Democracy under threat: Understanding mass appeal for undemocratic parties and practices

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Declaration

I, the undersigned Nemanja Stankov candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Central European University Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy, and International Relations, declare herewith that the present thesis, apart from Chapter II, is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. Chapter II is co-authored with Slaven Živković, a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science, Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of work of others, and no part the thesis infringes on any person's or institution's copyright. I also declare that no part the thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

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Abstract

In this dissertation, I explore the link between voter characteristics, religiosity, and right-wing authoritarianism, and particular types of electoral behaviour. Within a paper-based structure, the introductory chapter situates four empirical chapters in the framework of the democratic backsliding theory and its two dimensions - executive aggrandizement and strategic manipulation of elections. The first two empirical chapters focus on electoral support for populist far-right parties, which are recognized as the primary contributor to executive aggrandizement. The following two chapters focus on clientelist vote buying, a practice that severely skews the functioning of electoral institutions.

Specifically, in chapter II, we look at the radical right-wing parties' (RRWP) potential to mobilize religious voters. As the literature reports mixed results, we propose that religiosity increases the chance of voting for RRWPs when ethnic relations are a salient issue in the political system. By utilizing several European Social Survey and European Values Study datasets in a multilevel modelling approach, we find that religiosity is a significant predictor of the RRWP vote when there are salient ethnic relations in the political system proxied by the presence of an ethnic minority party.

In chapter III, I depart from a claim that the research on the origins of populist party support suffers from its broad conceptualisation of the populist radical right party family (PRR). I examine the link between authoritarianism and party support/appeal based on the ideological distinction between the three subfamilies within the far right: (a) the far right, (b) the populist right, and (c) the populist far right. Based on the analysis of Slovakia (2017), Austria (2013), and Serbia (2008-2012), the results show that individual levels of authoritarianism were associated with party support or the appeal of the far right and the populist far right, rather than parties of the populist right.

In chapter IV, I focus on the decision of patrons/brokers on whom to target for clientelist exchange. Building on the theories of norm-based compliance, I argued that authoritarian individuals should be more frequently targeted, as they should be more likely to comply with brokers' demands without any external monitoring. In a multilevel approach on Afrobarometer 5 dataset for 34 countries, I show that authoritarians have a higher chance of being targeted than non-authoritarian individuals by an average marginal effect of 3% and that this association increases as the district magnitude rises.

In chapter V, I revisit the question of why candidates/parties are able to secure re-election after corruption scandals occur. Moving away from the dominant explanation in the literature, I focus on the role of attitudinal characteristics in shaping perceptions of vote-buying allegations. With two studies from Montenegro, I experimentally show that authoritarian submission is related to higher support rates for candidates who allegedly use vote buying (Study I), followed by an observational study that links authoritarian submission with the perception of vote buying as a good rather than a bad practice, conditioned on the perception of election importance (Study II).

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Lastly, I dedicate this dissertation to my family. I started this journey without understanding how it would shape my life and the lives of people around me. My parents, Slavica and Rade, and

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Chapter I

Introduction

DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING AND MASS SUPPORT

'So, while democracy remains the only
game in town, many are beginning to doubt
whether it is a game worth playing.'

Ivan Krastev (2012)

European Disintegration?: A Fraying Union

1.1 Contemporary challenges to democracy

Following the 2020 presidential election in the United States, on January 6th, 2021, a mob of Trump supporters stormed the Capitol Building in Washington D.C., aiming to disrupt the joint session of Congress that had assembled to count electoral votes and formalize the victory of Joe Biden. Emboldened by the Trump claim that the election had been stolen, the 'Save America' rally quickly escalated into a riot that witnessed over two thousand people entering Congress and occupying it for several hours, assaulting law enforcement officers, looting, and vandalizing property. With Trump refusing to send in the National Guard, the remaining law enforcement agencies managed to clear the capitol by mid-evening, resuming the vote count that was finalized in the early morning of January 7th. In the aftermath of the event, numerous characterisations of what happened appeared, with some commentators even arguing that the riots had the characteristics of a failed *coup d'état*.

While this event was probably one of the most challenging episodes in the democratic life of United States in the 21st century, reports on blatant challenges to democratic institutions in the world are few and far between. Instead, they have given way to more subtle and illusive practices nested within the democratic system itself. Practices that gradually erode, disrupt, and eventually render useless the mechanisms that ensure the separation of powers, the rule of law, and free and fair elections. In a seminal work that provided the foundation for the contemporary debate on democratic backsliding, Bermeo (2016) demonstrated that a classic open-ended *coup d'état* is outnumbered by what she terms promissory coups, most notably conducted through ***executive aggrandizement*** instead of executive coups, and the prolonged ***strategic manipulation of elections*** instead of election day vote fraud. Along similar lines, Luhrmann and Lindberg (2019) claimed that we are indeed witnessing the third wave of autocratization, with gradual setbacks in relation to democratic practices conducted under a legal facade. The questions I start this dissertation from are these: what is new about this new wave of democratic backsliding or

autocratization, and what are the significant gaps in our understanding of how these processes unfold?

The answer to the first question may begin with a general conclusion from the literature on backsliding, that the first step on the path of backsliding is usually the electoral success of democratically disloyal populist parties or leaders (Cianetti & Hanley, 2021). Although not exclusively responsible for all backsliding episodes, most notable examples of backsliding are the work of right-wing populists, such as Fidesz in Hungary, PiS in Poland, AKP in Turkey, or even Trump in the USA. In that regard, once in power, populist parties and politicians tend to override the institutional constraints on the separation of power, claiming to channel the will of the democratic majority, typically a majority formed out of previously excluded groups and concerns (Cianetti & Hanley, 2021). The backsliding literature tends to focus on examining the processes and conditions that facilitate these backsliding practices; however, as most of the backsliding episodes nowadays begin with an electoral victory, the scholarship on these two phenomena is seldom linked[1].

The dissertation is structured within this gap, with the primary focus on the question of what can be learned about backsliding episodes by understanding the origins of mass support for populist parties and undemocratic practices. In that context, there are two processes that merit deeper understanding. ***The first process*** relates to the nature of party competition and the conditions that facilitate the success of anti-democratic forces in legally obtaining power through competitive elections. The literature on backsliding mainly focuses on the examination of the electoral strategies of the parties and the structural conditions that enable their success, without

[1] At most, the margin of electoral victory is treated as a condition that enables or limits the scope of backsliding practices. However, one notable exception is the study by Hanley and Vachudova (2018) in which they claim that the difference in the degree of backsliding episodes between Poland and Hungary on the one hand, and the Czech Republic on the other, can be attributed to the fact that in the Czech Republic Babiš and ANO were not able to amass electoral support to the extent PiS and Fidesz did. Consequently, ANO lacks the institutional power to push for either centralisation or broader executive aggrandizement practices. In a sense, understanding why ANOs electoral support is at a specific level can help us understand the nature of democratic backsliding in Czech Republic.

linking these to individual electoral behaviour. For example, several authors have demonstrated how, once in power, parties use identity issues to govern (Graham & Svolik, 2020), or employ ethnopopulism (Jenne, 2018; Vachudova, 2020) to polarize society and structure competition along identity and values (Polk *et al.*, 2017; Vachudova, 2019). Following that argument, in Chapter II, we[2] show how identity issues are exacerbated by the presence of ethnic minority parties signalling that identity politics is salient, further demonstrating that, under such conditions, religious voters are more likely to be mobilized to support populist radical right-wing parties. Equally, in Chapter III, I show that far fight dimension of right-wing ideology provides an electoral advantage among authoritarian voters even against other right-wing parties that incorporate similar ideological outlook (populism, Euroscepticism, and so on). The two chapters demonstrate not only that populism, radicalism, identity politics, or ethnopopulism, are effective political strategies for parties, but also that specific parts of the electorate are drawn by those ideas.

The second process relates to the fact that voters tend to disregard the anti-democratic policies enacted by these parties and reward them with re-election. In the area of electoral manipulation, the second part of the dissertation examines how the structural conditions, the electoral rules, and the quality of democratic institutions shape the decisions of patrons/brokers on whom to seek as collaborators for electoral malfeasance practices. Here Chapter IV shows that authoritarian individuals are more likely to be offered money/favours/employment in exchange for their vote, while in Chapter V, it is shown that authoritarian individuals are more likely to view clientelism as morally acceptable, particularly if they simultaneously believe elections are not important for the quality of their life.

The importance of such an approach stems from the shift in the type of political regime change nowadays. The nature of democratic erosion has shifted from blatantly illegal practices to

[2] This chapter was co-authored with Slaven Živković, a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science, Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz.

the distortion of the democratic system from within, conditioned on the capture of power through the ballot box. Consequently, the power to disrupt the system comes not only from structural factors, but also from legitimacy and the support these parties manage to mobilize through periodic elections. Furthermore, it is not simply that parties obtain power through elections, but also that they do not stay in power by solely using clear anti-democratic practices. Instead, they manage to gather significant electoral support to secure re-election. Although these elections may be flawed, and in some instances not free and fair, the elections are still held, and these parties are still competing for votes. As Slater (2013) suggests, this competition is usually structured along a different vision of democratic accountability, where populist parties/politicians claim to hold the legitimacy to override institutional constrains. Similarly, to understand the current state of democracy in the world, Schmitter (2015) argues that the most important aspect of democratic decline lies in the failure of accountability mechanisms, or the fact that voters are willing to accord legitimacy to the regime. Therefore, why voters actually support such parties, initially and in light of backsliding practices, is a crucial question which needs to be illuminated.

Despite the arguments presented above, linking these processes is a tall task, primarily because electoral success is a necessary condition, but not a crucial one in the process of the actual application of backsliding practices. For backsliding to occur, voters have to support populist radical right-wing parties to a significant degree, but an axiomatic generalization that electoral victory would definitively lead to backsliding cannot be established. In other words, the electoral victory is too far back in the causal chain to be regarded as a sufficient condition.

In the face of that limitation, the main contribution of this dissertation comes from the shift in focus from institutions to voters, and to the interplay between party strategies, the political context and the voter characteristics that results in stable patterns of support or the justification of malfeasance. Each chapter tackles a different dimension of the issue, mainly focusing on derivatives of dogmatic belief systems, religiosity, and authoritarianism, to theorize and empirically validate the

role of voter attitudes in supporting anti-democratic parties and practices. Chapter II analyses the salience of identity politics proxied by the existence of minority parties, as an unfairly neglected driver of radical right-wing party success and as a contextual moderating factor that shapes individual-level relationships, specifically the link between religiosity and radical right-wing parties. The main contribution of Chapter III lies in its nuanced approach to demand-side associations with ideological subfamilies within the populist far right. Examining the role of different dimensions of party (ideology) appeal can foster a deeper understanding of the perceptions and grievances within the electorate that these parties are able to capitalize on. Chapter IV introduces individual level authoritarianism as an explanatory factor for who the targeted voters for clientelist exchange are. Here, the chapter goes beyond the dominant approaches in the literature - core/swing ideological leanings, demographic characteristics or previously evaluated social values such as reciprocity, indebtedness, or preferences for democratic institutions. The main contribution of Chapter V is in its focus on the attitudinal characteristics of voters as a factor that could moderate the evaluation of clientelist allegations and produce varying behavioural consequences. Apart from a few studies in social psychology that have examined the association between authoritarian submission and general corruption intention, no previous attempts have been made to test the role of authoritarian submission in justifying vote buying strategies.

The introduction proceeds as follows. I first give a general overview of the conceptual debate within the literature on democratic backsliding, followed by the main theoretical explanations of ***why*** backsliding occurs. The subsequent section presents the dominant classification of backsliding practices that are situated in each of the empirical chapters of the dissertation. Next, the argument of the dissertation is presented. Lastly, the introduction is concluded with a few methodological notes on the type of research conducted, as well as certain measurement and conceptualisation issues related to the key concepts used in the chapters.

1.2 What is democratic backsliding?

Coming to terms with what democratic backsliding really is represents a tall task. In the broadest sense, it encompasses a variety of processes that erode the quality of democratic institutions through state-led debilitation (Bermeo, 2016). It is precisely here that the sharp conceptualisation of democratic backsliding becomes difficult. Democracy is comprised of multiple intertwined yet separate institutions, under the broad umbrella of participation, competitiveness, and accountability (Waldner & Lust, 2018). These institutions ensure the effective aggregation of interests, the protection of rights and the limitations of state power, political accountability, and the alternation of power, as well as political competitiveness and the election of representatives through free and fair elections. The erosion of each and any of these dimensions can be considered backsliding, although it is the nature of that erosion that help determine backsliding itself. Bermeo (2016) demonstrates a sharp decline in the prevalence of regime change following a *coup d'état*; instead, a more frequent occurrence is a series of discontinued actions that incrementally change the nature of the regime (Waldner & Lust, 2018). In that context, backsliding episodes undermine electoral competitiveness without completely wiping out elections; restrict participation without abolishing universal suffrage; and weaken checks and balances without abolishing the separation of powers all together (see Waldner & Lust, 2018). Moreover, while a general tendency to move away from democracy can be identified, the endpoint of the process is unknown and backsliding episodes can take on radically different trajectories (Cassani & Tomini, 2020). Irrespective of the different backsliding paths that can unfold in a particular case, some distinctive features of backsliding can be identified. First, democratic backsliding is primarily a within-state process led by elected officials, that came to power using democratic institutions and who are using those institutions to undermine the democratic system. Second, backsliding is an incremental rather than an abrupt change in the degree of democracy, that does not necessarily lead to a complete regime change.

There is an ongoing debate on whether democratic backsliding is occurring, albeit the dissenting voices are still in a minority (Cianetti & Hanley, 2021). Schmitter (2015) posits that a common conclusion of the qualitative and quantitative analyses of democracies being in decline is misleading; instead, democracies are transitioning, albeit to exactly what is not entirely clear. The key point Schmitter (2015) emphasises here is that focusing solely on the substantive performance of democracy and the quality of institutions conceals the processes that are unfolding in theses regimes. What matters more is the effectiveness of the accountability mechanisms and the willingness of the electorate to accord legitimacy to the regime. The former view leads to the conclusion that democracy is in crisis and declining, while the conclusion of the latter view is that democracy is transitioning and reforming.

Analysing the state of democracy Levitsky and Way (2015, p.45) commented on the literature's conclusion that over the first 15 years of the 21st century democracy has been 'under duress', in 'retreat', in 'decline', experiencing 'pushback', 'eroding', and ultimately that we are witnessing an 'authoritarian resurgence', saying that this 'is a gloomy picture indeed. It is not, however, and accurate one.' Instead, the conclusion of an existing democratic recession is a consequence of an overly optimistic classification of regimes in the first place, with an almost teleological tendency to view any authoritarian crisis during the 1990s as democratization (Levitsky & Way, 2015). Along those lines Levitsky and Way (2015) argued that many of the authoritarian crises that occurred were temporary weaknesses due to fiscal or state issues, and thus based on external pressures rather than a grassroots movement or other form of internal pressure for democratization. In other words, the scholarship is overestimating the reach of the democratic crisis and backsliding, as it can be argued that most regimes that are considered to be backsliding were never really democracies in the first place.

On a different note, while they recognize that a form of backsliding is occurring, some scholars challenge the analytical usefulness of backsliding paradigm (Cianetti & Hanley, 2021). Similar to how Levitsky and Way (2015) and Carothers (2002) critique the optimistic transition

paradigm of the 1990s, Cianetti and Hanley (2021) raise a similar objection to backsliding research, claiming that it is grounded in false assumptions. In particular, they question the idea that there is a linear sequence of events leading from and to a democratic regime, and that the end stage of democratic backsliding is a hybrid or full-fledged authoritarian regime. The risk here, Cianetti and Hanley (2021) argue, is the fact that even in regions where democracy is in crisis only seldom do democratic regimes backslide into hybrid or full-fledged authoritarian regimes. Instead, there is plethora of different paths and outcomes in between liberal democracy and autocracy[3]. In the words of Dan Slater, the real question is: 'How might we best make sense of instances where democratic game changes in decisive ways even as democracy neither collapses not more firmly consolidates in the process?' (cited in Cianetti & Hanley, 2021, p.72).

The answer here, Slater (2013) suggests, is to focus on the concept of democratic careening, 'a political instability sparked by intense conflict between partisan actors deploying competing visions of democratic accountability' (Slater, 2013, p. 731). The process results in movement that is not on a unidirectional line from and to autocracy or democracy, but from side to side without a stabilizing *status quo*. Rather than taking the regime towards hybrid or authoritarian system, the political conflict is between competing democratic claims – ***(a)*** a populist one that *channels* (emphasis mine) the democratic majority and therefore has the legitimacy to overcome institutional constrains; and ***(b)*** a 'liberal' one that defends constitutionality, the rule of law, transparency, and minority rights (Cianetti & Hanley, 2021).

Without attempting to reach a verdict on which framework has more empirical merit, they do share a central feature. In the backsliding paradigm, political elites are the ones that erode

[3] Looking at East and Central Europe, Cianetti and Hanley (2021) argue that Hungarian and Polish backsliding model awkwardly or not at all as a fit to the rest of the region. While populism, illiberal social conservatism, and attacks on media pluralism are present elsewhere in the region, they diverge in type, degree, and consequence. The electoral victory of Andrej Babiš in Czech Republic in 2017, and the inclusion of EKRE in the 2019 Estonian coalition government altered the political landscape, but it can be argued that neither of these changes amount to backsliding. Furthermore, these two cases, as well as those of Slovakia and Bulgaria, show that the central theme of the backsliding paradigm, electoral dominance, is not a necessary condition for backsliding at all. Instead, oligarchic structures and corporate power structures are sometimes capable of party and state capture, a feature that would be largely missed if backsliding paradigm was taken as the central analytical framework.

democracy after an electoral victory. In the careening paradigm, political elites are the ones that erode democracy, not necessarily after an electoral victory, and this could also be a product of other processes that are unfolding, such as the state capture by the corporate elites. Nevertheless, it is political actors that ultimately alter the nature of the regime itself. A logical follow up question is then: why does this occur?

1.3 Why backsliding occurs?

There is a myriad of explanations for ***why*** backsliding occurs. In a review article Waldner and Lust (2018) give an overview of explanations of backsliding, grouping them into five categories: ***(a)*** agent-based theories, ***(b)*** theories of political culture, ***(c)*** theories of political institutions, ***(d)*** theories of political economy, ***(e)*** and theories of social structure and political coalitions. From a brief overview of the literature, it is evident that despite the potential of different theories to explain parts of the problem, particular backsliding strategies are employed by specific political actors that push the regime farther away from democratic standards. In other words, it is the conscious choice of political elites to weaken the democratic system. In that context, I posit that any successful examination of democratic backsliding should depart from agent-based theories.

Looking at the success and failure of democracy in Latin America, Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (2013, p.5), make this point abundantly clear: 'Political actors, not structures or cultures, determine outcomes, […]', although it would be a mistake to theorize as if they are unconstrained in their political choices '[…] even though structures and cultures affect the formation and preferences of actors'. Nevertheless, when conditions are present that facilitate democratic backsliding (the level of development, income inequality, class structure and so on), the resilience of democratic regimes may come down to the normative attitudes of political actors towards democracy or autocracy. When political actors have strong normative preferences for democracy, the democratic system is more likely to survive (Mainwaring & Perez-Linan, 2013).

While the emphasis on actor agency in the process of democratic backsliding and regime change has a lot of merit, Mainwaring and Perez-Linan do imply that actors are mostly unconstrained in their political choices (Waldner & Lust, 2018), and that the most important factor guiding elite behaviour emerges in the shape of their values and attitude formation towards democracy. However, it would be misleading to analyse backsliding episodes as if political elites operate in a vacuum. One set of constraining conditions can revolve around *political and institutional factors*, where a government facing little control may be the key factor in backsliding (Tomini & Wagemann, 2017). For example, when comparing the backsliding processes in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, Cianetti and Hanley (2021) showed that political elites share similar strategies, built on the foundations of populism and illiberal social conservatism, but diverge in the degree of change exercised within the system. In other words, 'the presence of a strong but less than dominant populist party at the heart of the political system can generate a distinct dynamic, which amounts to something less than backsliding but more than politics as usual' (Cianetti & Hanley, 2021, p.71).

What appears to be the first distinct characteristics that is related to the degree of change within the political system is the margin of electoral victory (Cianetti & Hanley, 2021). In Hungary and Poland, where the electoral victory of Fidesz and PiS was dominant, backsliding episodes were more substantive, while ANO was not able to exact the same amount of control over the political system in the Czech Republic. Typically, these parties embrace an extreme version of populism with the promise to safeguard 'the people', that is 'us', from 'them', the corrupt elites, outsiders, traitors or foreigners (Grzymala-Busse, 2017) either as an electoral strategy (Vachudova, 2021) or a way to justify the manner in which they govern (Graham & Svolik, 2020). Through what some have labelled as ethnopopulism (Jenne, 2018; Vachudova, 2020) these parties successfully shift the focus of political competition from socio-economic issues to the sphere of identity and values (Polk *et al.*, 2017; Vachudova, 2019), an area of contestation much more conducive to sharp societal

polarization[4]. When the polarization of society is present and 'others' are portrayed as an existential threat, rather than as legitimate political opponent, it is a small leap to a system where winning the election is more important[5] than maintaining the integrity of the electoral process, or more generally of the entire constitutional order (Graham & Svolik, 2020).

However, the effects of polarization on the characteristics of the political system are conditioned on the amount of political power these parties initially acquire. In this context, Haggard and Kaufman (2021) state that polarization is conducive to backsliding if the would-be autocrats can capture the executive and ensure substantive control of the legislative branch of power, in order to enable or at least not stand in the way of the concentration of power and legal authority. This brings us back to the claim that the margin of electoral victory is the first condition that is a precondition of the backsliding episode (Bermeo, 2016). Therefore, to understand the origins of backsliding episodes, it is important to examine the bases of the electoral appeal of these parties and what sections of the electorate they are successful in mobilizing.

1.4 The Structure

1.4.1 Executive aggrandizement and electoral behaviour

A picturesque description of backsliding would probably be to say that it is a death by a thousand cuts. Nevertheless, these cuts can be organized into a useful conceptual framework. In that context, Bermeo (2016) outlines three types of backsliding practices – promissory coups[6],

[4] In their analysis of democratic breakdown and regression, Tomini and Wagemann (2018) use a fuzzy set QCA showing that sufficient conditions for democratic breakdown can be associated with (a) conditions of economic inequality or (b) economic underdevelopment and ethnolinguistic fractionalization, with the former being present in three out of four identified paths towards democratic breakdown. While no direct link was established in the paper, it can be argued that societies with high levels of ethnolinguistic fractionalization are more likely to be highly polarized on identity issues as well.

[5] Supposedly to safeguard 'us' from 'them'.

[6] The first of these, ***promissory coups***, often frame the ousting of an elected government as a necessary step in the defence of the democratic regime; moreover, there are usually followed by a promise of subsequent democratic elections. In 2006 in Thailand, parts of the security apparatus overthrew the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra (a Montenegrin citizen since 2009) while he was attending a United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. A military junta under the name of the Council for Democratic Reform, declared martial law, dissolved both houses of parliament, the constitutional court and the cabinet, and suspended the Thai constitution. In the days following the

executive aggrandizement, and the strategic manipulation of elections. This dissertation is organized around two of these larger themes within the literature on backsliding – ***executive aggrandizement*** and ***the strategic manipulation of elections***. The following section briefly outlines the various strategies of executive aggrandizement and links the first two empirical chapters with this topic.

The uniqueness of ***executive aggrandizement*** lies in the fact that elected officials slowly introduce institutional changes that limit the power of the opposition to challenge executive preferences (Bermeo, 2016). Note that the key characteristics of aggrandizement revolve around the fact that ***(a)*** parties and politicians won the election and were legally elected to fill the executive positions, and ***(b)*** they use democratic institutions to change the system from within. Regarding the latter, once in office, one avenue these parties can pursue is to make changes to the political economy, as Esen and Gumuscu (2018) argued occurred in Turkey, where AKP gradually built politicized state institutions that ensured that capital can be directed away from opponents towards regime supporters, and rents can be distributed to supporters, skewing the playing field in AKPs favour. As an example of the strategies used, following the 2008 financial crises, a series of presidential decrees limited the independence of the Independent Regulatory Agencies, bringing them back under the umbrella of several ministries, making them malleable to the political influence of governmental elites, which ultimately allowed for the transfer of capital, resources, and other privileges to pro-government businesses (Esen & Gumuscu, 2018). Similarly, a centralized system of crony capitalism was installed in Hungary (Magyar, 2016).

coup, on September 21st, the Council for Democratic Reform pledged to restore the democratic government within one year. Two months after the coup, the Council of National Security issued a white paper detailing the reasons for the coup, listing issues such as the abuse of power (nepotism, corruption, and the investigation of government opponents), interference with the system of political checks and balances (interference in appointments to the Electoral commission and the Constitutional court), and human rights violations (the extrajudicial killings of drug suspects). The forthcoming election planned for October 2006 were cancelled and the transition of power to civilian authorities was postponed. The election was held with a year's delay in December 2007, where Shinawatra's allies were allowed to regain power through the ballot box.

Another avenue is to seize control of the horizontal checks and balances on various branches of power, as in Poland and Hungary, by controlling the constitutional court and prosecutors' office, changing the electoral rules, and controlling the media (Vachudova, 2020). Both Hungary and Poland introduced legislation that established the predominant position of the legislative branch of power (Fidesz and PiS, respectively) in the matters of judicial appointments, mainly through the National Judicial Office in Hungary and National Council of the Judiciary in Poland (Holesch & Kyriazi, 2022). The retirement age of judges was lowered, forcing changes in the judiciary, which was now firmly under partisan control, that amounted to the replacement of approximately forty percent of all judges in Poland. Moreover, the disciplinary system from 2018 and the 'Muzzle Law' from 2020, 'allows for punishing Polish judges if they question the government's judicial reforms, ask the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, or even make public statements' (Holesch & Kyriazi, 2022, p.15). In Turkey, constitutional amendments transferred the power to appoint fourteen out of the seventeen Constitutional Court judges to the president (Turam, 2012).

In the electoral arena, Hungary's Fidesz passed an electoral law that, among other things, ensured the government has a majority at almost every level of the commission supervising electoral procedures, enabled the nationalization of the IT systems used for vote processing, and enabled the concealment of electoral lists for Hungarians living abroad (Magyar, 2016). Additionally, out of all backsliding cases in the EU, Bakke and Sitter (2020) claim, only the Hungarian government can unilaterally change district boundaries, electoral rules and the Electoral Law itself. In the Polish case, the 2018 changes to the Electoral Law saw a significant institutional reorganization of the National Electoral Commission (PKW), responsible not only for the implementation of the elections but also for the allocation of funds to political parties. Under the new provisions, seven out of nine judges who make up the PKW are appointed by the Polish parliament, the Sejm. Moreover, the head of the National Election Bureau, the main executive arm of the PKW, is chosen by the PKW from a range of candidates submitted by the Minister of the Interior. This institutional

setup renders the regulatory and supervisory role of the PKW obsolete and puts it firmly in the hands of the incumbent party[7] (Sadurski, 2019).

Control of the political and electoral processes is often complemented by steady control of the media. A prime example of these practices is a 2004 change to the penal code adopted in Turkey, which criminalized media coverage of any topic deemed controversial by state authorities (Bermeo, 2016). A step further in that direction is the establishment of a mixed media ownership structure, as has been implemented in Hungary, where the regime succeeded in nationalizing the Hungarian News Agency and is a major market participant through the Media Support and Asset Management Fund, that amounts to roughly 260 million euros (Magyar, 2016). By strategically distributing advertising money to pro-governmental media, it succeeded in distorting the media landscape (Batorfy & Urban, 2020). While PiS has not been able to penetrate the independent media market to the degree Fidesz did in Hungary, a similar objective has been reached through its support for partisan media outlets (Holesch & Kyriazi, 2022).

This brief overview demonstrates that the literature on executive aggrandizement is mostly focused on understanding the exact mechanisms and processes that result in the weakening of democratic institutions. Although not exclusively responsible for executive aggrandizement, the usual suspect here are populist radical right-wing parties, as demonstrated in the paragraphs above. However, despite the focus on specific parties as the main culprits, an area that is largely neglected, or more precisely, largely unconnected with the broader literature on backsliding, is the basis of the electoral support for these parties. As mentioned in the opening paragraph of this section, to implement executive aggrandizement practices and undermine the system from within, parties need to enter into office through election victories, and subsequently win re-election after some sort of

[7] The chairman of the PKW, Mr Wojciech Hermeliński, a former judge of the Constitutional Court, characterized the 2018 changes as '… a departure from a judiciary-based system which guaranteed the transparency and impartiality of the elections, and a move in the direction of commissioners who may be close collaborators of political parties. ... The changes in the electoral [law] are dangerous for the impartiality of electoral process...'(Nizinkiewicz, 2018, cited in Sadurski, 2019, p.143).

aggrandizement practices have been put in place[8]. On that note, the executive branch is required to seek the endorsement of the voting public through periodic elections and should understand which types of executive overreach and backsliding practices will be acceptable to the electorate, and which practices will be detrimental to their electoral result.

The first two empirical chapters deal with some of these questions, specifically related to which parts of the electorate populist radical right-wing parties are able to successfully mobilize. In Chapter II, we examine the patterns of support for radical right-wing parties (RRWP) in Europe in the 2010s. By using two international databases, the European Social Survey ESS and the European Values Study EVS, we look at the interaction of individual level characteristics and country level factors across time, that contribute either to increased chance of voting for (ESS) or supporting (EVS) radical right-wing parties. While some have argued that RRWP success can be understood as a reactionary process to the electoral success of minority parties (at least in Eastern Europe) (Koev, 2015), we apply a similar logic, limiting the argument of the chapter to the presence of minority parties as a proxy for identity issues being a salient topic of political contestation. The chapter demonstrates that RRWPs have a disproportionately higher chance of mobilizing religious voters when identity issues are a salient political topic. The rationale for such a research strategy with regard to executive aggrandizement is the general tendency that once in a position of power, these types of parties are the primary suspects responsible for the onset of democratic backsliding. Furthermore, it is important to analyse a wider universe of cases than those where backsliding has already occurred, as recent research has shown that even in well-established and consolidated democracies, voters might be prone to the justification of executive aggrandizement[9](Gidengil *et al.*, 2022). Furthermore, we examine these issues longitudinally, through three rounds of ESS that

[8] In a similar vein, Khaitan (2019) makes the observation that as executive aggrandizement is becoming more frequent, it is a signal that democratic systems are in crisis, particularly a crisis of executive accountability, rather than a broader crisis of constitutionalism, democracy, or liberalism. On top of horizontal and vertical accountability, Khaitan (2019) points to electoral accountability as well.

[9] On that note, Gidengil *et al.* (2022) show that partisan voters in both Canada and the USA are willing to condone the weakening of restrains on the power of the executive if it serves their ideological agenda.

cover a period between 2013 and 2020, implicitly examining the failure of accountability mechanisms and accounting for the potential influence which backsliding practices have exerted on the electoral body in countries such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro among others.

In Chapter III, I analyse the association between individual level authoritarianism and the vote for radical right-wing parties. I focus on three cases, Austria, Slovakia, and Serbia, taking into consideration the ideological content of right-wing parties successfully[10] competing in elections. Patterns of support for three distinct groups of parties are analysed – **(a)** populist; **(b)** far right (nativist and authoritarian); and **(c)** populist far right (populist, nativist and authoritarian) parties – with the results pointing to two conclusions. First, the general rule that right-wing parties have an electoral advantage among authoritarian individuals is partially confirmed in these three cases (with the exception of Slovakia). Second, a more nuanced approach reveals that parties that incorporate far right ideology (nativism or authoritarianism) are more successful in mobilizing authoritarian individuals than those who incorporate a populist outlook. In that regard, in the Austrian case, voting for populist far right parties – the Alliance for the Future of Austria BZÖ and the Freedom Party of Austria FPÖ - was associated with individual level authoritarianism, while voting for a populist party - Team Stronach – was not. In Slovakia, voting for far right (Kotleba), and populist far right parties (We are Family and Slovak National Party), was associated with individual level authoritarianism – while vote for a populist party (Olano) was not. In Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić was more successful among the authoritarian electorate in 2008 while he was authoritarian nationalist, than in 2012 when he transformed to a conservative populist.

The two chapters in question do not focus on mapping out the specific backsliding episodes, nor on the analysis of the structural conditions that facilitate the implementation of anti-democratic policies. Instead, I take a step back and explore the electoral support for populist far

[10] Successfully in terms of their ability to pass the electoral threshold and enter parliament.

right parties, as the distinguishing feature of that far right ideology is opposition to liberal democracy principles and its limitations to popular sovereignty (Mudde, 2007). The importance of such an approach lies in the fact that this core belief held by populist far right parties/politicians provides ideological justification for implementing executive aggrandizement. Therefore, the dynamics of democratic backsliding are not confined to specific mechanisms and policy changes that alter the nature of the regime, but rather extend to the manner in which parties legitimize these practices as well. Parties not only use core beliefs for their justification, but also ground their legitimacy in the fact that they have managed to succeed at the ballot box time and time again. Hence, the final piece of the legitimacy puzzle, comes in the form of electoral support for these parties. In that regard, understanding how and why backsliding occurs, is incomplete without an account that explores the reasoning behind the decision to vote for these types of parties.

1.4.2 Strategic manipulation of elections and electoral behaviour

The final set of backsliding practises falls under ***the strategic manipulation of elections***. While it can often be merged with executive aggrandizement (Bermeo, 2016) the primary goal here is to tilt the electoral playing field in favour of the incumbent, albeit in a way that means the elections themselves do not seem fraudulent. Through the framework of democratic backsliding, the strategic manipulation of elections is primarily viewed in terms of policy changes that tilt the electoral arena in favour of incumbents, rather than blatant election day fraud[11] (count falsification, ballot stuffing and so on). The former can encompass some strategies elaborated on previously, such as packing electoral commissions and changing electoral rules, with a key feature of the *new* practices of election manipulation being that they usually occur well before election day. However, while count falsification, ballot-stuffing and ballot box fraud are in decline (Bermeo, 2016) there are numerous strategies for which there is no evidence of decline[12], which are at the disposal of

[11] 'Today, only amateurs steal election on election-day.' Diplomat quoted in Klaas (2015).
[12] For example, Corrales (2020) demonstrates that vote buying is the single most present mechanism of electoral fraud in Venezuela in the 1999-2019 period.

political parties, and that effectively skew the electoral arena in favour of the incumbents. These strategies are both ***(a)*** long-term and strategic, and ***(b)*** elusive to election day monitoring. Here, I refer to various clientelist strategies that are transactional in nature, consisting of some sort of compensation (money, goods, favour, employment and so on) in exchange for votes. The breadth and effects of these strategies on election results are hard to detect through election day monitoring and usually require a long-term commitment from both brokers (the buyer) and voters (the seller). For these reasons, I would argue that excluding clientelism from the analysis of democratic backsliding practices understates the extent of electoral malfeasance.

An additional reasoning why clientelism should be central to the study of electoral manipulation stems from the fact that clientelist practices are not limited to unconsolidated or weak democratic systems, but also influence political processes outside of the elections themselves[13]. While state capacity can be associated with an overall level of clientelism[14] (Fortin-Rittberger, 2014; Bustikova & Corduneanu-Huci, 2017), the scholarship shows that clientelism flourishes even in wealthy consolidated democracies (Warner, 2007). As one example, Japanese politicians maintain vast personal networks (***koenkai***) that distribute material benefits to their constituencies (Scheiner, 2007), while American political machines engage in constituency services that sometimes cannot be clearly distinguished from clientelist exchange (Lawson & Greene, 2014). Additionally, Hill *et al.* (2017) analysed how political parties in England coordinate with influential members of the Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities (***biraderi*** elders), to exchange favours for votes. Similarly,

[13] Engler (2016) argues that when clientelism is a widespread practice, it binds the electorate to already established political parties, lowering the electoral prospect of new parties for two reasons. These parties do not have formed clientelist structures which allow them to compete with established parties, nor do they have access to state resources to build such structures. Additionally, even if they are in an unfavourable position, clientelism may be the only viable strategy for new parties to achieve electoral success. Guigal and Costinescu (2020) argue that the rise of the Romanian National Liberal Party (PNL) to the second largest party in Romania is primarily due to pork-barrel spending and the development of clientelist networks.

[14] For example, Fortin-Rittberger (2014) shows that infrastructural state capacity is associated with overall levels of electoral fraud, including vote buying, where countries with lower levels of state capacity experience higher levels of vote buying practices. Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci (2017) offer a valid explanation of why that might be the case. They argue that when trust in institutions (state bureaucracies) is at a low level, voters are incentivized to seek out more personalized relationships with power holders. This, in turn, is a fertile ground for the spread of clientelism and corruption.

in the analysis of the varying practices of patronage politics in Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, Kopecky and Spirova (2011) give an overview of the extent of patronage in Europe, showing that some Western European countries (for example Germany, Austria or Italy) record higher scores than the East European countries in question. In other words, they are more efficient in the allocation of jobs in the public and quasi-public sector, as well as important public positions, to party supporters.

The discussion above supports the decision to focus on clientelism. In that context, the remaining two empirical chapters explore the distinct role of authoritarian attitudes in the creation and justification of clientelist networks. The key question here is why accountability mechanisms fail, or more precisely, why voters are willing to support parties that utilize strategies that severely distort the functioning of democratic institutions. In Chapter IV, I examine the strategic choice made by brokers on who to target for clientelist exchange, based on the Afrobarometer Wave 5 data covering 34 countries from 2011-2013, and additional country level datasets for Sierra Leone, and Nigeria, from the unpublished Afrobarometer Wave 8 (2019-2021). Two conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. ***First,*** norm-based explanations (the attitudes and values of voters) seem to be associated with the decisions made by brokers to offer clientelist exchange. Here, I show that holding authoritarian attitudes is associated with a greater chance of being targeted, with an average marginal effect of ~1.3%. ***Second,*** the extent of authoritarian targeting varies with certain contextual characteristic. As clientelist targeting becomes less effective and more costly with the increase in district magnitude, the rate of authoritarian targeting increases. The marginal effect of being authoritarian on the likelihood of being targeted rises to 3% when the district magnitude is 20 or above. Additionally, the results demonstrate that, compared to autocracies, in democratic regimes that have stronger institutional limitations curtailing the effectiveness of clientelism, overall rates of targeting are lower. Simultaneously, authoritarian individuals are consistently targeted in democracies regardless of district magnitude, as the net contribution of district magnitude to the cost and effectiveness of clientelism diminishes in the light of functioning democratic institutions.

In the final empirical chapter, I examine the failure of accountability mechanisms to punish corrupt candidates. Focusing on the specific clientelist corruption practices of vote buying and economic coercion, the chapter analyses whether authoritarian submission can be linked to ***(a)*** a higher acceptance rate of clientelist candidates, and ***(b)*** the perceived harmfulness of vote buying to the functioning of the democratic system. For the former, with an original survey experiment study, I show that authoritarian submission can be causally linked with a greater propensity to vote for candidates under vote buying condition (as opposed to the control and coercion condition), with a total effect difference of four scale points (on a 7-point scale) between submissive and non-submissive individuals. For the latter, on observational data from the Montenegrin National Election Study from 2016, I show an association between submission and a tendency to morally justify vote buying, conditioned on the belief that elections are not important for the quality of their life. For individuals who believe elections are not important, the marginal effect of low to high authoritarian submission amounts to an increase from ~7.5% to ~47.5% chance of viewing vote buying as not bad.

Chapters IV and V relate to the overall literature on backsliding, and specifically on the strategic manipulation of elections, through several key dimensions. First, after the onset of backsliding episodes, the parties responsible often manage to win reelection (Fidesz won the elections in 2014 and 2018, PiS in 2015 and 2019) despite their history of antidemocratic governance. In other words, these parties have to continuously appeal to the electorate and mobilize significant support in the face of the backsliding practices that are employed. Note that the literature on backsliding does examine why accountability mechanisms fail, but primarily through a focus on the (electoral) strategies of various parties (see Cianetti & Hanley, 2021; Vachudova, 2020; 2021; Graham & Svolik, 2020; Jenne, 2018) and the institutional and political factors that constrain those strategies (see Mainwaring & Perez-Linan, 2013; Waldner & Lust, 2018), not the individual characteristic of the voters who are willing to condone those strategies. The chapters featured here examine the latter. The starting point here is the assumption that when

the distortion of democratic institutions is not only conditioned on the behaviour of political elites, but on voters as well, understanding the profile of those voters that would be more likely to accept and justify such practices is of central importance. On a general note, it is a fair assumption that at least a portion of the electorate has no issue with the implementation of antidemocratic policies and the centralization of power, and that this acceptance is associated with certain individual characteristics of voters. In that regard, both chapters offer evidence to suggest that the parts of the electorate that hold authoritarian attitudes **(a)** would be perceived as *natural allies* of antidemocratic elites and **(b)** would be more likely to justify the actions of those elites as morally acceptable. Additionally, bearing in mind the general tendency of authoritarians to approve of antidemocratic practices (for reference see Dunwoody & Plane, 2019), it could be extrapolated from their justification of clientelism, that they might be willing to justify other types of electoral manipulation as well.

1.5 The Argument

Building on the general synthesis of the previous sections, and the overall conclusion that, firstly, political elites interact with their environment, which constrains their choices in terms of political and electoral strategies, and secondly, that irrespective of the antidemocratic changes introduced into the political system, they ultimately have to secure significant popular support to both reach and remain in positions of power, I proceed with the argument of the dissertation. In the four chapters that follow, I examine the interplay between the broader characteristics of the political system and individual level preferences, to analyse the scope condition where these preferences translate into ***(a)*** support and voting for populist/far right political parties and ***(b)*** the acceptance and justification of antidemocratic (corrupt) practices.

The answer begins with the general assumption that the moral evaluation of political processes is central to the understanding both of the support for populist/radical political parties

and the justification and acceptance of antidemocratic practices. The decision to focus on moral evaluation is informed by the strategy employed by those political elites that implement antidemocratic practices and policies, usually justifying them as necessary so as to be able to defend 'the people', 'us' against a defined other, 'them'. Here, I explore two distinct yet closely intertwined concepts of individual religiosity and right-wing authoritarianism. In an overview of the psychological concepts used in political science Eckhardt (1991) posits that, among other elements, authoritarianism and religiosity are different aspects of the same thing. On a more specific note, Altemeyer (1996) suggested that religious fundamentalism is the equivalent of the religious expression of right-wing authoritarianism (see also Hall *et al.* 2010). On a more general note, what binds these two concepts together is a shared sense of moral evaluation, where 'good and evil are judged on the basis of superiority rather than equality, authority rather than consensus' (Eckhardt, 1991, p.120). As such, religiosity and authoritarianism share an inclination towards non-interpersonal morality, based on external sources of authority – the group, identifiable power figures, and divinity (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Similarly, Pachterbeke *et al.* (2011) show that religious priming among authoritarian individuals contributes to their moral rigidity, in the direction of abstract non-interpersonal morality. In the political arena, authoritarians interpret policies in the light of their values, whether they complement or conflict with them, and these values are commonly regarded as a part of persons religious belief system (Devine, 2012).

Empirically, several studies have found a high level of association between religiosity and authoritarianism (see Weller *et al.* 1975; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Wylie & Forest, 1992) with authoritarians seeing religion as an important part of their life (Blogowska & Saraglou, 2011) and practising their religion more frequently (Leak & Randall, 1995) although the strength of the association between religiosity and authoritarianism can vary across individual levels of education and societal levels of human development (Federico *et al.,* 2021).

Yet while they are related, religiosity and authoritarianism are associated with different outcomes in varying environments. Probably the most popular outcome in this context is prejudice, where some studies have found that both concepts can be related to prejudice towards minority groups (i.e., authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism, see Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), while some have shown that it is only authoritarianism that is associated with prejudice (Wylie & Forest, 1992). Alternatively, prejudice is best understood when religious fundamentalism is examined on the basis of its relationship with right-wing authoritarianism[15] (Hunsberger, 1995), as right-wing authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism have been found to fully mediate the relationship between religiosity and prejudice (Johnson *et al.* 2011).

At this point, it is a fair assumption that although similar in many ways, religiosity and right-wing authoritarianism will be associated with varying political outcomes (voting and support for antidemocratic practices) as well. Therefore, I separate the argument of the dissertation into four distinct sections, following the four empirical chapters.

In chapter II, we argue that ***the salience of identity issues enables voter-party linkages based on individual levels of religiosity***. I have demonstrated previously that polarization is an effective tool that right wing populists use to enable and justify backsliding practices (Haggard & Kaufman, 2021). We argue that polarization is expected to be found in political systems that have salient identity issues in the arena of political contestation, proxied by the presence of one or more ethnic minority parties. The argument here has two dimensions. Nativist political parties will ***(a)*** in general be more successful under these conditions and ***(b)*** will disproportionally mobilize specific types of voters. Regarding the latter, the salience of identity issues enables effective mobilization on the basis of a nativist political outlook, particularly among individuals that adopt the view that their society is under threat, whether in terms of cultural purity and ethno-nationalist identity, from

[15] On a similar note, Canetti-Nisim (2004) shows that negation of democratic values is associated with religiosity but only when it is mediated by authoritarianism.

a non-nativist 'them'. Specifically, where nativist parties particularly tend to capitalize on this mobilization strategy, given the condition of identity salience is satisfied, is among avowedly religious individuals.

In chapter III, I argue that that ***authoritarian individuals are more likely to support and vote for right wing parties that incorporate ideological nativism and authoritarianism rather than populism.*** With the right-wing party family encompassing a wide variety of ideologically distinct parties, a challenge emerges in understanding the differences and specificities of party ideology and how these specificities resonate with a particular type of voter. While there is a general tendency for authoritarian individuals to gravitate towards right wing parties, the structure of party competition can be associated with patterns of mobilization within the broader umbrella of the right-wing party family. When the party system incorporates a more far right option (i.e., parties with nativist or authoritarian outlook), authoritarian individuals will gravitate towards that option and away from populist ones.

In chapter IV, I argue that ***authoritarian individuals should be more frequently targeted for vote buying as they are more likely to comply with the demands of brokers without the necessity of external monitoring.*** Furthermore, I formulate the argument to apply to two levels of analysis – the individual and the contextual (country level). ***At an individual level***, not only would authoritarian individuals justify clientelist exchange as a legitimate electoral strategy, but in the context of limited external monitoring, it should act as a stabilization mechanism that establishes trust between brokers and clients that ***(a)*** clients will vote, and ***(b)*** brokers will provide. ***From the contextual point of view***, both the electoral rules and quality of institutions are associated with the overall cost and effectiveness of clientelist strategies. The type of electoral system, district magnitude, and the quality of institutions can facilitate/impede the establishment of the personalized relationships that are crucial to clientelist networks and can enable/limit the external monitoring potential of brokers to ensure that clients voted in the required manner. In

political systems where these factors are detrimental to the establishment of clientelist networks, as a function of efficiency and cost reduction, I argue brokers are incentivized to target authoritarian individuals at a higher rate.

In Chapter V, I argue that ***authoritarian submission should be linked to the moral justification of clientelist practices, grounded in their perception of power and hierarchy submissive individuals should be more inclined to perceive vote buying as a corruption practice that is not harmful to the functioning of the political system.*** As political candidates/parties increasingly manage to secure re-election, even in light of corruption allegation, by linking the perception of clientelism to the attitudinal characteristic of voters, the chapter provides an explanation of why the democratic accountability mechanisms fail to produce significant electoral consequences. Submissive individuals share a tendency to obey those who are perceived to be higher in a hierarchical structure, and they should be inclined to evaluate the actions taken by the established authorities as just and necessary, even if they fall outside the letter of the law. In circumstances when (illegal) vote buying allegations are made public, submissive individuals should be primed to morally justify the actions of the authorities as not particularly harmful.

1.6 A few methodological notes

With the variety of behavioural outcomes this dissertation aims to explore, the choice of research methods is guided by the specific theoretical assumptions made in the chapters. They are, however, firmly situated in the quantitative tradition. The first common theoretical assumption of Chapters II and IV is that the characteristics of countries (the higher level of analysis) are interacting with the attitudinal characteristics of individuals (the lower level of analysis), and that this interaction can be associated with specific behavioural outcomes. Therefore, the method used should be able to incorporate two modelling requirements - **(a)** that individual characteristics are in a hierarchical structure with country level characteristics (nested), and **(b)** that the interaction effect between the two levels of analysis can be estimated. Hierarchical or multilevel models offer

such a possibility and were deemed as the most suitable method to empirically test the propositions in Chapters II and IV. In reference to requirement **(a)** multilevel models assume the nested (clustered) structure of the data and avoid the violation of one of the basic regression assumptions, the independence of errors (Luke, 2014). In reference to requirement **(b)**, using multilevel models avoids 'propagating the notion that process work out the same way in different contexts' (Duncan *et al.*, 1998, cited in Luke, 2014, p.7), either by specifying a random intercept and slope model, or a cross-level interaction. The major difference between the two is in the fact that cross-level interactions allow for modelling the effect of a specific level 2 characteristic, and its influence on a level 1 relationship (Luke, 2014).

For Chapter III, I use logistic and multinomial logistic regression estimation, a choice that is informed by the structure of the dependent variables. Both approaches are based on maximum likelihood estimation, with similar interpretation where one unit change on the independent variable is associated with the log odds of belonging to each possible category (Pampel, 2000). In addition to the logistic regression estimation, multinomial extension allows for estimation in circumstances when the dependent variable is categorical but consists of more than two choices, by isolating the precise contrast between all possible pairs with the selected baseline category (Pampel, 2000). In this particular case, it allows for the estimation of vote choice for a specific party family in reference to multiple other possibilities (populist, far right, populist far right, or other).

Lastly, the final chapter of the dissertation introduces an original survey experiment fielded in October 2020 in Podgorica, Montenegro. Chapter 4 presents a 'split ballot' design, describing a situation in which an imaginary mayoral candidate presents his political programme in a newspaper interview varying the vote buying allegation levied against him – ***(a)*** the threat of contract termination or ***(b)*** the offer of employment in exchange for a vote. Despite the potential

shortcomings of this approach[16],the major advantage of a survey experiment is that the random assignment of observations to varying treatment conditions offers the opportunity to establish causality between the variables studied (Druckman *et al.,* 2011). Here, effective randomization allows us to hold other variables constant (unobserved heterogeneity), in order to isolate the effect of the treatment on the dependent variable. The specific research question studied in Chapter 4 does not actually allow for the experimental manipulation of the main independent variable, authoritarianism, but a between-subject design employed does allow for a causal interpretation of a conditional average treatment effect (CATE) (Martini & Olmastroni, 2021) - the interaction between authoritarianism and a type of corruption allegation (the treatment effect) on the main dependant variable – the propensity to vote for a candidate. Additionally, while the sample achieved is not large by survey standards due to active noncompliance (Berinsky *et al*., 2014) (n=216), the survey experiment was conducted in the field rather than in a laboratory or online setting, reducing the possibility that the identified relationship can be attributed to chance or convenience sampling (see Druckman *et al*., 2011). Furthermore, while the sample was not designed to be representative at the country level, stratified random sampling with urban/rural in Podgorica as a stratification variable, contributed to the local level representativeness and generalizability of the findings, particularly in light of some reports that analysis based on non-probabilistic and representative population samples in the political sciences on average report similar findings (Coppock *et al*., 2018).

1.6.1 Approach to measurement

1.6.1.1 Religiosity

The broader research on the individual corelates of religiosity is mostly focused not on the umbrella concept of religiousness but on more specific constructs and measurements of ***(a)*** religious fundamentalism and ***(b)*** religious orthodoxy, particularly Christian orthodoxy. On the

[16] In the political sciences, experimental studies can suffer from limits in terms of their external validity, generalizability, and robustness (Morton & Williams, 2010).

other hand, the literature on political behaviour uses religion in the broadest of senses, with a sporadic distinction between the behavioural aspects of individual religiosity (church attendance, prayer, and so on) and the attitudinal aspects – religious beliefs. This distinction presents the interesting question of whether a diverging pattern of relationship with individual vote choices emerges when religiosity is viewed as a unidimensional construct, as opposed to being seen as the separate dimensions of religious attendance and religious beliefs.

In Chapter II, we follow the argument of Montgomery and Winter (2015) that a valid estimation of the association between religiosity and vote choice should be based on a unidimensional conceptualisation of religiosity. Therefore, different measurement items[17] capturing various aspects of religiosity are transformed into a composite index and subsequently used to test the theoretical assumptions. However, Immerzel *et al.* (2013) suggest that religious beliefs and behaviour can have different associations with the RRWP vote. Omelicheva and Ahmed (2018) show that both formal and informal political participation is differently related to different aspects of religion, with beliefs often serving the role of a deterrent from political participation, while membership of religious organizations makes individuals more likely to engage in political activity. Similarly, different aspects of religiosity are differently related to support for democracy and democratic values (see Bloom & Arikan, 2012; 2013). On the one hand, the private aspects of religion, religious beliefs, is tied to a decrease in support for democracy. On the other hand, the communal aspects of religion, such as church attendance, seems to indicate more support for democracy (Bloom & Arikan, 2013).

A brief overview of the literature demonstrates that there is merit in a different approach, which I implement in this section to complement the primary analysis in Chapter II. The modelling strategy follows a similar logic to that of Chapter II and consists of identical model specifications,

[17] (a) Frequency of religious service attendance (7-point scale); (b) how often an individual prays outside of religious services (7-point scale); (c) and how religious an individual was (11-point scale).

and country and individual level controls, with the difference that here I estimate the cross-level interactions between ***(a)*** religious attendance and minority party presence, and ***(b)*** religious beliefs and minority party presence. Furthermore, I present the findings from two separate models, one on the entirety of the ESS sample (Waves 6, 7 and 8), and one where only those of Christian denomination are included (Table 1)[18]. The estimated effects of these separate dimensions are similar to the findings presented in Chapter II, albeit the individual effects of religious beliefs failed to reach statistical significance. The interaction effects are significant and in the same direction as in the main analysis, indicating that with the presence of a minority party in the political system proxying for the salience of identity issues, those who are more religious, be it through the measurement of beliefs or attendance, are more likely to vote for RRWPs.

However, the models present a few differences that are worth pointing out. I previously mentioned that the separate estimation of the associations of religious beliefs and voting for RRWPs failed to reach statistical significance, while the interaction effect was significant. Additionally, the effect sizes of both separate religious attendance and the interaction effect with minority party presence are larger than the ones reported in Chapter II. These findings would indicate that the main mechanism of association between RRWPs and religious individuals is associated with individual behavioural tendencies, church attendance, arguably as a consequence of their integration into like-minded religious communities. While it was previously argued that religious communal integration would act as a 'vaccine' against RRWPs and prime individuals to vote for Christian conservative parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009), the results of this analysis indicate that this argument is highly contextually dependent. In situations where identity issues are an integral part of political competition, the relationship goes in the opposite direction.

[18] While they were used for modelling, Table 1 omits the control variables at Level 1 and Level 2 and focuses on the main independent variables.

Furthermore, at least in reference to the specific research question in Chapter II, estimating the separate effects of attendance and beliefs proved to be fruitful.

Table 1: Associations between religious attendance, beliefs, and vote choice

	Vote for RRWP	
	Entire sample	Only Christians
Religious Belief	-0.014 (0.010)	0.001 (0.015)
Religious Attendance	-0.131***(0.019)	-0.160***(0.024)
Minority Party	4.168**(1.577)	3.830*(1.589)
Religious Belief*Minority Party	0.040*(0.016)	0.050*(0.023)
Religious Attendance*Minority Party	0.145***(0.029)	0.183***(0.038)
Constant	3.643 (2.761)	3.767 (2.769)
Observations	50 641	26 545
Log Likelihood	-16 696.1	-9 303.2
Akaike Inf. Crit.	33 984.2	18 652.5
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	34 187.3	18 840.8
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

1.6.1.2 Authoritarianism

Through the dissertation, I employ various measurements of authoritarianism, the choice of which was primarily determined by data availability for the specific issues examined in the chapters. Most notably, the chapter on the targeting of authoritarian individuals for clientelist exchange presents perhaps the most significant concerns with regard to the measurement items used. The aim of this section is to give a brief overview of the different measurement strategies of authoritarianism, and to offer arguments supporting the validity of the items used in Chapter 3.

It is clear that the measurement of authoritarianism has always been at the centre of the scholarly debate on authoritarianism, ever since Adorno *et al.* (1950) spearheaded the research on the political consequences of authoritarian personality. Originally conceptualising authoritarianism as a personality type consisting of nine dimensions (conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception, power and toughness, stereotypy and superstition, generalized destructiveness and cynicism, exaggerated concerns of sex, and the projectivity of one's aggressive impulses toward society), Adorno *et al.* (1950) utilize the F-scale for tapping into the

theorized dimensions. The approach was criticized in theoretical terms, as it is grounded in Freudian psychology, as well as in methodological terms, as the F-scale presents acquiescence bias and weak correlation among the items (Altemeyer, 1981).

In line with the criticism laid out in Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996), Bob Altemeyer suggested a conceptual refinement that limited the nine dimensions laid down by Adorno *et al.* (1950) to three (submission, aggression, and conventionalism) under the label of right-wing authoritarianism RWA. Additionally, while authoritarian tendencies were still regarded as relatively stable across time, RWA is conceptualised more as a predisposition rather than a personality type. Lastly, Altemeyer developed an RWA scale consisting of thirty items (positively and negatively worded statements) to measure the three proposed dimensions. The scale presents statements such as ***(a)*** Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that is ruining us. ***(b)*** Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else or ***(c)*** Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. The items presented should illustrate the primary objection levied against the RWA scale. Clearly, the scale consists of politically loaded measurement items, that subsequently blur the line between individual level authoritarianism and social conservatism, intolerance, and prejudice[19] (Feldman, 2003). In other words, it introduces exogeneity issues as responses to the questions can be influenced by the contemporary political context (Engelhardt *et al.,* 2021).

As a follow up to the criticism, a different measurement strategy introduced in the 1990s focuses on the choice between pairs of desirable qualities in children. The childrearing scale can be linked conceptually to the idea that authoritarianism is a disposition that places in opposition the values of personal autonomy and social control (Feldman, 2003). It is argued that this childrearing

[19] 'A reasonable critique of much research using the RWA scale is that it only shows that a measure of prejudice and intolerance predicts prejudice and intolerance' (Feldman, 2003, p. 45).

scale taps into authoritarian tendencies (in the form of the contrast between personal autonomy and social control) devoid of their political substance. Here, respondents are asked to choose between pairs of desirable qualities in children, for example (**(1)** independence vs. respect for elders **(2)** obedience vs. self-reliance **(3)** well-behaved vs. considerate **(4)** curiosity vs. good manners. However, most of the empirical support for the childrearing scale as a valid instrument for the measurement of authoritarianism comes from the correlation of the scale with concepts that theoretically should be linked to authoritarianism. Here, the scholarship refers to racial attitudes (Brandt & Reyna, 2014), LGBT rights (Miller *et al.,* 2017), stances on immigration (Kehrberg, 2017), or behavioural tendencies related to voting for far-right parties in Europe (Vasilopoulos & Lachat, 2017; see also Dunn, 2015). Only recently have scholars demonstrated that RWA questions are strongly related (across time) to childrearing items (Engelhardt *et al.,* 2021). Moreover, the results on the scale tend to be concentrated at the extremes, which is why the scale was recently refined through the introduction of four additional pairs of items (Engelhardt *et al.,* 2021). On the other hand, the greatest advantage of the scale is the argued elimination of exogeneity issues (Engelhardt *et al.,* 2021).

The above has outlined the primary points of contention in authoritarianism research[20], particularly related to the manner in which authoritarianism is measured. Two main questions can be isolated from the general debate, that relate to potential issues of measurement in the third chapter of this dissertation. First, are the items used valid measures of authoritarianism? And second, are they exogenous in relation to the dependent variable?

Regarding the first question, in Chapter IV, I use two pairs of questions from Afrobarometer to tap into the general authoritarian tendencies of respondents. Both questions

[20] Theoretically, the point of conjecture between the different approaches, whether conceptualised as personality type, disposition or even an attitude, is that authoritarianism should be quite stable and should be temporally prior to political attitudes.

present pairs of statements instructing respondents to indicate the degree to which they agree with one or the other (or neither). The first pair contrasts **(a)** The parliament should ensure that the President explains to it on a regular basis how the government spends taxpayers' money; with **(b)** The President should be able to devote his full attention to developing the country rather than wasting time justifying his actions. The second pair contrasts **(a)** Since the President was elected to lead the country he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong; with **(b)** The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong. While the Afrobarometer items cannot be directly linked to the items, either on F-scale or the RWA scale, I would argue that these questions examine a dimension prominently found in both of those. Specifically, they posit unlimited presidential authority in relation to parliamentary or judicial oversight. Furthermore, they are sufficiently general to ensure cross-cultural equivalence, that is the tendency to have the same meaning in different contexts. In a sense, they are tapping into the degree of submission to authority based on the president's position of power, not the rightfulness or validity of his/her actions.

Regarding the second question, measurement choices can introduce exogeneity issues, particularly as the scholarship points to the conclusion that this problem arises when authoritarianism is used in association with the *attitudinal preferences* of respondents. Therefore, it can be assumed that such problems might be less prevalent if the studied outcome is behavioural in nature. On that note, the dependent variable in Chapter IV is not an attitudinal characteristic of the respondents, but rather the behavioural action of the clientelist brokers, significantly reducing the concerns around exogeneity. For this reason, I would argue that the items used are sufficiently valid measures of authoritarianism and avoid the exogeneity problem.

1.7 Going forward

The dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter II we examine how religiosity is linked with support for the radical right, conditioned on the salience of identity issues in a multilevel

context. In Chapter III, I delineate between different party subfamilies on the right, based on their specific ideological outlook, and examine voter-party linkages for authoritarian individuals and a specific right-wing ideological content. In Chapter IV, I explore how patrons/brokers choose whom to offer money to in return for votes, in light of various institutional constraints that limit the effectiveness of vote buying. In Chapter V, I analyse the moral acceptability of vote buying with a particular focus on the authoritarian attitudes of targeted voters. Finally, the last chapter offers a theoretical reflection on the main findings of the dissertation and offers a number of conclusions.

Chapter II

MAY THE LORD PROTECT OUR COUNTRY: ETHNIC RELATIONS AS A MODERATOR BETWEEN RELIGIOUSITY AND RADICAL RIGHT VOTE[21]

'If we ever forget that we are one nation
under God, then we will be a nation gone under.'

Ronald Regan (1984)

Remarks at an Ecumenical
Breakfast Prayer in Dallas, Texas

[21] This chapter is coauthored with Slaven Živković, who is listed as a second author, and published in Journal of Contemporary European Studies. Slaven Živković is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science, Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz: Mainz, Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany. Statement explaining both author's role in development of the manuscript is submitted together with a dissertation.

2.1 Introduction

For God and Country could easily describe the majority of radical right-wing politics (RRWPs), yet despite the apparent and prominent role of religion, voter religiosity in explaining support for RRWPs has eluded consistent scholarly attention. While we know a lot about the typical type of RRWP voter, his (Givens, 2004) education (Betz, 1994), age (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997), attitudes towards immigrants (Van Der Brug *et al.*, 2000) and have clear data on various other topics, the relationship between religiosity and RRWP support has not been fully investigated so far. The scarce research on the topic has produced confusing evidence in this regard. On the one hand, it has been argued that religiosity leads to a decrease in the likelihood of voting for the radical right (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000). The main reason for this lies in the assumption that 'religious people are integrated in religious communities that are likely to vote for Christian party[22]; this makes them more likely to vote for traditional Christian parties, rather than RRPs' (Immerzeel *et al.*, 2013, p.946).

On the other hand, one of the key items on the agenda of radical right-wing parties is to 'warn of European civilization's destruction at the hands of non-Christian elites' (Montgomery & Winter, 2015, p. 380). This can make people feel religiously threatened by others (i.e., non-native citizens of the country), which has the potential to contribute to them voting for an RRWP (Raiya *et al.*, 2008). In the seminal work on the topic, Arzheimer and Carter found some evidence to support a positive relationship between the two elements in a sample of Western European countries and argued that religious voters would become increasingly available to radical right appeals as time passes (2009). A decade later, Marcinkiewicz and Dassonneville (2021) took another look at this question and found that in some countries there is clear evidence, of a positive relationship between religiosity and voting for RRWPs, while in other countries there is none.

[22] By 'Christian party' in this chapter, we mean the traditional well-established Christian Democratic parties that are found around Europe, such as the CDU in Germany, the CU in Netherlands, the OVP in Austria, and so on.

It seems that there is confusion on the exact nature of the relationship and its prominence. The variation in these relationships is puzzling, especially if we consider the fact that RRWPs often present themselves as the guardians of ethnic (Koev, 2015) and religious identity[23] (Froio, 2018; Montgomery & Winter, 2015) of the nativist population. In other words, if an RRWP calls for the protection of ethnic and especially religious identity, it is unclear how individual-level religiosity can be associated with either support for or opposition to those parties.

Since the most recent work on the topic has shown that both negative and positive associations are empirically observed (Marcinkiewicz & Dassonneville, 2021), we aim to extend our knowledge of this relationship and try to answer the question – What role do ethnic relations play as a moderator between religiosity and radical right vote? Are ethnic relations the factor that foster the activation of religiosity and result in support by religious voters for RRWP?

We argue that religiosity increases the chance of voting for RRWPs in countries with salient ethnic relations, where ethnic relations are one of the 'live' issues of political contestation. We argue in this chapter that the presence of ethnic minority parties'[24] proxies for a political context in which ethnic relations are politicized. Building on that assumption, a recent study by Koev (2015) provides insight as to when that might be the case. By looking at the aggregate levels of electoral success of both minority and radical right parties in CEE Europe, Koev (2015) argues that the electoral success and/or the presence of minority parties in the system or in government, increases the fear associated with cultural purity and the threat to ethno-nationalist identity, leading to higher levels of RRWP electoral support. We expand on this argument and claim that under such conditions, religious individuals are the ones who will be more likely to fear for the preservation of their cultural identity and to opt for RRWP.

[23] As an example, we can look at the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), and their Vienna Declaration of 2005, where they called for the protection of Christian values against an imminent Islamic treat.
[24] Throughout the chapter when we refer to a minority party, we are referring to ethnic minority parties.

Apart from Koev's study, minority parties have been unfairly neglected as a driver of RRWP success and as a contextual moderating factor that shapes individual-level relationships. The latter part of this gap is what we address and is the main contribution of the study. We demonstrate how and why the salience of ethnic relations proxied by minority parties accounts for religious voters' support for RRWPs. The first value of this approach should be in providing an insight into when we can expect religiosity to be related to support for RRWPs. Furthermore, as the presence of minority parties reflects the fact that ethnic relations are salient in a given political system, it is crucial to understand the profile of voters that might respond to such circumstances by opting for RRWPs.

Our assumptions are tested using multilevel regression modelling based on the European Social Survey Rounds 7, 8 and 9 and replicated on the European Values Study of 2017 (EVS, 2017). We find significant evidence to support our claim across multiple estimation procedures and model specifications. In particular, we find that religiosity is not a significant predictor of RRWP vote and can even be a detrimental factor in countries with no minority parties. When minority parties are present, indicating the salience of ethnic relations, religiosity is positively related to voting for RRWPs. Additionally, this pattern persists when ethnic relations are proxied by levels of ethnic fractionalization. Here, religious individuals tend to support RRWPs disproportionally more in countries with medium levels of fractionalization, compared to countries with low or high levels of ethnic fractionalization.

The article proceeds as follows. First, we conceptualise RRWPs and explain the dominant ideological dimensions. Then we outline how these dimensions are relevant to disentangling the story of the literature of RRWPs and religiosity. Furthermore, we outline the various mechanisms between religion and RRWPs and point out how and why ethnic issues, operationalized through the presence of ethnic minority parties should moderate that relationship. The subsequent sections

describe our data, methods, and the results of the analysis. Finally, we put our findings into a broader perspective.

2.2 What are RRW parties and who votes for them?

While our goal is to provide evidence for the contextual factor that accounts for religiosity as a predictor of RRWP vote, we first need to identify the ideological components that constitute such parties. As such, in this section we present previous findings on the typical characteristics of RRWP voters, which help us contextualize our findings and place them within the broader scope of research on the radical right in Europe.

Previous literature has suggested that radical right-wing organizations are borderline cases between movements and parties (Gunter & Diamond, 2003), sometimes perceived by the general public as Nazis and associated with those types of ideas (Rydgren, 2005). These parties are at their core ethno-nationalist and xenophobic, complemented by anti-political-establishment populism (Rydgren, 2005). In Western Europe, their central feature is their strong anti-immigrant platform (Arzheimer, 2009; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000; Van der Brug *et al.*, 2000). This created the crucial distinctiveness of what is a diverse party family and can be organized along three dimensions – nativism (promoting the economic and cultural interests of native inhabitants), authoritarianism (severe punishment for norm violators and the infringement of authority) and populism (the clash between the people and a corrupt elite) (Mudde, 2007).

Regarding voting for this diverse party group, a large body of research has produced consistent profiles across several demographic and attitudinal characteristics. The typical RRWP voter is usually male (Givens, 2004), young (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997), with a lower or middle level of education (Betz, 1994). Additionally, these people usually hold negative attitudes towards immigrants (Van Der Brug *et al.*, 2000), show higher levels of political distrust and euro-skepticism (Werts *et al.*, 2013), and are more likely to show general dissatisfaction with representative

democracy (Rico *et al.*, 2017) accompanied by a perception of the decline of society (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016). In terms of the political and societal context at the country level, previous research suggested that immigration and the unemployment rate, among others, are the most important contextual factors in explaining the rise of the extreme right vote (Arzheimer, 2009).

Taking these findings into account, how does religiosity fit in to the story of the RRWP vote? Previous findings on the nature of this relationship have been inconclusive, with some finding a positive relationship between religiosity and RRWP vote, while others found no relationship whatsoever. We assume this discrepancy arises from three separate issues: (a) the broad definition of the radical right party family; (b) the diverse conceptualisations of religiosity resulting in various types of religious sentiments as vote predictors; and (c) the lack of salient country-level factors that account for diverging relationship between religiosity and the RRWP vote. While the third factor is the focus of this article, we will also briefly describe the first two.

First, the literature does not clearly differentiate between the various elements of right-wing ideology when classifying political parties as RRWPs. Instead, the dominant conclusion is that these three dimensions are enough of a unifying thread to bind these diverse parties together (Koev, 2015). We argue that there is both a theoretical and empirical confusion between RRWPs and right-wing populist parties. We base this observation on theoretical and empirical arguments.

Theoretically, each dimension of the RRWP ideology carries (or not) a specific appeal to religious voters. As Montgomery and Winter argued (2015), 'Church attending Christians, for instance, might be less likely to hold populist (elite challenging) values but more likely to hold authoritarian (strong law and order) preferences.' It seems that a clear link between religiosity and nativism and authoritarianism can be drawn, while we do not see such a clear line of relationship with populism. Furthermore, treating populism as a sufficient condition for classifying a party as radical right-wing, might lead to empirical inconsistencies when considering the link between religiosity and RRWPs.

We expect that strong religious sentiment and church-going provides deep community relations and that consequently religious voters will genuinely care about the interests of their (cultural/nativist) group. This makes them much more responsive to nativist (identity-based) messages. Under such conditions, the perceived norm violating threat posed by migrants will be viewed as much more important than the perceived threat from the alienated political elite in the country. Lucassen and Lubbers (2012), suggests that concerns for cultural identity are the basis of support for radical parties. For this reason, we argue that the appeal of radical-right parties for religious voters comes for their nativist and authoritarian rather than their populist dimension. Therefore, when exploring the role of religion, RRWPs must have a nativist (native born) ideological outlook.

While this distinction might feel redundant, since nativism is an ideological dimension of all RRWPs, we find it necessary to point it out. We argue that inconsistencies regarding the relationship between RRWP vote and religiosity arise when populism alone is considered a sufficient condition to label a party 'radical right.' Following this view, studies such as the one by Montgomery and Winter (2015) that include a variety of distinct parties in their classification of the radical right and which conflate RRWPs and right-wing populist parties, not surprisingly report a range of positive, negative and neutral effects of religion on the propensity to vote for such parties. To illustrate, the study reports a negative relationship between religiosity and voting for Public Affairs (*Věci veřejné*) in Czech Republic, a party that is classified by the authors as radical right-wing but which was anti-establishment populist without a clear anti-immigration or nativist ideology. Similarly, Guth and Nelsen (2019) find that right-wing populists attract individuals detached from religious institutions.

On the other hand, studies that limit their classification of the radical right to anti-immigrant politics (ethnocentrism or nativism respectively) find positive effects of religion on RRWP vote (Van Der Brug & Fennema, 2003; Van Der Brug *et al.*, 2000; Molle, 2019). Similarly,

parties that dominantly monopolize nativist issues (such as Fidesz in Hungary, and Law and Justice in Poland) manage to capitalize on the religiosity of the electorate (see Montgomery & Winter, 2015). This observation gives merit to the claim that it is the nativist message that appeals to religious voters. Following this statement, we classify parties as RRWP only if a clear nativist ideology is a significant part of their political program.

Second, the confusion on the issue may arise from conflating the relationship between various types of religious sentiments and how each dimension of religiousness can relate to support for RRWPs (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009; Esmer & Pettersson, 2007). We refer to two particular types of religiousness: religious practices and religious beliefs. While not many studies analysing religiosity and voting make this distinction, some have argued that these dimensions could have a different effect on RRWP vote (Immerzeel *et al.*, 2013). Despite this observation, Montgomery and Winter (2015) argued recently that all dimensions of religiosity need to be accounted for when estimating its effect on RRWP vote. Simple conceptualisations of religiosity focused on one dimension not only omit parts of religiosity but may also underestimate the total effect religiosity might have on RRWP vote (Bartels, 1998). For this reason, we argue that only focusing on all aspects of religiosity, beliefs and practices alike can portray an accurate picture of the voting tendency for RRWPs.

Third, and most importantly for this research endeavour, the extant literature fails to distinguish between salient county-level factors that account for the diverging effects of religiosity. Instead, authors usually look at the strategies of specific RRWPs in attracting religious voters. However, party strategies tell us only about the core party ideology, and not about when or indeed whether the ideology is salient and important to religious voters.

In this research, we focus on examining the favourable contextual conditions that would direct voters towards these parties (see Arzheimer & Carter, 2009). The most recent research findings in the field show us that context matters. Marcinkiewicz and Dassonneville (2021),

revisited Arzheimer and Carter (2009), and found that religion plays a role as a predictor of RRWP vote in some European countries, while in others it does not. We try to build on their paper and to provide an explanation for this difference across countries. Relying on Koev's work (2015) we posit that the salience of ethnic relations in the country activates religiosity as a predictor of RRWP vote. The following section elaborates on this idea.

2.3 Support for RRWP parties – religiosity in a specific political context

Previous research suggests that typical RRWP voters are more alienated people, individuals who are living in *atomized* societies, without meaningful connections with others (Rydgren, 2008). RRWPs usually appeal to these voters through nationalist or populist agenda, promoting the ideas of '*us versus them*' (others, such as migrants and/or the elite, whether real or imagined). This way, they provide a sense of security through belonging to a broader group for those that are socially alienated (Fontana *et al.*, 2006). For most Western European countries which have experienced the rise of RRWP popularity *them* were portrayed as immigrants. Furthermore, Ivarsflaten (2008) found that no RRWP has managed to mobilize support in West without mobilizing the anti-immigrant vote. Additionally, as Arzheimer and Carter (2009) previously, and Marcinkiewicz and Dassonneville (2021) recently showed, established Christian-Democratic parties in the West still manage to mobilize almost all religious voters.

On the other hand, in Central Eastern Europe (CEE), these Christian-Democratic parties have not taken root for a variety of reasons. Thus, religious voters are more prone to giving their support to various different political options. This leaves room for RRWPs to try and mobilize them. The problem which occurred is that the CEE region has not faced that much pressure in terms of cultural heterogenization during the immigration crisis in Europe. That did not stop RRWPs, and it is our assumption that they used ethnic differences within CEE countries to mobilize voters, and to present ethnic minority groups as *them*, the ones which will try to become

newly empowered and to 'use their influence to improve their standing at the expense of the majority' (Koev, 2015, p. 651).

With *us vs. them* mobilization strategies used in both Western and Eastern Europe, the question is thus why religious voters are, or appear to be, most susceptible to the RRWPs pleas. Two comparative studies by van der Brug *et al.* (2000) and van der Brug and Fennema (2003) show that church attendance was predictive of voting for anti-immigrant parties as well. It is quite possible that because church-attending individuals are deeply integrated into their culturally like-minded communities, they feel much more threatened by outgroup members and cultural diversity. RRWPs tend to capitalize on these fears. Furthermore, previous research has indicated a clear relationship between religiosity and ethnocentrism, or religiosity, and ethnic prejudice (Altmeyer, 2003). Scheepers *et al.* (2002) found that religious service attendance and religious particularism increases prejudice towards ethnic minorities. This is not without contention as some scholars are showing the opposite effect, that religiosity can 'immunize' voters against prejudice, and thus against voting for RRWP (Siegers & Jedinger, 2021). However, the development of ethnocentric attitudes has been linked to religious service attendance (Adorno *et al.*, 1950) and religious beliefs (see Arzheimer & Carter, 2009). For the latter, church-attending individuals are more likely to hold authoritarian attitudes (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) and consequently respect and conform to religious authority. Respect for religious authority has been linked with adopting conventional norms and values related to the non-critical acceptance of discriminatory beliefs about outgroup members (Eisinga *et al.*, 1990). It is the conventionalism of religious voters that makes RRWP nativism appealing and electorally viable.

From a slightly different approach that focuses on beliefs not religious attendance, an overview of the literature suggests that religious beliefs can have a more direct relationship than attendance on voting for RRWPs. Religious extremists are almost natural voters for radical right parties (Camus, 2013). However, these individuals cannot be found at religious services, because

they have a more extreme position regarding theological teachings (Raiya *et al.*, 2008). The more orthodox people are, literature shows, the more likely they are to feel threats from other religions. In the European context, orthodox religious believers tend to find the presence of Muslims dangerous for their group, neighbourhood, city, or whole society/country (Immerzeel *et al.*, 2013). Furthermore, religious individuals are more likely to develop a 'closed-belief system' and dogmatic beliefs (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009), often closely connected with ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. This type of 'closed belief system' contributes to developing prejudice towards outgroup individuals and can function as the basis for the justification of nativist beliefs.

From the surveyed literature above, we might simply conclude that religious voters are an *easy target* for RRWP mobilization efforts. However, that is not always the case. As previously mentioned, the relationship is not entirely straightforward, and we must account for contextual factors as well. Thus, here we examine the political context – arguing that the salience of ethnic relations in society, which makes cultural treats salient, ensures a positive relationship between religiosity and RRWP vote.

We build on Koev's (2015) work and operationalize the salience of ethnic relations through the existence of ethnic minority parties in the system. Koev (2015) argues that 'when ethnic minority demands for equal rights, have themselves mobilized in the formation of an ethnic minority parties' and further adds that 'successful ethnic minority parties heighten the salience of ethnic-nationalist divisions within a state, creating electoral demand for parties of the populist right' (p. 649).

There are several reasons why we would expect any minority party to have an effect on the vote share of RRWPs, and specifically on the role of religiosity as the driver of that support. First, ethnic relations are more salient as it is much easier to mobilize against out-group members if they have political representation – that is, a minority party in the political system. Once ethnic minorities are politically organized, the party becomes perceived as a legitimate threat to national

virtues (Koev, 2015, p. 651). The more serious the cultural 'threat' from others becomes, the more likely it is that 'nativist' groups will counter-mobilize against the specific threat. Small parties, especially after an electoral success, tend to make particular topics very salient in public discourse (Abou-Chadi, 2016; Wagner & Meyer, 2017). Building on these studies, we assume that minority parties increase the salience of ethnic relations, stressing their cultural difference. Increasing the salience of nativist issues offers favourable conditions for religiosity to be linked to RRWP voting. When threatened by *them* and *their* different cultural standards, the RRWP message about the preservation of cultural unity should find fertile ground among religious individuals. In a way, minority parties provide RRWP parties with significant mobilization potential against them, especially among cultural purists that perceive the minority parties as a threat to national identity.

We argue that religious voters are the primary group to be mobilized in these conditions. Previous research has shown that Christian affiliation and Church attendance are associated with delineating and constituting what it means to be ethnically British (Storm, 2011). Similar ideas are found in the strategies of Law and Justice in Poland, Jobbik in Hungary, Attaka in Bulgaria, and the Slovak National Party in Slovakia, where being Catholic (or Orthodox, as appropriate) is a prerequisite for being truly Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian or Slovak, respectively. Where minority parties represent a particular minority interest, RRWPs and their emphasis on (nativist) religious purity become salient and resonate with religious voters. Note that it is not any one specific action that these outgroups perform that drives this, but rather the mere fact that they are culturally different and politically present, thus contributing to the ethnicization of politics and increasing the perceived threat to the nativist identity, which seems to push religious people towards RRWPs. In turn, religious individuals opt for RRWPs in order to protect what they see as the dominant culture against the perceived lurking threats of minorities.

Therefore, taking everything into consideration, we expect:

H1 – *Religiosity is positively related to the RRWP vote when ethnic relations are salient (i.e., a minority party is present) in the political system.*

2.4 Data and Methods

We use the European Social Survey Rounds 7 (2014), 8 (2016) and 9 (2018) with a reference point to the most recent parliamentary elections held for questions on electoral behaviour. The final sample used in the analysis totals 118019 observations across 26 countries that have at least one RRWP in the system.

For the dependent variable, we used respondents' vote choice in the last election and coded RRWP choices across countries as 1, and all other party responses as 0. This amounted to a total of 13,323 respondents classified as RRWP voters. The list of parties considered to fit the profile of RRWP described in the theoretical chapter can be found in Appendix A. Our strategy here was to look at party leaders and their dominant political messages at the time of the election, the party manifestos, and the Party Manifesto coding scheme (using code 70 for nationalist parties) to help resolve certain borderline cases (Volkens *et al.*, 2020).

The main independent variable was created from three questions about religious beliefs and religious practices. The frequency of religious service attendance apart from weddings and funerals were coded from 1 (Every day) to 7 (Never). In terms of religious beliefs, the question asked how religious an individual was on an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 10 (Very religious) and how often an individual prayed, scaled as 1 (Pray every day) to 7 (Never pray). Based on the argument from Montgomery and Winter (2015) that stresses the importance of studying the uniform effect of religiosity on political behaviour, we summed the responses to the three variables and divided the result by 3 to create an additive index of Religiosity ranging from 1 to 8, where higher numbers represent higher levels of religiosity. To retain to the maximum possible extent the logic of a uniform measurement, we decided to use original scaling in the creation of the index,

rather than standardized scores, as standardization would give much higher weight to the two behavioural measures as opposed to one that measures religious beliefs.

Additional variables included at the individual level were demographics – age (years of age grand mean-centred to avoid convergence issues), the dummy variable male 1 and female 0, education measured in completed years of education, and income measured on a 10-point scale as income percentile distribution in the sample. Substantive controls related to the literature findings we outlined above - interest in politics, measured on a 4 –point scale from 1 (Not interested at all) to 4 (Very interested); and satisfaction with democracy, measured on an 11-point scale, with higher numbers indicating higher levels of satisfaction.

From one country to another, we see that radical right parties are averaging around 10 percent of vote share across Europe nowadays (Stockemer, 2016), with an increasing trend in terms of electoral viability. Bohman and Hjerm (2016) test the assumed effect the electoral success of RRWP parties has on anti-immigrant attitudes over time, specifically – (a) that the peoples' attitudes towards migrants have become more negative, (b) that migrants' ethnicity plays a role and (c) that all of this has led to increasing polarization in European societies, finding no evidence in support of either. However, as we pointed out in the theoretical chapter, some have linked religious service attendance with prejudicial attitudes (Scheepers *et al.*, 2002), while others show that religiosity can 'immunize' individuals against prejudicial attitudes and consequently against RRWP (Siegers & Jedinger, 2021). To account for the possibility of a relationship between prejudice and RRWP vote, we included an item asking respondents how many migrants of different race or ethnic ancestry should be allowed to come and live in the country. The range was from 1 (Allow none) to 4 (Allow many to come and live here). Furthermore, we control for general ideological preferences measure on an 11-point left-right scale, with 0 being left, and 10 being right.

For minority parties, we looked at whether parties that can be classified as such had an electoral presence in previous elections. Countries satisfying that condition were coded 1, with

others coded 0. To classify minority parties, we used the Party Manifesto project as the first point of reference (using code 90 for Ethnic or Regional Parties in the Manifesto project), complemented by Koev's (2015) classification of minority parties. The list of countries that have a minority party is in Appendix A.

We included several contextual variables as controls. We used GDP per capita from the World Bank; net migration data from Eurobarometer for the year of the election expressed in tens of thousands: the ethnic and religious fractionalization index from ESS multilevel dataset; dummy variable for the presence of Christian Democratic parties in the system based on Manifesto Project database; and to account for serial autocorrelation and time, two dummy variables were introduced, ESS Round 8 and ESS Round 9, with the reference category being ESS Round 7.

Finally, while anti-immigrant attitudes play a crucial role in a radical right vote in Western Europe, this topic has been present but not that salient in the agenda of their ideological comrades in the East. For these parties, the clash with ethnic minorities has been more significant. To account for these differences, we include a control for Western vs. Eastern Europe when evaluating the role of ethnic parties in support for RRWPs.

2.5 Results

Our results confirm the initial expectations from the theoretical chapter. We argued that religiosity as an RRWP predictor is activated by the salience of minority relations proxied by minority rights. For this reason, we fitted several multilevel logistic regression models through which we were able to account for country differences as well as individual-level characteristics. Our initial model resulted in a 0.312 intraclass correlation coefficient, meaning that around 31% of our variance in voting for RRWP is attributed to country-level variation. The next step in the analysis checked whether we should expect this variation in the success of RRWP parties across countries to be reflected in a different relationship between religiosity and vote choice. Figure 1

present this relationship across countries, clearly demonstrating that this relationship is context dependent. With the visual inspection confirming that we should expect diverging effects across countries, we now turn to formal hypothesis testing.

Figure 1: Bivariate association of religiosity and voting for RRWPs across countries.



Moving on to the main argument of the chapter, we hypothesized that the salience of ethnic relations would turn religious voters towards RRWPs (Table 2, Model 1). Here, the effect of religiosity on voting for RRWPs is negative and significant (-0.090***), indicating that more religious people are less likely to vote for RRWP parties. However, since the separate effect of religiosity is conditioned on the interaction, the direction of the relationship is negative under the condition that no minority party is present in the system. In situations where a minority party exists, the relationship moves in a different direction, meaning that more religious people are in fact more likely to vote for RRWPs. The logistic function reveals that the probability of casting a vote for an RRWP rises from around 30% for non-religious individuals to around 50% for religious individuals if a minority party is present in the system (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Linear and logistic predictors of religiosity and voting for RRWPs across moderating factors.



To conduct robustness checks, we used several approaches and model specifications. First, we limited the pool of respondents to only those who belong to a Christian denomination. Several prominent studies including Arzheimer and Carter (2009) and Montgomery and Winter (2015) have suggested such an approach. In our subsample of Christian respondents, we replicated the results obtained earlier, with a similar effect size (see Table 2, Model 2).

Second, some authors have suggested taking into consideration the unique relationship between religion and politics in Poland (Montgomery & Winter, 2015). To account for the specificities of this case and test whether it might be driving or skewing the results of the analysis, in one of the models we omitted Polish respondents from the analysis (Table 2, Model 3). The results were replicated, although the differences were not as sharply identifiable as before, with much greater uncertainty associated with religious individuals in countries with minority parties.

Table 2: Religion and RRWP vote

	Dependent variable:			
	Vote for RRWP			
	Entire sample	Only Christians	Poland Excluded	
Male	0.269*** (0.029)	0.313*** (0.040)	0.272*** (0.030)	Level 1 variables
Education	-0.337*** (0.022)	-0.320*** (0.030)	-0.339*** (0.022)	
Income (C)	-0.251*** (0.031)	-0.246*** (0.043)	-0.240*** (0.032)	
Age (C)	-0.493*** (0.034)	-0.592*** (0.047)	-0.461*** (0.035)	
Ideology	0.272*** (0.007)	0.260*** (0.009)	0.255*** (0.007)	
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.127*** (0.006)	-0.108*** (0.009)	-0.145*** (0.007)	
Interest in politics	-0.002 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.025)	0.005 (0.019)	
Migrants	-0.498*** (0.018)	-0.469*** (0.025)	-0.495*** (0.019)	
GDP	-0.234*** (0.044)	-0.215*** (0.053)	-0.278*** (0.066)	Level 2 variables
West	-0.998 (1.538)	-1.183 (1.529)	-1.287 (1.482)	
Immigration	0.138*** (0.014)	0.136*** (0.016)	0.125*** (0.017)	
ESS Round 9	0.216*** (0.041)	0.172** (0.056)	0.218*** (0.042)	
ESS Round 8	-0.163*** (0.040)	-0.246*** (0.056)	-0.174*** (0.042)	
Ethnic Fractionalization	-58.727** (21.262)	-57.338** (21.383)	-59.958** (20.686)	
Ethnic Fractio. Squared	87.615** (32.853)	85.897** (33.038)	87.839** (31.753)	
Religious Fractionalization	-0.923 (3.173)	-1.484 (3.150)	-1.862 (3.040)	
Religiosity	-0.090*** (0.011)	-0.088*** (0.016)	-0.088*** (0.011)	Intera
Minority Party	4.235** (1.574)	3.902* (1.579)	4.335** (1.518)	
Religiosity*Minority Party	0.127*** (0.016)	0.160*** (0.023)	0.087*** (0.017)	
Constant	3.548 (2.755)	3.643 (2.751)	5.111* (2.777)	
Observations	50,641	26,545	48,908	
Log Likelihood	-16,985.330	-9,320.448	-16,013.400	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	34,012.670	18,682.900	32,068.790	
Note:			*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Third, to account for downward biased standard errors (Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019) we tested a model with random slopes across countries. The random effects of religiosity did not reach statistical significance; however, the fixed effects part of the model still produced significant results, both for individual predictors (religiosity and minority party presence) and for the interaction effect (in Appendix A). The results indicate that specific country level characteristics have to be taken into consideration so that the role of religiosity can be identified.

In the last stage of our robustness check, we replicated the model in as much detail as possible based on the European Values Study 2017 dataset consisting of 25 European countries

with RRWPs. A few differences in the modelling procedure deserve clarification. Our dependent variable here was slightly different and is more of an attitudinal than behavioural measurement. To be clear, the EVS asked what party appeals to you the most, instead of asking about vote choice in the previous elections. We coded all those who choose RRWP parties as (1) and the remainder as (0). Second, the EVS used identical questions and scales for issues of religious attendance and prayers but implemented a nominal scale measuring religious beliefs essentially capturing whether or not a person is religious. Instead of this question, we used a 10-point item that measures how important God is in an individual's private life. Using these three questions we created an additive index of religiosity rescaled to a range from 1 to 8. Finally, we used a set of control variables (gender, age, education, left-right preference, satisfaction with democracy, interest in politics, and the impact of immigrants in the country). The model shows that the effects of religiosity on the appeal of RRWPs are indeed conditioned on the presence of a minority party. When a minority party is present in the system, religious individuals have around a 15% chance of being drawn towards RRWPs, compared to around 10% in systems without minority parties. Furthermore, the direction of the relationship is different, in that in systems with at least one minority party, more religious voters are more often drawn towards RRWPs, while in other countries they are less attracted to RRWPs. The model results, their visual presentation as well as information on the parties classified as RRWPs and the countries with minority parties in the EVS are given in our Appendix A.

2.6 Discussion

Our results illustrate the correlation between religiosity and RRWP vote when a minority party is present; however, this finding warrants further consideration. In particular, the presence or absence of minority parties closely follows the East-West Europe division, although this is not so evident in the European Values Study sample from 2017. Regardless, if minority parties are present primarily in Eastern Europe, is it the presence of minority parties or another particular East vs. West Europe difference that accounts for the role of religiosity in RRWP vote?

In the first step undertaken to account for this observation, we did include a control variable for East and West Europe and despite this control, the moderating effect was still significant and altered the relationship between religiosity and RRWP vote[25]. However, to be certain the validity of our findings, a more nuanced examination is required. A recent paper by Marcinkiewicz and Dassonneville (2021), provides a partial answer to this question. They argue that the effects of religiosity are conditioned on the East-West division, primarily as a function of the strength of Christian Democratic parties. Where Christian Democratic parties are strong, primarily in Western Europe, religiosity is negatively related to RRWP vote, while this relationship takes on a different direction where Christian Democratic parties are weak or absent, as is primarily the case in Eastern Europe. We agree with this explanation insofar as it refers to the general East-West divide in Europe. However, we argue that our exploration has more validity. We base this argument on several empirical and theoretical observations.

First, when we inspect the countries where RRWP parties are most successful, the pattern is nonlinear, in that those countries that have medium levels of ethnic heterogeneity have the most successful RRWP parties (Figure 3). We argued earlier that the salience of ethnic relations is what pushes religious voters towards RRWPs, and we should expect that ethnic relations are salient in countries with medium levels of fractionalization. We base this argument on the observation made by Chandra (2007) in her analysis of patronage democracies and ethnic clientelist networks, where she stipulates that in homogeneous or highly heterogeneous countries, ethnic linkages are hard to monitor. A similar logic should apply in our case as well, where the salience of ethnic relations would be hard to establish where societies are either very homogeneous or very heterogenous. To test this assumption, we fitted a multilevel model with an interaction effect between religiosity and ethnic fractionalization, with the same control variables as presented in the main part of our analysis. As we expected a nonlinear relationship to exist, we used the squared values of the

[25] Despite the overlap between East-West divide, and presence or absence of minority parties, no multicollinearity issues were encountered in the models (for VIF results check Appendix A).

fractionalization index. The results confirmed our assumption, showing that the effects of religiosity on vote choice are strongest in the medium tercile of ethnic fractionalization, while its strength diminishes in the upper tercile and completely reverses in the lowest tercile (Figure 4).

Figure 3: RRWP success and Ethnic Fractionalization.



Figure 4: Linear and logistics predictor of religiosity and RRWP vote across Ethnic Fractionalization (squared).



These findings add more validity to our assumption that the salience of ethnic issues, proxied by the presence of a minority party or ethnic fractionalization, creates a favourable context for RRWPs to recruit religious individuals, as opposed to a situation where traditional Christian Democratic parties are relatively strong.

Secondly, while we do concur that Christian Democratic parties are much less prominent and successful in Eastern Europe, there are still countries where they do play a major role in the political system. To point out a few successful cases: People's Movement Party in Romania (5.3% of votes in 2018); Cristian Democratic Movement in Slovakia (8.8% in 2012, 4.9% in 2018); New Slovenian Christians Peoples Party (4.8% in 2012, 5.6% in 2019, 7.1% in 2020) (Manifesto Project). Nevertheless, to further establish the validity of our argument, we fitted an additional model with the control for the presence of Christian Democratic party included. The results previously outlined in the analysis chapter remain almost identical (model can be found in Appendix A).

Thirdly, Marcinkiewicz and Dassonneville (2021) make the somewhat tautological argument that the success of radical right parties among the religious electorate depends on the extent to which other right-wing parties are successful among such individuals. We believe this reasoning requires much more of an explanation, and that these dynamics can also be explained by the salience of ethnic relations. This much is implied by Koev (2015) who links the success of RRWPs to the success of minority parties in the previous electoral cycle. Regarding our argument here, where ethnic issues are salient, RRWP parties have success in mobilizing the religious electorate and increase their vote share most often at the expense of Christian Democratic parties.

2.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, we explore whether contextual factors, specifically ethnic relations within a society, proxied by the presence of ethnic minority parties, moderate the effects of religiosity, and contribute to the increased likelihood of voting for RRWPs. Our research interest was guided by the scarce literature on the topic, and the inconclusive results on the nature of the relationship between religion and RRWP voting. We imagined that these mixed results were a consequence of a failure to account for significant factors that might push religious voters towards or insulate them against RRWP parties. We posited that ethnic issues in the political system push religious voters towards RRWPs, as a contextual factor that had not previously been explored.

While Koev (2015) considered the success of minority parties to be the general driver of the success of RRWPs in CEE Europe, we expanded on this argument and regarded the presence of any ethnic minority party as an indicator of the salience of ethnic relations in the political system. Specifically, when an ethnic minority party is present, it organizes and represents minority interests, therefore threatening the dominant culture in the society as perceived by RRWP voters. In such conditions, religious voters integrated into their cultural communities might be particularly sensitive to cultural threats and diversity and as such be incentivized to vote for RRWP parties and their nativist ideological platforms. The findings presented here confirm that ethnic relations moderate the relationship between religiosity and RRWP vote by making religious voters more likely to be RRWP supporters. These findings stand the test of multiple model specifications and robustness analysis as well as the introduction of important control variables at both the individual and country level.

As such, we have demonstrated that religion is an important predictor of RRWP voting on top of individual attitudes and other demographic characteristics, but only when the proper contextual factors that foster the religious link to RRWP are accounted for. Our primary contribution is in identifying the ethnic relations, i.e., the presence of an ethnic minority party, to be such a moderating factor in the political system.

We recognize the importance of studying further contextual factors that help us explain the differences across and between countries related to various predictors and RRWP vote. Future research should try to expand on this, and potentially investigate in more detail the role of Christian Democratic parties around Europe, their size, or their party strategies, such as their emphasis on nativist rhetoric. These topics, though very important, were outside of the scope of this work, but we certainly hope that this chapter will stimulate more research in this direction.

Chapter III

AUTHORITARIAN SUPPORT FOR POPULISTS: AN INVISIBLE LINK?

'The war against superstition and the totalitarian mentality is an endless war. In protean forms, it is fought and refought in every country and every generation. […] As Bertold Brecht's character says over the corpse of the terrible Arturo Ui, the bitch that bore him is always in heat. But it is in this struggle that we develop the muscles and sinews that enable us to defend civilization, and the moral courage to name it as something worth fighting for.'

Christopher Hitchens (2011)

The Enemy

3.1 Introduction

Individual level authoritarianism is predictive of populist radical right (PRR)[26] support. The implicit expectation of such an association is widespread in the literature, making the statement almost tautological in nature (Dunn, 2015). However, while the general tendency of authoritarian individuals to support PRR parties can be identified, the widely cast web that classifies very diverse set of parties into the PRR family dilutes the specific origin of association between authoritarian individuals and the PRR. In light of this diversity, while we know that authoritarian individuals have a tendency to support populist radical right parties, whether those authoritarian individuals are drawn to *populism* or another dimension of the PRR party ideology is an open question. Guided by this challenge, this chapter focuses on several important questions – how is individual level authoritarianism related to support for the PRR? What dimension of PRR party's ideology appeals to authoritarian individuals? Is it populism, or far right ideology (i.e., nativism and authoritarianism)?

In a recent paper, Rooduijn (2019) outlined the argument that contemporary populism research suffers from sloppy conceptualisation, and essentially from the conceptual stretch of populism to cover the similar but distinct concepts of, among other ideas, nativism, and Euroscepticism. This argument refers to the tendency within scholarly research to classify the far right, the extremist right, the populist far right, and populist right parties within a single populist radical right-wing party family (PRR). By conflating the ideological characteristics of diverse parties, the scholarship suffers from invalid inferences on the demand side explanations of populism. In reference to the focus of this chapter, previous scholarship does not provide a direct test for the

[26] The designation PRR for the populist radical right is used through the chapter as it is an established abbreviation in the literature that focuses on right wing parties. However, note that the focus of this chapter is not on the radicalism but on the far-right ideological dimension.

association of individual authoritarianism and the distinct ideologic party groups within the broader PRR family.

To avoid conceptual misinformation and reach a more valid conclusion, based on ThePopuList database ideological coding of parties in Europe (Rooduijn *et al.*, 2019), this chapter starts with a separation of PRR parties into three distinct ideological party families – the populist right, the far right, and the populist far right. Building on the research on authoritarian personality/attitudes, I argue that individual level authoritarianism should be related to support for the far right and the populist far right rather than populist right parties, as authoritarian individuals should be more likely to relate to political leaders and parties that incorporate a far right authoritarian/nativist outlook – that is, parties and candidates that advocate for tougher punitive measures (Maxwell, 2019; also see Dunwoody & McFarland, 2016) and reject anything foreign (Dunn, 2015). In contextual terms, authoritarian sentiments are more likely to translate to a specific pattern of support for parties incorporating far right ideology, in systems where the perception of the existence of a viable threat to the national fabric is present (e.g., the immigrant threat in Austria, Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016).

The empirical part of the chapter applies multinomial logistic regression modelling to three cases taken from Slovakia, Austria, and Serbia. Despite the difference in the measurement items for authoritarianism in the three studies, individual levels of authoritarianism were related to electoral support for (or the appeal of) far right or populist far right parties. In 2016 in Slovakia, authoritarianism was associated with an electoral advantage for the far right (Kotleba) and populist far right (We are Family; the Slovak National Party), against a populist right party (Olano). In 2013 in Austria, individual level authoritarianism was associated with an electoral advantage against other parties for the populist far right (the BZÖ and the FPÖ) but not the populist right (Team Stronach). In Serbia, authoritarianism was associated with a vote choice for Tomislav Nikolić in the

presidential election, both against non-voters and voters for other candidates in 2008 (the far right), but not after the ideological shift in 2012 to the populist right.

The main contribution of the study lies in its nuanced approach to demand-side associations with ideological subfamilies within the PRR party family. Examining the role of particular aspects of party (ideology) appeal can foster a deeper understanding of the perceptions and grievances within the electorate that these parties are able to capitalize on. With a specific research design that separates far right ideology from populism, I provide a direct test that gives insight into whether authoritarian support is linked to the populism or the nativism/authoritarianism of the party/candidate. Furthermore, the study provides evidence of this type of relationship from two quite different methodological setups. First, in Slovakia and Austria, the analysis between parties examines the appeal of different party families following the parliamentary elections in 2016 and 2013, respectively. I directly compare the electoral outlook of different parties against both other PRR parties and against other parties competing in the elections. In the Serbian case, the analysis focuses on the same political figure, Tomislav Nikolić, who competed in two successive presidential elections in 2008 and 2012, in between which he distanced himself from the nativism/authoritarianism of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and formed the Serbian Progress Party (SPS) on a populist right platform.

3.2 The Populist Far Right

The theoretical and methodological approach of this chapter is grounded in the clear ideological distinction of the subfamilies within right-wing parties. This section outlines the main ideological dimensions that are the focus of this approach, as well as the theoretical necessity for a nuanced classification of right-wing parties. With a significant gain in electoral support over the last two decades, the populist far right quickly became one of the most researched party families. In the process, scholarship has produced an abundance of knowledge, although the breath of that knowledge has recently been subjected to serious questioning (see Rooduijn, 2019). The primary

issue here is the fact that a very diverse set of parties, both in terms of degree and type, have been placed under the umbrella of the populist far right. While in general these parties share a core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-establishment populism (Rydgren, 2007), the first common misconception is to regard extremist and radical parties as identical. Mudde (2007) makes this distinction, arguing that the extreme right rejects the basic democratic principles understood in a minimalist way through the concept of procedural democracy (Schumpeter, 1949; in Mudde, 2007). On the other hand, the radical right should be understood not as opposition to democracy, but rather to *liberal* democracy and the constitutional limitations it places on popular sovereignty (Mudde, 2007).

Secondly, and more centrally to the argument of this chapter, Rooduijn (2019) claims that parties do not diverge only on the issues of extremism or radicalism, but in terms of their ideological content as well. Here, scholarship often conflates populism with the related concepts of nativism and Euroscepticism (Rooduijn, 2019). Right wing parties may be nativist, populist, authoritarian or Eurosceptic but these different ideological positions do not necessarily converge in every single PRR party. Instead, Rooduijn *et al.* (2019) identify 6 different party families (both on the left and on the right) that could be related to populism depending on which ideological dimensions they incorporate[27]. For this reason, when conceptualising the populist far right, we should clearly delineate each of these concepts and their substantive meanings, especially if the research goal is to understand the electoral support for specific parties. What follows below makes an attempt to do just that.

As stated above, PRR parties can incorporate nativist, authoritarian, populist, and Eurosceptic outlook into their ideology. On a general note, populist far right parties stress the danger of a loss of national culture and identity, usually as a consequence of mass immigration (Dunn, 2015). This sentiment is almost exclusively derived from nativism, or the stance that 'the

[27] The party families are (a) Populist, (b) Far right, (c) Populist far right, (d) Far left, (e) Populist far left, and (f) Other.

state should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group and that non-native elements are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state' (Mudde, 2007, p.19). In Western Europe, this sentiment usually translates into the exclusion of immigrants, while in Eastern Europe it extends to cover 'indigenous minorities' as well (Mudde, 2016). Therefore, the exclusionary feature of nativism is grounded in socio-cultural differences (Dunn, 2015), be they ethnic, racial, or religious differences/prejudices (Mudde, 2016). Furthermore, what makes nativism distinct, is the horizontal nature of the antagonism between the nation and the dangerous others (Rooduijn, 2019).

The sentiment of exclusionary nativism in PRR ideology is often complemented by an authoritarian punitive dimension. Mudde (2007) conceptualises authoritarianism as the belief in a strictly ordered society where infringements of authority are to be punished severely. At the elite level, authoritarianism reflects a disregard for liberal democratic principles, including the limitation of civil liberties (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) as second order principles *vis-a-vis* the importance of order, tradition, and stability. The adherence to and importance of order, stability, and tradition form the basis for conformity. Given the importance of conformity to established social norms among authoritarian individuals, authoritarianism justifies strict moral sanctions and the harsh penalization of those who violate group norms (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This aspect of authoritarianism is congruent with the nativist distinction between nativists and non-nativists as 'conformity endorses tradition over novelty, natives over immigrants, and localism over traditionalism' (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, p.72). In its practical application, PRR parties argue that the social environment, or social norms, are threatened by mass immigration, that this change is not only consequential for the social fabric of the nation (in terms of unity and traditionalism) but contributes to the increase in violent crime as well. Bringing these two issues together, the threat to social norms and the increase in violent crime (see Dunn, 2015 for Swiss Peoples Party), PRR parties claim that the remedy is primarily in the social exclusion of foreigners - nativism; and harsh punitive measures that will maintain law and order - authoritarianism (Rydgren, 2007). In a similar vein, Dunn and Singh (2011, p. 317) go as far as to claim that 'PRR parties are the institutional

equivalent of authoritarian individuals'. Therefore, PRR parties should appeal to nationalist and authoritarian voters (Dunn, 2015), and the origin of that support is the PRR nativist and authoritarian ideological base.

The third dimension of PRR ideology is populism. With different approaches to defining populism, as a political strategy, its style of communication or style of governing, a somewhat accepted conceptualisation outlines populism as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite', where politics should be an expression of the general will of the people (Mudde 2007, p. 23). Understood as a thin centered ideology, populism encompasses anti-elitism – the distrust of and antagonism towards societal elites; people-centrism – the centrality of the people through the focus on the general will, whoever the people might be; and Manicheanism – the belief in the black and white (good vs. bad) nature of the surrounding world represented in the binary form of the 'pure people' and the 'corrupt (evil) elite'. Unlike nativism, here the antagonistic relationship is not horizontal among groups of people but has instead a vertical dimension where 'the corrupt elite' has power over 'the pure people'. Moreover, 'the pure people' are not in a conflict with the nativist others, but rather are ranged against the *within nation (in-group)* societal elites (Mudde, 2016).

The brief conceptualisation above follows a part[28] of the classification criteria used in ThePopuList (Rooduijn *et al.*, 2019) and its ideological coding of parties in Europe, whose combination allows for clear delineation between the three right wing subfamilies[29]. Throughout this chapter, if a party is nativist/authoritarian without a populist outlook it is treated as being ***(a)*** the Far right. If a party is populist without a nativist/authoritarian outlook, it is treated as being ***(b)***

[28] The focus of the chapter is on right wing parties, therefore I am excluding ThePopuList left wing party families from the analysis – (a) the Far Left, (b) the Populist Far Left and (c) Other Parties.

[29] This classification helps to avoid the common mistake of convoluting the knowledge we have obtained about the support patterns for PRR (Rooduijn, 2019). Consider the example, as Rooduijn (2019) elaborates, that studies consistently find evidence that lower educated people are more likely to vote for parties such as Front Nacional FN and the Freedom Party of Austria FPÖ. These findings cannot extend to the conclusion that lower educated people are more likely to vote for *populists*; rather, they are more likely to vote for populist right parties that are also nativist (far right).

the Populist right[30]. Lastly, if a party incorporates both populism and nativism or authoritarianism, it is treated as ***(c)*** the Populist far right.

3.3 Authoritarianism and PRR support

3.3.1 Theoretical considerations

With the outline of the ideological distinction within right wing parties covered, I now turn to the potential individual level explanation for the electoral success of these parties. The concept of the authoritarian personality was introduced by a seminal work by Adorno *et al.* (1950) in their attempt to examine the support for fascist regimes. For Adorno *et al.* (1950), individual level authoritarianism is a type of personality that among other things, focuses on social conformity, aggression, submission, and conventionalism. Building on the criticism of the poor measurement items and broad conceptualisation in the approach of Adorno *et al.* (1950), Altemeyer (1996) continues with the assumption of a stable personality trait, refining the dimensions and measurement of authoritarianism by claiming the existence of three (out of the original nine) separate yet intertwined dimensions: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. Such individuals have a general tendency to submit to authority and to be aggressive towards others, especially those who violate social norm or who are lower down the social hierarchy.

Staying within the framework of personality disposition, Stenner and Feldman did a series of studies linking authoritarianism to a personal tendency towards obedience and conformity (see Stenner 2005, Feldman 2003). However, they move away from Altemeyer's (1996) conceptualisation in two significant aspects. First, they limit authoritarian predisposition to the measurement of childrearing values (see Stenner 2005, Feldman 2003). In such a manner, the authors claim to gauge general authoritarian disposition, without linking it to specific political

[30] ThePopuList (Rooduijn *et al.*, 2019) also codes parties on the left ideological spectrum. Note that the parties considered as part of the populist right in this chapter are not classified in ThePopuList database as incorporating any type of left-wing ideological content.

attitudes. Second, in conceptualising authoritarianism as a predisposition, they maintain the stability of authoritarianism as a tendency to respond to similar events in a similar manner over time (Feldman 2003). However, the predisposition does not imply that authoritarian individuals will always act in an authoritarian manner (Aguilar & Carlin, 2019). Instead, normative[31] threats to social conformity are necessary to guide this authoritarian predisposition towards authoritarian attitudes and behaviour.

Lastly, more recent research has moved away from the personality trait argument towards seeing authoritarianism as a coping strategy in the face of threatening situations (see Jost, 2006). Using the least amount of cognitive resources to resolve threatening situations (Lavine *et al.*, 2005) authoritarians' express preferences for punitive and intolerant measures against those who threaten the social fabric (Dunn, 2015). Furthermore, the threat to the fragmenting social order is resolved either by withdrawing from society (Berzonsky, 1992) or by following an authority figure that fosters the ideas of social unity and homogeneity (Dunn, 2015). In other words, authoritarian individuals resort to aggression and conventionalism in order to reduce the uncertainty and threat associated with the changing social order.

Regardless of the approach to authoritarianism, whether seeing it as a predisposition, a set of attitudes, or a coping strategy, authoritarianism has been directly linked to support for Donald Trump (MacWilliams, 2016), the Tea Party Movement (Arceneaux & Nicholson, 2012), the Swedish Democrats (Jylhä *et al.*, 2019) and Front Nacional in France (Vasilopoulos & Lachat, 2018). Several studies have found evidence that authoritarians tend to support the populist far right (Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Dunn, 2015; Inglehart & Norris, 2016), although those support patterns are not always stable (Dunn, 2015) and may be mediated by other personality characteristics (Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016). Aichholzer and Zandonella (2016) explore the

[31] Normative threats include 'beliefs, values, and behavior that are inconsistent with perceptions of social conventions—but also behaviour that is a challenge to the government's ability to enforce compliance with social rules and regulations' (Feldman 2003: 50).

various relationships between right-wing authoritarianism and vote choice for the FPÖ in Austria, finding a significant and large effect of RWA, albeit not directly, but rather mediated by the perceived threat of immigration. The identical conclusion was reached by Golec de Zavala *et al.* (2017) on the role of RWA in the Brexit vote, explaining its importance in shaping the perceived immigrant threat as a dominant predictor of support for Brexit. Finally, Dunn (2015) analysed vote choice in 5 West European democracies and found inconsistent evidence on authoritarian support for the PRR in three cases, while exclusionary nationalism was consistently predictive of the PRR vote in all cases. Depending on the country and party-to-party comparison in a multinomial logistic regression setting, only in Denmark and Switzerland do authoritarians prefer the PRR over all other parties.

What appears to be a unifying conclusion in these studies is that some sort of threat (whether symbolic or physical) to the social fabric is conceptualised at the core of the activation of authoritarian attitudes. According to Feldman (2003) normative threats can incorporate any type of behaviour that poses a challenge to the government's ability to enforce compliance with social rules and regulations. In relation to the main question of this chapter, whether the voter-party linkages are grounded in populism or far right ideology, normative threats can be framed in a populist or authoritarian/nativist outlook. First, regarding the populist outlook, Aguilar and Carlin (2019, p. 399) provide an insight into the mechanism of the translation of populist support. 'A challenger campaigns with rhetoric that frames mainstream, establishment politicians as so corrupt and unresponsive to the people that they make a mockery of the democratic process.' In this situation, Aguilar and Carlin (2019) argue, the normative threat of corrupt politicians endangering the social order should be enough of a motivation to activate the authoritarian predisposition and translate it into support for populist candidates. On the other hand, this strategy might backfire, as authoritarians tend to have high levels of respect for and trust in societal authorities, which is reflected in the subdimension of authoritarian submission. Submission would motivate authoritarians to comply with the authority figures, but the populist frame calls for a *vertical* power

challenge to those same authority figures. Thus, challenging the authorities can have the opposite effect and might drive authoritarian voters towards established parties and established authorities. In other words, two of the dimensions of authoritarianism, submission and aggression, clash in this context.

Similarly, although their study does not directly test this claim, Bakker *et. al* (2015) argue that they provide enough evidence that *populist* voters do not have an authoritarian personality. Instead, additional conditions need to be satisfied in order for authoritarians to turn towards populist parties. Tillman (2015) outlines the scope of these conditions and argues that it is only when PRR parties are recognized as part of the established order that there is more reason for authoritarians to support them.

Second, regarding the authoritarian/nativist outlook, the natural response of an authoritarian to a normative threat to the national fabric is to withdraw from society, unless they are presented with a leader calling for national unity and purity (Dunn, 2015; see also Altemeyer, 2003). Here, parties tend to capitalize by articulating the framework of national purity and unity, and providing a strong authority figure that rejects anything foreign. The source of the normative threat to the national fabric is therefore not the authority figure's corruption, unresponsiveness, or misbehaviour, but rather *other* societal groups that do not conform with the established societal norms and rules. Through the lenses of the power hierarchy, the norm violators are in a *horizontal* relationship with the authoritarian individuals.

The conformist and submissive tendencies to rally around a strong authority figure are intertwined with a punitive aspect, as authoritarian individuals are more likely to express punitive tendencies when someone threatens the uniformity and unity of their society (Dunn, 2015). Support for such a claim comes from recent research in the USA, where Dunwoody and McFarland (2017) found that authoritarian individuals support anti-Muslim policies, and that this relationship is more extreme when Muslims are perceived as a threat. In a similar setup, Dunwoody and Plane (2019) extended this finding to apply to general support among authoritarian individuals for anti-

democratic policies, including extrajudicial measures for punishing and extraditing immigrants (in this case Mexicans as well as Muslims). Furthermore, Maxwell (2019) illustrates this point, showing that the President Duterte of the Philippines (in office since 2016) enjoyed disproportionate support among those who perceive drug-related crime as a severe threat to society. Duterte campaigned in 2016 calling for a 'war on drugs', promising to make law and order a priority of his presidency (Maxwell, 2019).

3.3.2 The argument

With both ideological voter-party linkages being somewhat plausible, the main question here is: which mechanism holds more empirical merit? Is the origin of authoritarian support for PRR parties linked to their populist or far right (nativist and authoritarian) dimensions?

The starting point here is the argument that we are distant from the implicit assumption that authoritarianism will almost certainly be linked with vote for PRR parties (Dunn, 2015)[32]. Instead, a careful examination of the specificities of party ideology is required, to disentangle when we should expect individual level authoritarianism to translate to voting for the PRR. I have presented two competing arguments in this regard, one linking authoritarianism to populism and one linking it to nativism/authoritarianism. The core of the issue here is in the nature of the antagonism – whether it is vertical (us vs. elites/authority figures) or horizontal (us vs. others), as these two factors should be aligned differently with individual level authoritarianism. Here, I assume that authoritarians should relate to nativism/authoritarianism rather than populism, as it fosters a more coherent attitudinal response to the issue at hand (the threat to social unity and purity), grounded in the authoritarian value system - submission, aggression, and conventionalism. When authoritarian voters perceive the overall societal identity (or order) to be under threat, the

[32] While I am focusing on far-right politics here, if the argument is extended to populist far left parties, it becomes quite clear that individual level authoritarianism is a disadvantage for mobilizing voters on a populist platform. Several studies, including Van Heil, Duriez, and Kossowska (2008) and Aguilar and Carlin (2019), have concluded that individual level authoritarianism translates to support for far left and not populist left parties.

origin of that sentiment is grounded in nativism, while the response to the perceived threat is grounded in authoritarianism.

Regarding the former, social order and identity are viewed as under threat as the society is being invaded by 'others', non-native members of that society, that are usually perceived as being responsible for an increase in violent crime. In terms of the latter, the resulting social tensions could naturally be resolved by rallying around a strong leader, who will implement stronger punitive measures, and restore law and order. The targeted 'others' which will face the punitive measures are not in any way the authorities but instead other social groups, providing for a coherent attitudinal response between the submissive and aggressive dimensions of authoritarianism. This is not the case in a populist frame, as the challenge to the authority figures would be incongruent with authoritarian submissive tendencies, and would require submissive individuals to actually, at some level, challenge the authorities. In other words, in aligning with a strong *far right* authority figure, an authoritarian individual can congruently exhibit both submissive behaviour towards the leader, and aggressive behaviour towards those who violate the norms (the *others*). *From this perspective, authoritarian attitudes should be more closely linked to the authoritarian and nativist dimensions of party ideology, i.e., cultural purity and law and order preferences, rather than to a populist framework which blames corrupt politicians.* An overview of the literature supports such a claim, as the pattern in the surveyed research identifies a link between individual level authoritarianism and some manifestation of nativism, be it directly or through antiimmigration attitudes[33]. *To reiterate, when it is present, it is fair to assume authoritarian support for PRR parties arises from their nativist and authoritarian dimensions, and not from their engagement with populism.*

[33] Albeit it is true that populism capitalizes on antiimmigration attitudes, it is primarily a part of a nativist rather than a populist outlook.

3.4 Study I - Slovakia

3.4.1 Case selection – Slovakia and Austria

In this section, the approach to case selection outlines the necessary characteristics of a potential case for the effective evaluation of the argument. The first two conditions are structural in nature, and refer to the existence of populist, far right and populist far right parties within one political system, as well as the existence of substantive electoral support for these groups of parties, to enable any meaningful analysis. Additional conditions relate to data availability on either vote choice or party appeal, and some measurement items for authoritarianism at the individual level. Only cases where all four characteristics are present create the universe of cases for the case study analysis (Table 1).

Out of the six potential cases, I selected Slovakia and Austria for several reasons. The starting point for the selection of these two cases is their representation of both Eastern and Western Europe, and the previously discussed differences in the conceptualisation of non-nativists 'others' across the East-West divide, as immigrants or indigenous minorities as well. For Slovakia as the East European case, the first specific reason relates to the classification of the PRR parties in Slovakia, where Rooduijn *et al.* (2019) coded the ideological content that appears across the various parties in Slovakia, separating them into the three groups of interest to this study. This is a major difference between Slovakia and the other potential Eastern European cases, such as Bulgaria or the Czech Republic, which have only two[34] viable party groups – the populist right and the populist far right. Therefore, Slovakia offers the possibility for a more nuanced analysis and the clear separation of political alignments. According to ThePopuList, Olano is coded as a populist party that has no far right or Eurosceptic outlook; Kotleba is coded as a far right and Eurosceptic party that has no populist outlook; while We Are Family and the Slovak National Party are coded

[34] Because of these structural differences in party system, party classification would differ, and a unified analysis would not be possible.

as Eurosceptic, populist far right parties. Second, all the parties entered the Slovak parliament after the 2016 parliamentary elections, providing for a large enough electoral body to conduct meaningful analysis. Third, by focusing on a comparison of party families within a single political system, this case allows us to control for the county level factors that could potentially work as a mediator between authoritarianism and party support.

For Austria as a case study from Western Europe, the 2013 elections witnessed a direct confrontation between the populist right (Team Stronach) and the populist far right (the BZÖ and the FPÖ) where each of the parties received substantive support, with the FPÖ and Team Stronach entering the national parliament (ideology coding according to ThePopuList (Rooduijn *et al.*, 2019)). Out of the three possible candidates for case studies in Western Europe (Austria, Belgium and Italy), the Austrian National Elections Study AUTNES 2013, provides better measurements of authoritarianism than Belgium National Election Study 2007, and records information on vote choice, not general party appeal (as in Italy – EVS 2017). Based on the above argument, the Austrian case satisfies all of the previously outlined conditions making this case suitable for analysis.

Table 3: Countries with diverse right-wing parties

	Year	Substantive electoral support (1), (2)		Data availability (3)		Potential case
		Populist	Far right	Vote	Autho.	
Austria	***2013***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***
Belgium	***2007***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***
Bulgaria	***2014/2017***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***
Croatia	2015/2016	Yes	No	No	No	
Czech Republic	***2017***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***
Estonia	2017	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Finland	2019	Yes	Yes	No	No	
Greece	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Italy	***2015/2018***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***
Latvia	2011	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Lithuania	2012/2016	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	
Luxembourg	1989/1994	Yes	No	No	No	
Norway	2001--	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Poland	2015/2016	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Slovakia	***2016***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***	***Yes***
Spain	2019	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Romania	2012	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Slovenia	2018	Yes	Yes	No	No	
Switzerland	2015	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	

(1) Party classification (Rooduijn *et al.*, 2019);

(2) Substantive support – passed census threshold and entered the national parliament

(3) Data is available and substantive

3.4.2 Data and Measurement

The data for Slovakia comes from the European Values Study 2017, collected after the 2016 parliamentary election (n=1432). The main dependent variable refers to general party appeal, not vote choice, which is why I have combined two questions, 'Which party appeals to you the most?' and 'Is there another party that appeals to you?', to recode all those who mentioned Olano to the populist right, those who mentioned Kotleba to the far right, and those who mentioned We are Family and the Slovak National Party to the populist far right. Furthermore, for multinomial purposes, I created an additional variable where the reference category for comparison was the appeal of other parties in Slovakia.

Regarding authoritarianism, the EVS offers a wide range of items that measure authoritarianism: attitudes towards the acceptability of homosexuality, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and casual sex; obedience as an important quality for children to learn at home; greater respect for authority in the future is a good thing; having a strong leader who does not have to

bother with parliament and elections; and whether you should always love and respect your parents. These 9 items have been validated as a joint measurement of authoritarianism in De Regt *et al.* (2011) and De Regt *et al.* (2011a). Furthermore, De Regt *et al.* (2011) showed that the items are time invariant, meaning that they capture the meaning of authoritarianism regardless of the time that the question is asked. However, the EVS 2017 questionnaire omits one item, the question on love and respect for your parents. Following the logic from De Regt *et al.* (2011) I fitted a confirmatory factor analysis on 8 available items to evaluate the scale consistency. The model estimates a very good model fit for a single factor solution (CFI=0.986, TLI=0.980, RMSEA=0.042), informing the decision to use 8 available items as a single additive index of authoritarianism scaled from 0 to 1 (less to more authoritarian).

The control variables used in the analysis were chosen to represent the major explanations of right wing support from the individual perspective – Euroscepticism, protest voting, anti-immigrant sentiment, ideology, and unemployment (or threat of unemployment) (for overview of micro level corelates of radical right support see Arzheimer, 2018): immigrants increase crime problems (10-point scale); interest in politics (4-point scale); satisfaction with the political system (10-point scale); left-right political orientation (11-point scale); support for EU enlargement (10-point scale); satisfaction with democracy (4-point scale); religiosity (religious vs. non-religious and convinced atheists); employment (full-time, part-time and self-employed vs. others); income (low, medium, high); gender (male vs. female), education (lower, medium and high) and age (calculated from year of birth).

3.4.3 Analysis

The Slovakian case offers the opportunity to estimate the electoral appeal of three distinct party families within the PRR. In a multinomial logistic regression setting, I estimated the effects of authoritarianism between pairs of parties with reference points to the populist right (Olano, Models 1, and 2), and all the other parties in Slovakia (Models 3, 4 and 5). First, I will examine the

null findings. Compared to the other parties in the case study, none of the party families recorded an electoral advantage among the authoritarian electorate (Models 3, 4 and 5). However, within the populist far right, significant differences do emerge. The authoritarian electorate tends to favour the far right over populist far right (**2.77***) corresponding to an approximately 15 times greater likelihood of electoral appeal for Kotleba over Olano. A similar relationship was found in the comparison between the populist far right and the populist right (**2.331****) with around a 10 times greater likelihood of electoral appeal for We are Family and the Slovak National Party over Olano. These results suggest that among the authoritarian electorate, right wing parties that incorporate a far-right ideological outlook have an electoral advantage over those that are purely populist.

Table 4: EVS 2017 Slovakia - Multinomial logistic regression models

	Dependent variable:				
	Reference: Populist Right		Reference: Other		
	Far Right	Populist Far Right	Populist Right	Far Right	Populist Far Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Authoritarianism	**2.777***	**2.331****	-0.939	1.582	1.294
	(1.33)	(0.870)	(0.800)	(1.292)	(0.663)
Immigration Crime	0.044	-0.029	-0.113	-0.117	**-0.140*****
	(0.115)	(0.070)	(0.063)	(0.105)	(0.054)
Political Interest	-0.148	-0.199	**0.393***	0.425	0.191
	(0.357)	(0.207)	(0.181)	(0.313)	(0.151)
Left-Right	-0.135	**-0.248****	**0.288*****	0.167	0.075
	(0.134)	(0.083)	(0.069)	(0.122)	(0.057)
Satisfaction pol. system	0.072	**0.190***	**-0.197***	-0.127	0.012
	(0.166)	(0.096)	(0.083)	(0.155)	(0.076)
EU enlargement	0.035	0.039	-0.001	0.072	0.039
	(0.112)	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.110)	(0.052)
Satisfaction democracy	**-0.656***	0.561	-0.092	-0.266	0.062
	(0.182)	(0.107)	(0.092)	(0.167)	(0.083)
Male	0.076	-0.022	-0.039	-0.064	0.054
	(0.568)	(0.341)	(0.299)	(0.512)	(0.254)
Age	-0.030	0.011	**-**	**-0.068*****	**-0.030*****
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.008)
Education	-0.108	-0.120	-0.274	-0.331	-0.248
	(0.589)	(0.341)	(0.302)	(0.582)	(0.266)
Household income	0.081	0.412	-0.089	0.008	0.250
	(0.339)	(0.211)	(0.189)	(0.315)	(0.159)
Religion	-0.902	-0.468	-0.107	**-1.089***	-0.347
	(0.604)	(0.402)	(0.372)	(0.537)	(0.317)
Constant	1.995	-0.313	1.030	2.426	-0.342
	(2.330)	(1.340)	(1.255)	(2.263)	(1.071)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	444.564	444.564	1,055.166	1,055.166	1,055.166
Cases	723		1897		
Negelkerke R^2	0.242		0.25		
Note:					$^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$

3.5 Study II - Austria

3.5.1 Data and Measurement

The data for Austria comes from AUTNES 2013, a panel study collected in two waves, before and after the 2013 parliamentary election on a sample of 3266 respondents. Vote choice was collected in the second wave covering 1218 follow-up respondents, and I recoded the data to a categorical variable for those who voted for other parties (or did not vote at all), those who voted for the populist right Team Stronach, and those who voted for the populist far right – the BZÖ or the FPÖ. This dependent variable was used in a multinomial setting with a reference point of 'other parties'.

Regarding authoritarianism, the pre-election AUTNES has 6 items that measured the extent to which respondents agree with statements on a 5-point scale. The following items were used: (a) We should be grateful for our leaders that tell us exactly what we should do and how; ***(b)*** *The age in which discipline and obedience for authority are some of the most important virtuous should be over;* ***(c)*** *Our society for once has to crack down harder on criminals;* (d) It is important to also protect the right of criminals; (e) Our country needs people who oppose traditions and try out different ideas; and ***(f)*** *This country would flourish if young people paid more attention to traditions and values.* Each of the dimensions of authoritarianism – aggression, submission, and conventionalism, were represented by 2 items on the above scale. Given the unsatisfactory reliability score for the entire scale (Cronbach Alpha = 0.62) I ran an exploratory factor analysis for a one factor solution, that identified satisfactory loadings on three items, (b) 0.58, (c) 0.57, and (f) 0.54. These three items representing aggression (c), submission (b) and conventionalism (f) were used to create an additive index of authoritarianism ranging from 1 to 5, corresponding to low to high authoritarianism.

The control variables used in the analysis follow a similar logic presented in the previous case study. I build on the overall findings in the literature regarding the patterns of support for far right and incorporate variables to account for issue and ideological stances pertaining to

Euroscepticism, anti-immigration, ideology, protest voting, and economic position of voters (see Arzheimer, 2018). The variables used were: left-right (10-point scale); assessment of Austria's EU membership from good to bad (3-point scale); interest in politics (4-point scale); satisfaction with democracy in Austria (4-point scale); political knowledge as a number of correct answers to 7 factual questions (8- point scale); how joint life among Austrians and immigrants has changed from better to worse (5-point scale); whether the Muslim way of life is compatible with life in Austria (5-point scale); assessment of the economy – how worried are respondents (4-point scale); net monthly income (20-point scale); employment – a dummy variable for employed respondents versus the others; age in years; education (14-point scale); male – a dummy for gender; and degree of religiosity (4-point scale).

3.5.2 Analysis

In a multinomial logistic regression setting, I tested the electoral viability of different party families against a reference category 'voted for other parties' on the post-election sample. The analysis revealed no association between levels of authoritarianism and voting for the populist right (Team Stronach), while the relationship was positive and significant for the populist far right (the BZÖ and the FPÖ). An increase in the levels of authoritarianism was associated with an increase in the odds of appeal for the BZÖ and the FPÖ by 0.675***, which corresponds to approximately a doubling of the likelihood of voting for these two parties against all others. In a direct comparison between the populist right and the populist far right, the effects of authoritarianism were not present. However, the entire model demonstrates the electoral advantage of the populist far right among the authoritarian electorate. Therefore, the results do contribute to the general argument of this chapter, that authoritarianism at an individual level is linked with the far-right dimension of the party ideology rather than its populist dimension.

Table 5: AUTNES 2013 - Multinomial logistic regression model

	Dependent variable: Reference: Other	
	Populist Right	Populist Far Right
	(1)	(2)
Authoritarianism	0.463	**0.675*** **
	(0.285)	(0.173)
Left-Right	0.179	**0.199** **
	(0.109)	(0.064)
EU Membership	0.415	**0.624*** **
	(0.262)	(0.161)
Interest in politics	**0.604***	0.290
	(0.263)	(0.148)
Economy - Worried	-0.307	0.029
	(0.271)	(0.158)
Life: Immigration	-0.016	0.224
	(0.213)	(0.131)
Knowledge	**-0.318** **	-0.138*
	(0.134)	(0.075)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.018	**0.423** **
	(0.254)	(0.162)
Way of life: Compatibility	-0.163	-0.126
	(0.187)	(0.114)
Income	-0.006	-0.019
	(0.041)	(0.024)
Employment	-0.026	0.107
	(0.464)	(0.272)
Male	**0.888***	0.075
	(0.442)	(0.243)
Age	-0.011	**-0.024** **
	(0.014)	(0.008)
Education	0.008	-0.097*
	(0.083)	(0.055)
Religiousness	-0.084	-0.164
	(0.226)	(0.135)
Constant	**-5.192***	**-5.470*** **
	(2.137)	(1.278)
Akaike Information Criteria	821.750	
N	2298	
Negelkerke R^2	0.301	
Note:		*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

3.6 Study III - Serbia

3.6.1 Case selection

Unlike the approach in the first two studies, here I turn to a different scenario that could be used to evaluate the argument. To be specific, I have identified two cases in which a party transformation, or a party split, occurred where the two resulting parties had different ideological outlooks. First, in 2017 in Finland, after the appointment of Jussi Halla-aho to the position of party leader of the True Finns, 19 MPs left the party and formed Blue Reform. According to ThePopuList (Rooduijn *et al.*, 2019) in contrast to the True Finns which are populist far right, Blue Reform formed as a Eurosceptic populist party without the far-right elements. However, although this scenario constitutes a case with favourable structural conditions, Blue Reform failed to gather substantive electoral support winning a marginal 0.97% of votes in the 2019 parliamentary election.

In another instance, between the 2008 and the 2012 presidential elections and the 2012 parliamentary election, held on the same day, in Serbia, an internal power struggle occurred within the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) – an openly radical, nationalist, and Eurosceptic party. The power clash fostered a split in 2008 into the SRS and the breakaway Serbian Progress Party (SNS) – a conservative and populist political party. One additional feature of the case is that in the presidential elections in both 2008 and 2012, Tomislav Nikolić ran for president. In 2008, Nikolić ran as the vice-president[35] of the Serbian Radical Party while in the subsequent presidential elections in 2012, Nikolić ran and won the presidency, as the president of Serbian Progress Party. In both instances Nikolić gathered substantial electoral support, making this case suitable for analysis. Furthermore, this scenario offers the opportunity to examine individual level authoritarianism, isolating its relationship with party/candidate ideology by holding the candidate constant, including such factors as his charisma, competence, and personal characteristics. The following paragraphs

[35] Effectively its main political figure in the country, as party president Vojislav Šešelj faced criminal prosecution at the Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Hague.

examine the process of the party split, the ideological distancing, and the introduction of populist elements into the approach of the newly formed SNS.

The Serbian Radical Party (**SRS**) was formed in the early 1990s under the leadership of Vojislav Šešelj. The axis of political activity of the SRS was both harsh criticism of Milošević and his *soft* approach in the Yugoslav Wars and support for the establishment of Greater Serbia. Towards that end, the party leader Vojislav Šešelj organized and ran a paramilitary formation named the Serbian Chetnik Movement and called for a territorial expansion to neighboring countries, including territories in Macedonia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, and Montenegro (Bochsler, 2009). This territorial expansion should have ultimately resulted in an ethnically pure state of the Serbian nation (Tomić, 2013) conceptualised as constituting exclusively of Orthodox Christians (Bakić, 2009). Even though regime change in 2000 brought about a wave of democratization and the abandonment of open expansionism, the SRS did not renounce its goal of a nationalist greater Serbia[36]. Furthermore, their political outlook of territorial expansion was complemented by a strongly expressed authoritarian character (Goati, 2006), constant threats against national minorities (Tomić, 2013), and hard Euroscepticism (Stojić, 2017), followed by an emphasis on the spread of anarchy in Serbian society, which could be remedied by a return to power of the national-patriotic politics and a strong system of law and order (Komšić, 2006). Based on the characteristic mentioned above, it is quite clear that the SRS easily qualifies as a far-right party, with strong authoritarian, nationalist and xenophobic dimensions.

While the SRS had a clear ideological position, it was no stranger to internal party struggles. With Vojislav Šešelj voluntarily surrendering to the ICTY in 2003, the vice president of the SRS, Tomislav Nikolić, became the primary party figure in Serbia. His efforts to move the party towards a more centrist conservative outlook was unsuccessful (Bochsler, 2009), partly because of the party's established nationalist and radical identity, and partly because of the control over the party

[36] An insightful window into the main focus of the SRS is provided by one of their electoral slogans 'Serbia is like a Nokia, its getting smaller and smaller' (Stojarova, 2012)

that Šešelj still had despite being detained at the ICTY in Hague. This internal party collision ultimately resulted in a party split in 2008, when Nikolić, Aleksandar Vučić and 18 MPs decided to form the Serbian Progress Party **SNS.** The final point of contention that fostered this split was the decision of Nikolić to break with the SRS hardline Euroscepticism and to support the DS-led[37] signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. As acting president of the SRS, Šešelj vetoed any such agreement with the Serbian government, which effectively split the SRS.

With the formation of a new party, Nikolić was free to reposition himself and the SNS on the ideological spectrum. To understand how SNS defined its ideology, I turn to examining their strategy at the first elections they contested, in 2012. By organizing a petition for snap elections in 2010 that gathered over a million signatories (Atlagić, 2012), the SNS had effectively started their campaign some two years prior to the elections of 2012. Their main goal was to establish themselves as moderate right-wing party, and in the process, they did introduce some populist elements. The party abandoned its predecessors' goal of a Greater Serbia (although still standing firm on the issues of Kosovo as an illegitimate country), supported EU integration and argued for centre right positions on social and economic policy (Spasojević, 2012). With the local, parliamentary, and presidential elections converging, what started as a programmatic and ideological competition swiftly turned to personal confrontation between the party leaders (Slavujević, 2012). Nikolić took center stage, and his campaign for president was used as a front line for the parliamentary elections as well.

Regarding the ideological positioning of the party, Nikolić clearly framed the central electoral issue as the struggle for economic development (Spasojević, 2012) that could best be achieved through the opposition of the good people against the criminal and corrupt ruling elites (here equated most obviously with the Democratic Party and its elites). His approach included,

[37] The Democratic Party.

some would say unsuccessfully, an attempt to portray himself as empathetic towards the struggle and suffering of the ordinary people (Slavujević, 2012, p. 30). Along those lines, looking at the semantic meaning of party slogans and campaign speeches, Stepanov (2012) concluded that main message Nikolić was conveying was one of the possibility of a virtuous, honest, and fair Serbia (incorporating a virtuous, honest and fair people), implicitly suggesting that this possibility was conditioned on Tadić (of the Democratic Party) losing the presidential race. That implicit suggestion from campaign slogans was explicitly articulated elsewhere, as Atlagić (2012, p. 41) claims it is clear Nikolić was drawing a direct parallel between fighting crime and corruption and fighting Tadić and the Democratic Party. Stojiljković and Spasojević (2018) emphasize this point, arguing that the fight against corruption and crime was framed within the populist rhetoric of a fight against the usurpers who took power after the democratic changes of 2000. One prominent framing device in that regard was the populist message that the DS represented a unified block with various tycoons, who were getting all the economic benefits and state subsidies (Spasojević, 2018).

Furthermore, Nikolić stated that in his presidential term, he would be a 'president of the people, not president of the party', again portraying Tadić as a detached (president) elite who operated in the interest of the establishment rather than the people. Lastly, the conceptualisation of 'the people' was expanded to not only Orthodox Serbs, as was the case with the SRS, but to all those good people who are faithful regardless of the specific God they are faithful too[38] (Lončar, 2012). In other words, the SNS moved away from exclusionary xenophobia and nativism, but remained on the right of the political spectrum, clearly acknowledging the importance of religion to the moral fabric of society. The rhetorical acceptance of Muslims and Catholics was further validated as the SNS did form a pre-electoral coalition for parliamentary elections with Bosniak People's Party (Lončar, 2012). Without internal enemies outside the DS political elites, the populist

[38] 'Every man that believes in God is a good man. And whether he looks for God in an Orthodox chruch, a mosque or a Catholic church, is irrelevant to me'. (part of a speech by Tomislav Nikolić speech, in Lončar, 2012).

'others' blamed members of the international community, and despite their stated support for EU integration, Brussels (as a cypher for the EU) for stirring up anti-Serbian sentiment (Spasojević, 2018). Based on the features outlined above, a case can be made that Nikolić positioned the SNS as a populist right party. Anti-elitism and Manicheanism were clearly a part of his political discourse – fighting corruption and crime essentially represents a fight against the evil and corrupt elites that must be defeated in order for virtuous and honest people to revive Serbia.

Finally, I compared two electoral speeches of Nikolić prior to 2008 and 2012. Using the coding scheme developed by Hawkins and Kocijan (2013), I selected the two closing speeches in the presidential campaigns of 2008 and 2012. Furthermore, the speeches were accessed in their entirety, using a holistic grading approach (White 1985), to evaluate whether populist elements were present or not. Each speech could be assigned one of three categories (0, 1, 2) depending on the level and consistency of the populist frames utilized. The 2008 closing speech in Kraljevo offers some populist elements, but they are not used in a consistent enough manner to qualify as fully-fledged populism, receiving a grade of 0 (details in Appendix B). On the other hand, the closing campaign speech from 2012 in Belgrade is clearly populist, exhibiting all the major parts of the ideational approach to populism, a Manichaean world view, anti-elitism, and an expression of the general will of the people, and thus receives a maximum grade of 2.

To reiterate what has been outlined so far, the SRS and the SNS are two quite different political parties, and Nikolić, in acting as a leader of both, represented quite different ideological positions. While on the one hand the SRS was radical, nationalist, authoritarian, xenophobic and Eurosceptic, on the other, the SNS was a conservative, pro-European and populist. With a focus on Nikolić in the presidential races of 2008 and 2012, I can isolate how individual level authoritarianism was correlated with vote choice and link voter characteristics to the candidate's ideology.

3.6.2 Data and Measurement

This study uses the Serbian National Election Study (SNES) elements of which are published in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems CSES Module 4 dataset for Serbia from 2012.[39] The dependent variables included two questions - respondents were asked about their vote choice in 2012 as well as their vote choice in the 2008 presidential elections. From this data, I created a categorical variable, with non-voters as one category, all those who voted for Nikolić as a second, and all other valid votes as a third[40]. The distribution of the dependent variable is presented in the following table.

Table 6: Survey election results

	Electoral cycle	
	2008	2012
Voted for Nikolić	289 (18%)	484 (~31%)
Voted against	559 (~36%)	675 (~43%)
Non-voters	720 (~46%)	409 (~26%)

Number of respondents and percentage of response

In terms of the independent variables, there were six items that tap into individual level authoritarianism, retrieved from both national contributors and the SNES, that were not included in the CSES 4 module. The questions asked, on a five point scale, the extent to which the respondents agree with the following statements: ***1)*** *The most important virtues children should learn are obedience and respect for authority;* 2) Young people sometimes have rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they should overcome them and calm down; 3) The state of immorality in our society is partially a consequence of the fact that teachers and parents have forgotten that physical punishment is the best form of upbringing; ***4)*** *It would be better if the authorities censored the press, movies and other media, so*

[39] The study totaled 1568 respondents and contains a multitude of important questions pertaining to the subject of this study. The study was conducted from December 2012 to February 2013, using face-to-face CAPI with address-based contact derived from the national registry of the Post Office of Serbia. Respondents were chosen in three selection stages, starting with their postal geographical region, then their residential households within the region, and finally individuals within a residential household.

[40] The survey itself had two questions for each election, where the order of response items was randomized across two groups. The randomization was limited to two responses: for the presidential elections Tadić and Nikolić (which alternated between 1st and 2nd position across groups).

that the trash is kept away from young people; ***5)*** *Most of our societal problems would be resolved if we could somehow get rid of immoral and degenerate individuals;* and 6) People can be divided into two groups: the strong and the weak. Guided by the debates in the literature on the exact nature and structure of authoritarianism, I ran an exploratory factor analysis with *oblimin* rotation fitting one, two and three factor solutions to investigate which of the items covary. The scree test suggested that a one factor solution was the most optimal one, which retained 27% of variance with the three items recording satisfactory factor loadings – obedience, censorship and getting rid of immoral and degenerate individuals. I used these three items in an additive index of authoritarianism ranging from 1 to 5 (low to high levels of authoritarianism).

Control variables used in the analysis were: political knowledge – 5 point scale; employment – recoded into a dummy variable from the original data so that full time and part time workers are coded as one, and the rest (including retired, students and people with disabilities) are coded as 0; income –an 11 point scale representing categories of monthly income measured in ranges of 10,000 dinars (approximately 100 euros); which political system is better, dictatorship or democracy? – 10 point scale; vote choice in a hypothetical EU accession referendum, coded into a dummy for supporters versus opponents and undeclared; left-right ideological orientation measured on an 11 point scale; interest in politics on a 4 point scale; age of respondents; place of residence – a dummy variable for rural versus others; and education measured on an 8 point scale.

3.6.3 Analysis

To test the argument, I conducted multinomial logistic regression analysis on presidential vote choice in two elections in Serbia across 2008 and 2012. I tested the predictive power of vote choice in two identical models, with different reference categories - against non-voters and against those who voted for other presidential candidates. Following this strategy, controlling for the third option, I obtained direct comparisons between pairs of voters – (a) non-voters and Nikolić voters and (b) Nikolić voters and those who voted for other candidates. The results add validity to the

proposed relationship mechanism, as Nikolić had no electoral advantage in 2012 among the authoritarian electorate; however, authoritarians were approximately 1.5 times more likely to vote for him in 2008 than to be non-voters (**0.354****), or approximately 1.3 times more likely to vote against him (**0.271***)[41].

Table 7: Multinomial Logistic regression on vote choice for Nikolić (2012) and (2008)

	Dependent variable:							
	Ref: Non-voters **2012**		Ref: Voted against **2012**		Ref: Non-voters **2008**		Ref: Voted against **2008**	
	Voted against	Voted Nikolić	Non-voters	Voted Nikolić	Voted against	Voted Nikolić	Non-voters	Voted Nikolić
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Authoritarianism	0.068	0.188	-0.068	0.121	0.083	**0.354****	-0.083	**0.271***
	(0.094)	(0.101)	(0.094)	(0.103)	(0.090)	(0.125)	(0.090)	(0.120)
Dictatorship vs. Democracy	0.071	0.055	-0.071	-0.015	**0.096****	0.065	**-0.096****	-0.031
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.038)
EU referendum support	**0.514****	-0.353	**-0.514****	**-0.867*****	**0.486*****	-0.348	**-0.486****	**-0.834*****
	(0.193)	(0.181)	(0.193)	(0.190)	(0.176)	(0.205)	(0.176)	(0.194)
Interest in politics	**0.486*****	**0.330****	**-0.486*****	-0.156	**0.418*****	**0.471*****	**-0.418*****	0.054
	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.098)	(0.118)	(0.098)	(0.110)
Left-Right	-0.017	**0.083****	0.017	**0.100****	-0.010	0.048	0.010	0.058*
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Age	0.006	0.011	-0.006	0.005	**0.025*****	**0.031*****	**-0.025*****	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Education	0.020	**-0.119***	-0.020	**-0.139***	-0.0004	-0.073	0.0004	-0.073
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.068)	(0.057)	(0.063)
Employment	-0.020	0.028	0.020	0.048	0.352	**0.483***	-0.352	0.132
	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.200)	(0.183)	(0.226)	(0.183)	(0.217)
Rural	0.343	**0.396***	-0.343	0.053	0.070	**0.478***	-0.070	**0.408***
	(0.186)	(0.183)	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.175)	(0.210)	(0.175)	(0.197)
Male	0.052	0.012	-0.052	-0.040	-0.261	-0.224	0.261	0.036
	(0.176)	(0.173)	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.166)	(0.201)	(0.166)	(0.189)
Constant	**-2.795*****	**-2.415*****	**2.795*****	0.381	**-3.250*****	**-5.102*****	**3.250*****	**-1.852***
	(0.697)	(0.693)	(0.697)	(0.726)	(0.661)	(0.858)	(0.661)	(0.830)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,868.90	1,868.90	1,868.904	1,868.90	1,767.32	1,767.32	1,767.329	1,767.32
Cases	2637		2637		2637		2637	
Negelkerke R^2	0.13				0.17			
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

[41] Identical results were obtained with a different dependent variable where vote choice for the SRS was evaluated in 2008 and the SNS in 2012.

At this point, certain drawbacks related to the empirical strategy should be addressed. While some important elements are present, the Serbian scenario does not amount to a pure case of natural experimentation. The 4-year period analysed is quite a large one, particularly if we seek to exclude the possibility of intervening variables significantly shaping vote preferences. On a general note, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis could have contributed to the overall change in the political landscape and to the demise of the Democratic Party and Tadić in 2012. In terms of the internal political processes that unfolded, the party split that is the focus here was hardly the only major political change during that period as the presidential election in 2008 were held only three months after Kosovo declared independence from Serbia.

Additionally, the 2012 elections were held in light of the disappointment among Serbian voters that 'nothing' substantive had been done to reclaim the lost territory. Furthermore, the ideal test of the outlined theory would come from a panel study that took identical measures after both the 2008 elections and the 2012 elections, regardless of whether the same respondents were included in the datasets. Unfortunately, such data is not available; instead, I am limited to a dataset that took measurements at one point in time. This is the main empirical drawback of the study. For this reason, drawing stronger conclusion and inferences on the nature of the relationship between voting behaviour and some of the predictor variables is not possible. I am referring here in particular to predictor variables that are likely to change over time, such as employment, or income. Instead, the comparison of the results that outline the nature of the relationship between these variables and vote choice in 2008 should be taken with caution. However, regardless of whether authoritarianism is conceptualised as a disposition or a coping strategy, it is clearly a stable individual characteristic, and a safe assumption can be made that it does not change drastically over time. For this reason, I argue it is safe to assume that levels of authoritarianism among respondents were very much the same in 2008 as they were in 2012, when the measures were recorded. This

allows us to make correlational statements between authoritarianism and vote choice even across a four-year period, and to be quite certain in their validity.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter makes an effort at disentangling the role of individual level authoritarianism and support for populist parties/politicians. As an empirical strategy, I followed the suggestion of Rooduijn (2019) to carefully conceptualise the parties for empirical analysis, in order to examine whether authoritarianism can be linked to populism or the related far right ideological dimensions of nativism and authoritarianism. The primary argument of the chapter is that in general terms individual level authoritarianism should be related to PRR vote choice, but more specifically only if parties are clearly far right (i.e., nativist, or authoritarian), rather than populist.

Employing multinomial logistic regression models on a sample of Serbian, Slovakian and Austrian respondents from 2012, 2017 and 2013, I have provided evidence that individual level authoritarianism relates to politicians and parties that express far right (nativist and authoritarian) ideas rather than populist ideas. The Slovakian case supports this pattern, as individual level authoritarianism there was related to the increased appeal of the far right (Kotleba) and the populist far right (We are Family and Slovak National Party) but not the populist right (Olano). Similarly, the Austrian case suggest that authoritarianism is linked to support for the populist far right (the BZÖ and the FPÖ) but not the populist right (Team Stronach). Lastly, in Serbia, by contrasting the support patterns for Tomislav Nikolić in two presidential elections, authoritarianism was linked to an increase in electoral support when Nikolić was campaigning on the basis far-right ideology in 2008, but not as a populist right candidate in 2012.

The importance of such analysis lies primarily in the nuanced approach to the ideological classification of the political subject in question. The consideration of support patterns for separated party families within right wing politics, adds strength to the validity of the conclusion

and helps clarify the accumulated knowledge on demand-side explanations for the success of the PRR. Moreover, such an approach might help us understand why scholarship has found diverse results regarding the relationship between individual level authoritarianism and PRR support.

In the reflection on some limitations to the study mentioned in the previous section, this chapter does not provide a definitive answer to the questions it departs from. However, it does point to the conclusion that the careful consideration of party ideology is needed and that not all right-wing ideological dimensions should be theorized as having an impact in shaping the PRR vote within specific parts of the electorate. Future research should look to replicate the findings of this study, complementing it in at least two ways. First, there are several ways of measuring authoritarianism and scholarship should explore whether these findings are robust regardless of the measurement scales used. An attempt towards this strategy was offered in this chapter with diverging measures of authoritarianism across all three cases. In any case, further studies would help increase the robustness of the findings or point to the additional scope conditions of the theoretical assumptions. Similarly, replication of the methodology, applied to additional cases and in comparative studies, would enhance the validity of the conclusion reached in this chapter.

Chapter IV

OFFER MONEY, THEY WILL ACCEPT: LINKAGES BETWEEN AUTHORITARIAN ATTITUDES AND CLIENTELIST TARGETING IN AFRICA

'Hundreds of pages of interview transcripts and fieldnotes testify to one simple - although essential - fact: it is not the state that is perceived as the distributing agency; it is Matilde or Juancito.'

Auyero Javier (1999)

***From the Client's Point(s) of View*, p.314**

4.1 Introduction

Electoral competition is at the core of the democratic process; however, not all competition practices are fair or even legal. Political elites employ a variety of different strategies that skew the electoral playing field in their favour, of which clientelism stands out, as it relies not only on the actions of politicians but requires a degree of cooperation from voters as well. This strategy is conditioned on a dyadic relationship between patrons and clients, in which some sort of (personalized) offer and continuous access to benefits (money, goods, land, jobs and so on) in exchange for a vote occurs (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). In the process, patrons and brokers decide whom to redistribute the limited resources to, or whom to target for clientelist exchange. For the strategy to be as cost effective as possible, and to avoid wasting limited resources, patrons and brokers must make a form of evaluation as to whom would be willing to credibly commit to a clientelist exchange. This chapter sets out from this broad question – what are the characteristics of voters targeted for clientelist exchanges?

How patrons and brokers decide who to target for clientelist exchange is an important question, as it contributes to the overall understanding of clientelism, a strategy that severely distorts the functioning of democratic institutions. Research on the issue of targeting has focused on the ideological affiliations of voters (Stokes, 2005), their socioeconomic status (Stokes *et al.*, 2013) and more recently on their social preferences (norm-based explanations) – predominantly reciprocity and indebtedness (Lawson & Green, 2014), and preferences for democratic institutions (Carlin & Moseley, 2014; Carlin & Moseley, 2021). Social preferences, or norm-based explanations, were introduced as a means of understanding the effectiveness of clientelism, despite some of its drawbacks, positing them as a solution to one of the key issues which patrons have to resolve – compliance and defection. Here, in particular, the illegal nature of the practice results in the inability to formulate clientelist exchange by means of a formal contract, thus creating a scenario in which both patrons and clients may be unable to commit to a credible exchange (Robinson & Verdier,

2013). On the one hand, voters cannot be certain that the promised benefits will actually be delivered. On the other, patrons and brokers cannot be certain that voters will in fact vote as instructed, and high levels of defection can result in the breakdown and bankruptcy of the entire system (Dal Bó, 2007).

The first theoretical approach to the commitment issue was the instrumentalist approach, where voter decisions are directly influenced by the ability of brokers and patrons to monitor their electoral behaviour (Lawson & Greene, 2014). The greater the monitoring potential, the greater the chances that clients will comply with the demands of brokers. However, ballot secrecy severely limits the ability to monitor for patrons (see Van de Walle, 2007) which is why some scholars have turned to norm-based explanations to further their understanding of the durability and stability of clientelist exchanges. In this context, the social preferences of voters and the interpersonal nature of clientelism lead to the examination of the clients' value system as a significant factor that can make clientelist exchanges more stable and predictable, without the need for actual monitoring. I build on those assumptions and examine the role of individual level authoritarianism in identifying who the targeted voters are. I argue that individuals holding authoritarian attitudes will be more likely to comply with broker/patron demands, which might explain why brokers/patrons offer vote incentives to them in the first place.

There are several reasons why authoritarian attitudes might be associated with higher levels of compliance. Most notably, authoritarian individuals tend to be submissive to authority figures and seek to justify almost any action taken by them. I theorize later in the chapter that two mechanisms are in place here. First, in what is a dichotomous (patron) broker/client relationship, the brokers hold a significant amount of power, influence, and authority over the clients, as they control access to resources, a feature that 'grants' them a higher position in the social hierarchy. Therefore, authoritarian individuals should be more likely to comply with the demands of patrons/brokers precisely because the demand to act in a specific manner comes from a person

with authority (or higher social status). Second, authoritarian individuals should be more likely to evaluate clientelist exchange as a legitimate electoral strategy, due to the divergence between authoritarian tendencies and civic norms necessary for the functioning of representative institutions. Indeed, authoritarian individuals have a track record of greater support for anti-democratic practices. Among others, authoritarians are more supportive of restriction of civil liberties, or mass surveillance (Cohrs *et al.*, 2005; Crowson, 2007) and torture (Arlin, 2016), in comparison to which vote buying is morally ambiguous at best. In that sense, authoritarian individuals should be less likely to experience a value-based conflict between the clientelist demand and the civic obligation to vote for the needs of the community, not just themselves (Almond & Verba, 1964, in Lawson & Greene, 2014). Therefore, if offered the opportunity to engage in a clientelist exchange, authoritarian attitudes should act as a legitimizing mechanism explaining why that exchange is acceptable.

As an additional layer of analysis, I focus on the role of electoral rules in enabling effective clientelist strategies. Here, I build on the research by Chang and Golden (2007) and Pellicer and Wegner (2013), arguing that the type of electoral system, as well as district magnitude, influence the overall cost and effectiveness of clientelism. Depending on these institutional characteristics, some clientelist strategies might be more feasible than others and should incentivize patrons to use different targeting strategies. I argue that authoritarian individuals are more likely to be targeted in PR or systems with a high district magnitude for two reasons. First, establishing clientelist exchange as a type of personalized relationship is harder and more costly in PR or high district magnitude systems, are they are by their nature more depersonalized, and second, the monitoring potential is lower. For these reasons, patrons/brokers should logically opt for strategies that reduce the overall cost, and which place less emphasis on the ability to monitor client compliance.

In the analysis section, I use the Afrobarometer 5 (2011-2013) integrated dataset with data available for 34 countries, and parts of the published Afrobarometer 8 (2019-2021) country level

datasets for Sierra Leone and Nigeria. Apart from offering the possibility to conduct a large N comparison, Afrobarometer fits the purpose of this research rather well, as clientelist strategies are quite frequent in Africa, institutional systems differ, and the overall quality of institutions is different. These conditions offer the setting for a more detailed analysis of clientelist targeting.

Regarding the findings of the chapter, I report statistically significant associations between individual level authoritarianism and the offer of clientelist exchange. The results of the multilevel models show that those who are supportive of unrestricted presidential authorities, both in relation to parliament and the judicial system, are on average targeted more frequently. In terms of marginal effects, the effects amount to around a 1.3% higher probability of being targeted among supportive individuals than among those who are unsupportive of unrestricted presidential authorities. Furthermore, I find that the frequency of targeting differs depending on the institutional context. The type of electoral system in itself was not a significant factor, but associations were found in the cross-level interaction with district magnitude. The greater the district magnitude across countries, the more likely it is for authoritarian individuals to be targeted. The marginal effect of this interaction rises from 1% when the district magnitude is 1, to around 3% when the district magnitude is 20 or higher. Considering that the overall share of targeted individuals is on average 16%, this effect is relatively substantive.

The findings of this chapter add to two strands of the literature within clientelism research. First, it explores an additional factor that can be used to explain who the targeted voters are, going beyond the core/swing ideological leanings, demographic characteristics or previously evaluated social values of reciprocity, indebtedness, or preferences for democratic institutions. Here, I approach the issue from a different perspective, not examining whether voters hold democratic attitudes, but whether they hold authoritarian attitudes that should render them meaningless. Second, it addresses the literature that aims to 'solve' the problem of imperfect monitoring by focusing on voter agency in ensuring compliance. Instead of implying that ballot secrecy can be

violated, and voter decisions known, patrons/brokers are able to rely on the personal characteristics of clients as a guarantee of compliance.

4.2 Clientelism overview: Who to target and why?

Clientelism is by no stretch of the imagination a new phenomenon. Evidence of electoral clientelism dates back to the earliest organised competitive elections (see Mares, 2015, for XIX century German elections). In its pure form, clientelism is considered to be a chain of dyadic type relationships between politicians (patrons), brokers and clients (Hicken, 2011) in which some type of offer and continuous access to benefits (money, goods, land, jobs and so on) in exchange for a vote or series of votes occurs (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). These strategies must be individually targeted, rather than elevated to a policy level, in order to constitute a clientelist exchange (Stokes *et al.*, 2013). Therefore, to be regarded as a clientelist exchange, some sort of *quid pro quo* arrangement must exist – specific electoral behaviour on the part of the client (a specific vote or abstention from voting) in return for a certain agreed upon behaviour by the broker[42] (Mares & Young, 2016).

With the idea of clientelism in mind, I begin this exploration with a general question of how brokers select which voters to target. The first generation of research focused on the ideological positioning of voters in explaining targeting patterns. Here, Stokes (2005) and Stokes *et al.* (2013) have claimed that brokers target non-partisan voters and those with weak ideological affiliations. However, the evidence in support of this claim is not conclusive. In many countries, the partisan and core voters are those that are rewarded (see Mares & Young (2016) for an extensive review). The rationale behind this strategy lies in the assumption that core voters are easier to target and monitor *effectively* as they are embedded within partisan networks (Calvo & Murillo, 2013). Similarly,

[42] Note that this conceptualisation of clientelism implicitly excludes negative clientelist strategies, such as threats, the withdrawal of benefits and ultimately violence. While I recognize that these can also constitute clientelist exchanges, this chapter will focus only on those strategies that 'promise' some sort of directly transferable benefits for future electoral support.

Gans-Morse *et al.* (2014) argue that under ballot secrecy, core voters are more likely to become targeted, as it is easier to monitor their compliance. To summarize on a general note, based on the Afrobarometer data, Mares and Young (2016) claim that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that parties usually target core voters when distributing positive inducements (money, goods, or favours).

The second line of research focuses on the relationship between socioeconomic status and clientelist targeting with positive inducement (Stokes, 2005; Stokes *et al.*, 2013; Calvo & Murillo, 2004). Parties tend to target poorer voters with positive inducements, as the marginal utility of the benefits is higher for lower-income voters (Calvo & Murrilo, 2004; Stokes 2005; Stokes *et al.*, 2013), making them more likely to engage in clientelist exchange. Another possible mechanism that explains why low-income voters are more frequently targeted comes from a study by Gonzales-Ocantos *et al.* (2012), in which they find evidence that vote buying is less stigmatized among those who are economically worse off. This notion is supported by a study by Bratton (2008), who shows that poorest quintile of voters is half as likely to view vote buying as 'wrong and punishable' compared to high income voters.

Both of the above-mentioned strains of literature have an implicit assumption built into their core – whether brokers choose clients based on their partisanship and affiliation, or their socioeconomic status, they do so in a way that allows them to effectively distribute resources and maximize compliance. What brokers and patrons are trying to limit is the extent of what Kitschelt and Altamirano (2015) label as the 'effectiveness gap' – a situation in which clientelist targeting is conducted on a large scale, but only few voters actually fulfil the exchange. For clientelist strategies to be effective, the ability of each party to monitor and sanction the other is crucial (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). Brokers need assurances that clients will vote the way they are supposed to, while clients need certainty that brokers will provide the promised benefits. As a result, recent models assume that voters only comply with the wishes of political brokers if they believe that their choices

are monitored and that they could be sanctioned if they fail to support the machine (Lawson & Green, 2014).

The monitoring aspect of clientelism introduces further complication for understanding the exact mechanism of the reasons that clientelism works. This complication is contingent on the fact that almost all systems have a significant degree of ballot secrecy, thus, creating an imperfect monitoring scenario. With that in mind, how do brokers enforce clientelist relationships in the face of secret ballot? In other words, which targeting strategies do brokers employ when they cannot identify individual defectors?

4.3 The effectiveness of clientelism through norm-based lenses

Muno (2010) provides three explanations for the success of clientelist exchanges, and their exploration could be fruitful in the pursuit of answers to the questions from previous section – (a) power and force (b) needs and demands and (c) voluntary obligation. The first two are based on an instrumentalist approach to clientelist exchanges – they assume that brokers can still obtain information and monitor client defection, and that the success of the exchange is contingent on that ability. The voluntary obligation aspect does not assume effective monitoring, and has developed into a standalone strain of research, also known as a norm-based enforcing mechanism (Lawson & Green, 2014). In other words, the success of clientelism is contingent on some sort of psychological factors or norms that make clients voluntarily comply. As Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) acknowledge, in the absence of 'expensive organizational surveillance and enforcement structures', clientelism thrives only where voters voluntarily and spontaneously comply with clientelist inducements. Here, the literature focuses on feelings of reciprocity, indebtedness, and gratitude (Lawson & Greene, 2014; Chang, 2016; Finan & Schechter, 2012).

Through the lenses of norm-based explanations, Finan and Schester (2012) show that brokers leverage social preferences in deciding who to target with clientelist exchanges. Reciprocity

is the primary norm explored here, with both observational (Finan & Schester, 2012) and experimental data (Lawson & Greene, 2014) validating the assumption that receiving gifts creates a feeling of obligation to behave in a reciprocal way, increasing the likelihood that the targeted voters will comply with the broker's demand. Not only does that norm-based approach assume compliance, but as countries become more developed economically, the cost of clientelism rises as well. As such. brokers are incentivized to use strategies that reduce monitoring costs and therefore increase the resources available for actual clientelist exchange (Hickens, 2011).

Two underlying mechanisms ensure that this norm-based approach is effective. First, most scholars stress that, at their core, clientelist relationships are personal, dyadic relationships between individuals, at all levels of the clientelist exchanges down to the level of brokers and individuals' clients (Hicken, 2011). Based on this assumption, brokers would be knowledgeable as to whether the targeted individuals are those who are prone to feel indebted or obligated, and thus act in a reciprocal manner. In this context, by combining data from two surveys, one with voters and one with patrons, Finan and Schester (2012) show a surprisingly high correlation between the voter's social preferences and the patron's (middleman's) estimation of those social preferences. Second, clientelist exchanges are seldom a one-off trade. Vilchez *et al.* (2021) stipulate that clientelism creates a perpetual cycle, in which citizens are dependent on the actions of the government. Therefore, not only do those clients expect future exchanges, but brokers incorporate them in networks and have several iterations to ensure that they are behaving in a reciprocal manner. To reiterate, a norm-based approach assumes that clients comply because they feel that is what they should do, not because of the threat of monitoring.

However, norm-based compliance built on reciprocity is not without its drawbacks. Obligations stemming from reciprocity must compete with other obligations that could diminish the likelihood of compliance, such as the degree to which voters have embedded civic norms and respect for the rule of law or for representative institutions (Lawson & Green, 2004). Therefore,

norm-based compliance implicitly assumes a hierarchy of norms, in which reciprocity is positioned at the top, superior to any other civic norm. However, literature demonstrates that this is not always the case, and that voters do tend to behave in a manner that upholds democratic principles. For example, Fox (1994) reported that civic education campaigns reduce the effectiveness of vote buying in Taiwan. Additionally, Carlin and Moseley (2021) argued that the 'effectiveness gap' of clientelism is best explained by the existence of democratic norms, where targeted voters who are committed to democratic governance and norms actually set out to punish the vote buying parties and vote against them. In other words, targeting democratic individuals can result in an electoral backlash, or 'audience' cost (Carlin & Moseley, 2014). Democratic individuals are seen as more likely to find clientelism morally objectionable, and as a result of these considerations, some authors suggest that patrons/clients specifically aim to avoid voters who view clientelism as an unseemly strategy (Gonzales Ocantos *et al.*, 2014).

4.4 Authoritarian attitudes and clientelism

If reciprocity is sometimes outweighed by adherence to democratic principles, the question here is whether a norm or an attitude exists, that would by virtue of its structure ensure norm-based compliance. I argue that there are attitudinal characteristics that, if present, clearly render democratic values as second order – the most notable of these characteristics is authoritarianism. Before outlining the mechanism of authoritarian influence, there is a lingering question that should be addressed first – if patrons are targeting voters based on their authoritarian tendencies, how would patrons know whether a person is authoritarian or not? Finan and Schester (2012) explored a similar issue in their research on indebtedness and reciprocity. Their explanation is grounded in the nature of the clientelist exchange, and the fact that it is a highly personalized process, in which two individuals, the patron and the client, reach a mutual understanding. Furthermore, targeting is executed as close to 'the ground' as possible (with a middlemen/patron for each village in the case

of Peru), based on voter characteristics that would make them more likely to engage in clientelism in general terms, and is not influenced by client closeness to the middlemen themselves (Finan & Schester, 2012). Finally, the fact that the benefits are delivered personally fosters a reliance on middlemen that are knowledgeable about the specific community. Finan and Schester (2012) showed that middlemen in Peru know not only various observable characteristics about the targeted individuals (their wealth, landholdings and so on) but that their estimation of a client's social preferences, for example their levels of altruism, are highly corelated with client's own survey report of those preferences.

Building on these findings, it is not a farfetched assumption to argue that patrons are also knowledgeable about various other attitudinal characteristics of potential voters, including their authoritarian tendencies, especially if these attitudes foster higher compliance with clientelist exchange. This chapter argues that they do. If individuals hold authoritarian attitudes, the influence of these attitudes on shaping their behaviour will almost certainly overweight other civic norms, such as the respect for the rule of law or representative institutions. Therefore, authoritarian attitudes will be associated with an increased chance of compliance, and not only that, they actually discourage the targeted individuals from backlashing and punishing the clientelist parties. In this manner, brokers employ a strategy that (a) results in a greater chance of compliance, and (b) does not result in any negative externalities even if the targeted individuals do not comply.

I base this assumption on two observations. First, Lande (1977) posits that clientelism is a type of vertical dyadic relationship, an alliance between two people of unequal status, each of whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior of inferior to themselves. Indeed, nearly all of the studies on the issue assume that the relationship between patrons and clients is asymmetric (Hicken, 2011). Recently, Yildirim and Kitchelt (2019) argued that with developed clientelist networks of multiple parties, this asymmetry decreases, as it makes it easier for clients to defect to other patrons. Nevertheless, the asymmetrical power relations still exist and should exercise their

influence over the individual based on his/her authoritarian attitudes. Here, I refer to authoritarian submission, which should prompt clients to comply with the demands of the brokers. Submissive individuals should be motivated to comply because they believe it is their obligation; however, this is not because a reciprocal relationship is to be established, but because the demand comes from a person with authority (see Altemeyer & Altemeyer, 1996) and power (see McKee & Feather, 2008). McKee and Feather (2008) show that authoritarian individuals also consider power values to be important in their lives (i.e., the importance of social status and prestige, dominance over people and resources (Schwartz, 1992)). In the clientelist exchange, brokers or patrons are those who hold the power and control over the resources which should prompt authoritarian individuals to attribute the value of importance to them as well. As authoritarians tend to obey those in positions of authority, submissive individuals should comply with brokers demands, as brokers are *de facto* the ones who are in a higher position in the existing social hierarchy.

Second, in the interplay with other civic norms, authoritarianism should take precedence, thus negating one of the shortcomings of the norm-based compliance approach. While voters in general may hold a negative moral evaluation of clientelism[43], if individuals hold authoritarian attitudes, the moral judgment related to those demands should be a second order consideration. Here, authoritarian individuals should be less likely to act according to civic norms and uphold the institutions of representative democracy, rendering them unimportant, or at least not as important as their own submissive tendency to comply with the authorities. Thus, in congruence with submissive tendencies they should also be primed to comply with the demands of people with authority. In Altemeyer's (2006) words, authorities are viewed through the lenses of 'daddy and mommy know best', where laws and social norms do not automatically apply to all, but rather are

[43] For example, Braton (2008) reported that most of Nigerian voters' view vote buying as an infraction against public morality.

seen as things which the authorities are not bound by. Therefore, these authorities should be able to decide when and where laws and social norms do apply and when they do not.

In a similar vein, Cohrs *et al.* (2005) showed that authoritarianism is related to higher support for the restriction of civil liberties (see also Crowson, 2007) and increased surveillance, while Dunwoody and Plane (2019) showed that authoritarian individuals are more likely to support antidemocratic policies targeting outgroups. Furthermore, Arlin (2016) reported that authoritarian individuals are more likely to hold more positive attitudes towards torture. Extrapolating from these studies, it can be concluded that authoritarian individuals are more likely to support a wide array of antidemocratic practices, out of which clientelism is certainly more morally ambiguous than, for example, the wholesale restriction of civil liberties or torture. Based on this logic, authoritarian submission should override any other type of moral examination of clientelist practices, negating the need to see them as good or bad, and rendering them acceptable if they are conducted by people with authority. Tentative support for such a claim comes from a recent study of the political transformation of Poland, where Markowski (2019, p. 125) argued that support for political clientelism is related to the 'social consequences of religious dogmas dominant among those who were raised in nationalist/authoritarian/catholic traditions'. In other words, the justification mechanism for political clientelism comes from, among other elements, an authoritarian value system. Thus, the following conjecture emerges:

H1*: Authoritarian individuals are more likely to be targeted for clientelist exchanges.*

4.5 Authoritarian targeting in an institutional context

Apart from voter characteristics, scholarship has also examined the contextual factors that may influence the type of clientelist strategies that brokers employ (see Mares & Young, 2016). One prominent area of research focuses on the role of electoral systems in shaping clientelist practices, albeit the exact nature of the relationship is far from established. A general assumption

in this regard is that clientelist strategies are less prevalent in proportional representation systems (Mares & Young, 2016). Chang and Golden (2007) explain that the incentives of politicians to amass a large amount of resources for campaigning is under the influence of personal vote linkages. Pellicer and Wegner (2013) stipulate that personal broker/client relationships are easier to establish in majoritarian systems which is probably the reason clientelist parties do better in these types of conditions. Furthermore, Chang and Golden (2007) argued that when PR uses closed lists, candidates compete in a different arena for the nomination, not among the electorate but among the party leadership which controls the process. This is precisely the case in Africa, as all the PR systems there are closed list systems.

Additionally, Chang and Golden (2017) suggested that this effect is only captured when district magnitude is accounted for. It can be assumed that district magnitude is a feature of the electoral system that conditions the level of vote personalization. Here, for example, Mares and Young (2016) stipulate that district magnitude is probably what increases the overall cost of clientelism in PR systems. Furthermore, when lists are open and a majoritarian feature is introduced, incentives to compete for votes and engage in pork-barrel politics arise (Carey & Shugart, 1995). This feature is exacerbated in conditions where the district magnitude is large and numerous candidates within parties compete for name recognition (Chang & Golden, 2007).

Two conclusions can be drawn from this research. First, overall levels of clientelism should be higher in majoritarian systems, or systems with small district magnitude. Second, the cost of clientelism is higher in PR or large district magnitude systems, which should motivate brokers to use strategies that reduce the overall cost of their activities. Additionally, if patrons/brokers aim to avoid voters that view clientelism as morally objectionable (Gonzales Ocantos *et al.*, 2014; Carlin & Moseley, 2015) it would make sense that this effort is maximized in circumstances where resources are limited and the overall levels of clientelism are at a lower scale. Therefore, it can be

expected that recruitment strategies differ across both types of electoral systems and district magnitudes.

As stipulated above, norm-based approaches should, in theory, reduce the cost of monitoring, in turn reducing the overall cost of clientelist strategies. This should be enough of a motivating factor for brokers to employ norm-based targeting, which in turn should ensure compliance without a significant monitoring cost/effort. Previously, I have argued why authoritarian tendencies should align with this logic, and promt clients to comply without effective monitoring. In a similar way, it can be argued that in PR or large district magnitude systems, authoritarian individuals should be more frequently targeted than in majoritarian or small district magnitude systems.

H2*: Authoritarian individuals are more likely to be targeted in PR or large district magnitude systems.*

4.6 Data and Measurement

This chapter uses the Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011-2013) dataset with 51587 respondents across 34 countries[44]. The dataset comprises of a range of questions on political issues, including electoral intimidation and vote buying. To the authors knowledge, it is the only available data on clientelism for large N comparative analyses. In that regard, the *dependent variable* uses data from a question that asked whether, in the last national elections, the respondent was offered something (such as food, a gift or money) in return for their vote. Answers were recoded into a dummy variable for those who reported being offered something (once or twice, a few times, or often) and those who report not being offered incentives to vote (never, no experience with this in the past year). Around 16% or respondents report being offered incentives[45].

[44] Country level data for Sierra Leone and Nigeria, that are a part of currently unpublished Afrobarometer Round 8 (2019-2021) was used for additional robustness analysis presented in Appendix C.

[45] Possible validity issues regarding this measurement and the subsequent analysis lies in the fact that it may be that authoritarian individuals are systematically different than the rest of the sample in reporting clientelist targeting. While

To create the main independent variable, I used two questions that asked of respondents to report the level of agreement between two opposing statements. The first question asked whether (a) *The parliament should ensure that the President explains to it on a regular basis how his government spends taxpayers' money* or (b) *The President should be able to devote his full attention to developing the country rather than wasting time justifying his actions*; meanwhile, the second question offered a choice between (a) *Since the President was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong* and (b) *The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong*. Support for statements which accepted the concept of no limitations on presidential action were coded as 1, and opposition to those statements was coded as 0. Two questions were added to create a measurement of presidential freedom ranging from 0 (limited by parliament, the laws and the courts) to 2 (agreement with both statements that the President should be free to acts without restriction).

At the country level, I used several variables as the focus of analysis. First, I created a variable of the average district magnitude for the parliamentary elections closest to the data collection period. For this, I used two items of information from the Constituency-Level Election Archive (CLEA) Lower Chamber Election Dataset that provides the number of constituencies in election cycles and the number of MP seats allocated to each constituency. Second, I used a dummy variable indicating whether country uses a variant of proportional representation electoral system, based on the data from the African Elections Database and Inter-Parliamentary Union.

4.6.1 Individual level controls:

As control variables at the individual level, I used: a) living conditions – a 5-point self-evaluation of living conditions ranging from (1) very bad to (5) very good; b) interest in public

this may be a valid criticism of the approach taken here, I would argue it does not reduce the validity of the findings. Admitting to being offered voting incentives is not an automatic admittance of accepting the offer, and, in itself, it does not constitute wrongdoing on part of the respondent. If it was an actual measure of the criminal behaviour of the respondents, it would be a much more serious shortcoming.

affairs – a 4-point scale ranging from not at all interested (0) to very interested (3); ethnic discrimination – an estimation of whether the ethnic group the respondent identified with is treated unfairly, scaled from never (0) to always (3); voting secrecy – how likely it is that the powerful will find out who you voted for, scaled from not at all likely (0) to very likely (3); party closeness – asking whether the respondent felt close to any political party, scaled from no (0) to yes I feel close to a political party (1); male – a dummy variable for gender, male (1) female (0) and the rest coded as missing; age – a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 105, grand mean centred to avoid convergence issues; education – a 10-point scale ranging from no formal education (0) to post-graduate level (9); and employment – a dummy variable for full and part time employment (1) as opposed to everything else (0).

4.6.2 Country level controls:

At the country level, I used the following variables as controls: a) electoral competition – as a proxy for electoral competition I used the margin of victory in percentage points in the closest previous elections (parliamentary or presidential); b) the quality of institutions – a dummy variable for whether countries can be considered democratic or not based on the Freedom House Index; c) average number of voters per district in hundreds of thousands – I used the number of registered voters for the elections closest to the data collection period from the African Elections Database and combined the data with the number of constituencies (CLEA) to obtain the average number of voters per constituency at the most relevant elections; d) economic performance – International Monetary Fund data on GDP per capita for 2011 - the year at which Afrobarometer Round 5 data collection started from.

4.7 Analysis

4.7.1 The multilevel approach

In the initial stages of analysis, I evaluated some tentative evidence that validates my hypotheses, starting from the comparison of target rates among authoritarian individuals in relation to how widespread clientelist practices are. For this purpose, I used the percentage of respondents who reported being targeted within countries and divided them into two groups with the sample average as a cut-off point– below 16% of the overall country sample as the low target rate, and above 16% as the high target rate. The results of a statistically significant chi-square test showed that there is a smaller share of targeted authoritarian individuals where overall targeting is higher. Among those who support unlimited restrictions of presidential powers, 63.27% are in countries with low target rates, and 36.73% in countries with high target rates. Analysed from a different perspective, within countries with low target rates 9.7% of all targeted individuals are authoritarian, while this percentage is 8% in countries with high target rates (Figure 5). This tentative evidence relates to both hypotheses outlined in this chapter. Furthermore, it indicates that there is an association between how patrons/brokers choose targeted individuals and the amount of available resources. Where resources are limited and clientelism is not pervasive, authoritarian individuals are targeted to a higher degree. Where clientelism is widespread, authoritarian individuals are targeted at a lower rate. These results support the overall argument of this chapter rather well, as I assumed in the theoretical section that authoritarianism should ensure compliance. Ensuring compliance and reducing the 'effectiveness gap' should be more important if resources are limited.

Figure 5: Share of targeted authoritarians across overall country target rate.



Moving on to more specific hypothesis testing, the main analysis used in this chapter accounts for the variability and clustering of respondents that can be attributed to country level characteristics. I used multilevel logistic regression modelling and started off with a baseline model of clientelist targeting across countries. The baseline model showed there is significant variation in the overall proportion of clientelist targeting, and also that that variability can be attributed to country level characteristics at a rate of 24.6%. The first hypothesis was tested in Model 1 (Table 8) and showed that the effect of authoritarianism on clientelist targeting is positive and significant. The exponentiated coefficient revealed that for each point increase on the authoritarianism scale (0-2 range), the odds of being targeted increase by 6% points. In terms of marginal effects, Model 1 shows that among non-authoritarian respondents, the predicted probability of the targeting rate is around 12% of the sample, while for authoritarian individuals it rises to approximately 13.3%. The effect is relatively high considering that approximately 16% of the entire sample reports being targeted. The results of the model provide enough evidence to reject the null hypotheses of no association, and to conclude that authoritarian attitudes are associated with the probability of being targeted for a clientelist exchange.

Table 8: Authoritarianism and clientelist targeting

	Dependent variable: Offered incentives to vote			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Authoritarianism	**0.058***	**0.027**	**0.086****	
	(0.024)	**(0.028)**	**(0.033)**	
Living conditions	-0.043***	-0.043***	-0.029	
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	
Interest in public affairs	0.080***	0.080***	0.075***	
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	
Ethnic discrimination	0.119***	0.119***	0.133***	
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)	Level 1 variables
Voting secrecy	0.190***	0.190***	0.188***	
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)	
Party closeness	0.447***	0.447***	0.445***	
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.041)	
Male	0.163***	0.163***	0.196***	
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.037)	
Age (c)	-0.113***	-0.113***	-0.128***	
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.038)	
Education	-0.017	-0.017*	-0.022*	
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	
Employment	0.003	0.003	-0.002	
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.042)	
Electoral competitiveness	0.001	0.001	0.002	
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	
Democracy – Freedom House	-0.540	-0.542	-0.530	
	(0.338)	(0.339)	(0.344)	
GDP per capita 2011	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	
Average voters per district	0.0029*	0.0033*	0.0035*	Level 2 variables
	(0.001)	(0.0014)	(0.0015)	
Proportional representation	-0.157	-0.137	-0.132	
	(0.339)	(0.338)	(0.343)	
District magnitude	-0.051***	-0.062***	-0.053***	
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	
Authoritarianism*District magnitude		**0.011***		
		(0.005)		Interactio
Authoritarianism*Proportional representation			-0.030	
			(0.065)	
Constant	-1.877***	-1.857***	-1.968***	
	(0.317)	(0.316)	(0.320)	
Observations	34,275	34,275	34,275	
Log Likelihood	-13,848.310	-13,845.870	-8,656.271	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	27,732.620	27,729.730	17,350.540	
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	27,884.6	27,890.1	17,510.9	
Note:	*p <0.05; **p <0.01; ***p <0.001			

Moving on to the second hypothesis, I predicted that one characteristic of electoral system – type or district magnitude – would be a significant moderator that should be associated with the degree to which authoritarian individuals are targeted for clientelist exchanges. The analysis presented here provides mixed evidence in this regard. First, when I examined the type of electoral system, no significant effect was found, either in the overall rate of clientelist targeting or in the association between authoritarianism and targeting (Model 3). Chang and Golden (2007) suggest as much arguing that the type of electoral system on its own is not going to reveal any major differences, unless district magnitude is considered. Following up on that argument, Model 2 reported the results when district magnitude was used as a moderator, showing that the overall targeting rate, and the targeting rate among authoritarian individuals, differs across district magnitude.

The marginal effects plotted in Figure 6 illustrate the predictions made in this chapter quite effectively. First, I observed that the overall targeting rate is higher in countries with a lower district magnitude, which was illustrated by the intercept positions of the interaction effects. As the district magnitude increases, the probability of being targeted drops from around 15% (at a district magnitude of 1) to around 5% (at a district magnitude 20 and above). In the same manner, the association of authoritarianism on the probability of being targeted increases with the increase in district magnitude size. The marginal effect of not being authoritarian to being authoritarian amounts to around 1% point when the district magnitude is 1, and it increases to slightly more than 3% points when the district magnitude is 20 and above. In other words, changes from not being authoritarian to being authoritarian have a greater association with the probability of being targeted as district magnitude size increases. I would argue that the marginal effects of 3% points are quite substantive in size, as the overall probability of being targeted across the entire sample is on average around 16%. These findings are in line with the predictions of this chapter, that district magnitude will be associated with the overall cost of clientelism and will thus incentivize brokers and patrons to rely on norm-based selection to ensure compliance.

Figure 6: Marginal effects of the interaction effects between authoritarianism and district magnitude on clientelist targeting.



4.7.2 Robustness

While the African continent offers the opportunity to comparatively explore clientelist practices, sharp differences in the quality of the democratic institutions might confound the results of any analysis in this regard. If the election results might be tampered with through ballot-stuffing, fraud, or violence, the choice of and prevalence of clientelist strategies might also be influenced. In other words, it can be expected that the competitiveness of elections is related to clientelism as well. As a robustness check and to account for this possibility, I first looked at the overall prevalence of clientelist targeting that revealed a difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes. Almost 19% of respondents in autocratic regimes report being targeted, compared to 12.3% in democratic regimes. Based on the argumentation of this chapter, authoritarian attitudes should be a preferred tactic for clientelist targeting as the overall rate of clientelism decreases. The multilevel model that tested the interaction effect between authoritarian attitudes and the quality of institutions (Table 19, Model 2), showed that the estimate for authoritarian attitudes was not significant, but that the interaction effect was (0.21^{***}). In other words, authoritarian attitudes are not related to clientelist targeting when the interaction condition is equal to 0 (i.e., autocracy), but it is positively related to the chance of being targeted when interaction condition is 1 (i.e., democracy). The marginal effects of this interaction (Figure 7) show an approximately 3.5% change in the likelihood of being targeted from non-authoritarian to authoritarian in democratic countries.

Figure 7: Marginal effects of the interaction between authoritarianism and regime type on clientelist targeting.



In the additional stages of the robustness checks, I tested whether the quality of institutions is related to the second argument of this chapter on the conditionality between clientelist strategies and electoral rules. For this purpose, I fitted a three-way interaction model, that can be found in the appendix C (Table 19, Model 1). Two findings can be identified here. Specifically, authoritarianism is related to clientelist targeting but that relationship is conditioned both on the electoral rules and the regime type. Both cross-level interactions, as well as the three-way interaction, were significant. The results show that in autocratic regimes, authoritarian individuals have less chance of being targeted if the district magnitude is 1, and that the relationship changes the direction from negative to positive as the district level increases. When the district magnitude is 20, the marginal effects show that authoritarian individuals have a 5% greater chance of being targeted than non-authoritarian individuals (Figure 8). The finding is in congruence with the theoretical expectation of the chapter, as it shows that as the limitations on the prevalence of clientelism rise, so does the importance of authoritarian attitudes for targeting. On the other hand, in democracies where overall levels of clientelist targeting are much lower, authoritarianism is positively related to clientelist targeting regardless of district magnitude. The strength of the relationship changes and becomes slightly weaker as the district magnitude rises; however, the results are not statistically significant.

Figure 8: Marginal effects of the three-way interaction between authoritarianism, district magnitude and regime type.



In conjecture, I would argue that the robustness analyses contribute to the validity of the chapter's findings. They illustrate the complex ways in which authoritarianism is related to clientelist targeting and are linked to the overarching theme of the chapter. Here in particular, it seems clear that authoritarianism becomes more important in clientelist targeting when the overall target rate is lower, whether due to limited resources, the inability to establish a deep personal connection as district magnitude rises, or because the quality of the democratic institutions disables clientelism on a massive scale.

4.7.3 Limitations and Discussion

One possible issue with the theoretical argument of this chapter relates to the specific information on *who* targets voters for clientelist exchange. Here, I implicitly assumed that the incumbency effect holds no relevance, as an asymmetrical relationship between brokers and client is established anyway. While this may be the case, it is valid to assume that incumbency would add an additional layer of separation, in which the targeted authoritarians would be more likely to comply with incumbents, rather than with opposition party brokers. Information that would allow for such a distinction was not available, but future studies should try to take this into account. One possible solution would be to follow the strategy of Carlin and Moseley (2021) and focus on within country electoral districts where incumbents were overwhelmingly dominant in the previous electoral cycle. This approach was not possible here, due to the sheer number of countries and the

fact that Afrobarometer does not provide sufficient information to assign respondents to specific electoral districts.

Second, the ideal test of the argument laid out in the chapter would come from a comparison between those individuals who were offered incentives to vote and those who actually accepted. In doing so, a test could be made that reveals whether compliance rates are higher among authoritarian individuals compared to non-authoritarians. Such an approach would further validate the assumption that patrons/brokers target individuals in such a manner so as to reduce the 'effectiveness gap'. Since Afrobarometer does not have data on the acceptance of clientelist exchange, this goes beyond the scope of this chapter, but would be a fruitful avenue for future research.

Third, perhaps the most significant issue in terms of the validity of the findings in this chapter, is the manner in which authoritarian attitudes were measured. The traditional RWA scales that have been developed and refined since the 1990s were not available in this dataset, nor, to the best of my knowledge, in any other comparative dataset that also reports data on clientelist practices. Instead, I opted for items that tapped into individuals' attitudes towards institutional limitations that should be placed on the authorities of the president. This approach may conflate general support for anti-democratic practices as a regime type with authoritarian beliefs; however, I do think it accounts for the tendency to be submissive towards authorities. Previously in the chapter, I argued that the core of authoritarian beliefs is the unconstrained authority of those higher in the social hierarchy (see Altemeyer, 2006), as they know best when the laws and regulations should be applied. These values are congruent with the ideas represented in the two items used for analysis. In particular, the views that the president should not be bound by laws and the decisions of the courts and that he/she should not waste time justifying his actions to the public seem like good proxies for a more general leaning towards authoritarianism.

Finally, the overall influence of ethnic and tribal identity on the nature of African politics is a well-established fact. In that regard, not only could ethnic/tribal linkages serve as a basis for clientelist targeting, but different ethnic and tribal communities should have a varying degree of access to resources and therefore smaller communities should be unable to provide the same level of opportunities to engage in a clientelist exchange than larger ones. For these reasons, ethnic voter/party linkages could be a competing explanation of clientelist targeting. However, information that would allow for modelling of co-ethnicity between brokers and clients was not available in Afrobarometer, which is why this study is limited to additional modelling strategies that may approximate the effects of ethnicity on targeting rates. Towards that end, in the main analysis, models include a control for respondents' perception on whether he/she is a member of ethnically discriminated group, while a more detailed account of the role ethnicity plays in clientelist targeting can be found case studies presented in Appendix C.

4.8 Conclusion

The idea of simply buying votes is hardly an effective strategy; instead, patrons/brokers have to develop different targeting approaches in order to maximize the return on their investment. In this chapter, I looked at authoritarian attitudes at the individual level as a way of maximizing compliance without the need to establish an effective monitoring mechanism. As a feature of submission to authority figures, I argued that authoritarian attitudes would incentivize individuals to comply with the demands of patrons/brokers. Authoritarian attitudes would outweigh considerations stemming from other social norms and make individuals more likely to view clientelism as a legitimate electoral strategy. If targeted, authoritarian individuals should have a higher chance of compliance and be more likely to except clientelist exchange. Additionally, I argued that the authoritarian targeting rate would be associated with the electoral institutions, the type of electoral system and district magnitude, as well as the overall target rate. The lower the overall target rate, the more likely it is that authoritarianism would be considered a viable selection

strategy. As resources are limited and clientelism is not as frequent, it should matter more who the targeted individuals are.

The analysis presented in this chapter largely supports these predictions. Multilevel analysis shows that authoritarian individuals are on average more likely to be targeted for clientelist exchange. While the prevalence of authoritarian targeting is present in the majority of analysed countries, the rate is associated with some competing strategies as well as country level characteristics. The scope conditions, in terms of the county level characteristics that could influence the effectiveness of instrumentalist monitoring and push patrons towards norm-based mechanisms were identified as certain electoral rules (district magnitude and the electoral system) and the overall quality of democratic institutions. Here, I showed that as district magnitude increases, (a) severing the potential to establish close and personal networks between clients and brokers and (b) limiting the potential to violate ballot secrecy, the targeting rate of authoritarian individuals also rises. However, the picture is not quite that simple, as electoral rules exert more or less relevance depending on the overall characteristics of the regime. On the one hand, when regimes are autocratic, district magnitude is associated with higher rates of targeting for authoritarian individuals. This result implies that when regimes are unconstrained by democratic norms, brokers/patrons will turn to authoritarians when other limiting conditions for effective monitoring, district magnitude in this specific instance, are present.

On the other hand, in democratic regimes this was not the case, as no effect of district magnitude was discovered. Here, authoritarian have a higher chance of being targeted regardless of district magnitude. This result implies that democratic institutions, presumably the effective protection of ballot secrecy, can play a limiting role for instrumentalist monitoring in themselves, rendering specific electoral rules for seat allocation inconsequential. In other words, when patrons/brokers are unable to violate or imply the violation of ballot secrecy due to the correct

functioning of democratic institutions, authoritarian individuals are more likely to be targeted regardless of the additional constrains associated with higher district magnitude.

Chapter V

IT IS NOT THAT BAD: AUTHORITARIAN SUBMISSION AND ELECTORAL ACCAUNTABILITY

'The act of voting is one opportunity for us to
remember that our whole way of life is
predicated on the capacity of ordinary people
to judge carefully and well.'
Alan Keyes

5.1 Introduction

In March 2022 a voice recording was leaked to the Montenegrin press, in which allegedly five people, including the Prime Minister Abazović, discussed vote buying prices ahead of local election in Ulcinj. When asked by an unknown person – 'How much do pay for a vote?', an MP in Montenegrin Parliament Fatmir Đeka allegedly replies: 'More than anyone ever gave you. Do you understand? You will not be needing anything. If someone comes to you and offers you something, you come to us.' Mehmeti, a communal inspector in Ulcinj, allegedly continues to say to the person: 'If someone offers you 100 or 200 euros, you will have 50 euros more from us.' This is but a recent example of many politicians utilizing illegal practices (vote buying) as part of their campaign strategies, and yet still managing to win the election. A simple, yet truly complex and profound question arises here: why?

Studies on this issue do find that in general, corruption scandals decrease electoral support for corrupt candidates; however, in the majority of cases, candidates are able to secure enough votes to win re-election (see Peters & Welch, 1980; Welch & Hibbing, 1997; Vivyan *et al.*, 2012). The reasons why the democratic accountability mechanisms fail in these instances are varied, but they often centre around factors such as voter knowledge and the credibility of corruption information (see Runquist *et al.*, 1977; Ferraz & Finan, 2008), partisanship and perceptual bias in the evaluation of illicit practices (Jimenez & Cainzos, 2006; Anduiza *et al.*, 2013), or the economic benefits that are distributed to voters by corrupt politicians (Sousa & Moriconi, 2013; Klašnja *et al.*, 2021; Fernandes-Vasquez *et al.*, 2015). An emerging strain within the literature builds on the economic benefits assumption, reaching the conclusion that not all corrupt practices are evaluated as being equally bad (Botero *et al.*, 2021; Weschle, 2016; Truex, 2011). In that context, because of the economic benefits supplied through clientelist vote buying, this specific form of illicit practice should be more acceptable to poor voters (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012; Weitz-Shapiro, 2014) than other forms of blatant corruption (Botero *et al.*, 2021; see also Weschle, 2016).

Building on the identified acceptability of vote buying in comparison to other corruption practices, this chapter goes beyond the partisanship and benefit calculus for clients and focuses on the question of whether certain attitudinal characteristics within the electorate as a whole shape the perception/acceptability of vote buying allegations/practices. The focus is on the role of authoritarian submission in shaping individual perceptions and the acceptance of vote buying allegations and practices. Building on previous research in the field of social psychology that has linked authoritarian attitudes to a willingness to engage in corrupt behaviour (see Tan *et al.*, 2016; Wang & Bernardo, 2017), I theorize that individuals who are submissive in an authoritarian sense, would tend to punish clientelist allegations less frequently. The main proposition here is that submissive individuals are more willing to accept this type of behaviour, following their general tendency to void agency in the political arena and submit to a request levied from a position of authority. Furthermore, the justification of clientelist allegations should come from the submissive individuals' tendency to morally justify such practices, or to perceive them as good for, rather than harmful to, the functioning of the political system. An important caveat here is that submissive individuals should be more likely to condone vote buying when they simultaneously believe that the elections are not important.

In the theory testing section, the chapter presents two quantitative studies fielded in Montenegro. First, I analyse original survey experiment data linking authoritarian submission and the consequences of vote buying allegations. The study was fielded in the Montenegrin capital, Podgorica, in May 2019. By randomizing respondents to three experimental conditions (neutral, vote buying, and economic coercion/intimidation) the design was used to explore the first part of the argument, specifically whether submissive individuals disregard clientelist allegations at a higher rate. Here in particular, right-wing authoritarianism was recorded and interacted with group assignment to test the moderation effect of authoritarian submission on the likelihood of voting for a clientelist candidate. The interaction effects show that submissive individuals have a higher propensity to vote for clientelist candidates under the vote buying condition, with a total effect of

four points on a 7-point scale. A similar pattern was recorded for economic coercion condition, albeit the results were only significant at the α of 0.9.

Second, data from the Montenegrin National Election Study 2016 was used to analyse the perceived harmfulness of vote buying practices, and the association of submissive tendencies with these evaluations. The analysis shows that submissive individuals are more likely to disregard the harmfulness of vote buying practices, conditioned on their view of whether free and fair elections make a difference to their lives. When they believe that elections are not important, authoritarian submission is associated with a sharp increase in the marginal probability of evaluating vote buying as not bad at all, from ~7.5% chance for non-submissive individuals to ~47.5% for submissive individuals.

The main contribution of the study is in the focus on the attitudinal characteristics of voters as a factor that could moderate evaluations of clientelist/corruption allegation. Apart from a few studies in social psychology, no previous attempts have been made to test the link between authoritarian submission and corruption intention, particularly when it comes to the willingness of submissive individuals to condone and justify clientelist vote buying. This study takes a step in that direction and examines the link between submission and the electoral consequences of clientelist allegations. Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to test the general perception that voters have of clientelism and its association with submissive tendencies.

In the following sections, this chapter presents an overview of the literature on the effects of corruption allegations on electoral performance, followed by a section on the conceptual similarities between clientelism and corruption. The theoretical section focuses on the role of authoritarian submission in shaping the perception of clientelist strategies. The subsequent section is dedicated to case selections and arguments on why Montenegro represents a favourable case for the exploration of these issues. The analysis chapters for both studies are followed by sections that discuss the limitations of the approaches taken in both studies and the nuances of the theoretical

implications of the findings presented. Finally, the conclusion briefly reiterates the main take away points of the chapter.

5.2 Why are they still in office?

Contrary to the normative expectations of democratic theory, corruption is a resilient feature that continues to persist despite the existence of a good institutional setup in democratic systems. One of the defence mechanisms that was outlined in the broad umbrella of democratic theory revolves around accountability as a safeguard against corrupt practices that distort the functioning of the entire democratic system. In this regard, Schmitter and Karl (1991, p.76) argued that democracy is 'a system of governance in which rulers are held *accountable (emphasis added)* for their actions in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives'. Therefore, from a normative point of view, it should be expected that corrupt politicians/parties would be held accountable by voters and punished at elections. Empirically, this is not the case in most situations.

One of the first major studies on this issue looked at the aggregate effect of corruption charges on the electoral viability of candidates running for the US House of Representatives from 1968 to 1978 (Peters & Welch, 1980). The authors show that the majority of corrupt candidates were re-elected, despite the fact that they suffered a loss in votes of between 6 and 11 percentage points. A decade later, Welch and Hibbing (1997) revisited the issue and reached a similar conclusion. From 1982 to 1990, slightly more that 60% of candidates facing corruption scandals were re-elected. Similarly, Clark (2009) reported that scandals seemed to be associated with a decrease in the overall vote share in 9 West European democracies. However, this effect was mild and did not always prevent corrupt candidates from getting re-elected (Golden, 2006). Vivyan *et al.* (2012) reported the even more limited impact of the expenses scandal in the UK House of Commons in 2009, estimating its effect at an approximately 1.9% decrease in incumbent vote share

at the following election. In other words, corruption scandals in themselves seem insufficient to prevent re-election (Chang *et al.*, 2010). The scholarship referenced above demonstrates that accountability mechanisms often fail in their implementation. In this particular instance, having the means to punish corrupt politicians at their disposal through the ballot box, does not necessarily mean that voters will exercise that option.

The natural question is to wonder why corruption scandals do not have a stronger effect on electoral outcomes. Some of the earliest studies on this issue suggested that voters were ignorant about the wrongdoings of political candidates (Peters & Welch, 1980; see also Johnston, 2005) and that under these conditions democratic accountability cannot be expected. The findings for the 'information hypothesis' are quite mixed, as some experimental studies do actually find the effect of corruption information on the electoral performance of mayoral incumbents (see Ferraz & Finan, 2008), while Chong *et al.* (2015) found that voters are more likely to 'punish' the wrongdoers by withdrawing altogether from the political process, which amounts to a negligible negative effect on incumbent vote share.

More recently, the 'information hypotheses' was adjusted to point out not only that the presence but also the reliability of information pointing to corruption must be considered (Jimenez & Cainzos, 2006). As such, information dissemination in the form of politically motivated accusation might not be that effective, as voters do not perceive the existence of an alternative viable (i.e., non-corrupt) candidate (Runquist *et al.,* 1977). Following this line of argumentation, Agerberg (2020) demonstrated that voters tend to punish corrupt candidates only when a clean alternative exists. When every candidate is perceived as corrupt, party identification plays an important role as voters tend to forgive illicit behaviour by their preferred candidate (see also Munoz *et al.*, 2016). An alternative explanation here omits the reliability of corruption information, stipulating that the mere presence of corruption allegation is not sufficient to damage the electoral viability of corrupt candidates and needs to be (politically) capitalized on. In this context, either the

media (Jimenez & Cainzos, 2006) or political parties (Bagenholm, 2013) need to increase the salience of the corruption issue, and when it is done by political parties, set it at the centre of their negative campaigns.

However, even when knowledgeable, some voters might not think of corruption activities as something that is inherently bad. Jimenez and Cainzos (2006) label this as 'home team' explanation, or the fact that a perceptual bias exists depending on existing party affiliation. This mechanism can take on two different manifestations. First, some groups of voters might have a general tendency to evaluate corruption as better or worse. Welch and Hibbing (1997) offer some evidence that Republican and Democrat voters in the US evaluate corruption charges differently with Republicans being more likely to punish the wrongdoers. Second, partisan affiliation might create a bias towards the preferred candidate. Following this, Anduiza *et al.* (2013) experimentally demonstrated that voters are less likely to punish their preferred candidates for wrongdoing. Furthermore, in a conjoint experimental setting Breitenstein (2019) reassessed this trade-off between corruption allegation and partisanship linkages, findings that partisanship does determine the evaluations of corruption allegation, even more strongly than economic performance.

Finally, what seems to be a dominant thread in the literature are those explanations that account for some sort of positive externalities associated with the corrupt regime/politicians. On a general note, some research suggests that voters tend to 'forgive' corrupt behaviour, in a sort of trade-off, when the economy is doing well (Casey, 2014). Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013) analysed 19 presidential regimes in North and Latin America, showing that the general economic conditions are associated with the electoral consequences of corruption allegations. Furthermore, they argue that personal wealth also plays into these evaluations, where those who are better off are more likely to disregard corruption allegations. Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013) reported similar findings from their research in Brazil showing that wealthier individuals are more tolerant of corruption allegations.

On a more specific note, Sousa and Moriconi (2013) argued that voters tend to forgive corrupt behaviour if it directly benefits them. Fernandez-Vasquez *et al.* (2016) show that corruption allegations around the Spanish housing boom were discarded if they produced side benefits for voters. Klašnja *et al.* (2021) analysed conjoint data finding that voters in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay tend to punish corruption less when there are positive economic externalities, especially when they personally stand to gain from side benefits. Moreover, even the expectation of positive externalities might be a sufficient motivator to ignore corruption allegations (Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). These explanations are closely derived from the model of economic voting, where voters will retrospectively evaluate candidate performance and disregard corruption allegation if their internal calculations result in a net positive balance (Fernandez-Vasquez *et al.*, 2016).

The scholarship discussed previously also suggest that not all forms of corruption are evaluated equally. As stipulated above, corruption practices that generate positive externalities for voters might get a free pass at the polling booth. In other words, specific types of corrupt activities such as the clientelist exchange of votes for benefits (money, goods, jobs) should be evaluated by a part of the electorate as more acceptable. Building on this assumption, Botero *et al.* (2021) conducted a telephone experiment varying (a) voter/candidate partisanship linkages and (b) the type of corruption – personal enrichment or clientelist vote buying. They presented evidence that poor voters disapprove more when politicians use their position for personal enrichment rather than clientelism. In a similar manner, Weschle (2016) showed that voters are less likely to support punitive measures when candidates use campaign funds to buy votes rather than for personal enrichment, while Nepalese voters are more likely to accept small-scale corrupt practices (gift-giving and favouritism) and to condemn large-scale bribery (Truex, 2011). Additionally, Bacchus and Building (2021) showed more than a 10% difference in Mexico, and more than 25% in US, in the evaluation of (a) offering food or favours for votes, as opposed to (b) the personal use of campaign funds, as corrupt practices. Lastly, Rothstein and Varraich (2017) reported the evaluation of different corruption scenarios in Africa, in which an elected official diverting a development

project to an area where their family and supporters live received a much more favourable evaluation than scenarios involving nepotism or bribery.

5.3 Conceptual clarification: Clientelism and Corruption

At this point, a little conceptual clarification on the similarities between clientelism and corruption is needed. In the simplest terms, corruption is considered to be the misuse of public office for personal gain (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), while clientelism can be considered to be a dyadic type of relationship (Hicken, 2011) where 'the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services' occurs (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, p.2). In that sense, clientelism implies a hierarchical and uneven power relationship between the broker and the client.

Although clientelism and corruption are not the same thing, the conceptual 'family resemblance' between the two (Varraich, 2014; see also Hicken, 2011) often makes distinction between them negligible in practice (Ansell, 2018). This is true particularly in a post-communist context, where clientelism is often considered to be a structural form of corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006), as '…the two phenomena seem fused at the hip' (Sajo, 2003, p.2). In particular, corruption and clientelism share conceptual similarities in the sense that both involve the manipulation of public resources, that in the case of clientelism are used to promote mutual benefits between two parties (the broker and the client) (Kawata, 2006). Furthermore, not limiting it to a post-communist context, Kawata (2006) goes as far as including patronage and vote buying in his conceptualisation of corruption[46] (see also Jain, 1999). Additionally, others follow a similar logic, viewing excessive patronage as part of a public interest conceptualisation of corruption (Stockemer *et al.*, 2011).

[46] 'Corruption takes many forms. It appears as […] vote buying, patronage…' (p. xii).

The discretionary aspect of resource distribution in clientelism is seen by some authors as its constitutive corrupt feature. Singer (2009) argued that clientelism can be widely perceived as corrupt when it delivers state benefits to a small clique associated with a particular patron/broker. A similar argument is made by Abdullah *et al.* (2018) where they conclude that clientelism constitutes a type of political corruption, as it privatises the public interest and gives it to a specific segment of the community (see also Hutchcroft, 1997). Lastly, clientelism and corruption share enough common features that some authors use levels of corruption as proxies for levels of clientelism (see Torsten *et al.*, 2003; Keefer, 2007).

In conjecture, there is sufficient conceptual overlap that enable the consideration of vote buying, the type of clientelism explored in this chapter, a form of corruption. This is primarily because both participating parties, the brokers/patrons, and the clients, illegally obtain personalized benefits – either money or electoral support.

5.4 Why does authoritarianism matter?

The previous section outlined the dominant approaches in studying the electoral consequences of corrupt behaviour. With the exception of the information hypotheses, the other studies assume that there are competing considerations in a single electoral race – the trade-off hypotheses between corruption allegations and other factors associated with electoral behaviour. They could be related to partisan linkages and party identification, economic externalities, or information credibility, but what remains largely missing are the attitudinal characteristic of voters and their linkages with the evaluation of corruption allegations. As vote buying encompasses hierarchical power relations between brokers and clients, how voters perceive those hierarchical power structures is of crucial importance. For this reason, this chapter examines the role of authoritarian submission.

Introduced by Altemeyer and Altemeyer (1981), right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) as a refinement of the authoritarian personality (Adorno *et al.,* 1950), describes individuals who are willing to submit to established authorities, who are highly conventional in their adherence to social norms and who are aggressive towards people who are not (Stenner, 2009); these elements are broadly representative of the three RWA subdimensions – aggression, submission, and conventionalism. On a general note, authoritarian individuals are more permissive of unethical behaviour on the part of the authorities (Bocchiaro & Zimbardo, 2017), as was effectively demonstrated by Blass (1995) in their examination of the famous Milgram's obedience experiments, where study participants who scored highly for RWA assigned less blame to the teacher for shocking the learner. Additionally, authoritarianism seems to be associated with greater levels of justification for unethical behaviour in situations when behavioural decisions require a trade-off between profit and ethics (Son Hing *et al.*, 2007).

In terms of corruption specifically, Tan *et al.* (2016) analysed individual willingness to engage in corrupt behaviour, showing that corruption intention was positively related to authoritarianism. This relationship was further mediated by the perceived moral outrage, and as authoritarian individuals have a lesser tendency to be morally outraged, they are more likely to report willingness to engage in corruption. Additionally, Carrasco *et al.* (2020) reported that authoritarianism is the strongest predictor of tolerance for corruption in 8th grade students in six Latin American countries.

The mechanism behind the authoritarian acceptance of corrupt practices may be grounded in the fact that the rejection of corruption could be considered a form of pro-social disobedience, that requires a critical examination of the authorities (Pozzi *et al.*, 2014). The critical examination of the authorities is in direct opposition to the authoritarian tendency to respect, obey and submit to established authorities (see Passini, 2017) most closely related to the subdimension of

authoritarian submission[47]. Similarly, authoritarian submission is positively correlated with conformity as opposed to self-actualization (Passini, 2017), indicating that submissive individuals tend not to confront the established elites. Additionally, Altemeyer (2007) argues that individuals who are submissive in an authoritarian sense, go way beyond normal respect for authority and are expected to submit even to corrupt, dishonest or potentially evil authorities. Furthermore, this can be a consequence of the submissive individuals' tendency to see authorities as above the law, and as people or organisations who do not have to adhere to social norms. As such, submissive individuals might even comply with the degradation of democratic principles. Even the infringement of individual rights would be justifiable as, under this logic, only those who have done something wrong would object to these kinds of limitations (Altemeyer, 2007).

Translated to a specific corruption scenario, Wang and Bernardo (2017) examined how subdimensions related to right-wing authoritarianism connected with the willingness to engage in *zou hou men* (ZHM), an unofficial (and often illegal) back door practice in China that is associated with corruption. Their findings indicate that individuals who exhibit high levels of authoritarian submission are more likely to accept illegal ZHM as a legitimate practice. Furthermore, this acceptance is mediated by its perceived harmfulness, as they report that submissive individuals are less likely to perceive ZHM as a detrimental practice to the political system. To conclude, the implication of the previous paragraphs would be that submissive individual should hold more favourable views of clientelist practices and should thus be more likely to condone that particular type of corrupt behaviour on the part of political elites.

H1: *Submissive individuals are more likely to condone clientelist practices.*

[47] Most studies reports that RWA in general is associated with the values of tradition, social security, and conformity (see Altemeyer, 1998; Cohrs *et al.*, 2005; Livi *et al.*, 2014); however, some studies have demonstrated that each RWA subdimensions is associated with different underlying value priorities (see Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Duckitt *et al.*, 2010).

The previous paragraphs have argued that submissive individuals are more likely to condone clientelist practices because they tend to approve of the actions taken by those in positions of authority. The argument implies that in a clash between democratic principles and illicit behaviour, submissive individuals should have the tendency to disregard democratic principles. However, while they should be more willing to accept corrupt behaviour, one still lingering question is how submissive individuals justify these actions in moral terms.[48] Furthermore, could there be a specific feature of vote buying that is incorporated into these justifications?

I would argue there are at least two avenues to explore here. First, it was demonstrated previously that the dominant explanation for the justification of corruption (and consequently vote buying) are economic benefits supplied to voters. This mechanism is important to unpack in relation to authoritarian submission, as its underlying assumption would suggest a diverging behavioural outcome. Namely, if ***(a)*** economic benefits assumption is true, then different strategies of clientelist exchange should be evaluated in a similar manner by individuals with and without submissive tendencies. Regardless of the level of authoritarian submission, a practice that provides economic benefits, vote buying, should be perceived as good and therefore acceptable, while a practice that withdraws economic benefits, economic coercion, should not.

H2a: *Voters are more likely to condone vote buying and reject economic coercion than to reject them both at a similar rate, regardless of the levels of authoritarian submission.*

However, if ***(b)*** individual attitudes towards hierarchies and power structures are the underlying mechanism of clientelist justification and acceptance of politicians that utilize such practices, specific features of clientelist strategies should not play a significant role. What should

[48] Stokes (2005) implies that voters have negative ethical considerations related to vote buying; however, these are nullified by the economic benefits provided in the exchange. Moreover, authoritarianism seems to be associated with higher levels of justification of unethical behaviour in situations when behavioural decisions require a trade-off between profits and ethics (Son Hing *et al.*, 2007). Here, while the economic benefits associated with vote buying could be the reason, they do not constitute a moral justification.

matter is the position of authority and power of the person employing clientelist strategies, regardless of whether he/she is engaged in vote buying or economic coercion. In that regard, submissive individuals would tend to vote for both vote buying and economic coercion politicians at a higher level than non-submissive individuals:

H2b: *Submissive voters are more likely to vote for clientelist politicians regardless of whether they employ vote buying or economic coercion.*

Second, how voters perceive the general performance of the democratic system may be crucial to understanding how they justify clientelist strategies. On a general note, Chandra's (2007) argues that vote selling is instrumentally rational behaviour in patronage democracies. She revisits Olson's (1971) collective action problem that implies voters are rational in their decision to abstain, as they have few instrumental incentives to vote, since any single vote is unlikely to affect the result of the elections. However, in patronage-democracies where vote buying is prevalent, this assumption crumbles as voting is a means of extracting material benefits from competing candidates. A similar argument is raised by Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci (2017), who conclude that when trust in institutions (state bureaucracies) is low voters are incentivized to seek personalized relationships with power holders. These studies would point to a conclusion, that how voters perceive the functioning of democratic institutions is crucial for understanding the prevalence of illicit behaviour. In other words, inefficient democratic and electoral institutions foster the acceptance of antidemocratic practices. Along those lines, Pellicer *et al.* (2021) argue that the perception of inefficacy is one of the key features that explains how widespread clientelism is among poor voters, while Gherghina *et al.*, (2022) experimentally demonstrated that Bulgarian voters who are dissatisfied with the performance of democracy are more likely to condone vote buying and accept clientelist offers. On a slightly different note, Keefer (2007) suggests that politicians' inability to make credible electoral promises to voters is associated to voters' preference for clientelism.

While the general perception of the democratic system is important, voting is about elections, and as vote buying is 'a part' of the electoral process, how voters perceive the efficacy of elections themselves is the primary avenue to be explored. Building on the argumentation from the previous paragraph, it is a fair assumption to propose that the ethical evaluation of vote buying is conditioned on the perceived importance of the elections. If voters tend to downplay the importance of elections and their individual vote in determining the election outcome, no moral objection could be rendered against clientelist vote buying, or - from a client's point of view – vote selling. Therefore, the role of various other attitudinal characteristics, such as authoritarian submission, should be considered in relation to the efficacy of the electoral process. Here, I assume that when voters view elections as inefficient and unimportant, authoritarian submission should result in a net positive evaluation of vote buying.

H3: *Submissive individuals' evaluation of vote buying should be moderated by perceived importance of elections.*

5.5 Case selection

For the purposes of this chapter, the case study in question must meet one key criterion - that the experimentally presented scenarios are believable and can be imagined as occurring frequently by the voters. I believe Montenegro constitutes such a case and in the following paragraphs I will lay down the arguments as to why that is the case.

As the smallest of the former Yugoslav republics, Montenegro finally regained its independence after the 2006 referendum. Apart from its long struggle to resolve the statehood issue, the other constant in Montenegrin political life is the dominance of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), that lasted up until the 2020 parliamentary election. A 'one party show' (Vuković, 2015) was a nice way to describe the predominant party system and the 30-year political domination of the DPS, that led some researchers to conclude that the party has developed an 'image of invincibility' among the electorate (Komar & Živković, 2016). From this position, the DPS

developed a complex network of patronage and clientelism which served as a justification for opposition parties to boycott state parliament following the 2016 parliamentary election results. Džankić and Keil (2017) argue that such a clientelist network is the primary means through which a party which incorporates a very diverse set of interests is able to survive. This claim gains validity by the day, as DPS electoral support has continued to decline in subsequent municipal elections following the first alternation of power on state level in October 2020.

The success prior and relative failure after the electoral loss in 2020, was due to the DPS ability translate the mechanisms of control from the communist era to the period of the democratic transition and, as such, control all the major economic resources (Džankić & Keil, 2017). Not only was the party able to command effective control of the economy, but the fact that almost 60 000 people (out of a total of 225 000 employed) are employed by the public administration gives the party significant leverage and control. Indicative of this *de facto* control was a series of leaked audio tapes from DPS party meetings in 2013, where electoral strategies were discussed (the so-called 'Tape Scandal'). The tapes were leaked to the public by the opposition party Positive Montenegro and its leader, Darko Pajović. In short, the content of the tapes revolves around vote buying as a strategy to employ around 8000 DPS supporters, particularly offering/securing a job for one person in return for the votes of the entire family. The now famous, widely quoted and much discussed phrase in the media, 'One Job - Four Votes', was one of the most direct strategies of patronage and electoral success that the high ranked officials of the DPS discussed amongst themselves.

Second, negative inducement and electoral intimidation is a form of clientelism that is frequently present in Montenegro. Some would go as far as to talk about electoral violence, which occurred in this reading as recently as the 2013 presidential election (Mocht'ak, 2015). While this point might be disputed, electoral violence was not common in the in the early years of democratic development. Analysing the OSCE election monitoring reports, Mocht'ak (2015) suggests that electoral violence occurred for the first time in 1997, when the ruling party split between those

supporting an independent Montenegro, and those supporting Milošević and the union with Serbia. These incidents mostly related to illegal house searches, intimidation, and the public harassment of opposition voters (Mocht'ak, 2015). Furthermore, the paper reports instances of economic coercion around the 2012 parliamentary elections, when employees of GENEX LLC were threatened and eventually dismissed from work for not voting the right way (Mocht'ak, 2015).

Third, the 2017 election monitoring report from the OSCE/ODIHR recorded incidents of vote buying, pressure on public employees, voter intimidation, abuse of public resources, and violations of vote secrecy in 2016 parliamentary election. Not only that a variety of strategies are used, but there is evidence that the choice of strategies is tailored to the needs of specific clients. According to the media reports based on the journal of the president of the Municipality of Gusinje, Anela Čekić, the journal contains detailed plans for the distribution of benefits to different DPS supporters (Vijesti, 2016). For example, amnesty could be offered to those whose family members are incarcerated; state ministers could offer agricultural funds to farmers during the pre-election visit, and provide a heifer to one specific voter (Nufrija Mulamekić); The Centre for Social Work should pressure small businesses owners to recruit voters offering employment through geronto-housewife programme; and the chief of police in another municipality (Plav) should return a seized pistol to a prospective voter in Gusinje.

To reiterate, the Montenegrin case is suitable as it satisfies the two conditions outlined by Runquist *et al.* (1997), namely that the experiment can be assumed to raise (a) accusations that have a degree of credibility and (b) previous cases have produced extensive press coverage, thereby raising public awareness on the issues of clientelism and corruption. This provides sufficient justification for the case selection, as the respondents have witnessed such practices and can realistically imagine them being utilized in Montenegro.

5.6 Study I

5.6.1 Methods and Design

To test the **H1** and **H2 (a, b)** hypotheses, I conducted an original survey experiment fielded in the capital city of Montenegro, Podgorica, in May 2019. The design aimed to reach 300 valid respondents stratified across both urban and rural areas (70%-30%). The final dataset consisted of 216 valid respondents distributed across three experimental groups (neutral n=69; positive n=76; negative n=71)[49]. Randomization was successful, as no differences were found between the groups on demographic variables, nor personality characteristics. Prior to the stimulus stage of the experiment, the respondents' answers were recorded on a 7-point Right Wing Authoritarianism scale consisting of 12 items (Passini, 2017), to avoid any potential spillover effect of experimental manipulations on respondents scores. Each sub-dimension of authoritarianism was measured using 4 items, from which I created additive indices of aggression, submission, and conventionalism. The question wording and scoring can be found in Appendix D.

During the experimental phase, the study featured a newspaper interview between a reporter and a first-time challenger candidate running for the position of Mayor. As the dominant approach in the literature focuses on the economic benefits as a justification mechanism for the acceptance of the corrupt practices of politicians, I choose to present a scenario with clientelism as a type of corruption practice that can be directly tied to provision or withdrawal of economic benefits for the immediate recipient. The neutral condition offered a general story with a short elaboration on the candidates' motivation for running for office and a few policy initiatives. In the treatment conditions I introduce two experimental manipulations: (a) vote buying allegations ('However, information could also be read in the media that you are offering individuals jobs in

[49] I excluded 84 respondents from the analysis based on two criteria. First, the experimental treatments were between 250 and 300 words in length. Realistically, they cannot be read in full in less than 30 seconds so every respondent below that threshold was excluded. Second, I excluded unusually long responses that were over and hour long and used the average time of 22 minutes as a benchmark for short responses. All those below 10 minutes were also excluded from the analysis.

your companies if they vote for you.'); or (b) economic coercion ('However, information could also be read in the media that you threatened your employees that you would fire them if they did not vote for you.'). The experimental manipulation introduces two novelties about the candidate. First, that he is a person that allegedly uses corruption to boost his chances of getting elected, and second, that he has been caught doing so. The rationale behind such a design follows the theoretical expectations associated with the **H1** and **H2 (a, b)** hypotheses, as it contrasts vote buying, economic coercion, and an ordinary election candidate. It should be expected that respondents would exhibit more favourable views towards the candidate that uses clientelist practices, compared to the candidate in the neutral condition, conditioned on their level of authoritarian submission. The full text of the experimental vignettes can be found in Appendix E.

Following the vignette, in the post-treatment phase, a series of questions was asked about the candidate, his competence, viability and ultimately the likelihood of voting for him. The main[50] dependent variable focused on the propensity to vote for the specific candidate measured on a 7-point scale (1 - very unlikely; 7 - very likely) with the expectation that submissive individuals would be more likely to support a candidate that uses vote buying compared to others.

Lastly, for ethical considerations and deception regarding the purpose and study design, respondents were debriefed at the end of the survey. They were instructed to fill in a questionnaire for the purpose of studying the competence of political candidates without explicitly mentioning experimental manipulation with clientelist information. The reasoning behind such an approach was to avoid priming respondents to think of candidates based on clientelist information and assess how much importance they attribute to such information of their own accord. In that regard, deception was crucial for the success of experimental manipulation.

[50] Additional variables that were used to control for treatment effects were three statements describing the candidate: - (a) Candidate X is a very capable and competent persons; (b) Candidate X has a fair chance to win the election; (c) Candidate X is a person who gets the job done (1 - strongly disagree; 7 - strongly agree).

5.6.2 Analysis and Results

Prior to hypothesis testing, I reviewed the results of the stimulus items to confirm whether they produced an effect on general candidate evaluations and vote buying propensity. The results presented in Table 9 show that there were significant differences in the propensity to vote for a vote buying or coercion employing candidate, compared to the baseline condition. In both instances, the candidate received less favourable evaluations and a smaller average rating in the likelihood of voting (Model 1, 2), while no significant difference was found between vote buying and economic coercion scenario (Model 3). With the exclusion of competence evaluation in vote buying condition, no other differences across experimental groups were found.

Table 9: Treatment effect

	Experimental condition		
	Negative vs. Neutral (1)	**Positive vs. Neutral (2)**	**Positive vs. Negative (3)**
Propensity to	***-0.72* (3.6 – 4.32)***	***−1.14*** (3.18 - 4.32)***	-0.42 (3.18 – 3.6)
Competence	-0.52 (4.33 – 4.86)	***−0.81* (4.05 - 4.86)***	-0.28 (4.05 – 4.33)
Viability	-0.3 (3.6 – 3.9)	−0.20 (3.7 - 3.9)	0.04 (3.7 – 3.6)
Gets the job	-0.29(4.40 – 4.69)	−0.52 (4.17 - 4.69)	-0.23 (4.17 – 4.40)

Note: Mean values in parentheses. T test levels of significance ***p <0.001; **p <0.01; *p <0.05

According to the overall findings of the literature on this topic, it is expected that the candidate will be punished for corruption allegations; however, the question here is whether the severity of the punishment varies across attitudinal characteristics. Table 10 reports a direct test of the proposed **H1** hypothesis that authoritarian submission should be related to a higher acceptance of clientelist practices. As the hypothesis was tested on experimental data, the logic implies there is a conditional average treatment effect that can be modelled in a regression setting with an interaction effect to account for potential confounders (see Fink *et al.*, 2014). Therefore, I fitted several models with interaction effects between the treatment conditions and the subdimensions of authoritarianism[51]. The analysis presents somewhat mixed results in this regard. First, there is a

[51] Aggression and conventionalism were included as potential confounders, and for further validation that the subdimensions have different value orientations and should be treated separately.

significant and positive effect of authoritarian submission on the likelihood of voting for a vote buying candidate (Table 10, Model 1, ***0.21****). Authoritarian submission had no effect on candidate evaluation in the control group (with a flat regression line), while in the vote buying scenario, the change from non-submissive to submissive nets a positive effect of a little more than three points on a seven-point scale (Figure 9). Second, authoritarian submission is related to the increased propensity to vote for the economic coercion candidate, albeit the result falls short by a thread at the conventional significance levels and is significant at the p<0.1 (Table 10, Model 2, ***0.162***(.)[52]. Taken together, there is partial evidence presented to support the rejection of the null hypothesis of no association hypothesis between authoritarian submission and clientelist acceptance.

Table 10: Linear regression estimates of conditional average treatment effect on propensity to vote.

	Propensity to vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Submission	-.032 (.069)	-.032 (.061)	**.130* (.061)**
Aggression	-.028 (.091)	-.028 (.080)	**-.153*(.066)**
Conventionalism	.125 (.072)	**.125(.) (.064)**	.080 (.070)
Vote buying	-3.081 (3.139)		-2.295 (2.623)
Economic coercion		-.786 (2.415)	
	Reference condition in interaction term:		
	Neutral	Neutral	Coercion
Submission*Vote buying	**.211*(.090)**		.049 (.081)
Aggression*Vote buying	-.045 (.127)		.080 (.105)
Conventionalism*Vote buying	-.079 (.104)		-.033 (.098)
Submission*Economic coercion		**.162(.) (.085)**	
Aggression*Economic coercion		-.125 (.103)	
Conventionalism*Economic coercion		-.046 (.093)	
Constant	3.668 (2.128)	3.668 (1.889)	2.882 (1.552)
Observations	117	117	124
R^2	.177	.168	.170
Adjusted R^2	.124	.115	.120

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; (.) p <0.1; *p <0.05; **p <0.01; ***p <0.001;

[52] Fink *et al.* (2014) emphasize the necessity to incorporate standard corrections to multiple hypothesis testing, in order to minimise the risk of false positive results. Following the suggestion, I estimated the expectation of a false discovery rate (FDR), with fdrtool function from the same package in R, which amounted to adjusted p-values (q-values) of 0.15 and 0.41, representing 15% and 41% chance that the interactions in Model 1 and Model 2 are false positives.

Moving on to **H2 (a, b)** hypotheses, Table 9 and 10 present three pieces of evidence for consideration. First, if the mechanism of justification of clientelist practices is based on economic benefits then vote buying should be more acceptable than economic coercion regardless of submissive tendencies. This was not the case in this experiment, as both vote buying and economic coercion candidate received lower voting scores than a candidate from neutral condition, with tentative evidence that vote buying candidate was punished even more severely (Table 9, Model 1 and 2). Second, the effect of both treatments on the propensity to vote for a clientelist candidate was moderated by authoritarian submission (Figure 9), albeit at different levels of statistical importance (Table 10, Model 1, and 2), providing for electoral advantage among submissive individuals for clientelist candidates as opposed to a candidate from the control condition. Third, as the level of submission increases so does the propensity to vote for either of the clientelist candidates (Table 10, Model 3, 0.13*), with no identifiable differences in direct comparison between vote buying or economic coercion conditions. In other words, vote buying candidate does not have an electoral advantage over economic coercion candidate **(H2a)**, while at the same time there is tentative evidence that submissive individuals do not discriminate against candidates based on the provision or withdrawal of economic benefits **(H2b)**. Rather, authoritarian submissiveness provides for an electoral advantage for clientelist as opposed to regular political candidates. In conjecture, the evidence would suggest that that the mechanism of justification is probably related to the perception of authority and power, rather than economic benefits associated with specific clientelist strategy.

Figure 9: Linear regression estimate of the interaction effect between authoritarian submission and vote buying condition on propensity to vote for a candidate.



5.7 Study II

5.7.1 Methods and Design

To test the **H3** hypothesis, I used the Montenegrin National Election Study from 2016 with 1214 respondents (part of CSES Module 5). Apart from the standard CSES questionnaire, the national battery of questions presents an item of interest for this study, on the harmfulness of vote buying practices. The question was phrased to ask 'During the electoral campaign the media presented allegations of vote buying. Regardless of whether you believe these allegations to be true or false, please tell us you attitude towards vote buying'. Possible responses included three options: (a) Vote buying is very bad for the political system and should be criminally prosecuted; (b) Vote buying is bad but is understandable from the viewpoint of an average voter; and (c) Vote buying is not bad at all, there is too much fuss surrounding it. I recoded the answers in a dummy variable indicating the notion that vote buying is bad (0) and that vote buying is good (1).

For authoritarianism, the study offers six items measured on a 5-point scale: (1) The most important virtues children should learn are obedience and respect for authority (2) Young people

sometimes have rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they should overcome them and settle down; (3) The state of immorality in our society is partially a consequence of the fact that parents and teachers have forgotten that physical punishment is still the best way of parenting; (4) It would be best for all if the authorities censored the press, movies and other media, so that the trash is kept away from young people; (5) People can be divided into two groups – the strong and the weak; and (6) Most of our societal issues would be solved if we could somehow get rid of immoral and degenerate individuals. To create a measurement of authoritarian submission, I ran an exploratory factor analysis with two factor solutions, and subsequently used the factor scores as variables in the analysis. The two-factor solution model was significant at (α=0.05) with the two factors retaining 54% of the variance (RMSR=0.01, RMSEA=0.04, Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability=0.988), and performing better than the one factor solution (RMSR=0.06, RMSEA=0.147, Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability=0.843). The mean item complexity was 1.2, meaning that that individual items do not cross-load on different factors. Factor 1, which I label conventionalism, records high factor loadings on items (4), (5) and (6), while Factor 2, submission, records high factor loadings on items (1) and (2) (Table 11).

Table 11: Exploratory factor analysis of authoritarian measurement items

	Factor loadings	
	Conventionalism	**Submission**
Children – Obedience	*0.21*	**0.63**
Youth – Rebellious	-0.06	**0.91**
Immorality – Physical punishment	0.24	0.33
Censorship	**0.78**	0.03
Strong vs. Weak	**0.49**	0.05
Social problems – Degenerate and Immoral	**0.80**	-0.02

Rotation: Oblimin

For the moderating variable, I used question that asked how much do respondents agree on a 5-point scale with the statement – 'Some people think that fair elections make a difference in their lives. Others, on the contrary, think that they do not. Do you think that free and fair elections play an important role with regard to the quality of life of you and your family?'.

As controls, I include gender (a dummy variable for male vs. female), ethnicity (a dummy variable for the largest ethnic group in the country - Montenegrins), education measured on a 9-point scale for the obtained educational level, income measured on a 20-point scale, and age recoded from the year of birth. In substantive terms, I include a dummy vote choice variable for the biggest party in terms of electoral support, the DPS (which presumably has the most extensive network for distributing clientelist benefits), satisfaction with democracy (on a 4-point scale), economic expectations in the next 12 months from getting worse to remaining about the same (on a 5-point scale), the offer of clientelist exchange (an offer of money, jobs, or favours for voting or abstaining), and political interest (on a 4-point scale).

5.7.2 Analysis and Results

Using the Montenegrin National Elections Study form 2016, I fitted a logistic regression model on the harmfulness/acceptability of vote buying. In addition to the main interest in the interaction between election importance and authoritarian submission, the model included controls for gender, age, education, income, ethnicity, satisfaction with democracy, economic expectation, offers of clientelist exchange, and political interest (Table 12).

Table 12: Logistic regression results on the acceptability of vote buying - MNES 2016

	Dependent variable:
	Vote buying is not bad at all
Conventionalism	0.278 (0.35)
Submission	**-0.730* (0.36)**
Election importance	**0.798*** (0.10)**
Conventionalism *Election importance	-0.151 (0.12)
Submission* Election importance	**0.311* (0.13)**
Vote (DPS)	**-0.471* (0.23)**
Male	0.163 (0.22)
Education	-0.063 (0.07)
Income	-0.005 (0.005)
Age	-0.007 (0.008)
Ethnicity (Montenegrin)	0.103 (0.25)
Satisfaction – Democracy	**-0.975*** (015)**
Economic expectation	**0.227* (0.13)**
Political interest	**0.462*** (0.13)**
Offer of clientelism	**1.135***(0.22)**
Constant	**-3.374*** (0908)**
Observations	745
Log Likelihood	-298.095
Akaike Inf. Crit.	628.19
Note: Log odds estimates in table	*p <0.05; **p <0.01; ***p <0.001

The substantive results follow the predictions laid out in the H2b hypothesis and both the separate effects and the interaction effects reached satisfactory levels of statistical significance. The analysis shows that there are substantive interaction effects between authoritarian submission and the perception of election importance on the evaluation of vote buying. Submissive individuals are more likely to evaluate vote buying as not bad at all, conditioned on their perception that elections are not important for the quality of life of them and their families (Figure 10)[53]. When individuals believe elections are important, authoritarian submission diminishes the chance of condoning vote buying, in terms of marginal effects, from ~7.5% to a 2.5%. However, when individuals believe elections are not at all important, submission increases the chance of condoning vote buying from

[53] The importance of elections was measured on a 5-point scale, but for visual clarity only 3 levels were plotted.

~7.5% for individuals low in authoritarian submission to 47.5% for individuals high in authoritarian submission.

Figure 10: Marginal effects of interaction between authoritarian submission and importance of elections on the acceptability of vote buying.



5.8 Limitations and Discussion

This chapter aimed to understand the potential connection between authoritarian submissiveness and the acceptance and justification of clientelist practices. The main focus was not on why and how voters accept clientelist offers, but how the wider electorate perceives and acts towards politicians who use clientelist strategies. To achieve this, each empirical section provides a piece of the puzzle. Experimental study presents causal evidence that voter's level of authoritarian submission influences the way in which they perceive clientelist practices (Figure 11, Study I). The more voters tend to unconditionally submit to authorities, the less likely they are to electorally punish politicians that engage in clientelism. While experimental data does present causal evidence in this regard, the exact mechanism of relationship remained unclear. Here, survey data analysis complements the picture. Survey data analysis was built on the assumption that if voters perceive the impact of individual votes and elections in general as insignificant, accepting vote buying offer is morally justifiable. If this view is extrapolated to the general public, it suggests that those with antidemocratic attitudes and who see elections as unimportant should perceive vote buying as an acceptable practice. This line of reasoning should be congruent with authoritarian submissiveness,

and the tendency of such individuals to attribute value not to the institutions but to individuals in positions of authority. It is precisely that scenario that is confirmed in the final study, where I present regression findings of a correlational association between authoritarian submission and perception of vote buying as not bad at all, conditioned on the belief that elections are not important for the quality of life for respondents and their families (Figure 11, Study II). An outline of the findings, and their role in the mechanism can be found in the following figure.

Figure 11: The role of authoritarian submission in understanding support for vote buying politicians.



In conjecture, the two studies paint a picture that both challenges and complements the literature on acceptability of vote buying. First, the experimental results challenge the economic benefits explanation as they imply that for submissive individuals' acceptance of vote buying practices it not purely guided by economic interest. If the positive externalities are the driving mechanism behind submissive individuals' evaluations of vote buying, candidate in coercion condition should have been punished more, as coercion produces negative economic externalities. This was not the case in the experimental study, suggesting other explanations drive the relationship, presumably the way in which submissive individuals perceive power and authority. In that regard, second, I provide a correlational confirmation that this justification might be further grounded in the perception of institutional efficacy, namely, how much are free and fair elections important for the respondent's quality of life. By doing so, the chapter complements the recent

developments in the literature that suggest that general antidemocratic tendencies are associated with justification of vote buying (see Gherghina *et al.*, 2022).

At this point it is important to acknowledge a few limitations of the findings. The experimental results present causal evidence that authoritarian submission modifies candidate evaluation; however, whether this finding can be generalized to a population of voters is questionable. The experimental conditions were hugely simplified when compared to real world situations, which helps to isolate the effects of clientelist allegations but negates other possible factors that voters may use in a 'trade-off' scenario (known track record, partisanship, charisma, competitors, and so on). Furthermore, due to Montenegro's size and geographical differences, whether the sample obtained is representative for the entire electorate is an open question. The sampling design was stratified to account for urban/rural differences in the place of residence; however, it is still limited to the capital city of Montenegro only, without respondents from other cities or regions.

Lastly, the apparent shortcoming of Study II is the fact that I was able to evaluate only the first part of the mechanism, specifically the association between submission and the evaluation of vote buying, and not the willingness to engage in vote buying or vote for politicians who use the practice. Since MNES 2016 does not have the data on engagement in clientelism but is rather limited to respondent reports of whether they were *offered* something in exchange for their vote, I was unable to conduct the necessary mediation analysis that would put the entire mechanism to the test. However, while a complete picture of vote buying would be more informative, the focus of this chapter is not on the willingness of potential clients to enter into a clientelist exchange, but on the issue of how the entire electorate accepts/rejects vote buying as a legitimate electoral strategy. In that regard, the evidence presented above should be sufficient.

5.9 Conclusion

This chapter set out to explore the role of authoritarian submission in individual evaluations of corrupt practices, aiming to provide an explanation for the limited electoral consequences of corruption scandals. In the analysis, I focused on a specific type of corruption, clientelism, that can result in both positive and negative externalities for voters as well as the politicians who engage in those practices. Taking into consideration the limitations of both quantitative studies, enough causal and correlational evidence was presented to infer the existence of an association between authoritarian submission and the more favourable evaluation of clientelist vote buying. Submissive individuals are shown to be more likely to disregard allegations of clientelist vote buying, and to evaluate vote buying as not bad at all particularly when they simultaneously view elections as unimportant for the quality of their lives.

The main implication of the findings presented here goes against the dominant explanation in the literature that revolves around the economic justification of corrupt behaviour and shifts the focus to attitudes – submissive tendencies and attitudes towards elections. The results imply that economic benefits may prove to be the initial motivation but may lack the normative content to justify corruption. Voters may accept corrupt politicians in expectation of some economic externalities, but that does not necessarily make the practice of clientelism morally acceptable. That additional step could be predicated on the voters' perception of the origins of power within a democratic system, whether it stems from democratic institutions or individuals in positions of authority. When voters perceive individuals, not institutions, to hold the power, accepting practices that distort the system should be morally justifiable. Along those lines, for corruption to flourish, it is crucial for individuals to have little trust in the governing bodies and institutions (Pop, 2012). In the context of vote buying, it follows that the perceived integrity of personal vote choice, and consequently the integrity and importance of the entire electoral process, plays a crucial role. More broadly, the effectiveness of economic benefits to motivate voters to accept and condone

antidemocratic practices is contingent on voters' antidemocratic tendencies, be it authoritarian submission or general rejection of democratic principles.

The study contributes to two strands of the existing literature: one that explores the acceptability and electoral consequences of corrupt behaviour, and another that explores the political consequences of authoritarian attitudes. Regarding the former, this chapter demonstrates that attitudinal characteristics of voters are a fruitful avenue for research when it comes to electoral consequences of corrupt behaviour. In both instances, the study introduces authoritarian submission and explores its consequences from a political science perspective, moving away from the handful of studies that have explored a similar idea in the field of social psychology. Future research could devise a more nuanced approach to the economic benefits explanation, disentangling its motivation and justification function. Also, future studies should more thoroughly test the exact mechanism of the justification for corruption practices among submissive individuals. This avenue can take at least two paths. One would be to link submission with the evaluation of vote buying harmfulness and actual corrupt behaviour (such as the acceptance of vote buying offers), while the other would test the cross-cultural consistency of authoritarian submission and the justification of corruption.

Chapter VI

CONSLUSION

'One of the keys to the survival of free institutions is the relationship between private and public life, the way citizens do, or do not, participate in the public sphere.'

Robert N. Bellah

6.1 The story

Following the rapid expansion of democratic systems after the breakdown of communism, several issues pertaining to the effectiveness and functioning of democracy slowly came to dominate both the real world and scholarly literature. With this focus also came a realisation that the functioning and survivability of democratic systems cannot be taken for granted. What was once a rare occurrence became the norm as more and more functioning democracies started slowly losing their constitutive democratic features. What paints the picture bleak is that even established democratic systems in Europe and North America are vulnerable to malign influences. Democratic erosion is not on the fringes of politics anymore.

However, all is not lost. Addressing the Indian parliament in New Delhi in 1978, Jimmy Carter said, 'The experience of democracy is like the experience of life itself — always changing, infinite in its variety, sometimes turbulent and all the more valuable for having been tested in adversity.' And tested they have been. However, the success of antidemocratic forces appears to follow a cyclical pattern. FPÖ in Austria and Vlaams Belang in Belgium are not as strong as in their electoral heydays in 1999 and 2001. Trump, the most powerful contemporary right-wing populist in the world, was defeated in 2020. Both Bolsonaro and Babiš lost presidential elections to left-wing candidates. These examples witness that there is a reason for optimism, as voters are turning away from disruption and back to normalized political contestation.

The starting point of this dissertation was the claim that the onset of democratic backsliding is usually a consequence of the electoral success of democratically disloyal populist parties and politicians. These parties offer a vision of a *democratic* society in which, by virtue of channeling the will of the majority, usually of politically marginalized groups and interests, they obtain the legitimacy to override institutional constraints (Cianetti & Hanley, 2021). These parties claim to safeguard the people, *us*, from *them* (elites, outsiders, traitors, and foreigners (Grzymala-Busse, 2017)), which provides a fundamental justification for the manner in which they govern (Graham

& Svolik, 2020). Once in power, they engage in ***executive aggrandizement*** by introducing incremental institutional changes that limit the power of the opposition to challenge executive preferences or ***strategic manipulation of elections*** by tilting the electoral playing field in their favour without the elections seeming fraudulent (Bermeo, 2016). Regarding these processes, a broad question guided this dissertation, what are the characteristics of the electorate willing to tolerate the gradual loss of democratic institutions?

Each empirical chapter builds on the general research question and explores a specific issue. In the ***executive aggrandizement*** realm, this dissertation was guided by the general idea that parties are culprits, but the people support and provide legitimacy for their actions. Chapter II focused on the association between religiosity and support for far-right parties as one of the main issues on these parties' agenda, as guardians of ethnic (Koev, 2015) and religious identity (Froio, 2018), is to 'warn of European civilization's destruction at the hands of non-Christian elites' (Montgomery & Winter, 2015, p. 380). However, as the literature shows, they are often unsuccessful in mobilizing the religious part of the electorate (see Marcinkiewicz & Dassonneville, 2021; Immerzeel *et al.*, 2013), we explored potential structural reasons for why that would be so. Specifically, the chapter focused on the question of what the role of ethnic relations is in moderating the association between individual religiosity and support for far-right parties. In chapter III, building on the observation that right-wing party family is ideologically very diverse (Rooduijn, 2019) I explored the question of which ideological dimension of populist far-right ideology appeals to authoritarian individuals.

In the realm of ***strategic manipulation of elections***, I explored the role of attitudinal characteristics of voters in scenarios where voters are a constituent part of manipulation strategies. Brokers buy votes, but some voters are more corruptible than others. In chapter IV, I focused on the decision of brokers whom to target for clientelist vote buying. As the crucial problem brokers have to resolve revolves around compliance and defection (see Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007;

Kitschelt & Altamirano, 2015), norm-based explanations suggest voters are targeted based on their attitudes and beliefs that ensure compliance without the need for external monitoring (Lawson & Green, 2014). From this perspective, a specific research question asked in which way is individual-level authoritarianism associated with an offer of a clientelist exchange. An additional layer explored revolved around the question of electoral rules' role in shaping authoritarian individuals' target rates. Lastly, in chapter V, I build on the observation that politicians engaged in corrupt activities often get a free pass at the polling booth (see Vivyan *et al.*, 2012). The most dominant explanation for this occurrence argues that voters tend to disregard corruption allegations when corruption activities result in the distribution of economic benefits to voters (see Klašnja *et al.*, 2021). For this reason, I focus on the provision or withdrawal of economic benefits to voters through the individualized practice of vote buying and economic coercion, mainly asking what the role of submission in shaping individual perceptions and justification of clientelist politicians is.

6.1 What have I learned?

From the individual perspective, the dissertation's findings illuminate how parts of dogmatic belief systems, religiosity, and authoritarianism relate to political participation. The decision to focus on religiosity and authoritarianism is informed by the strategies employed by populist far-right parties that seek justification for their actions in terms of the necessity to defend the *good* against the *evil*, *us* from *them*. Here, religiosity and authoritarianism share the foundation for moral evaluation, as good and evil are judged based on 'superiority rather than equality, authority rather than consensus' (Eckhardt, 1991, p.120). From a contextual perspective, I show how the structure and nature of party competition and institutional context interact with these individual-level predictors to be associated with specific attitudinal and behavioural outcomes.

In chapter II, we argued that populist far-right parties capitalize on the fears of the loss of cultural purity and ethno-nationalist identity associated with the presence of minority parties in the political system, claiming that under conditions of ethnic issue salience, religious voters should have

a higher chance of voting for populist far-right parties. We demonstrate a positive association between religiosity and support for populist far-right emerging in systems with minority parties. Our findings are stable across time (in three waves of European Social Survey), different data (European Values Survey), and when ethnic composition (fractionalization) is taken into account.

In chapter III, I argued that parties incorporating far-right ideology should have an electoral advantage among authoritarian voters as opposed to those who are simply populist. As authoritarian attitudes appear to be activated by a perceived threat to the social fabric (symbolic of physical), far right ideological outlook offers a congruent response to such a scenario to authoritarian individuals allowing for both submissive behaviour towards the leader and aggressive/punitive behaviour towards the source of the threat – social norm violators (i.e., *others*). Examining the case of Slovakia, Austria, and Serbia, I find that in some instances, authoritarian attitudes are associated with electoral advantage for far-right and populist far-right parties/politicians against populist right and all other parties.

In chapter IV, I argued that authoritarian individuals should have a higher chance of being targeted for a clientelist exchange as they should have a higher tendency to comply with the demand to act in a specific manner (vote or abstain). Primarily because the demand comes from a position of authority and due to the divergence between authoritarian and democratic norms. Furthermore, as compliance based on authoritarian norms would diminish the need for external compliance monitoring, authoritarian targeting should be higher in systems where electoral rules limit brokers monitoring potential. Analysis of Afrobarometer data shows that authoritarian individuals report being targeted at a higher rate and that this rate increases when institutional context limits the potential for external monitoring. In particular, when district magnitude rises so does the rate of authoritarian targeting, with the effects being exacerbated in autocratic as opposed to democratic systems.

Lastly, in chapter V I argued that individuals submissive in the authoritarian sense should be inclined to overlook politicians' clientelist behaviour and give them a free pass at the booth. Resulting from how they perceive hierarchical power relations in society, submissive individuals generally tend to comply with the demands of those in positions of authority even when those demands are morally questionable or illegal. I experimentally show that submissive individuals report a higher tendency to vote for a vote-buying candidate, complementing the finding with a correlational analysis that shows that submissive individuals tend to evaluate vote-buying as not bad at all, particularly when they believe elections are not important for the quality of their lives.

6.2 The big picture

Why democracies stumble is a tall task to unravel and is certainly beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, Schmitter (2015) suggested that the problem of democratic decline can be pinpointed to the willingness of voters to accord legitimacy to the regime. Ultimately, that legitimacy is conscripted from the electoral body that is willing to accept or reject certain types of behaviour. In the broadest sense, this dissertation explored the source of legitimacy of various political strategies fostering an argument for bringing individual (voters) agency back in. In the following paragraphs, I will provide further detail on that assertion.

Democratic backsliding is usually fostered by a specific political context. Here, populist far-right parties tend to structure political competition along identity and values (Polk *et al.*, 2017; Vachudova, 2019), deepening the ('pernicious') polarization and creating a context in which politics becomes a war between *us* and *them* (see Somer *et al.,* 2021). They are presented as an existential threat and the dangerous 'others', making it more essential for *us* to win than to maintain the integrity of the electoral process and uphold the constitutional order (Graham & Svolik, 2020).

If a picture of a dangerous world surrounding us is painted, some will come to believe that. This dissertation shows that there are particular characteristics of voters who adopt such a

worldview, and in turn, vote for the populist far-right and justify antidemocratic actions. In chapter II, we showed it was religious voters; in chapters III, IV, and V, I demonstrated that these were authoritarian voters. When there are structural grounds for identity polarization, some voters will base their decisions on these ideas, as was demonstrated in chapter II with increased electoral support for the populist far-right among highly religious individuals in systems where identity is salient and ethnic minority parties exist. Koev (2015) showed minority party success as the driver of populist far-right success. We built on this finding to demonstrate that religious voters are essential to illuminating that success story. Second, these types of voters will be drawn to parties that nurture the nativist idea in its purest form. In chapter III, I showed that authoritarian voters prefer right-wing parties that are clearly nativist and authoritarian, and that populism is not the driver but a complementary ideological outlook.

In addition to support, parties exploit such an electorate as natural allies for electoral malfeasance. In chapter IV, I showed that was particularly true in democratic as opposed to authoritarian systems, demonstrating that brokers seek out voters that do not place high importance on upholding democratic institutions. In chapter V, the perception of vote buying as not bad was conditioned on the view that elections are not important. This belief ties back to the structural condition that antidemocratic forces create within the political system, namely, that winning is more important than maintaining the integrity of the electoral process and constitutional order.

What could be the moral of the story? These two groups, religious and authoritarian voters, share a sense of morality, the judgment of whether something is good or bad, that is based in superiority and authority (Eckhardt, 1991), be it the group, power figures, or divinity (Graham & Haidt, 2010). The consequence of such a worldview is a belief that individuals in positions of authority determine the moral and practical value of political actions. Such individuals will support populist far-right parties in continuity and accept and condone vote buying as a legitimate electoral strategy. By not constraining actors' political choices, authoritarian voters grant legitimacy to the

regime and abdicate personal responsibility for the state of democracy. Democratic accountability mechanisms wither, and failure of democracy becomes a possibility. Precisely for this reason, the individual political agency is crucial for democratic survival. Merkel and Lührmann (2021) frame this issue in the context of democratic resilience, arguing that the more anchored democratic values and attitudes are, the more immune democracy is to external shocks. Welzel (2021) posits that backsliding episodes are largely confined to societies where emancipative values, as opposed to authoritarian values, are at a low level. From Welzel's (2021) cultural perspective, for democracy to thrive, there ought to be a mass demand for freedom and liberal democracy. Along those lines, this dissertation would suggest that individual voters must understand that the source of legitimacy lies within their political views and that they bear the responsibility for the survival of democratic institutions. Citizen assemblies and civic education campaigns might be an answer here, as Lacelle-Webster and Warren (2021) argue citizen assemblies show significant promise to address democratic deficits of inclusion, deliberation, and collective capacity; while Finkel and Lim (2021, p.1) claim civic education 'programs continue to have the potential to deepen democratic engagement and values, even in fragile or backsliding democratic settings.'

To reiterate the importance of individual voters' agency, if voters ultimately hold the power to decide what sort of a system they want to live in, then it is all the more crucial to understand and shape these voter preferences to foster functioning democratic institutions. When the individual agency is undermined, it is associated with a perception of voters' powerlessness to shape political outcomes and opens the space for the corruption and dominance of the political elites. A passive electorate is one that is easily manipulated. However, when voters engage with the political process and utilize accountability mechanisms to their fullest, it should create a context in which governments are responsive to the democratic pressures from bellow.

6.3 Contribution

This dissertation offers several contributions to the democratic backsliding literature and to the particular sub-fields of far-right voting and clientelism. First, the dissertation offers an individualized account for understanding antidemocratic politics and practices. In that regard, it is one of the first accounts that try to frame the issue of the legitimacy of democratic backsliding from an individual voter's perspective. Here, our work complements the recent developments that look at how democratic resilience is grounded in the fourth level of the political system, its citizens (Merkel & Lührmann, 2021), based on the emancipative values (Welzel, 2021) and populist radical right negative partisanship (Meléndez & Kaltwasser, 2021).

The second contribution of the dissertation is in the conclusion that religiosity and authoritarianism are not automatically associated with support for populist far-right parties. These individual characteristics operate within specific political contexts and become consequential for specific political outcomes when certain conditions are met. For religiosity, we provide evidence that clarifies the mixed findings in the general literature. Notably, our explanation challenges the 'vaccine effect' of Christian Democratic parties as a safeguard against the far-right mobilization of religious voters (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009) and goes beyond the West vs. East European division (Marcinkiewicz & Dassonneville, 2021). Instead, we claim it is the salience of identity politics within the political system that enables the effective mobilization of religious individuals, consistent with Lucassen and Lubbers (2012) cultural identity thesis. For authoritarianism, specific dimensions of right-wing ideology are essential, as they provide the diverging basis for the activation of authoritarian attitudes. When parties adopt a far-right outlook and stress the danger to the social fabric, they amass an electoral advantage among the authoritarian electorate. The findings of chapter III are consistent with scholarship that argues that the perceived threat of immigration is at the core of authoritarian activation (Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Golec de Zavala *et al.*, 2017)

and can help the understanding of why patterns of support between authoritarians and populist far-right parties are not always stable (see Dunn, 2015).

The third contribution points to the conclusion that individual authoritarianism fuels antidemocratic politics through voting as described above or through acceptance of antidemocratic practices. Here, this dissertation introduces authoritarianism into studies of clientelist vote buying. In that regard, I complement the literature on norm-based explanations of vote buying (Lawson & Green, 2014) but go beyond previously established norms of reciprocity and indebtedness and demonstrate that authoritarianism is important in two aspects. First, in understanding targeting strategies for electoral malfeasance, and second, in acceptance of vote buying as a legitimate electoral strategy. Regarding the latter, this dissertation also goes beyond the economic benefits provided to voters (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012) as a dominant explanation for the moral evaluation of clientelism. The third contribution points to the conclusion that individual authoritarianism fuels antidemocratic politics through voting as described above or through acceptance of antidemocratic practices.

6.4 Limitations

As with all scientific research, this dissertation is not without its drawbacks. In terms of general limitations, the inability to make causal inferences is first in line, as most of the data used in the dissertation were observational. In that sense, it was not causally established that voters vote for the populist far right because they are religious and authoritarian and accept vote-buying practices because they are authoritarian; thus, the possibilities of spurious correlation and reverse causality are entirely possible.

The second general limitation regards the case selection. Chapter II relies on large N comparative analyses rather than a particularized approach to instances where specific parties implemented backsliding practices in light of which they managed to rally electoral support.

Additionally, in chapter III, individual-level data were available for electoral cycles temporary prior to the time when analysed politicians/parties in Slovakia, Austria, and Serbia contributed to backsliding episodes. More recent cases were not analysed primarily due to the lack of individual-level data on authoritarianism.

As for limitations related to specific chapters, first, without a causal estimation, we cannot unambiguously claim that identity salience drives the relationship between religiosity and populist far-right vote. Other structural differences between the countries may prove to be more important. However, here lies the space for future research, as one thing is clear, the pattern of the voting behaviour of religious voters varies across different political contexts.

Second, while I do show that authoritarianism is a vital voter feature in clientelist targeting, the reason for being so is still unknown. I argued that brokers target authoritarian voters as they are more likely to comply. However, I could not examine whether authoritarians actually accept clientelist exchanges at a higher rate. Bearing in mind all the caveats of studying illegal practices, future studies could focus on establishing the exact mechanism of why brokers target authoritarian voters.

Third, in chapter V I was able to tentatively show that authoritarianism is associated with moral justification of clientelism, but what is missing is the link with actual acceptance of vote-buying offers. Future studies could focus on this problem from two perspectives. First, whether the electoral body justifies vote buying based on authoritarianism and votes for known vote-buying candidates, and second, as in chapter IV, how individual-level authoritarianism shapes personal engagement in clientelist exchange.

6.5 The end of the line

It was the aim of this dissertation to demonstrate that politics is based on individual voters' decisions and preferences as much as it is shaped by parties and institutions. The future of

democratic governing is unbreakably bonded to liberal-democratic values and the electorate that is determined to uphold them. Informed and engaged citizens are the first line of defence against corrupt practices that plague even developed democracies. It is my hope that this dissertation managed to make a small contribution to the understanding of how individual choices shape democratic processes.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Table 13: Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe (European Social Survey Round 7, 8 and 9)

Country	Radical Right-Wing Party	*Minority Party*
Austria	***Freedom Party Austria***	
Austria	Team Stronach	
Austria	Alliance for the Future of	
Belgium	***Vlaams Belang***	
Belgium	Front Nacional	
Bulgaria	**GERB**	***Movement for Right and Freedoms***
Bulgaria	Attaka	
Bulgaria	IMRO	
Bulgaria	NFSB	
Bulgaria	RZS	
Switzerland	***Swiss Peoples Party***	
Switzerland	Federal Democratic Union	
Switzerland	Ticino League	
Check Republic	***The Dawn of Democracy***	***Moravane, Roma***
Check Republic		***Democratic Party***
Cyprus	***National Popular Front***	
Cyprus	*Citizens 'Alliance*	
Croatia	***HNS***	***Serbs Peoples Party***
Croatia	*HSS*	
Croatia	*HDSSB*	
Denmark	***Danish Peoples Party***	
Germany	***Alternative for Germany***	
Germany	National Democratic Party of	
Estonia	***Conservative People's Party***	***Estonian Centre party***
Estonia	The Estonian Independence	
Estonia	Rahva Uhtsuse Erakond	
Finland	***True Fins***	***Swedish Peoples Party***
Finland	Independence Party	
France	***Front Nacional***	
United Kingdom	***United Kingdom***	
Hungary	***Jobbik***	***Gypsy Party of Hungary***
Hungary	*Fidesz*	***13 Minority lists***
Italy	***Five Star Movement***	
Italy	Lega	
Italy	The Right	
Lithuania	***Young Lithuanians***	***Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania***
Lithuania	Order and Justice	
Lithuania	The Way of Courage	
Latvia	**Latviešu Nacionālisti**	***Latvian Russian Union***

Latvia	Politiskā partija KPV LV	
Montenegro	**Serbian Party**	***Croatian Civic Initiative***
Montenegro	Democratic Front	*Bosniak Party*
Montenegro	Serbian Radicals	*Albanians Firmly*
Netherlands (2012)	***Party for Freedom***	
Norway	***Progress Party***	
Poland	***Law and Justice***	***German Minority Electoral***
Poland	Korwin	***Committee***
Poland	Kukiz' 15	
Russia	***Rodina***	
Russia	Liberal Democratic Party of	
Serbia	**Progress Party**	***Hungarian Union of***
Serbia	Radical Party	***Vojvodina***
Serbia	Dveri	*Bosniak Democratic Union of*
Serbia		*Sanžak*
Serbia		*SDA Sandžak*
Serbia		*Party for Democratic Action*
Sweden	***Sweden Democrats***	
Slovakia	***Obyčajní Ľudia a nezávislé***	***Party of the Hungarian***
Slovakia	*Slovenská národná strana (SNS)*	***Community***
Slovakia	*Smer – SD*	***Most-Hid***
Slovakia	*ĽS Naše Slovensko*	
Slovakia	*SME Rodina*	
Slovenia	***Slovenian Democratic Party***	***Hungarian and Italian communities***

Table 14: Multicollinearity test for the main model - Variance inflation factor scores

Male	1.049
Education	1.200
Income (C)	1.170
Age (C)	1.177
Ideology	1.047
Satisfaction with democracy	1.056
Interest in politics	1.107
Migrants	1.083
GDP	1.157
West	2.223
Immigration	1.143
ESS Round 9	1.746
ESS Round 8	1.624
Ethnic Fractionalization	53.39
Ethnic Fractio. Squared	50.52
Religious Fractionalization	1.339
Religiosity	1.705
Minority Party	2.381
Religiosity*Minority Party	1.751

Table 15: Religiosity and voting for RRWPs - Random slopes model.

	Dependent variable:	
	Vote for RRWP	
Male	0.268*** (0.030)	Level 1 variables
Education	-0.338*** (0.022)	
Income (C)	-0.247*** (0.031)	
Age (C)	-0.486*** (0.034)	
Ideology	0.270*** (0.007)	
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.129*** (0.006)	
Interest in politics	0.005 (0.019)	
Migrants	-0.493*** (0.018)	
GDP	-0.232*** (0.045)	Level 2 variables
West	-1.363 (1.597)	
Immigration	0.144*** (0.014)	
ESS Round 9	0.217*** (0.041)	
ESS Round 8	-0.161*** (0.041)	
Ethnic Fractionalization	-63.682*** (22.058)	
Ethnic Fractio. Squared	95.773*** (34.083)	
Religious Fractionalization	-1.249 (3.296)	
Religiosity	**-0.084*** (0.031)**	Intera
Minority Party	**4.099** (1.652)**	
Religiosity*Minority Party	**0.158*** (0.049)**	
Constant	4.222 (2.864)	
Observations	50,641	
Log Likelihood	-16,908.540	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	33,863.090	
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table 16: Radical Right-Wing Parties in EVS 2017

Country	Party	Minority	Region
Albania	***Albanian National Front***	***No***	***East***
Albania	Justice, Integrity and Unity Party		
Austria	***Freedom Party Austria FPO***	***No***	***West***
Belarus	***Belarus National Front***	***No***	***East***
Bulgaria	***Attaka***	***Yes***	***East***
Bulgaria	Bulgarian National Movement		
Bulgaria	National Front for Salvation of Bulgaria		
Croatia	***Croatian Rights Party***	***Yes***	***East***
Croatia	Croatian Democratic alliance of Slavonia and Baranja		
Czech Republic	***The Dawn of Democracy***	***Yes***	***East***
Czech Republic	Freedom and Direct Democracy		
Czech Republic	Party of Free Citizens - Svobodni		
Denmark	***Danish Peoples Party***	***No***	***West***
Denmark	The New Right		
Germany	***Alternative for Germany***	***No***	***West***
Estonia	***Conservative People's Party of Estonia***	***Yes***	***East***
Finland	***True Fins Party***	***Yes***	***West***
France	***Front Nacional***	***No***	***West***
France	Other Extremists		
United	***United Kingdom Independence Party***	***No***	***West***
United Kingdom	National Party		
Hungary	***Jobbik***	***Yes***	***East***
Hungary	Fidesz		
Italy	***Five Star Movement***	***No***	***West***
Italy	Lega (Lega Nord)		
Italy	Brothers of Italy		
Italy	CasaPound Italy		
Italy	Italy to Italians		
Lithuania	***Order and Justice***	***Yes***	***East***
Netherlands	***Party for Freedom***	***Yes***	***West***
Netherlands	Forum for Democracy		
Netherlands	Reformed Political Party		
Norway	***Progress Party***	***No***	***West***
Poland	***Law and Justice***	***Yes***	***East***
Poland	Korwin		
Poland	Kukiz' 15		
Romania	***Great Romania Party***	***Yes***	***East***
Russia	***Rodina***	***No***	***East***
Russia	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia		
Serbia	***Serbian Radical Party***	***Yes***	***East***
Serbia	Dveri		
Slovakia	***Kotleba***	***Yes***	***East***
Slovakia	We are Family		
Slovakia	Slovak National Party		
Slovenia	***Slovenian Democratic Party***	***Yes***	***East***
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party		
Sweden	***Sweden Democrats***	***No***	***West***
Switzerland	***Swiss Peoples Party & Ticino League***	***No***	***West***

Table 17: European Values Study - Religiosity and appeal of RRWP

	Dependent variable:
	RRWP Appeal
	(1)
	(Christians)
Male	0.25*** (0.042)
Education	−0.145*** (0.008)
Age	−0.09*** (0.013)
Ideology	0.307*** (0.010)
Satisfaction - Dem.	−0.028*** (0.010)
Pol. Interest	−0.094 *** (0.025)
Migrants	−0.555*** (0.023)
Religiosity	**-0.060***(0.014)**
Minority Party (MP)	0.754 (0.485)
Religiosity*MP	**0.133*** (0.023)**
Constant	−0.455*** (0.379)
Observations	19,080
Country	25
Log Likelihood	−7,802.9
Akaike Inf. Crit.	15,629.8
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Figure 12: Interaction effect between religiosity and minority party presence on voting for RRWP in EVS 2017.



Table 18: Religiosity and voting for RRWP - Christian Democratic Party control

	Dependent variable:	
	Vote for RRWP	
Male	0.269*** (0.029)	Level 1 variables
Education	-0.336*** (0.021)	
Income (C)	-0.251*** (0.031)	
Age (C)	-0.493*** (0.034)	
Ideology	0.271*** (0.006)	
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.126*** (0.006)	
Interest in politics	0.001 (0.018)	
Migrants	-0.498*** (0.018)	
GDP	-0.226*** (0.043)	Level 2 variables
West	-1.811 (1.13)	
Immigration	0.130*** (0.013)	
ESS Round 9	0.223*** (0.040)	
ESS Round 8	-0.156*** (0.040)	
Ethnic Fractionalization	-61.794*** (15.805)	
Ethnic Fractio. Squared	92.509*** (24.426)	
Religious Fractionalization	-2.432 (2.315)	
Christian Democratic Party	3.818***(0.881)	
Religiosity	**-0.090*** (0.010)**	Intera
Minority Party	**4.398** (1.161)**	
Religiosity*Minority Party	**0.126*** (0.015)**	
Constant	2.21 (2.005)	
Observations	50,641	
Log Likelihood	-16,978.0	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	34,000.1	
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Appendix B

Name: Tomislav Nikolić

Speech: Closing campaign speech

Date: January 16th, 2008 (Kraljevo)

Date of grading: 21/10/2020

Final grade: 0 - A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements.

Populist	Pluralist
Political system worked against the majority of the people, and hasn't produced expected economic and social benefits: 'Krajnje je vreme da se menja vladajući režim jer u proteklih osam godina nije uradio ništa dobro za svoje građane.' *'It is about time the ruling regime changed because it has not done anything good for its citizens in the past eight years.'* 'Kada postanem predsednik, država će se brinuti o svim građanima, brinuti za decu i za njihovo besplatno školovanje, za stare i za njihovo lečenje. Obezbediću mladima sigurnu budućnostu u Srbiji.' *'When I become president, the state will take care of all citizens, take care of children and their free education, the elderly and their treatment. I will provide secure future for young people in Serbia.'* 'Umeću da se nosim sa odgovornostima predsednika države i to ću uraditi zbog dece, budućnosti Srbije, njenog ponosa i zbog svakog građanina države.' *'I will know how handle the responsibilities of the president of the state and I will do it for the sake of the children, the future of Serbia, its pride and for every citizen of the state.'*	**Will of the people: Nikolić does not speak about the people but about citizens and recognizes that they are not united but have particular political interests.** 'Uspem li ja da vas pomirim i ujedinim, bićemo tako tvrd orah za Evropsku uniju da će ona morati ozbiljno da razgovara sa nama i moraće da prizna postojeće granice Srbije' *'If I manage to reconcile and unite you, we will be such a tough nut to crack for the European Union that it will have to talk to us seriously and recognize the existing borders of Serbia.'* 'Već godinama se pripremam za dan kada će podrška građana Srbije meni biti veća od podrške svim ostalim kandidatima.' *'I have been preparing for years for the day when the support of the citizens of Serbia to myself will be greater than the support to all other candidates.'*
Cosmic proportions of the event: The ruling coalition called for snap presidential election as they want to betray Serbian national interest and renounce Kosovo and Metohija. Elite might be viewed as evil minority that works against the general interest of the Serbian people. 'Vladajući režim požurio je sa raspisivanjem izbora za predsednika države hoće što pre da predaju Kosovo i Metohiju.'	

'The ruling regime hastened to call presidential elections as they want to hand over Kosovo and Metohija as soon as possible.'	

General comment: While some populist elements exist in the speech, they are few and far apart to create a coherent populist rhetoric. Furthermore, apart from territorial integrity (Kosovo and Metohija) Nikolić does not presume to know the will of the people nor does he think such a thing exists.

Name: Tomislav Nikolić

Speech: Closing campaign speech

Date: May 15th, 2012 (Belgrade)

Date of grading: 21/10/2020

Final grade: 2 - A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse and has few elements that would be considered non-populist.

Populist	Pluralist
Manichean outlook: Good and evil references emphasized. Nikolić portrays SNS as good and forgiving people while the DS elites are corrupt and criminal. 'Nikada mi neće pasti na pamet da fizički ugrozim (Borisa) Tadića i njegovu porodicu. Opraštam što je slao otporaše na moju kuću. Dolazi vlast koja će da prašta.' *'It would never occur to me to physically endanger (Boris) Tadic and his family. I forgive him for sending his party activists to my house. The new government will be forgiving.'* 'Saradnici Borisa Tadića – Đilas, Petrović, Šutanovac, su tajkuni koji su zaradili milione i obogatili se krađom.' *'Boris Tadic's associates - Djilas, Petrovic, Sutanovac, are tycoons who earned millions and got rich by stealing.'*	
Will of the people: The general will of the people is clear and obvious and they want Nikolić to win. It did not occur so in the first round of presidential election, because the DS elites organized electoral fraud. 'U noći 6. maja bila je krađa izbora. To je bila noć dugih hemijskih olovaka, a džakovi su nestajala i pojavljivali se.' *'On the night of May 6, there was an election theft. It was a night of long ballpoint pens, and the sacks of voting tickets were disappearing and reappearing.'* 'U nedelju izađite na izbore, na biračka mesta, čuvajte ono što je naše.' *'Go to the polls on Sunday, to the polls, keep what is ours.'*	

'Pobediću, uprkos manipulacijama i njihovom pokušaju da u drugom krugu ponovo pokradu izbore. Ko kaže da će on (Boris Tadić) da pobedi. Nisam sreo čoveka koji je rekao da će glasati za njih. Nema u Srbiji tog broja glasova koji su prikazali da su dobili. 6. maja Srbija je očekivala promene.' *'I will win, despite the manipulations and their attempt to steal the elections in the second round once more. Who says that he (Boris Tadic) will win? I did not meet a single man who said he would vote for them. Their support in Serbia is not as they showed it to be. Serbia expected changes on May 6th (ie. first round of presidential election).'*	
Cosmic proportion of the possible event unfolding: The will of the people must be realized, otherwise Serbia will continue to suffer the consequences of the crocked system controlled by a few criminal and corrupt elites. 'Srbija mora da pobedi. Odavno Srbija nije pobedila, sila, moć, diktatura, sve to pada jednog dana kad se probudi narod. Probudite narod Srbije 20. maja.' *'Serbia must win. Serbia has not won for a long time, force, power, dictatorship, all that falls one day when the people wake up. Awaken the people of Serbia on May 20th.'* 'Nikada nije bilo važnije da odredimo sudbinu svoje dece tako što ćemo da skinemo sa grbine ovog naroda ne samo Tadića, već i celu bulumentu koja ide sa njim, i gleda šta ima i gde da se ukrade, proda, izgradi.' *'It has never been more important to determine the fate of our children by removing these people from our backs, not only Tadic, but also the entire bulwark that goes with him, that looks for what exists and how to steal it, sell it, or build.'*	
Evil minority: Nikolić clearly portrays then current president Tadić and his party as the evil minority. 'Saradnici Borisa Tadića – Đilas, Petrović, Šutanovac, su tajkuni koji su zaradili milione i obogatili se krađom.' *'Boris Tadic's associates - Djilas, Petrovic, Sutanovac, are tycoons who earned millions and got rich by stealing.'* 'Kad više ovi koji su sada na vlasti ne budu mogli da kradu neka ponovo dođe Boris Tadić. On je pokvario Srbiju i sada moraju da dođu majstori, odnosno bolji ljudi da je poprave.'	

'When those who are now in power can no longer steal, let Boris Tadic come back again. He has corrupted Serbia and now the repairmen must come, that is, better people to fix it.'	
Control of the system for the elite's own interests: 'Saradnici Borisa Tadića – Đilas, Petrović Šutanovac, su tajkuni koji su zaradili milione i obogatili se krađom.' *Boris Tadic's associates - Djilas, Petrovic, Sutanovac, are tycoons who earned millions and got rich by stealing.'* 'Kad više ovi koji su sada na vlasti ne budu mogli da kradu neka ponovo dođe Boris Tadić. On je pokvario Srbiju i sada moraju da dođu majstori, odnosno bolji ljudi da je poprave' *"When those who are now in power can no longer steal, let Boris Tadic come back again. He has corrupted Serbia and now the repairmen must come, that is, better people to fix it."* 'Nikada nije bilo važnije da odredimo sudbinu svoje dece tako što ćemo da skinemo sa grbine ovog naroda ne samo Tadića, već i celu bulumentu koja ide sa njim, i gleda šta ima i gde da se ukrade, proda, izgradi.' '*It has never been more important to determine the fate of our children by removing from the hump of this nation not only Tadić, but also the entire bullion that goes with him, and looks for what and how to steal, sell, or build.*'	

General comment: The speech is a general overview of the political reality in Serbia trough Nikolićes eyes, without references to specific issues of events. He clearly portrays DS elites as evil, corrupt, and serving their own personal agendas, contrasting them with the general will of the people and preference for change.

Appendix C

Table 19: Robustness analysis – Multilevel approach

	Dependent variable:		
	Election incentives offered		
	(1)	(2)	
Authoritarianism	**-0.095****	**-0.037**	
	(0.038)	**(0.032)**	
Living conditions	-0.041***	-0.041***	Level 1 variables
	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Interest in public affairs	0.080***	0.080***	
	(0.015)	(0.015)	
Ethnic discrimination	0.116***	0.116***	
	(0.016)	(0.016)	
Voting secrecy	0.190***	0.190***	
	(0.016)	(0.016)	
Party closeness	0.449***	0.449***	
	(0.035)	(0.035)	
Male	0.163***	0.163***	
	(0.032)	(0.032)	
Age (c)	-0.114***	-0.114***	
	(0.033)	(0.033)	
Education	-0.017*	-0.017*	
	(0.009)	(0.009)	
Employment	0.002	0.002	
	(0.035)	(0.035)	
Democracy – Freedom House	-0.775*	-0.665*	Level 2 variables
	(0.362)	(0.330)	
District magnitude	-0.089	-0.050***	
	(0.047)	(0.015)	
Electoral competitiveness	0.0003	-0.001	
	(0.008)	(0.008)	
Proportional representation	-0.066	-0.121	
	(0.383)	(0.370)	
GDP per capita	-0.12	-0.09	
	(0.0083)	(0.08)	
Authoritarianism*Democracy	**0.273*****	**0.214*****	Interaction effects
	(0.056)	**(0.048)**	
Authoritarianism*Magnitude	**0.025*****		
	(0.008)		
Democracy*Magnitude	0.062		
	(0.043)		
Authoritarianism*Democracy*Magnitude	**-0.026***		
	(0.010)		
Constant	-1.710***	-1.809***	
	(0.321)	(0.338)	

Observations	34,275	34,275
Log Likelihood	-13,833.560	-13,840.300
Akaike Inf. Crit.	27,711.120	27,716.600
Note:	$^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$	

Robustness – Case studies

The following paragraphs explore ethnic affiliations in more detail based on two case studies - Sierra Leone and Nigeria. These two countries were chosen based on several criterion: **(a)** data availability[54], **(b)** very high levels of Fearon's (2003) ethnic fractionalization index, **(c)** type of regime – Sierra Leone treated as electoral democracy while Nigeria is not, based on Freedom House 2019 report; **(d)** type of electoral system – majoritarian in both countries; **(e)** district magnitude – average district magnitude in both countries is 1. On most selection criteria the two cases are quite similar, but the differ on a key issue – whether they are electoral democracies or not. Following the robustness analysis discussed in the main body of the chapter, I decided this factor should be the key for case selection.

Regarding ethnic/tribal identity, I use two variables – whether respondent belong to a minority group, and whether he/she feels that group is discriminated against based on ethnic grounds. Regarding ethnic minority groups, Sierra Leone has around 16 ethnic/tribal groups that are substantively large enough to constitute a separate community. Out of those 16, Temne and Mende account for 66.7% of the total population (35.5% and 31.2%, respectively) while no other group is larger than ~6.5%. Therefore, Temne and Mende were used a reference category and all other ethnic/tribal identities were coded as minority groups. In Nigeria, there are three relatively large ethnic groups, Hausa ~25%, Yoruba ~21%, and Igbo ~20%, that were used as the reference category for all others that were coded as minority groups.

The results of the case study robustness analysis are presented in Table 20. In Sierra Leone, authoritarianism was positively associated with the offer of clientelist exchange (0.342**) amounting to ~40% increase in the chance of being targeted for authoritarian individuals, in line with the general argument of the chapter. In Nigeria, authoritarianism was negatively associated with the likelihood of being targeted (-0.264***). The results on the importance of authoritarianism correspond to the general finding in the chapter, that authoritarian targeting should be more pronounced in democratic systems. Additional results follow this logic as well. Ethnicity, as well as voting secrecy was a statistically significant predictor of clientelist targeting in Nigeria, while authoritarianism was significant predictors in Sierra Leone. These two case studies further imply that quality of democracy is an important factor in the decision which particular voters brokers decide to target for clientelist exchange.

[54] At the time this chapter was written Afrobarometer 8 (2019-2021) was partially released on a country-to-country basis with 8 country datasets and documentation available in English. In Wave 8, questions on clientelist offers were repeated for the first time since Wave 4 (2011-2013) which serves as the main source of the data analysed in this chapter.

Table 20: Robustness analysis – Case studies approach: Ethnic and tribal identity associations with clientelist targeting.

	Dependent variable:	
	Election incentives offered	
	Sierra Leone (1)	Nigeria (2)
Authoritarianism	**0.342***	**-0.264****
	(0.159)	**(0.095)**
Voted for gov. parties		0.091
		(0.140)
Voted All Peoples Congress	-0.072	
	(0.246)	
Voted for Peoples Party	-0.120	
	(0.253)	
Party closeness	0.466	0.040
	(0.253)	(0.135)
Discuss politics	**0.412****	**0.237***
	(0.143)	(0.099)
Voting secrecy	-0.028	**0.257*****
	(0.133)	(0.067)
Community backslash	-0.062	**0.141***
	(0.069)	(0.057)
Minority ethnic/tribal identity	-0.063	**-0.302***
	(0.212)	(0.146)
Ethnic discrimination	0.077	0.019
	(0.296)	(0.133)
Male	-0.244	0.019
	(0.193)	(0.135)
Age	**-0.018***	**-0.010***
	(0.008)	(0.005)
Education	**-0.082***	-0.016
	(0.042)	(0.029)
Living conditions	-0.105	**0.099***
	(0.088)	(0.048)
Employment	0.265	-0.163
	(0.224)	(0.133)
Constant	-1.446***	-0.587
	(0.454)	(0.342)
Observations	777	1058
Log Likelihood	-366.328	-709.181
Akaike Inf. Crit.	762.655	1446.361
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Appendix D

Passini (2017) Right Wing Authoritarianism 12 item scale: Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represents strongly disagree and 7 represents strongly agree, how far do you agree with the following statements?

SUB Our country would be great if we did what the authorities told us to do.
SUB It's important for children to learn to obey the authorities.
SUB People that criticize the authorities create useless doubts in people's minds.
SUB People must, always and for whatever reason, have greater freedom to protest against the government. **(R)**
AGG The recent growth in crime shows that we have to use extreme measures against delinquents.
AGG Governments should eliminate all opponents.
AGG Our country would be great if we got rid of the 'rotten apples' who are ruining everything.
AGG We have to be tolerant toward protesters. **(R)**
CON Traditional values and the traditional way of life are still the best way to live.
CON Our country would be great if we respected our traditions.
CON The established authorities have to exercise the power of censorship to stop the diffusion of immoral material.
CON It is fair to allow marriages between gays and lesbians. **(R)**
R denotes reverse-scored items.

Appendix E

Vignette: In the following minutes we will ask you to read a short excerpt from a story about a fictitious political candidate. Please read carefully and tell us your initial thoughts about the candidate.

Several months before the 2016 local elections, Candidate X announced his candidacy for the major of City X, leading a citizens group. Our reporters visited his electoral headquarters to ask about his political programme.

Reporter: Can you tell us something about your ideas and plan for running this city?

Candidate: As a successful entrepreneur, I have the necessary experience in both planning and executing complex development projects that can only benefit the residents of this city. I've gathered a team of young people who can translate my ideas into successful public policies. We will start with the reconstruction of our worn-out road infrastructure, water supply and sewerage systems, but we will also focus on creating a stimulating environment for the development of small businesses.

Neutral: *Reporter:* In your recent TV interview, you called on citizens to go to the polls in as many numbers as possible, and to vote independently and freely. Would you like to add anything?

Treatment - Negative: *Reporter:* In your recent TV interview, you called on citizens to go to the polls in as many numbers as possible, and to vote independently and freely. *However, information could also be read in the media that you threatened your employees that you would fire them if they did not vote for you.* How do you comment on this information?

Treatment - Positive: *Reporter:* In your recent TV interview, you called on citizens to go to the polls in as many numbers as possible, and to vote independently and freely. *However, information could also be read in the media that you are offering individuals jobs in your companies if they vote for you.* How do you comment on this information?

Neutral: *Candidate:* It is true that I called on the citizens to vote in the largest possible numbers. This is a free country, and citizens are free in their political choices.

Treatment - Negative: *Candidate:* It is true that I called on the citizens to vote in the largest possible numbers. *It is a complete fabrication that I threatened my employees with layoffs if they did not vote for me.* This is a free country, and citizens are free in their political choices.

Treatment - Positive: *Candidate:* It is true that I called on the citizens to vote in the largest possible numbers. *It is a complete fabrication that I offered employment to people to vote for me.* This is a free country, and citizens are free in their political choices.

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