Grief, Affective Politics, Affective Injustice

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Abstract

The Saturday Mothers is Turkey's longest civil disobedience movement composed of the families of the forcefully disappeared people and human rights activists. There is a considerable amount of literature on the Saturday Mothers examining the "improper" grief processes and emphasizes that the members of the group experience endless grief and also face police violence and meeting bans during their peaceful sit-in protests (Alpkaya, 1995; Karaman, 2016; Şanlı, 2018). Yet, none of the studies investigate the experiences of the Saturday Mothers within the frame of *affective injustice*. Affective injustice is a relatively new concept that has been attracting increasing attention, especially in philosophy. Its significance relies on its promise to illuminate affective aspects of oppression within the frame of injustice. Considering these, the thesis reconceptualizes affective injustice by focusing on structured oppressive affective politics to reveal the affective aspect of oppression and power hierarchies, and to use it as a conceptual tool for analyzing "improper grief" processes and sit-in protests within the context of the Saturday Mothers. By elaborating on Iris Marion Young's (1990) conceptualization of injustice, this study argues that affective injustice emerges as a result of oppressive affective politics and institutions embedded in these politics so that a group of people exercising and developing their affective capacities is inhibited or harmed. Drawing on this understanding of affective injustice, the thesis unpacks the experiences of the Saturday Mothers within the framework of affective injustice. It argues that the state's oppressive affective politics lead to the inhibition of performing proper grief rituals which is one way of exercising and developing affective capacity. Also, it claims that the Saturday Mothers experience an inhibition of expressing emotions through which affect circulates and reveals its political potential during the sit-in protests. The thesis also explores the affective aspect of the dominant discourse on the Saturday Mothers and reveals how the discourse of traditional motherhood harms the political significance of the movement. By analyzing the political transformation of mothers, the thesis emphasizes that the Saturday Mothers are not passive victims of oppression, but rather active political agents. The study contributes to the current affective injustice literature by reconceptualizing the concept and also to the literature on the Saturday Mothers by examining their experiences within the frame of affective injustice.

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of original research; it contains no materials accepted for any other degree in any other institution and no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

I further declare that the following word count for this thesis are accurate:

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Introduction

My bones and flesh are in front of the doors
life lost life lost
My God, what kind of world is this?
How shameful is this?[1]

> Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law. (United Nations, 1993, p.1)

Research Topic

Enforced disappearances are a form of state violence where they are used as a method for implementing state policies without compromising their legitimacy (Alpkaya, 1995). "Enforced disappearances are a serious problem in many countries, in all regions of the world; from Mexico to Syria, from Bangladesh to Laos, and from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Spain" (Amnesty International, n.d.). In Turkey, enforced disappearances emerged during the 1980s and peaked in the 1990s (Alpkaya, 1995). In cases of enforced disappearances, the families and the relatives of those who forcefully disappeared do not know what happens to the bodies of their loved ones. This situation leads them not to be able to grieve properly and end the grieving process, thus, living with endless grief (Şılar, 2013). In countries where enforced disappearances occur, many relatives of the disappeared, especially mothers, have come together to learn the fate of the forcefully disappeared people and to demand justice. The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, Mothers of Khavaran in Iran, and the Saturday Mothers in Turkey exemplify groups that emerged against enforced disappearances, all of which have a gendered component based on motherhood (Karaman, 2016).

In Turkey, enforced disappearances emerged during the 1980 coup-d'état as a means to suppress leftist groups and peaked in the 1990s as a response to the Kurdish armed

[1] A section of the lyrics of the song written by Sezen Aksu in 1996 for the Saturday Mothers who are the mothers of the forcefully disappeared people during the1980s and 1990s in Turkey.

movement (Alpkaya, 1995). During this process, the relatives of the disappeared encountered the lack of any serious investigation by the government and the dismissal of their demands for justice (Alpkaya, 1995). This situation led the relatives of the disappeared to weekly gather and sit at Galatasaray Square, one of the most popular locations in Istanbul, at noon and demand justice for their loved ones who forcefully disappeared; over time the sit-in protests turned out to be the longest civil disobedience movement in the history of Turkey called the Saturday Mothers[2] (Karaman, 2016). Even though they paused gathering between 1999-2009 due to increasing police attacks and were recently banned from Galatasaray Square, they have been continuing their sit-ins in front of the Human Right Association (Can, 2022). Recently, after three hundred weeks, police blockades were removed from the Galatasaray square for the thousandth week of sit-in protests on May 25th, 2024.

There is a considerable amount of literature on the Saturday Mothers examining the "improper" grief processes and emphasizes that the members of the group experience endless grief and also face police violence and meeting bans during their peaceful sit-in protests (Alpkaya, 1995; Karaman, 2016; Şanlı, 2018). Yet, none of the studies investigate the experiences of the Saturday Mothers within the frame of affective injustice. Affective injustice is a relatively new concept that has been attracting increasing attention, especially in philosophy. Its significance relies on its promise to illuminate affective aspects of oppression within the frame of injustice. Considering these, the main objective of this thesis is to reconceptualize affective injustice by focusing on structured oppressive affective politics with a view to revealing the affective aspect of oppression and power hierarchies and to use it as a conceptual tool for analyzing "improper grief" processes and sit-in protests within the context of the Saturday Mothers.

Literature Review

The concept of affective injustice was first used in two articles published in 2018, one by Amia Srinivasan and the other by Shiloh Whitney and has attracted great interest since then. Srinivasan (2018) states that members of marginalized groups such as black people experience

[2] Although the group has not only consisted of the mothers of disappeared people, it has been called the Saturday Mothers. Göral (2021) states that "According to the initial organizers, "Saturday People" was first used; feminists participating in the organization of the first sittings had insisted on this name" (p.82). In this thesis, "the Saturday Mothers" is used since one of the aims of this thesis is to discuss the transformation of mothers into political activists in relation to their loss and grief, and since I would like to emphasize and analyze how this name is a part of national discourse that grasp motherhood as an essential extension of women, I prefer to use "the Saturday Mothers".

a difficult normative conflict when "[they] must choose between getting *aptly* angry and acting prudentially" in order not to worsen the situation (p.127). She argues that those normative conflicts represent "a form of unrecognized injustice", that is, affective injustice (p.127). Srinivasan's article has a significant place in the literature as it is one of the articles that use the term affective injustice. However, Srinivasan's conceptualization of affective injustice remains limited to account for the experiences of the families and the relatives of the forcefully disappeared people in terms of their grief processes and expression of emotions since she only focuses on anger and normative conflict that marginalized people experience about their anger.

Whitney (2018) argues that gendered and racialized oppressions engender affective injustice. She states that women and racialized people generally do not get a proper *uptake* for their anger, they are treated through their characteristic features as if their anger does not have meaningful content. She states that "when my anger is unjustly refused uptake, it is not appropriately *moving* to others; it does not *affect* them as it should", and this situation leads to affective marginalization (p.495). She argues that affective marginalization leads those people to become vulnerable to affective exploitation that is to project unwanted affects to the bodies of marginalized people (p.512). Affective violence occurs when affective marginalization and affective exploitation happen simultaneously. On the one hand, Whitney's conceptualization of affective injustice illuminates the affective aspect of oppression and points out the structuredness of affective injustice. On the other hand, her reading of affect implies that there is an ideal way for affect to move to the other bodies, and as long as it does not occur in this ideal way, there emerges an affective injustice. However, what is to "*affect* them as it should" needs further explanation if there is an ideal way for affect to move, about which I have a critical stance. Without giving an account for this concern, it does not seem possible to be sure whether a case represents affective injustice engendered by oppressive structures, or if it occurs incidentally due to other factors.

Alfred Archer and Benjamin Matheson (2020) define affective injustice as "a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as an affective being" (p.8). They argue that this definition provides a broad understanding of affective injustice that also encompasses the cases of affective injustice introduced by Srinivasan (2018) and Whitney (2018). Archer and Matheson examine a case of commemorative practice where a Northern Irish athlete is forced to wear a red poppy. The athlete refuses to wear it since the red poppy's symbolic meaning enlarged through time such that it includes almost every war and bloody event the British Army

took place including Bloody Sunday[3]. By taking this example into their center, they introduce two forms of affective injustice engendered as a result of enforced emotion regulations: violation of affective rights that denotes violation of someone's right to feel and express what they feel, and emotional imperialism that denotes "a powerful group imposing aspects of its culture's emotional norms and standards on another less powerful group whilst at the same time marking out the other culture's emotional norms and standards as deviant and inferior" (p.11). Archer and Matheson offer an insightful discussion by introducing two forms of affective injustice that touch upon the significance of power hierarchies on emotion regulation. However, since what "affective capacity" signifies remains obscure in their discussion, it hardens to use their definition of affective injustice as a conceptual tool for analyzing other cases of affective injustice including the case of the Saturday Mothers.

Francisco Gallegos (2021) points out the lack of a discussion on the necessary conditions for naming a case as affective injustice in the current literature of affective injustice. Based on the theory of distributive justice, he defines affective justice as "a state in which each person has the *affective goods* they are owed", and affective injustice as "the morally objectionable deprivation of such affective goods" (p.5). He introduces two fundamental affective goods that are the core of our emotional lives: *subjective well-being* and *emotional aptness.* His framework is of importance since he gives an account for affective justice, but, first, I have some concerns about how to define subjective well-being since the concept is subject-dependent and its scope is highly wide. Second, since he applies a distributive justice frame to affective injustice, his framework does not encompass affective injustices that fall outside the distributive accounts and need structural changes such as in the case of the Saturday Mothers.

Considering all, the current literature on affective injustice remains limited to account for affective injustice that emerges as a result of oppressive affective politics that target the grief processes and expression of emotions. Therefore, this thesis redefines affective injustice and uses it as a tool for analyzing the experiences of the families and the relatives of forcefully disappeared people within the context of the Saturday Mothers. By appealing to Iris Marion Young's (1990) "Five Faces of Oppression", it is argued that affective injustice is a structured social phenomenon faced by marginalized social groups. It occurs as a result of oppressive

[3] The Bloody Sunday refers to "British Army's killing of 13 unarmed civilians, wounding a further 15, on a peaceful protest on the streets of Derry on the 30 January 1972, which was acknowledged as 'both unjustified and unjustifiable' in 2010 by the then British Prime Minister David Cameron" (Archer and Matheson, 2020, p. 1).

affective politics and institutions embedded into these politics so that a group of people exercising and developing their affective capacities are inhibited or harmed. With this grasp of affective injustice, the thesis examines the case of the Saturday Mothers by centralizing their "improper" grief processes, and sit-in protests where their expression of emotion is obstructed.

There is a rich literature exploring the grief processes, sit-in protests, and the motherhood identity of the Saturday Mothers from different perspectives. Researchers highlighted the significance of grief rituals to experience a proper grief process in which grief will end at a certain point. They showed how in the cases of enforced disappearances not knowing the fate of the bodies of disappeared people harmed these grief rituals and, as a result, prevented the families and the relatives from experiencing proper grief, thus, leaving them with endless grief (Şılar, 2013; Şanlı, 2018; Şanlı, 2020). Not knowing the fate of the disappeared people pushed the families and the relatives of the disappeared to search for them, however, they did not receive a response from the official authorities (Alpkaya, 1995; Tanrıkulu 2003), and they started sit-in protests at Galatasaray Square on Saturday at noon (Tanrıkulu 2003; Günaysu, 2013).

On the one hand, a considerable amount of research was held on the politicization of mothers through these sit-in protests. Researchers showed how mothers got politicized during their demand for justice, transformed their private emotions into a public issue, and challenged the traditional understanding of motherhood in Turkey, which is apolitical and confined to the private space, by becoming political agents of public spheres (Karaman, 2016; Şanlı, 2018, Şanlı, 2020). On the other hand, researchers pointed out that the protestors preferred to call themselves the Saturday People at the beginning of the sit-ins since they compose a heterogeneous group in terms of not being composed of mothers, however, the media called them the Saturday Mothers and the group started to be known as the Saturday Mothers over time (Tanrıkulu, 2003; Baydar and İvegen, 2006; Günaysu, 2013). Various research revealed that naming the group as the Saturday Mothers helped them to continue their protests since they are perceived as only suffering mothers rather than political agents (Tanrıkulu, 2003; Baydar and İvegen, 2006; Karaman, 2016; Can, 2022), however, this name confines the protestors of the Saturday Mothers into the discursive limits of motherhood and shifts the political content of the protests to private emotions (Baydar and İvegen, 2006; Can, 2022). Researchers also revealed that the identity of motherhood did not serve long to help the protestors continue their sit-in protests as they got national and international support as political actors against enforced disappearances (Tanrıkulu, 2003; Karaman, 2016), and the protestors were exposed to excessive police violence during their sit-ins (Tanrıkulu, 2003; Karaman,

2016; Göral, 2021; Can, 2022). The literature on the Saturday Mothers is comprehensive, yet there is no study that examines the experiences of the families and the relatives of the disappeared people within the frame of affective injustice by navigating the affective dimension embedded into the grief processes and sit-in protests.

Research Objectives and Questions

The main objective of this thesis is to reconceptualize affective injustice and use it as a theoretical tool for illuminating the experiences of the Saturday Mothers. With this aim, the thesis addresses four interrelated questions. First, it asks how to redefine affective injustice in a way to encompass a wide range of cases including the aftermaths of enforced disappearances within the context of the Saturday Mothers. Second, it asks what is to exercise and develop our affective capacity and which kinds of activities illustrate it. Third, it asks what oppressive affective politics signify. Lastly, it asks how to analyze the Saturday Mothers within the context of affective injustice. In other words, how it represents a case for affective injustice. In line with these research questions, this thesis considers affective injustice as a structured social phenomenon that some particular social groups face. It argues that affective injustice emerges as a result of oppressive affective politics and institutions embedded in these politics so that a group of people's exercising and developing their affective capacities are inhibited or harmed. To further elaborate on this grasp of affective injustice, the thesis introduces and discusses two ways of exercising and developing our affective capacity: one is to perform affective rituals such as grief rituals and the other one is to express emotions, individually or collectively, through which affect circulates. Besides, the thesis claims that oppressive affective practices refer to targeting a certain group's affective life either to suppress its political potential or as a result of other politics. Drawing on this comprehensive conceptual analysis, the thesis further argues that in the context of the Saturday Mothers, first, the state inhibits the grief processes by rendering the disappeared people *unmournable*. Second, it prevents the group from expressing their emotions through which affect circulates and reveals its political potential during the sit-ins. Lastly, by reducing the protestors' suffering mothers through the discourse of motherhood rather than taking them as political agents, the media also harms the political potential of circulation of affect such as making awareness in the public conscience and increasing the support to the Saturday Mothers. Regarding these points, this thesis reads the affective experiences of the Saturday Mothers within the frame of injustice and claims that the Saturday Mothers face a perpetrating affective injustice.

Methodology

In this thesis, primary and secondary sources are analyzed, with the majority of these studies being primary sources, through close reading and critical 'textual' engagement. Various types of studies are included in the sources such as theoretical books and articles, field research, weekly reports, and interviews. Different criteria for source selection are applied in order to use the most relevant studies for this thesis. For the first chapter which offers a theoretical framework based on affect theory, the scope of the literature is confined to two prominent understandings of affect theory, one offered by Silvan Tomkins and the other one by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, since they are the most influential figures in the affect theory literature. Tomkins's writings are accessed through the book *Shame and Its Sisters* edited by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank (1995) since it offers the most relevant chapters compiled from Tomkins's four-volume work *Affect Imaginary Consciousness*[4]. For the affective injustice literature, the sources that used the term for the first time and sources that are in dialogue with these texts are analyzed through a close reading with a critical stance. And, for the Saturday Mothers, a detailed literature review is done, and the sources are selected according to "thematic exploration" as suggested by O'Leary (2004). In this respect, sources with themes "grief processes", "politicization of mothers "and "discourse of motherhood" are analyzed in this thesis by navigating the concept of affect in the texts.

In this thesis, sources in English and Turkish, and one interview in French are analyzed. Since APA style citation is used, quotation marks are not used for the translations. However, page numbers are given in parenthesis whenever the grammatical structure is kept more or less the same as the original text so that readers can find these passages in the original article.

Significance

The particular significance of this thesis lies in reconceptualizing affective injustice in a way to renders it a theoretical tool that can apply to a wide variety of cases by critically engaging with the current literature on affective injustice. Also, this thesis makes some important contributions to the field of study on the Saturday Mothers by being the first study that examines the experiences of the Saturday Mothers within the framework of affective injustice. Besides, this study offers a new perspective to approach the sit-in protests and the role of discourse by tracing the political potential of affect that is revealed or, by the state's oppressive affective politics, inhibited during sit-ins and through discourse. This thesis deepens the current discussions on affective injustice by analyzing a historical case whose effects

[4] The four volumes are published respectively in 1962, 1963, 1991, and 1992 by New York: Springer.

continue and for which the demand for justice still lasts. This point holds the significant possibility to open up new discussions on the intersection of memory, memory politics, and affective injustice for future research. Lastly, this thesis represents an example for examining the aftermaths of the other cases of enforced disappearances that happened in other countries, within the framework of affective injustice since the considerable part of the discussion in the thesis can apply to those cases as well. In this regard, it offers an encompassing discussion that is not limited to one case but can potentially be used globally.

Chapter Overview

Chapter 1: This chapter provides a comprehensive theoretical framework for this thesis by examining two influential figures in affect theory in detail. The chapter delves into Tomkins and Deleuze & Guattari's approaches to affect and highlights the political significance of their understandings of affect. This chapter offers a synthesis of these two approach and takes affect as both a psychological state that emerges from physiological processes and bodily sensations as suggested by Tomkins, and also affect as a force circulating in a way to affect living and non-living matters and forms new *assemblages* as suggested by Deleuze and Guattari. Through this synthesis, this chapter constructs a solid basis for understanding what oppressive affective politics means and how they engender affective injustice that are the subjects of the following chapters, within the theoretical frame of affect.

Chapter 2: This chapter first provides a detailed literature review on affective injustice by elaborating on what is introduced in the introduction chapter. By taking a critical approach to the current literature, the need to reconceptualize the term affective injustice in a way to encompass the experiences of the Saturday Mothers is highlighted. In the second part of the chapter, first Francis Gallegos's (2020) grasp of affective injustice based on the theory of distributive justice is examined in-depth. Through this analysis, it is claimed that there are cases of affective injustice that fall outside the frame of distributive justice. In respect to this claim, by appealing Iris Marion Young's (1990) definition of injustice, affective injustice is reconceptualized as a structured social phenomenon that some particular social group faces. It occurs as a result of oppressive affective politics and institutions embedded in these politics so that a group of people exercising and developing their affective capacities are inhibited or harmed.

Chapter 3: This chapter analyzes the Saturday Mothers in a comprehensive way within the framework of affective injustice as reconceptualized in the previous chapter. Taking Judith Butler's (2004) discussion on unmournable bodies at the center, this chapter elaborates on the

lack of bodies of forcefully disappeared people and its meaning for mournability and grief practices. Besides, police violence, meeting bans, and some discursive strategies such as reducing the members of the group to suffering mothers rather than recognizing their political agency are discussed in terms of how they harm the political potential of affect. It is argued that as a result of oppressive affective politics that inhibit the members of The Saturday Mothers' exercising their affective capacity, they face a perpetuating affective injustice. This situation reveals that some cases of affective injustice do not only have to do with the present but also with the past and possibly with the future, thus, they are the subject of memory and memory politics.

1. Affect Theory

Affect theory has been one of the most controversial, yet at the same time one of the most remarkable theories that has led to new discussions across several disciplines including philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, cultural theory, sociology, and so forth, especially since the 1990s. It is mainly used as a tool to analyze subjectivity and make sense of social and political dynamics. One of the most salient reasons that relies on the controversies in the affect theory literature is the lack of a consensus on the meaning of the term *per se*. On the one hand, it would be legitimate to argue that the lack of consensus on what affect signifies might engender some difficulties and confusion in research where affect is held as the theoretical framework. On the other hand, it would be possible to defend this variety in the conceptualization of affect by considering it an intellectual richness that opens up a broad scope of discussion and exploration. Seigworth and Pedwell (2023) in *The Affect Theory Reader 2* articulate that "There will never be a single overarching critical-methodological magnetic force that magically consolidates all the touchpoints, vectors, and ambiences of affect study into any representative totality. And we would not wish it otherwise" (p.4). Regarding this uncertainty on the meaning of affect, this chapter examines the two influential grasps in affect theory, namely one by Silvan Tomkins (1995) and one by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), with a view to provide a synthesis of their understandings and use this synthesis as a theoretical framework in this thesis. The synthesis embraces a reading of affect as both a psychological state that emerges from physiological processes and bodily sensations as suggested by Tomkins, and also affect as a force circulating in a way to affect living and non-living matters and forms new *assemblages* as suggested by Deleuze and Guattari. This reading of affect captures both the grief processes in terms of its effects on the family members, and the sit-in protests and media representations of the Saturday Mothers in terms of how affect circulates or how its circulation is inhibited. By drawing on the examination of these two approaches to affect, this chapter also discusses the political significance of affect such as how they can be a triggering factor for resistance, new *assemblages*, and demand for justice like in the case of the Saturday Mothers[5].

[5] Although this chapter investigates the subversive political potential of affect by referring to the Saturday Mothers, it should be noted that the political potential of affect might also be oppressive and reinforce the dominant structure. At the individual level, "The delights of consumerism, feelings of belonging attending fundamentalism or fascism, to suggest just several contexts, are affective responses that strengthen rather than

Pointing out the political potentiality of affect serves as a strong ground to understand why states appeal to oppressive affective politics which is the subject of the following chapter.

1.1.Tomkins's Approach to Affect

Tomkins (1995) challenges the Freudian model of psychoanalysis that considers drives, and biological instincts, as the primary motivation for human behavior. Instead of drives, he suggests the affect system with its great complexity as the primary motivation system of human beings. Though he acknowledges that drives can operate as a motivator, they should be amplified by the affect system (Frank and Wilson, 2020). According to Tomkins's affect theory, both drives and affect systems are rooted in biology, however, while drives are specific in terms of aim, time, object, and bodily location, thus, allowing for limited freedom; affects are non-specific, general, and open to new possibilities, thus, allows for more freedom compared to drives. Besides, while drives as supposed in Freudian psychoanalysis focus on internal mechanisms, Tomkins's affect system emphasizes the dynamic and complex relationality between inner mechanisms and the environment. Tomkins introduces nine primary affects, which are, interest-excitement and enjoyment-joy (positive affects); surprise-startle (neutral affect); distress-anguish, anger-rage, and fear-terror; disgust, dissmell, shame-humiliation (negative affects). Although Tomkins discusses the distinctive features of the nine affects, he stresses the complex relation among each other and with other systems such as drives, cognition, perception, thoughts, memory, and actions. "The affect system provides the primary motives of human beings. The human affect system is nicely matched in complexity both to the receptor, analyzer, storage, and motor mechanisms within the organism and to a broad spectrum of environmental opportunities, challenges, and demands from without" (Shame and Its Sister, 1995, p.36-37).

The dynamic relationality between the internal and external mechanisms reveals the social aspect of Tomkins's affect theory even though his theory is rooted in a psycho-biological perspective. "What Tomkins's theory generates, perhaps uniquely in the contemporary scene, is a thick description of the life of affects as very specifically physiological, facial, individual, social, ideological, and parental" (Frank and Wilson, 2020, p.68). The social and ideological aspects of Tomkins's affect theory would be better understood with his script theory: Tomkins calls singular experiences or events scenes, and "scripts are the sets of ordering rules for the interpretation, evaluation, prediction, production, or control of scenes" (Shame and Its

challenge a dominant social order." (Berlant, 1997, as cited in Hemming, 2005, p.551). In the structural level, oppressive affective politics illustrate the political capacity of affect as a means of oppression.

Sisters,1995, p.180). Scripts are affect *theories* where the term theory should be considered as the set of rules that people use for regulating their behaviors and affective experiences in everyday life. While scripts define our social relationships and behaviors to some extent, they are also formed and shaped by social interactions constantly. In this regard, scripts are neither internal nor external in their origins, but a combination of them. They change according to past experiences and different contexts. Therefore, scripts are selective, incomplete rules, and not always accurate in their interpretation (Shame and Its Sisters, 1995, p.181). Tomkins investigates script theory in two categories: strong theory and weak theory. A weak theory operates to interpret and control an experience for a particular time and location with an aim to minimize negative affects, whereas a strong theory is formed as a result of failures of weak theories and dominates humans' perception and interpretation of several events. Tomkins suggests developing weak theories instead of strong ones since the latter dominates to a great extent a particular way that people engage with their environment and, thus, cannot be adaptable to different contexts.

There are two main points in Tomkins's affect theory that are politically significant to address. First, for Tomkins, negative affects must be minimized since they considerably harm humans psychologically and socially. For that reason, he does not even suggest maintaining negative affects for political purposes. Frank and Wilson (2020) explain Tomkins's attitude toward anger by articulating that "… anger will produce social effects that confound all parties, including those that take an ethical, angry stand against social discrimination. That is, there is no firm distinction between anger that emancipates and anger that is deflected into social control, violation, or harm" (p.63). I think Tomkins's attitude towards negative affects overgeneralizes and poses a risk of overlooking the political role of negative affects for liberation considering the wide range of discussions in race and feminist studies. To illustrate my point, while Fanon (1663) discusses the liberatory role of anger for anti-colonial struggles in his seminal book *The Wretched of The Earth*, Audre Lorde (1984) emphasizes anger's potential for social and political transformation. She states: "Every woman has a well-stocked arsenal of anger potentially useful against those oppressions, personal and institutional, which brought that anger into being. Focused with precision it can become a powerful source of energy serving progress and change" (Sister Outsider, 1984, p.127). In addition to a considerably large number of theoretical discussions embracing negative affects, several empirical studies also put forward the mobilizing power of negative affects, especially anger (Miller et al. 2009; Valentino et al. 2011; Aytaç et al. 2018). Particularly within the context of grief, also a negative affect, Butler (2004) argues that grief holds out a possibility to create a

sense of political community through the acknowledgment of the *primary tie* among us and our shared corporeal vulnerability. Thus, rather than privatizing and isolating, grief has a subversive political potential. To illustrate, within the context of the Saturday Mothers, grief plays a crucial role in the politicization of the mothers. In the context of enforced disappearances where the losses were rendered unmournable, the improper grief process that led to endless grief became a triggering motivator for a social struggle and transformed the grief into a public issue (Şanlı, 2018). Therefore, contrary to Tomkins, negative affects hold liberatory potentials such as a capacity to trigger a social struggle for demanding justice as emerged in the case of the Saturday Mothers.

Secondly, Tomkins's emphasis on the interplay between internal and external mechanisms in the formation of scripts points out the role of social factors on subjects' experiences and behaviors. This idea supports the significance of affective encounters and media representations in terms of their capacity to affect other people's scripts, thus, experiences and behaviors. To further explain, within the framework of the Saturday Mothers, the sit-in protests reached many people over time and gained national and international support to a certain extent (Tanrıkulu, 2003). While this situation illustrates how people get involved in social struggles through encounters, it should be considered that some "counter" encounters may operate oppositely. To illustrate, many media representations and discourse on the Saturday Mothers reduced their demand for justice to a state of individual suffering, thus, depoliticized the protests (Can, 2022). In this case, it might be argued that these representations and discourse prevented the possibility of people joining the group. Considering these points, the political role of social factors and encounters in terms of the capacity to (de) motivate behaviors within Tomkins's script theory elucidates why states would like to regulate and control political encounters such as meetings and social media representations, in other words why they appeal to oppressive affective politics.

1.2. Deleuze and Guattari's Approach to Affect

Deleuze and Guattari (1987), in their seminal book *A Thousand Plateaus*, take a critical stance toward the Western philosophy tradition that is rooted in binary modes of thought. Employing the metaphor of arborescence, they criticize Western philosophy as including roots and branches that grow hierarchically in a linear way towards the "truth" and that lead to binary and hierarchical relations among concepts. Instead of this line of thought, they suggest a new theoretical framework embracing multiplicity, fluidity, and relationality in making sense of reality, through the metaphor of rhizomes. Contrary to hierarchical branches, a rhizome

represents nonlinear lines that do not have any starting or ending point and are constantly in relation to each other. Concerning this, rhizome symbolizes the multiplicity of reality in terms of placing culture, language, science, art, and so forth in a dynamic relational position rather than a linear causal chain. Deleuze and Guattari's holding rhizomatic way of thinking connects firmly to their understanding of affect. Getting inspired by Spinoza's *Ethics* (1949) wherein Spinoza delineates affect as a capacity to affect and to be affected, Deleuze and Guattari grasp affect as force relations and intensities that diffuse through rhizome by circulating between bodies where the term body is taken with a broader understanding that encloses living and non-living bodies. For Deleuze and Guattari, affect is pre-individual, pre-conscious, and nonlinguistic, thus, it distinguishes from emotion that emerges as a result of conscious awareness and linguistic interpretation of affect.

Deleuze and Guattari argue that subjects are always in a process of *becoming* that occurs according to affective encounters where affect circulates between bodies, passes from one body to another, and intensifies. Through these circulations, subjects are *becoming*. Deleuze and Guattari elaborate on *becoming* by introducing the term *assemblage* which signifies a disposition of heterogeneous elements in a way to compose a complex whole. The elements in an *assemblage* constantly affect and get affected by each other and subjects are *becoming* in this dynamic interplay. Similar to subjects, assemblages also hold a dynamism in terms of getting formed or decomposed according to affective intensities that Deleuze and Guattari call *territorialization* and *deterritorialization* in their philosophical discourse. Therefore, they do not represent closed boundaries that subjects are confined to.

Deleuze and Guattari's approach to affect and related to affect, subjectivity, and assemblages is of political significance and should be addressed. First, understanding subjectivity as an ongoing process challenges grasping identities as fixed and stable categories. They articulate:

> Becoming produces nothing other than itself. We fall into a false alternative if we say that you either imitate or you are. What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes. (1987, p.238)

In the context of the Saturday Mothers, this understanding is informative to grasp how the identity of traditional motherhood is challenged by performing political agency and it revealed that motherhood is not an essential fixed identity. Furthermore, since becoming is a relational process in terms of the circulation of affect between bodies, it implies the social aspect of subject formation as well. In this regard, Deleuze and Guattari's approach to affect

reveals the significance of affective encounters for the process of becoming. Affective encounters do not only participate in the subject formation but also group formation. Thus, the notion of assemblage as flexible affective wholes entails the possibility of forming new groups or dissolving the previous ones from a social and political perspective. In other words, their approach to affect is of significance regarding the role of affect in terms of bringing people together through affective ties as in the case of the Saturday Mothers.

Considering that both theories illuminate some aspects of the Saturday Mothers, this thesis approaches the concept of affect as a synthesis of these two theories rather than favoring one of them. In this respect, affect is taken both as a psychological state that emerges from physiological processes and bodily sensations as suggested by Tomkins, and also as a force circulating in a way to affect living and non-living matters and forms new *assemblages* as suggested by Deleuze and Guattari. This approach to affect will provide a more encompassing grasp of the role of affect in the case of the Saturday Mothers since their experiences have to do with their psychological experiences especially in the process of improper grief and also with the circulation of affect through which the political potential of affect emerges.

2. Affective Injustice

Affective injustice is a relatively new concept that was first used in two articles published in the same year, one by Amia Srinivasan (2018) and the other by Shiloh Whitney (2018), and since then it has been attracting increasing attention, especially in philosophy. The political significance of the term relies on its promise to illuminate affective aspects of oppression within the frame of injustice. Elaborating on the literature review on affective injustice introduced in the introduction chapter, this chapter first provides a detailed examination of the current literature on affective injustice through a critical lens that explores both the significant and obscure points. By this examination, this section of the chapter aims to draw attention to the limitedness of the current literature to encompass a wide range of cases of affective injustice including the case of the Saturday Mothers. In line with this criticism, the second section delves into how to (re)conceptualize affective injustice. This section first investigates an account of affective justice based on the theory of distributive justice offered by Francisco Gallegos (2021) and claims that understanding affective (in)justice through distributive mechanisms is an inadequate frame to make an account for the structuredness of affective injustice and the necessity for institutional changes to eliminate affective injustice. In respect to this point, this section provides a comprehensive conceptual analysis of affective injustice. By appealing to Iris Marion Young's (1990) "Five Faces of Oppression", it is argued that affective injustice is a structured social phenomenon that some particular social group faces. It occurs as a result of oppressive affective politics and institutions embedded in these politics so that a group of people exercising and developing their affective capacities are inhibited or harmed. This reconceptualization of affective injustice captures the injustice that is engendered through inhibition of grief processes and sit-in protests, thus, constitutes a theoretical ground to analyze the case of the Saturday Mothers that will be examined in the following chapter.

1.3.A Critical Approach to the Current Literature on Affective Injustice

Srinivasan (2018) states that a considerable amount of discussion about whether someone ought to be angry or not focuses on the (counter)productivity of anger. Within this frame, on the one hand, it is argued that anger should be avoided because it is always counterproductive in the sense that it worsens the situation. On the other hand, it is argued that anger should be appreciated because it serves for political actions, mobilization, and change.

Srinivasan argues that those discussions examine instrumental reasons for getting angry or not; and lead to missing the intrinsic reason for getting angry, "thereby obscuring the possibility that the agent's anger is apt" (p.128). She conceptualizes the *aptness* of anger as having an *intrinsic reason* that the subject of anger knows and is motivated by this reason. Besides, in order for anger to be apt, it should be directed towards a genuine *normative violation*, "a violation of how things *ought to be*" (p.128), and should be *proportional*. Srinivasan delves into cases where "victims of oppression must choose between getting aptly angry and acting prudentially" and argues that those cases "themselves constitute a form of unrecognized injustice, [that is], *affective injustice*" (p.127). She illustrates her point with Black Americans who have to negotiate between having an apt anger for what happens to them or their community, and also considering the possibility of counterproductivity of anger in order not to make the situation worse. Srinivasan articulates that the injustice involved in such cases does not ground on subjects' feeling bad about the situation, "its wrongness lies rather in the fact that it forces people, through no fault of their own, into profoundly difficult normative conflicts…" (p.136). She further explains apt anger by arguing that it has an intrinsic value since "getting angry is a means of affectively registering or *appreciating* the injustice of the world…" (p.132). By making an analogy with appreciating something beautiful, she articulates:

> Just as appreciating the beautiful or the sublime has a value distinct from the value of knowing that something is beautiful or sublime, there might well be a value to appreciating the injustice of the world through one's apt anger—a value that is distinct from that of simply *knowing* that the world is unjust. (p.132)

In addition to appreciating the injustice in the world, Srinivasan argues, anger has a communicative function in the sense that it is "a way of publicly marking moral disvalue, calling for the shared negative appreciation of others" (p.132). Considering the intrinsic value of apt anger, being forced to choose either getting aptly angered or acting prudentially leads those who already face injustice to a considerably difficult normative conflict that "is not merely psychically painful; it is a genuine normative conflict, a conflict involving competing and significant goods that often feel incomparable" (p.133).

Srinivasan's article is of importance since it is one of the first articles that uses the term affective injustice and opens a new philosophical area of discussion. Examining the normative conflict that the members of some social groups already face injustice reveals the complexity of those experiences as Srinivasan also states, "things are even worse than we generally take them to be" (p.136). Also, her discussion on the communicative aspect of anger shows the

political potential of anger in terms of its capacity to affect people in a way to raises awareness towards inequalities in the world. However, I have some concerns about Srinivasan's argument on apt anger. First, one of the necessary conditions for anger to be apt is to be proportional in the sense that the intensity of the anger should fit into the situation. I am skeptical about this condition since it is a highly subject-dependent concept and there is no way to define its limits. Besides, it is important to consider who will decide whether anger is apt or not in order to demand justice in the cases of affective injustice. Also, it remains obscure in her analysis that why particularly anger instead of sadness for example is a way of appreciating the injustice in the world. In addition to these points, since she only focuses on cases that include normative conflict that emerges due to apt but counterproductive anger, her discussion does not account for the aftermaths of enforced disappearances. What happens and leads to affective injustice in those cases is the inhibition of grief rituals and protests rather than normative conflict on anger.

Whitney (2018) argues that gendered and racialized oppressions engender affective injustice. Borrowing three categories of oppression from Young's (1990) five faces of oppression, namely, exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence, Whitney introduces *affective marginalization, affective exploitation, and affective violence*. First, she argues that affects are *intentional* in the phenomenological sense, that is, being *about* the external world, rather than being contentless "mere" affects. For example, when someone gets angry, this person's anger is about something in the world rather than being just an affective state. Second, Whitney grasps affect as energetic in the sense that it is transmissible from one body to another, and it might reside in a body. Within this grasp of affect, she defines affective marginalization as where someone cannot get *uptake* for her emotions[6]. To illustrate, when women are angry, their anger is generally attributed to their mental state by ignoring the *aboutness* of their anger. Whitney argues that refusal of uptake leads to affective injustice since "when my anger is unjustly refused uptake, it is not

[6] Whitney (2018) borrows the term uptake from Marilyn Frye (1983). In "A Note On Anger", Frye (1983) articulates that "It is a tiresome truth of women's experience that our anger is generally not well-received" (p.84). When women are angry, generally men and some women do not consider what this anger is about and do evaluate the women through mental stabilities such as being hysteric. Frye suggests that similar to J.L. Austin's (1962) *speech act theory* where some statements have the force to *do* or change the situation, anger "has a certain conventional force whereby it sets people up in a certain sort of orientation to each other; and like a speech act, it cannot "come off" if it does not get uptake" (p.88). Uptake refers to responding to an angry person within the limit of anger's claims, that is, accepting or challenging the situation itself. She points out that getting uptake depends on the conception of who one is in the eyes of the hearer, on the hearer's world view. She articulates, "in the world of male-supremacy … [men's] understanding of what sorts of relations and connections are possible between beings of these sorts, to a great extent determine the rage of his capacity to comprehend these claims, and hence of his capacity to give uptake to women's anger" (p.90).

appropriately *moving* to others; it does not *affect* them as it should" (p.495). One of the damages of refusal of uptake is the marginalization of oppressed people from affective sense-making since their affective state is not counted as *intentional*. Whitney argues that affective marginalization leads those people to become vulnerable to affective exploitation, that is, to project unwanted affects on the bodies of marginalized people. Lastly, she defines affective violence as the co-emergence of affective marginalization and affective exploitation, "a uniquely affective structure of oppressive violence, one that displaces and accumulates disjointed affective force, quarantining it within the racialized body until it becomes toxic" (p.512).

Whitney (2018) offers a considerably significant account of affective injustice by applying Young's (1990) three categories of oppression into the affect frame. Her conceptualization of affective injustice reveals the affective side of oppressive structures such as racism and sexism. However, she argues that in the case of withholding uptake, the affect cannot move as it should. This reading implies that there is an ideal way of moving affects to other bodies. And, as long as affects do not circulate in this way, it will lead to withholding of uptake, thus, affective injustice. But, considering the subjective and contextual differences, I am skeptical about the ideal way of moving affect and, thus, about conceptualizing affective injustice on this ground. Besides, although Whitney conceptualizes affective violence as a combination of affective marginalization and affective exploitation, I think that affective violence might emerge without affective marginalization or exploitation. For example, in the case of the Saturday Mothers, the inhibition of the grief process does fit well into neither affective marginalization nor exploitation. But I think it can still be considered as affective violence considering oppressive affective politics that engender violence in people's affective lives.

Archer and Matheson (2020) conceptualize affective injustice as "a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as an affective being" by drawing on Miranda Fricker's (2007) definition of epistemic injustice[7] (p.8). They investigate cases in which some people situated in powerful positions in society force others to feel and express emotions according to their affective norms. They analyze a case in which a Northern Irish athlete refuses to wear a red poppy as a commemorative practice of the British Army since the red poppy's symbolic meaning extended in a way that it includes almost every event the British Army took place.

[7] Fricker (2007) defines epistemic injustice as "most fundamentally, in a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower" (p.1).

The athlete receives several threats and is exposed to abuse although he explains his reasons for not wearing a poppy. Archer and Matheson consider this case as a case of affective injustice that goes beyond individual emotional harm. They introduce two forms of affective injustice engendered as a result of enforced emotion regulations. The first one is the violation of affective rights which denotes the violation of someone's right to feel and express what they feel. Secondly, drawing on Young's (1990) concept of cultural imperialism, they introduce emotional imperialism which denotes "a powerful group imposing aspects of its culture's emotional norms and standards on another less powerful group whilst at the same time marking out the other culture's emotional norms and standards as deviant and inferior" (2020, p.11). While providing a considerably insightful discussion on two forms of affective injustice, what Archer and Matheson take as affective capacity remains obscure in their discussion. This obscurity makes it difficult to apply their definition to the other cases of affective injustice including the affective injustice in the case of the Saturday Mothers.

All the criticisms and concerns raised in this section show the need for a reconceptualization of affective injustice in a way to elucidate the affective dimension of states' politics within the frame of injustice. Reconceptualizing the term affective injustice by taking these concerns into account will provide a broad understanding of affective injustice that accounts for different types of cases including historical cases such as the aftermath of enforced disappearances and that emphasizes the structuredness of affective injustice.

1.4. On Affective (In) Justice and Affective Politics

I would like to devote this section to (in)justice in order to further elaborate on how we can account for a theory of (in)justice or at least a framework for (in)justice that elucidates the particularly affective dimension of some cases of injustice. The main question to be delved into might be why our affective lives are subject to (in)justice and also, it can be formulated as why our affective lives *should* be a subject of (in)justice since (in)justice maintains both descriptive and normative discussions. I believe both kinds of discussions complement each other, namely, descriptive discussions of (in)justice facilitate examining normative aspects of (in)justice and vice versa. Several cases might illustrate a case of affective injustice from different perspectives, as discussed in the previous section, yet providing a theory of justice that will encompass all the possible cases is a highly tough task, it might even be impossible. Moreover, my concerns about a theory of affective justice do not only rely on its hardness or its possibility of remaining limited to account for each case that can be taken as affective justice but also, I believe that rather than affective justice, examining directly affective injustice might offer a

better comprehension of affective injustice and also be more informative for what affective injustice is. Shklar (1990) articulates that

> Every volume of moral philosophy contains at least one chapter about justice, and many books are devoted entirely to it. But where is injustice?... They take it for granted that injustice is simply the absence of justice, and that once we know what is just, we will know all we need to know. That belief may not, however, be true. One misses a great deal by looking only at justice. The sense of injustice, the difficulties of identifying the victims of injustice, and the many ways in which we all learn to live with each other's injustices tend to be ignored, as is the relation of private injustice to the public order. (p.15)

By embracing Shklar's point, I reconceptualize affective injustice rather than affective justice. Drawing on Iris Marion Young's (1990) fruitful discussion on oppression in "Five Faces of Oppression", I argue that affective injustice is a structured social phenomenon that some particular social group faces. It occurs as a result of oppressive affective politics and institutions embedded in these politics so that a group of people's exercising and developing their affective capacities are inhibited or harmed. As indicated, there might emerge other theories of (in)justice to account for affective (in)justice. Thus, I do not assert that approaching affective injustice through oppression, particularly as offered by Young, is the only way to discuss affective injustice, however, it *is* certainly one way to do it.

Before delving into affective injustice in-depth, I would like to give some space to discuss an account of affective justice that is grounded on the theory of distributive justice and introduced by Francis Gallegos (2021). Distributive justice, in its general sense, denotes the distribution of primary goods based on a principle that accounts for justice. For example, John Rawls (1999) who is a prominent figure in political philosophy with his theory of distributive justice, introduces two principles for distribution, namely, the first is the principle of equal basic liberties and the second is the equal opportunity principle and difference principle (p.53). Francisco Gallegos (2021) points out the lack of a discussion on the necessary conditions for naming a case as affective injustice in the current literature and he offers a theoretical frame of affective justice based on the theory of distributive justice. Accordingly, he defines affective justice as "a state in which each person has the *affective goods* they are owed", and affective injustice as "the morally objectionable deprivation of such affective goods" (p.5). He argues that two fundamental affective goods are the core of our emotional lives: *subjective well-being* and *emotional aptness.* And he defines fundamental affective goods as such:

> An affective good is fundamental if it is not merely instrumentally valuable for the attainment of other goods, including non-affective goods such as physical well-being, but, rather, is a primary way that things can go well for us as affective beings. Fundamental affective goods not only contribute positively to our emotional lives but count as core components of a desirable, excellent, or thriving emotional life. (p.6)

Gallegos argues that similar to distributive justice theories where each subject has goods such as freedom, resources, opportunities, and forms of recognition, "affective goods might be specified with reference to *affective freedoms*, *affective resources*, *affective opportunities*, and *forms of affective recognition*" (p.5). For example, he defines affective freedom as a subsidiary good for subjective well-being as "freedom from interference in the pursuit of subjective well-being, including freedom from circumstances that give rise to emotional distress and negative or unpleasant emotions and moods" (p.7), and affective freedom as a subsidiary good for emotional aptness as "freedom from interference in one's apt emotional responses and in one's participation in the normative practices that facilitate emotional aptness" (p.11).

Even though Gallegos's (2021) theory of affective justice provides a detailed and considerable account of affective justice that might be applied to some cases, it remains limited to encompass a wide range of cases of affective injustice and some points need further examination. First, I agree with him on the point that affective injustice involves psychological harm that the subject of injustice experiences. However, I have some concerns about how we can measure subjective well-being or "a desirable, excellent, or thriving emotional life" (Gallegos, 2021, p.6) since these concepts might be operationally defined in different ways by psychologists or other authorities. Moreover, it would be inescapable to encounter individual differences that might harden analyzing a case as an example of affective injustice or not within the frame of subjective well-being. To further illustrate, Gallegos introduces *affective resources and opportunities* as subsidiary goods for subjective well-being, and he explains these resources and opportunists as "materials, activities, and circumstances that contribute positively to one's subjective well-being, including nurturing interpersonal and social relationships; sleep, therapy, and other means of providing self-care …" (p.7). Even though this list makes sense for a good life in its general understanding, the concepts in this list remain highly individual-dependent, and this leads to ask to what extent we can be sure that a person has affective resources and opportunities that this person *owned* to, what the measurement criterion is, and so forth. Besides, the scope of these resources and opportunities is so wide that it gives the impression that as long as we do not feel completely content and satisfied with our lives, any lack in our lives might be a reason for affective injustice.

With my concern about the individual differences and measurement criteria, the second point I would like to touch on Gallegos's conceptualization of affective justice is his taking distributive justice as his main theoretical framework. What is to distribute affective goods? What is the *principle(s)* of distribution that accounts for justice? How can we account for the distribution of affective goods *justly*? These fundamental questions should be taken into consideration and examined in detail for taking a theory of affective justice based on a distributive mechanism. To further elaborate, a principle should be provided in terms of distributing affective resources and opportunities, a principle that suggests the criteria according to which these resources should be distributed, e.g. a criteria based on needs, equality, equity, and so forth. Besides, even if we are content with the idea of the distribution of affective goods, "justice should refer not only to distribution but also to the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacities and collective communication and cooperation" (Young, 1990, p.37). The structured and institutionalized aspect of affective injustice should also be illuminated, especially regarding that corrective measures for (affective) injustice often require structural changes rather than mere distributive corrections.

Lastly, it is important to consider the political capacity of affect when we scrutinize the concept of affective injustice. As discussed in the first chapter, affect does not denote emotion taken as an individual mental state. A certain capacity is attributed to affect in terms of its capacity to dissolve or form new *assemblages* through its circulation, in other words, a communicative and transformative capacity. Regarding this point, in cases of affective injustice, generally, what is harmed is not always only the so-called emotional life of the subject of injustice but also the transformative capacity of affect is inhibited. Although the latter also harms the emotional lives of the subjects of affective injustice, I find it politically significant and fruitful to particularly point out the transformative aspect of affect, especially for understanding structured affective injustices.

The concerns I raised about Gallegos's conceptualization of affective injustice show that understanding affective injustice through distributive justice does not elucidate the cases of affective injustice that fall outside the frame of distributive justice like in the case of the Saturday Mothers. Therefore, to understand their affective experience within the frame of injustice rather than individual harm, another approach to affective injustice should be provided. With this aim, I focus on the question of what it means for a case to represent a case of affective injustice, and also, what it means that affective injustice is a structured social phenomenon. Young's (1990) seminal paper provides a strong ground for pursuing the answers

to these questions by revealing different aspects of oppression and arguing that each aspect engenders injustice.

Young (1990), in "The Five Faces of Oppression", conceptualizes justice as not only referring to distribution but also "to the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacities and collective communication and cooperation" (p.37). In line with this conceptualization, injustice specifies "two forms of disabling constraints, oppression, and domination" (p.37) She states that although these constraints might involve distributive patterns, there are some constraints that cannot be explained through distribution, such as "decision-making procedures, division of labor, and culture" (p.37).

Young articulates that the dominant discourse of contemporary politics, especially new left social movements in the U.S. since the 1960s, centralizes the concept of oppression, yet the meaning of it is not defined clearly. For that reason, she gives a considerable account of the term oppression in a way that illuminates different forms of oppression that some social groups face, where a social group should be understood as people who have similar experiences and a sense of belonging; and illuminate injustice structured in societies. She articulates that "all oppressed people suffer some inhibition of their ability to develop and exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings" (p.38). Thus, all of them share something in common in their experiences from a broader perspective. However, she argues, there cannot be only a set of criteria to make sense of the oppression that all oppressed groups face, therefore she comes up with "five faces" of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. Exploitation refers to the systematic transference of power of a social group to another one where the latter group augments its power. Marginalization refers to the process of rendering a social group unused to the system of labor, e.g. blacks, old people, single mothers, and so on who cannot find a job in the labor market are marginalized. Powerlessness indicates cases in which a social group is expelled from decision-making processes, treated non-respectfully in society and deprived of opportunities to develop their capacities. Cultural imperialism is a dominant group's universalizing and imposing its values and cultural norms on other groups. As the last category of oppression, Young introduces the category of violence which refers to acts of violence and harassment that particular social groups face. She articulates that violence is a face of oppression not because of the act of violence itself, but because of the social structure that makes these actions possible and tolerable.

It is vital to point out that Young emphasizes the structuredness of oppression. She underlines that though oppression might occur as a result of sovereign power where a group of

people deliberately oppresses the other group, it is a structural phenomenon embedded in everyday practices as Foucault (1977) suggests for understanding the operation of modern power. Young articulates:

> Oppression refers to the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms -in short, the normal process of everyday life. (p.39)

For that reason, she argues that injustices cannot be eliminated by legislating new laws or changing administrative staff, all these efforts are not adequate to cease the reproduction of injustices "in major economic, political, and cultural institutions" (p.39). In connection with this idea, Young emphasizes that even though the five faces of oppression represent social injustices because of some distributive inequalities, e.g. unequal distribution of resources, goods, and opportunities; what makes each of them a category for social injustice also lies in their structuredness in the sense that they harm or overlook the exercise and development of capacities of some social groups, thus distributive policies *per se* are not sufficient to eliminate them.

Considering these points, it is of significance to focus on affective politics that engender affective injustice by targeting, regardless of intentionally or unintentionally, the affective life of an oppressed group or particularly members of that group, e.g. in the case of the Saturday Mothers. In line with Young's discussion, I argue that (one aspect of) affective injustice is a structured social phenomenon that some particular social groups face. It occurs as a result of oppressive affective politics and institutions embedded in these politics so that a group of people exercising and developing their affective capacities are inhibited or harmed. I take affective politics as a term signifying a wide range of political scope including strategizing, regulating, allowing, or preventing groups or people's affective encounters. It also includes expressing and experiencing emotion through which affect circulates. Taken in this broad sense, affective politics encompasses both liberatory and oppressive politics concerned with our affective lives and political potential of affect. To illustrate, strategizing on the transformative capacity of anger considering its role in mobilizing people exemplifies emancipatory affective politics, whereas banning meetings exemplifies oppressive affective politics. It should be noted that affective politics, especially oppressive ones, represent one aspect of more complex politics, and they might operate as a result of intentional or unintentional processes. For example, while banning a meeting involves the prohibition of

expression of emotion and circulation of affect, it also involves inhibition of epistemic flow and freedom of expression of thoughts. And the ban might be a decision taken considering only epistemic or other factors rather than an affective one. Regarding this remark, affective injustices that emerge as a result of those implicit affective politics might not be salient and, thus, require a closer examination. Besides, affective politics are determined and implemented by different "bodies "such as states, social groups, political parties, NGOs, and even companies, with different aims that can be economic, political, and so forth. I focus on particularly states' oppressive affective politics to investigate the structured affective injustice that oppressed groups face. For that reason, after this point, I will be referring to these particular politics of states when I use the term oppressive affective politics.

Relying on Young's explanation of injustice, I argued that affective injustice emerges when a group of people exercising and developing their affective capacities is inhibited or harmed by oppressive affective politics and institutions embedded in these politics. I think being able to *experience* a particular state of affectivity or emotivity and *express* emotions through which affect can circulate between bodies exemplify two ways to exercise and even develop our affective capacity. Here, I use "being able to experience a particular state of affectivity or emotivity" in a very specific sense considering that some rituals that are performed for particular affective cases constitute a part of the affective experience *per se.* In this regard, when these rituals are not allowed to be performed like in the case of the Saturday Mothers where funereal rituals cannot be performed, people's being able to experience a particular state of affectivity is inhibited. Thus, exercising their affective capacities is harmed. To further explain affective rituals, Şılar (2013) articulates that when someone dies, the dead person bids a farewell through certain rituals and finally becomes fully dead. All of these are inevitable requirements for a healthy mourning process. He states that although these rituals vary depending on religion, culture, and individual disposition, for example in Turkey, the dead *body* is the main actor who sets the death-mourning scene, the process of mourning and grieving begins by washing and cleaning the body and food is handed out, Mawlid is read, graves are built, laments are expressed for the dead, condolences are accepted, and funeral prayers are performed (para.35). Since these rituals and performances are a constitutive part of the experience of grief, not being able to perform affective rituals harms the experience *per se*, thus, exercising one's affective capacity. Although these harms might occur in the course of daily life sense that not as a result of a political reason, they might also emerge as a result of oppressive affective politics such as in the case of enforced disappearances where the families and the relatives do not know where the bodies of their loved ones are. In those cases,

since exercising a certain group of people's affective capacity is inhibited by the states' oppressive politics that prevent grieving rituals that are the core elements of an appropriate mourning process, the harm that those people experience goes beyond an individual situation and represents an affective injustice.

On the point of expressing emotions through which affect can circulate, it is a particular way of exercising and developing our affective capacity since affects and emotions involve a communicative and even a transformative aspect that can emerge through the expression of emotions and circulation of affect. In this regard, affects and emotions have a collective aspect intrinsic to them. And a prevention of certain groups' expressing emotions through which affect can circulate, due to oppressive affective politics also represents a case of affective injustice. Mourning processes also illustrate the communicative aspect of affects since mourning is under normal conditions experienced as a state of social communication between the deceased person and the relatives of this person (Şanlı, 2018, p.98). However, in the case of enforced disappearances, not only affective rituals but also these communicative and transformative aspects of affects are inhibited. The communicative and transformative aspects of expressing emotions rely not on utterances of emotions *per se*, but on affects that emerge from utterances and affective encounters, that circulate through bodies and reveal a transformative potential by getting intensified. To conclude, I argue that *experiencing* affective states and *expressing* emotions are particular ways of exercising and developing our affective capacities, and their being harmed and inhibited by oppressive affective politics illustrates affective injustice. This reading of affective injustice offers a new conceptual tool that can apply to a wide range of cases including the experiences of the Saturday Mothers.

3. The Saturday Mothers And Affective Injustice

The aftermaths of enforced disappearances illustrate one of the most salient examples of cases in which grieving rituals and expressing emotions through which affects circulate are inhibited by states' oppressive actions, thus illustrating a case for affective injustice. The injustice in question is perpetuated through states' not taking responsibility and continuing their oppressive politics toward the families and relatives of the disappeared people. Moreover, states' constituting their narratives on enforced disappearances or even implementing politics of amnesia deepens several kinds of injustice on both those who are the families and relatives of disappeared ones and also on different aspects of social and political life. To further elaborate on how the process of enforced disappearances as a means of state violence engenders affective injustice on the families and the relatives of the disappeared people, this chapter analyzes the Saturday Mothers in detail. In accordance with this aim, the term "forcefully disappeared" will refer to specifically those who forcefully disappeared in Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s in this chapter.

The first section of this chapter draws on Judith Butler's (2004) "Violence, Mourning, Politics" and discusses how the forcefully disappeared people were rendered *unmournable* through the unknowingness of the fate of their bodies. By extending Butler's discussion, this section highlights that although forcefully disappeared people were rendered publicly unmournable, they were/ are mournable for their families and relatives. This fact illuminates why these people experience endless grief due to not performing grieving rituals, thus, an aspect of affective injustice that they face. The second section examines the political transformation of the families of the disappeared people. By introducing a new concept "state-related loss", the section investigates the relationship between citizens and the state and argues that in the case of the Saturday Mothers, the relationship between the state and the families is harmed since the families could not get a response from the legal authorities, and this situation became a strong motivator to start sit-in protests. In the following section, the political transformation of mothers in terms of becoming activists is analyzed since focusing particularly on the mothers reveals how and to what extent the traditional understanding of the identity of motherhood in Turkey is challenged through the sit-ins of the Saturday Mothers. This analysis also helps to understand the police violence that the Saturday Mothers face in their sit-ins and that engenders affective injustice. The fourth section called "Mothering" examines the role of

discourse within the context of the political potential of affect and argues that naming the group as the Saturday Mothers prevents the society from knowing the political aspect of their grief. The last section discusses the Saturday Mothers within the context of memory and claims that some cases of affect injustice like the Saturday Mothers are the subject of past, present, and possibly the future, thus, the subject of memory and memory politics. Overall, this analysis offers a comprehensive examination of the case of the Saturday Mothers within the frame of affect and affective injustice. Investigating the different stages of the aftermaths of enforced disappearances in Turkey reveals how affective injustice that the Saturday Mothers face has been perpetuated through different oppressive politics and channels.

3.1. Who is mournable?

Judith Butler (2004) discusses the political implications of grief in the frame of corporeal vulnerability and focuses on the question of *"What makes for a grievable life?"* by addressing several concerns about media representation and lack of recognition of *some* people. They argue that when we lose someone, we do not only lose this person but also, we lose something that makes us who we are. This loss in us has to do with our being socially constituted bodies where we are attached through complex relationality, bonds, and ties. A relationality that precedes the formation of "I", a *primary tie* that composes who "I" am. Thus, when we lose someone, a part of us, composed by the tie between us and this lost body, is also lost. This shows that "we are not only constituted by our relations but also dispossessed by them as well." (p.24). In the case of a loss, we are dispossessed and undergo a transformation forever and we cannot know what this transformation is in advance. Besides, Butler considers grief, rather than privatizing and isolating, as holding out a possibility for a sense of political community through the acknowledgment of the fundamental tie among us and our shared corporeal vulnerability. Concerning this, they point out the necessity of thinking about violence which is "always, an exploitation of the primary tie, that primary way in which we are, as bodies, outside ourselves and for one another." (p.27) Butler articulates that acknowledgment of the vulnerability and the exploitation of the primary tie by violence might lead us to think about how some human lives are rendered less vulnerable than others, and thus less grievable than others, or even, *ungrievable*. In this context, Butler argues that our cultural frames for who counts as human have to do with the public avowal of losses. To illustrate, they problematize the lack of information in the mainstream media, about Afghan and Palestinian people who were killed, and the dehumanization of Arab people. Butler emphasizes that what they problematize is not just an exclusion of some people from the framework of "human", but

rather the ontological difference between those who are grievable or not. They articulate that those who count as ungrievable are exposed to *derealization*, that is, putting those people in the living or dead position. Thus, "They cannot be mourned because they are always lost, rather, never "were ", and they must be killed, since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness." (p.33). Butler explains derealization further by appealing to discursive limits where they argue that those people are rendered as ungrievable not as a result of a dehumanizing discourse, rather of "a refusal of discourse that produces dehumanization as a result." (p.36).

Enforced disappearances refer to the deprivation of a person's freedom by the state in such a way that a person is considered "non-existent" in the legal order, and sometimes the "destruction of this person's physical existence", enforced disappearances transform the "lost" people into a non-existent person in the legal order, thus, violating the right to legal recognition, freedom, security, and fair trial (Alpkaya, 1995, p.31). At the same time, since the lost ones are almost "non-existent" people, proving these acts becomes almost impossible for the families in question. This situation renders enforced disappearances a method for implementing state policies without compromising their legitimacy (Alpkaya, 1995). Regarding this, enforced disappearances turn out to be an implication of *state of exception* as introduced by Carl Schmitt (2005) as states' suspension of laws with an aim to exercising power without legal constraints. Elaborating on the concept of the state of exception, Giorgio Agamben (1998) argues that some lives are reduced to "bare life" which refers to people who are deprived of social and political status, thus, reduced to mere biological lives. Şanlı (2018) articulates that, by using Giorgio Agamben's notion of bare life, forcefully disappeared people are taken out of the legal protection by being reduced to bare life, which is a space between law and life, and as a result, they are excluded from being the subject of mourning (p.103). Being non-existent in the legal order resonates with Butler's discussion on the derealization of some people where they paradoxically live in a state of deadness, in between living and dead. In the case of enforced disappearances, this in-betweenness takes a concrete form since nobody knows whether these people are alive or not, except the perpetrators of the disappearances. In the context of the Saturday Mothers, the uncertainty about the disappeared people puts relatives of the forcefully disappeared people in a highly difficult situation since they experience grief and hope at the same time. During the first years of the enforced disappearances, families and relatives of the disappeared people had hope of finding them alive. They report that they went to the police station many times and asked about their disappeared loved ones, but each time they got the same response "S/he was not here." (Alpkaya, 1995). This state of silence *derealizes*

disappeared people as if they have never been living as if they are not real, thus, they are ungrievable.

The ungrievability of forcefully disappeared people occurs in different ways. On the one hand, related to the point of in-betweenness, the lack of dead bodies prevents the proper mourning process for the families and the relatives of forcefully disappeared people since they are the main entities that start mourning processes and rituals as discussed in the previous chapter. Şanlı (2018) states that one of the most important stages for the *realization* of disappeared people is the demand for a funeral since it will start a proper mourning process (p.104). Especially, the absence of the dead body and the place to put that body creates a huge tear in the symbolic universe of the families and relatives who need to mourn, and it leads to serious trauma (Şanlı, 2018, p. 103). On the other hand, since the cases of enforced disappearances are somehow ignored and not investigated seriously, they are not considered as death people in the legal order (Şanlı, 2018). Thus, those people legally remain between life and death as Butler suggests. This situation turns the mourning process into an endless mourning that cannot be experienced and ended properly. One of the interviewees in Şanlı's (2018) article points out the situation of in-betweenness:

> Since the forcefully disappeared person can never be found, it is also an endless mourning process with the search process in which constant pain is repeated. Sometimes, tragicomic things happen, for example, the disappeared person is called up for military service. Since losses are not accepted as non-existent at the moment of communication with social life, losses are a situation that constantly falls within our sphere of influence. The forcefully disappeared person is not officially considered dead nor is s/he removed from the registry. The situation may change if the body of the forcefully disappeared is found. (p.104)

Although Butler discusses the loss and grief process of those who lost their loved ones, they examine the notion of ungrievability in terms of how states derealize some people and disavow public grief. However, they do not touch upon the fact that those disappeared people are still grievable for their relatives and, as a result, the process of derealization harms and even traumatizes them since they cannot grieve properly. "The demand for a proper grave, therefore, is an urgent call for the *re-humanization* of the disappeared through the recognition of his dignity and his family's right to mourn properly" (Göral, 2021, p.86).

Regarding these points, Butler's perspective on derealization, ungrievable bodies, and grief, alongside its wider theoretical implications, provides a comprehensive frame to grasp how the forcefully disappeared people were rendered unmournable in the eyes of the state, and

how the families in question could not perform affective rituals properly within the context of the Saturday Mothers. As discussed, this situation considerably harmed the affective lives of the families and relatives of those who disappeared. The harm done to the affective lives of those people goes beyond an individual problem and represents a case of affective injustice since those people's exercising and developing affective capacities are inhibited by the state's oppressive politics.

3.2. Politically Transformative Effect of "State-Related Loss"

In this section, I would like to elaborate on Butler's (2004) notion of the *primary tie* through which people are attached to discuss the political transformation of the families of forcefully disappeared people. As mentioned, Butler argues that our bodies are socially constituted through a complex relationality with others. We are attached through the *primary tie* that precedes the formation of "I". In other words, a tie that participates in subject formation and constitutes a part of us. They state that in case of a loss, we both lose this person and a part of us which was formed via our relationality to this person. As a result, we are dispossessed by this relationality and transformed into someone else forever. I argue that this discussion on the primary tie can be enlarged to our relation to the state in case of political losses and it can apply to the Saturday Mothers. First, what I mean by political loss is that a loss that is caused by a political reason rather than occurred in the daily flow of life. In this regard, losses caused by enforced disappearances illustrate political loss. Second, what I mean by our relation to the state can be considered through the concepts of citizenship, through which citizens have a certain relationship with the state that they have social and political expectations and duties. For example, citizens have certain rights such as voting, accessing social services, and so forth, and duties such as obeying the laws, paying taxes, and so forth. Within the frame of citizenship, they also expect social justice. In this regard, it might be argued that we as citizens do not have a primary tie only among each other but also between "I" and the state, and this tie also precedes the "I" and participates in its formation to some extent.

In the context of the Saturday Mothers, the families, and relatives of the forcefully disappeared people who cannot get a response from legal authorities might lose the tie between them and the state, which I call *state-related loss*. In those situations, they might experience another "grief" for their relation to the state since their sense of being a citizen of this state would be shaken. Various research and reports support this argument. As mentioned in the previous section, the relatives of the lost ones first went to the police stations to learn what happened to their loved ones. However, they could not get any satisfactory answers, the only

answer that they could get from them was "s/he was never here" (Alpkaya, 1995). After this long state of silence, in 1995, the families and relatives of forcefully disappeared people started to gather at the Galatasaray square each Sunday at noon and try to make their voices heard. Another example that supports state-related loss is that in 1997, a police van named "Mobile Search Center for Missing People" was sent to the Galatasaray Square in the sit-in protests and police officers called the Saturday Mothers to fill out an application form for their disappeared loved ones (Can, 2022, p.471). However, the families in question had already applied to the police to find their loved ones and had not got an answer. Therefore, "the response of the families was to turn their backs to the bus and sit in protest, acting as if the police were not there." (Can, 2022, p.471). Lastly, Karaman states that the feeling of citizenship of most of the Saturday Mothers was damaged because of the injustices they had faced. Moreover, Karaman (2016) states that "Most of my interviewees said that the injustices they had encountered had prevented them from feeling like citizens even though they also voted and paid taxes. "Thus, they have been struggling to redefine the realms of justice, citizenship, and peace instead of working within those realms" (p.392,393).

All these reactions of the Saturday mothers strengthen the idea of state-related loss based on losing their trust in the state and a sense of security[8]. Since the sit-in protests began after this loss, I argue that the political transformative effect of loss and grief has to do with state-related loss. The loss of the tie between citizens and the state is a strong motivator to start a collective resistance as is seen in the case of the Saturday Mothers.

3.3. Transformation of Mothers Into Political Activists

As mentioned, the unmournability of forcefully disappeared people and the state-related loss that the families of the disappeared people experience led those families to start a peaceful collective resistance by sitting at Galatasaray Square every week. Through these peaceful protests, the mothers of The Saturday Mothers underwent a self-transformation in terms of getting politicized, and, as a collective result of these self-transformations, also transformed the socially and culturally constructed meaning of motherhood in Turkey into a

[8] I do not claim that these people completely lost the socio-political tie between them and the state. We can think about the loss of the tie as something transformed into a less strong one considering the relatives' reaction to the police bus and their utterance about the sense of citizenship. However, it should be also stated that "the Saturday Mothers refused to dialogue with the police. Yet, at the same time, they were making demands of the police. The Saturday Mothers found a way to coexist with them in the square by ritualizing their protest" (Can, 2022).

means for peaceful collective resistance (Karaman, 2016, Şanlı, 2020). Şanlı (2020) states that as a result of not being able to grieve properly for their loved ones and questioning the legitimacy of the system, the mothers have gone out into the public sphere to show their legitimate objections. Through these sit-ins, they have also pointed out that their experiences are not limited to the private sphere, rather they are the subjects of public matters. Şanlı (2020) also articulates that women, who made their trauma public as a social agenda, refused to be "silent victims of the private sphere" in this context; they have become active subjects of the public sphere, and in a more accurate conceptualization, they have become "politicized" (p. 53-54). The traditional understanding of motherhood in Turkey takes mothers as apolitical and confined to the private sphere (Karaman, 2016, Şanlı, 2020). Besides, the ideal way of being a mother in the patriarchal nationalist discourse in Turkey is to "produce "proper Turkish subjects" who willingly sacrifice themselves for their country" (Karaman, 2016, p. 389). Regarding these understandings of motherhood, the Saturday Mothers challenged the culturally rooted symbolic meaning of motherhood through their self-transformations. By transforming their grief into a public issue and showing an active political agency, they reveal another way of being a mother. "By doing so, they encourage the public to consider motherhood as a socially constructed and *performed* [emphasis added] identity that challenges ideal motherhood in nationalist discourse" (Karaman, 2016, p.393).

It is of importance to note that since the idea of an ideal motherhood has been deeply rooted in the dominant discourse of Turkey, the Saturday Mothers challenging this understanding was not noticed/ recognized by the authorities at first hand (Tanrıkulu, 2003; Karaman, 2016). "The image of "traditional mothers" with untraditional demands confused the authorities, media, and the public: Were they subversives? Or were they simply looking for lost relatives?" (Karaman, 2016, p.388) This confusion helped the mothers to continue their protests for a while since it would be shameful to use violence against the mothers, however, it did not last for a long time (Karaman, 2016). As they became more visible and got more support from human rights defenders, the authorities recognized them as political activists who demanded justice rather than traditional mothers who have only suffered for their children. While this situation might be considered a political gain in terms of challenging traditional motherhood by not *performing* what it requires, the Saturday Mothers encountered excessive police violence during sit-in protests and bans of meetings.

Regarding the police violence and bans of meetings, I argue that the Saturday Mothers do face affective injustice not only because of their being deprived of experiencing a proper mourning process that is to be able to perform affective rituals but also because their affective

freedom, here, in the sense that expressing emotions through which affect can circulate, is violated. As discussed in the previous chapter, affect has a communicative and transformative aspect intrinsic to it. It has the capacity to form new *assemblages* by circulating between bodies in affective encounters. To illustrate, as a result of ritualistic sit-in protests, the Saturday Mothers have formed a new social group who have a sense of solidarity among themselves and "have been affectively connected to each other and remained so for a long time" (Can, 2022, p.470). Besides, holding out the photographs of the disappeared people increased the affective dimension of the protests, and "[they] played an important role in connecting the families and other participants to the protest (Can, 2022, p.472). In this respect, the affective aspect of the sit-in protests has played a certain role in tying the group members to each other including the families of the disappeared people and human rights defenders.

Considering the affective aspect of sit-ins, police violence, and meeting bans harm or prevent the circulation of affect in the public area that holds the possibility to reinforce the tie between the group members and attract more people in time. They also inhibit the group members' exercising their affective capacity by not allowing people to express their emotions. Those cases fall in the frame of affective injustice since the harm to affective capacity is engendered as a result of systematic oppressive politics. To further explain, in the sit-in protests of the Saturday Mothers, first, a particular group of people, who demand justice and whose loved ones are rendered unmournable through a state of exception, is targeted. Thus, the aforementioned harm is a subject of a social group rather than of an individual or individuals. Secondly, the excessive police violence and bans of meetings reveal how power might be exercised in a way to control/suppress the circulation of affects that hold a political potential such as building solidarity among people. In other words, how power, either intentionally or not, inhibits people's exercising their affective capacities. Thus, these political practices refer to oppressive affective politics. Lastly, since those practices do not occur randomly for one time but continuously, they are systematic. Considering all these points, the Saturday Mothers face affective injustice during their sit-ins.

3.4. "Mothering"

Regarding the political potential of circulation of affect in terms of building a sense of solidarity and an awareness towards injustices, the state would like to prevent the rise of sympathy with the Saturday Mothers and it fears how this sympathy will radiate through the population and shape a powerful feeling in society against its policies and actions. Therefore, they implement oppressive politics of which one aspect is affective. As discussed in the

previous section, police violence and meeting bans illustrate the state's control over the circulation of affect. However, these oppressive politics are not limited to police violence and meeting bans. They also have to do with the dominant discourse. Günaysu (2013), one of the women who initiated the gatherings at Galatasaray Square against enforced disappearances in 1995, states that at the beginning of the gatherings, they insisted on calling themselves *the Saturday People*. She articulates that the reason lies under this preference was the desire to challenge the global tendency to equate women with motherhood which is a tendency based on patriarchal cultures. However, the dominant media refers to the group as "the Saturday Mothers", and it has become the most used name in the media and literature through time.

On the one hand, as discussed in the previous section, naming and perceiving the group through the identity of motherhood benefited the group for a while. "The state apparatus did not see the sittings as a threat until the 170th week when the protesters began to gain increasingly broad support from the public as well as international acclaim" (Baydar and İvegen, 2006, p.696). On the other hand, the discourse of motherhood reduced the political agency of mothers to suffering mothers (Tanrıkulu, 2003; Baydar and İvegen, 2006; Karaman, 2016; Can, 2022). "It turns public attention away from the political content of the protest to the private realm of emotions. That is, possible political outrage is instead channeled toward private sentiments toward a mother who has lost her child" (Baydar and İvegen, 2006, p.696). Besides, the discourse of motherhood within the context of the Saturday Mothers played a crucial role in how the group is perceived by the dominant media, the public, and some politicians. Can (2022) states that "the Saturday Mothers were increasingly consumed as a spectacle of suffering in the mainstream media and official narratives" (p.473). She also points out how politicians focus on "suffering mothers" in their narratives rather than the demand for justice of the Saturday Mothers when they decided to take the issue of enforced disappearances on their agenda. Considering what discourse does in terms of limiting political agents to the frame of traditional motherhood and changing/reinforcing the way they are perceived, "discursive wars against the mothers reveal the power politics of naming. Labeling the mothers simply as oppressed or ignorant or as victims limit the possibilities for understanding the women's public performances in demonstrations" (Karaman, 2016, p.390).

Within the context of affect, the discourse of motherhood functions as a means to suppress and inhibit the political potential of affect that emerges through media representations. Similar to the political potential of affect in terms of bounding people to each other and attracting more people to the struggle for justice during sit-in protests, this potential might emerge through media representations. However, privatizing the grief of the Saturday Mothers

through the discourse of suffering mothers prevents the circulation of the grief in question in a way to emphasizes its political aspect. This point reveals the role of media representations in the context of the circulation of affect, and also it shows the virtual aspect of the circulation of affect.

Lastly, on the one hand, a discourse shaped around motherhood has operated in the dominant media, on the other hand, a "counter-discourse" against the legitimacy of the Saturday Mother has emerged (Karaman, 2016). In the first case, the political potential of the group is inhibited by representing them as apolitical suffering mothers. In the second case, namely, in the case of counter-discourse, the Saturday Mothers are placed outside of ideal motherhood that "would produce 'proper Turkish subjects'" (Karaman, 2016, p.389). Karaman (2016) points out the relationship between the sacredness of motherhood and Turkish nationalism and argues that as long as Turkish and Kurdish mothers of the Saturday Mothers do not serve the ideals of Turkish nationalism, "they were immediately excluded from the notion of motherhood or the legitimacy of their position was measured against normative models such as the Friday Mothers," who are the mothers of dead soldiers (p.399).

These two discursive strategies discussed in this section showed that through the power of discourse, the political potential of affect has been either oppressed by depoliticizing the Saturday Mothers in terms of reducing them to suffering mothers or harmed by creating a new discourse that undermines the legitimacy of the Saturday Mothers. To conclude, these two discourses reveal the strong relationship between discourse and the political potential of affect. Considering that the dominant discourse is shaped by those who hold power, the emergence of the political potential of affect is also closely related to power dynamics.

3.5. Remembering, Reminding, Reconstructing Memories

Starting from 1995, even though a ten-year break between 1999 and 2009, the Saturday Mothers is the longest civil disobedience movement in Turkey. Through their sit-in protests, they transformed their gatherings not only a space to demand justice but also a space to "remember, remind, and reconstruct their memories of state violence throughout their demonstrations as performative lullabies for their dead children as well as resistance narratives for the living ones" (Karaman, 2016, p.382-383). Contrary to the state's denial of politics or constructing its narration, the Saturday Mothers want the cases of enforced disappearances to be remembered as a social reality and ensure that this form of violence will never happen again (Karaman, 2016; Şanlı, 2018).

> As opposed to the murderers' efforts to efface the victims in unmarked graves, the mothers—as witnesses, survivors, and storytellers—offer up a remembrance. By making their wounds and silence publicly visible and audible, they remind us of the absence or disappearance of their loved ones. They were not "troublemakers." They had names. They were not "bare bodies" but people with smiling faces. They were not just numbers in human rights reports. They did not simply disappear and die. (Karaman, 2016, p.393)

As discussed in the section "Who is mournable?", Butler (2004) argues that some people are derealized in terms of being situated between death and life and rendered unmournable as a result of discursive limits. They argue that some of those people become ungrievable not as a result of a dehumanizing discourse, but rather of "a refusal of discourse that produces dehumanization as a result." (p.36). Considering Butler's discussion, the Saturday Mothers challenges the dominant media discourse that either does not give place to the enforced disappearances and leads the public to forget them or reduces the disappeared people into mere numbers by shadowing their humanity.

Moreover, the Saturday Mothers which is already composed of people from oppressed groups resist power dynamics that construct public memory in accordance with their agenda and also resist being excluded in memory-making processes as the people who experienced enforced disappearances most closely. "[The Saturday Mothers] were not only passive receivers of these omissions and suppressions; they actively participated in a struggle over memory. The resulting manifestations, public gatherings, and political claims thus produced different forms of memory-making…" (Göral, 2021, p.82).

Within the context of memory, the case of the Saturday Mothers reveals that some affective injustices emerge and continue as a result of historical events. In the cases of enforced disappearances, the families and relatives of forcefully disappeared people experience endless grief since those people do not have the dead body and, thus, cannot perform mourning rituals. This situation is perpetuated by states' not taking responsibility or starting fair trial processes. In addition to their endless grief caused by state violence, they encounter police violence, meeting bans, and some discursive strategies that either ignore them or confine them to suffering mothers throughout the process of their sit-in demonstrations in a way to prevent their expressing of emotions and circulation of affect in a politically transformative way. As a result of oppressive affective politics that inhibit those people from exercising their affective capacity, the members of the Saturday Mothers face a perpetuating affective injustice. This situation shows that some cases of affective injustice do not only have to do with the present

but also with the past and possibly with the future, thus, is the subject of memory and memory politics. Thus, to maintain permanent social justice, including affective one, it is of significance to make structural and institutional changes through which fair trial processes can start and through which collective memory is reconstructed by the narrations of oppressed people.

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to reconceptualize affective injustice in a way to use it as a theoretical tool to analyze the case of the Saturday Mothers within the frame of affective injustice. By critically engaging with the current literature on affective injustice, the thesis offered a new grasp of affective injustice grounded on Young's (1990) conceptualization of injustice. It is argued that affective injustice emerges as a result of oppressive affective politics and institutions embedded in these politics so that a group of people exercising and developing their affective capacities is inhibited or harmed. To further explain this understanding of affective injustice, the thesis introduced two ways of exercising and developing our affective capacities. The first one is to perform affective rituals such as grief rituals and the second one is to express emotions through which affect circulates. Drawing on this comprehensive conceptual analysis, the thesis argued that the Saturday Mothers face perpetuating affective injustice. This claim is discussed by examining the improper grief process and sit-in protests of the Saturday Mothers. The thesis analyzed the Saturday Mothers in-depth within the frame of the political significance of affect and affective injustice. By investigating different stages of the aftermaths of enforced disappearances, it is argued that the Saturday Mothers have faced affective injustice for a long time from different aspects: They experience inhibition of proper grief rituals and of expressing emotions through which the political potential of affect can emerge. Also, they are reduced to suffering mothers in the dominant discourse. This examination revealed that some cases of affective injustice have to do with the past, present, and possibly the future. Therefore, they are also the subject of memory and memory politics. It is of significance to note that by emphasizing the political agency of the Saturday Mothers, it is highlighted that they are not passive victims of oppression including affective injustice, but rather active political agents.

Although the thesis offers a close reading and in-depth analysis of the sources, the number of sources that are examined for the Saturday Mothers remained limited considering the vast literature on this subject. Nevertheless, each source provided a strong foundation and support for the main argument and discussions of the thesis.

The thesis contributes to the current affective injustice literature by reconceptualizing affective injustice in a way to renders it a theoretical tool that can be applied to a wide variety of cases. It also makes a significant contribution to the literature on the Saturday Mothers by being the first study that examines this case within the frame of affective injustice. Furthermore, this thesis offers a new perspective to approach the sit-in protests and the role of

discourse by tracing the political potential of affect and oppressive affective politics. This thesis deepens the current discussions on affective injustice by analyzing a historical case whose effects continue and for which the demand for justice still lasts. Regarding this, future research might examine the intersection of memory, memory politics, and affective injustice. Lastly, this thesis represents an example for future research that will examine the aftermaths of the enforced disappearances that happened in other countries within the framework of affective injustice.

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