkiye’de Milli İktisat, 1908-1918*, 6.

²³¹ Toprak, 5. Note: The umbrella organization was called *Esnafklar Cemiyeti* (Society of shopkeepers/artisans)

²³² Toprak, 113. Toprak notes that the number of companies until the 1908 revolution was 86. By 1918 the number reached to 236.

²³³ Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, *Osmanlı’yı Müslümanlaştırmak: Kitle Siyaseti, Toplumsal Sınıflar, Boykotlar ve Milli İktisat (1909 - 1914)*, 1. ed, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2015), 112.

²³⁴ Çetinkaya, 169.

the Muslim bourgeoisie was the appropriation of the Armenian property after the deportation of the Armenians in 1915. The provincial bourgeoisie who forged ties with or controlled the local branches of ITC saw the deportation as a window of opportunity to accumulate wealth.²³⁵

Social and political divisions, patterns of alliances and conflicts swiftly changed in this intense period of history in Turkey. As an influential intellectual of the period, Yusuf Akcura's description of the ITC's social base prior to the 1908 revolution is striking.²³⁶ He argued that ITC initially became popular among the low-rank civil servants and military officers who could not get their salaries regularly. ITC represented their resentment against the rich high-ranking bureaucrats who had personal ties to Abdulhamid's personalized regime. Secondly, he argues that the bourgeoisie in the Balkans supported ITC with the idea that they can replace the privileged Armenian and Greek bourgeoisie of Istanbul who also had personal ties to the regime. Finally, some big landowning bourgeoisie in the Balkans supported ITC to get protection against the Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian gangs. Politically, ITC was in alliance with the Armenian and Bulgarian revolutionary/nationalist organizations who aimed to topple the Abdulhamid regime as well.

On the other hand, Akcura argues that the social base of the Abdulhamid regime was the high-ranking bureaucrats who were also part of the big bourgeoisie, non-Muslim big bourgeoisie who dominated commerce thanks to its ties to the regime, and the provincial bourgeoisie. He argues that some of these groups loosely allied with the Liberal Entente after they lost their power when the regime changed. Non-Muslim and non-Turkish groups also came close to this party since it supported the communitarian structures of the ancien regime.

After the revolution, ITC gradually extended and consolidated its alliance with the Muslim central and provincial commercial and landowning bourgeoisie in the processes explained in this section. The neo-mercantilist policies of the party on the one hand, and nationalist conflicts between the Muslim and non-Muslim middle classes were the platforms of this alliance. The intertwined Turkish and Islamic nationalisms became the ideology of this alliance.

2.4.3 The Turkish War of Independence and the transition to the Republic

The Central Powers, namely the German Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria, lost World War I. The Sevres Treaty imposed severe terms on the Ottoman

²³⁵ Kurt, *The Armenians of Aintab*, 212–13.

²³⁶ Toprak, *Türkiye'de Milli İktisat, 1908-1918*, 224–27.

Empire. It stipulated the partition of the empire where the Ottoman state gets a share in northern Anatolia and Istanbul. The Ottomans were to lose control of the straits. The capitulations which had been removed unilaterally by the Ottoman government before the war was to be re-executed, and the Allies were to control the finances of the empire. Western, south-eastern, and south-western parts of Anatolia were to be left as zones of influence to Greece, Italy, and France respectively. An independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdish region were to be established in eastern Anatolia.

The leaders of ITC and of the war cabinet resigned and fled abroad. And ITC was shut down officially. British and French armies had already occupied the Arab lands of the empire, and they started to occupy the southern provinces of Anatolia after the treaty. The Greek army occupied Thrace and the region around Izmir. Finally, the Ally forces occupied Istanbul. Simultaneously, local guerrilla resistance movements started. Several resistance societies which were called “Defence of Rights” were established in every corner of Anatolia. Most of the members in these societies were the local cadres of ITC.²³⁷ Later, these societies got united under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and the local struggles turned into a national struggle. The generals who did not surrender their armies also joined the resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

Consequently, a parliament was convened in Ankara with 232 deputies. 92 of these were the deputies of the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul who fled to Ankara, and the rest was elected by the Defence of Rights societies. The Istanbul government proclaimed Mustafa Kemal and the Ankara assembly as rebels. There were officially two governments in the country, but the Ankara government held the military and representative power. Consequently, the Ankara government defeated the Greek army and became victorious in the war. The Ankara parliament abolished the sultanate in 1922 to consolidate its position as the sole authority of Turkey. The regime became a de-facto republic then, although the official proclamation of the republic was in 1923. With the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 and Ankara Treaty in 1926, the Turkish side renounced its claims for the territories in the Middle East beyond today’s Turkey. In return, its sovereignty was recognized by the victorious powers of WWI.²³⁸ The capitulations and the privileges of the foreign states and entrepreneurs were removed; however, Turkey was to set new tariffs independently starting from 1929. Turkey and Greece were to exchange their Muslim and Greek-Orthodox populations.

²³⁷ -Cemal Kutay, 1983, *Talat Paşa'nın Gurbet Hatıraları*, p.7. İstanbul: Kültür Matbaası. In Demirbas, 1999, *İTC ve Milli Mücadele*, p.132. Kutay argues that 164 out of 197 branches were completely ITC cadres;

-Cemal Kutay refers to Memduh Şevket Esendal and argues that 163 of 197 local branches of ITC only changed their plaque to Defence of Rights. In Demirel, 2003, *Birinci Mecliste Muhalefet*, p.55.

²³⁸ Only Antioch would join Turkey in 1939 after a referendum.

2.4.4 Social alliances, opposition and ideological conflicts during the transition to the Republic regime

Regarding the composition of the deputies of the Ankara parliament, the Independence War was carried out mainly as a Muslim alliance of the high-ranking and low-ranking civilian and military bureaucracy (46.9% of the deputies), the provincial commercial and landowning bourgeoisie, and the chieftains of the Kurdish tribes (18.9%), other white-collar professionals (14%), and clergy (11.2%).²³⁹ The ideology of this alliance was Islamic nationalism. Mustafa Kemal Pasha used an Islamic discourse in his speeches and letters in this period. The united Defence of Rights organization set one of its goals as rescuing the Islamic caliphate and the Ottoman sultanate.²⁴⁰ The Armenian and Kurdish interests in the overlapping lands in the Eastern Anatolia became an important motive for the Kurdish chieftains and the elite to join the Ankara forces. The Islamic ideology complemented this underlying motive. On the other hand, some Kurdish tribes did not support the Ankara government. A significant failed Kurdish rebellion against the Ankara government took place in 1921. A more effective one, known as the Islamic-Kurdish Sheikh Said rebellion, took place in 1925. The abolition of the caliphate in 1924, and therefore the signs of the Ankara government to move away from the Islamic ideology of the Independence War which bounded Muslim Kurds and Turks was an essential cause of the rebellion.

Over time, two main groups emerged in the Ankara parliament. The First Group was founded by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to act in a discipline to legislate the laws. Later, the dissidents of Mustafa Kemal Pasha founded the Second Group.²⁴¹ The difference between the groups was not a sociological one. Both groups had deputies from each social groups at similar rates. Both groups had similar opinions regarding the major changes such as the abolition of the sultanate.²⁴² The main reason for the foundation of the Second Group was to prevent the gradual concentration of power in Mustafa Kemal Pasha's hands.²⁴³ The Second Group supported to keep the legislation powerful vis-à-vis the executive. The group was reluctant to establish extraordinary tribunal courts initially, and later it supported to limit its authority only with deserters.²⁴⁴ The Second Group members decided not to join the 1923 elections as a separate group. And Mustafa Kemal Pasha did not enlist

²³⁹ Ahmet Demirel, *Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet*, 3. Baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 137.

²⁴⁰ Demirel, 64

²⁴¹ Note: The First Group and the Second Group are short versions of the First Defence of Rights Group and the Second Defense of Rights Group

²⁴² Demirel, *Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet*, 483.

²⁴³ Demirel, 231.

²⁴⁴ Demirel, 232 & 408.

them in the First Group lists in the elections. This became the end of the parliamentary opposition of the Independence War period.

The last parliamentary opposition in the form of a political party before the establishment of the mono-party rule in 1925 was the Progressive Republican Party (TCF). Mustafa Kemal Pasha established CHP²⁴⁵ by transforming the unified Defence of Rights societies into party branches in 1923. The republic was proclaimed in 1923 and Mustafa Kemal Pasha became the first president of the republic. The caliphate was abolished in 1924 and secularization reforms started. While Mustafa Kemal Pasha consolidates its powers, the other leading commanders of the Independence War founded TCF. Former ITC members who had been excluded by the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha from the centre of power started to gather in this party. Main cadres of this party were composed of bureaucrats, officers, and intellectuals like CHP. The party supported principles of economic and political liberalism, separation of powers, decentralization.²⁴⁶ It did not differ from CHP's ideology fundamentally. The party did not defend the sultanate. Only some members were not pleased with the way that the republic was proclaimed. According to them, fundamental political reforms should have been made through deliberation and popular support. The main ideological difference between the two parties was the same with that of the Second Group. They opposed the concentration of power and authoritarianization. Yet some clauses in the party program tacitly criticized CHP. Article 6 stated that the party is "respectful to religious beliefs". This was an implication that CHP had certain anti-religious positions, and that TCF distinguishes itself from those.

Consequently, the party was banned in 1925 after the Kurdish-Islamic Sheikh Said rebellion with the allegation that its members in the east had contacted the leader cadres of the rebellion.²⁴⁷ It should be noted that the party was banned although it had fully supported CHP to suppress the rebellion. A failed assassination attempt took place against Atatürk in 1926. The leader cadre of TCF, who were also the commanders of the Independence War, was also tried in an emergency court. Although they were not sentenced, they were eliminated from politics this year. On the other hand, six TCF deputies were executed after the assassination trial.²⁴⁸ The Kurdish-Islamic Sheikh Said Rebellion, the state of emergency which continued till 1929, and the ban of TCF started the

²⁴⁵ Initially called CHF.

²⁴⁶ Erik Jan Zürcher, *Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yıllarında Siyasal Muhalefet: Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (1924-1925)*, 3. ed (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2010).

²⁴⁷ Zürcher, 109

²⁴⁸ Hakkı Uyar, "Türkiye'de Tek Parti Döneminde İktidar ve Muhalefet 1923-1950" (İzmir, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, 1998).82

mono-party rule of CHP. This period continued until the transition to the competitive regime in 1950.

3 PARTY SYSTEMS IN TURKEY IN THE REPUBLIC ERA

3.1 The Party Systems in Turkey

This section introduces a descriptive overview of the party systems in Turkey since the beginning of the mono-party rule of CHP until 2023. This overview will be based on the arithmetical approach of Siaroff. And it will introduce a simple overview for the subsequent substantial analysis. The formation and change of the party system and party competition structures will be discussed extensively in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

The final section of the previous chapter discussed lastly the social base and the ideology of the Independence War, and the salient political divisions until the Kurdish-Islamic Sheikh Said rebellion and the state of emergency in 1925. This state of emergency was also the beginning of the mono-party rule of CHP which continued until the transition to the competitive regime in 1950. The elections in this period were not competitive. The only opposition in the political party form in the mono-party regime was the Free Republican Party (SCF). The party was founded in 1930 by Ataturk's close friend Fethi Okyar upon Ataturk's request and demand; and it was under the regime's control strictly. To put it simply, it was only a facade opposition, and it lived for four months. A real opposition in the party form emerged with the foundation of Democrat Party in 1946. The party joined the 1946 elections which was not sufficiently competitive for the standards of the literature. Therefore, I classify the 1925-1950 period as the authoritarian mono-party period; and 1950-2023 as competitive period with spells. The table below is based on Siaroff's method, and it shows the party patterns in Turkey for each election since 1950.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁹ Alan Siaroff, *Comparative European Party Systems: An Analysis of Parliamentary Elections Since 1945*, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019).267-268

Table 4: Party systems in Turkey based on Siaroff's method

1950	two-party, with a single-party super-majority (DP)
1954	two-party, with a single-party super-majority (DP)
1957	two-party
1960	– Military coup (the parliament was closed, DP was banned)
1961	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (CHP and AP)</i>
1965	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (AP)</i>
1969	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (AP)</i>
1971	– Military memorandum (the parliament was kept open, TIP and MNP were banned)
1973	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (CHP and AP)</i>
1977	two-and-a-half-party
1980	– Military coup (the parliament was closed; all the parties were banned)
1983	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (ANAP)</i>
1987	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (ANAP)</i>
1991	moderately multi-party
1995	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (RP, DYP, and ANAP)</i>
1997	– Military memorandum (the parliament was not closed; the ruling DYP-RP government was forced for certain policy changes)
1999	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top five parties (DSP, MHP, FP, ANAP, and DYP)</i>
2002	two-party
2007	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (AKP)</i>
2011	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (AKP)</i>
2015 June	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (AKP)</i>
2015 Nov	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (AKP)</i>
2016	– Failed military coup attempt
2017	– Switch to presidential system
2018	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (AKP)</i>

In Siaroff's theory, party 'pattern' which reflects the result for one electoral term turns into a 'system' if it repeats at least three electoral terms. Based on the results for each electoral term (pattern), Siaroff mentions three party systems, with a bit of smoothing, for the history of Turkish politics. The first one is the two-party system (DP and CHP) of the period between 1950-1960.

The second one is the two-and-a-half-party-system (AP and CHP) between 1965 and 1980. The third one is the moderately multi-party system between 1983-2018.

His model demonstrates the two-party characteristics of the 50s with the single-party super majority of DP. It shows the moderately multi-party pattern of the post-1960 coup period where the two biggest parties formed a coalition. It characterizes the period until 1980 as a two-and-a-half party system where the dominant parties were CHP and AP. On the other hand, Siaroff combines the period between 1983-2018 and labels it as moderately multi-party system. I opt to distinguish the periods 1980-2002 and 2002-2023 since they show different patterns of cooperation and competition of parties. Most importantly, most of the established parties lost relevancy after the elections in 2002. Secondly, the single party rule of AKP characterized the period after 2002. This is in sharp contrast especially to the 90s where frequent coalition governments marked a stamp in the party system. Considering the essential changes in the structures of party competition and cooperation, I will discuss the party systems in the competitive era in four periods with sub-periods. These are (1) 1950 and 1960, (2) 1961 and 1980, (3) 1983 and 2002 with two subperiods, and (4) 2002 and 2023. The following section discusses the mono-party period between 1925 and 1950.

3.2 The Mono-party Period

Atatürk's accession to power and leadership started in 1919 during the War of Independence. But the advent of the authoritarian rule of the mono-party regime was after the state of emergency in 1925 which was introduced upon the Kurdish-Islamic Sheikh Said rebellion. The last real party opposition (TCF) was eliminated this year. CHP carried out what is known as the republican reforms or Kemalist reforms in this period. The short-lived SCF emerged as a facade party opposition in 1930. Therefore, one can mention intra-party opposition, factions, and different orientations in this period. One of these evolved into Democrat Party in 1946. This section will initially introduce the main social and economic structures of the mono-party period. Then it will discuss the politics and political divisions during this period in four categories.

3.2.1 Main social and economic structures in the early republic

The total population of Turkey in 1927 was 13 million 648 thousand people. Average life span from birth was 32 years.²⁵⁰ If a person survives until the age of 5, then life span was around 49 years in average.²⁵¹ The total population reached around 21 million in 1950. Of the population over 15 years old, 18 percent in 1935 and 31 percent in 1950 were literate.²⁵² The destructive effects of the long wars on the social and economic structures of the early republic was significant. According to the 1927 census, 30 percent of the women were widowed and only 5 percent of the lands were under cultivation.²⁵³

Regarding the Muslim and non-Muslim population ratio, the republic was much more homogenous than the empire. Christian peoples made only 2.4 percent of the population in 1927, and 1.4 percent in 1935²⁵⁴. Non-Muslim peoples had the highest percentage in Istanbul (35.2%), Edirne (18.4%), and İzmir (13.8%) in 1927. Within the Islamic population, the major divide was between Sunni and Alevi people. There has never been official data for the Alevi population in Turkey, a common estimation is that it is around 10-15 percent of the total population.²⁵⁵ Based on the ethno-linguistic measurements of the official censuses, around 85-87 percent of the population was Turkish, and 8-10 percent was Kurdish/Zaza between 1927 and 1965.²⁵⁶ The Kurdish and Zaza population concentrated in eastern and especially south-eastern regions of the country.

The early republic was largely a rural society. 24 percent of the population lived in the towns and cities; and 76 percent lived in the villages.²⁵⁷ These rates remained similar until 1950s. The percentage of rural population increased towards the eastern provinces by around 7-10 percent.²⁵⁸ A third category of population that can be mentioned was the semi-nomadic tribes which lived off animal husbandry mostly in the eastern provinces. There has not been a certain official data for their population, but Beşikçi's guess even for the 1960s was 70-100 thousand.²⁵⁹ Of the working

²⁵⁰ Behar, *Osmanlı imparatorluğu'nun ve türkiye'nin nüfusu*.66

²⁵¹ Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*, 113. Note that Quataert indicates this number as a general estimation for the "last decades of the Ottoman Empire"

²⁵² TÜİK, 2012, p.18

²⁵³ Safiye Yelda Kaya, "Land Use, Peasants, and the Republic: Debates on Land Reform in Turkey 1923-1945" (Ankara, Middle East Technical University, 2014), 67.

²⁵⁴ Fuat Dündar, *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar*, 2. Baskı (Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Civi yazıları, 2000), 57.

²⁵⁵ David Shankland, "The Alevis in Turkey: The Emergence of a Secular Islamic Tradition," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 33 (2005): 20.

²⁵⁶ Dündar, *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar*. 57. Note: I calculated the ratios from the official censuses made available by Dündar. I merged the original categories "Kurdish", "Kirmanca", "Zaza", and "Kirdas" as Kurdish/Zaza.

²⁵⁷ TÜİK, 2012, 1923-2011 Genel İstatistikler

²⁵⁸ İsmail Beşikçi, *Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni: Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller* (Ankara: E Yayınları, 1970), 37.

²⁵⁹ Beşikçi, 43.

population, 89.9 percent in 1927 and 84.3 percent in 1950 was employed in agriculture. In short, the rural characteristics of the society remained similar and dominant in this period.

I explained the development of market and private property relations in the Ottoman Empire in the previous chapter. I argued that the rural elite started to appropriate large lands throughout the 18th and 19th centuries and legalize the status of their properties in the Ottoman legal modernization processes. These processes created large inequalities in the land ownership of the population. There are data on the land ownership patterns in the official censuses of 1913, 1927 and 1937 but scholars argue that their reliability is controversial.²⁶⁰ It is known that there was not a radical land redistribution reform either in the Ottoman Empire or in the Republic. It is not possible to trace the trajectory of land concentration or de-concentration. However, Tezel argues that the Civil Code of 1926 caused further concentration of lands in favour of the big landholders.²⁶¹ Below, I will refer to the 1952 survey and 1963 census to discuss the land ownership.²⁶²

Table 5: Land ownership structures in 1952 and 1963²⁶³

Size of the owned land (decare)	1952 Agricultural Survey		1963 Agricultural Census	
	Percentage of the agricultural enterprise	Percentage of the total land	Percentage of the agricultural enterprise	Percentage of the total land
1-20	30.5	4.3	40.9	7
21-50	31.5	14.3	27.8	17.4
51-100	21.6	20.6	18.1	23.9
101-200	10.2	19.3	9.4	23.7
201-500	4.2	16.6	3.2	17
500+	1.6	24.8	0.5	11
Total	100	100	100	100

Barkan argues that the amount of land a peasant family needs to cultivate for subsistence farming is 100 decare in the early republic period.²⁶⁴ Based on this criterion, one can argue that 83 percent of the rural population was either living at or under the subsistence levels at that time. Obviously,

²⁶⁰ Kaya, "Land Use, Peasants, and the Republic: Debates on Land Reform in Turkey 1923-1945," 9.

²⁶¹ Yahya S. Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisat Tarihi (1923-1950)* (Ankara: Yurt Yayıncılık, 1982), 344.

²⁶² Note: The 1950 census is also regarded reliable. Findings in the 1950 census and 1952 survey are very similar. But 1952 is a bit more detailed. Therefore I opted to use the survey.

²⁶³ Makal Ahmet, "Türkiye'de 1950-1965 Döneminde Tarım Kesiminde İşgücü ve Ücretli Emeğe İlişkin Gelişmeler," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 56, no. 3 (2001): 108.

²⁶⁴ Oya Köymen, *Kapitalizm ve Köylülük: Ağalar, Üretenler ve Patronlar*, 1. ed, Yordam Kitap 54 (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2008), 120. Note: The amount of lands needed for subsistence farming is estimated as 70 decare in average in Turkey in 1970s. (Köymen, 202)

the amount of land a family needs for subsistence change from one location to another based on the factors such as the quality of the soil, weather and irrigation opportunities. Still, it can be argued that a large chunk of the rural population lived in the subsistence levels.²⁶⁵ On the other hand, the data show that 1.6 percent of the rural enterprises owned around 25 percent of the cultivated lands in 1952. The richest 10 percentile of the rural population cultivated 49.8 of the total cultivated lands and extracted 57.3 percent of the total agricultural revenues.²⁶⁶ The amount of land that these top landholders declined in 1963; however Makal argues that the data in this year might not be very reliable since the big landholders did not report the correct numbers amidst the land reform debates.²⁶⁷ Regarding the landless peasantry, estimations generally vary between 5 percent and 20 percent for the 1940s and 1950s. This ratio increases in the eastern provinces.²⁶⁸ Beşikci argues that landless peasants in eighteen eastern provinces are 38 percent of the total farmer families in the 1960s. This ratio is 27 percent in twelve western provinces in his research. On the other hand, the undersecretary of Agriculture Ministry argues that landless peasants make 8-10 percent of all rural population in 1957.²⁶⁹

In brief, despite the lack of full reliability and precision, data regarding the land ownership and agricultural relations show that the society in the rural areas in Turkey was polarized between a small group of wealthy large landowners and a majority of peasantry who live in subsistence levels if not less. Big landowners mostly lived in towns and cities. They also involved in businesses of commerce and moneylending to peasants. They leased their lands fully or for sharecropping. Thus, sharecropping and agricultural wageworkers emerged as common forms of employment in the rural areas. Peasants who owned lands less than subsistence levels worked as sharecroppers in the big landholders' lands.²⁷⁰ This type of work patterns increased in the eastern provinces. Such moneylending, leasing, and commerce activities created a dependency relationship between the rural elite and the rural poor. This position of the rural elite also constituted a political leverage vis-a-vis the central politics and a source for clientelist politics.

As a periphery country, the industry was very weak. The share of agricultural products predominated the country's export Consumer goods predominated the first decade of the

²⁶⁵ Kaya, "Land Use, Peasants, and the Republic: Debates on Land Reform in Turkey 1923-1945," 109. The undersecretary of Agriculture Ministry Aktan argues that half of the population did not have enough land in 1957.

²⁶⁶ Köymen, *Kapitalizm ve Köylülük*, 209.

²⁶⁷ Ahmet, "Türkiye'de 1950-1965 Döneminde Tarım Kesiminde İşgücü ve Ücretli Emeğe İlişkin Gelişmeler," 108.

²⁶⁸ "Besikci - 1970 - Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni.Pdf," n.d., 60.

²⁶⁹ Kaya, "Land Use, Peasants, and the Republic: Debates on Land Reform in Turkey 1923-1945," 109.

²⁷⁰ Köymen, *Kapitalizm ve Köylülük*, 106–7.

republic's import. After the etatist industrialization started in the 30s, the share of capital goods in import increased significantly until the Second World War.

Table 6: Export by sectors and import by product groups

Year	Export (%)			Import (%)		
	Agriculture	Industry	Other	Capital goods	Consumer goods	Raw material and intermediate goods
1923	74.3	13.9	11.8	4	66	20
1925	74.9	15.5	9.6	7	57	23
1930	74.8	12.6	12.6	12	42	32
1935	79.3	7.6	13.1	18	26	40
1938	83.2	5	11.8	40.8	25.8	33.3
1940	76.1	12.6	11.3	12	22	54
1945	86.4	3.3	10.3	19	15	46
1947	82.6	7.5	9.9	32.3	29	38.8
1950	86.1	5.7	8.2	46	20.7	33.3

Industry was mostly composed of light industry and small manufactures in the early republic. According to the 1927 industry census, only 256 thousand people were employed in light industry and manufacture sector. 98.7 percent of these worked in enterprises which employ 10 or less employees.²⁷¹ Therefore, one cannot mention a sizeable industrial working class, let alone an organized one, in the early years of the republic. The size of the urban wage-labourers expanded significantly after the etatist industrialization policies of the 1930s. The official employment surveys of 1937, 1938 and 1943 comprise the urban enterprises which employ more than 10 workers more strictly, and the enterprises which employ between 5 and 10 workers less strictly. The data show that the number of registered industrial working class reached 249 thousand in 1937 and 268 thousand in 1943.²⁷² Around half of the industrial workers concentrated in three provinces between 1937 and 1943. These provinces are Istanbul (21.7 percent of the total in 1943), İzmir (18.9 percent), and Zonguldak (12.4 percent).²⁷³ The latter was a hub for mining industry. There is no data that cover all the wage earners in the country in the 30s and 40s. Based on estimations of the era, Makal argues that around 600 thousand in non-agricultural sector, and 800 thousand in total could be upper limit for the estimations of the total number of waged workers.

²⁷¹ Ahmet Makal, *Türkiye'de Tek Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri, 1920-1946*, 1. baskı (Kızılay, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999), 215.

²⁷² Makal, 306

²⁷³ Makal, 309

The industry, and therefore the industrial bourgeoisie, were weak in the early republic. The dominant and organized faction of the bourgeoisie was commercial bourgeoisie in the big cities and rural bourgeoisie in the provinces. The former worked as agencies of big foreign brands such as Ford in the biggest cities, but they also involved in domestic trade.²⁷⁴ The latter combined the functions of domestic trade, moneylending, and agricultural rent. Between these two, commercial bourgeoisie was dominant and thus received majority of the credits in the 1930s.²⁷⁵ The industrial bourgeoisie did not even have its separate business association until the 1950s.²⁷⁶ The commercial bourgeoisie grew stronger by taking advantage of the opportunities during the Second World War and in the period followed the war because of the expansion of the international trade.²⁷⁷ Only then the commercial bourgeoisie started to involve in industry gradually. State enterprises predominated the industrial sector after statist economic policies were enacted in 1930s.

To sum up, the early republic had a religiously homogenous population compared to the empire. Ethno-linguistically, only Kurdish/Zaza population had a significant presence as a separate group; and this group also had a concentration in the south-eastern region. The population was predominantly rural and lived in subsistence levels. Land ownership in the rural areas was polarized between a rural bourgeoisie and poor peasantry. The rural bourgeoisie combined the economic functions of agricultural rent, moneylending, and commerce. Thus emerged a dependency relationship between them and the peasants in the absence of independent peasant organization capabilities. This dependency relationship intensified towards the eastern and especially south-eastern provinces. This economic power of the rural elite also became their political power vis-à-vis the central politics. Industry and industrial bourgeoisie and working class were not significant in the early republic. Commercial bourgeoisie who involved in import and domestic trade was dominant in the private sector in the urban life. State became predominant after 1930s, and an industrial working class started to emerge gradually. Only after the Second World War, both industrial bourgeoisie and working class started to make their presence felt gradually.

²⁷⁴ Özgür Öztürk, *Türkiye’de Büyük Sermaye Grupları: Finans Kapitalin Oluşumu ve Gelişimi*, 1. Basım, Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı ; Küreselleşme Dizisi, 29. 13 (Beyoğlu, İstanbul: SAV, 2010), 148.

²⁷⁵ Öztürk, 148

²⁷⁶ Öztürk, 139-140

²⁷⁷ Öztürk, 120

3.2.2 External relations

As opposed to the other defeated countries of the Central Powers, the Turkish side did not sign the initial peace treaty, the Sevres; and it started a resistance movement to alter the terms of the treaty. Consequently, the war officially ended for Turkey in 1923 with the signing of Lausanne Treaty which reversed some of the Sevres Treaty's terms in favour of Turkey. In contrast to other defeated countries, the relatively better terms became a motive for Turkey to take side in the 'anti-revisionist' camp in the post-war conditions.²⁷⁸ In other words, the main goal of the young republic in international relations became to protect its territorial integrity and the international status-quo. Turkey's goal was to improve relationship with the western powers without harming its relationship with the Soviet Union. The Turkish-Soviet non-Aggression and Friendship Agreement was signed in 1925. Turkey joined the League of Nations in 1932.

The post-war status quo started to change with the rise of fascism and Nazism in Italy and Germany. Turkey signed the Balkan Pact with the anti-revisionist group in the Balkans, namely Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia, to improve the relationship against possible revisionist attempts of Bulgaria and Italy in the region. Turkey also aimed to improve peaceful relationship in the east. A non-aggression pact named the Treaty of Sadabad was signed between Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey in 1937.

Consequently, the world war erupted in 1939. Turkey's main policy was to stay neutral and resist the pressure of different sides to get her involved in the war. Even so, the Foreign Affairs Ministry believed before the war that Britain's side would win a war against Germany.²⁷⁹ Therefore, its goal was to sign a defensive alliance with Britain and France. This alliance was signed in 1939. The countries agreed for aid and assistance against a military attack in the Mediterranean region. The implication regarding the Mediterranean was the Italian threat. After the treaty, Turkey significantly lowered its trade size with Germany which was its primary partner in foreign trade in the 1930s.²⁸⁰ Italy joined the war and attacked the Balkans in 1940. However, France had surrendered earlier that year, and Turkey claimed that this cancelled the obligation for Turkey to join the war. After Germany occupied Romania and Bulgaria and reached Turkey's borders in 1941, Turkey aimed to improve its relationship with Germany to protect itself. The Turkish-German non-Aggression and Friendship Treaty was signed in 1941. The size of the German-Turkish trade which had declined

²⁷⁸ William M. Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası, 1774-2000* (İstanbul: Arkeoloji ve Sanat Yayınları, 2003), 50.

²⁷⁹ Hale, 56

²⁸⁰ Hale, 79

after the agreement with Britain and France reached its former size by 1942.²⁸¹ The most important product exported to Germany was chrome which was used to produce steel and weapons. Shortly after the Turkish-German treaty, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Britain and the Soviets increased their pressure on Turkey to join the war on their sides, but the Turkish side resisted these demands. It feared that Germany could defeat Turkey easily before the military aid, and that the Soviets could have long term impact once they stepped in the Turkish lands.²⁸²

By 1944, Britain and the Soviet Union backed down the opinion to pull Turkey into the war. Stalin started to criticise the Montreux Treaty and Turkey's rights on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. Turkey's relationship to Britain and USSR deteriorated during the war. Especially, the deteriorated relationship with the Soviet Union became the major concern of Turkey in the very aftermath of the war. The Soviet resentment emerged upon the fact that Turkey allowed some German battleships to cross the straits through the Black Sea. After the war, the Soviets announced that they would not extend the 1925 Turkish-Soviet non-aggression and friendship treaty.²⁸³ Turkey sought for alliance with the Soviet Union to prevent further deterioration of the relationship. The Soviets' made two offers, albeit unofficially, to negotiate to build such an alliance. Accordingly, Turkey was to give Kars and Ardahan region in the northwest Anatolia to the Soviet Union which were left to Turkey in 1921; and it was to provide a base in the Bosphorus.²⁸⁴ Turkey did not insist on its quest for an alliance with the Soviet Union upon this. However, this incident particularly, and the broader "Soviet threat" perception in general, shaped the post-war politics internally and externally. It became a useful tool to build authoritarian anti-leftist discourse and policies in internal politics, and to ask for aid and protection from the western bloc in external politics.

Turkey declared war to Germany and Japan in February 1945, hence fulfilled the condition to join the founding summit of the United Nations and became a founding member of the organization. Churchill announced the new axis of global conflict in his 1946 speech where he mentioned the "iron curtain". The Truman Doctrine announced USA's intention for "support for democracies against authoritarian threats", and Turkey was included in the Marshall Plan for economic and military aid in 1948. It also became a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) the same year. Turkey also attempted to join NATO in 1948 but this first

²⁸¹ Hale, 89

²⁸² Hale, 93

²⁸³ Hale, 99-100

²⁸⁴ Gencer Özcan, *Kuşku ile Komşuluk: Türkiye ve Rusya İlişkilerinde Değişen Dinamikler*, ed. Evren Balta and Burç Beşgöl, 1. Baskı, Bugünün Kitapları 219 (Fatih, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017), 62.

attempt failed. Briefly, the mono-party regime of CHP aimed to take part in the western bloc and started to join the organizations of it in the aftermath of the war.

3.2.3 Economic policies

The 1923 İzmir Economy Congress was the first big summit to determine the macro plans for economy in the new period. Representatives of commercial bourgeoisie, industrialists, workers, and farmers joined the congress. The congress which was summoned during the peace talks in Lausanne in 1923 had an implicit message for the domestic and foreign actors. It was that the new republic was to choose the non-socialist way of development and that it would not exclude the private sector.²⁸⁵ On the other hand, CHP retained ITC's project of creating a national economy and national bourgeoisie. For that reason, state was also involved in infrastructural investments. Railroads were nationalized, and resources were spent to extend the railroads over the country. Sea transport became forbidden to foreign enterprises. Regarding the goal of nurturing the national bourgeoisie, the İş Bank was founded in 1924, and it became the hub to bring together the politicians and businessmen. The 1920s became the golden age for the commercial bourgeoisie who take advantage of their relationship to the state, and more specifically the İş Bank.²⁸⁶ "The İş bank circle" that gathered around Celal Bayar started to emerge as one of the factions within CHP these years. Simultaneously, they were accused of corruption/opportunism by other circles within the party. Later, the etatist faction that is led by İsmet İnönü emerged as a rival group in economy policies within the party²⁸⁷.

The other important decision of the 1923 economy congress was to remove the traditional tithe (*aşar*). Tithe revenue was vital and made one fifth of the 1924 budget.²⁸⁸ The state aimed to gain the consent of the peasantry who paid the heaviest burden during the long wars. Also, this was considered as a tool to increase the agricultural production for relief in the extreme poverty conditions of the post-war period. The revenue loss which stemmed from the removal of the tithe was compensated by increasing the indirect taxes. This policy negatively affected the urban wage-earners. The state also enacted livestock tax and road tax for compensation of the tithe. This affected disproportionately the small peasantry who had few animals compared to the wealthier rural population. The peasants who could not pay the road tax also had to work in the construction

²⁸⁵ Öztürk, *Türkiye'de Büyük Sermaye Grupları*, 139.

²⁸⁶ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2002*, 9. ed (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2005).

²⁸⁷ Uyar, "Türkiye'de Tek Parti Döneminde İktidar ve Muhalefet 1923-1950." 57.

²⁸⁸ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2002*, 53.

of the roads. These two reduced the popularity of the mono-party regime among the small peasantry masses.²⁸⁹ In sum, the main policy caused a shift of resources from the urban working classes to the rural population in this period.²⁹⁰ However, among the rural population, the beneficiaries were the big landholders and medium peasantry.

1920s was a period of recovery after the world war. The mono-party regime never took the non-capitalist way of development, and it aimed to nurture a national bourgeoisie to make industrial development. Nonetheless, this goal did not yield tangible results and wealth for the masses. Also, the Great Depression of 1929 affected the periphery countries disproportionately since the raw material prices declined more than the prices of industrial products. Wheat prices declined 68 percent between 1929 and 1932.²⁹¹ The short-lived Free Republican Party (SCF) drew significant attention in a short amount of time in 1930. The support mainly came from the lower classes in the regions that were integrated to market relations.²⁹² In such a conjuncture, state had an etatist turn in 1930s and started to establish state enterprises in industry. Following the successful Soviet example, the First Five-Year Development Plan was enacted in 1933. By the end of 1930s, the state enterprises succeeded to produce basic consumption products such as flour, sugar and textile domestically. The first enterprises in the metallurgy, steel, chemical, and paper sectors were established in this period as well. Private industry also started to improve gradually in the period. In general, the resources that channelled to industrialization were mainly extracted from the rural sectors, especially from the wheat producers. The domestic terms of trade for agriculture, which is measured as the average ratio of wheat, cotton and tobacco prices to the manufacture prices, declined around 25 percent between 1929 and 1934, and it remained at around this level until 1939.²⁹³

The Second World War disrupted the economic policies of the 30s. Although Turkey did not join the war, the government increased the defence expenditures significantly. Conscription of the peasants declined the agricultural output tremendously. Prices for basic goods increased, and shortages and black markets emerged. The measures of the government²⁹⁴ to feed the army lay the burden on the poor segments of the peasants disproportionately. Because the big landholding bourgeoisie and middle farmers who produce for the market could also take advantage of the

²⁸⁹ Kaya, "Land Use, Peasants, and the Republic: Debates on Land Reform in Turkey 1923-1945," 89.

²⁹⁰ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2002*, 55

²⁹¹ Boratav, 63,67

²⁹² Çetin Yetkin, *Atatürk'ün "Vatana İhanet"le Suçlanması: Türk Demokrasi Tarihinde "Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası" Olayı*, 3. Basım (İstanbul: Otopsi yayınları, 2004), 243-44.

²⁹³ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2002*, 78-79

²⁹⁴ These measures were based on primarily the National Protection Law in 1940.

increasing agricultural products and compensate their losses. The increasing prices also affected the wage-labourers negatively in the cities. The graph below²⁹⁵ shows the trajectory of the industry real wages and consumer prices between 1925 and 1945. While the former had a sharp decline, the latter had a sharp increase during the war.




Figure 1: Industry real wages and consumer prices indexes between

On the other hand, a group of merchants made big profits out of black-market opportunities. The government made two important attempts to compensate the war-time profiteers. The first one was the Capital Levy Law in 1942 that aimed to extract the rapid enrichment of the commercial bourgeoisie. The share of capital levy to all tax revenues was 42 percent that year. This was by far the record in the history of Turkey for the share of capital levy in all tax revenues collected in a year.²⁹⁶ However, in practice, the law disproportionately affected the Istanbul bourgeoisie that deals with import sector. More specifically, it targeted disproportionately the non-Muslim citizens.²⁹⁷ The government's second move was to extract the excessive war-time profits in the agricultural sector through the Soil Products Tax Law in 1943. This was the re-enactment of a direct tax on the agricultural sector since the removal of tithe. It was a heavy burden on the poor segments of the peasantry. In short, the relative winner of the war-time economy was the rural bourgeoisie.²⁹⁸

The ruling elite of the mono-party regime aimed to involve in the western bloc in the post-war period. The regime decided that democratic opening would also serve this purpose. CHP sought

²⁹⁵ Yıldırım Koç, *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi: Osmanlı'dan 2020'ye*, 1st ed (Kaynak Yayınları 2021), 328.

²⁹⁶ The second highest year was 1926. Only 18.7 percent of all taxes was extracted through capital levy this year. Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 2018, p.164

²⁹⁷ Kaya, "Land Use, Peasants, and the Republic: Debates on Land Reform in Turkey 1923-1945," 329

²⁹⁸ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2002*, 85

for popular support before the transition to the competitive regime in 1946. Its relationship to the lower classes including the poor segments of the peasantry was turbulent as explained in this section. It was unpopular among them due to the war-time economic conditions and policies. In such a conjuncture, CHP elite aimed to make a land reform with the name the Law for Providing Land to Farmers.²⁹⁹ The double goal was to gain the support of the poor peasantry and increase production. This was not a radical reform that would change the property structures between classes fundamentally. Mainly, it aimed to distribute land out of state land. The organizing commission of the law was led by a big landholder anyway. Nonetheless, there were some radical articles of the law that could potentially threaten big landowners.³⁰⁰ Although the law passed, the conservative deputies showed an unprecedented reaction to it.³⁰¹

In sum, the Capital Levy Law, the Soil Products Tax Law, and the land reform law deteriorated the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the leading cadre of CHP around İnönü. The elite consensus started to break. On the other hand, the CHP leaders could not reverse the long resentment of the popular masses against the party. These elite level and popular level reaction were the reasons behind the quick success of Democrat Party which came to power in 1950 four years after transition to multi-party regime.

3.2.4 Nationhood and cultural policies

The mono-party regime took over some of ITC's cultural policies and it developed new ones in the new demographic conditions. Essentially it aimed to move away from the traditional culture and institutions which were interwoven with Islam and encircles several aspects of life; and it aimed to embrace a new set of constructed secular-Turkish and/or western culture and institutions.

The nationhood project of the republic about religion and culture had arguably three pillars. The first pillar was to continue the process of disestablishment. The second pillar was to monopolize the Islamic institutions. The third pillar was to inhibit the traditional Islamic culture and institutions, and, instead, to adopt western culture and institutions. Regarding disestablishment, the republic reforms continued and finalized separating religion from official state identity, laws, judiciary, and education. The official Islamic identity of the state was abolished. The constitutional article that defines the head of the state as the Caliph, the head of the Islamic state and nation, was repealed

²⁹⁹ Kaya, "Land Use, Peasants, and the Republic: Debates on Land Reform in Turkey 1923-1945," 319

³⁰⁰ The famous article 17 made all lands subject to expropriation.

³⁰¹ Kaya, "Land Use, Peasants, and the Republic: Debates on Land Reform in Turkey 1923-1945," 369

in 1924. The article of the constitution that defines the religion of the state as Islam was repealed in 1928. Another article that defines state as “laic” was added to the constitution in 1937. Judiciary and laws were also fully separated from religion by the republic reforms. Congregational courts and the limited judicial authority of the clerics were abolished. Shari courts whose jurisdiction had already been restricted to civil law by ITC were abolished completely. This also meant the removal of the clergy from the judicial sphere completely. The duality in judiciary which was caused by the coexistence of Islamic courts and modern courts that had continued all along the Ottoman modernization thus ended.

Civil code, the only part of law that remained in the realm of religion, was also secularized by the Republic’s reforms with the enactment of the new civil code in 1926 which is based on the Swiss civil code. New civil code aimed towards equality between man and woman. It banned polygamy. It made civil marriage obligatory (contrary to the tradition of unofficial religious marriage carried out by Imams). Men and women became equal in their testimonies in courts, in inheritance and divorce. In 1934, women were given the right to vote in parliamentary elections although party politics was not competitive. The republic also continued disestablishment in education. The traditional religion schools (*madrasa*) were shut down in 1924. Quran course was removed from the curriculum in 1924.³⁰² Religion courses were removed from the curriculum in 1929.³⁰³

After these reforms of disestablishment in the constitution, laws, judiciary, and education; worship organization and religious service became the only field where state-religion relationship remained institutionally intact. The policy of the republic in this field was to monopolize Islam by banning private institutionalized religion in civil society sphere and authorize state on the religious service and worships. For that aim, Presidency of Religious Affairs was founded in 1924, and it was authorized to carry out the administration of all mosques and their personnel in towns. Villages and village mosques, however, remained autonomous and far from the centre’s influence at least until the 1960s.³⁰⁴ The mono-party regime banned all the religious orders such as Bektashi, Mevlevi, Naqshbandi, and shut down their lodges in 1925. This pushed the orders to the underground. In 1938, a law banned opening a foundation related to congregational activities. Sacred tombs were closed for visit. Religious titles were forbidden to use except state officials. This meant that religious service could be carried out only in state-controlled mosques in public sphere except remote villages.

³⁰² Budak, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ne İlkokul Programları 1870-1936,” 61.

³⁰³ Alkan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Modernleşme ve Eğitim,” 76.

³⁰⁴ See Bulut, 2001: <https://www.diyanehaber.com.tr/bir-koye-imam-durmak-bir-koyde-imam-olmak>

The other aspect of cultural policies of the mono-party regime was to move away from the traditional Islamic culture. This also meant cultural westernization and integration with western cultural institutions. The Islamic calendar was changed to European calendar in 1925. The official day of rest was changed from Friday to Sunday. To wear religious dress, except for the religious officials, and fez were prohibited the same year. Members of parliament and state officials were obliged to wear western style hats. Atatürk personally introduced caps to citizens in a public meeting and encouraged them to wear it. The alphabet was changed from Arabic script to Latin in 1928. European measurement units were adopted in 1931. Call to prayers in mosques were obliged to be in Turkish instead of its original Arabic version.

The other aspect of the nationhood and culture policies of the mono-party regime of CHP was to build a nation in mono-ethnic terms. The resettlement law in 1934 enforced around 25 thousand Kurdish citizens to be resettled in the Western provinces of the country.³⁰⁵ A military operation to Dersim, which was a de-facto semi-autonomous Kurdish/Zaza majority province, caused thousands of deaths in 1937-1938. Despite this, these policies were not applied in a systematic way to the extent to annihilate the Kurdish/Zaza population and/or disperse a plurality of the Kurdish/Zaza population over the country. Therefore, I argue that the main strategy of the mono-party CHP vis-a-vis the Kurds (and other smaller ethnic groups) was slow assimilation through education, and prohibitions on ethno-cultural activities and language. The state monopolized education in the country in 1924 and made education in Turkish language the only possible option. The republic inherited ITC's ethnic outlook in historiography in education which had an ethnic emphasis on Turkishness and ethnic Turkish roots.³⁰⁶ Systematic exile of the Kurdish elite such as sheiks and tribe leaders to break the elite-people connection was the other main policy of slow assimilation.³⁰⁷ A decree of the ministry of the internal affairs in 1940 changed the names of several villages which did not have "Turkish-sounding" names.³⁰⁸ Regarding the bans on language, regime capacity was low to reach villages and rural areas. Therefore, these forced assimilation policies against Kurds who constituted the majority in their regions were never thoroughly effective in reality.

³⁰⁵ Mesut Yeğen, "The Kurdish Question in Turkey: Denial to Recognition," in *Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue*, ed. Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics 26 (London New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2010), 67–84.

³⁰⁶ Budak, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne İlkokul Programları (1870-1936)," 60.

³⁰⁷ David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London: Tauris, 2004), 209–10.

³⁰⁸ Harun Tunçel, "Türkiye'de İsmi Değiştirilen Köyler," *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 10, no. 2 (2000): 27.

To establish the new culture and ideology and to increase literacy among the overwhelmingly rural population in the technical conditions and capacities of the time was a hard task for the mono-party regime. For that purpose, the mono-party regime established People's Houses (*Halkevleri*) in the provinces in the 1930s, People's Rooms (*Halkodaları*) in the big villages in the 1940s, and Village Institutes (*Köy Enstitüleri*) in the 1940s. The Village Institutes' goal was to raise village teachers rapidly to overcome the literacy problem in the countryside in a short amount of time. Also, teachers were trained to teach essential knowledge in agriculture, basic construction and carpentry, economic and social life. In a sense, it was a project to raise conscious peasants for the new, modern life. This worried the rural elite who took advantage of the dependency relationship with the peasants as explained before. This reaction also reflected in a conservative faction within CHP. The village institutes were accused of being a "communist project" and immoral because of mixed education of girls and boys.³⁰⁹

Finally, the post-war conjuncture and the decision to transition to a competitive regime in 1946 was a turning point in policies of culture. Religion courses were introduced in schools; courses to train imams and Quran courses were opened in this period. In short, the mono-party regime of CHP decided to ease its cultural policies upon the need for popular support.

3.2.5 Political system, institutions, and freedoms

The legal legitimacy of the mono-party regime was based on the 1924 Constitution. Although the constitution stipulated the supremacy of the constitution, there was not a separate judicial institution (i.e., constitutional court) to check the legislations.³¹⁰ The courts were independent and bounded by the laws in the constitution. But the transferral and appointment of the judges were subject to a special law and to the parliament.³¹¹ The constitution identified the parliament as the organ with supreme authority. In practice, however, its power was subject to the president. The electoral system played a critical role in this. The two-stage election system of the Ottoman Empire was inherited by the republic. Accordingly, the primary voters elected the electoral colleges in each constituency; and the electoral colleges chose the deputies. The candidate deputies for the parliament were vetted by the president and through deliberation with the vice-president and

³⁰⁹ Uyar, "Türkiye'de Tek Parti Döneminde İktidar ve Muhalefet 1923-1950," 61–61 & 261–62.

³¹⁰ Mehmet Kabasakal and Ergun Özbudun, eds., "Türkiye'nin Anayasa Sorunu," in *Türkiye'de Siyasal Yaşam: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, 1. ed, (Şişli, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2016), 27.

³¹¹ Mehmet Kabasakal, ed., "Hukuk Devleti ve Yargının Bağımsızlığı," in *Türkiye'de Siyasal Yaşam: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, by Serap Yazıcı, 1. ed, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları ; Siyaset Bilimi, 569. 56 (Şişli, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2016), 88.

general secretary.³¹² In short, the president who was also the chairperson of the ruling party had the supreme political authority and power. The system was lack of separation of powers, and of legal mechanisms of checks and balances.

Two important set of laws of the mono-party regime that strictly restricted freedom of association were the 141st-142nd articles and the 163rd article of the penal law which were adapted from the Italian penal code in 1936. The article 163 penalized the associations that aim to base social, economic, political and legal order of the state on religion. In practice, this law would prohibit politicized religious movements, associations, and parties. The 141st and 142nd articles penalized heavily to establish associations that operate on class-struggle. In practice, these laws criminalized any kind of socialistic/left-leaning party, and independent labour movement. Therefore, although the authoritarian anti-labour policies would dominate the Turkey's political system during the Cold War as it will be discussed more extensively in the subsequent sections, the beginning of this policy was in the mono-party regime. On the other hand, the law of associations was softened in 1946 when CHP decided to transition to a competitive regime. The first independent labour unions and left-wing parties emerged in 1946. But they were shut down in six months with the accusation of being under the influence of left-wingers.³¹³ The 1947 law of labour relations stipulated that the unions were to be nation-oriented and not international-oriented; and that they would be non-political.³¹⁴ Thus, the transitory regime aimed to cut the ties between labour movement with party politics, and with international organizations.

3.2.6 Socio-political and ideological divisions in the mono-party regime of CHP

I argued in the previous chapter that the Independence War was carried out as a Muslim alliance of the central and provincial elite in the predominantly agrarian Turkish society. These were namely the civilian and military bureaucracy, intellectuals, clergy, provincial commercial and landholding bourgeoisie, and the chieftains of the Kurdish tribes. The ideology of this alliance was Islamic nationalism. The mono-party regime of CHP retained this alliance. As argued in the previous sections, CHP did not have any radical attempt to alter the relations of production through a comprehensive land reform. Like ITC, CHP had to rely on the rural commercial and landholding bourgeoisie to be able to control the provinces. This alliance determined the capacities and limits

³¹² Uyar, 191.

³¹³ Karpaz, *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi, 1800-2012*, 200.

³¹⁴ Fatih Yaşlı, *Antikomünizm, Ülkücü Hareket, Türkeş: Türkiye ve Soğuk Savaş*, 2. Ed., Yordam Kitap 337 (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2020a), 37.

of the regime for its cultural and institutional reforms. I explained CHP's policies and their trajectory in the mono-party period in the categories of external relations, economy, nationhood and culture, and political system. In this section I will briefly discuss CHP's self-proclaimed ideology and sum up the main ideological divisions during this mono-party period.

The ideology of CHP in the mono-party regime is an unresolved debate in the literature. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches. The first camp portrayed the Kemalist ideology as a conservative one. Politically, this corresponded to a permanent authoritarian regime³¹⁵, and even to a regime with totalitarian inclinations³¹⁶. Economically, this corresponded to conserving the dominant relations of production and inequalities between different classes.³¹⁷ Culturally, this corresponded to illiberal homogenization of the society.³¹⁸ The second camp's main argument is that the mono-party regime of CHP was a tutelary and liberalizing autocracy. In other words, it is argued that the party aimed to make reforms gradually to prepare the society to a full democratic regime.³¹⁹ In his seminal work *Political Parties*, Duverger distinguishes between totalitarian and non-totalitarian parties within the group of single-party regimes, and argues that CHP is the best example of the latter. He argues that CHP was not totalitarian either in ideas or organization. Its ideology was democratic and pragmatic. Its main goal was to Westernize Turkey. The party's anti-clericalism stems from the fact that Islam is the primary obstacle for modernization in the Middle East. According to Duverger, CHP's liberalism and nationalism resemble to that of 1848 movements in Europe. He argues that CHP is comparable to French Radical Socialist party.³²⁰ This argument has a basis because CHP was invited to the Radical International which gathered the centrist and centre-left parties of Europe in Karlsruhe in 1927. CHP participated the congress as an observer but decided not to be a member.

Both camps have valid points. I argue that this is because the mono-party regime of CHP undertook multiple tasks in a late-capitalist, semi-feudal country in a special context of the history, i.e., the interwar period. The party undertook or aimed to complete the tasks of state-building, nation-building, building the institutions of political liberalism, and industrialization simultaneously which spread over a much longer time period in early capitalist countries. The elite social basis of the party determined the capacities, limits, and trajectory of these tasks. Moreover, the novel

³¹⁵ Demirel, *Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet*, 608–9.

³¹⁶ Taha Parla, *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm* (İstanbul: Metis Yayıncılık, 1993), 8.

³¹⁷ Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi [Modernisation, Kemalism and Democracy]*, 224–29.

³¹⁸ Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 6–7.

³¹⁹ Duverger, *Political Parties*, 275–80.; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Siyasal Kurumlar ve Anayasa Hukuku* (Ankara: Cumhuriyet, 2000), 313–15.

³²⁰ Duverger, 276

regimes of fascism and communism of the period were able to influence positively or negatively the orientations of the party.

I argue that the primary element in CHP's ideology during the mono-party regime was to "raise Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization". This motto has been emphasized in several party documents of CHP during the mono-party period since the 1923 party bylaws.³²¹ Contemporary civilization was the Western countries that are economically capitalist and wealthy, politically democratic, and powerful in external affairs. The content of this pro-Western-modernization ideology was shaped pragmatically. Although precise ideological targets were stated in the party documents, I argue that the party did not embrace a conventional, stable, holistic ideology. Rather its westernization ideology was pragmatic, it evolved over time under different influences; and as a founding umbrella party, groups and factions with different ideological orientations coexisted within the party. The ideas of different groups were welcomed or excluded based on the internal and external political climate and needs.

In 1923, CHP bylaws mentioned the *populism* principle. In 1927, CHP party program indicated *republicanism, populism, nationalism* as three main principles, and it defined and embraced *laicism* as a principle without calling its name. In 1931, *etatism* and *revolutionism* were added to the main principles in the party program and the six principles took their ultimate form. The Six Arrows has been the logo of the party until today. Here I will briefly discuss the historical trajectory of the party's ideology, the six main principles, different orientations, and divisions within the party.

The first bylaw of CHP³²² was enacted in 1923. The first article defined the goal of the party as "to guide to implement the national will by people and for people; and to raise Turkey to the state of a contemporary state; and to work to make the authority of the law superior to all forces. The second article called the party members as "populists", and made a definition of the people as follows:

"For the People's Party, the notion of people is not exclusive to a class. All the individuals who do not claim any privileges, and who accept the absolute equality before laws in general are of people. Populists are individuals who do not accept the privileges of any family, any class, and congregation, any individual; and who accept absolute freedom and independence to execute the laws."³²³

³²¹ Most famously, this remark is made in the speech delivered by Atatürk on the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the republic as follows: "We shall raise our national culture above the contemporary level of civilization."

³²² Then named *People's Party*

³²³ Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması 1923 - 1931*, 6. ed (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012), 362. Translation from Turkish is mine.

As I argued earlier, the goal to raise Turkey to the level of a modern state was the main ideological element of CHP. The articles highlight two essential liberal/constitutionalist principles. These are the supremacy of law and equality before the law. The rejection of the privilege to any congregation is the manifestation of the goal to transition from a traditional society that is organized in the forms of communities with different rights and duties to a modern society that is composed of individuals with same rights and duties legally. This also reflects the liberal-nationalism principle that Duverger identifies. The rejection of the privilege to any family is a reference to the Ottoman dynasty. This reflects the republicanism arrow of the party. The definition of republicanism in the 1927 and 1935 programs contrast republicanism to despotic regimes (*implying the Ottoman dynasty*) and argue that republic is the best state form to establish national sovereignty.³²⁴

The rejection to privilege to any class took place under the populism principle in all party programs since 1923. The 1935 program argues that people in Turkey is not composed of different conflicting classes. Rather it is argued that the society was divided according to division of labour of “farmers, artisans, shopkeepers and workers, self-employed people, industrialists, merchants”.³²⁵ Indeed, the Turkish society was overwhelmingly a rural society, and the conditions for a class conflict in the form of an industrial proletariat and capitalist class as in the Western and Soviet cases did not exist. On the other hand, this principle worked in practice as an authoritarian rule that prohibited class-based politics even when these conditions started to emerge as I explained in the previous sections. Toprak argues that the ideological source of such solidaristic discourses were the French solidarists of the Third French Republic.³²⁶ And the peculiar characteristic of such solidarist thinking is that they operate on a slippery ground, and thus can take the form of both left-wing and right-wing politics.³²⁷

The emphases on the notions of “national will” and “people” demonstrate CHP’s concern for popular legitimacy. Although competitive elections did not exist until 1950, it can be argued that one of the facades of the populism principle was the proto-democratic orientation of CHP. The populism principle referred to nation as the source of sovereignty in the 1927 and 1935 programs. The first attempt to transition to a multi-party regime in 1930 with the foundation of SCF, and the permission for the independent deputies of the 1935 elections are signs of this orientation too. Atatürk’s remarks to Okyar, the founder of the SCF, supports this argument:

³²⁴ 1927 CHP Program,3; 1935 CHP Program, 6.

³²⁵ 1935 CHP Program, 8

³²⁶ Zafer Toprak, *Atatürk Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi* (İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2020), 290.

³²⁷ Toprak, 146

“Our [state’s] outlook is more or less an outlook of a dictatorship. It is a fact that there is a parliament, but they regard us as dictatorship inside and outside [of the country] ... However, I did not make the republic for my personal benefit. We are all mortals. After I die, the institution that I leave behind is a despotic institution. I, however, do not want to bequeath a despotic institution to the nation and go down in history with that image...”³²⁸

Atatürk’s remarks show that he was not pleased with the authoritarian state of the regime and that he did not consider it as an ultimate state in the pro-western modernization goal. The notion of democracy is introduced in secondary schools in 1931 in a book written by Atatürk. Although the book did not highlight contestation of parties as an essential pillar of a democratic regime, it was a sign that the regime aimed to introduce democracy as a value to embrace. The 1931 party program indicates the transition from two-stage elections to one-stage elections as a goal of the party. But it conditioned that the citizens’ knowledge should be raised to a level that they have the capacity, qualities, and instruments to evaluate the people they elect; and that it is more suitable for democracy that people do not elect freely until that capacity is built.³²⁹ This is the tutelary aspect of the proto-democratic inclination of CHP. As stated in the first article of the 1923 bylaws, the party considers itself as the ‘guide’ to the predominantly rural and illiterate Turkish society to implement the national will until the society has the capacity and instruments to do it.

On the other hand, a fascistic orientation, albeit only with regards to the state and party organization, emerged within the party in the 1930s. This orientation was mainly represented by the general secretary Recep Peker. After a trip to Germany and Italy, Peker prepared a new party bylaw that offers to make the party and state organization similar to that of the fascist regimes in 1935. Atatürk declined this offer, and Peker was removed from the general secretary office in 1936.³³⁰ Nonetheless, some steps towards state-party fusion and authoritarianization took place these years. The party dropped the goal to transition to one-stage elections in the 1935 party program which had taken place in the 1931 program. CHP’s six principles were put in the constitution in 1937. The bureaucrat-governors of each province also became CHP’s chairperson for that province until 1939. These show that the democratic orientation of CHP was disrupted during the peak of fascistic regimes in Europe in the 30s. However, the essential features of the totalitarian regimes such as mobilization of the masses and implementing an irredentist foreign

³²⁸ Osman Okyar and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, *Atatürk, Okyar ve Çok Partili Türkiye: Fethi Okyar’ın Anıları*, 3rd Ed., Genel Yayın 365 (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006), 104–5.

³²⁹ Uyar, “Türkiye’de Tek Parti Döneminde İktidar ve Muhalefet 1923-1950,” 275.

³³⁰ Uyar, 237.

policy together with industrialist war economy were not aimed by the CHP regime. The country did not have the capacity and material conditions for those either.

The laicism principle is explained in the 1927 and 1931 programs as separation of religious ideas from state, world and political affairs. This principle complemented the previous ones. The caliph-sultan represented the religious authority that the republicanist principle opposed. The liberal-nationalist principle stipulated that different individuals and groups should be subject to the same laws. In other words, different congregations were not to be subject to different religious laws. Thus, laicism confronted religious laws and the clergy class who had an authority to execute those laws in Shari courts, and who had an authority on education through madrasas. The clergy had been dominated by the state gradually and its function was limited mostly to religious affairs since the 19th century Ottoman modernization except a few fields in judiciary. But the republic aimed to extend this control to the autonomous religious orders and religious elite who had a certain power over the society especially in the provinces. This attempt of social Westernization became a source of tension between the central elite and the provincial elite. Finally, the laicite principle complemented the populism principle since laicism stipulated national will and the parliament as the source of laws (and not the divine law). On the other hand, the goal to separate religion from the world affairs worked in practice as an authoritarian anti-traditionalist attempt to regulate the society according to new western norms since the traditional culture and institutions were interwoven with Islam. As explained in the previous sections, this included policies such as changing the call to prayers from Arabic to Turkish, adopting western calendar and an alphabet, promoting men and women equality before law. A conservative faction within CHP emerged in the 1940s. This group aimed to transform the cultural policies in education in general, and in the People's Houses and Village Institutes in specific, with the claims to stop imitating the west, prevent communist and cosmopolitanist orientations.³³¹

The etatism principle was about the economic approach of the party. The etatism articles in the 1931 and the 1935 party programs both argue that while private enterprise is primary for the party, state's involvement in the economy as an entrepreneur, regulator, and guide for the private sector is necessary for a rapid economic development. The emphasis of CHP on the primacy of the private sector since the beginning was the manifestation of a non-socialist developmentalist policy. But the private sector could not achieve the targeted economic leap until 1930. On the other hand, the achievements of the Soviet Union in that period were tempting. In such a conjuncture, the CHP

³³¹ Burak Cop, "Tek Parti CHP'nin İdeolojisi," in *Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Düzeni: Ordu, Sermaye, ABD, İslamizasyon*, ed. Behlül Özkan and Tolga Gürakar, 1. Baskı (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 2020), 68.

elite had such an etatist turn in the early 30s to increase state enterprises. Such a state-led and private-sector-led developmentalist strategies within the party were also identified with the division between the İnönü circle and the Bayar circle respectively. Also, the short-lived SCF had an economic liberal emphasis in 1930. It is noteworthy that the etatism principle became one of the six arrows of CHP after SCF was founded and claimed to have liberal economic policies. CHP also aimed to distinguish itself from SCF. During these years, a group of left-leaning and former Marxian intellectuals started to publish a journal named *Kadro*. They aimed to produce a socio-economic content to the Kemalist ideology with anti-colonial and etatist ideas. They shared common opinions with the etatists within the party but they never had a representative figure within the leading group. On the other hand, they drew reaction from both the economic liberal (i.e., Bayar and the İşbank circle) and authoritarian factions (i.e., the Peker circle). The journal was shut down in 1934.³³²

The nationalism principle is explained in the 1927 and 1935 programs as to develop the Turkish language and culture which is argued to provide linguistic, sentimental, and ideational unity between the citizens. As I explained above, on the one hand, this was a liberal-nationalist view for a regime that aimed to transition from a congressional/confessional society with different rights and duties to an individualistic society with standard rights and duties. On the other hand, the content of the national identity was constructed in ethno-cultural terms. In practice, these worked as prohibition of non-Turkish cultures in the public sphere. This was the authoritarian aspect of the nationalism principle. While CHP's nationalism was defined in ethno-cultural terms, there was also a distinct racist-fascist ideological wave in the intelligentsia who gathered around the Orhun journal. The leader of this circle, Nihal Atsız, defended the supremacy of the Turkish race, to build a society organized in a hierarchical and militarist way, social Darwinism, and Pan-Turkism. He was an antisemitic, an ardent enemy of communism and cosmopolitanism. Contrary to the assimilationist policies of CHP vis-à-vis the Kurds, he was hostile and exclusionary towards the Kurds.³³³ Initially, the CHP government tolerated this group during the Second World War. Then in 1944, when the Nazi defeat was on the horizon, the group was prosecuted for spreading racism, pan-Turkism and attempting a coup. Initially they had prison sentence that range from some months to some years but the appeal court released them with the verdict that “racism is not a crime in the Turkish constitution”³³⁴. Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) between 1969-1977, was also among the people who were given prison sentence initially.

³³² Uyar, “Türkiye’de Tek Parti Döneminde İktidar ve Muhalefet 1923-1950,” 58.

³³³ Fatih Yaşlı, *Türkçü Faşizmden "Türk-İslam Ülküsü'ne"*, 3rd Ed., (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2020b), 31–66.

³³⁴ Yaşlı, 2020a, Anti-Komünizm, Ülkücü Hareket, Türkeş, p.29

The sixth and the last principle of the CHP's self-proclaimed ideology was **revolutionism**. The 1935 party program explained this principle by contrasting it to gradual and evolutionary way of change.³³⁵ The implication is that the party defends rapid and sharp reforms. Indeed, the republic ended the dual structure of the Ottoman modernization approach where, for example, Shari courts and secular courts, madrasas and secular schools coexisted. The republic reforms sharply abolished many institutions. On the other hand, revolutionism did not mean a radical change in relations of production as in the Chinese, Mexican or Soviet revolutions. They were mostly in the political and cultural domains.

To sum up, the political divisions in the mono-party regime was naturally an intra-party matter except the SCF experience which took only for four months in 1930. SCF was founded by the same regime elite upon Atatürk's request. The party aimed to distinguish itself from CHP in economic policies by supporting liberalism. Although the party lived shortly, it drew significant attention from the lower classes in the regions where market relations were more developed. The impact of the 1929 Great Depression, and the general unpopularity of the regime among the lower classes were the main reasons. But one cannot make further analysis regarding the sociological and political divisions between CHP and SCF.

To identify the intra-party divisions, I explained thoroughly the policies of CHP in the previous sections and the ideological orientations within the party in this section. Accordingly, I argued that the social basis that the party had to rely on determined the limits and the capacities of the party's ideology and policies. Like ITC, CHP relied on the rural commercial and landholding bourgeoisie in the provinces. The party's primary ideological element was to pro-western modernization. The content of this ideology was shaped rather pragmatically; it evolved over time under different influences; and different orientations coexisted within the party. Politically, the party had a proto-democratic inclinations, but these had a rupture in the 1930s during the peak of authoritarian-totalitarian regimes in Europe. Economically, the party chose the capitalist way of development since the beginning, and it aimed to nurture a domestic bourgeoisie. But its policy changed towards etatism in 1930s. An etatist and pro-private sector division took place within the party. The party's populist/solidaristic ideology propagated for division of labour, but in practice this stipulated a prohibition for class-based politics. Although economically left-wing groups existed around the party, their view was not class-based. Rather it was anti-colonial and etatist. Culturally, the party had an ethno-cultural and anti-traditionalist ideology in line with the liberal-nationalist modernization of the period. Policies regarding religious tradition were softened in the 1940s, and

³³⁵ 1935 CHP Party Program, p.12

a division between the conservative and left-wing/liberal groups took place. The conservative faction operated on an anti-communist discourse towards the left-wing/liberal group.

3.3 1950-1960: Polarized Two-Party System

After the regime's decision to transition to competitive elections in the post-war period, Democrat Party (DP) was founded in 1946 by a group of CHP elite led by the former prime minister Celal Bayar. CHP called for an election one year earlier than its normal calendar. DP could not participate in 16 of the provinces, and there were irregularities in the elections. Consequently, DP got 62 of the 465 seats in the parliament. This election was not sufficiently competitive, and the results were not published. The first sufficiently competitive elections in Turkey in 1950 ended the twenty-seven years mono-party rule of CHP. As I argued in the previous section, CHP became unpopular both among the upper and lower classes because of the Second World War. The Wealth Tax, Soil Products Tax, and land reform pushed the upper classes to seek for an alternative. Similarly, the party became unpopular among the working classes and poor peasants who carried the burden of the war. In such an atmosphere, DP could become an alternative although it was the same regime elite. DP's decisive victory in 1950 opened an era of single party rule of the party which continued for three electoral terms until 1960. The military coup of 1960 and the closure of DP ended the period. The two largest parties were DP and CHP respectively. The highest vote share and seat share that the third party of the period (MP/CMP) could get were 7.1 percent (1957) and 0.9 percent (1954) respectively. This indicates the two-party characteristics of the period. The disproportionality between the vote share and seat share of DP in the period is also striking. This stems from the majoritarian electoral system. The system gave DP the chance to rule singly throughout the period. The tables below show the vote and seat shares of the relevant parties, as well as the patterns of government and opposition.

Table 7: Vote share (%V) and seat share (%S) of parties between 1950-1960

	1950		1954		1957	
	%V	%S	%V	%S	%V	%S
DP	55.2	85.4	57.6	92.9	47.9	69.5
CHP	39.6	14.1	35.4	5.7	41.1	29.1
MP/CMP	4.6	0.2	4.9	0.9	7.1	0.6
HP	-	-	-	-	3.8	0.6
Others	0.6	0.2	2.2	0.5	0.1	0

Table 8: The governments/coalitions and oppositions between 1950-1960

Period	Government / Coalitions	Opposition
05/1950**	DP	CHP, MP*
05/1954**	DP	CHP, CMP*
11/1957**	AKP	CHP, CMP*, HP*
05/1960 Military coup		

*Parties that have less than 10 seats in the parliament.

**The first cabinet formed after a general election.

3.3.1 Main social and economic structures

The total population of Turkey increased from 13 million in 1927 to around 21 million in 1950, and to 27 million in 1960. While the rural-urban ratio of the population was 75-25 in 1950, it became 68-32 in 1960 as a result of the migration to the cities.³³⁶ The ratio of population working in agriculture declined from 84.3 in 1950 to 69.8 percent in 1960. The post-war period was a period of recovery and an economic growth in Turkey like in other countries. The growth rate during the DP governments between 1950 and 1960 was 7 percent. Both industry and agricultural sectors grew significantly in this period. But growth in agriculture sector in this decade in comparison to the previous and the subsequent decades is especially significant.

³³⁶ Adem Üzümcü, "Türkiye'de Tarım Sektörünün Gelişimi," in *Türkiye Ekonomisi: Sektörel Yaklaşım*, ed. Mehmet Dikkaya, Adem Üzümcü, and Deniz Özyakışır, 1. Baskı (Ankara: Savaş Yayınevi, 2018), 32.

Table 9: Growth rates in GDP and sectors³³⁷

Period	GDP	Agriculture	Industry	Service
1924-1929	10.8	15.9	8	8.1
1930-1939	6	6	11.7	7.8
1940-1949	-0.4	2	-0.5	0.6
1950-1959	7	6.6	9.2	6.9
1960-1969	5.5	1.9	9.4	6.7

Rapid mechanization in agriculture was the major reason of this growth. The number of tractors which was 1150 in all Turkey in 1945 reached to 9 thousand in 1949, and 44 thousand in 1957. The cultivated agricultural area increased by 60 percent between 1948 and 1956.³³⁸ In short, there was an agricultural boom in this period. The mechanization in agriculture had two impacts. The agricultural sector and agricultural output increased rapidly. Middle peasantry and landholding bourgeoisie had a prosperous period. But this development created an excessive unemployed rural population among the poor peasants, who in return, migrated to the cities. Although the industrial sector kept developing these years as well, its capacity to absorb this excessive population was not sufficient. This caused the expansion of both the service sector and the “marginal sector”, and employment in the cities.³³⁹ Also, slums in the periphery of the cities started to emerge in this period.³⁴⁰

Table 10: Sector’s share in GDP | share in employment (%)

Year	1923 1927	1930 1927	1940	1950	1960
Agriculture	43.1 89.9	46.8 89.9	44.8 86	40.9 84.3	37.5 69.8
Industry	10.6 3.2	10 3.2	14.6 5.6	13.1 5.5	15.7 6.6
Service	46.3 6.9	43.2 6.9	40.6 8.4	45.9 10.2	46.8 23.5
Sum	100 100	100 100	100 100	100 100	100 100

The etatist industrialization policies of the 30s succeeded to substitute the import in consumer products by 1940s. The commercial bourgeoisie which accumulated capital through import of

³³⁷ Dilek Çetin and Ali Bora, “Türkiye’de Hizmetler Sektörü,” in *Türkiye Ekonomisi: Sektörel yaklaşım*, ed. Mehmet Dikkaya, Adem Üzümcü, and Deniz Özyakışır, 1. Baskı (Ankara: Savaş Yayınevi, 2018), 99.

³³⁸ Öztürk, 160.

³³⁹ Boratav, 115.

³⁴⁰ H. Tarık Şengül, *Kentsel Çelişki ve Siyaset: Kapitalist Kentleşme Süreçlerinin Eleştirisi*, 2nd ed (Ankara: Imge, 2009), 122.

consumer products in the 20s and 30s started to involve in industry between 1946 and 1960. A study shows that 2 out of 3 industrial entrepreneurs in the end of the 50s used to be involve in commerce. These industrial sectors were mostly composed of consumer non-durables such as textile and food or intermediate goods such as concrete, chemicals.³⁴¹ This was a period the industrial bourgeoisie started to increase its power vis-a-vis the rural and commercial bourgeoisie.

3.3.2 External relations

The DP government declared commitment to the policies that was inherited from the mono-party governments of CHP. This commitment essentially concerned to stay loyal the alliance with the West.³⁴² Fuad Köprülü, the minister of foreign affairs, stated as early as 1950 that a state cannot stay neutral between the 'Free World' and the Communist World.³⁴³ DP aimed to improve the relations with the West further. The party applied to join the NATO in 1950 three months after it came to power. The government considered the Korean War as an opportunity to join the NATO and sent troops to the war. Finally, Turkey was accepted to NATO in 1952. The parliament ratified to join the NATO with unanimous vote. Several US-NATO military bases were established in Turkey. By 1960, 24 thousand American military personnel were stationed in Turkey. DP's policy in the Middle East was to follow the USA's policy line closely. Turkey joined the Baghdad Pact with Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain in 1955. The pact was organized by the US for the goal of common security and defence purposes.³⁴⁴ Both CHP and CMP declared support the government's Middle East policy.³⁴⁵ Similarly, as DP aimed to improve relations with the USSR in 1960 with the hope to find financial support amidst the economic crisis, CHP supported the government.³⁴⁶ In short, the parties did not have any significant difference regarding the external policies in this period.

3.3.3 Economic policies

DP criticized the mono-party regime in its government program of 1950 for being interventionist, bureaucratic, monopolistic. The program commits to minimize state intervention and state

³⁴¹ Öztürk, 156

³⁴² Milliyet, 17.5.1950

³⁴³ Milliyet, 20.8.1950

³⁴⁴ Hale, 124-127

³⁴⁵ Milliyet, 3&8.2.1955

³⁴⁶ Milliyet, 26.4.1960

monopolies, privatize public enterprises, and invite foreign capital.³⁴⁷ Initially, DP postponed CHP's project to create a national industry and declared that the way to development is market economics and agriculture.³⁴⁸ CHP, on the other hand, opposed the economic policy that leaves economic development only to the market, and continued to support its program to have state enterprises and to develop a national industry through state's involvement.³⁴⁹ The two parties had such a difference regarding state's role in economy. However, they were both committed to the primacy of capitalist development and of free enterprise. Moreover, it was the mono-party CHP government who already had a liberal orientation in foreign trade since 1946. The CHP government had devalued the Turkish lira by 54 percent in 1946 against the US dollar. It declined an etatist 5-years development plan and adopted a more liberal one.³⁵⁰ These policies were in line with the standard role of improving in agriculture and exporting raw materials for development that the US suggested for periphery countries. DP was also more enthusiastic to attract foreign direct investment. As I demonstrated in the previous sections, the agricultural output increased significantly in this period through rapid mechanization in agriculture. The growth rate of agriculture between 1946 and 1953 was 13.2 percent in average per year. Such a period of agrarian prosperity in the predominantly rural society was a reason how DP could increase its high popularity even further between the 1950 and 1954 elections.

On the other hand, the liberalized foreign trade started to return as foreign trade deficit as early as 1947 since the level of export could not meet the level of import. The deficit had a peak in 1952. The export/import coverage ratio had a record low (65.3 percent) this year since 1929.³⁵¹ DP could not attract the foreign investment that it aimed for development. Because of all these reasons, then DP returned to more protectionist policies after 1954 along with import-substitute industrialization policies.³⁵² In other words, the promises of removing state out of economy in the beginning of the DP rule was changed. State entrepreneurship in industry was re-activated but its role was determined according to the needs of the private sector. The DP government continued to support the agricultural sector and investments through fiscal expansion to protect its voter base. Thus, inflation became a chronicle problem. The foreign aid and funding of the investments were cut since 1954. The DP government increased its control over economy through price controls. This became parallel to political authoritarianization. Nonetheless, shortages even for inputs in industry

³⁴⁷ Milliyet, 29.5.1950

³⁴⁸ Milliyet, 17.4.1952

³⁴⁹ Milliyet, 28.10.1956

³⁵⁰ Boratav, 96-98

³⁵¹ Üzümcü, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Dış Ticaretin Gelişimi in Türkiye Ekonomisi: Sektörel Yaklaşım*, 232.

³⁵² Boratav, 107

and spare parts for tractors took place.³⁵³ The growth rate started to decline gradually as the crisis hit. Consequently, the DP government accepted a stabilization program and to devalue the Turkish lira in 1958 in exchange for foreign aid. CHP's primary concern in economy in the 1957 election manifesto was stabilization of prices and prevention of the inflation.

3.3.4 Nationhood and cultural policies

The legacy of state-religion relationship was unique in Turkey. On the one hand, the state forbade “private Islam”, that is the religious orders, their lodges and their activities. It aimed to nationalize and centralize mosques and the teaching of Islam through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*the Diyanet*). In a way, the state and religion were united despite the claim of being a secular state in the constitution since 1937. In such a state religion policy, the call to prayer was changed from the original Quranic Arabic to Turkish in the mono-party period. On the other hand, the mono-party state removed religious education from schools while it banned the private practice of it by the religious orders. In short, the state nationalized religion, tried to implement a kind of new modern religious practices such as Turkish call to prayer, but it also tried to minimize religion both in public and private sphere by not offering religious education in public schools and by banning religious orders. CHP had already changed its policies of religion slightly before moving into the competitive elections of 1950 and opened the first religious schools in 1948. DP lifted the ban on the Arabic call to prayer one month after the election victory in 1950, promised to raise the wages of religious officials and to train new Islamic scholars.³⁵⁴ The government reopened the Eyup Sultan tomb (*turbe*) which was closed in the monoparty era along with other sacred tombs. The leader of the Ticani order also participated in the opening. This was a sign that the religious orders started to be visible in public again.³⁵⁵ Elective religion courses were introduced in primary schools in 1951, and in secondary schools in 1956. Nineteen vocational religion schools were opened by 1960.³⁵⁶ A faculty of theology was opened in 1959.³⁵⁷

On the other hand, DP retained some aspects of the state-religion policies of the mono-party state. On occasion, some DP members asked for reversing the reforms of the mono-party state radically

³⁵³ Gökhan Atılğan, “Tarımsal Kapitalizmin Sancağında,” in *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, ed. Cenk Saraçoğlu and Ateş. Uslu (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2019), 404.

³⁵⁴ *Milliyet*, 17.6.1950

³⁵⁵ *Milliyet*, 2.9.1950

³⁵⁶ Mustafa Öcal, “100. Yılında İmam Hatip Liseleri” *Uluslararası Sempozyumu: -Bildiriler-*, 1. ed (“100. Yılında İmam Hatip Liseleri” Uluslararası Sempozyumu, İstanbul: Değerler Eğitim Merkezi, 2015).

³⁵⁷ *Milliyet*, 20.11.1959

such as bringing back the Shari laws instead of the Civil Law,³⁵⁸ but prime minister Menderes clearly stated that to open the Tekkes, to change the Civil Code to Sharia laws, to bring the Arabic alphabet is out of concern.³⁵⁹ DP also retained the ban on religious orders and their activities. Members of Bektaşî, Naqşî, Nurcu, and Tîcanî orders were arrested several times while they practice collective religious activities.³⁶⁰ In short, DP inherited the legacy of centralized state religion, reversed some of the endeavours to create new Islamic practices, only expanded the role of the state in religion by opening new religious schools and introducing religion courses in the existing secular schools. On the other hand, it continued the pressure on private religion, albeit less aggressively.

3.3.5 Political system, institutions, and freedoms

DP inherited a political system that lacks the mechanisms of horizontal checks on the government. The political system was primarily lack of a constitutional court. The parliament was treated by DP as the supreme judicial authority. However, the qualified majority was also constituted by DP in the parliament. The constitution and the verdicts of the courts in such a context became null and void in practice. DP could declare state of emergency easily and suspend any political activities, press and universities. In the height of its authoritarian rule, DP was able to constitute a commission in the parliament with fifteen of its MPs in 1960 to act like a court. The commission was authorized, inter alia, to suspend political activities of any party or organization, shut down press, and give prison sentence.³⁶¹ In this context, the main concern of the opposition against the authoritarian rule of DP became democracy, basic freedoms, constitutionalism, and balance of powers.

DP started to increase control over judiciary in 1954. It passed a law that allows the government to retire justices and bureaucrats after their twenty-five years of service. CHP opposed the law arguing that it removes the legal guarantee of many justices in critical positions most of whom already passed twenty-five years in their careers.³⁶²

Freedom of assembly was another area of conflict between the parties. In 1956, DP banned rallies and mass meetings except the election period. Security forces virtually chased the opposition politicians and forbid them to speak to the people indoor and outdoor, and only allowed meetings

³⁵⁸ E.g., DP's MP Abdullah Aytemiz asks for it, *Milliyet*, 20.2.1955.

³⁵⁹ *Milliyet*, 12.5.1953

³⁶⁰ E.g.: *Milliyet*, 1.7.1951; 3.7.1951; 6.10.1952; 6.5.1958; 15.1.1960

³⁶¹ *Milliyet*, 16.4.1960

³⁶² *Milliyet*, 27.7.1954

with party members.³⁶³ The government aimed to limit the interaction between the politicians and voters only to election campaigns. The parliamentary immunity of Bölükbaşı, MP's leader, was lifted in 1957. Bolukbasi got arrested two weeks after his immunity was lifted.³⁶⁴ DP also brought a resolution to the parliament to lift the immunity of CHP's leader in 1959, but eventually, his immunity was not lifted.

The pressure on free press started as early as 1952. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, renowned journalist of daily *Ulus* and a member of parliament, was tried for an article he wrote criticising DP.³⁶⁵ His immunity was lifted in 1952. A law that forbids “news that damage a person's reputation” passed in the parliament in 1954. Any news that makes a claim about a politician could easily violate the law, and the reporter did not have the right to prove his/her claim. “The right to proof” for journalists became a policy that CHP defended throughout the 1950s. During the economic crisis in 1956, another anti-democratic law passed in the parliament regarding free press. Accordingly, the press was banned to make news stating there is shortage in the markets, and newspaper hawkers were prohibited to shout the news loudly.³⁶⁶ The punishment to suspend daily journals for one month period became a common practice after 1958. The journals such as *Ulus*, *Vatan*, and *Zafer* were suspended several times.³⁶⁷ Metin Toker, a journalist and the son-in law of CHP's leader, and Ahmet Emin Yalman, a renowned journalist, were arrested in 1957 and 1960 respectively.³⁶⁸ London Times News reported that 811 journalists were jailed during in the first eight years of the DP rule.³⁶⁹

The most salient target of DP's authoritarian politics was left-wing politics. “Communism” was a key label in this respect. The label did not connote only pro-labour policies or political order but also, and more importantly, being against religion and all the traditional values. This seems parallel and related to the strategies of the American foreign policy in the Cold War. For example, Dean Acheson, the undersecretary of the state of the USA, addressed the Turkish audience in the Voice of America program in the Turkish radio and propagated that communism is “godlessness and the religion of materialism.”³⁷⁰ Similarly, the head of Directorate of Religious Affairs stated in one of his speeches that “communism is against religion, family, property, freedom and rights all of which

³⁶³ *Milliyet*, 2&5.8.1956

³⁶⁴ *Milliyet*, 24.7.1957

³⁶⁵ *Milliyet*, 9.4.1952

³⁶⁶ *Milliyet*, 13.6.1956

³⁶⁷ E.g: *Milliyet*, 8.5.1958 & 22.11.1958

³⁶⁸ *Milliyet*, 8.3.1960

³⁶⁹ *Milliyet*, 26.12.1959

³⁷⁰ *Milliyet*, 26.6.1951

are the main principles of Islam”.³⁷¹ The label of communism was simply a scapegoat for the government. For example, DP blamed the communists for the Istanbul Pogrom³⁷² against the Greek minority in 1955.³⁷³ However, this claim was never proved by the government. DP declared communism as “treason” in laws and forbade and punished any movement which it declared as communist.³⁷⁴ The government was generous to label any incident as a sign of communism. Such punishments included the imprisonment of the members of the illegal Turkey Communist Party, Turkey Socialist Party, Motherland Party, unions which were already very limited in number, and left-leaning youth organizations. In short, any pro-labour and socialist movement was harshly restricted throughout the 50s in Turkey.

The abuse and partisan use of bureaucratic power was also a major area of conflict. CHP started to complain about partisan use of radio as early as 1950.³⁷⁵ Arguably there are two extreme examples of partisan use of the radio. The first one was the use of radio during the elections of 1957. CHP claimed that the government announced the victory of DP before the polls are closed and, thus, manipulated the results on the election day.³⁷⁶ The second extreme example of the partisan use of the radio was to call the names of persons on radio everyday who join the DP-related Motherland Front in 1959.³⁷⁷ Public advertisements was another tool of partisan use of public sources. DP gave public advertisements to newspapers disproportionately based on their support to the government.³⁷⁸ DP also blackmailed voters with public investment. In his speech in Kars and Sinop in 1957, Menderes argued that the reason why Kars and Sinop, two provinces where CHP won all the parliamentary seats, could not get public investment was that the “CHP MPs do not encourage the government to make investment in these places.”³⁷⁹ Clearly, Menderes implied that as long as these provinces elect CHP MPs, DP would not make public investment in there.

Arguably, the most salient aspect of the DP discourse and policies was revanchism with regards to the mono-party period. As early as 1950, the prime minister Menderes argued that CHP ruled illegitimately for years.³⁸⁰ Obviously, the DP cadres were members and deputies of CHP in the

³⁷¹ Milliyet, 13.12.1950

³⁷² The incident occurred as the mobs and masses attacked collectively the Greek minority and their properties in all over İstanbul upon the fake news that stated the house where Atatürk was born in Thessaloniki was bombed by Greeks.

³⁷³ Milliyet, 28.10.1955

³⁷⁴ Milliyet, 12.8.1950

³⁷⁵ Milliyet, 8.9.1950

³⁷⁶ Milliyet, 28.10.1957

³⁷⁷ Milliyet, 14.1.1959

³⁷⁸ Milliyet, 30.5.1952

³⁷⁹ Ayetullah Kocamehi and Vahdettin Ayberk, eds., *D.P. Muhteşem Zaferi Adnan Menderes'in 1957 Seçim Nutukları ile Paris Nato Konferansındaki Tarihi Hitabesi 1958* (İstanbul: Sıralar Matbaası, n.d.), 54.

³⁸⁰ Milliyet, 30.8.1950

mono-party period. To attack CHP for ruling illegitimately for years, DP had to distinguish itself from the autocratic past. Deputy Prime Minister Ağaoglu claimed that the DP members had two options in the autocratic period. They had to either revolt against the government and damage the whole country or join the party and push it for reforms. And he claimed that the DP cadres had chosen the latter.³⁸¹ Throughout its rule, DP proclaimed itself as the representative of the “people’s will” and used this motto continuously. In this regard, DP was one of the archetypes of a populist authoritarian government. The party also defended the majoritarian system arguing that proportional representation brings instability.³⁸² In sum, DP regarded democracy as majoritarianism and limitless government of the elected in an electoral autocracy.

Prime Minister Menderes called İnönü a former dictator several times, accused CHP for atrocities such as executing masses of people.³⁸³ Although he did not target Atatürk directly, he argued several times that the twenty-seven of CHP’s mono-party rule (1923-1950) did not bring anything to the country.³⁸⁴ Therefore, he indirectly targeted Atatürk and the reforms of his time. He accused CHP of using eight hundred mosques as stable and distillery depots.³⁸⁵ Obviously, this was to portray CHP as a party which did not respect religion and traditional values. He called CHP-related People’s Hearts associations as “a product of fascist mindset” that aims to indoctrinate people.³⁸⁶ DP expropriated People’s Hearts and several CHP buildings between 1951 and 1953 with the claim that they had been expropriated illegally during the mono-party rule.³⁸⁷ İnönü named these policies “partisan rule” that aims towards shutting down the parties. He added that this is a war declared to the will of hundreds of thousands of people.³⁸⁸

3.3.6 A summary of the party competition between 1950-1960

I analysed the ideological positions of parties in different policy domains and showed the policies that the parties converged and diverged. In brief, the parties converged on the pro-West foreign policy. The nuance was that DP carried out the pro-Western agenda more ambitiously. DP also

³⁸¹ Milliyet, 10.9.1950

³⁸² Kocamemi and Ayberk, *D.P.Muhteşem Zaferi Adnan Menderes’in 1957 Seçim Nutukları İle Paris Nato Konferansındaki Tarihi Hitabesi 1958*, 45–46.

³⁸³ Milliyet, 7.10.1952

³⁸⁴ Kocamemi and Ayberk, *D.P.Muhteşem Zaferi Adnan Menderes’in 1957 Seçim Nutukları İle Paris Nato Konferansındaki Tarihi Hitabesi 1958*, 45–46.,98.

³⁸⁵ Milliyet, 23.10.1957

³⁸⁶ Milliyet, 13.12.1950

³⁸⁷ Milliyet, 11.12.1953

³⁸⁸ Milliyet, 6.10.1952

retained the policies of centralization of state-religion, and the pressure on religious orders. It only expanded state's role in religion by opening public religious schools and adding religion courses to the curricula of other schools. More importantly, DP distinguished itself from the other parties with revanchism for the twenty-seven years of mono-party regime of CHP and a strong McCharthyist discourse and policies. Although DP distinguished itself with pro-market and pro-agriculture economy policies initially, the party had an interventionist turn after these policies failed, and kept supporting agricultural sector through expansionary fiscal policies. DP also identified democracy with the unconstrained rule of the elected majority. This combined with a populist discourse since Menderes frequently portrayed DP as the representative of the “national will”. CHP and smaller parties of the opposition distinguished from DP to support democracy and the institutions of constitutionalism against the authoritarian rule of DP. CHP also differed from DP to support that state should have more effective role in economy and pro-industrialization policies.

In sum, the transition to multi-party competition without the proper institutions of democracy yielded to electoral autocracy where the incumbent was only checked by the elections which were not sufficiently competitive. In this context of the hegemonic party system of 1950-1960, the opposition became unilateral, and the salient political division was about the institutions of democracy. The table below summarizes the salient policies of each party.

Table 11: Salient policies of the parties between 1950-1960

Party	Salient policies
DP	Compensation/revanchism Illiberal democracy, majoritarianism, (cultural) populism McCarthyism, scapegoating of communism Mixed economy, agrarian populism Softening anti-traditionalism, retaining public religion
CHP	Democracy and constitutionalism Market regulation, economic planning, pro-industry
MP/CKMP	Democracy and constitutionalism Traditionalism, state-religion
HP	Democracy and constitutionalism

3.4 1961-1980: Polarized Multi-Party System

The elected autocratic regime of DP was overthrown by the 1960 coup d'état. DP was banned and several politicians were tried and charged with high crimes such as treason and violation of the constitution. Three prominent politicians of DP, Prime Minister Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Zorlu, and Minister of Finance Polatkan were executed in 1961, and several DP members were imprisoned and banned from politics. A constituent assembly was composed after the coup. It comprised members of the military, the opposition parties, and civil society. The constituent assembly drafted a new constitution, and a constitutional referendum was held in 1961. It was approved by 61.7 percent of the voters with a turnout of 81 percent.

The new constitution introduced the institutions of checks and balances on the government, and of independent judiciary. Most importantly, a constitutional court and an independent judicial council that is authorized for the appointment and transferral of judges were formed. The constitution also introduced a senate and turned the legislative body from unicameral to bicameral. The electoral system was also changed from majoritarian system to proportional representation. This functioned as a legislative check on the government since it aimed to prevent the composure of disproportional and large majorities in the parliament because the entry barriers for the new and small parties became lower. The law that forbade press to prove a claim about statesmen in the courts was abrogated.³⁸⁹ The monopoly of the government on advertisements on newspapers were removed.³⁹⁰ In short, liberties regarding free press were also provided. The constitution also mentioned the right to strike and “land reform” as a duty of the state³⁹¹, founded the State Planning Organization (DPT), and tasked the governments to carry out these duties by enacting the relevant laws and introducing the relevant institutions. As shown above, most of these new institutions that turned the electoral authoritarian regime into a democracy were the demands of the opposition parties in the 1950s.

Despite the merits of the reforms, the new political regime can be called defective democracy for three aspects. The first aspect concerns the civil-military relations. Firstly, the two-headed justice system of the previous decades was retained. Military courts, where the military judges adjudicated, gave the military an undemocratic/privileged position in the regime. Secondly, the constitution introduced a new institution called the National Security Council (NSC). NSC was composed of president, prime minister, a secretary, seven ministers, chief of general staff, and three commanders

³⁸⁹ Milliyet, 1.12.1960.

³⁹⁰ Milliyet, 8.1.1961

³⁹¹ Milliyet, 11.2.1961

in chief of the armed forces. The council was authorized to summon once a month to take decision about the issues of “national security”. However, this authority did not regard only the external threats. The council also functioned as an apparatus for military to intervene in domestic politics. Consequently, “a double headed political system”³⁹² both in the executive (council of ministers and NSC), and in the judiciary (i.e. civilian and military) took place. Twenty-four members of the junta were also appointed to the senate as lifelong members. Moreover, the 1961 junta also introduced the Army Mutual Assistance Association (*OYAK*), a pension fund and company for military personnel. *OYAK* involved in business, grew into one of the biggest conglomerates in years, and became highly profitable for its military investors.³⁹³ Through *OYAK*, the military got the incentive to concern about the economy policy of the governments and it improved its relations with big business with whom its interests coincided. In sum, the political regime that was founded after the 1960 military coup was defective also for lacking a full effective government since the military gained reserved domains in politics³⁹⁴. As a consequence, the army started to be a non-ignorable actor of policymaking.

The army had another intervention in 1971. It forced the government to resign and formed technocratic governments for a brief period. In this period where state of emergencies took place for almost two years, the governments introduced bills to restrict the autonomy of the universities, founded courts that has special authorities to ensure security and appealed to state of emergency to discipline and pressure mostly the left-wing social movements, unions, intellectuals, and civil society in this period.³⁹⁵ It is noteworthy that Workers Party of Turkey (*TIP*) was also banned after the military intervention of 1971. The constitutional amendments also aimed to strengthen the executive. The legislature was authorized to grant executive law-making powers with decrees.³⁹⁶ Thus, it should be noted that the military intervention of 1971 was mostly in line with the ideology and demands of the anti-leftist political parties, especially that of AP, to force the parliament for amendments to strengthen the government vis-à-vis the liberal institutions and to oppress the left-wing movements and civil society.

The second defective aspect of the post-1960 regime concerned the exclusion of certain ideologies from politics. The 141st article of the penal code of 1937 which criminalized “propaganda for the

³⁹² Umit Cizre Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy,” *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 2 (January 1997): 157–58.

³⁹³ Ahmad Feroz, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 1st edition (London: Routledge, 2002), 12.

³⁹⁴ For the concept of “defective democracy”, see Merkel et al., 2004, Defective Democracy Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” *Democratization* 11, no. 5 (January 1, 2004): 33–58,

³⁹⁵ The demands of the Prime Minister Erim of the technocratic government at *Milliyet*, 27.3.1972

³⁹⁶ Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, *Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey*, NED-New edition, 1 (Central European University Press, 2009), 18,

aim to make one social class dominant over other classes” was retained. The 163rd article of the penal code of 1926 which criminalized associations that “abuses religion and religious sentiments” was also retained. Similar to the previous periods, the articles 141 and 163 hung like the sword of Damocles over any political actor who aims to run a pro-labour agenda or use religious discourse in politics.

The third defective aspect regarded fundamental rights of freedom from violence. The regime failed to protect its citizens from violence against each other. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) related groups known as the Commandos/the Idealists/ the Grey Wolves and illegal left-wing groups such as Revolutionary Left (Dev-Sol) committed violent crimes. Despite the mutual violence, it is noteworthy that the left-wing organizations were illegal, and the legal Workers Party of Turkey was banned in 1971. On the other hand, MHP survived the period without being banned. The political activities and rallies of Workers Party of Turkey was sabotaged since 1965 by groups who named themselves ‘nationalists’, ‘moralists’ which were related to AP.³⁹⁷ To sum, the biggest threat of the period for the state elite and anti-left political elite was the rise of the left-wing.

Three parties claimed the heritage of the banned Democrat Party in this period. Two of them, Justice Party (AP) and New Turkey Party (YTP), were founded in 1961. Among the two, AP managed to receive the bulk of the votes between 1960 and 1980 and appeared as the largest party of the period. The third one, Democratic Party (DP), was founded in 1970 by the MPs who broke away from AP. YTP showed a significant presence in the 1961 elections with the vote and seat share of 13.7 percent and 14.4 percent respectively. DP’s remarkable presence was only in the 1973 elections. The party received the vote and seat shares of 11.9 percent and 10 percent respectively.

On the other side of the political axis, CHP was the biggest party. AP and CHP together obtained at least 63 percent (1973) and at most 81 percent (1965) of the votes in five general elections in this period. CHP became the first party in 1961, 1973 and 1977, and AP came the first party in 1965 and 1969. CHP had a vote share range between 27.4 percent (1969) and 41.4 percent (1977) in the period. The latter is also the highest vote share CHP reached in entire history of the party. AP’s vote share range changed between 29.8 percent (1973) and 52.9 percent (1965). Overall, AP was the bigger of the two parties.

CKMP (formerly MP) split into two parties as CKMP and MP in 1962. Later CKMP changed its name to Nationalist Action Party (MHP). National Order Party (later National Salvation Party - MSP) which is known as the first Islamic party entered the electoral scene in 1969. The party

³⁹⁷ E.g. Milliyet, 11.1.1965

received the vote shares of 11.8 and 8.6 in 1973 and 1977 elections respectively and became the third biggest party of the 70s. Workers' Party of Turkey was founded in 1961. The Alevi minority founded the Union Party (BP/TBP) in 1966. And finally, Republican Reliance Party (CGP) was founded in 1967 by a group of MPs who broke away from CHP.

The vote and seat shares were more proportional in this period than the period between 1950-1960. The switch from majoritarian electoral system to proportional representation after the 1960 coup is a major factor in these results. The table below shows the vote and seat shares of the relevant parties of the period in four electoral terms.

Table 12: Vote share (%V) and seat share (%S) of parties between 1961-1980

	1961		1965		1969		1973		1977	
	%V	%S	%V	%S	%V	%S	%V	%S	%V	%S
CHP	36.7	38.4	28.7	29	27.4	31.7	33.3	41.1	41.4	47.3
AP	34.8	35.1	52.9	53	46.5	56.8	29.8	33.1	36.9	42
CKMP/MHP	14	12	2.2	2.4	3	0.2	3.4	0.6	6.4	3.5
YTP	13.7	14.4	3.7	4.2	2.2	1.3	-	-	-	-
MP	-	-	6.3	6.8	3.2	1.3	0.6	0	-	-
TIP	-	-	3	3.1	2.7	0.4	-	-	0.1	0
GP/CGP	-	-			6.6	3.3	5.3	2.8	1.9	0.6
MSP							11.8	10.6	8.6	5.3
DP							11.9	10	1.9	0.2
Others	0.8	0	3.2	0.2	8.4	4.6	3.9	1.5	2.8	0.8

None of the single parties managed to obtain sufficient number of seats in the parliament to form a single-party government after the 1961 elections. The brief post-coup period of 1961-62 hosted the one and only grand coalition between AP and CHP of the era. This coalition government took only for seven months. Except this period, either AP or CHP had coalitions with smaller parties to form a government if they did not have simple majority in the parliament. AP obtained simple majority after the 1965 and 1969 elections. CHP had simple majority only once in 1977 when the party transferred twelve MPs that resigned from AP in exchange for ministry positions. AP ruled single-handedly between 1965 and 1971 until the military coup. The coup did not dissolve the

parliament. Rather it enforced for technocratic governments with members from all the parties. The period of technocratic governments continued until the 1974 elections. After 1974, CHP formed a coalition government with MSP once, and a single party government once. AP formed a coalition government with MSP, CGP and MHP once in 1975, and formed another one with MSP and MHP once in 1978. These were named “National Front” governments. The National Front governments appear as a pattern of the cooperation between the parties in the 70s. It is noteworthy that MHP is the only party that entered a coalition (in 1975) without an arithmetic necessity. MHP which had three seats in the parliament in 1975 was included in the government by AP. It can be argued that AP aimed to take advantage of the MHP’s paramilitary power in the streets against the left. The table below shows the government and opposition patterns between 1961 and 1980.

Table 13: The governments/coalitions and oppositions between 1961-1980

Period	Government / Coalitions	Opposition
11/1961**	CHP – AP	CKMP, YTP
06/1962	CHP-YTP-CKMP	AP
12/1963	CHP (minority government)	AP, MP, YTP, CKMP
02/1965	AP-YTP-CKMP-MP	CHP
10/1965**	AP	CHP, MP, YTP, TİP, CKMP/MHP
11/1969**	AP	CHP, CGP, MP*, MHP*, BP*, TİP*, YTP*
03/1971 coup	Technocratic cabinets	
01/1974**	CHP-MSP	AP, DP, CGP, MHP*, BP*
11/1974	Technocratic cabinet	
03/1975	AP-MSP-CGP-MHP*	CHP, DP, BP*
06/1977**	CHP	AP, MSP, MHP, CGP*, DP*
06/1977	AP-MSP-MHP	CHP, CGP*, DP*
01/1978	CHP-CGP*-DP*	AP, MSP, MHP
11/1979	AP (minority government supported by MSP and MHP)	CHP, MSP, MHP, CGP*, DP*
09/1980 coup		

*Parties that have less than 10 seats in the parliament.

**The first cabinet formed after a general election.

3.4.1 Main social and economic structures

The total population of Turkey increased from 27 million in 1960 to 44 million in 1980. Migration to the cities continued in this period. The rural-urban ratio of the population which was 68-32 in

1960 changed to 56-44 by 1980.³⁹⁸ The migration did not occur along with a planned urbanization, and the number of slums proliferated in the cities. The share of the population living in slums in the urban space increased from 4.7 percent in 1955 to 26.1 percent in 1980.

Table 14: The population living in the slums (1955-1990)³⁹⁹

Year	1955	1960	1965	1970	1980	1990
Population in million	250 k	1.2 m	2.1 m	3 m	5.7 m	8.7 m
Ratio to urban population (%)	4.7	16.4	22.9	23.6	26.1	33.9

As I will elaborate below, the import-substitution industrialization orientation which started in the mid-1950s continued in the 60s and the 70s. The difference in the 60s and 70s was the enactment of central coordination and five-years-development plans. The plans were in accord with the demands of the industrial bourgeoisie who had already become dominant among the commercial and landholding bourgeoisie by 1960s.⁴⁰⁰ In this phase of industrial deepening, the content of the production transitioned from consumer products to consumer non-durables to durables.⁴⁰¹

As the industry developed, the size of the industrial working class increased from 791 thousand in 1960 to 2 million in 1980.⁴⁰² The share of industrial employment in working population nearly doubled between 1960 and 1980. The table below shows the sectors' share in GDP and share in employment. The share of agriculture in GDP declines to 24.2 percent by 1980 but its share in employment (50.6) is still highest among sectors. This indicated the ongoing relative disadvantage of the agricultural sector and the rural population in general which in return becomes one of the sources of ongoing migration to the cities.

Table 15: Sectors' share in GDP⁴⁰³

Year	1923	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980
Agriculture	43.1	46.8	44.8	40.9	37.5	30.7	24.2
Industry	10.6	10	14.6	13.1	15.7	17.5	20.5
Service	46.3	43.2	40.6	45.9	46.8	51.7	55.4
Sum	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

³⁹⁸ Üzümcü, "Türkiye'de Tarım Sektörünün Gelişimi," 32.

³⁹⁹ Ruşen Keleş, *Kentleşme Politikası*, 2. Basım (Kızılay, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1993), 383.

⁴⁰⁰ Öztürk, *Türkiye'de Büyük Sermaye Grupları: Finans Kapitalin Oluşumu ve Gelişimi*, 163

⁴⁰¹ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2015*, 118

⁴⁰² Öztürk, 180

⁴⁰³ Üzümcü, "Türkiye'de Tarım Sektörünün Gelişimi", 49

Table 16: Sectors' share in employment⁴⁰⁴

Year	1927	1935	1950	1962	1972	1982
Agriculture	80.9	76.4	86	84.3	69.8	59.9
Industry	8.9	11.7	10.3	10.9	14.5	19.3
Service	10.2	11.9	12	12	20.5	27
Sum	100	100	100	100	100	100

Not only the size of industry expanded, but also the organized working class rapidly increased in this period. There is no official and reliable data for the number of unionized workers but the number of workers who were in the scope of collective bargaining is a good indicator for the trajectory of number of organized working class. The graph below shows these numbers for selected years between 1945 and 1980.⁴⁰⁵ While the number of workers in the collective bargaining was 282 thousand in 1960, the number went up to 1.4 million in 1979.




Figure 2: Number of workers in the collective bargaining processes

⁴⁰⁴ Güral Özcüre, "Türkiye'de İşgücü Piyasası, İstihdamın Yapısı ve Sorunları," in *Türkiye Ekonomisi: Sektörel Yaklaşım*, ed. Mehmet Dikkaya, Adem Üzümcü, and Deniz Özyakışır, 1. Baskı (Ankara: Savaş Yayınevi, 2018), 268.

⁴⁰⁵ Calculation is mine based on the method suggested by Koç. Koç suggests that the Collective bargainings are generally for two years. Therefore, the sum of the number of workers who were in the scope of collective bargaining for two consecutive years gives the total number in a cycle. Koç also suggests that this number give a close number about the unionized workers. Koç, *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi*, 2021

3.4.2 External Relations

The foreign policy of Democrat Party during the 50s was full engagement with the Western bloc. As argued in the previous section, CHP and the tiny opposition MP complied with this policy of DP. AP, as one of the three and the most powerful successors of DP, retained the consensus on the pro-Western policy of the previous era. The party supported the pro-American foreign policy⁴⁰⁶ and also signed a treaty with the European Economic Community (ECC) in 1970 to start the accession process.⁴⁰⁷

On the other hand, Turkey had a turbulent relationship with the US in the 60s and 70s. This was essentially for two reasons. The first one was USA's demand from Turkey to abolish the production of opium in the 60s. The second one was the Cyprus question. Based on its guarantorship rights, the Turkish government aimed to intervene in Cyprus in 1964 upon the suppression of the Turkish population in the island. The US president Lyndon Johnson penned a letter to the prime minister İnönü stating that the NATO will not protect Turkey in the case of a Soviet attack if Turkey attempts a military operation in the island. At the height of the tension, the USA imposed an arms embargo on Turkey between 1975 and 1978 after Turkey had a military operation in Cyprus in 1974.⁴⁰⁸ On the contrary, the Soviet-Turkish relations improved in these two decades. The Soviet Union also changed its foreign policy after Stalin's death in 1953. It aimed to improve its relationship with the Third World by economic and military support. It announced that it does not have any claims on the north-eastern provinces of Turkey this year.⁴⁰⁹

The high engagement with the Western world started to be questioned in Turkey in the 60s with the rise of urban movements that are either socialist or Third Worldist, and with the external developments. Such social pressure translated into party politics through Workers Party of Turkey (TİP) that was founded in 1961. TİP emerged as the first significant party to oppose the traditions in foreign policy. It had a critical stance against the absolute pro-West/NATO engagement and rather supported an independent foreign policy. This included to reconsider NATO treaty⁴¹⁰ and to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the Third World states without breaking up with the West⁴¹¹. This centrifugal force had an impact on CHP's foreign policy view as well. Ecevit, the general secretary of CHP, started to raise concerns about the engagement with the USA as early as

⁴⁰⁶ See Demirel's speech, *Milliyet*, 26.2.1969

⁴⁰⁷ *Milliyet*, 24.11.1970

⁴⁰⁸ Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası, 1774-2000*, 154.

⁴⁰⁹ Hale, 123.

⁴¹⁰ *Milliyet*, 31.7.1965

⁴¹¹ *Milliyet*, 11.1.1965

1966. He stated that USA and CIA involve in the internal politics of its allies and encourages governments to follow an anti-communist policy against the non-existing communist threat. He argued that the anti-communist discourse functioned as a mechanism to crush the legal oppositions.⁴¹²

Turkey started to diversify its foreign policy to a certain extent in the late 60s. A prime minister of the USSR (Kosygin) visited Turkey in 1966 for the first time to sign treaties for investments in heavy industry in Turkey.⁴¹³ Turkey and the Soviet Union signed an economic aid project in 1967 to build seven large industry projects in Turkey.⁴¹⁴ Ultimately, Turkey did not change its position in the Cold War significantly. The AP and CHP governments continued their commitments to NATO and to the treaties with the west. But the parties gradually moved away from the full-commitment policy to the USA.

3.4.3 Economic policies

I argued in the previous section that Democrat Party pursued liberal foreign trade and pro-agrarian development policies until mid-50s. After these policies did not yield a tangible industrialization and the foreign trade deficit increased, DP shifted to a more protectionist policy and interventionism in industrial development. The party continued to support the agricultural sector with economic populist policies. In short, its economic policy was unstable and short-sighted. The industry could not transition to the “industrial deepening” stage to produce consumer durables which already took place in some other developing countries in the 1930s.⁴¹⁵

The military coup of 1960 brought back the planning agenda to the political scene. And such policies were also demanded by CHP in the 50s as argued in the previous part. The State Planning Organization was founded in 1960 as a constitutional institution. Therefore, the elite enforced the parties for a consensus on a “planned development” in the beginning of the 60s. This was also in line with the demands of the industrial bourgeoisie which had already secured its dominance vis-à-vis the landholding and commercial bourgeoisie.

CHP declared in 1962 that it embraces the task of planned economy of the constitution and supports the protectionist policies for the national industrial bourgeoisie.⁴¹⁶ The party started to

⁴¹² See Ecevit’s speech at Milliyet, 21.6.1966.

⁴¹³ Atilgan, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, 650.

⁴¹⁴ Hale, 156.

⁴¹⁵ Oktar Türel, *Küresel Tarihçe: 1945-79* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2017), 210.

⁴¹⁶ Milliyet, 2.2.1962

use the terms “social justice” as of 1961, “mixed economy” in 1964⁴¹⁷, and “centre-left” in 1965 to define its goals in economic and social life.⁴¹⁸ İnönü stated in 1965 that CHP is pro-private enterprise and identified the role of state as involving in the economy where private sector is insufficient.⁴¹⁹ In this regard, he supported the same position he had since the mono-party period. The novel part was the emphasis on the social justice and (centre-)left terms.

AP and YTP, two successors of DP, were reluctant about planning initially. Demiray, an AP deputy, argued in 1962 that planning is the doctrine of “materialist sociologists like Durkheim”, and also “a totalitarian project practiced in countries like the Soviet Union”. A CHP deputy responded that planning is not inspired by the Soviet Union, and that countries like India practices planning strategies and receives American aid.⁴²⁰ As of 1964, AP leader-to-be Demirel stated that he embraces planning⁴²¹ as well as limited land reform where the aim is only to increase production.⁴²² Consequently, a consensus on the planning strategies occurred among the parties. The smaller parties joined the consensus on the idea of mixed economy and planning.⁴²³ Nevertheless, the successors of DP always had a tense relationship with the State Planning Organization. The prominent staffs resigned in 1962 upon the substantial revisions⁴²⁴ of the initial plan after the objections of YTP deputies to the plans⁴²⁵. After AP formed the government alone in 1965, the party started to colonize the Planning Organization for its clientelist economic goals.⁴²⁶ The consensus on the industrialist development and therefore shifting the resources to industry among the heirs of DP shattered in 1970. The Democratic Party (DemP) was formed this year by former AP deputies. The party was supported by deputies who represent the interests of the landholding and commercial bourgeoisie in Anatolia vis-à-vis the expanding industrial bourgeoisie.⁴²⁷

TİP appeared as the only party that had a more radical agenda than the other parties. It supported to nationalise banks, insurance sector and foreign trade.⁴²⁸ Similar to CHP, TİP also supported the involvement of the state in economy. But, as opposed to CHP, TİP did not limit the role of state

⁴¹⁷ Milliyet, 17.10.1964

⁴¹⁸ Milliyet, 29.7.1965

⁴¹⁹ Milliyet, 30.1.1965

⁴²⁰ Milliyet, 18.11.1962

⁴²¹ Milliyet, 8.11.1964

⁴²² Milliyet, 24.11.1964

⁴²³ E.g. YTP in 26.9.1965;

⁴²⁴ Atılgan, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, 572.

⁴²⁵ Milliyet, 27.9.1962

⁴²⁶ Okan İrtem, “12 Mart: Karagahtaki İslam İktidarı,” in *Türkiye’nin Soğuk Savaş Düzeni: Ordu, Sermaye, ABD, İslamizasyon*, ed. Behlül Özkan and Tolga Gürakar, 1. Baskı (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 2020), 178–79.

⁴²⁷ Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1977), 247.

⁴²⁸ Milliyet, 11.1.1965

with the areas that private sector does not enter. The party leader Aybar embraced etatism but he criticised the way these policies were implemented. He argued that the state enterprises were given the role to produce inputs to meet the needs of the private sector.⁴²⁹ Indirectly, he coined the etatist development policies as state capitalism to nurture the bourgeoisie.

As I stated above, the urban working class appeared as a significant social force in the 60s and 70s as a result of industrialization and rapid urbanization. Two events were historical in the struggle for social rights of the working class. The first one was the Istanbul demonstrations of 1962 where tens of thousands of workers demanded the right to bargain collectively and to strike in Istanbul⁴³⁰. The second one was the great riot of June 1970. Thousands of workers took to the streets for two days and clashed with police and army to cancel a bill in the parliament that had aimed to weaken the second biggest and left-leaning union (DISK)⁴³¹.

Two parties aimed to absorb the rising wave of the working-class movement. These were TİP and CHP. TİP was founded as a coalition of socialist intellectuals and union leaders. It clearly supported class politics in legal framework. The party became the scapegoat of the legal political arena and was pointed as the biggest threat to the regime although the maximum vote share it could receive was the 3 percent in the 60s and 70s.

CHP started to address lower classes as early as 1961. One of its promises was “social justice” in the 1961 election manifesto.⁴³² The coalition government of CHP and AP granted the right to strike and lockout in 1962.⁴³³ CHP’s minister of labour Ecevit started to meet workers in all over Turkey and promised them better conditions.⁴³⁴ Also, he raised the question of landless peasants who demanded land from state. On this matter, he confronted with Demirel, the leader of AP. Demirel argued that Ecevit provokes the peasants to occupy lands and violate the constitution.⁴³⁵ In brief, Ecevit followed an economic-populist strategy. He addressed both to the workers and peasants as “people” and contrasted their interests to that of the “dominant classes”. Ecevit distinguished CHP from TİP by arguing that CHP is not a class-party, and it denies class conflict.⁴³⁶ As a result of such a populist strategy, CHP managed to increase its ties with the unions in the second half of the 70s.

⁴²⁹ Milliyet, 31.7.1965

⁴³⁰ Milliyet, 1.1.1962

⁴³¹ Milliyet, 17.6.1970

⁴³² Milliyet, 11.9.1961

⁴³³ Milliyet, 29.1.1962

⁴³⁴ Milliyet, 3.10.1967

⁴³⁵ Milliyet, 13.2.1969

⁴³⁶ Milliyet, 21.6.1966

The party received the support of DISK, the second largest union federation.⁴³⁷ Also Türk-İs, the largest union federation, declared that “the closest party to its principles is CHP”.⁴³⁸ However, this union did not declare open support to CHP. Its excuse was that DISK supported CHP. Türk-İş argued that the fact that DISK supports class struggle instead of class compromise violates its principles.⁴³⁹

MSP also distinguished for its economic policies. The party had a special emphasis on the “Anatolian capital”. MSP leader Erbakan contrasted the interests of the “Istanbul capital” and the Anatolian capital in his discourse. By the Istanbul capital and Anatolian capital, Erbakan meant the big bourgeoisie and the small bourgeoisie respectively. He complained that the financial resources only served the Istanbul capital. Erbakan aimed to align with these small bourgeoisie through an Islamic and nativist discourse.⁴⁴⁰

Despite the industry-led development model, the economic populist policies and subsidies in the agriculture sector continued in this period. The domestic terms of trade for agriculture, measured as the average ratio of agricultural prices to the manufacture prices, increased 22 percent between 1961 and 1976.⁴⁴¹ In other words, the relative income of the peasantry increased in this period.

Real wages in industry increased 57 percent between 1963 and 1971. They declined after the 1971 military memorandum for couple of years and increased sharply after 1974 and 1976. In total the real wages increased more than double between 1963 and 1976. The impact of the organized labour and strikes which peaked in this period had a role in this. The real wages kept increasing 45 percent between 1976 and 1979, it finally dropped by 23 percent in 1980.⁴⁴² The public sector had a determining role in the trajectory of the prices. The graph below⁴⁴³ shows that the wages in public sector was higher than the private sector, but their trajectory was similar.

⁴³⁷ Milliyet, 30.6.1975

⁴³⁸ Milliyet, 22.7.1976

⁴³⁹ Milliyet, 22.7.1976

⁴⁴⁰ Öztürk, *Türkiye'de Büyük Sermaye Grupları: Finans Kapitalin Oluşumu ve Gelişimi*,179.

⁴⁴¹ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2015*,135.

⁴⁴² Boratav, 139 & 142.

⁴⁴³ Koç, *Türkiye işçi sınıfı tarihi*, 524.



Figure 3: Workers' real wages 1963-1980

In short, the economic development model in the 60s and 70s was a kind of corporatist/consensual development model that aimed to satisfy both the urban and rural working classes through economic populist policies. These policies were financed mostly through foreign loans in the protectionist development model. The goal of industrial deepening was achieved only to some extent. **As the table below⁴⁴⁴ shows,** the share of consumer nondurables production in the private manufacturing industry declined from 66.7 percent in 1963 to 39.8 percent in 1980. The share of consumer durables and intermediate goods increased around 25 percent to 53 percent. But the share of capital goods production declined. In sum, some industrial deepening was achieved through the increase in the share of intermediate goods production, however the industrial deepening did not go far as to produce capital goods in a significant level. The planning model remained as an economic model to transfer the resources to the private industry. An important role of public enterprises was to produce cheap inputs for the private sector. Compared to some other developmentalist states, the pressure on the private sector for industrial deepening and innovation remained low in the Turkish ISI model.⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴⁴ Boratav *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2015*, 133.

⁴⁴⁵ Ümit Akçay and Oktar Türel, "Import Substituting Industrialization Strategy and Planning Experience in Turkey: 1960-1980," in *Political Economy of Development in Turkey: 1838-Present*, ed. Emre Özçelik and Yonca Özdemir (Paulgrave Macmillan, n.d.), 177-79.

Table 17: Production of goods by categories in industry (%)

Year	Private manufacturing industry					State industry			
	CND	CD	IG	CG	Sum	CND	CD	IG	CG
1963	66.7	4.4	20.5	8.4	=100=	53.5	0.4	36.5	9.8
1980	39.8	10.1	42.6	7.5	=100=	29.2	0.1	64.5	6.2

Abbreviations: CND: Consumer nondurables; CD: Consumer durables; IG: Intermediate goods; CG: Capital goods

Turkey already had a chronic foreign trade deficit due to high dependency on the import of intermediate and capital goods. The export/import coverage ratio was less than 70 percent in most of the 60s. When the OPEC crisis hit in 1973, this ratio reached to 30 percent.⁴⁴⁶ The growth rates were kept above 5 percent till 1977 through foreign loans with high interest rates. By 1978, the share of short-term loans reached to 52 percent of all loans since the credibility of the country was significantly low. When the second OPEC crisis hit in 1979-1980, the economy went in a deeper crisis. The growth rate went below zero between 1978 and 1980. Unemployment rate reached 20 percent, and shortages emerged in consumer goods. The Turkish lira were devalued five times between 1975 and 1980. The private industry stopped production of intermediate and capital goods production. 50 thousand workers were on strike by 1980. A stabilization program draft was introduced to the CHP government by the World Bank in 1978.⁴⁴⁷ TUSIAD, the association of the big business, pressured the CHP government for stabilization programs by giving advertisements on the newspapers in 1979. After the CHP government resigned, it would be the AP government to announce the new stabilization program which is known as the “January 24 decisions”. It would be implemented by the government under military rule between 1980 and 1983.

3.4.4 Nationhood and cultural policies

The pressure on the religious orders continued in the early 60s. However, religious orders would be legitimized in the McCarthyist climate of the two decades. A debate started between CHP and other parties in 1962 upon the arrest of the Nurcu order members. CHP’s ministry of internal affairs argued that the Nurcu order aims to create a state that is based on Shari laws. In response, a CKMP deputy defended the order arguing that Islam is the way to fight against communism.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁶ Üzümcü, “Türkiye’de Tarım Sektörünün Gelişimi,” 237.

⁴⁴⁷ Öztürk, *Türkiye’de Büyük Sermaye Grupları: Finans Kapitalin Oluşumu ve Gelişimi*, 183-184.

⁴⁴⁸ Milliyet, 13.11.1962

To legitimize and defend religious orders as an antidote to communism became a common strategy of AP, MSP, and MHP in the 60s and 70s.⁴⁴⁹

CHP and other parties also confronted for the position of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in early 60s. An CHP deputy argued that the budget of the Directorate should be independent from state in a secular setting. AP and CKMP opposed it. Both parties supported the state to train more religious officials by opening more religious vocational schools.⁴⁵⁰

The foundation of National Order Party (MSP) in 1969 was a critical moment for Islamic politics in Turkey. The party received the support of several religious orders⁴⁵¹ used a remarkable religious/traditionalist discourse and raised politics of religion. It was banned in 1971 after the military coup and re-founded as National Salvation Party (MSP) in 1972. The party became successful quickly, received twelve and eight percent of the votes in two elections in the 70s. MSP brought discussions of traditions and lifestyle such as women's dress in the political agenda, consumption of alcohol⁴⁵², foreign movies. In a social climate where women were attacked in the streets for wearing skirts⁴⁵³, the party opposed women wearing skirts and/or revealing dresses⁴⁵⁴. The party also supported freedom for religious orders and their activities.⁴⁵⁵ Occasionally, the MPs of AP also made statements regarding traditions and lifestyle. However, AP leadership was less concerned about this issue than MSP. AP dismissed an MP from the party in 1966 who opposed women wearing skirts.⁴⁵⁶ MSP also suggested to censor movies in cinema and theatre plays which are claimed to degenerate the morals of the society.⁴⁵⁷ The party supported compulsory religion courses in schools⁴⁵⁸ and promised to open a religious school in every town in 1977.⁴⁵⁹ The party

⁴⁴⁹ E.g. the speech of Sıddık Aydın, an AP deputy, at Milliyet, 1.6.1964. He states that "the Nur booklets are against communism. Quran is also against communism. Quran curses communism, therefore Nur order and Quran is the same."

⁴⁵⁰ Milliyet, 24.12.1962

⁴⁵¹ M. Hakan Yavuz, Ahmet Yıldız, and M. Hakan Yavuz, *Modernleşen Müslümanlar: Nurcular, Nakşiler, Milli Görüş ve AK Parti*, 2. ed. (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2008), 279–81.

⁴⁵² E.g. MSP deputy Hüseyin Abbas suggested that the state enterprises which produce raki and wine should replace them with jam and fruit juice. Milliyet, 26.5.1974

⁴⁵³ E.g. Manisa events, 5.6.1970

⁴⁵⁴ E.g. Erbakan's speech at the MNP launch at Milliyet, 9.2.1970: He argues that "morality has collapsed in Turkey. These lands which have been watered with martyrs' blood is about to lose its modesty since the women go in the streets naked."

⁴⁵⁵ Milliyet, 26.9.1973

⁴⁵⁶ The MP who was dismissed was Muammer Dirik. See Milliyet, 6.5.1966

⁴⁵⁷ See Erbakan interview at Milliyet, 6.8.1973: He states that "cinema and theatres push the youth towards immorality. These should be go through a strict censorship."

⁴⁵⁸ Milliyet, 9.10.1969

⁴⁵⁹ Milliyet, 18.4.1977

leader Erbakan even argued that restoration of Caliphate could be helpful for Turkey.⁴⁶⁰ MSP regarded the modernization reforms since the mid-19th century as “non-national” movements that aim to impose Western values upon the society. The party described these reforms including those of Ataturk as copying the Western culture.⁴⁶¹ It coined the twenty-seven years mono-party rule of CHP as the period of “oppression of the believers.”⁴⁶² In sum, it had a revanchist attitude towards the Ottoman-Turkish modernization including the times of Tanzimat reformers, Jonturks, and Ataturk. Its self-censored proposals implied that it rather supports an alternative modernization that is based on the traditional Islamic order of the Ottoman Empire, and on the so-called national and moral values.

The rise of the religious orders which were considered as an antidote to communism, and the rise of MSP functioned as centrifugal forces in politics during the 60s and the 70s. During the AP government, and the CHP-MSP coalitions, tens of religious vocational schools were opened in the 70s. AP started to support religious orders openly towards the end of 1970s. The party leader Demirel suggested that everyone should read the Nur booklets by contrasting it to the Communist Manifesto.⁴⁶³ The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) also headed towards a strong religious discourse in this period and combined its McCarthyism with a discourse that is based on Islam and morality. MHP leader Türkeş argued that religion was neglected in Turkey for years and that Turkey needs more religious officials.⁴⁶⁴

CHP’s relation to religion was quite noteworthy in this period. The party started to downplay the anti-traditionalist discourse around 1968. Ecevit argued that CHP should not speak negatively about religious sentiments and students who go to religious schools.⁴⁶⁵ He stated that “superstructural reforms” such as “hat reform” of the mono-party era did not bring anything to the peasants. He called people who are concerned with such issues as “wardrobe Ataturkists”⁴⁶⁶ and argued that the real reforms are those about “infrastructure”. Although Ecevit declined Marxism as a model for CHP’s new “left-of-center” orientation, he was clearly influenced by the

⁴⁶⁰ See Erbakan’s interview at *Milliyet*, 25.9.1969. He argues that “to bring the Caliphate might have several benefits. Political benefits too. I am not saying it must be brought back. But if the nation wants, anything can happen. Anything can happen. But it is not beneficial to portray these ideas as taboo.”

⁴⁶¹ MNP election manifesto of 1970, p.5-6

⁴⁶² MSP election manifesto of 1977, p.43

⁴⁶³ See Demirel’s speech about Nurcu order at *Milliyet* 22.5.1978. Demirel argued that “The people who read religious books do not harm anyone. The one who tells a bead cannot be same with the one who shoots with a gun. It is not possible to understand that to read Nur booklets is crime in a place where to read the Communist Manifesto is free. Let everyone read the Nur booklets.”

⁴⁶⁴ *Milliyet*, 4.11.1969

⁴⁶⁵ *Milliyet*, 20.10.1968

⁴⁶⁶ *Milliyet*, 18.12.1969

Marxist or class-based analysis of the society. His analysis of the Atatürk reforms and the distinction he makes about the “superstructural reforms” and “infrastructural reforms” are signs of this. Ecevit had the famous motto “land belongs to the tiller; water belongs to the user”. He also started to use themes and terms of religion and tradition in his speeches such as “Allah’s justice”.⁴⁶⁷ He stated once that “a person is a leftist as much as I am no matter he prays five times a day as long as he wants to change the order”.⁴⁶⁸

In short, religion and religious discourse that are intertwined with the so-called traditional values started to rise in this period parallel to the rise of the left. However, the ways that the parties used religion in their discourse and policies were nuanced. Religion appeared in the discourse of AP and MHP as an important element of national/nativist identity which was portrayed as a value that “the communists aim to destroy”. On the other hand, religion and traditional values in MSP’s discourse and policy meant more concrete policies and an extensive alternative order based on the traditional Ottoman setting. This included, for example, how women should wear and how norms of law should be regulated. Compared to AP and MHP, MSP’s anti-communism was less salient. However, MSP’s extensive alternative order was also different from TİP’s and radical left’s alternative order. Although MSP antagonized the “Istanbul capital” and the “Anatolian capital” as argued in the previous sub-section, the party’s alternative order was not based on a class perspective. In such a political climate of McCarthyism where parties combined religion/tradition and anti-communism, CHP played down its anti-traditionalist legacy and discourse. Moreover, Ecevit denounced some of the “superstructural” reforms of the mono-party era.

The first appearance of Alevi and Kurdish politics in the stage of party politics was in the 60s and 70s. The Alevi community founded the Union Party (BP) and managed to enter the parliament in 1969 with eight members. The party raised the questions of discrimination and violence against Alevis. Its leader Balan argued that the AP government tolerates militants who attack to Alevi people in Anatolian towns. The party initially supported in 1969 that the Directorate of Religious Affairs should also represent Alevi beliefs.⁴⁶⁹ It looked more like a centrist Alevi party that aims to appeal to Alevis from different ideologies of the spectrum. Then, the party started to move towards socialism and a different understanding of laicite in the 70s. The 1980 program stated that “the Directorate of Religious Affairs has no place in laic republic”.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁷ Milliyet, 22.9.1969

⁴⁶⁸ Milliyet, 22.9.1969

⁴⁶⁹ Milliyet, 4.10.1969

⁴⁷⁰ 1980 TBP Party Program See Mete Kaan Kaynar and Nurettin Kalkan, eds., *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Partiler Seçimler Beyannameler (1923-1980)* (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2022), 1155.

The Kurdish question also slightly entered the political scene in the 1960s with the arrest of forty-nine young Kurds related to the publication of a poem in Kurdish language in a literary magazine in 1961. Most of the parties avoided to define the Kurdish question as an issue of ethnic identity. As a matter of fact, the question was not even labelled as “the Kurdish question”. The term used was “the Eastern question”. Upon the arrest of forty-nine Kurds in 1961, CHP’s minister of internal affairs Bekata argued that the question is not about separatism or cultural autonomy. He argued that Kurds are from the same race with Turks like Uzbeks and Turkmens.⁴⁷¹ YTP, as one of the heirs of DP, appeared as the only party to show special interest to the East where the Kurdish population lived in the early 1960s. However, their policy was not to raise cultural issues but rather the economic backwardness of the East.⁴⁷² In the late 60s, TİP became a stage for Kurdish politicians. The “eastern rallies” of the party that started in 1967 caused many Kurds to start debating the Kurdish question as, inter alia, a matter of oppressed cultural identity. Economic issues such as landless peasants and the economic “backwardness” of the East was a main theme in these rallies. However, the demands such as “respect for the local language” was also raised for the first time.⁴⁷³ These rallies and the concerns raised in these rallies became the reason of the banning of TİP for “separatism” in 1971 after the military coup.

3.4.5 Political system, institutions, and freedoms

The determinant of the political division and party system since 1965 was arguably “anti-communism”. Similar to its precursor DP, AP started to portray communism as the greatest threat to society before the 1965 elections. Although there was not a communist party and a visible threat of communism, this policy played a central role in AP’s ideology and discourse. Demirel claimed that “the threat of the extreme-left” is against the values of the traditional order such as “family, reputation, honor, and property”.⁴⁷⁴ He argued that communist movements aim to overthrow “the order of the established values”.⁴⁷⁵ Demirel called people to get after the TİP members. He criminalized TİP in several of his speeches with the argument that TİP is not socialist but communist.⁴⁷⁶ As Demirel targeted TİP, the anti-leftist youth associations such as the Struggle with

⁴⁷¹ Milliyet, 22.6.1963

⁴⁷² Milliyet, 9.11.1963

⁴⁷³ Gökhan Atılğan, “Sanayi Kapitalizminin Şafağında,” in *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, ed. Cenk Saraçoğlu and Ateş Uslu, Birinci Basım (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2019), 602.

⁴⁷⁴ Milliyet, 13.6.1965

⁴⁷⁵ Milliyet, 5.7.1965

⁴⁷⁶ E.g.: Milliyet, 28.11.1966

Communism Association⁴⁷⁷ attacked and paralyzed TIP's meetings. A typical pattern of violence in this period was to throw weak explosives to the mosque yards and blame it on the communists. In one of the incidents, the suspects confessed that the plot was organized by AP's minister of internal affairs to ban TIP⁴⁷⁸. Against the accusations, Aybar, the leader of TIP, denied being communist. Instead, he argued that Demirel calls people for crime and does not respect the rules of democracy for free competition of parties.⁴⁷⁹

The military also joined the scapegoating policy. The commander in chief Tural urged the military personnel in 1967 that “communists are trying to capture Turkey with a coup”.⁴⁸⁰ While Demirel endorsed the commander in chief, CHP leader İnönü stated that the military cannot intervene in the affairs of citizens.⁴⁸¹ The president Sunay also urged that the constitution does not allow “communism, socialism, and fascism” and implied that TIP is out of law.⁴⁸² Conservative, nationalist youth organizations such as the Union of National Turkish Students (MTTB) organized several rallies which were named the “meetings of cursing communism” in the second half of the 60s.⁴⁸³ CHP claimed that AP is behind these associations financially.⁴⁸⁴ Against such demonization of TIP by the AP government, CHP leader İnönü took attention to the liberties granted in the constitution.⁴⁸⁵ Consequently, the AP deputies attempted to lynch one TIP deputy in the parliament in 1965. Also, the ministry of internal affairs opened an investigation for “the eastern rallies” of TIP with the allegation that TIP is serving to Kurdish separatism.

Anti-communism was also at the heart of the discourse of Nationalist Action Party (formerly CKMP, later MHP) since Türkeş became the leader of the party in 1965. Türkeş claimed that the aim of TIP is “to break Turkey into pieces” and the leaders of the party are actually alien to the Turkish peasants and workers.⁴⁸⁶ MP also announced that they will not shake hands with TIP deputies in the parliament⁴⁸⁷.

The anti-communist discourse and scapegoating were so determinant in the political atmosphere of the period that CHP also started to legitimize its policies of “social justice” with an anti-

⁴⁷⁷ Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği in Turkish

⁴⁷⁸ E.g. The İzmir incident, *Milliyet*, 12.8.1968; the Hatay incident, *Milliyet*, 6.3.1971

⁴⁷⁹ *Milliyet*, 3.10.1965

⁴⁸⁰ *Milliyet*, 23.1.1967

⁴⁸¹ *Milliyet*, 31.1.1967

⁴⁸² *Milliyet*, 28.5.1967

⁴⁸³ E.g., *Milliyet*, 21.3.1966

⁴⁸⁴ Ecevit's speech in *Milliyet*, 21.6.1966

⁴⁸⁵ *Milliyet*, 29.7.1965

⁴⁸⁶ *Milliyet*, 30.9.1965

⁴⁸⁷ *Milliyet*, 27.11.1965

communist discourse. İnönü argued in 1965 that “it is only the centre-left that can prevent communism”⁴⁸⁸ although there was not any significant communist movement or party in the political scene. In this political climate, a group of deputies broke away from CHP and founded the Republican Reliance Party (CGP) in 1967. The party accused CHP of protecting the communists. CGP introduced itself as a nationalist, right-wing party, and joined the anti-communist camp in late 60s.⁴⁸⁹

After the military coup of 1971, AP and CGP supported the formation of the special tribunals (DGM) and restricting the autonomy of the universities in the direction of the demands of the military. CHP, on the other hand, opposed these constitutional amendments.⁴⁹⁰ Finally, TIP was banned in 1971. Later, MSP also opposed the bills arguing that the tribunals were founded to target “the believers”.⁴⁹¹ These courts were founded consequently. But the constitutional court repealed some of their jurisdiction for being against the constitution.⁴⁹² In general, AP leader Demirel complained about the decisions of the constitutional court for being either unconstitutional or undemocratic.⁴⁹³ This was the illiberal aspect of AP and its partners’ ideology.

Democratic Party (DemP), founded in 1970 by a group of deputies who broke away from AP, also introduced itself as a nationalist, rightist party in the 1973 election campaign.⁴⁹⁴ After the election, the party called “right-wing” parties, AP, MSP, CGP, to unite. Similarly, CGP called for “nationalist” parties to unite in a coalition.⁴⁹⁵

The violence between left-wing and right-wing groups increased especially after 1975 during the first “Nationalist Front” government of AP, MSP, MHP, and CGP. MHP related organizations which were called “the Commandos”, “the Idealists”, “the Grey-wolves” clashed with the illegal left-wing groups such as the “Revolutionary Left”. As the violence increased, the polarization between CHP and the right-bloc also increased. CHP’s leader Ecevit called Demirel a “murderer”, and Türkeş the “knife of the murderer”.⁴⁹⁶ As a response, Demirel called CHP “the enemy of the regime”.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁸⁸ Milliyet, 8.10.1965

⁴⁸⁹ Milliyet, 13.5.1967 & Milliyet, 22.5.1967

⁴⁹⁰ Milliyet, 16.3.1973

⁴⁹¹ See Erbakan’s election campaign speech at Milliyet, 23.7.1973

⁴⁹² Milliyet, 9.6.1974

⁴⁹³ E.g. Milliyet 3.7.1974

⁴⁹⁴ Milliyet, 8.7.1973

⁴⁹⁵ Milliyet, 19.10.1973

⁴⁹⁶ Milliyet, 7.6.1976

⁴⁹⁷ Milliyet, 15.5.1977

In sum, authoritarian anti-communism became the most essential policy and discourse after 1965 with the rise of left-wing movements, labour movements, and left-wing politics. The laws of the mono-party period that banned communist propaganda encouraged the parties for such a position. Also, the laws did not make a clear definition of who is a communist and who belongs to another variant of left-wing politics. The authoritarian anti-communist parties took advantage of this ambiguity and used the pejorative label “communist” to suppress the left-leaning parties and movements as in the case of McCarthyism. Communism did not only mean an economic system. Perhaps more importantly, the parties of the large authoritarian anti-communist bloc portrayed it as an ideology that is against Islam and the traditions of the Turkish society. Such a synthetic discourse became the key for the authoritarian anti-communist parties’ success to appeal to large masses. The dominant faction in the military complied with this authoritarian anti-left politics.⁴⁹⁸ The military manifested this view in its demands for authoritarian policies after the 1971 memorandum, and later the 1980 full-fledged coup.

3.4.6 A summary of the party competition between 1961-1980

The policies and discourses of the parties and party leaders were analysed with respect to four different policy domains above to identify the salient issues that diverged parties from one another. As distinct from the 50s where parties mostly converged on the foreign policy issues, parties in the 60s and 70s started to diverge in this field. The most salient rupture with the pro-West engagement was that of TIP. TIP was highly critical of the NATO membership and the American influence in Turkish politics. The party rather supported an independent and diversified foreign policy that can be called “Third-Worldism”. CHP also developed a critical stance vis-à-vis USA. Ecevit raised concerns about America’s involvement in the domestic affairs of its allies and encouragement of the scapegoating policy. However, the party did not make any substantial change in the traditions of foreign policy when it came to power. AP and the other parties stayed committed to the pro-West line in foreign policy. But even they were critical of the full-commitment policy compared to the previous period.

Arguably the most effective issue that shaped the political landscape and party rivalry in the 60s and 70s was authoritarian “anti-communism”. Communism was a scapegoat term to restrict the activities of the left-leaning parties or the parties that aim to lean towards the left. The term did not only mean pro-labour policies, but more importantly being against religion and the so-called values

⁴⁹⁸ İrtem, “12 Mart: Karagahtaki İslam iktidarı,” 183–208.

of the Turkish people. Thus, the anti-communist parties appealed heavily to the religious and moral sentiments of people and used them as an antidote to the rise of left-wing politics. The discourse of anti-communism was a legacy of the late 40s and 50s as I argued in the previous sections. The laws which were enacted in these earlier years already forbade communist parties and parties that are founded on the idea of class conflict. This naturally left a grey zone about the question who is communist and who is not. AP embraced a strong anti-communist discourse since 1965. The party allied with MHP whose paramilitary power in the streets against the illegal left-wing organizations was strategic. Groups related to AP and MHP attacked the meetings of TIP and aimed to paralyze the activities of the party. AP actively supported such actions. Moreover, CHP claimed that AP financially backed these groups. CHP was also affected from this scapegoating policy because the party also appropriated an economic-populist discourse and started to expand towards lower classes in this period. Naturally, it supported the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and assembly for any parties including TIP. The dominant faction in the military also backed AP's authoritarian politics against the left. The military coup of 1971 and the subsequent era of technocratic governments served authoritarianization of the regime by banning TIP, enforcing state of emergency for one and half year and restricting autonomy of the universities.

Regarding economic policy, the parties had a relative consensus on planning and a mixed economy. Yet, AP was the reluctant side about it. TIP distinguished from the other parties by supporting more state involvement in the economy. The party criticized the etatist policies to work in favour of the private enterprise and big business. It supported nationalization of critical sectors such as banking. TIP and CHP appealed to lower classes in this period. CHP established relations with the lower classes by downplaying issues regarding religion and traditions and by emphasizing economic issues such as land reform and workers' rights. Consequently, the party managed to increase its vote share over 40 percent.

Islamic and traditionalist politics started to rise in the 60s and 70s. MSP played a prominent role in bringing forward issues about morality and lifestyle of people. It supported to increase the role of religion and Islamic laws in society and asked more freedom for religious orders. AP and MHP also emphasized religion. The two parties regarded religion as a useful instrument against communism. Consequently, they followed the strategy to contrast religion, family values, traditions to left-wing politics. This is one of the novel proposals of this study to distinguish between MSP on the one hand and AP and MHP on the other hand, as an alternative to the literature that portrays MSP and MHP as the two far-right parties of the unidimensional party system of the Turkish politics. The table below shows the salient policy and ideologies of the relevant parties between 1960 and 1980.


Table 18: Parties' salient policies 1960-1980

Party	Salient Policy
AP	Authoritarian anti-communism & Islamic nativism Strong executive, illiberalism, majoritarianism Planned and mixed economy with a pro-private sector leaning
CHP	Pro-lower classes, (economic) populism Democracy and constitutionalism Planned and mixed economy Critical of full pro-American foreign policy
MP	Authoritarian anti-communism & Islamic nativism
YTP	Authoritarian anti-communism & Islamic nativism The “Eastern Question” as economic backwardness
TİP	Socialism, pro-lower classes Democracy and constitutionalism Planned economy with pro-public sector leaning Third-worldism, pro-independent foreign policy The “Eastern Question” as economic backwardness and denial of the Kurdish identity
CKMP/MHP	Authoritarian anti-communism & Islamic nativism
CGP	Authoritarian anti-communism & secular nativism
BP	Alevi politics Secularism Socialism (after 1972)
MSP	Conservative and religious values Revanchism against the Ottoman-Turkish secular-modernization Pro-“Anatolian capital” vis-à-vis the big business

Below I demonstrate the relative positions of parties in the party system and their change with on a two-dimensional political compass. The first and most important division is the one between left-populism and authoritarian anti-“communism”. The second dimension is labelled as pro-secular modernization vs. pro-Islamic modernization.

Cleavages and Party System (1960-1980)

- Polarized multi-party system, with two main parties (CHP and AP)
- The power rotates between the camps



3.5 1983-2002: Authoritarian Transition and Polarized Multiparty System

The military coup on September 12, 1980 ended the period that covers five electoral terms between 1961 and 1980. The National Security Council (NSC) which was composed of the leaders of the military directly took the power until 1983. The NSC declared a state of emergency and closed the parliament, suspended the constitution, and banned all the parties. It suspended all the strikes⁴⁹⁹, and banned several trade unions, most importantly the left-wing and the second biggest union federation DISK⁵⁰⁰. On the other hand, the biggest union federation Türk-İş supported the coup.⁵⁰¹ The big business also backed the military intervention.⁵⁰²

The main justification of the coup in the discourse of the junta leaders was “anarchy and terror”⁵⁰³ in the streets which caused deaths every day. Indeed, 99 people died in the clashes in the streets in the week before the coup⁵⁰⁴, and 5241 people died in two years before the coup.⁵⁰⁵ The cause of the anarchy was argued to be the large freedoms granted by the 1961 constitution. The authoritarian laws and policies implemented after the 1971 military intervention was insufficient according to the military leaders. Therefore, the military was going to finalize the task to “discipline the Turkish democracy” which was left incomplete in the 1971 military intervention. During the rule of NSC between 1980 and 1983, 50 persons were executed, 299 persons died in jail arguably under torture, 650 thousand people were taken into custody, 230 thousand persons were tried, and 41 thousand people were convicted.⁵⁰⁶

The NSC formed a constituent assembly of 160 members in 1981. The members were nominated by the governors of each province and approved and appointed by the NSC. They were supposed to be non-partisan. The assembly passed several laws and drafted a new constitution.⁵⁰⁷ The new constitution removed the senate and returned to unicameralism. The review powers of the judiciary

⁴⁹⁹ 50 thousand of workers were in strike when the military suspended the strikes. A strike decision which would affect more than 100 thousand workers were annulled. See *Milliyet*, 16.09.1980

⁵⁰⁰ MHP-related MİSK and MSP-related Hak-İş were also the trade union confederations that were closed. But these were small unions compared to DISK.

⁵⁰¹ Koç, 610-611. The Türk-İş chairperson İbrahim Denizci personally penned a letter to the coup leader Kenan Evren to state that the union celebrates the coup.

⁵⁰² See Vehbi Koç’s statement in *Milliyet*, 18.12.1980. The chairperson of the biggest business group, Koç argued that people were relieved since the day military took control of power. He also penned a letter to the coup leader Evren.

⁵⁰³ The phrase used in General Evren’s press conference. *Milliyet*; 17.09.1980

⁵⁰⁴ *Milliyet*, 20.09.1980

⁵⁰⁵ *Milliyet*, 07.01.1981

⁵⁰⁶ Sina Akşin, *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi*, 4. Baskı, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014), 241.; Murat Yetkin, *Meraklısı İçin Darbeler Kitabı*, 1. Baskı, Araştırma İnceleme (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2020), 202.

⁵⁰⁷ Akşin, 239.

were curbed.⁵⁰⁸ Ten percent electoral threshold was enacted. These policies together would serve to create stronger governments. Unicameralism and weaker judiciary would serve to remove some of the constraints for an effective/unconstrained government, and the ten percent threshold would eliminate the smaller parties in favour of the bigger parties. As the new system would strengthen the government, it created a double-headed executive by also strengthening the position of the president. Some scholars argued that the Turkish political system became a semi-presidential system after the 1980 coup.⁵⁰⁹ The president was authorized with veto powers and the authority to make critical appointments to the constitutional court and other organs of the judiciary. The position was tailored for General Kenan Evren, the leader of the military coup. Therefore, the military aimed to have tutelary powers through the president after transitioning to competitive politics in 1983. The 1982 constitution also founded the Council of Higher Education (Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu - YÖK), made the universities subject to it, and thus abolished the autonomy of the universities. The president was also authorized to appoint the head of YÖK. The constitution retained the institution of National Security Council from the 1961 constitution. Therefore, the military would continue to influence domestic politics through NSC. The appointments, promotions, and expulsions within military became closed to judicial review. The 1982 constitution retained the State Security Courts (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri – DGM*). These special tribunals were initially introduced in the 1961 constitution and empowered after the 1971 military intervention. DGMs became partly inefficient after the constitutional court repealed these courts for being against the constitution.⁵¹⁰ These were mixed courts of civilian and military judges that deal with “offences committed against the integrity and unity of the State”.⁵¹¹ DGMs would become the main apparatus of the securitization of political issues, and another apparatus for military to intervene in politics. In short, the military aimed to strengthen the government vis-à-vis the opposition and the judiciary. But it aimed to balance the power of the government through the expanded authorities of the president (who is arguably imagined to be always a military general) and through the military whose institutional autonomy increased after the coup.

The new constitution curbed the power of the unions and civil society. Conditions to go on a strike became more difficult. To have horizontal ties between unions in different sectors were banned.⁵¹² The procedures to form civil society organizations became more difficult and subject to red-tape.

⁵⁰⁸ Özbudun and Gençkaya, *Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey*, 20-21.

⁵⁰⁹ Nur Uluşahin, “Kuvvetler Ayrılığı ve Yasama Yürütme İlişkileri,” in *Türkiye’de Siyasal Yaşam: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, ed. Mehmet Kabasakal, 1. Baskı, 569. 56 (Şişli, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2016), 54.

⁵¹⁰ *Milliyet*, 9.6.1974

⁵¹¹ Özbudun and Gençkaya, 45-46.

⁵¹² *Milliyet*, 11.12.1981

The cooperation between the parties and elements of civil society such as unions, associations were not allowed.⁵¹³ Thus, the already weak ties between the political parties and elements of civil society got even weaker after the 1980 military coup.

During the military rule, several laws prohibiting Kurdish language were legislated. Article 26 of the constitution stated that “no language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought”.⁵¹⁴ Article 26 referred to Article 28/2 which practically banned publication in Kurdish.⁵¹⁵ Article 42 implied that the mother tongue of Turkish citizens is Turkish.⁵¹⁶ Thus, the law indirectly appointed mother tongue to citizens.

The other important cultural policy of the junta was to put compulsory religion education in primary and secondary schools, and to spread Quran courses in the country. Although these policies seem contradictory to the Atatürkist discourse that the junta leaders championed⁵¹⁷, they considered religion and morality as a barrier for the rise of the left. This approach followed the strategy of the authoritarian anti-communist parties of the 60s and 70s which instrumentalized religion to mobilize masses against the rising left.

Regarding the economic policy, the regime under the junta carried out liberalization policies. These included devaluating the Turkish Lira and removing the barriers on convertibility to increase foreign trade, subsidize companies that target export through cheap credit and tax refund, removing subsidizing the production of basic consumption goods, and pressuring the real wages. Boratav⁵¹⁸ argued that these were the standard World Bank prescriptions that are also seen in Latin American countries to transition from import substitution industrialization development model to neoliberal development model.⁵¹⁹ World Bank and IMF declared support to the government under

⁵¹³ Özbudun & Gençkaya, 20-21.

⁵¹⁴ Welat Zeydanlıoğlu, “Turkey’s Kurdish Language Policy,” *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, no. 217 (2012): 109.

⁵¹⁵ The article stated that “no publications or broadcasts may be made in any language prohibited by law”. This addressed the Law 2932 which states “languages other than those which are the primary official languages of states recognised by the Turkish State”. There was not any state whose official language was Kurdish and who were recognized by the Turkish state back then. See Zeydanlıoğlu, 2012, p.109.

⁵¹⁶ Article 42 states that “no language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education”.

⁵¹⁷ The junta leader Evren made his own interpretation of Atatürkism as he champions the term. See e.g. *Milliyet*, 6.01.1981; Evren stated that “there is no place for ideologies outside the Atatürk principles in Turkey” in *Milliyet*, 20.5.1983

⁵¹⁸ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2015*, 148.

⁵¹⁹ World Bank report suggested that state should only invest in infrastructure, public enterprises should be privatized, Turkey should be open to foreign trade and focus on agriculture rather than industry. See *Milliyet*, 22.11.1980

the military regime.⁵²⁰ It should be noted that the deputy prime minister who was in charge of the economy policies of the government under the junta was Turgut Özal. Özal would be the leader of the Motherland Party (ANAP) which ruled the country alone between 1983 and 1991. This shows the continuity between the military regime and the civilian regime regarding the authoritarian neoliberalization.

In sum, the authoritarian regime under the military rule implemented three sets of policies. Firstly, transition to neoliberal development model was provided through banning the left-wing trade unions and also suspending the union activities in general, breaking the ties between civil society and the political parties through laws, repressing the real wages of labour, relaxing the instruments for foreign trade. Secondly, cultural monism was aimed through the ban on Kurdish, implementing compulsory religion courses in schools. Thirdly, executive was strengthened vis-à-vis the judiciary and opposition. Ten percent electoral threshold was implemented to curb the power of the smaller parties. The military aimed to balance the power of the strengthened government through increasing the power and autonomy of the military, and the president who is aimed to be a member of the military. It should be noted that all these policies except increasing the role of military in politics were in line with the demands of the authoritarian anti-communist parties, primarily AP and MHP, of the 70s.

A constitutional referendum was held in 1982 and the new constitution was approved by 91.4 percent of the voters. The constitution had a provisional article that made General Kenan Evren, the leader of the military coup, the president of the republic. The military decided to transition back to competitive politics in 1983. The party system took place between 1983 and 2002 included five electoral terms.

All parties except ANAP, HP and MDP were vetoed by the military to participate in the 1983 elections. The military-backed-MDP competed only in the 1983 elections and could not survive later. ANAP ruled single-handedly until 1991 by having the seat shares of 52.7 percent and 64.8 percent in the 1983 and 1987 elections respectively. The disproportionality between its vote share (36.3 percent) and seat share (64.8 percent) is striking for the 1987 elections. The reason is that ANAP changed the election system to its favour before the 1987 elections. HP (later SHP and CHP) was the second biggest party in the 80s.

⁵²⁰ World Bank declared financial support. See Milliyet, 27.11.1981. And See Steiner Report from IMF in Milliyet, 23.01.1981

Fragmentation and coalition governments of similar size of parties in three electoral terms between 1991 and 2002 were the main characteristics of the party system of this period that distinguished this period from all other periods of Turkish political history.

27 percent vote share and 39.5 percent seat share that DYP received in 1991 were the highest numbers a party could get in this period. HP/SHP/CHP and DSP claimed the heritage of the old-CHP which was banned in the coup of 1980. A pro-Kurdish party (HADEP) competed for the first time in a general election in 1995. The party was founded by former SHP politicians. HADEP received 4.2 of the votes and failed to pass the ten percent threshold. The total vote share of HP/SHP/CHP and DSP were 30.5, 33.2, 31.5, 25.4, 30.6 in 1983, 1987, 1991, and 1999 respectively.

A pro-Islamic party (RP – formerly MNP and MSP) became the first party in 1995 for the first time by gaining 21.4 percent of the votes. During RP's rule in 1997, the military forced RP for certain policies to implement. The events that followed the military intervention led to the closure of RP by the constitutional court in 1998. The period ended with the 2002 election where all the established parties of the period except CHP failed to pass the 10 percent threshold.

Table 19: Vote share (%V) and seat share (%S) of parties between 1983-2002

	1983		1987		1991		1995		1999	
	%V	%S	%V	%S	%V	%S	%V	%S	%V	%S
ANAP	45.1	52.7	36.3	64.8	24	25.5	19.7	24	13.2	15.6
HP/SHP/CHP	30.5	26	24.7	22	20.8	19.5	10.7	8.9	8.7	0
MDP	23.3	15.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DYP	-	-	19.1	13.1	27	39.5	19.2	24.5	12	15.4
DSP	-	-	8.5	0	10.7	1.5	14.6	13.8	22.2	24.7
RP/FP/SP	-	-	7.2	0	16.9	13.7	21.4	28.7	15.4	24.6
MHP							8.2	0	18	23.4
HADEP							4.2	0	4.8	0
Others	1.1	0	4.2	0	0.6	0	2.1	0	5.7	0.6

The traditional patterns of cooperation between parties changed in the 90s. The two biggest parties of the party systems made a coalition only once in the history of Turkish politics. That was right after the 1960 coup, and it took for six months. In the 90s, however, parties or party families which had not make a coalition before, entered coalitions several times. This included the partnership between DYP and SHP, and DSP and MHP. The only relatively big party that the other parties refrained from forming a coalition government was the pro-Islamic RP. Only DYP formed a coalition government with RP after the 1995 elections where RP became the first party.

Table 20: The governments/coalitions and oppositions between 1983-2002

Period	Government / Coalitions	Opposition
12/1983**	ANAP	HP, MDP
12/1987**	ANAP	SHP, DYP
10/1991**	DYP - SHP	ANAP, RP, DSP*
03/1996**	DYP – ANAP	RP, DSP, CHP
06/1996	RP – DYP	ANAP, DSP, CHP
06/1997	ANAP - DSP - DTP - CHP	RP, DYP
01/1999	DSP (minority government supported by ANAP and DYP)	RP, ANAP, DYP, DSP, CHP
06/1999**	DSP – MHP – ANAP	FP, DYP

*Parties that have less than 10 seats in the parliament.

**The first cabinet formed after a general election.

The rise of the Kurdish Question and the Islamic politics, both of which became issues of authoritarianism, security, violence and rights at the same time, were arguably the two main issues that shaped the characteristics of the party system after the transition to competitive politics in 1983.

PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), the pro-Kurdish armed organization, launched its first attack to Turkish security forces in 1984. The armed conflict between Turkey and PKK continues since 1984 except the periods between 1999-2004 and 2013-2015 when PKK declared one-way ceasefires. According to Sener, PKK killed 8128 security forces and 5700 civilians, and Turkish security forces killed 43019 PKK members between 1984 and 2020. 3000 rural settlements in the south-eastern Turkey were evacuated. The estimated number of internally displaced people due to evacuations

were around 950 thousand to 1.2 million.⁵²¹ The numbers of the evacuated and destroyed villages had a peak in 1993 and 1994 when 874 and 1531 villages were evacuated respectively.⁵²² 1993 and 1994 were the two years when the war intensified most. Around 5000 people were murdered by unknown assailants in the Kurdish-majority provinces of the eastern Turkey by the unknown forces of the “deep state”. Kurdish politicians, intellectuals, and businessmen were among the victims of this series of killings. Deputy Prime Minister and DYP leader Çiller endorsed tacitly the unknown assailants in 1996 by saying “those who shoot bullets or those who are the targets of bullets in the name of the state are both honourable. They are heroes.”⁵²³

The peculiarity of the Kurdish Question was that violence and the debate of Kurdish rights intertwined. On the one hand, the legal pro-Kurdish movement struggled for (the recognition of) the Kurdish identity rights, on the other hand, they opposed the human rights violations such as forced village evacuations and murders by unknown assailants. But also, these parties did not call PKK as terrorist but an armed guerrilla movement that emerged as a reaction to the violence and forced assimilation policies of the Turkish state against Kurds in history. For the reasons of supporting terrorism and separatism, the constitutional court banned the legal parties of the pro-Kurdish movement seven times since 1993. Each time a party was banned, a new party with a new label was founded by the movement. These parties were HEP, HADEP, DEHAP, ÖTP, DTP, BDP, HDP chronologically.

The second issue that shaped the characteristics of the party system was the rise of Islamic movements and politics. Similar to the case of the Kurdish Question, the question of Islamic politics was related to authoritarianism, violence, and rights at the same time. The headscarf question lied at the centre of the debates of rights of religious people. Civil servants were not allowed to wear a headscarf. This practically banned veiled women from working in public service. Wearing a headscarf in state receptions was also not allowed to a large extent. This prevented the veiled wives of the politicians to participate in such receptions. Universities started to implement sanctions on headscarves gradually since 1985 based on the regulations of YÖK. Organized

⁵²¹ Cenk Saraçoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm,” in *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, ed. Gökhan Atılğan and Ateş. Uslu, 3. ed (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2019), 817.

⁵²² Joost Jongerden, *The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: An Analysis of Spatial Policies, Modernity and War*, Social, Economic, and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia, v. 102 (Leiden, The Netherlands ; Boston: Brill, 2007), 82.

⁵²³ Mehtap Soyler, *The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (London: Routledge, 2015), 147.

protests against the ban in universities were held since 1987. RP leader Erbakan led some of these protests.⁵²⁴

Unknown assailants of several secular intellectuals, and Islamic violence in general, shaped the political climate of the 90s. For example, Turan Dursun, a public atheist and a critic of Islam; Bahriye Uçok, a theology professor who argued that hijab is not obligatory in Islam; Ugur Mumcu, a renowned journalist who worked on the issues of Islamist movements and PKK, were murdered by unknown assailants between 1990 and 1993. Arguably the most shocking event regarding violent Islamism was the Sivas Massacre. Several intellectuals, mostly Alevi artists and writers, gathered in the city of Sivas to attend an Alevi cultural festival in 1993. Among the intellectuals was Aziz Nesin, a renowned writer who had published Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* in Turkish prior to the Sivas Massacre. RP's local newspaper published a notice before the event calling "Muslims to fight". Several local pro-Islamic associations penned this declaration that sounded like a call to jihad. Eventually, the hotel that these intellectuals were staying was set on fire by a mob of people chanting Islamist slogans. Nesin managed to escape but 37 of the intellectuals died in the fire. RP-related lawyers defended the defendants in the court.

In such a political climate in the 90s, RP came the first party in 1995 for the first time in the history of the pro-Islamic party lineage. The party had a coalition government with DYP. The military, concerned with the expanding Islamic politics, gave a memorandum to the government in the National Security Council. The memorandum raised concerns about the threats to the laic regime and asked the government to implement the Revolution Laws of 1924 which would ban religious orders and certain religious clothes, shut down private courses and schools that belong to the religious orders, the religious vocational schools in the secondary level (12-15 age), the surplus religious vocational schools that are not needed in the labour market. These were against the policies that RP supported. The series of events led to the resignation of the DYP – RP government initially. Then the constitutional court banned RP in 1998 for its actions against the laic character of the regime. Virtue Party (FP), which was founded by the RP politicians were also banned in 2001. This series of events led to the split of the party. One faction, mostly the older generation of politicians, founded the Felicity Party (SP), the other faction, mostly the younger generation of politicians led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001.

⁵²⁴ RP leader Erbakan led a crowd of 4000 people in a headscarf protest in Beyazıt, Istanbul in January 1987. DGM opened a lawsuit against Erbakan for the rally. Another 4000 people marched in Konya the same month. See *Milliyet*, 17-1819.1.1987

During the 1997 memorandum period, the military expanded its institutional autonomy vis-à-vis the civilian authority. A protocol between the general staff and ministry of internal affairs gave the military the authority to act independently for internal military operations and intelligence gathering without the need to ask the governor of the province.⁵²⁵ This began to reverse after 1999 when Turkey gained the candidate country status from EU. During the coalition government of DSP-ANAP-MHP, the civilian authority started to limit the military domain slowly in 2001. The numbers of the civilians in the NSC increased from 5 to 6 as the military members remained 5. The NSC decisions which had been labelled as “priority” amended to “recommendation” in the constitution.⁵²⁶

Below I elaborate on the main social and economic structures of the period initially. Then I analyze the party policies and competition in three policy domains between 1980 and 2002. In this section, I combined the domains of political system and nationhood/culture.

3.5.1 Main social and economic structures

Turkey’s population increased from 44 million in 1980 to 67 million in 2000. The urban population exceeded the rural population in the 80s. The rural-urban ratio changed from 56-44 in 1980 to 35-65 in 2000. While the share of industrial employment in all sectors increased from 12.5 percent to 16.9 percent in 2000, its share in GDP decreased from 20.5 percent in 1980 to 17.2 percent in 2000. The service sector, on the other hand, constantly increased its share both in GDP and employment in this period. The industrial share in GDP in the advanced capitalist countries usually start to decline after it reaches 30-40 percent in favour of the service sector. This shows that the Turkish economy had a “premature de-industrialization” in its neoliberal turn.⁵²⁷

⁵²⁵ The protocol is known as EMASYA, and signed on 27.2.1998

⁵²⁶ These two constitutional amendments took place on 17.10.2001.

⁵²⁷ Özgür Orhangazi, *Türkiye Ekonomisinin Yapısı: Sorunlar Kırılğanlıklar ve Kriz Dinamikleri* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2020), 153.

Table 21: Sectors' share in GDP⁵²⁸

Year	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Agriculture	40.9	37.5	30.7	24.2	16.3	9.8
Industry	13.1	15.7	17.5	20.5	25.9	17.2
Service	45.9	46.8	51.7	55.4	57.9	68.4
Construction	-	-	-	-	-	4.6
Sum	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 22: Sectors' share in employment⁵²⁹

Year	1950	1962	1972	1982	1992	2002
Agriculture	77.7	77.1	65	53.7	43.7	34.9
Industry	10.3	10.9	14.5	19.3	20.2	18.5
Service	12	12	20.5	27	36.1	42.1
Sum	100	100	100	100	100	100

Throughout the 70s, the profit rates in industry in the developed world declined and the economies started to face the problem of excessive capital accumulation. One solution to the problem was to steer the excessive capital to the developing world in the form of credits and funds. Between 1980 and 1991, the ratio of international bank credits to the global GDP doubled.⁵³⁰ Simultaneously, the big bourgeoisie in Turkey had matured enough to have the motivation to seek for other markets for investment. The firms in big business had a horizontal development throughout the 60s and 70s, took the form of “holdings” and dominated the industrial, financial, and service sectors altogether. A study that analysed the share of firms in 115 different sectors shows that the market share of the top four firms in 106 out of 115 sectors was at least 30 percent in 1976. And one firm’s share was at least 25 percent in 66 out of 115 sectors.⁵³¹ In short, the big business established their monopolistic character nationally. These coinciding external and internal pushes, together with the “alarming” strength of the organized working class were the underlying reasons for the advent of the authoritarian-neoliberal transition under the military rule between 1980 and 1983.

The first two phases of the neoliberal transition took place between 1980 and 2001. These are the 1980-1988 and the 1989-2001 periods. The first phase mainly concerned the transition to export-

⁵²⁸ Üzümcü, *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Dış Ticaretin Gelişimi in Türkiye Ekonomisi: Sektörel Yaklaşım*, 49.

⁵²⁹ Özcüre, “Türkiye’de İşgücü Piyasası, İstihdamın Yapısı ve Sorunları,” 268.

⁵³⁰ Öztürk, *Türkiye’de Büyük Sermaye Grupları: Finans Kapitalin Oluşumu ve Gelişimi*, 188.

⁵³¹ Öztürk, 178.

led-industrialization through liberal foreign trade policy, pressuring the domestic demand, increasing incentives for export-oriented business, and implementing weak national currency policy. The second phase (1989-2001) was the advent of capital account liberalization to attract the international financial capital.⁵³² Both the domestic terms of trade for agriculture and real wages in urban sectors declined until 1988. As I will elaborate on in the next sections, ANAP's authority started to be challenged by the reviving opposition parties and labour movements. Then, both the real wages and the domestic terms of trades for agriculture started to rise again. After the financial integration with the global markets in the second phase of the neoliberalization, the Turkish economy became fragile to short-term cash inflows and outflows. Because of these trends of swift cash outflows, perpetual economic crises occurred such as in 1994 and 2001, which in return caused sharp upward and downward movements for both real wages and agricultural terms of trade throughout the 90s.

Briefly, the domestic terms of trade for agriculture declined 39 percent between 1979 and 1988. This decline is the sharpest decline in the domestic terms of trade for agriculture in history together with the period between 1929 and 1934. Subsidies through public purchase in agriculture declined these years as well.⁵³³ They increased 80 percent between 1988 and 1998, and decreased 36 percent by 2002. Between 1981 and 1988, the real wages of public sector workers, private sector workers and civil servants declined by 54 percent, 29 percent, and 28 percent respectively. After 1988, they started to increase again. The table below shows the trajectory of real wages between 1981 and 1993.⁵³⁴




Figure 4: Real wages between 1981 and 1993 (1981=100)

⁵³² Orhangazi, *Türkiye Ekonomisinin Yapısı: Sorunlar Kırılganlıklar ve Kriz Dinamikleri*, 81.

⁵³³ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2015*, 163-165

⁵³⁴ Koç, *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi: Osmanlı'dan 2020'ye*, 692.




Figure 5: Real wages index 1989-2001 (1989=100)

3.5.2 External Relations

The military junta of 1980 declared commitment to all the NATO and all other international agreements Turkey had. Under the influence of the Third Worldist/leftist stream in Turkey, CHP had taken a certain distance, at least in the discourse of the party, from the full commitment to the Western alliance in the 70s. However, the party never cancelled or revised the agreements when it came to power. After the 1980 coup, all the relevant parties except the pro-Islamic RP converged on the commitment to the West. This included the target to join the EEC/EU. Turkey joined the Customs Union in 1995 during the coalition government of DYP and SHP. It gained the status of “candidate country” in the 1999 Helsinki Summit during the coalition government of DSP, ANAP, and MHP.

Erbakan, the leader of RP, regarded the EEC/EU as a “Christian Club” and argued that the parties which aim to join the EU want to make Turkish people servant to the Christians. He called IMF “Zionist” and accused Özal government to be pro-Zionists. Erbakan also had an anti-American discourse. In a speech, he argued that the goal of the USA is to give Cyprus to Greeks and Erzurum to Armenians.⁵³⁵ Although some opposition parties in the party system such as DSP raised some concerns about joining the Custom Union in 1995, only RP opposed to join the union completely.

⁵³⁵ Milliyet, 30.10.1987

According to Erbakan, to join the union meant the colonization of Turkey by the Europeans.⁵³⁶ However, the party softened its discourse about the West slightly after it became the first party in the 1995 elections and prepared to access to power. Erbakan declared commitment to NATO, Customs Union, and alliance with USA in Iraq.⁵³⁷

RP's interest in the Middle East also distinguished the party from the other parties. Erbakan had projects such as founding the World Islam Union, the Islam Bank, the Islamic Common Market, the Islamic Dinar and the Islamic Cultural Cooperation.⁵³⁸ Clearly, he aimed to establish alternative Islamic versions of the European Union, the World Bank, the Customs Union, and EURO currency. Erbakan summoned the Muslim Eight (M-8) in Istanbul in 1996.⁵³⁹

The collapse of the communist regimes and the simultaneous rise of nationalist and religious movements influenced the domestic actors in Turkey in the 90s. The war in Bosnia and Jerusalem were especially raised the Muslim-internationalist (pro-Ummah) sentiments among the RP flanks. MHP, on the other hand, raised an emphasis on the Turkic cooperation with the Central Asian Turkic countries which gained independence from the Soviet Union in the early 90s.

3.5.3 Economy

Turgut Özal was the vice-prime minister in charge of economy during the authoritarian transition to neoliberal policies under the military regime. After the transition to competitive politics in 1983, Özal founded ANAP. The party ruled alone until 1991 and continued the neoliberalization policies. Both ANAP and MDP championed policies such as privatization of the state enterprises including infrastructures such as certain bridges and roads in their campaigns. Both parties supported flat taxation instead of progressive taxation, and floating exchange rate system. Both featured red tape as a major problem of economy.⁵⁴⁰ Entrance to the Turkish markets for foreign investors were made easier by the ANAP government.⁵⁴¹ State monopolies on the production of certain products such as tobacco were removed.⁵⁴²

⁵³⁶ Milliyet, 15.12.1995

⁵³⁷ Milliyet, 6.6.1996

⁵³⁸ Milliyet, 18.12.1995

⁵³⁹ This appears as an alternative project to the G-8 (Group of Eight) in Milliyet, 22.10.1996

⁵⁴⁰ Milliyet, ANAP and MDP campaigns between September 9 and November 5 1983.

⁵⁴¹ Milliyet, 24.03.1986

⁵⁴² Milliyet, 18.05.1986

Most importantly, ANAP implemented policies to create a flexible/insecure labour market. The party incentivized workers to switch from permanent contracts to short-term contracts.⁵⁴³ Real wages of labour declined significantly after 1980. After a long period of oppression and silence, workers had rallies in 1986 for the first time as a reaction to the decline of their purchasing power.⁵⁴⁴

In contrast to ANAP and MDP, HP defended welfare policies during the 80s. The party opposed the privatization of the state enterprises and flexible labour market; it supported social security, labour rights, and to subsidize farmers.⁵⁴⁵ On the other hand, the party did not have a fundamental opposition to free-market economy.

The leaders of the banned parties started to return to the political stage after 1986. All of them criticized the neoliberal policies of the single party rule of ANAP for being extreme. Both DYP and DSP argued that industrialization was neglected by ANAP. Both parties supported to subsidize farmers, emphasized on the declining real wages of workers. Workers and civil servants went on massive strikes in 1989, 1991, 1995. The coalition government of DYP and SHP which was founded in 1991 granted certain labour and social rights. Nonetheless, all the relevant parties gradually converged on the neoliberal policies. DYP-SHP government signed the Custom's Union agreement in 1995. SHP and CHP merged in 1995. Under the influence of Blair and the "Third Way", Deniz Baykal, CHP's new leader, argued that CHP represents the "new left", and supported the policies of globalization.⁵⁴⁶

DSP raised concerns about privatization of state enterprises and suggested autonomy instead of privatization. But eventually, the coalition government of DSP, ANAP and MHP decided for large-scale privatization of public enterprises in 1999.⁵⁴⁷ This government also reversed certain welfare policies such as increasing the age of retirement. These decisions led to massive workers' rallies.⁵⁴⁸ RP appeared as the only sizeable party that openly opposed the IMF recipes of neoliberalization and the Custom's Union. However, the party also implemented some these policies during the RP – DYP government in 1996. On the other hand, RP started to forge ties with the lower classes through social aids thanks to its municipalities and Islamic solidarity networks.

⁵⁴³ Milliyet, 27.01.1985

⁵⁴⁴ Balikesir rally in Milliyet, 09.02.1986, and Izmir rally in Milliyet, 23.02.1986

⁵⁴⁵ Milliyet, 22.11.1987

⁵⁴⁶ Milliyet, 15.12.1995

⁵⁴⁷ Milliyet, 18.7.1999

⁵⁴⁸ The age of retirement rose to 58 for women and 60 for men. 200 thousands workers made a demonstration to protest the decisions.

3.5.4 Nationhood, cultural policies, political system, and violence

Two main cultural conflicts started to dominate the structure of party system and party competition since the transition to competitive politics in 1983. The first one was the conflict on the ethnic regime of the country. One of the camps demanded Kurdish rights and a multi-ethnic public sphere and national identity. The other camp aimed to protect the status quo of the mono-ethnic regime which does not recognize any other ethnicity in the public sphere except Turkish. Nonetheless this conflict overlapped with the armed struggle between the Turkish army and Kurdish Workers' Army (PKK). The pro-Kurdish camp regarded the violent struggle of PKK as a just reaction to the denial of the Kurdish identity and to the violence of the Turkish state against the Kurds with the purpose of cultural amalgamation.⁵⁴⁹ The pro-state camp regarded PKK as a terrorist group whose aim is to separate Kurdish-majority provinces of Turkey to found the independent Kurdistan. It supported to take any measures to crush PKK. This included the suspension of the civil liberties such as persistent state of emergency, evacuation of villages, and tolerating torture and unidentified murders. As a reaction to these, the pro-Kurdish camp featured human rights.

The pro-Kurdish camp initially appeared in legal politics as a faction within SHP that is composed of the Kurdish/left-wing deputies of the party. These MPs founded HEP in 1991. The conditions these MPs put forth to support the DYP - SHP coalition was the recognition of Kurdish identity in the constitution and laws, Kurdish channel in radio and TV, general amnesty for people who got convicted for the Kurdish Question, lifting the state of emergency in the Kurdish majority provinces.⁵⁵⁰

SHP was the closest party to HEP initially. The two parties made an alliance in the elections of 1991. Nonetheless, the two parties diverged in time for their approach to the Kurdish Question. HEP was a separatist party for DSP. Ecevit accused SHP of protecting the separatists implying the alliance between SHP and HEP in 1991.⁵⁵¹ ANAP, DYP and RP had different factions within their parties which had different positions for the Kurdish question. The Kurdish deputies of these parties mostly demanded the cultural rights of Kurds such as Kurdish channel on TV and radio, and Kurdish courses in schools. On the other hand, the Turkish-nationalist factions opposed these

⁵⁴⁹ HEP MP Zana stated that "PKK defends with arms against attack with arms. Kurds are against violence. But Kurds do not only want electricity or dams". By that she implies the identity rights of Kurds. See *Milliyet*, 26.10.1991; HEP MP Hatip Dicle stated that "PKK is legitimate". See *Milliyet*, 10.1.1992. People cheered for PKK in the HEP congress. See *Milliyet*, 20.9.1992. Some party members unfurled a PKK flag and an Abdullah Ocalan poster in HADEP congress in 1991. See *Milliyet* 24.6.1996.

⁵⁵⁰ *Milliyet*, 6.11.1991

⁵⁵¹ *Milliyet*, 18.9.1991

by arguing that these demands serve separatism.⁵⁵² RP also distinguished from the other parties by suggesting to solve the problem through Islamic brotherhood. The parties and the bureaucracy became more liberal for civil liberties about Kurdish language after the Helsinki Summit in 1999 when Turkey got the candidate position for EU.⁵⁵³

The second cultural conflict was about the position of tradition and religion in public life. The anti-traditionalist end, mainly represented by dominant factions of civilian and military bureaucracy, aimed to exclude veiled women from public institutions, primarily from the universities and bureaucracy. It aimed to suppress the religious orders and private Quran courses, to decline the role of religion in education. It perceived the rise of Islam as a threat to the liberal rights due to the laws that Sharia would enforce. The opposite end, mainly represented by RP in legal politics, aimed to free the activities of the religious sects, to impose and increase the size of Sunni Islam in education. But the party also aimed to replace the laws with the Islamic law. Therefore, both the traditionalist and the anti-traditionalist camps had authoritarian aspects, albeit from different angles, in their vision for how the public sphere should be.

The State Security Courts (DGM), which started to operate in 1984, opened lawsuits against RP members⁵⁵⁴ and to the members of religious sects⁵⁵⁵ as early as 1985 with the allegation of replacing the laws with Islamic law. Universities started to implement sanctions on headscarves gradually since 1985.⁵⁵⁶ ANAP and DYP were more liberal about the headscarf ban.⁵⁵⁷ The parties suggested referendum for the headscarf freedom in public and public institutions. However, these parties were composed of secular-liberal, conservative and Turkish ethno-nationalist factions. Therefore, the positions of these parties about the headscarf issue were not monolithic.⁵⁵⁸ SHP/CHP, on the other hand, regarded headscarf as a symbol of the religious movement that aims at Sharia and reactionism.⁵⁵⁹ On the other hand, the party also supported equal representation of Alevis in the

⁵⁵² DYP's leader Demirel made a statement that the state recognizes the Kurdish identity. See *Milliyet*, 9.12.1991. DYP MP Ensarioğlu demanded a Kurdish channel in radio and TV, Kurdish lessons in schools in the Kurdish-majority region. See in *Milliyet*, 9.12.1991. On the other hand, Münif İslamoğlu and Coşkun Kırca opposed the recognition of the Kurdish identity. See *Milliyet*, 30.12.1991; ANAP MP Hasan Celal Güzel, RP MP Aykut Edebalı, MÇP MP Koray Aydın criticized these for serving separatism. See *Milliyet* 12.12.1991.

⁵⁵³ The ministry of foreign affairs led by a minister of DSP asked governors of provinces to tolerate broadcasting in Kurdish on private channels. See *Milliyet*, 15.8.2000. The National Security Council decided that "languages that are used in everyday life can be learned individually". See *Milliyet*, 27.2.2001. President Sezer also approved Kurdish channels on TV but declined education in Kurdish. See *Milliyet* 9.3.2002

⁵⁵⁴ *Milliyet*, 01.11.1985

⁵⁵⁵ *Milliyet*, 12.06.1986

⁵⁵⁶ *Milliyet*, 22.12.1985

⁵⁵⁷ *Milliyet*, 03.01.1987

⁵⁵⁸ For example, while Hasan Celal Güzel supported referendum, Semra Özal argued that the goal of the headscarve protests is to "instrumentalize religion in politics". See *Milliyet*, 09.03.1989

⁵⁵⁹ SHP MP Fikri Sağlar made this statement. See *Milliyet*, 08.01.1987

Directorate of Religious Affairs.⁵⁶⁰ The headscarf debate was not limited to university students. During the government of RP and DYP after 1996, the veiled wives of the RP leaders could not join the state receptions on national days.⁵⁶¹

RP leader Erbakan claimed that Turkish people have been exposed to the Western mindset since the beginning of the Republic and got degenerated. He portrayed RP as the representative of the oppressed and the so-called real values of Turkish people.⁵⁶² He also claimed that misbehaviour and prostitution is increasing in the society.⁵⁶³ To reverse the so-called degeneration, the party promised to put Quran courses in the curriculum of secondary level schools and high schools⁵⁶⁴ and to build a religious vocational school in every town.⁵⁶⁵ During the government of RP and DYP, RP promised to allocate the largest part of the resources in education to the religious schools.⁵⁶⁶ Although it was not in the party program, an RP mayor supported to change the civil code to allow polygamy for men.⁵⁶⁷ Another MP suggested to hold a referendum to bring a regime that is based on religion.⁵⁶⁸

All the parties except SHP/CHP tried to have a contact with the religious sects in the 90s.⁵⁶⁹ This played an important role in the legitimization of the religious orders despite the Revolution Laws that officially bans the orders since 1925.

The military memorandum of 1997 was a turning point in the party. Concerned with the rise of Islam in society and politics, the military demanded from the RP-DYP government to ban the religious orders, to limit religious schools only to the high school level, and to shut down the excessive religious schools. As discussed above, the series of events led to the resignation of the RP – DYP government in 1997, and the closure of RP by the constitutional court in 1998. The military intervention highly affected the campaigns of the 1999 elections. FP, the heir of banned RP, abandoned the anti-systemic “Just Order” discourse, started to promote the headscarf issue as

⁵⁶⁰ SHP culture of minister Sağlık statement. See *Milliyet*, 17.08.1992

⁵⁶¹ For example, Erbakan’s wife could not join the celebration of the Victory Day held hosted by the military. See *Milliyet*, 24.8.1996

⁵⁶² *Milliyet*, 20.11.1987

⁵⁶³ *Milliyet*, 9.10.1991

⁵⁶⁴ *Milliyet*, 07.11.1987

⁵⁶⁵ The name of these vocational schools is Imam-Hatip. See *Milliyet*, 13.11.1987

⁵⁶⁶ See the statement of RP minister Lütfü Esengül in *Milliyet*, 24.8.1996

⁵⁶⁷ See Ibrahim Halil Celik’s statements in *Milliyet*, 12.10.1991

⁵⁶⁸ See Hasan Mezarci’s statement in *Milliyet*, 12.12.1991

⁵⁶⁹ DSP’s leader Ecevit argued stated that beliefs and religious orders should be free. See *Milliyet*, 08.09.1991; Ecevit defended Gulen Movement even in the political climate after the military memorandum in 1997. CHP leader Baykal criticized Ecevit for not being pro-laicite. See *Milliyet* 30.3.1998. ANAP politicians met several religious orders. See 12.11.1995.

a human rights matter, and denied that the party aims to enact Shari laws. But the party also criticized the closure of the religious schools in the second level and supported religious education.⁵⁷⁰

Çiller, DYP's leader, addressed the traditionalist sentiments and the aggrievements of the veiled women. She visited holy places, appealed to religious symbolism in her speeches, and argued that she is the protector of the religious people. She also criticized ANAP claiming that it is not a right-wing party anymore, implying that ANAP did not defend the demands of the religious people.⁵⁷¹ ANAP propagated that the bans on private Quran courses took place during the government of DYP. The party also argued that headscarf did not become a problem during its government.⁵⁷² MHP leader Bahçeli accused FP and DYP to provoke people over headscarf. He stated that the problem can be solved in the parliament.⁵⁷³ DSP tried to balance between the anti-traditionalist position of the military and the religious people. Ecevit argued that DSP is the only party that supports laicite without suppressing the religious people.⁵⁷⁴ CHP appealed to Atatürk symbolism. The party was arguably the only party that did not appeal to religion symbolism and the resentments of the religious masses. CHP leader Baykal argued that all other parties are parts of the "corrupt order".⁵⁷⁵ The headscarf debate reignited after the 1999 elections as a veiled MP from FP, Merve Kavakci, entered the parliament for the first time in history. DSP MPs protested Kavakci when she entered the parliament the first day to make the oath, and forced her out of the parliament.

3.5.5 A summary of the party competition between 1983-2002

The policy positions and discourses of parties have been discussed in three main relevant domains. The matters that parties diverged and converged have been revealed. Briefly, I argued that the 1980 military coup brought about the authoritarian transition to neoliberalism. The junta put into practice the neo-liberalization package, the "decisions of April 24, 1979", of the AP government. The architect of the package, Turgut Özal, became deputy prime minister in the technocratic government during the military rule after the coup, and led ANAP after the transition to competitive politics in 1983. The party ruled singly until 1991 and implemented the neoliberalization policies until then. Yet, it had to relax the policies about agricultural subsidies and

⁵⁷⁰ Recai Kutan's statement in *Milliyet*, 2.7.1998 & 14.4.1999

⁵⁷¹ She visited Rumi's Tomb in Konya, picked up and kissed a Quran. See *Milliyet*, 7/10/17.4.1999

⁵⁷² Mesut Yiilmaz's statement in *Milliyet*, 8.4.1999

⁵⁷³ *Milliyet*, 13.4.1999

⁵⁷⁴ *Milliyet*, 12.4.1999

⁵⁷⁵ *Milliyet*, 13.4.1999

real wages in 1988 after the popular discontent. In general, the policies show the continuity between the AP government of the 70s, the coup, and the ANAP government. The fact that the junta crushed the power of the left-wing civil society and unions was arguably the most important factor that made available the politics of suppressing the real wages, switching to flexible/insecure labour market, and privatization of public enterprises.

It was argued that as the regime liberalized and the parties and the party leaders of the 70s re-joined the party system, strict neoliberal policies were softened, and economic populist policies in wages and agriculture re-started. DYP, SHP, DSP, and RP started to re-emphasize the importance of the industrialization policies of the import substitution industrialization development model, raise concerns about the declining purchasing power of the labour and agriculture. Nonetheless, I showed that all the relevant parties for the party system gradually converged on the neoliberal economic policies in the 90s.

The anti-systemic, (economic) populist discourse of CHP in the 70s disappeared in the 80s and the 90s. There were two anti-systemic parties/party lineage that the other parties refrained from cooperating. The first one is RP/FP that represented the pro-Islamic lineage. The “Just Order” economic program and slogan of RP appealed to the material resentments of the lower classes. Nonetheless, the program did not offer a concrete, convincing alternative to the neoliberal system. More concretely, RP’s anti-systemic policies and discourse, which distinguished the party from the other parties, concerned the anti-American and anti-EU positions of the party. The party called the EU and the Custom’s Union as “Christian clubs”, IMF as Zionist, and offered alternative international organizations among the Muslim-majority countries. RP also appealed to cultural populism. It portrayed itself as the representative of the oppressed and religious people of the country, fighting against the republican elite that tries to impose the Western values upon people for decades. This nativist-populist discourse of RP coupled with Islamic social conservatism. Accordingly, the party leaders propagated to establish the Islamic law although such desires did not take place in the party program or manifestos explicitly. These were the aspects that put the party in trouble with the military and civilian bureaucracy. On the other hand, RP was the most salient representative of the liberal demands of the veiled women who were excluded from certain parts of the public sphere, mostly importantly civil service and universities.

The second anti-systemic party lineage was the parties of the pro-Kurdish lineage. On the one hand, the parties of this family differed from the other parties by not calling PKK as a terrorist organization. It rather explained it as a movement reacting to the monoethnic regime which denied the Kurdish identity and appealed to violence against Kurds in the history. On the other hand, this

party family aimed to change the monoethnic regime of the Turkish state, supported the identity rights of the Kurds. Regarding the PKK problem, all the other parties and bureaucracy had the same position of treating PKK as a terrorist organization. This premise led to the solution to clear PKK with arms. Regarding the Kurdish identity rights, the parties had factions. While the deputies mostly of Kurdish origin raised such concerns, nationalist factions within the parties either opposed completely or were cautious to change the ethnic regime of Turkey. MHP was the party that opposed most strictly to question the status quo regarding the ethnic regime of the country. Nonetheless, even MHP started to soften its policies with the process of EU after the Helsinki summit in 1999.


The table below shows salient policy and ideologies of parties between 1983 and 2002.

Table 23: Parties' salient policies 1983-2002

Party	Salient Policy
ANAP	(1983-1987) Authoritarian neoliberalism Authoritarian anti-left/ 1980 coup apologia (1987-2002) Neoliberal consensus Monoethnic status-quo
HP/SHP/CHP	(1983-1995) Smoothing neoliberal transition, pro-labour/farmers Democracy and constitutionalism (1995-2002) Neoliberal consensus with economic populism Monoethnic status-quo Anti-traditionalism, distance to religious orders, pro-Alevi rights
MDP	(1983-1986) Authoritarian neoliberalism Authoritarian anti-left/ 1980 coup apologia
DYP	(1987-1995) Smoothing neoliberal transition, pro-labour/farmers Democracy and constitutionalism (1995-2002) Neoliberal consensus with economic populism Monoethnic status-quo
DSP	(1987-1991) Smoothing neoliberal transition, pro-labour/farmers Democracy and constitutionalism (1991-2002) Neoliberal consensus Monoethnic status-quo (strict)
RP/FP/SP	(1987-2002) Economic and cultural populism, nativism Anti-West, anti-Zionism, international Islamic cooperation Authoritarian (religious) traditionalism, pro-Islamic law apology Liberal rights for veiled women Monoethnic status-quo, Islamic brotherhood as a solution to the Kurdish question

MHP	(1991-2002) Monoethnic status-quo (strict) Emphasis on Turkicness and the Turkic world
HEP/HADEP	(1991-2002) Pro-Kurdish rights, pro-multi-ethnic regime, liberal rights against securitization of the Kurdish Question PKK as not terror but a reaction to violent and forced ethnic amalgamation

Below I demonstrate the party system and party competition patterns in two sub-periods. These are 1983-1991 and 1991-2002. As I explained in this section, the period between 1987 and 1991 could be considered as a transition to neoliberal consensus.



Cleavages and Party System (1991-2002)

-Polarized multi-party system, with relative balance of parties

-The power rotates between coalition governments

(DYP-SHP; DYP-ANAP; RP-DYP; ANAP-DSP-DTP-CHP; DSP-MHP-ANAP)




Figure 6: Party positions on ideological space 1991-2002

3.6 2002 – 2023: Polarized Multiparty System with a Predominant Party

The 2002 general elections marked the beginning of a new party system in Turkey. First and foremost, Justice and Development Party (AKP), which was founded in 2001 by the politicians who split from the pro-Islamic RP, came to power in November 2002; and the party has been ruling the country alone since then. In the national elections of 2002, only AKP and CHP passed the 10 percent election threshold and managed to enter the parliament. All the other relevant parties of the previous party system, namely ANAP, DEHAP, DSP, DYP, MHP, and SP remained below the threshold. Constant economic crises of the 90s, with an inflation-devaluation spiral made the voters' lose faith in the centrist parties. I argued in the previous section that the Welfare Party (RP) appeared as an anti-systemic alternative to the system in the 90s. However, its radical aspects such as the anti-western discourse, ambiguous pseudo corporatist economic model of the "Just Order", and radical social conservatism made the party conflict with the military, bureaucracy, and the businessmen. Its vote share declined from 21.3 percent in 1995 to 15.4 percent in 1999 after the military memorandum in 1997. This was a sign that its electorate did not reward an excessive clash with the system.

This was the lesson that RP's one of the two successors AKP learned. AKP had a pro-European and pro-American agenda before the elections. Erdoğan visited U.S. two times before the 2002 elections to give speeches in think-tanks and convince the American public that his party does not have an anti-American agenda. He also penned an article in Wall Street Journal titled "My Country Is Your Faithful Ally and Friend" in 2003.⁵⁷⁶ Rather than the radical Islamic social conservatism of RP, AKP highlighted a democratization discourse through EU accession. It framed issues like headscarf and religious vocational schools as democratization problems. Erdoğan denied being a successor of the "National Outlook" party lineage. He stated that the party considers itself as the successor of Democrat Party of the 50s.⁵⁷⁷

AKP also abandoned RP's ambiguous corporatist economy plan which also had an egalitarian/anti-systemic tone. The party declared its commitment to free market economy. However, the party was aware of the society's resentment to IMF and IMF austerity measures. Therefore, it had a critical discourse about the IMF programs during the 2002 election campaign.⁵⁷⁸ In short, in a conjuncture of a political and economic crisis where people lost faith in the conventional parties

⁵⁷⁶ İlhan Uzgel, "AKP: Neoliberal Dönüşümün Yeni Aktörü," in *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, ed. Bülent Duru and İlhan Uzgel (Ankara: Phoenix, 2009), 19–20.

⁵⁷⁷ *Milliyet*, 17.5.2003

⁵⁷⁸ Nazif Ekzen, "AKP İktisat Politikaları: 2002-2006," *Journal* 30, no. 252 (2006): 473.

of the party system, AKP found a good balance between being and anti-system and intra-system-party to win the elections.

The new system appeared as a two-party system between AKP and CHP under the AKP government for one electoral term between 2002 and 2007. MHP and the candidates of the pro-Kurdish party family entered the parliament in 2007, and the system turned into a moderately multi-party system with a predominant AKP. For three electoral terms between 2007 and 2018, the relevant parties for the party system were AKP, CHP, HDP, and MHP. Finally, Good Party (İYİP), which was founded by politicians who split from MHP, became the fifth relevant party of the party system by entering the parliament in 2018 with a vote share of 9.9 percent. In short, the party system between 2002 and 2023 appeared as a multi-party system with 4-5 relevant parties, and with a predominant AKP which constituted the government alone throughout the whole period.⁵⁷⁹ Regarding the basic patterns of cooperation and conflict behaviours of the parties, alliance patterns of the parties are briefly reviewed below.

The electoral laws for electing the president changed in the 2007 constitutional referendum. The new law stipulated to elect the president by popular vote instead of by parliament. The first presidential election with popular vote was held in 2014. While AKP supported Erdoğan, CHP and MHP had a common candidate, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu. HDP's candidate was the party's co-leader Demirtaş. Their vote shares were 51.7, 38.4, and 9.7 percent respectively.

The 2017 constitutional referendum replaced the parliamentary system with presidential system. A new election law that permits parties to forge official alliances in the elections passed before the 2018 presidential elections. The law stipulated that the electoral threshold of ten percent applies to alliances, not to single parties. An official alliance named "People's Alliance" was established between AKP and MHP before the 2018 elections. Similarly, CHP, İYİP, and Felicity Party (SP) established "Nation's Alliance". AKP and MHP supported Erdoğan, and he received 52.5 percent of the votes. CHP, İYİP, and SP ran with their own presidential candidates.⁵⁸⁰ Their candidates received 30, 7.4, and 0.8 percent of the votes respectively. Thanks to the new election system, İYİP candidates entered the parliament with the party's own list despite the 9.9 percent share of votes. Finally, HDP's presidential candidate received 8.4 percent of the votes.

⁵⁷⁹ AKP could not form a government alone only after the elections in June 7, 2015 since it could not constitute majority in the parliament. Then, the party formed the government alone after the election in November 2015.

⁵⁸⁰ These were the parties that officially took place in the alliances. Other small parties also supported one of the alliances and, in return, had candidates from one of the bigger parties' lists.

The alliances expanded before the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. In addition to AKP and MHP, Great Unity Party (BBP), and New Welfare Party (YRP) took place in the People's Alliance. They all supported Erdoğan in the presidential election. Nation's Alliance was officially composed of CHP and İYİP in the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. However, CHP, İYİP, SP, Democracy and Progress Party (DEVAP), Future Party (GP), and Democrat Party (DemocP) had formed the unofficial alliance known as the "Table of Six" for the elections. All these parties supported Kılıçdaroğlu in the presidential elections. SP's, DEVAP's, GP's, and DemocP's parliamentary candidates ran in the CHP's lists officially. The third alliance was "Labour and Freedom Alliance" of HDP/YSP and Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP-2017). Labour and Freedom Alliance supported Kılıçdaroğlu in the presidential election and ran separately in the parliamentary election. Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu got 49.5 and 44.8 percent of the votes respectively in the first round. The third and the fourth candidates received 5.1 and 0.4 percent of the votes. In the second round, Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu received 52.1 and 47.8 percent of the votes respectively.

Table 11 shows the vote share and seat share of the relevant parties between the 2002 and 2023 elections.

Table 24: Vote share (%V) and seat share (%S) of parties between 2002-2023

	AKP		CHP		MHP		DEHAP/HDP		İYİP		Other	
	%V	%S	%V	%S	%V	%S	%V	%S	-	-	%V	%S
2002	34.3	66	19.4	32	8.4	0	6.2	0	-	-	31.7	6
2007	46.6	62	20.9	20	14.3	13	Ind	3	-	-	Ind	2
2011	49.9	60	25.9	24	13	10	Ind	6	-	-	4.7	0
2015 June	40.9	47	24.9	24	16.3	14	13.1	14	-	-	4.8	0
2015 Nov	49.5	57	25.3	24	11.9	7	10.7	10	-	-	2.6	0
2018	42.5	49	22.6	24	11.1	8	11.7	11	9.9	7	2	0
2023	35.6	44	25.3	28	10	8	8.8	10	9.6	7	10	1

The AKP government took over the institutional structure which was formed after the 1980 coup. As I explained in the previous section, the coup aimed to strengthen the government vis-a-vis the judiciary and the parliament. The 10 percent electoral threshold to enter the parliament was in favour of bigger parties and of party discipline. The cost of splitting off from a party and to form a new party to compete in the elections became high. The voters were incentivized to vote for bigger parties. The institutional structure aimed to balance the power of the strengthened government with the president and the National Security Council. The president had veto powers, the authority to make critical appointments in judiciary, various state organs, and universities. This position was tailored for the junta leader who became the president in 1982. It was planned that the military could influence politics through the president and the National Security Council. Thus, the government, which was strong vis-a-vis the parliament and judiciary would be balanced by the presidency and the National Security Council in the institutional structure of the post-coup period. Such an institutional design was to lead to unconstrained government if a party manages to elect both the prime minister and president after getting a hegemonic plurality in the parliament. That is basically what happened gradually since the late 2000s as AKP perpetually gained large majorities in the parliament.

AKP opted to call the authorities of the president, military, judiciary, and universities as “bureaucratic tutelage” over the national will. It propagated that the party represents the national will by pointing to the party’s electoral majority. Indeed, the weight of military in politics is controversial from a liberal democratic perspective. On the other hand, to call judiciary, president and universities as tutelative organs is also controversial from a liberal democratic perspective. Such an approach was the early sign of AKP’s majoritarian and electoral authoritarian understanding of democracy.

3.6.1 Main social structures, economy, and economic policies

The total population of Turkey increased from 67 million in 2000 to 85 million in 2022. The rural-urban ratio of the population which was 35-65 in 2000 became 23-77 in 2012⁵⁸¹ mainly due to de-agriculturalization. Agriculture’s share in GDP decreased from 9.8 in 2000 to 6.4 in 2016. The share of agriculture in employment decreased from 34.9 in 2002 to 20.7 in 2016. This meant that millions of people kept joining the workforce in the secondary or tertiary sectors or became unemployed.

⁵⁸¹ The official method of calculation for the rural and urban population changed in 2012. Thus, a sharp decline in the official data for the rural population emerged between 2012 and 2013 (22.7 percent to 8.7 percent). According to the new calculation method, the rural-urban ratio is 6.8-93.2 in 2022.)

The share of the secondary sector (industry and construction in the table below) in GDP oscillated between 22-27 percent in the period between 1990 and 2016. These ratios indicate that the premature deindustrialization pattern that I mentioned in the previous section for the 90s continued after 2000. The share of industry never reached somewhere between 30-40 percent of the GDP as in the industrialization era of the early capitalist countries. Moreover, the share of construction within the secondary sector increased between 2000 and 2016. This indicates the increasing importance of the construction sector for the AKP's growth model.

Table 25: Sectors' share in GDP 1970-2016

Year	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2016
Agriculture	30.7	24.2	16.3	9.8	8.1	6.4
Industry	17.5	20.5	25.9	17.2	17.7	18.9
Service	51.7	55.4	57.9	68.4	68.1	67.2
Construction	-	-	-	4.6	6.1	7.5
Sum	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 26: Sectors' share in employment 1972-2016⁵⁸²

Year	1972	1982	1992	2002	2012	2016
Agriculture	65	53.7	43.7	34.9	24.6	20.7
Industry	14.5	19.3	20.2	18.5	19.1	18.9
Service	20.5	27	36.1	42.1	49.4	52.6
Sum	100	100	100	100	100	100

In the previous section, I explained the periods 1980-1988 and 1989-2001 as the first two phases of neoliberal peripheral development. I indicated that the second phase started with the capital account liberalization, and the Turkish economy gradually became fragile to rapid capital inflows and outflows. These were the main reasons for the two big economic crises in 1994 and 2001. These crises and the subsequent IMF stabilization programs alienated wageworkers, self-employed, and farmers from the central parties, and consequently caused the collapse of the party system in 2002. The third phase of neoliberal peripheral development under the AKP governments had

⁵⁸² Özcüre, "Türkiye'de İşgücü Piyasası, İstihdamın Yapısı ve Sorunları," 268.

continuities and ruptures with the previous phase. The major continuity was the commitment to the free capital movements. Turkish economy has been eager to attract the short-term capital. The other commitment was to the IMF program. Although AKP propagated against the IMF during the 2002 election campaign to benefit from the public anger after the 2001 crisis, the party continued the partnership with IMF and implemented its essential instructions. An important economic policy of AKP was to deregulate the labour market and extend the flexible labour practices. The old labour law was repealed in 2002, and a new labour law which stipulates flexible labour market was enacted in 2003. Another law in 2014 increased the extent of the subcontracting system considerably.⁵⁸³ CHP, HDP, İYİP, and MHP stated in their 2018 election manifestos that they will end the subcontracting system in state.⁵⁸⁴ However, the municipalities of these parties continued to employ subcontracted workers. This showed that a tacit consensus emerged on the issue.

On the other hand, the differences from the previous phase were mainly disciplinary policies for the public budget in line with the IMF instructions, and the policies not to neglect the “losers” of neoliberalization. Regarding the public budget discipline, privatization and de-agriculturalization became the two main tools. The Figure 7 below shows the privatization revenues between the year privatization started (1986) and 2023. While the sum of privatization revenues until AKP came to power (2002) was 8 billion dollars, it became 63 billion dollars during the AKP rule between 2003 and 2023.⁵⁸⁵

⁵⁸³ Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler (Organization), ed., “Bölüşüm İlişkilerine Neoliberal Saldırı,” in *AKP’li Yıllarda Emeg’in Durumu*, Birinci Basım (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015), 59–62.

⁵⁸⁴ CHP’s election manifesto 2018, p.170; HDP’s election manifesto, 2018, p. 30, İYİP’s election manifesto 2018, p.30; MHP’s election manifesto 2018, p.118

⁵⁸⁵ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası Elektronik Veri Dağıtım Sistemi (EVDS): <https://evds2.tcmb.gov.tr/index.php?>




Figure 7: Privatization Revenues 1986-2023

Through the aggressive privatization policies, AKP strengthened the treasury directly through the privatization revenues. Public expenditures such as the wages in the public enterprises were cut. Both the subsidy and welfare functions of the public enterprises were abandoned. Also privatization played a major role in the resource transfer to the big bourgeoisie. For example, the revenue of the Koç group, the biggest corporate group in Turkey, increased from 11 billion dollars in 2003 to 40 billion dollars in 2007.⁵⁸⁶ Although CHP and MHP were not against privatization in principle, they criticized the government on the grounds of nepotism in the 2010s.⁵⁸⁷ Similarly, through privatization or public-private partnership projects, a good amount of public resources were transferred to big companies. Ten companies obtained the biggest share of these projects by far.⁵⁸⁸ Kılıçdaroğlu called five of these companies as “gang of five”⁵⁸⁹. Corruption, nepotism, and the criticism about the “gang of five” became prominent terms in the discourses of CHP, HDP, and İYİP in the late 2010s. CHP and HDP made the promise to nationalize the public-private cooperation projects whose profit were guaranteed by the treasury in the 2020s.⁵⁹⁰

⁵⁸⁶ Mustafa Sönmez, “2000’ler Türkiye’sinde AKP, Hakim Sınıflar ve İç Çelişkileri,” in *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, ed. Bülent Duru and İlhan Uzel (Ankara: Phoenix, 2009), 85.

⁵⁸⁷ E. Burak Arıkan, *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - MHP: Türk Sağının Türk Sorunu*, 1. ed, (İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2008), 75.

⁵⁸⁸ Orhangazi, *Türkiye Ekonomisinin Yapısı: Sorunlar Kırılmalıklar ve Kriz Dinamikleri*, 146.

⁵⁸⁹ <https://medyascope.tv/2020/12/14/kilicdaroglunun-besli-cete-dedigi-holdingler-cengiz-limak-kalyon-kolin-ve-makyolun-aldigi-kamu-ihaleleri/>

⁵⁹⁰ CHP’s statement on September 2022: <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/470219/chp-el-koyacagiz-iyi-parti-hukuka-aykiri-dedi> ; HDP’s 2023 election manifesto, p.46.

In general, the winner of the AKP's neoliberal development model became the employers. The Figure 8⁵⁹¹ below shows Oyvatt's calculation of the adjusted share of labour (including both wageworkers and self-employed) in the GDP between 1998 and 2022. Accordingly, the share of labour in the GDP decreased from 46 percent in 2002 to 33.1 percent in 2022. Symmetrically, the share of employers in the GDP increased from 54 percent in 2002 to 66.9 percent in 2022.




Figure 8: Adjusted share of labour 1998-2022 (%)

Although the winner of the AKP's neoliberal development model became the employers vis-à-vis the labour, AKP did not neglect the labour contrary to the case in the 90s. In fact, this change between the two decades was a global phenomenon. These two phases of neoliberalism partly corresponded to the differences between the Washington Consensus and the “Post”-Washington Consensus. While the former's motto was “stabilize, privatize and liberalize” as Rodrik put it, the

⁵⁹¹ Oyvatt, 2023: <https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/emek-payi-yeni-bir-dibi-gordu-haber-1607278> . Oyvatt's formula for the adjusted share of labour is as follows: Sum wage expenditures + sum income of self-employed / GNP – taxes on production + subsidies.

latter also suggested to focus on poverty reduction and sustainability of the model.⁵⁹² The graph below shows that the real wages during the AKP era has been stable in contrast to the 90s.




Figure 9: Real wages index 1989-2019 (1989=100)

AKP also took advantage of the farmers' reaction to the neoliberal transformation during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition between 1999 and 2002. In this period, the share of agricultural subsidies in GDP decreased from 3.2 percent to 0.5 percent; and the share of agricultural prices decreased by 40 percent.⁵⁹³ Figure 10 below shows that the share of agricultural subsidies in GDP remained between 0.4 and 0.7 percent (the right axis). On the other hand, the total amount of subsidies increased ten times in this period. 2.5-3 million people left the agricultural sector during the AKP era. This meant that the relatively same size of subsidies (0.4 – 0.7 percent of GDP) is shared by less farmers. This shows the dual character of the AKP's policies of agriculture. As Gürel argues, AKP's agricultural policies did not alienate the medium and big farmers whose agricultural productivity was more coherent with the neoliberal goals. These concerned their adaptability to large-scale production and contract-farming. On the other hand, it was the small farmers who experienced de-agriculturalization.

⁵⁹² Dani Rodrik and World Bank, "Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's 'Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform,'" *Journal of Economic Literature* 44, no. 4 (2006): 973–87.

⁵⁹³ Burak Gürel, "Türkiye'de Kırdaki Sınıf Mücadelelerinin Tarihsel Gelişimi," in *Marksizm ve Sınıflar: Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Sınıflar ve Mücadeleleri*, ed. Sungur Savran, Kurtar Tanyılmaz, and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, 1st. Ed. (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2014), 348–51.




Figure 10⁵⁹⁴: Agricultural subsidies 2002-2020;

Left axis: sum of agricultural subsidies (billion TL); Right axis: share of agricultural subsidies in GDP

The other major difference between the AKP's development model and that of the 90s was AKP's management of poverty. As I indicated in the previous section, the share of people living in the slums in the urban population reached to 30-35 percent in the 90s. Also a considerable part of the 2.5-3 million small farmers who abandoned the agricultural sector during the AKP era joined the workforce in the cities. In brief, urban poverty became a major issue for the governments in the 90s, 2000s, 2010s. Despite the relative loss of labour vis-à-vis the employers in their share in GDP as I showed above, two factors helped AKP's alignment with the urban poor.

The first factor was the increase in social expenditures. As the Figure 11 shows⁵⁹⁵, the share of social expenditures in GDP increased from 9 percent in 2002 to 12 percent in 2019. The share of public social transfers in the income of the bottom ten percent increased from 2.4 in 2002 to 13.2 in 2018.⁵⁹⁶ AKP expanded the social security system to the unemployed people who were not covered by any social security previously. Since the informal employment was about 30-40 percent of the total employment, this new policy concerned around half of the population.⁵⁹⁷ To sum up, while AKP continued the neoliberal policies to deregulate the labour market and established job insecurity as a norm, the party used mechanisms to relieve the lowest segments of the society.

⁵⁹⁴ <https://www.sbb.gov.tr/tarim-ve-gida-gostergeleri/>

⁵⁹⁵ <https://data.oecd.org/social-exp/social-spending.htm>

⁵⁹⁶ Oğuz Işık, *Eşitsizlikler Kitabı: 2000'ler Türkiye'sinde Gelir, Tüketim ve Değişim*, 1st. Ed., 524 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2022), 389.

⁵⁹⁷ Yonca Özdemir, "AKP's Neoliberal Populism and Contradictions of New Social Policies in Turkey," *Contemporary Politics* 26, no. 3 (2020): 8.

CHP's, HDP's, and İYİP's main concern about AKP's social aids were their use in clientalistic way. To prevent this, CHP and HDP promised universal basic income as a right in the 2020s.⁵⁹⁸ The opposition parties emphasized that social aids are not governments' favour but citizenship rights.




Figure 11: The share of social expenditures in GDP 1980-2019 (%)

Finally, AKP's other effective instrument to gain the consent of the masses was to boost expenditures through credits. Financialization, which is briefly the expansion of the role of financial markets, institutions and activities, became an effective factor in the structures of economy all over the world since the 80s. Credit availabilities expanded considerably, and it shaped both growth models and consumer behaviours. Figure 12 below shows that the size of the credits that banks give to people tripled in Turkey between early 2000s and early 2020s. Symmetrically, the subsequent Figure 13 shows that total household debt as percentage of GDP increased three-four times between the same period. Thus, it became possible for people to spend more than their incomes. While the governments kept people's purchasing power high by increasing the real wages in the import substitution industrialization era and before the 2000s, they were able to do this by using cheap credits after the 2000s.

⁵⁹⁸ Kılıçdaroğlu's article: <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/kilicdaroglu-yazdi-alcakgonullu-bir-uygarligin-insasina-cagri-1734359> ; HDP's 2023 election manifesto, p.9




Figure 12: Credit from banks to private non-financial sector as percentage of GDP 1986-2023⁵⁹⁹




Figure 13: Household debt as percentage of GDP 1986-2023⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁹ Bank for International Settlements:

https://data.bis.org/topics/TOTAL_CREDIT/BIS%2CWS_TC%2C2.0/Q.TR.P.B.M.770.A?view=chart ; 1.9.2023

⁶⁰⁰ Bank for International Settlements; 1.9.2023:

https://data.bis.org/topics/TOTAL_CREDIT/BIS,WS_TC,2.0/Q.TR.H.A.M.770.A

To sum up, I demonstrated through the change in their shares in GDP over time that employers were the winner of AKP’s growth model vis-à-vis the labour. AKP deregulated the labour market and expanded the flexible labour practice all over the economy through the subcontracting system. On the other hand, the party did not neglect the losers of the neoliberal development model contrary to the 90s. Through stable real wages, social transfers, selective welfare policies, and credit expansions, the party aimed to gain the minimum consent of the lower classes. While the richest segment has increased its share in national income, the rest of the society has become more equal among each other since their income started to get closer to the minimum wage income. According to the Central Bank’s report, 42.8 percent of the wageworkers in the non-agricultural sectors receive minimum wage In 2017.⁶⁰¹ The graph below shows the minimum wage as percentage of median wage for selected OECD countries. The higher percentage in Turkey and Colombia indicate that minimum wage is becoming a norm for most of the wageworkers, and that these societies are reaching equality around subsistence levels except the richest.




Figure 14: Minimum wage as percentage of median wage (%)

⁶⁰¹ Central Bank Inflation Report, 2018, p.54: https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/1e306323-d6fc-47e6-aaa5-8359b5446470/enf_ekim2018_tammetin.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE-1e306323-d6fc-47e6-aaa5-8359b5446470-msSBptK

3.6.2 External relations

As I explained in the previous section, RP regarded European Union as a “Christian club” and was strictly against it until the late 90s. Although this position did not change fundamentally, the party started to appeal to the human rights discourse and some decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the late 90s due to the pressures on the party by the judiciary and military. AKP brought forward this policy and became an ardent supporter of European Union in its first electoral term. The previous coalition government passed three EU harmonization packages in the parliament which were conditioned by the Copenhagen Criteria for EU accession. AKP maintained the process and passed five more packages in two years. These packages concerned freedom of association and speech, prohibition of torture, Christian foundations’ rights to property, the right to education and press in mother-tongue, curbing certain authorities of the National Security Council.⁶⁰² CHP supported these legislations in the parliament. The party also supported to join the EU. However, it raised concerns about certain topics such as the Cyprus Question and criticised the Annan Plan which stipulated the reunification of Cyprus as a federation.⁶⁰³ MHP also regarded AKP’s foreign policy as submission to EU, USA, World Bank and IMF.⁶⁰⁴ DTP, on the other hand, regarded the accession to EU as a process of democratization and supported it.⁶⁰⁵

Iraq War was a fundamental issue for Turkish foreign policy regarding the American-Turkish relations in the early 2000s. Turkish parliament rejected the US proposal to station 60 thousand troops in the Turkish bases and ports to operate in the Iraq war in 2003. CHP was strictly against the proposal, and all the party deputies voted against it. AKP, on the other hand, was divided. A group led by Erdoğan supported the proposal to become proactive in Iraq war whereas the other group within AKP voted against the proposal.⁶⁰⁶

The EU accession process slowed down in 2006. The referendum for the Annan Plan in Cyprus was a blow. It was supported by 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots but 24 percent of the Greek Cypriots; therefore, the plan failed to pass. The Sarkozy government in France and Merkel government in Germany were reluctant about Turkey’s accession.⁶⁰⁷ As Turkey’s relationship to

⁶⁰² Melih Yeşilbağ and Cenk Saraçoğlu, “Minare ile İnşaat Gölgesinde,” in *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, ed. Gökhan Atılğan, Cenk Saraçoğlu, and Ateş. Uslu, 3. Baskı (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2019), 903.

⁶⁰³ <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/baykal-annan-plani-ciddi-sorunlar-tasiyor-38596337>

⁶⁰⁴ https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/209/index.html

⁶⁰⁵ DTP Party Program, 2005, p.49

⁶⁰⁶ Erdoğan’s statement about his support to the proposal in 2016: <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/1-mart-tartismasi-2190915>

⁶⁰⁷ Ramazan Gözen, *AK Parti Dış Politikası: Sıfır Sorun’dan Suriye Savaşı’na Kaybolan Bir İdealizm*, 1. ed (Ankara: Elips Kitap, 2021), 467.

EU slows down, the AKP government started to pursue a pro-active foreign policy on several other regions after 2008. The party aimed to increase Turkey's influence in the world politics and especially in former Ottoman territories. Many scholars called this new policy as "neo-Ottomanism". Soft power and diplomacy became the main tools for this goal between 2008 and 2011. "Zero problems with the neighbours" became the motto in this period. A protocol to normalize the relationships with Armenia was signed; and visa requirement between Turkey and Syria was removed. Turkey played a role in conflict resolution in many corners of the World, became arbitrator in internal conflicts in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan. Consequently, Turkey also served as a non-permanent member in the UN Security Council between 2009-2010.⁶⁰⁸

Neo-Ottomanism through soft-power turned to hard power after 2012. The Arab Spring was the crucial external factor for this change. And the internal factor was AKP's consolidation of power after the party dominated the judiciary in addition to its hegemony in the parliament and government. AKP saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity to increase its influence in the Middle East by forging ties with the opposition movements which were reckoned to come to power by overthrowing their authoritarian rulers. This goal was in line with USA's foreign policy on several fronts. Obama and Erdoğan supported the Morsi government in Egypt, the Syrian Opposition in Syria, and Turkey joined NATO forces in Libya operation. Turkey hosted meetings for the Syrian opposition in Turkey. It was exposed in 2014 that Turkish Intelligence sent weapons to Syria. Erdoğan claimed that those weapons went to Turkmens in Syria and rejected the claims that Turkey arms Free Syrian Army or other groups in Syria.⁶⁰⁹ All the opposition parties in the parliament strongly criticised Turkey's involvement in the Syria war. Both CHP and MHP accused the government of arming terrorists groups in Syria. These parties argued that Turkey should implement more neutral policy and take role to reconcile the sides. A group of CHP deputies went to Syria and met Assad in a political conjuncture where the AKP government had cut the diplomatic ties with him.⁶¹⁰

However, the Morsi government was overthrown in 2013. Assad held on to power in Syria thanks to the Russia's and Iran's support. Islamic State (IS) and pro-Kurdish PYD/YPG increased their power in Syria. In short, things started to go against AKP's plan to increase its influence in the Middle East. USA's support to PYD/YPG in Syria to fight against IS deteriorated the Turkish-

⁶⁰⁸ Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Dış Politikanın Yüz Yılı," in *Cumhuriyet: Asırlık Bir Muhasebe*, ed. Mehmet Ö Alkan, 1. Baskı, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2023), 212–13.

⁶⁰⁹ Çetinsaya, 217

⁶¹⁰ Bahçeli's speech on May 21, 2013:

https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/2840/index.html; CHP deputies' meeting with Assad on March 3, 2013: <https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2013/03/08/chpli-heyet-besar-esadla-gorustu>

American relations since the AKP government proclaimed PYD/YPG as the Syrian branch of PKK. The rise of PYD/YPG as a significant armed force in northern Syria started to shape both internal and external politics in Turkey. AKP's primary concern in Syria changed from toppling Assad to stop the Kurdish advance. HDP was the party that opposed most strongly Turkey's hostility against PYD/YPG in Syria. This issue became one of the primary issues that CHP and MHP diverged radically in 2014. CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu stated that YPG is not a terror organization since it does not involve in killing civilians and that the organization defends its homeland against IS in Syria. On the other hand, MHP leader Bahçeli criticized this statement strongly and argued that AKP, CHP, HDP, Barzani, PKK leader Öcalan, and global forces became allies.⁶¹¹

Turkey started to improve relations with Russia in the late 2010s after having conflict of interest with U.S. in several areas. The conflict had internal reasons as well as the external ones. One of them was Turkey's demand from U.S. to extradite Fethullah Gülen after the failed coup attempt in 2016. U.S. declined this demand. The AKP government regarded this as taking side with the coup plotters. As argued above, American-Turkish interests also conflicted in Syria. Turkey and U.S. could not agree on Turkey's attempts to buy NATO missiles with technology transfers since the early 2010s. Moreover, the United States announced that the Patriot missiles that had been deployed in Turkey since 2013 as part of the NATO mission would be returned to Germany for maintenance. Consequently, Turkey approached Russia in 2017 to buy S-400 missiles.⁶¹² And first parts of the S-400 missiles arrived in Turkey in 2019. Turkey did several military operations in northern Syria mainly targeting PYD/YPG but also IS since 2016 thanks to Russia's greenlight. On the other hand, Turkey-U.S. relationship deteriorated. The U.S. imposed certain sanctions to Turkey in 2020 and excluded Turkey from the F-35 combat aircraft project. CHP, İYİP, and HDP were critical of buying S-400 missiles. İYİP leader Akşener argued that Turkey established asymmetrical relationship with Russia, and that it should get rid of S-400 missiles.⁶¹³ On the other hand, MHP fully supported AKP to buy S-400 missiles from Russia and criticized the U.S. to get

⁶¹¹ Kılıçdaroğlu's statement on October 21, 2014: <https://t24.com.tr/haber/kilicdaroglu-ypg-teror-orgutu-degil-vatanini-kurtarmak-icin-orgutlenmis-bir-olusum,274588>; Bahçeli's statement on October 26, 2014:

https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/3569/index.html

⁶¹² Townsend and Ellehuus, 2019, The Tale of Turkey and The Patriots:

<https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/the-tale-of-turkey-and-the-patriots/>

⁶¹³ Akşener's statement on February 24, 2022: <https://www.haberturk.com/son-dakika-meral-aksener-s400-lerden-acilen-kurtulmalı-3355732>; Kılıçdaroğlu argued that Turkey should act together with its NATO partners for its defense concerns; August 19, 2022: <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c9x30w6jn2zo>; HDP co-chairperson stated that Turkey needs neither S-400 missiles or F-35 aircrafts, July 16, 2019: <https://hdp.org.tr/tr/buldan-bu-ulkeyi-kadinlar-yonetseydi-ulkenin-gundeminde-s-400-degil-demokrasi-ve-baris-olurdu/13326/>

closer with Greece to pose a potential threat to Turkey.⁶¹⁴ MHP also changed its position about the Assad regime in the late 2010s and gave full support to the AKP government on its Syria policies.

3.6.3 Religion, nationhood, and political institutions

I demonstrated in the previous section that there were two main conflicts regarding the cultural issues and nationhood in the party systems between 1983 and 2002. The first one concerned the Kurdish Question, and the second one was about the place of tradition, religion and secularism in public life. The party system that emerged after the 2002 elections retained these two fields of conflict, and they will be analysed in two subsections.

Regarding the role of religion and traditions in public life, the main issues have concerned the headscarf ban in universities, official ceremonies, parliament, and state office for civil servants; the number and function of religious vocational schools; the place and function of religious orders in public life; pressure on secular lifestyle; and women's rights and LGBT rights.

The first issue of conflict concerned the headscarf ban in universities, state receptions, parliament, and for civil servants. Leading state institutions including the president, the constitutional court, the military, and the rectors of the major universities were against to remove the ban in the first two terms of AKP. Among the opposition parties, CHP sided with these state institutions in the 2000s. On the other hand, DTP and MHP supported AKP's constitutional amendment proposal in 2008 which stipulated to remove the headscarf ban in universities.⁶¹⁵ Then the amendment was repealed by the constitutional court upon CHP's appeal. CHP, military, and the leading secular civil society organizations also opposed to Abdullah Gül's candidacy for presidency in 2007 with the claim that Gül does not abide by the laicite principle of the constitution. These civil society organizations led by Atatürkist Thought Association organized mass rallies in several cities of Turkey in 2007 for laicite concerns. The conflict was discussed on media mostly with regards to Gül's wife who had a headscarf. The Presidency of General Staff published a statement on its website that conveys the army's concerns about laicite. The AKP speaker responded that this behaviour of the military does not comply with a democratic regime.⁶¹⁶ CHP changed its position about the headscarf ban after Kılıçdaroğlu became the head of the party in 2010. The AKP

⁶¹⁴ Bahçeli's statement on March 2, 2021:

https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/4776/index.html

⁶¹⁵ <https://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/104789-universitede-basortusu-icin-anayasa-degisikligi-meclisten-geci>

⁶¹⁶ Milliyet, 28.4.2007

government removed the headscarf ban in universities in 2010, and for civil servants in 2013. Deputies with headscarf entered the parliament in 2013 for the first time, and CHP did not oppose this new practice. Furthermore, CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu made several self-criticism in the late 2010s about CHP's earlier stances concerning the headscarf issue.⁶¹⁷

The second conflict concerned the vocational high schools. Students of these high schools were given lower scores in the university exam if they decide to study in subjects other than their subject in their vocational school. Students of religious high schools had a disadvantage if they decide to study subjects such as law, medicine and engineering. AKP removed this disadvantage of the vocational high schools in 2011. The same camp with the headscarf issue opposed these policy changes. They considered them not as liberal reforms but as changes in the direction of AKP's intention to impose a religious-conservative lifestyle over the society from top. Vocational high schools differ from the other high schools to have a religion-intensive curriculum with Sunni-Islam content, to separate girls and boys in classrooms in many of the schools, and to allow children to wear headscarves in schools. For the critics, these religious vocational schools were founded in the early republic to raise religious officials to mosques. Therefore, to encourage graduate students to study other subjects did not serve to their original function but served to raise generations with a Sunni religious-conservative ideology.

The third salient issue was religious orders. As I explained in the previous section, the military asked the government to end the activities of the religious orders during the 1997 military memorandum. The president and the National Security Council raised concerns about religious orders' activities in state institutions. A report on the Gülen Movement warned the government in the National Security Council about Gülen Movement's capturing positions secretly in police department in 2004.⁶¹⁸ CHP also raised concerns about the fact that Gülen Movement infiltrates in the military in 2009.⁶¹⁹ Although MHP did not have a strong opposition to Gülen members' activities in state institutions, the party raised concerns occasionally. During the Ergenekon trials in 2011, MHP leader Bahçeli asked Gülen to stop the activities of Gülen-related prosecutors and

⁶¹⁷ Kılıçdaroğlu's statement on October 3, 2019: <https://www.diken.com.tr/kilicdaroglundan-basortusu-ozelestirisi/>

⁶¹⁸ Milliyet, 25.6.2004

⁶¹⁹ CHP deputy Atilla Kart's statement on November 7, 2009: <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/chpli-kart-cemaatler-ordunun-icine-sizdi-1159340>

judges.⁶²⁰ AKP regarded the claims about Gülenists' infiltration in bureaucracy "paranoia" in 2012.⁶²¹

AKP and the religious orders had a clientelistic relationship. Clientelism has been the case between all the right-wing parties and religious orders since the transition to multi-party politics. However, it can be argued that the extent of this relationship peaked in the 2000s during the AKP government. Although some religious orders and circles only get involved in other-worldly religious activities and moral issues, many of them, especially big and influential ones, get involved in business, politics, education, and social aid.⁶²² The AKP governments have helped the religious orders to carry out religious and secular education activities, to open schools and dormitories, and to involve in social aid projects through foundations. These are the main fields where the religious orders find their human resource. As the state transferred its welfare function to the market after the neoliberal turn in the 1980s, religious orders used the opportunity to increase their field and size of activities. They have got critical positions in bureaucracy to recruit their members thanks to the AKP government. In return, religious orders have supported AKP in grassroots mobilization, and in media through their TV and radio channels, newspapers and magazines.

In addition to these, Gülen Movement had a special role in the first two terms of AKP. The order used its power and members in judiciary, police, intelligence service, and media to oppress and eliminate secular-nationalist bureaucracy, media, and civil society, and also to weaken the Kurdish movement. Hundreds of people were tried in Ergenekon and Balyoz trials between 2008 and 2011 with the allegation of founding a clandestine organization to plot against the AKP government, and sentenced many of the suspects to lengthy prison terms in 2012 and 2013. The sentences in the Ergenekon trial included to be a member of an armed terrorist organization, to attempt to overthrow the government by using violence and coercion, to encourage the military to insubordination. The suspects included a wide range of people. A group of them were military commanders and high-ranking officers in gendarmerie and intelligence who had been mentioned in connection with the unknown-assailant murders in the 90s.⁶²³ Other group included nationalist journalists, activists, retired generals (including the retired Chief of the General Staff) and politicians of both right-wing and left-wing origin, and some socialist journalists and public figures.

⁶²⁰ Bahçeli's statement on March 31, 2011:

https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/1053/index.html

⁶²¹ February 20, 2012: <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/cemaat-devlete-sizmis-buna-kargalar-guler,FMxmUxVJhUqKz-8NGPbZnQ>

⁶²² The Directorate of Religious Affairs' confidential report on the religious orders and circles which leaked to the media presents a comprehensive overview of the religious and political opinions, as well as activities of these orders.

⁶²³ Soyler, *The Turkish Deep State*, 158.

Famous mafia leaders were also among the suspects. The Balyoz trial sentenced over 300 people most of whom were former generals and high-ranking officers to have prepared a coup plan in 2003 to overthrow the AKP government.

Until 2013, AKP backed the trials. DTP supported the trials by identifying the suspects with unknown assailants-murders in the Kurdish-majority region in the 90s, but the party also warned that the prosecutors “water down” the case by involving irrelevant famous figures.⁶²⁴ On the other hand, CHP and MHP were critical of the trials.⁶²⁵ The tide started to turn for the defendants when the fight between AKP and the Gülen Movement started in 2012. A prosecutor, who was jailed for being a member of the Gülen Movement later, summoned the head of National Intelligence Service to ask questions about the secret peace talks with PKK. Erdoğan intervened and did not let him to be summoned in this first round of the AKP-Gülenists conflict. In 2013, the AKP government announced that the cram schools⁶²⁶ will be shut down. This was a blow for the Gülen Movement which was the leader in this sector. The Gülen Movement’s response was the big corruption operation to major AKP politicians through their members in judiciary in December 2013. Erdoğan’s son was also summoned by the prosecutor. Erdoğan called the operation as a plot by a “parallel state organization” to its legitimate government and to the national will. He started to call the Gülen Movement as a terrorist organization during the 2014 election campaign.⁶²⁷

CHP and MHP preferred to focus on AKP’s corruption in this conflict⁶²⁸. BDP’s main concern, on the other hand, was the peace talks between the state and the Kurdish Movement. Demirtaş indicated that his party demands to call the parallel state to account, however AKP’s corruption is an obstacle for that.⁶²⁹ When the general director and the chief editor of the biggest Gülenist newspaper were detained in December 2014, CHP and MHP accused the government of authoritarianism.⁶³⁰ The government changed its position about the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials after the conflict with the Gülenists. The courts started to acquit the suspects by 2014.

⁶²⁴ Demirtaş’s speech on March 26, 2009: <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/dtp-grup-baskan-vekili-demirtas-tan-ergenekon-iddianamesine-elestiri-1075806>

⁶²⁵ H Akin Ünver, “Turkey’s ‘Deep-State’ and the Ergenekon Conundrum,” *The Middle East Institute*, Policy Brief, no. 23 (2009).

⁶²⁶ Cram schools are private courses that prepare students to the university entrance exam.

⁶²⁷ Erdoğan’s statement on March 22, 2014: <https://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/erdogan-cemaate-terror-gutunu-dedi>

⁶²⁸ Bahçeli’s statement on December 12, 2013:

https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/3133/index.html and Kılıçdaoğlu’s statement on December 29, 2013: <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/75217/kilicdaroglu-sen-ayakkabi-kutusu-partisisin-artik>

⁶²⁹ Demirtaş’s statement on December 26, 2013

⁶³⁰ Bahçeli’s statement on December 16, 2014:

https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/3651/index.html and Kılıçdaoğlu’s statement on December 14, 2014: <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/kilicdaroglundan-operasyon-yorumu-1984105>

The fight between the Gülenists and AKP had a peak at the event of failed coup attempt in July 2016. Thousands of people most of whom are claimed to be affiliated to the Gülen Movement got detained. Although AKP purged Gülenists from bureaucracy, its clientalistic relationship with the religious orders which include to allocate positions in bureaucracy and transferring welfare functions were criticized by the opposition parties. For example, one of the effective promises of CHP's İstanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu during the election campaign was to cut the transfers to religious orders and foundations from the municipality budget.⁶³¹

The fourth salient category of cultural conflict in this era concerned pressures on the secular lifestyle, and women and LGBT rights. Secular people have considered the expansion of religious orders, proliferation of religious-conservative education as potential threats to liberal-secular public order. These worries increased as AKP's emphasis on the Sunni-Islamic Ummah increased after the Arab Spring. During the 2011 election campaign, Erdoğan made his crowd boo Kılıçdaroğlu in the meetings each time after he stated that Kılıçdaroğlu is Alevi.⁶³² The Gezi Demonstrations in 2013 were held partly because of the reaction and worries of the secular and especially young people. While AKP tried to suppress the protests with brute force, CHP regarded the Gezi protests as the "uprising of an oppressed society" and supported it.⁶³³ MHP regarded the protests as the "explosion of the the ones who had been oppressed for years" but Bahçeli also warned that PKK and extreme left tried to manipulate the protestors. He also stated the MHP is not taking place in the protests.⁶³⁴ HDP supported the protests and regarded it as the "uprising of people who asked for more democracy and freedom". On the other hand, HDP's leader Demirtaş warned that there are people in the protests who call military for a coup d'état.⁶³⁵

AKP's policy on alcohol was one of the issues that showed signs in early 2000s that the party aimed to restrict secular lifestyle in public sphere. Erdoğan stated in 2002 that he would not allow alcohol service in public enterprises.⁶³⁶ Initially, alcohol was partly removed from the restaurants in public trains in 2004.⁶³⁷ Some AKP municipalities decided to move restaurants that serve alcohol outside the city centre.⁶³⁸ In 2005, local governments were authorized to determine the regions in their

⁶³¹ İmamoğlu stated in a famous speech that "the period to serve to specific persons, religious orders, foundations and associations has ended": <https://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/212268-imamoglu-vakiflara-aktarilan-357-milyon-liraya-noktayi-koyduk>

⁶³² <https://t24.com.tr/haber/sizin-inancinizi-binlerce-kisi-ayni-anda-hic-yuhaladi-mi,206585>

⁶³³ <https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/852606-gezi-parkinda-alinan-karara-saygi-duymaliyiz>

⁶³⁴ Bahçeli's speech on June 2013: https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/2856/index.html

⁶³⁵ Demirtaş's speech on July 2013: <https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/865259-bdp-lideri-demirtas-gezi-parki-elestirine-yanit-verdi>

⁶³⁶ Milliyet, 15.7.2004

⁶³⁷ Milliyet, 5.3.2004

⁶³⁸ Denizli mayor of AKP Nihat Zeybekçi took such a decision in 2005: Milliyet, 9.9.2005

jurisdictions that restaurants and bars could serve alcohol in. This law functioned to restrict alcohol consumption to certain neighbourhoods and streets in every city. By 2013, to display alcohol scenes on TV shows, and alcohol advertisements on TV and public were banned. To serve alcohol in sports events, university campuses, and cafes were banned. While CHP and BDP regarded these policy changes as governments' interventions to lifestyle of individuals, MHP supported them.⁶³⁹

As AKP consolidated its power, its authoritarian religious-conservative inclinations became more salient. The government withdrew from the Istanbul Convention on Violence Against Women in 2021. While MHP supported the government, CHP, HDP, and İYİP were against the withdrawal. In 2020, Erdoğan called LGBTs as deviants that religion and Turkish traditions prohibit. Both Erdoğan and Bahçeli called LGBT movement as a “global imposition”⁶⁴⁰ against the native and Islamic values in the 2020s, and identified this movement with CHP, İYİP, and HDP's politics and vision for society.⁶⁴¹

3.6.4 Ethnicity, nationhood, and political institutions

As I explained in the previous section, the Kurdish question has two aspects that are intertwined. The first one is the identity rights and demands of the pro-Kurdish movement. The second one is the armed conflict between the state and PKK, and the related security and securitization policies. AKP had policies in both aspects during its rule. On the one hand, AKP initiated trilateral secret and open dialogues in different periods with the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in his prison, with the PKK commanders and civilian leaders, and with the leading politicians from the legal pro-Kurdish party to make PKK lay down arms permanently. On the other hand, AKP initiated certain reforms regarding the Kurdish identity rights. These two parallel processes made together what the government called the “Kurdish Initiative” or the “Peace Process”.

The first round of -secret- talks were held in Oslo between 2008 and 2011.⁶⁴² The public learned about these secret talks when they were leaked to media in September 2011.⁶⁴³ The second round of talks were not secret. Erdoğan declared in December 2012 that the National Intelligence Service

⁶³⁹ See CHP and BDP lawmakers' criticisms: <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/57644/alkol-yasaklari-meclisten-gecti>; See MHP leader Bahçeli's support: <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/mhpden-hukumete-alkol-destegi>

⁶⁴⁰ Erdoğan's speech on November 28, 2022: <https://bianet.org/bianet/lgbti/270647-lgbt-dayatmasi-aileyi-ve-islami-degerleri-zayiflatmayi-amaclayan-bir-tehdittir>

⁶⁴¹ Bahçeli's speech on April 5, 2023: <https://t24.com.tr/haber/bahceli-kilicdaroglu-zalimlerin-truva-atidir-lgbt-ittifakina-milli-ahlakimizla-milli-varligimizla-direnip-insallah-rezil-oyunu-bozacagiz,1102519>

⁶⁴² <https://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/pkk-ilk-kez-acikladiosloda-neler-oldu/haber-199057>

⁶⁴³ <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/mit-pkk-gorusmeleri-sizdi,a87SUp4ta0akgKLpkhb5-w>

started talks with Öcalan. Then, BDP/HDP politicians were included in the process. Between January 2013 and April 2015, DBP/HDP MPs went between Öcalan and other PKK leaders in the Qandil Mountain several times under the state's permission. The peak of the peace process was when the government members and HDP MPs made a declaration together in the prime minister's office for the first time in 2015. In the meeting, the HDP side read a declaration which can be considered as the main issues to deliberate between the parties later. In other words, the declaration was not a text that the sides compromised on. Even so, Öcalan called PKK to lay down arms. However, PKK did not do so. One of the PKK leaders stated that PKK will not lay down arms until the government deliberates the issues and find solutions.⁶⁴⁴ But the other reason was that the parties had a big conflict in northern Syria. Erdoğan stated in June 2015 that 'Turkey will not allow a Kurdish state in the northern Syria.'⁶⁴⁵ The peace talks officially suspended when Erdoğan declared that the process is "in the fridge" in August 2015.⁶⁴⁶

The state of the pro-Kurdish party family and politicians oscillated between being legal and illegal throughout the era. DEHAP shutdown itself in 2005 during a closure trial; its successor DTP was banned by the constitutional court in 2009. BDP succeeded DTP. The party shut down itself in 2014, and HDP succeeded it. Finally, the trial to ban HDP started in 2021. The party competed under YSP banner in the 2023 elections. The cause of the closures are all about having ties with PKK and terror. HDP's leader Demirtaş and eight deputies were detained with the claim to propagate about a terrorist organization (PKK) in November 2016. 94 out of 102 HDP mayors who were elected in the 2014 elections got dismissed between 2016 and 2017, and the government appointed trustees in these municipalities.⁶⁴⁷ Similarly, the government appointed trustees to 48 out of 65 HDP municipalities between 2019 and 2022 after the 2019 elections.⁶⁴⁸

Regarding the identity rights, the government passed several laws parallel to the Kurdish Initiative processes. In 2009, the ban to speak Kurdish for prisoners on the phone calls were removed⁶⁴⁹; a public channel started to broadcast in Kurdish 24 hours for the first time; a postgraduate institution of Kurdology was opened with the education language in Kurdish.⁶⁵⁰ Propaganda in Kurdish for the political parties were permitted in 2011.⁶⁵¹ Kurdish became an elective course since the fifth-

⁶⁴⁴ Mustafa Karasu's statement: https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/02/150228_ocalan_cagri_analiz

⁶⁴⁵ https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/06/150630_suriye_mudahale_tartismalari

⁶⁴⁶ <https://www.france24.com/en/20150811-turkey-press-anti-pkk-campaign-until-no-terrorist-remains-erdogan>

⁶⁴⁷ <https://tr.euronews.com/2017/12/11/kayyum-raporu-102-belediyenin-94une-kayyum-atandi>

⁶⁴⁸ <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/415521/hdpnin-65-belediyesinden-48i-kayyumla-6si-mazbata-verilmeyerek-gasbedildi>

⁶⁴⁹ <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/115383-cezaevinde-kurtce-ye-sinirli-serbestlik-yururlukte>

⁶⁵⁰ Zeydanlioğlu, 2012, p.116-118

⁶⁵¹ <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/secim-icin-kurtce-propaganda-serbest-226978>

grade in schools in 2012.⁶⁵² And defendants in courts were permitted to speak in mother tongue in 2013.⁶⁵³

MHP regarded these policies as concessions to PKK.⁶⁵⁴ The party consistently opposed the reforms about the identity rights and peace talks with PKK because it defended the position that the only way to deal with the problem was through security and military measures. Bahçeli considered the legal pro-Kurdish parties as the legal faction of PKK. Thus, he supported the closure of the party.

CHP's approach to the reforms and the peace talks can be divided in two periods. During the Baykal period until 2010, the party criticized many of the government's policies although it was not as strict as MHP. For example, CHP did not oppose to Kurdish broadcasting but argued that Kurdish broadcasting should be in private channels instead of the public ones. Baykal regarded this as state's support to certain ethnic movements.⁶⁵⁵ CHP was critical of the Kurdish Initiative/Democratic Initiative policy of the government in 2009. Baykal criticized that CHP and MHP were not included in the process, and that the initiative encourages the terrorists.⁶⁵⁶ During the Kılıçdaroğlu period after 2010, CHP's approach to the Kurdish question gradually changed. The party still did not approve the peace talks with Öcalan and PKK. Kılıçdaroğlu argued that the CHP cannot support the process since it is not transparent.⁶⁵⁷ On the other hand, when AKP started to drift to full-fledged securitization of the Kurdish Question and got closer with MHP after 2015, CHP's position about two issues differed significantly from those of AKP and MHP. Firstly, Kılıçdaroğlu did not call PYD/YPG terrorist but an organization that emerged to defend their homeland. Secondly, CHP opposed the imprisonment of HDP MPs in 2016, and the appointment of trustees to HDP municipalities by the state.⁶⁵⁸

İYİP was stricter than CHP and less strict than MHP and AKP about the imprisonment of the leading HDP politicians and the appointment of trustees to the HDP municipalities. İYİP leader Akşener stated in 2018 that HDP leader Demirtaş should be released from the prison.⁶⁵⁹ Regarding the municipalities, İYİP speaker argued that the state cannot tolerate someone who have ties with

⁶⁵² <https://www.sabah.com.tr/egitim/kurtce-secmeli-ders-egitimi-basladi-2255069>

⁶⁵³ <https://bianet.org/bianet/minorities/143897-parliament-approves-court-defense-bill>

⁶⁵⁴ Bahçeli's statement in June 2008: <https://www.mynet.com/bahceli-kurtce-yayin-pkkya-jesttir-110100344264>

⁶⁵⁵ Baykal's statement in January 2009: <https://www.haberturk.com/polemik/haber/118778-trtnin-kurtce-yayini-bize-ters>

⁶⁵⁶ Baykal's statement in December 2009: <https://t24.com.tr/haber/baykal-uzlasmaci-anlayisin-sonucu-tokattir,64228>

⁶⁵⁷ Kılıçdaroğlu's statement on 10.5.2013: <https://t24.com.tr/haber/kilicdaroglundan-cozum-sureci-aciklamasi,229601>

⁶⁵⁸ <https://haber.sol.org.tr/turkiye/kilicdaroglundan-hukumete-kayyum-elestirisi-274840>

⁶⁵⁹ <https://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/197180-meral-aksener-demirtas-tahliye-edilmeli>

terror. On the other hand, the party criticized the Supreme Election Board and the government to have permitted candidates who are claimed to have ties with PKK.⁶⁶⁰

The pro-Kurdish party lineage (DEHAP-DTP-BDP-HDP) had the most radical position for its policies about PKK and the identity rights of Kurds and other ethnicities. Briefly, HDP denied any connection to PKK. Demirtaş stated that HDP is not an extension or representative of PKK.⁶⁶¹ And that they reject PKK's violence. But he also stated that HDP does not define PKK as a terrorist organization but as a "violence organization that emerged as a reaction to the state terror".⁶⁶² Some statements of the HDP politicians, on the other hand, were expressions of sympathy and support. In an incident when police attacked the protesters with spray gas to put down the Öcalan poster, Demirtaş reacted by saying that "they will erect Öcalan's statue" in the future, let alone the posters.⁶⁶³

Regarding cultural rights, the pro-Kurdish party lineage supported a multi-ethnic institutional design with collective group rights. These included mainly constitutional recognition of Kurdish people and Kurdish language (and other local languages); education in mother-tongue; and cultural, administrative, judicial, and financial decentralization. About the decentralization policy, the party had proposed the "democratic autonomy" model in 2007. Briefly, the model proposes to decentralize the administrative system by dividing Turkey into 20-25 regions. Accordingly, each region gets its own assembly and government. It was suggested that these regional governments take over some of the judicial, financial, security, and education authorities of the central government.⁶⁶⁴ None of the parties, including AKP in the 2000s and CHP in the 2010s got closer to any of these demands of HDP. Therefore, HDP appeared as the anti-system party throughout the period.

3.6.5 A summary of the party competition between 2002-2023

I discussed the policy positions and ideologies of the major parties of the party system between 2002 and 2023 in four categories. Arithmetically, the party system between 2002 and 2023 appeared

⁶⁶⁰ <https://tr.euronews.com/2019/08/21/iyi-parti-den-uc-buyuksehire-kayyum-atanmasina-iliskin-aciklama>

⁶⁶¹ Demirtaş's statement in July 2022: <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/466076/demirtas-kimse-hdpyi-pkknin-siyasi-uzantisi-gibi-goremez>

⁶⁶² Demirtaş's statement in September 2016: <https://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/demirtas-biz-pkkyi-teror-orgutu-olarak-tanimlamiyoruz>

⁶⁶³ Demirtaş's statement in November 2012: <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/demirtas-ocalanin-heykelini-dikecegiz,aHxdKXZrqEOHtlUTDsGFsw>

⁶⁶⁴ The Democratic Autonomy text of 2007: <https://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/102605-dtp-kongresinden-20-25-ozerk-bolge-onerisi> and the Democratic Autonomy text of 2015: https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/12/151228_dtk_deklarasyon

as a multi-party system with 4-5 relevant parties, and with a predominant AKP. I argue that this period can be divided into two main sub-periods regarding the ideological proximity, cooperation and conflict patterns of the parties. The first period was between 2002 and 2015, and the second period is after 2015. Arguably the period between 2011 and 2015 was the transition period.

In its first two electoral terms, AKP took advantage of the economic crises, high inflation, and austerity packages that alienated the masses from the traditional parties at the turn of the century. Although AKP continued the neoliberal policies of deregulation of the labour market, privatization, and dependency on short-term cash inflows, the party aimed to forge ties with working class and urban poor through stable real wages, social aid, and credit policies. Simultaneously the party had a good relationship with the business world through the same economy policies. The party had a pro-Western agenda in foreign policy and became an ardent supporter of the European Union. Thus, the party championed democratic discourse, and it framed many of its policies of culture with this discourse. AKP conflicted with CHP as well as state institutions such as military, judiciary, universities in this period because of the headscarf issue, religious vocational schools, and religious orders. The party also conflicted with MHP in addition to the previous ones about the Kurdish issue and foreign policies about Cyprus and EU. DTP-HDP and MHP were not as strict as CHP about the issues of secularism and religious-conservatism. And MHP was stricter about the Kurdish question than CHP. CHP started to soften its position vis-à-vis both issues after 2010 during the leadership of Kılıçdaroğlu. AKP and HDP maintained a tense cooperation regarding the Kurdish Initiative until 2015.

AKP survived a closure trial in 2008. The party portrayed its opponents as tutelary forces over democracy and identified democracy with the electoral majority that the party represents. Through its partnership with the Gülenist in bureaucracy and judiciary, the party used the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials to weaken its opponents both in state, politics, and civil society. As the party started to dominate the state institutions and consolidated its power, its authoritarianism crystallized. Its violent reaction to Gezi protests in 2013 was the clearest manifestation of the authoritarian turn. Nonetheless, Gülenists and AKP started to have a conflict in 2012, and it had a peak in 2016 during the failed coup attempt. CHP and MHP opted to focus on corruption cases of AKP until 2015 which were revealed by Gülen-affiliated prosecutors. HDP, on the other hand, pointed to both corruption and the plot to topple AKP.

The breaking point for the cooperation and conflict patterns in the party system was the general elections in June 2015. AKP could not get the sufficient number of seats in the parliament to form the government alone for the first time. CHP, HDP, and MHP could not build a coalition

government due to deep divisions between HDP and MHP. Consequently, early elections for November 2015 declared. YPG captured Tel Abyad from IS in northern Syria and connected its cantons of Kobani and Jazire. YPG's expansion across the Turkish border alarmed the AKP government. Armed conflict between Turkey and PKK intensified between these two elections. Erdoğan declared that the peace process/Kurdish initiative is suspended.⁶⁶⁵ Meanwhile two suicide attacks killed more than 100 people in two different places. The re-securitization of the Kurdish question and this atmosphere of violence between the two elections helped AKP in the early elections in November 2015, and the party managed to come to power alone again. The decline of MHP's vote share from 16.3 percent in June to 11.9 percent in November triggered the intraparty opposition movement. Three candidates declared their candidacy for the party leadership. At this point, Bahçeli made his move and stated that one of the candidates is Gülen Movement's candidate.⁶⁶⁶ Thus, like AKP, Bahçeli started to call the Gülenist Movement as plotters and "parallel state organization". The intraparty opposition changed party bylaws to call a congress to elect a new leader. The Bahçeli faction did not accept this and take the conflict to the court. While the first instance court decided in favour of the intraparty opposition, a superior court decided in favour of the incumbents. Meral Akşener, the leading opposition candidate within MHP, got expelled from the party in 2016. The Good Party (İYİP) was founded in October 2017.

Since 2017, AKP and MHP have been acting together in elections. Symmetrically, CHP and İYİP have been cooperating. HDP also supported unilaterally CHP's candidate in certain major cities in the local elections in 2019, and in the 2023 presidential election. Despite the deep divisions between HDP and İYİP, such a tacit cooperation between CHP, İYİP, and HDP took place because of the increasing authoritarian rule of the Erdoğan government. The opposition parties had the common objective to return to the parliamentary system and restore the democratic regime. Below I illustrate salient policy positions of the parties, and their positions on the ideological space between 2002 and 2023.

⁶⁶⁵ Erdoğan's statement on August 11, 2015: <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/437638/erdogan-buzdolabina-kaldirdigi-cozum-sureci-icin-sonlandiran-biz-olmadik-dedi>


⁶⁶⁶ Bahçeli's statement on December 1, 2015: <https://www.diken.com.tr/bahceli-isim-vermedi-itham-etti-adaylardan-biri-gulen-hareketinin-siyasi-figuru>

Table 27: Parties' salient policy positions 2002-2023

Party	Salient Policy
AKP	<p>(2002-2023)</p> <p>Neoliberal development with clientelist social policies</p> <p>Support for headscarf in public, religious vocational schools, religious orders for democratization</p> <p>(2002-2015)</p> <p>Kurdish question as not fully a terror problem & limited pluralism in identity rights</p> <p>Pro-western foreign policy</p> <p>Secular-nationalist bureaucracy as a tutelage over democracy</p> <p>(2015-2023)</p> <p>Concentration of power as effective government</p> <p>Kurdish question as a security and terror problem</p> <p>Western-critic within the Western bloc in foreign policy</p> <p>Conservatism in women's rights & anti-LGBT</p>
CHP	<p>(2002-2023)</p> <p>Pro-market economy with anti-clientelist social policies</p> <p>(2002-2010)</p> <p>Headscarf issue, religious vocational schools, religious orders as potential religious-conservative authoritarianism</p> <p>Kurdish question as a security and terror problem & limited pluralism</p> <p>Western-critic within the Western bloc in foreign policy</p> <p>(2015-2023)</p> <p>Concentration of power as autocratization</p> <p>Pro-liberal democracy and separation of powers</p> <p>Headscarf issue as freedom</p> <p>Kurdish question as not fully a terror problem & limited pluralism in identity rights</p>
HDP	<p>(2002-2023)</p> <p>Pro-Kurdish rights, pro-multi-ethnic regime, liberal rights against securitization of the Kurdish Question</p> <p>PKK as not terror but a reaction to violent and forced ethnic amalgamation</p> <p>Economic left</p> <p>Headscarf issue as freedom</p> <p>(2002-2011)</p>

	<p>Secular-nationalist bureaucracy as a tutelage over democracy (2015-2023) Concentration of power as autocratization Pro-liberal democracy and separation of power</p>
MHP	<p>(2002-2023) Headscarf issue as freedom Monoethnic status-quo Kurdish question as a security and terror problem Emphasis on Turkicness and the Turkic world Western-critic within the Western bloc in foreign policy (2002-2015) Concentration of power as autocratization (2015-2023) Concentration of power as effective government</p>
İYİP	<p>(2017-2023) Concentration of power as autocratization Pro-liberal democracy and separation of power Kurdish question as a security and terror problem Emphasis on Turkicness and the Turkic world Monoethnic status-quo Pro-market economy with anti-clientelist social policies</p>

Cleavages and Party System (2002-2023)
 -Polarized multi-party system, with a predominant AKP



4 CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES IN TURKEY BETWEEN 1950 AND PRESENT

4.1 Left and Right Division

I argued in the first chapter that the one-dimensional left-right (centre-periphery) political scale, which is the most common approach to explain the Turkish party system, is insufficient to explain the ideological positions of the parties historically. In this section, initially, I will discuss the merits and limits of this approach with the sociological and historical data.

It was stated in the previous chapter that CHP started to embrace the “left-of-centre” label since 1965. As a response, AP and the other parties introduced themselves as right-wing. The sociological data from 1975 in Table 12 below shows that the labels caught on to a considerable extent. While 44 percent of the CHP voters positioned themselves on the left-of-centre, 48.2 percent of the AP electorate positioned themselves on the right-of-centre. The survey clusters all the other parties in one category as “small parties”. 44.9 percent of this group position themselves in the right of centre. The subsequent Table 13 shows that approximately 90 percent of the respondents who position themselves on the right-of-centre choose either AP or the other small parties whereas 93.7 percent of the of the respondents who position themselves on the left-of-centre choose CHP. Finally, 31.3 percent and 55 percent of the centrist respondents choose AP and CHP respectively. These together imply that, the primary division in Turkish party system in the 70s regarding the relevant parties can be summarized as “CHP and the rest”. In other words, MSP and MHP, the two other relevant parties that do not appear on the survey, also situate on the right sociologically. But subsequent analysis distinguishes MSP and the Islamic lineage from the rest.

Table 28: 1975 - Left-right scale self-positioning (within parties) I in Ergüder (ER)⁶⁶⁷

	AP	CHP	Small parties
Right of centre	48.2	5.6	44.9
Centre	23.6	30.2	25
Left of Centre	1.8	44	5.4
No idea	26.4	20.2	24.7
Total	100	100	100

⁶⁶⁷ Üstün Ergüder, “Türkiye’de Değişen Seçmen Davranışları Örüntüleri,” in *Türkiye’de Politik Değişim ve Modernleşme*, ed. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, 1st Ed. (İstanbul: Alfa Akademi, 2000), 285–308., 298

Table 29: 1975: Left-right scale self-positioning (within categories) II (ER)⁶⁶⁸

	Right of centre	Centre	Left of Centre	No idea
AP	64.9	31.3	2.9	41
CHP	10.3	55	93.7	43.2
Small parties	24.8	13.7	3.4	11
Total	100	100	100	100

The chart below shows the average value of the electorate of each party for the self-positioning themselves on the 1-to-10 left-right scale between 1990 and 2018. Overall, the weight is historically on the right-wing. The historical division between CHP/SHP (and DSP) and the rest, and its stability, is seen on the chart. The pro-Kurdish party lineage appears as the leftmost party and as the closest party to CHP. Nonetheless, I will show below that, this illustration which shows CHP and HDP very close to each other is deceptive. On the other hand, it implies that both electorates distinguish themselves from the right-wing label, albeit for different reasons. RP electorate until 2002, AKP electorate since 2002, and MHP electorate since 1996 appear as the rightmost ones. ANAP appears as the party that is closest to the centre among the right-wingers. The average score of the DYP electorate move from centre to the right between 1990 and 1996. Considering the proximity between the constituencies, this result is consistent with the fact that DYP was the only party that had a coalition with the anti-systemic RP in the 90s. IYIP electorate appears as the most centrist in the late 2010s.

⁶⁶⁸ Erguder, 298.




Figure 15: Self-positioning on the left-right scale 1990 - 2018 (1=Leftmost; 10=Rightmost)

The one-dimensional left-right scale has a merit to explain the durable “CHP and the rest” division historically in the Turkish party system. On the other hand, I will show through demographical and ideological data below that its explanatory power is limited for two reasons. Firstly, the “left-right” division has only a nominal value as a durable signifier of divisions in the party system. This means that the content of what these labels mean sociologically change over time. Secondly, I will show that the visual proximity of the pro-Kurdish parties and the “left-of-centre” is deceptive.

4.2 Demographical and Ideological Sources of Party Choice in the 60s and 70s

Different surveys from 1975 show that party choice by settlement shows different patterns for parties. Based on the answers of the respondents, CHP receives significantly higher support from the urban centres than slums, small city and towns, and villages. AP, on the other hand, is most popular among the respondents living in villages and least popular among the people living in the urban areas. MHP and MSP are more popular in the slums and small city and towns compared to urban site and villages.

Table 30: Vote share by settlement 1975 Ankara University social research (AU)⁶⁶⁹

	Urban	Slums	Small city and town	Village
CHP	65.1	50.5	47.2	47.1
AP	16.3	18.7	22.5	27.6
DP	0.8	1.3	3.4	1.4
MSP	0.6	4.9	4.5	3.2
MHP	1.7	3.9	6.7	3.2
TBP	0	2	2.2	0
None	4.7	2.6	1.1	1.4
Undecided	9.3	16.1	12.4	15.8
Total	98.5	100	100	99.7

The findings below show that CHP steadily increased its popularity among the respondents living in slums between 1965 and 1975. Simultaneously AP's popularity declined in slums in this period. CHP's increasing popularity between 1973 and 1975 were highest in urban space and slums, and lowest in small towns. This implies that Ecevit's economic populism in this period managed to forge a relative alliance between the urban middle classes, urban poor, and to a lesser extent, peasants. It will be shown below that this conclusion is supported by the data about party choice by occupation.

Table 31: Slums (party preference within the respondents living in slums) (AU)

	1965	1969	1973	1975
AP	52.5	43.4	21	18.7
CHP	28.8	30.1	40.7	50.5
MHP	1.7	3.4	1.6	3.9
BP/TBP		8.4	2	2
MSP			5.2	4.9
DP			2.6	1.3
TIP	3.5	1.7		

⁶⁶⁹ Ankara University social research 1975

Table 32: CHP - change of vote share by settlement type (AU)

	1973	1975	Change 73-75
Urban	51.2	65.1	13.9
Slum	40.7	50.5	9.8
Small town	43.8	47.2	3.4
Village	40.7	47.1	6.4
Average	44	52	8

The three tables below show the party choice by occupation. The Ankara University social research (AU) is conducted within the Ankara region where the urban area is larger than Turkey's average. Therefore, the sums cannot be generalized to Turkey. Nonetheless, comparative results between parties are noteworthy. CHP is relatively popular among the students, civil servants, industrial workers, and unemployed. CHP's popularity increases from 1973 to 1975 in all occupation groups except the small farmers and the retired people. But the relative increase is especially remarkable for the students, unemployed and the industrial workers. AP, on the other hand, is relatively popular among the businessmen and farmers category. Moreover, while AP has a decline almost in every occupation category between 1973 and 1975, it gets more popular among farmers and businessmen. These together indicate that CHP's anti-systemic/economic populist discourse attracted students, industrial workers and unemployed while it was perceived as a threat to businessmen. The fourth table below which covers the period between 1969 and 1975 shows that the popularity of CHP among the industrial workers started to increase since the 60s. The relatively stable support of civil servants to CHP and of farmers to AP show the persistency of loyalties of these groups despite the changing discourse and ideology of the parties.

Regarding the smaller parties, MHP's popularity among the students is very significant. This shows that MHP's strict anti-leftist discourse and violent struggle against the left made the party more popular among the right-wing students compared to the other anti-left parties.

Table 33: Party choice by occupation - Ankara University social research 1975 (AU)

	Worker in agriculture	Small farmer (1-50 decare)	Medium farmer (50-200 decare)	Industrial worker	Informal sector	High rank civil servant (including doctors and lawyers)	Low rank civil servant
CHP_1975 (CHP_1973)	33.3 (16.7)	46.8 (46.8)	41 (35.9)	52.6 (35.1)	61.5 (53.8)	68.8 (57.8)	62 (50.7)
AP_1975 (AP_1973)	16.7 (33.3)	33.9 (24.2)	28.2 (25.6)	15.8 (15.8)	7.7 (7.7)	12.5 (10.9)	9.9 (11.3)
DP	0	1.6	5.1	0	0	0	2.8
MSP	0	3.2	5.1	8.8	0	1.6	2.8
MHP	16.7	1.6	0	5.3	0	0	4.2
TBP	0	0	0	1.8	7.7	1.6	2.8
None	0	1.6	2.6	1.8	0	6.3	2.8
Undecided	33.3	11.3	15.4	14	23.1	9.4	12.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 34: Party Choice by Occupation 1975 (AU)

	Shopkeeper & craftsman	Housewife	Businessman	Student	Unemployed	Retired	Worker in service sector
CHP_1975 (CHP_1973)	49.3 (37.3)	50.4 (44.6)	35.3 (29.4)	69.2 (23.1)	60 (25)	44.9 (46.9)	52.2 (42)
AP_1975 (AP_1973)	22.4 (31.3)	23.7 (25.8)	47.1 (35.3)	0 (0)	5 (10)	24.5 (28.6)	21.7 (27.5)
DP	1.5	1.7	0	0	0	2	0
MSP	4.5	2.5	0	0	10	4.1	2.9
MHP	4.5	2.5	5.9	23.1	5	4.1	5.8
TBP	1.5	0.4	0	0	0	2	0
None	3	2.1	0	7.7	5	6.1	2.9
Undecided	13.4	16.7	11.9	0	15	12.2	14.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 35: Party Choice by Occupation 1975; Ergüder 1975 (ER)

	Civil Servant	Farmers	Workers	Shopkeeper & Craftsman	Housewife	Other (inc. businessmen)
AP	10.6	47.6	21.2	37.2	38.4	35.3
CHP	71.8	36.8	67.1	43.1	44.1	48.5
Small Parties	17.6	15.8	11.7	19.7	12.5	16.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 36: Industrial Workers 1975 (AU)

	1969 (party choice)	1973 (voted for)	1975 (planning to vote)
AP	28	16	16
CHP	25	35.1	52.6
MHP	4	7	5.5

Religiosity is another factor that is associated with the patterns of party choice. Among the people who do not pray regularly, CHP seems significantly popular. Small parties, on the other hand, are significantly popular among the group that practice religion most frequently. It can be expected that this finding stems from the impact of MSP, the third biggest party of the 70s. As argued in the previous chapter, MSP appealed to the Islamic discourse remarkably and suggested authoritarian traditionalist/Islamic policies. AP is also relatively more popular among people who pray very frequently. Apart from these two categories, people who pray on Fridays and on Ramadan seem distributed among the parties proportional to their general popularity.

Table 37: Party Choice by religion (prayer frequency) 1975 (ER)

	Everyday	Every Friday	Only on Ramadan	Occasionally
AP	43.7	34.2	39.7	28.8
CHP	37.5	52.8	52.9	81.0
Small parties	18.8	13.2	7.4	10.4
Total	100	100	100	100

Language, as a proxy of ethnicity, is another factor that is associated with the patterns of party choice. The table below gives the results of the question that ask the respondents the languages they speak. The “Middle Eastern” languages can be expected to represent Kurdish and Arabic. The “other” category should represent Balkan languages such as Albanian and Bosnian people, and languages of the various Caucasian groups such as Circassians, Georgians etc. CHP is more popular among both groups compared to the popularity of the party among the “only Turkish” speakers.

Table 38: Party choice by language(s) spoken 1975 (ER)

	Only Turkish	Turkish and a "Middle Eastern" language	Other
AP	40.0	23.0	22.2
CHP	46.2	63.1	61.2
Small parties	13.8	13.9	16.5
Total	100	100	100

An overview of the specific reasons for party choice shows the niche character of MHP and MSP in the 70s. 88.9 percent of the respondents who support MSP features the reason that MSP is “respectful to religion”. 67.9 percent of the respondents who choose MHP select the party because of its nationalism. On the other hand, the reasons to choose CHP and AP is more varied. Foreign policy, economic policy, and respect to liberal rights are the prominent reasons to choose CHP. The reason why foreign policy comes first is related to the successful military operation to Cyprus during the CHP – MSP government in 1974. CHP respondents differ from the others to rank lowest in “respect to religion” and highest in “respect to liberal rights” as the reasons of party choice. First three reasons to choose AP are economic policy, nationalism, and respect to religion.

Table 39: Reasons of voting within party supporters – 1975 (AU)

	CHP	AP	DP	MSP	MHP
Economic policy	28.9	30.7	18.2	0	7.1
Respect to religion	1.2	19.3	27.3	88.9	10.7
Nationalist	5.3	21.1	36.4	3.7	67.9
Foreign policy	30.1	4.2	9.1	0	7.1
Respect to liberal rights	21.6	3.6	0	3.7	3.6
Party loyalty/ Other/ Don't know	12	20.4	9.1	3.7	3.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Concerning the second favourite party of the respondents, the AP base appears to be the most diverse one. 19.9 percent of the respondents choose CGP as the second preferred party, 16.9 percent choose CHP, 13.9 percent choose MSP, 8.4 percent choose DP, and 7.8 percent choose MHP. This shows that the base of the party is composed of different social groups with different priorities such as anti-leftism and religion. This diversity also sheds light on AP's successful formula that articulated anti-leftism and religious nativism during the 70s. The supporters of MSP, MHP and DP choose AP as the second favourite party by far. The rates for the supporters of each party are 40.7, 32.1, and 27.3 respectively. 44.7 percent of the CHP supporters indicate that they do not have a second favourite party. This is the highest number for not indicating a second favourite party between all parties. This indicates that most of the CHP supporters think that their party does not have an alternative. 15 percent of the CHP supporters choose TBP as the second favourite party. TBP is a pro-Alevi party led Alevi leaders. Alevi supporters of CHP can be expected to be high among this 15 percent. 9.5 percent of CHP supporters indicate AP as the second favourite party.

Table 40: Second party choice – 1975 (AU)

	CHP	AP	DP	MSP	MHP	TBP
CHP	0.7	16.9	18.2	3.7	7.1	25
AP	9.5	0	27.3	40.7	32.1	12.5
DP	8	8.4	0	7.4	10.7	37.5
MSP	1.5	13.9	9.1	0	7.1	0
CGP	1.2	19.9	0	7.4	3.6	0
MHP	2.4	7.8	0	14.8	0	12.5
TBP	15	0.6	0	0	0	0
TSİP	1.2	0	0	0	0	0
TİP	1.5	0	0	0	0	12.5
SP	0.2	0	0	0	0	0
None	44.7	17.5	27.3	14.8	32.1	0
Undecided	1.2	0	9.1	0	0	0
Don't know	12.9	15.1	9.1	11.1	7.1	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

The tables below show the volatility between parties in the 60s and 70s. The bulk of the excessive support of CHP comes from the people who had voted for AP and TİP before. DP's excessive

votes also comes mostly from AP. CGP's vote share is composed of former CHP electorate and, to a lesser extent, former AP electorate. MSP received most of its new votes from former AP electorate.

Table 41: CHP: Sources of the 10 percent increase in vote share between 1969-1973 (EPO 1973)

AP	TİP	GP	MP	TBP	Indep.	Other	None	No ans.
45.9	17.4	3.5	1.9	0.4	0.4	14.3	13.5	1.5

Table 42: DP: Sources of the 6.7 percent increase in vote share between 1969-1973 (EPO 1973)

AP	CHP	GP	MP	YTP	Indep.	None	Other
45.9	17.4	3.5	1.9	0.4	0.4	14.3	13.5

Table 43: CGP: Sources of the increase in the vote share between 1969-1973 (EPO 1973)

CHP	AP	MP	Don't know	Other
60.2	28.8	4.1	1.4	5.5

Table 44: MSP: Sources of the increase in the vote share between 1969-1973 (EPO)

AP	CHP	MP	YTP	MNP	Indep.	Other
65.1	7.6	1.9	0.9	0.9	17	6.6

4.3 Demographical and Ideological Sources of Party Choice in the 80s – The Transition Period

The party system was disrupted after the 1980 coup. As stated in the previous chapter that the military allowed only three parties to compete in the 1983 elections. The table below shows that ANAP managed to attract big blocks of supporters of AP, CHP, MSP and MHP at the same time. 75.8 percent of MSP supporters, 70.4 percent of AP supporters, 47.3 percent of MHP supporters and 34.9 percent of the CHP supporters shifted to ANAP after the coup. HP, as the heir of CHP of the 70s, could receive only very small portions from the AP, MSP, and MHP supporters of the 70s. MDP also received the bulk of its votes from the electorate of these three parties. MHP supporters' first preference was MDP. This shows that the strong anti-left discourse of the party

and the embracement of the coup against the “anarchy” attracted the MHP supporters more than other parties could do. In sum, the main division in the party system, “CHP and the rest”, continued to certain extent after the 80s with a difference that a considerable portion of CHP voters (34.9 percent) de-aligned from CHP in favour of ANAP.

Table 45: Shift of Votes from the parties of the 70s 1984 - PİAR

	AP	CHP	MSP	MHP
MDP_83	26.1	8.3	21.2	52.7
HP_83	3.5	56.8	3	0
ANAP_83	70.4	34.9	75.8	47.3
SUM	100	100	100	100

Table 46: Shift of votes to the parties in the 80s 1984 - PİAR

	MDP_83	HP_83	ANAP_83
AP	52.1	4.3	49.9
CHP	19.3	82.1	29
MSP	8.1	0.8	10.3
MHP	11.2	0	3.5
Other/unknown	9.3	11.8	7.3
	100	100	100

Party choice by occupation provides a better information about the societal groups that de-aligned from and stayed loyal to CHP/HP. HP receives significantly higher support from three social groups in comparison to the rest despite the declining vote share compared to CHP of the 70s. These are the white collar (civil servant, artists, teachers, academics), self-employed, and workers. The loyalty of the white collar is also visible in the subsequent table that reveals party choice by education. HP is remarkably popular among the people who have higher education (high school or above) compared to other categories. However, HP’s popularity among the peasants is significantly low. This group overwhelmingly supports ANAP (80 percent of the peasants). As shown above, CHP had always been less popular among the people living in rural areas. Nonetheless, the 10 percent share in this group in 1984 is remarkably disproportional. The third

table below, which shows the low popularity of HP in the villages and small towns in comparison to urban centre and urban periphery (slums), supports this finding. ANAP's increasing popularity among the workers and civil servants is remarkable in comparison to AP's relatively low popularity among these groups in the 70s. This explains the sources of shift of votes from CHP to ANAP between the 1977 and the 1983 elections. MDP is relatively popular among the retired group, and also among the older generations (the last table below). This points at the fact that the salient pro-security and anti-left discourse of the party, and the embracement of the coup addressed the older generations who is expected to seek for order and security more than other groups.

Table 47: Party choice by occupation 1984 - PİAR

	ANAP	HP	MDP	Total
Housewife	56	21.7	22.3	100
Retired	42.9	23	34.1	100
Businessmen	64.5	12.2	23.2	100
Civil servant	50.4	39.2	10.4	100
Worker	46.1	42.5	11.4	100
Peasant	80	10	10	100
Self-employed	48	44	8	100
Artists	25	62.5	12.5	100
Teachers & Academics	41.3	43.5	15.2	100
Average	50.5	33.2	16.3	100

Table 48: Party choice by education 1984 - PİAR

	ANAP	HP	MDP	Total
Primary school grad	52.9	24.9	22.2	100
Secondary school grad	53	29.6	17.4	100
Higher education	43.3	40.4	16.3	100
Average	49.7	31.6	18.6	100

Table 49: Party choice by settlement 1984 - PİAR

	ANAP	HP	MDP	Total
Urban centre	49.3	30.5	20.2	100
Urban periphery & slums	59.3	28.8	11.9	100
Villages and small towns	60	20	20	100

Table 50: Party choice by age 1984 - PİAR

	ANAP	HP	MDP	Total
21-30	48	40	12	100
31-40	54.9	27.7	17.4	100
41-50	53.9	25.1	21	100
51-60	51	14	35	100
61+	51.4	21.6	27	100

As stated in the previous chapter, the leaders who had been banned from politics by the junta in 1980 returned to politics after 1986 and founded new parties. The survey data below point at certain patterns of realignments between 1983 and 1990. It appears that SHP is relatively more popular among the civil servant, private sector employee, and self-employee categories. This finding implies that the bulk of white collar, which partly de-aligned from CHP after the coup, re-aligned with the party again. The total share of workers' support to SHP and DSP (46 percent), the two successors of the CHP of the 70s, is also slightly above the total share of overall support these parties receive (40 percent). This shows that this party lineage is still popular among the workers, nonetheless, it could not reach the level of support of the 70s among them. SHP and DSP are still relatively less popular among the peasants. This finding was also supported by the data that shows the relatively low popularity among the respondents who live in the rural area. On the other hand, the dramatic decline in popularity among this group in the 1984 survey slightly reversed. It was revealed in the previous chapter that both DYP and SHP criticized the strict neoliberal politics of ANAP and promised to subsidize the farmers. DYP's relatively high popularity among the people living in rural areas show that the promises of the party successfully appealed to the farmers in the end of the 80s.

Table 51: Party choice 1990 - KONDA

DYP	SHP	ANAP	DSP	RP	DMP	MÇP	IDP	None	Total
28.4	28.4	14.5	12.3	5.2	4.4	3.9	2.1	0.8	100

Table 52: Party choice by occupation - 1990 - KONDA

	DYP	SHP	ANAP	DSP	Other	Total
Civil servant	16.4	41.8	12.3	10.6	18.9	100
Private sector employee	18	42	2	20	18	100
Self-employed	6.9	51.7	6.9	3.4	31.1	100
Businessmen	20	31.4	11.4	17.1	20.1	100
Worker	29.8	29.8	10.4	16.4	13.6	100
Shopkeeper/craftsman	29.5	23.4	13	13.4	20.7	100
Farmer / Worker in farm	38.8	23.6	10.9	10.3	16.3	100
Other	20.6	37.9	15.5	10.3	15.7	100

Table 53: Party choice by Settlement - 1990 - KONDA

	DYP	SHP	ANAP	DSP	Other	Total
Urban	23.1	30.5	14.5	14.1	17.8	100
Rural	33.1	26.5	14.5	10.7	15.2	100

4.4 Demographical and Ideological Sources of Party Choice between 1990 and 2023 – Combined Data

This section examines the demographics and values of the supporters of each relevant party in the Turkish party system longitudinally between 1990 and 2018 based on the combined data from the World Values Survey.

The first three tables below show the ratios of workers (skilled and unskilled), white collar, and farmers within each party. Workers constitute a significant share of respondents who support DSP (40 percent) and a low share of ANAP supporters (15 percent). Starting from 1996, the parties get rather similar shares of workers within their constituency. This implies that workers as a category of social cleavage that structures the party system disappears gradually since the 90s.

The white-collar respondents constitute an important share of CHP's electorate steadily between 1990 and 2018. Except IYIP in 2018, no other parties have a higher share of white-collar respondents within its supporters than that of CHP. The difference between the parties on this category is especially remarkable in the 2000s. The share of white collars in all other parties started to rise in the 2010s. This also reflects the structural changes in the Turkish economy where the

number of white collars increased in the 2010s. 38 percent and 33 percent of IYIP and CHP electorate respectively are white collar in 2018.

An important share of DYP’s respondents is composed of farmers in the 90s. On the other hand, this group constitutes a small part of the CHP and DSP’s whole electorate. The share of farmers is highest within the AKP’s electorate compared to other parties after 2000. Nonetheless, the share of this group in all parties declines steadily in this period. This is also related to the overall decline of the share of agriculture in Turkish economy.




Figure 16: Workers (skilled + unskilled) % within parties – World Values Survey 1990-2018




Figure 17: White collar % within parties - World Values Survey 1990-2018




Figure 18: Farmer % within parties - World Values Survey 1990-2018

The share of lower income group in each party is relatively close in the 90s. But the share of this group increases within DYP and RP in this period. It is highest within the electorate of the parties of the pro-Kurdish lineage, and second highest within the AKP electorate after HDP since the 2000s. However, except HDP, the share of this group within all parties gets closer to each other in the 2000s.

The share of high-income group is similar within the electorate of each party in the 1990 survey. Then the share of this group declines within RP in the mid-90s. Contrary to this, it increases within ANAP, CHP, and DSP. The relatively high share of this group within CHP steadily continues until 2018 when the shares of this group within parties except HDP get closer to each other. The association between the income level and party choice is similar for the education. The share of respondents with relatively high education is higher within the CHP electorate than most of the parties steadily since the 1990s. The high-educated group is highest within the IYIP electorate in 2018 as in the case of white-collar group.




Figure 19: Low income % within parties - World Values Survey 1990-2018




Figure 20: High income % within parties – World Values Survey




Figure 21: Secondary or higher-level education % within parties - World Values Survey




Figure 22: Primary education diploma or lower literacy % within parties - World Values Survey

Regarding religiosity, I examine the prayer frequency of the respondents. For that I clustered respondents who pray at least once a month or more (once a week and everyday) as an indicator of high religiosity. This group constitutes a significant share of respondents who support RP in the 90s (65 percent). The high shares of religious people within the DYP and MHP voters are also remarkable in the 90s. On the other hand, respondents who pray frequently are relatively low within the constituencies of CHP, ANAP, and DSP in the 90s. The religious respondents constitute low share of the CHP constituency regularly between 1990 and 2018. On the other hand, religious people constitute the majority of AKP's constituency after 2001. The shares of this group within other parties are arrayed between the shares of the group within AKP on the highest end and CHP on the lowest end.

The second graph below examines the relationship between the traditional gender roles and party choice. The indicator that I use asks the respondent if s/he thinks that "university education is more important for a boy than a girl". The people who believe that men and women have different roles in the society, and that university education and public life suit men more than women is expected to agree with this statement. The share of the supporters who agree with this statement is highest within MHP and RP electorates and lowest in CHP and DSP electorates in the 90s. The share continues to be lowest among the CHP supporters throughout the 2000s. However, the numbers get close to each other in the 2010s. The share is lowest within IYIP's electorate in 2018.

The third graph below shows the average score of each party's electorate on the justifiability of divorce. The patterns seem similar to the question about university education for women and men. The average score who agrees with the statement that divorce is justifiable is highest for the DSP and CHP electorate in the 90s and lowest for the RP electorate. CHP electorate has the highest average until 2018. Only the constituency of IYIP scores higher than that of CHP in 2018. The electorate of AKP is rather on the low end longitudinally. The average scores of the electorates of HDP and MHP fluctuate over time. However, HDP gets closer to the higher end while MHP gets closer to the lower end in the end of the 2010s.

The positions of the electorate of different parties regarding these values and religiosity show similarity with their positions in occupation (e.g.,white collar) and education.




Figure 23: Party Choice by Prayer Frequency (Prays once a month or more) - World Values Survey




Figure 24: Gender Roles - % who thinks "university education is more important for a boy" within parties – World Values Survey




Figure 25: Average of each party's electorate on the justifiability of divorce – World Values Survey

Although it is not possible to check party choice by ethnicity through WVS data, the question that measures “how proud of the nation the respondent is” reveals the difference between the pro-Kurdish HDP electorate and the rest. The table below shows that the share of respondents that are very proud of the nation within each party is similar. The average score for national pride for HDP supporters is distinctively lower than the other parties. This implies that the sense of belongingness to the Turkish nation among HDP supporters, which are expected to be overwhelmingly Kurdish, are relatively and distinctively low.




Figure 26: % of pride of the nation – World Values Survey

Regarding the views on economy, I examined if there are values that distinguish the constituencies of the parties from each other over four questions. The items examined concern one’s view on the ownership of business and industry (state or private), on the benefit of income equality or difference, competition, and on the role of state/individual in provisions. These distinctions are commonly associated in the literature with the economic left wing and right-wing values, and measure if a person values the importance of solidaristic economy or individualistic economy. Between these four items investigated, there is only a (limited) pattern concerning the electorate who support income equality and party choice. The averages of CHP and DSP electorates rather

support income equality in the 90s. This shows that the legacy of the left-wing ideology of the parties is still partly effective in the 90s. However, CHP electorate does not differ from the other parties in the 2000s. Only HDP electorate seem more egalitarian in average steadily since 2001. It should be noted that the low-income group has the highest share within HDP electorate compared to the other parties. Apart from the limited pattern regarding the income equality statement, there is not an association between the economic views and party constituencies. This shows that the views on economy is not a salient ideological element that structures the divisions in the party system at least since 2000s.




Figure 27: Average score within parties - income equality (1) vs income differences (10)

4.5 Discussion of the Findings

In this chapter, I analysed the historical trajectory of the social bases of the parties to reveal the sociological continuities and ruptures in the Turkish party system. The results show that one important continuity all throughout the history of competitive politics is the alignment between the urban middle classes with relatively high education, liberal/secular values and the lineage of CHP (SHP/CHP and DSP after 1983). ANAP in the 90s, and IYIP after 2017 also situate in this social cleavage. On the other side of the axis, the important historical continuity is the alignment

between the rural population with relatively low education and with conservative/religious values and the AP, MSP, and MHP of the 60s and 70s, ANAP of the 80s, and AKP of the 2000s and 2010s. The rural cleavage is rather fragmented in the 90s due to the fragmented party system, nevertheless DYP's alignment with this group is salient in this period. It should be noted that these alignments are in relative terms and that all the parties show the characteristics of the "catch-all-party" type since the transition to competitive politics in 1950. This means that the party lineages that have a consistent alignment with either urban middle classes or rural classes also appeals to and receives considerable amount of support from the other social group.

The second important historical finding concerns the alignment and dealignment processes of the CHP lineage with the urban lower classes. It was demonstrated above that CHP started to articulate remarkably the blue collar and the people living in the urban periphery/slums to its base after 1965 when the party embraced an economic populist and anti-systemic discourse. Especially during the leadership of Bulent Ecevit in the 70s, CHP forged an alliance in the urban site between the white collar and the blue collar, and between the urban centre and the urban periphery. It was shown that the party also grew, albeit to a limited extent, among the rural classes in this period. The process of dealignment of the blue collar from the CHP lineage started slightly in the 80s and continued in the 90s. As of 2000s, the blue-collar support ceased to be a distinguishing feature for any party. In parallel to this process, an association between the group of low-income, low literacy with religious/conservative values and party choice emerged. The share of these groups within the DYP and RP electorate in the 90s, and within the AKP electorate in the 2000s and 2010s are salient. This points at the fact that AKP forged an alliance between rural classes and urban lower classes as the previous party system collapsed in 2002 along with the collapse of DYP and RP. It should be noted that the rise of the new cleavage voting of the urban lower classes and the decline of the old type blue-collar cleavage voting is simultaneous. This points at the emergence of the new 'underclass' or the urban poor of the neoliberal period and its alignment with AKP as the old organized working-class declines.

The third important process of historical alignment and dealignments concerns ethnic voting. It was demonstrated above that the share of non-Turkish ethnic groups within the CHP base was remarkably higher than those of the other parties in the 70s. Yet, the ethnicity was not a politicized topic in the legal political scene then. The foundation of HEP in 1990 marked both the emergence of the Kurdish cleavage in the legal politics and the dealignment of the Kurds from CHP. The pro-Kurdish party lineage managed to institutionalize and found a new party each time the constitutional court banned one since the 90s.

The fourth important pattern concerns the alignment of Alevi with CHP. Although there is no historical survey data regarding the Alevi voting, researchers showed that Alevi people aligned with CHP in the 1960s and stayed on the secular and/or left-wing lane.⁶⁷⁰

These findings show that, although there are certain sociological continuities, the Turkish party system cannot be reduced to a durable one-dimensional centre-periphery division where the former represent the “elite” and the latter represent the “popular classes”. The historical trajectory is intricate regarding the articulation of different sub-groups in the changing political projects of the parties.

The table below summarizes the historical trajectory of significant alignment, de-alignment and re-alignment processes based on nine demographical and ideological categories which have been discussed throughout this chapter. The table reveals which parties forge alliances between which social groups for each period. The label “balance” indicates that the category does not constitute a distinct base for any party for that period. The label “N/A” means that the category is not a matter of politics for the period. The label “?” means that there is no data from the period that I could reach. The periods are divided roughly as decades. The real cut-offs are obviously more nuanced. It should be noted that more precise knowledge such as the internal divisions within rural classes can be obtained only through more comprehensive and sophisticated data.

⁶⁷⁰ Ertan, 2021, *Aleviliğin Politikleşme Süreci*, p.59-72

Table 54: Distinctive party by voting according to demographical and/or value cleavages

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Urban middle classes	?	CHP	CHP, CGP	Balance	Balance	CHP	CHP, IYIP
Urban lower classes	?	AP	CHP	Balance	Balance	AKP	AKP
Rural classes	?	AP, MSP, MHP	Balance	ANAP	DYP	AKP	AKP
Secular-liberal values + Alevi (Sunni) religious-conservative values	?	CHP	CHP, CGP, TBP	Balance	Balance	CHP	CHP
(Sunni) religious-conservative values	?	AP, MSP, MHP	AP, DemP, MSP, MHP	ANAP, MDP	DYP, RP	AKP	AKP
Non-Turkish ethnic vote (not in the party system until 1990)	?	?	CHP	Balance	HEP-HDP	HEP-HDP	HEP-HDP
Turkish ethnic vote (not politicized until 1990)	?	?	Balance	Balance	MHP	MHP	MHP, IYIP
Economic left-wing values	?	N/A	CHP, TIP, BP	SHP	SHP/CHP, DSP	N/A	N/A
Anti-“communism” values	?	N/A	AP, MHP, CGP, MSP	ANAP, MDP	N/A	N/A	N/A

5 CONCLUSION

The dominant approach in the literature of party systems describes the history of multiparty politics in Turkey since 1950 as a stable, unidimensional and a cultural struggle of a centre and a periphery. According to this theory, the secular, nationalist, bureaucratic, elite forces, and their parties, as the followers of the state and nation-building ideology, constitute the centre. On the other hand, the Islamic, Kurdish, pro-democratic, popular forces, and their parties, as the dissidents of the founding ideology, constitute the periphery. The interventions of military and bureaucracy in politics is perceived in this narrative as restoration projects of the centrist ideology against the popular and democratic advancements of the periphery. This literature sought for the causes of this peculiar setting of the Turkish political system in the Ottoman Empire. It was argued that the dominant conflict in the Ottoman Empire was between the despotic state and peasants. In contrast to the European cases of feudality where there were intermediate classes between the peasants and the emperor such as the nobility, it is argued that the state had a direct relationship with, and therefore pressure over, the peasants through its personnel. This disconnection between the centre and periphery, and the dominance of the former over the latter determined the main social conflict in the Ottoman Empire.

Although this is a popular narrative, such cultural historical arguments concerning the socio-political change (or stability) have not been demonstrated empirically in a longitudinal study. This study aimed to address this gap critically by describing and explaining the long history of the formation and evolution of the cleavage and party system structures in Turkey, and of political divisions and change overall with historical empirical data.

The second chapter focused on the cultural and economic legacies that precedes and shapes the structure of party system in the multiparty period. These legacies concern the traditional period of the Ottoman Empire, and the subsequent Ottoman-Turkish modernization since the end of the 18th century.

The third chapter of the study revealed major socio-economic, socio-cultural, and political/institutional developments that affect the formation of the party systems for each period since 1950. After I introduced these surrounding factors for each period, I analysed qualitatively the ideologies and politics of each relevant party for the party systems by comparing their position to each other in four main categories. For that, I analysed the relevant party manifestos of the significant parties since 1950. Similarly, I surveyed leaders' speeches and policies of the relevant parties from newspaper archives since 1950. These four policy categories were external relations,

economy, nationhood and culture, and political system and freedoms. The goal of this part of the analysis was to deduce the dimensions of the party system and to demonstrate the relative positions of the parties and their distance to each other on an ideological space.

In the fourth chapter, I analysed the sociological bases of the relatively significant parties of the party systems for each period with various indicators of demographics and value-orientations. For that, I used novel surveys that I found in the newspaper archives, old academic studies, and the World Values Survey data for the period between 1990 and 2018. The aim of this sociological research was to reveal the historical processes of alignments and de-alignments of social groups with the parties. The findings of the thesis can be summarized as follows.

Turkey transitioned to multiparty regime in 1950 as an overwhelmingly rural society with a large population of small peasantry and with basic industrial capacity which was achieved through planned economic development via import-substitution-industrialization after 1930. Since 1950, the country followed different paths of capitalist development. These are pro-agrarian market economy of the early 50s, the planned economic development model via import-substitution-industrialization of the 60s and 70s, and export-oriented neoliberal model of the post-80s. These economic structures shaped the character of class formations and class relations between different modern, modernizing, and traditional segments of the society in a continuous process of urbanization.

Regarding the cultural and economic legacy, the country went through a long process of cultural modernization in the last two centuries. Based on the laws and traditions of Islam which were practiced through the authority of the sultan, the traditional order of the Ottoman Empire organized its pluricultural society in religious communities with the principles of segmentation and hierarchy. In this hierarchical setting, the Sunni-Islam culture vis-à-vis other groups was on top. And women's public presence was minimal. The Ottoman-Turkish modernization became about transforming this Islamic, traditional, hierarchical and pluricultural order into a secular-liberal and mono-ethnic Turkish nation. The long transformation of the legal-cultural framework of the Ottoman Empire stemmed from both external and internal factors. Regarding the internal socio-economic legacy, the Ottoman Empire had relied on the tacit alliance between the central elite and provincial elite (*sipahis* in Anatolia and Balkans) to keep the peasants under control and under tax. The long social turmoil between the late 16th century and mid-17th century triggered the two-centuries long expansion of market relations, monetization, increasing upward social mobility, changing class relations, and development of centrifugal forces. This led to the development of landholding and commercial bourgeoisie in the provinces. While the centre wiped off the most

powerful ones, it cooperated with the medium ones. These provincial Muslim gentry became the internal force behind the Ottoman-Turkish modernization in the periphery and the partner of the centre. This alliance carried out the First World War and the Independence War. Their alliance determined the possibilities and limits of the republic reforms as well. This elite alliance shattered during the Second World War, and this was manifested in the political division between CHP and DP after transition to competitive politics in 1950.

The first party system between 1950 and 1960 was characterized by the opposition between the opponents and defendants of the modernization legacy and the mono-party period. The two largest parties of the party system showed the characteristics of “catch-all-party” type since the beginning. Nonetheless, they had different leanings. The opponent side, represented by the populist-conservative Democrat Party (DP), had an appeal more to the traditional and lower/rural segments of the society, and to their grievance through a populist and nativist discourse. The clientelist ties were established through the provincial elite. The party became electorally hegemonic throughout the term and conducted an illiberal rule in the absence of mechanisms of checks on the government including an independent supreme court. The heir of the secular modernization legacy, represented by Republican People’s Party (CHP), appealed more to the urban middle class. The party defended a liberal-democratic agenda against the illiberal regime. The first (two-)party system and the illiberal regime was ended by the military intervention in 1960. The constituent assembly that was formed under the military tutelage enacted a liberal-democratic constitution that brought the mechanisms of checks on the government and extended political and social liberties. These were in line with the policies and principles that the opposition parties had supported during the 50s.

The second party system that took place throughout the 60s and 70s. The power rotated between the opposing parties in this period. The party system was characterized by oppositions that I opted to summarize in two main dimensions. The first dimension is the opposition between populist-left and Islamic-McCarthyism or authoritarian anti-“communism” that coalesces with and Islamic discourse. The reason why I used the term McCarthyism for the second camp is that these parties labelled the left-leaning organizations and parties “communist” very generously and regarded them illegal. The second dimension is the opposition between pro-secular-modernization and the pro-Islamic-modernization. The first dimension emerged as the secular modernists, that is represented mainly by CHP, expanded towards the lower classes (urban working class and small peasants) in the 60s through class politics and economic-populist discourse. While the 1961 constitution gave permission, albeit limited, for class politics and left-wing unions, the import-substitution-industrialization model in economy gave rise to the organized working class to a certain extent. These created the opportunity structures for CHP’s appeal to the lower classes. As a reaction to

this popularization of the left through populism, the conservatives moved to a McCarthyist position in the conditions of the Cold War where Turkey was NATO's critical member across the Soviet border. Despite the decline in popularity, the Islamic-nativist camp continued to be more popular among the rural-traditional segments overall. On the cultural basis, it is noteworthy that Alevis' and Kurdish-speakers' remarkable alignment with the secular-left took place in this period. The second dimension of the party system was formed in the late 60s with the emergence of the Islamist lineage as a nativist, religious and socially conservative reaction to the institutions and reforms of the secular modernization. The emergence of the Islamist lineage also became possible as the liberal 1961 constitution and laws also gave permission, albeit limited, for Islamist politics. Violent clashes between independent illegal left-wing groups and right-wing groups that are affiliated to the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) highly affected the political climate of the 70s. The military intervened in politics partly in 1971 and fully in 1980. The 1980 junta banned all the parties, unions, civil society organizations; and it dissolved the parliament and thus gave an end to the party system. The constituent assembly formed a new constitution and enacted complementary legislations between 1980 and 1983. These legislations that were enacted during the junta rule were in line with the demands of the anti-communist conservatives in the 70s. They relaxed the check mechanisms on the government for the aim to have a stronger government. The left-wing movements, unions, and civil society were crushed. On the other hand, the junta positioned the army as the check mechanism vis-à-vis the government by expanding its role and jurisdiction in the bureaucracy.

The third-party system took place in the 80s under the military tutelage after the 1980 coup. An authoritarian transition to neoliberalism during the rule of neoliberal conservatives took place in the 80s while the parties, left-wing unions, and several civil society organizations of the pre-coup period were banned. On the one hand, the party competition in this period is characterized by the neoliberal conservative rule which defended the authoritarian setting of the coup and employed the policies of the neoliberal transition. The ruling Motherland Party (ANAP) aligned with the supporters of the conservative and Islamist parties of the pre-coup period. But the party also managed to attract part of the secular-left lineage as well. On the other hand, the left-wing-secular People's Party (HP) constituted the opposition and supported an agenda that was critical of the neoliberal transition and authoritarianism of the new status quo.

The fourth party system began to take shape in the 90s. On the political basis, the regime started to liberalize in 1987, and the leaders of the pre-coup period returned to politics. This led to the fragmentation of the party system. A neoliberal consensus between the historical left-wing and right-wing parties started to occur as industrialization and organized working-class decline. Thus,

the secular-left gradually dropped its populist appeal to the lower classes' grievances. This neoliberal consensus converged with a pro-secularism consensus as the anti-systemic, populist Islamist politics started to rise. Therefore, one dimension of the fragmented party system became about the opposition between the secularist parties (both the historical secular-left-wing and historical conservatives) and the Islamists while the lower classes started to align with the latter in the absence of other anti-system parties. The second dimension of the party system emerged with the rise of the pro-Kurdish party lineage which was parallel to the rise of violence between armed militants of the PKK and the Turkish state. This also marked the end of the historical alignment of Kurds with the historical secular-left. The political competition on this dimension became about both Kurdish identity rights vis-à-vis the legacy of the monoethnic Turkish nationhood structures and the issue of violence. The military intervened in politics with a memorandum in 1997. The memorandum asked the Islamist-led government to pass certain anti-Islamist laws that include the ban on headscarf in universities, declining the number of public religious-vocational schools and restricting the activities of religious orders. The series of events led to the resignation of the government and prohibition of several Islamist politicians from politics.

The fifth party system emerged in the 2000s as the polarization in the fragmented party system of the 90s between the seculars and Islamists crystallized further in two poles. The fragmentation of the historical conservative lineage caused the disappearance of this party family when the parties failed to pass the 10 percent threshold in the 2002 elections. The political polarization between the secular-left CHP and Islamist AKP was sharpened by class polarization. The Islamist-populist side aligned more with the religious/traditionalist urban and rural lower classes and the secularist side remained more with the urban, secular middle classes while the intensified neoliberal transformation and anti-agricultural policies produced higher number of urban underclasses. The stable rule of the Islamist-populist Justice and Development Party (AKP) turned the party system into a pre-dominant party system both in the 2000s and 2010s. "Democratization" has been an essential element of the party competition. AKP propagated for the elimination of the "military and bureaucratic tutelage" over "people's will" and supported the trials and purge against the members of the high bureaucracy, military and opponent civil society which were carried out by the judges affiliated to the Gulenist religious order. On the other hand, CHP regarded these as indicators of illiberalization, as the attempts to "colonize" bureaucracy and military and to eliminate the institutions of the secular republic. The second dimension in this period continued to be about the Kurdish question. The pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) and its polar opposite Nationalist Action Party (MHP) situated mainly on this dimension.

In summary, this thesis aimed to identify the political change, party systems and explain their formation and evolution in the multiparty politics of Turkey since 1950. The general conclusions can be summarized as follows. The traditional Islamic setting of the Ottoman Empire organized its pluricultural society on the principles of hierarchy and segmentation which were based on the Islamic Sharia and practiced through sultan's authority. And the subsequent Ottoman-Turkish modernization aimed to replace this traditional order with a secular-liberal and monoethnic Turkish nationhood. There emerged different kinds of reactions to the cultural modernization. The first one is the conservative lineage that was formed in the transition to multiparty politics. This lineage aimed to stop further secular-modernization, reverse some of the reforms, but overall, it did not aim to alter the founding secular institutions fundamentally. The conservative lineage always had a more economic liberal leaning compared to its secular-modernist opponent. This lineage used Islam and nativist sentiments in its authoritarian anti-left propaganda. The second one is the Islamist-traditionalist lineage that emerged in the late 60s. This party lineage objected fundamentally the institutions of the secular-modernization. The third one is the pro-Kurdish party lineage that emerged in the 90s. The parties of this lineage reacted to, inter alia, the institutions and policies of mono-ethnic Turkish nationhood.

Nonetheless, the party systems did not form and evolve as mere manifestations of cultural conflicts. Although the largest parties showed the characteristics of umbrella parties since the transition to multiparty politics, the secular-modernist side (mainly CHP) initially appealed more to the urban middle segments of the society while the conservatives appealed more to the socially conservative rural and urbanizing segments. When the liberalization for class politics and the second phase of the import-substitution-industrialization model in economy gave rise to the organized working-class movement in the 1960s, CHP started to align more with lower classes through economic-populist discourse and politics and forge an alliance between middle and lower classes. On the other hand, the conservatives moved to a McCarthyist position and to an Islamic-nativist discourse. They sought for minimization of the liberties which had been brought after the 1960 military coup. The 1980 coup crushed the left-wing unions and civil society, and also the illegal left-wing violent movements. There also occurred neoliberal transition during the rule of the neoliberal-conservatives under the authoritarian tutelage. On the one hand, this marked the beginning of the decline of industrialization and organized working class. On the other hand, it gave rise to atomized urban underclass as the migration to the cities continued. The anti-systemic, Islamist lineage started to appeal to this urban underclass in the 90s with a populist discourse as the parties of the secular-left-wing started to remain more with the group of urban secular middle classes. The rise of Islamist politics pushed the secular-left and historical conservatives towards a convergence on pro-secular

positions and neoliberal consensus. The rather socially conservative rural segments of the society and the urban poor also started to align with the Islamists in this period. The fragmented party family of the historical conservatism fell behind the 10 percent threshold after the elections in 2002 and became irrelevant for the party system. The Islamist-populist AKP absorbed mostly the electorate of the conservative party family. Thus, the polarization between the seculars and Islamists got consolidated as the minority secular middle class align more with the former and the majority conservative lower classes align more with the latter throughout the predominant rule of AKP in the 2000s and 2010.

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