

Evaluating a Repositioning Attempt: The Three-Year Long Anti-Immigration Campaign's Implications for Voter Preferences

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Abstract

This thesis offers to give further understanding to the debate around the effects and intertwined relationships of issue salience and issue ownership. While the results of prior research show some evidence for changing voting behavior in case of changes in salience or issue ownership, this study connects the two with deeper analysis of media effects, and the usage of cross-sectional data. To contribute to the broader discussion of the effects of issue salience and issue ownership on voter choice, this study analyzes how the large-scale anti-immigration campaign between 2015 and 2018 affected the attitude and preference of voters in Hungary throughout the parliamentary elections between 2010 and 2018. This specific period gives a prime opportunity to analyze the effects of heightened salience linked with an intensive media campaign. Through the analysis of secondary sources, and the statistical analysis of voter preference and attitude towards immigration throughout three parliamentary elections (2010-2018), the results support the hypothesis that Fidesz voters became more negative towards immigration, but they point to an explanation that even despite the media campaign, they could not convince voters of other parties. The effects of the campaign should be understood in terms of mobilization and the changes in the opinions of their existing voters.

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Introduction

Background and relevance

This thesis analyses the increased issue importance of immigration and its effects on voting behavior on the 2018 parliamentary elections in Hungary. The research was inspired by the reception of the refugee crisis in 2015 and the subsequent large-scale media campaign of the Hungarian governing party.

In 2015, Hungary saw an influx of immigration because of people fleeing their war-torn countries and trying to get to the European Union, mostly to Germany and Sweden. While Hungary was only supposed to be a transit zone for these refugees, the Hungarian government took radical steps in order to stop immigrants from crossing the border. In the following years leading up to the 2018 parliamentary elections, the government kept immigration continuously on the agenda, and built several campaigns around immigration, connecting this issue to other topics such as the European Union, Hungarian sovereignty, foreign influence, the competence of the Hungarian opposition, or the campaign against George Soros.

While this unprecedented media campaign is considered to be a leading factor in the re-election of Fidesz and them gaining two-third of the mandates for the third time in a row, the mechanism through which this campaign made its impact is less clear. It would be difficult to argue that the issue of immigration had no impact on the election, since the campaign of Fidesz was solely based on the claims that the opposition would tear down the fence built on the border and that George Soros wants immigrants to flood the European Union – Fidesz being the only option to stop the alleged plan.

This study aims to deepen our understanding about the effects of the above mentioned events and in this way contribute to the field of voting behavior and issue salience. In a general sense,

I am aiming to contribute an answer to the following question: In what way issue salience and issue ownership influence voter choice? I am examining the previously described Hungarian case to add onto the growing literature of this topic. While looking for the answer to the above question, I also need to dive into a set of other questions: How did the influx of immigrants and the large-scale media campaign affect the attitude and party preference of voters? Did voters with a negative attitude towards immigration change their party preference to Fidesz? Or were they already Fidesz voters? Do voters make their decisions based on their country's (perceived) most important problem, or do they stick to partisanship and follow the – sometimes changing – opinion of their party leaders? The research aims to give cues and potential answers to these questions.

Research summary

Scholars on voting behavior agree that issue salience, the importance of a topic or problem can influence party preferences and election results. This study aims to connect the research on this area of voting behavior with media effects through the analysis of the changing attitudes and party preferences of the Hungarian electorate throughout three election cycles from 2010 to 2018. The research fills a gap in the area of issue salience because it deals with the underresearched mechanism through which issue salience has an impact on party preference. Voter choice based on issue salience, issue ownership or voter choice based on partisanship has a long history in political science literature. The joint analysis of issue salience and media effects makes the understanding of the effects of issue salience more available. Beside contributing to this debate through joining together the voting behavior and the political communication literature, the thesis also fills a gap in its choice of country. According to my literature review, the effects of issue salience were widely analyzed on Western European countries, but similar evidence from other democracies is less frequent.

The research strategy is built on secondary sources: a review of the media analysis and data analysis about the connection between the attitudes and party preferences of Hungarian voters. The media analysis serves as an input, an explanation about the mechanism through which attitudes have changed, while the data analysis aims to explain how attitudes affected party preferences. Fidesz's campaign against immigration throughout the years serves as a quasinalatural experiment. While direct effects cannot be measured, the discussion and exclusion of other possible explanations help in getting closer to an answer to the research question.

The thesis pursues the following structure: In Section 2, I introduce the theory of issue salience, the spatial theory of voting, previous research on the salience of immigration, the definitions of media effects, and previous research on the media effects of immigration in order to give a conceptual overview of the topic and help to establish my assumptions. In Section 3, I give an overview of the Hungarian case from multiple perspectives: the political context and history of the immigration crisis, the events of the crisis itself and the government's reaction, and also the media landscape of Hungary and the media campaigns that ensued in the following years. In Section 4, the assumptions are formulated and some descriptive statistics are presented that lay the groundwork for the econometric analysis. The second part of Section 4 is where the effect of attitude towards immigration on party preference is described in statistical terms with the assistance of ordinary least squares (OLS) models. Section 5 discusses and interprets the results, connecting it back to the theory and media effects and also presents the limitations. Finally, Section 6 contains the conclusion of the study, while the Appendix includes Stata do files for the models.

Theory

Issue ownership and issue salience

The theory of issue salience is strongly related to issue ownership theory introduced by Budge and Farlie (1983) and Petrocik (1989). Thus, before discussing the idea of issue salience, I will shortly discuss issue ownership. Issue ownership is “the idea that voters associate certain issue with certain political parties” (Lefevere – Tresch – Walgrave, 2015, p. 2), such as immigration with the radical right, social security with Social-Democrats, or environmental protection with Green parties. Based on this theory, parties focus on their respected issues. Meanwhile, voters that consider a given issue more important than others (e.g. health care is more important to them than the environment) will prefer the party which focuses on their issue. In the last two decades, issue ownership theory became prominent again because of increasing voter volatility, the decreasing ideological distance between parties, and more fluid party preferences among voters. Unfortunately, the increase in research did not lead to a consensus about the impact of issue ownership. In some cases, the impact seems to be direct, while in other cases, it is only present for salient issues. According to the authors, one of the main problems is the lack of comparative empirical analysis on the topic. (Lefevere – Tresch – Walgrave, 2015)

In their paper, Bélanger and Meguid (2008) argue that the effect of party ownership of an issue to individual vote choice is conditioned by the perceived salience of the issue in question. Although the authors agree that issue ownership can be important in two dimensions, - explanation to party and candidate behavior and an account to voter behavior – they state that research mainly focused on the first aspect and less on understanding voter behavior. Based on these previous studies, issue ownership should not be seen as constant, but rather something that parties and candidates continuously compete over by reframing the issues or appealing to their record in that policy area. A few scholars focused on the role of issue ownership in

individual voter choice as well. The studies have different findings: there is some evidence that supports indirect effect of issue ownership through its impact on the perception about the party's position on the left-right spectrum, while other findings support the idea of direct effect on voter's choice. (Bélanger – Meguid, 2008)

Bélanger and Meguid (2008) state that previous research ignored or downplayed the role of issue salience in determining the effect of issue ownership. They argue that the impact of issue reputation on an individual's vote choice is conditioned by issue salience. Issue ownership only affects those who think that the given issue is important. As voters have different priorities among the issues, "ownership-based voters will support different parties, based on the issues that they find salient". (Bélanger – Meguid, 2008, p. 480) To test this conditional formulation, the authors used individual-level data from the 1997 and 2000 federal elections in Canada. They find that issue ownership does not play an equal role in voting decisions for every issue and every party. Their conditional model is closer to the true specification of vote choice. The reputation of a party in an issue alone is not significant, parties need to convince the electorate about the significance of their issue as well. (Bélanger – Meguid, 2008)

The word 'salience' was originally "used by voting behavior scholars to designate the importance individual voters attach to different issues when evaluating political candidates. In effect, greater salience meant greater importance" (Wlezien, 2003, p. 1). Initially, scholars measured salience by turning to the voters and asking them about the most important problem the nation has to face. These responses indicated relative importance. In this way, scholars could also measure the salience of different issues over time. This remains true today and we can see that salience of issues can change dramatically over time. (Wlezien, 2003)

Wlezien (2003) argues that the importance of issues and the degree to which they are a problem is confused in the research. Surveys capture the most important problems from the perspective

of the public, but not the importance of an issue in itself. The author offers a conceptualization of an “important issue”, “an important problem,” and the “most important problem”. “An important issue is one that people care about and have (meaningful) opinions. These opinions are likely to structure party support and voting behavior and form the subject of political debate.” (Wlezien, 2003, p. 3) An important problem “captures the importance of an issue and the degree to which it is a problem. An issue is a problem if we are not getting what we want”. (Wlezien, 2003, pp. 4-5) In this case, we have to look at the combined effect: something can be a problem, but still not be important and vice versa. The most important problem is simply the winner among important problems with the most votes. Wlezien’s analysis shows that most important problem (MIP) responses are largely driven by the degree to which the given issue is a problem. In times of economic crises, economic mentions increase. In times of international threats, national security and foreign policy responses increase. Their other important finding is that the movement in MIP responses is not related to changes in importance per se: a large part of the variation in particular categories reflects the degree to which other issues are problems. To solve this problem in measurement, one possibility would be to ask people about the importance of different issues. Wlezien concludes that certain issues might be more important to people than others in general, and only the extent to which they are problems has varied. (Wlezien, 2003)

On the other hand, Hatton (2017) emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between preference and salience. While preference is used to capture the individual’s position, only salience is able to identify the intensity of those feelings, or more specifically, the issue’s importance. From a policy perspective, this means that only those preferences gain political traction where salience is high enough to make it a political priority. (Hatton, 2017, p. 2)

This theoretical distinction helps our case as well. Each individual has a different set of preferences that lead to their voting decisions. The weight of each component is different to every voter and issue salience can change their perceptions. Those voters with a strong preference against immigration look for the parties who would carry out these policies.

The spatial theory of policy influence gives a frame to the connection between issue salience and issue ownership. Based on Hargitai (2020), the theory is built on the assumption that mainstream parties aim to eliminate the niche parties with an ideologically similar voter base. The success of the mainstream party depends on three dimensions: issue ownership, issue salience and policy convergence. Based on this approach, the mainstream party can take dismissive, accommodative or adversarial strategies. The accommodative strategy increases issue salience, policy position converges between the two parties and issue ownership is transferred partly or totally to the mainstream party. Thus, the electoral support of the niche party decreases. (Hargitai, 2020) The mechanisms of the possible strategies are shown on Table 1 and it will be a useful tool especially when we analyze the relationship between Fidesz and Jobbik.

1. Table: Spatial theory of policy influence: Predicted effects of mainstream party strategies

Strategies	Mechanism			Niche party electoral support
	Issue salience	Issue position	Issue ownership	
<i>Dismissive</i>	Decreases	No movement	No effect	Decreases
<i>Accomodative</i>	Increases	Converges	Transfers to mainstream party	Decreases
<i>Adversarial</i>	Increases	Diverges	Reinforces niche party's ownership	Increases

Source: Hargitai (2020, p. 199) referencing Meguid (2005, p. 350)

Salience of immigration

The salience – or in other words, the politicization of migration – has different historical backgrounds in Eastern and Western Europe. Compared to the 1970s, migration has gradually

become a highly politicized issue in Western Europe, radical right parties being the biggest issue entrepreneurs. It can be explained by the increasing number of immigrants both from within the European Union and other Western European countries, and from countries of Eastern Europe and countries outside Europe. Although, it is important to note that the increasing numbers did not always translate into increasing politicization of the topic. It is certainly some kind of precondition, but the share of immigrant population does not determine the scale of politicization. (Grande et al., 2018)

In Western-Europe, the content of the traditional ideological – socio-economic and sociocultural – dimensions have changed in the last 40-50 years. Environmentalism, and later on, immigration and European integration all became some part of these two dimensions, the latter two the cultural one, also giving a new content to far-right parties. These changes are in line with the winners and losers of globalization thesis put forward before, which says that the increasing economic and cultural competition caused by globalization produced winners and losers. Some – mainly the well-educated and qualified – gained new possibilities, while others are challenged by the competition for jobs in their countries because of sectors moving to East Asia or because of the influx of Central European workers to Western European countries. This structural problem could shape the salience of issues and the party system as well. (Van der Burg – Van Spanje, 2009)

Meanwhile, in Eastern European countries this politicization did not happen from the 1970s, it is a newer phenomena by which the political arena is continuously shaped. It has either led to the emergence of new populist and far-right parties or to older far-right parties putting the issue on their agenda in most of the European Union. Thus, Eastern European countries also have to deal with a new salient political topic and a public opinion that has to be taken into account.

Although there is much less work on the historical analysis of politicization of immigration in Eastern Europe, Rovny (2016) says that the migration crisis put the previously marginal topic into the spotlight. The rising salience and the potential of migrants of culturally different backgrounds created an opportunity for political entrepreneurs in an already increasingly conservative and nationalist political environment. Among others, both Viktor Orbán and Jaroslaw Kaczynski seized this opportunity.

Research on the relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and party preference are not without examples. De Vries, Hakhverdian and Lancee (2013) showed in their research that identification with the left- or right-wing can be based on cultural and economic roots. In these issues, immigration has a more and more important role in Western-Europe.

In their analysis, they looked at data from the Netherlands between 1980 and 2006 to see based on what issues people decided to be left-wingers or right-wingers. According to their results, anti-immigrant sentiment became more important when one had to place herself on a political-ideological scale, while their thoughts and feelings about the state of economy and economic policy became less important. This trend can be attributed to the fact that the voters identify themselves as left-wingers or right-wingers based on changing political topics and their supposed importance. As they state, the mobilization based on cultural issues became much more important for one's party preference while questions of redistribution were thrust into the background. (de Vries – Hakhverdian – Lancee, 2013)

It is not obvious if this kind of trend is true to Hungary or other Central-European countries. Meanwhile, this research connects well with the broader topic of political salience and shows an example on how a similar question can be answered. It also underlies my previous statement about part of the research gap being the analysis of this problem in the Eastern-European context.

Role of the media: Agenda-setting, priming and framing

While it is clear that the topic of immigration has become salient because of how it was kept on the agenda by mostly Fidesz and other political parties as well, the question of priming and framing seem to be interesting as well. In this chapter, I define all three media effects and discuss their relevance in the research topic.

McCombs and Shaw (2017) define the agenda-setting function of the mass media as the following: “In reflecting what candidates are saying during a campaign, the mass media may well determine the important issues—that is, the media may set the "agenda" of the campaign.” (McCombs – Shaw, 1972, p. 176) In other terms, it means that media has the power to disseminate messages and this dissemination affects voters’ perception of what are the important, or salient issues during an election campaign or in politics in general.

Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) define priming as changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations. In this case, the communication of how Fidesz handles the refugee issue and how other parties would handle it if they were in the governing position got coverage mainly in the earliest stages of the refugee crisis. Differences in policy recommendations and world view became apparent and this was usable for priming for the actors. For Fidesz, it became a differentiating point from the other parties and also, from the European Union.

According to Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), framing is a characterization of an issue that influences the audience’s understanding of the topic. Frames can be used to interpret and reduce complex information. As immigration and the refugee crisis were and are complex issues as well, the usage of framing was inevitable, but it did not necessarily happen by chance. The framing of the crisis changed over the years, Fidesz first associated the European Union with

the topic, then civil organizations and George Soros as well, using immigration as a linkage or a good representation of the threat against Hungarian national sovereignty.

These three approaches or theories of political communication can help us understand the discourse surrounding immigration and the refugee crisis and it can also help to understand why attitudes and party preferences changed in the direction they did, in accordance with the salience of the topic.

Agenda-setting, priming and framing of immigration

Szalai and Göbl (2015) argue that the media is a key institution in the framing of migration because it reproduces the construction of the self and the other and in this way, it is a leading instrument of securitization. The media image is largely affected by the governing elites and the power relations between them. He also claims that the media discourse in Hungary and other Eastern European countries during the migration crisis was similar to those experienced in the 1980s and 1990s in Western European discourse.

Based on the literature review of Eberl et al. (2018), the literature about media effects and immigration concentrates on two aspects: (1) how immigration and different migrant groups (Eastern-Europeans, Africans, the Roma, refugee crisis) are reported in European media coverage and (2) how this coverage affects audiences. According to them, the literature mostly concentrates on agenda-setting and framing, and as the second question suggests, most scholars are interested in how coverage affects issue salience and preferences.

Based on Eberl et al. (2018)'s review, salience is mostly influenced by agenda-setting. This kind of agenda-setting can have two sources: external events, like an influx of immigrants or a terrorist attack, or it can come from inputs from the politicians, like a far-right party who effectively

presses the issue of immigration. Concerning agenda-setting, they summarize several findings from recent years about immigration:

- The media coverage of Muslim immigrants is overrepresented compared to Christians,
- Jews and Hindus.
- Differences experienced in visibility are dependent on country of origin, ethnicity, religion and the legal status of the immigrant.
- Media coverage of immigration increases anti-immigration attitudes. These are results even in studies where they control for recent developments (e.g. influx of immigrants) or for the tone of media coverage.
- If there is greater media coverage on immigration, more people vote for parties with anti-immigration messages.

As for the framing of immigration, Eberl et al. (2018) distinguish between three types of framing of immigration:

- Economic frame: Media frames can depict the economic consequences of migration, like an increasing competition for jobs. In case of labor shortage, this frame can also be positive.
- Cultural frame: Media frames can depict the cultural consequences of migration, like undermining cultural values.
- Security frame: Media frames can depict the consequences of migration for security and order, like increased crime rate.

Concerning framing, there are several findings about immigration, some of them are the following:

- The expressions 'migrant' and 'immigrant' are more related to economic threats (increasing competition on the labor market), while the terms 'refugee' and 'asylum

seeker' are more prominent in discussions about the burdens that welfare states have to cope with because of immigration.

- North-Africans are more often depicted as cultural threats than Eastern-Europeans.
- As a security threat, North-Africans have the most mentions. As a secondary frame, they are talked about as cultural threats, but rarely as economic burdens.
- There are differences between types of media as well: tabloids tend to discuss economic aspects, while broadsheets concentrate more on education and policy-frame.
- When media coverage concentrates on integration of immigrants, the cultural frame prevails, while when the topic is immigration in itself, media coverage with economic perspective is more dominant.

Beside economic, cultural and security threat frames, there is another distinction of how media frames immigration: these two are negativity and victimization. The latter is more prevalent when the media reports on refugees, in the beginning of a news cycle (e.g. when refugees arrive in a country or the death of refugees) or during Christmas when people are more charitable. The negativity frame speaks for itself and can contain any negative information or opinion from either economic, cultural or security perspective. (Eberl et al., 2018)

What I can draw from this literature review is the necessity to examine both the quantity and the quality of media coverage of immigration in Hungary. These categories help establish the academic language to use in my thesis and also improves my understanding of what to look for in the Hungarian media system and in other papers that deal with this issue.

Overview of the Hungarian case

Politics in Hungary before the migration crisis

Enyedi (2016) argues that Hungary had a rather established institutionalized party system by 1994 after the transition. He states that since 2010, three blocs compete against each other: the right (Fidesz), the radical right (Jobbik) and the fragmented left.

Fidesz, the governing party since 2010, was founded in 1988 during the liberalization of the communist regime in Hungary and first came into power in 1998-2002. While signs of clientilism were present in the first Orban government as well, the victory of the 2010 National Assembly elections saw a turning point in Fidesz's operations. The coalition of Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) won over two-third of seats in the National Assembly, creating a solid constituting power. Fidesz used this power to create a new political and economic system. (Kubas – Czyz, 2018) This great shift of the party system was partly the result of a term of scandal and mismanagement by the previous left-wing government. The 2010 election changed the political arena and positioned Fidesz in the central. (Zeller, 2016)

Ceylan Tok (2018) claims that Orban took a populist turn before the 2010 elections and his politics can be defined as “the politics of battle” where enemies are constantly constructed in order to maintain support: in the last decade, the International Monetary Fund, the EU elite and the refugees all fell into this category.

In 2011, the Hungarian National Assembly adopted a new Constitution. This new constitution increased the power of the executive branch, limited the freedom of the Constitutional Tribunal, reduced decentralization and emphasized a conservative and national worldview. The electoral law was also reformed, the division of districts was redrawn and Hungarians with dual citizenship living outside the country were also granted a right to vote in the elections. These

decisions together solidified a supporting base for Fidesz and made the opposing parties' chances for election much smaller. (Kubas – Czyz, 2018) According to Tölgyessy (2012), the new Fundamental Law aims to limit the possibilities of government change and to stabilize the Orbán-regime for decades.

Wittenberg (2013) characterizes Fidesz's political principles as similar to the pre-communist conservative politics, primarily based on the new Fundamental Law. The preamble starts with "God bless the Hungarians" and recognizes the role of Christianity in preserving statehood. It also declares an "abiding need for spiritual and intellectual renewal" after the decades of moral decay in the twentieth century. Wittenberg (2013) also states that in the early 2010s, Fidesz faced opposition from the left and the right as well, since Jobbik became a parliamentary party in 2010.

Between 2010 and 2014, the level of patronage and clientilism also saw new heights compared to the first Orbán government and Orbán became an even more central figure of the party. In 2014, Fidesz won just two-third of the seats in the National Assembly again. In 2015, the government faced the migration crisis as Hungary is located on one of the shortest routes from the Middle East to Germany, which was mainly the destination country of migrants and refugees. (Kubas – Czyz, 2018)

By the 2010-2014 parliamentary period, Jobbik also became a major political party. According to Bíró-Nagy and Boros (2016), Jobbik started out as a radical party that firstly consolidated its strength in Eastern Hungary, but later was able to gain support in the country's Western part as well. Hyttinen – Nare (2017) say that Jobbik presented itself as the most competent to deal with the 'Roma issue' and therefore gained issue-ownership over the matter, but it was not the only topic that ensured their success, it was rather a mixture of the anti-Roma issue and related law and order rhetoric, antiglobalization rhetoric, antiestablishment rhetoric and the economic crisis

that hit Hungary seriously in 2008. Kyriazi (2016) describes Jobbik's ideological core as a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism, a party which mobilises its constituencies on the grounds of culture and identity and which is characterized by xenophobia and a belief in strict social order.

By 2014, Jobbik was the second strongest party in opinion polls after Fidesz, making it the governing party's main contender. From 2013, Jobbik started to depart from its radical roots, especially in their communication. They labeled themselves as a party of the 21st century, denouncing Fidesz and the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) in the process, and in general they took a more positive turn in their communication compared to 2009-2010. The authors write that in order to build a people's party, extremely anti-Semitic and anti-Roma statements have disappeared from the party's communication and the party chairman made it clear to Jobbik's politicians that public displays of racism will no longer be tolerated in the party. (Bíró-Nagy – Boros, 2016).

According to Wilkin (2018), Fidesz and Jobbik are often viewed as different parties with overlapping ideologies. While anti-EU rhetoric is powerful at both parties, they are not committed to leave the EU and neither are hostile towards Russia. On the other hand, Jobbik drove the political culture towards the far-right by normalizing "prejudices aimed at Jews, globalization, the gay community, the EU, Roma, and migrants" (Wilkin, 2018, p. 25). Wilkin also adds that Fidesz was trying to keep their hegemony on the illiberal right through the adoption of several policies advocated by Jobbik. (Wilkin, 2018, p. 26)

Enyedi (2016) argues that the rise of Jobbik, a radical right party, illustrates the magnitude of dissatisfaction with Hungarian politics before 2010 through the fact that there was room for a party like Jobbik next to Fidesz. He also claims that the two parties shared several ideological positions and that "their populist posture was most clear in the professed defense of ordinary

Hungarians against multinational corporations, international agencies, and foreign powers.” (Enyedi, 2016, p. 215)

Bíró-Nagy and Boros (2016) also make the observation that the Orbán government worked several elements of the programme of Jobbik into their policies, potentially because of the fear that Jobbik would take away voters from Fidesz. Among others, they list the crisis taxes on large corporations, the reference to the Holy Crown in the constitution and the introduction of the national commemoration day about Trianon as prime examples. (Bíró-Nagy – Boros, 2016, p. 255) While these policies did not stop Jobbik’s rise, the party’s popularity actually decreased during the refugee crisis where both Fidesz and Jobbik took a strong anti-immigrant stance. (Bíró-Nagy – Boros, 2016) On the other hand, Böcskei and Molnár (2017) argue that Fidesz implemented policies that were in their programmes too in the first place or were ideologically in line with their plans. Thus, the idea that Fidesz implemented Jobbik’s programme is at least a debatable statement.

The events and aftermath of the migration crisis

Based on Tálas (2020), data shows that the proportion of immigrants in Hungary is modest and a large portion of these immigrants came from neighboring countries. After the regime change and the Balkan war, the 2015 migration crisis was the third wave of immigration to the country.

The conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia led to an unprecedented number of asylum seekers to the European Union member states in 2015 and 2016. Far-right and populist political parties exploited this crisis to reinforce anti-immigration rhetoric and experienced an increase in support. Thus, islamophobia also appeared as a phenomenon in the Eastern European context. (Thorleifsson, 2017)

The beginning of the refugee crisis could be dated to the first months of 2015. As Hettyey (2017, p. 109) writes, “there was a sudden jump in asylum applications in 2015. While in 2014 only

42,000 applications were filed, in 2015 no fewer than 177,135 people applied (the second highest figure in the EU after Germany), of which 502 people were awarded asylum.” Still, the author claims that as the immigrants’ destination country was not Hungary but other Western European countries and many applicants left before finishing the review process. (Hettyey, 2017)

In response to the influx of immigrants, the Hungarian authorities tightened the regulations on illegal border crossing and constructed a fence on the Hungarian-Serbian border. The Hungarian government ordered a nationwide referendum to strengthen the position of Hungary in the European debate surrounding the crisis. In October 2016, 98% of participants voted ‘no’ to the question: “Do you want the European Union to decide, without the consent of the Hungarian Parliament, that people other than those with Hungarian citizenship should be settled in Hungary?” (Kubas – Czyz, 2018, p. 57-58.) However, the referendum was invalid because only 40% of those entitled turned out to vote. (Kubas – Czyz, 2018)

As Thorleifsson (2017) recounts the events, the Hungarian state refused the Franco-German quota proposal which would have forced countries to take an obligatory number of migrants. The author analyzes the crisis as a battle for political power between Fidesz and Jobbik.

Ceylan Tok (2018) writes that Orbán seized the opportunity of the crisis to construct a sense of emergency. In the meantime, Fidesz members of the parliament “parliament referred to refugees as ‘thieves’, ‘arsonists’, the ‘source of diseases’ and ‘criminals’” (Ceylan Tok, 2018, p. 99). The left-wing parties in the Parliament criticized these comments.

Ceylan Tok (2018) claims that Hungary already had one of the toughest immigration policies in the European Union. Gyollai – Korkut (2019) write that Hungary constructed a 174,6 km long barbed wire fence at its southern border with Serbia and later it was extended by 116,1 km at the Croatian border.

Pap – Reményi (2017) discuss that the role of the “bastion” of the West and Christianity is still a strongly living concept in many Hungarians. This information is paired with a higher rate of xenophobia compared to other countries, which they – among other factors – contribute to the hardships in the co-existence with the Roma minority and the fact that Hungarians have a unique language and history compared to its neighbors.

Although, erecting the fence was only one of many new measures introduced by the government. Police officers and the army were given additional powers to control the inflow of migrants and police officers had the right to intervene on the territory of the whole country if they suspected a violation of migration laws. (Klaus, 2017)

According to Pap and Reményi (2017), after the Bataclan attack in Paris in November 2015, the narrative underwent militarization. They recount the argument that because of the West’s war with Islamists and the Middle East, they will send warriors among the arriving migrants. As Fidesz strengthened the anti-Muslim narrative, Jobbik’s earlier pro-Muslim policy backfired and the migration crisis debate was totally overtaken by Fidesz.

Hargitai (2020) writes that Fidesz’s position on the European Union has become more critical, while Jobbik has moderated its own since 2014. During the refugee crisis, Orbán depicted the European Union as an organization that wants to transport and settle foreigners within its borders and redraw the cultural and ethnic map of Europe in order to eliminate the nation state.

Traditionally, Jobbik’s discourse concentrated on the Roma and Jews. Jobbik largely capitalized on the image of ‘gypsy crime’, a stereotype that the Roma are criminals by nature and this idea was a great factor in their success in the 2010 elections. While Gábor Vona, a previous leader of the party praised Islam for its spiritual qualities in 2012, migrants from Muslim lands were associated with terrorism by 2015. Besides Fidesz, Jobbik also launched several campaigns to

present itself as a solution to the crisis. Fidesz's sharp move to the radical right and Jobbik's formulating anti-Muslim stance brought the two parties closer together in terms of ideology. (Thorleifsson, 2017)

Szalai and Göbl (2016) treat the Hungarian discourse as a securitization problem and write that at first, migration was securitized as an economic threat, but later, it changed into an identity-based threat frame where the economic threat was only manifested in the costs that Hungarians have to bear because of migration. Thus, securitization got a mainly cultural frame where the migrants were a threat to the Hungarian (and in a more general sense, European) way of life. Desecuritization attempts also took place, mainly from civil actors of the society. While these actions also gathered media attention both in Hungary and abroad, they could not be as successful as the government's securitization campaign, solely because of the skewed power relations and the specificities of the Hungarian audience which shows high levels of xenophobia.

The unevenness of this power relation is also showcased by Leboeuf – Pirlot (2019) who write about the special immigration tax of 25% that the Hungarian government imposes from 2018 on organizations that carry out 'immigration support activities'.

As Ceylan Tok (2018) summarizes, Orban and Fidesz managed to turn the issue of immigration into a pro-national and anti-national debate, where the opposition was presented as pro-foreigner. Jobbik supported Fidesz's anti-immigration policies, while the divided left barely raised its voice against it.

In 2018, Fidesz once again won the elections and gained a constitutional majority in the national assembly. During their campaign, Fidesz concentrated on anti-migration slogans while connecting anti-immigration to other "external threats" against Hungarian sovereignty, mainly

the European Union and George Soros. After the elections, Fidesz passed amendments to the “stop Soros” package, punishing “unlawful help for immigrants” by up to one year in prison.

(Kubas – Czyz, 2018)

According to Várnagy (2019), the lines of campaign financing also became blurry, as the government financed public advertisements that focused on anti-immigration and on the plans of George Soros. In the same time, the leader of Jobbik, Gábor Vona also pushed the party towards the centre-right with the support of the ex-Fidesz oligarch, Lajos Simicska. (Várnagy, 2019)

Even after the election, Fidesz kept immigration on the agenda, but took a direction into a more positive frame. In November 2018, they launched the National Consultation on Families where the first question was: ‘Do you agree that the population decline should be tackled not by immigration but by stronger support for families?’. (Várnagy, 2019, p. 130)

Media landscape in Hungary

In this chapter, I give an overview about the Hungarian media system and summarize how immigration was presented in the years leading up to the 2018 election. It is important to discuss this topic in order to see the agenda-setting and framing power of the Hungarian government. Their control over media outlets is a crucial part of that power.

Dragomir (2018) argues that the Hungarian government uses the system of state advertising to capture the media. This can be tracked through the significant changes in the distribution of state advertising. For example, Class FM, a station that took over one of the two radio frequencies (taken away from Slager and Danubius), started to receive state advertising money as soon as Fidesz won in 2010, securing 58 percent of the entire state budget for radio advertising in 2012. (Dragomir, 2018, n.a.)

A similar trend happened with newspapers. While the left-wing Népszabadság's 12.7 percent share of the total newspaper state advertising in 2008 reduced by 3 percent in 2012, despite solid circulation, government-supportive Magyar Nemzet increased its share from 12.7 percent to 22 percent. In 2016, Népszabadság was shut down in a suspiciously sudden decision. (Dragomir, 2018. n.a.)

As for television broadcasting, Dragomir (2018) tells the story of the advertising tax that Fidesz introduced to financially cripple the German-owned RTL Klub, the biggest channel at that time and to capture another broadcaster, TV2 into the government's sphere of influence. The plan was successful, and TV2 was soon bought by one of prime minister Viktor Orbán's allies.

Last, but not least, there are similar tendencies in online media as well. One of the most popular news portals, Origo, took a pro-government turn after having been sold by Deutsche Telekom to a local media company close to Fidesz. Since then, it became a megaphone of government communication against opposition parties, migrants and George Soros. (Dragomir, 2018)

For the government's dominance in the media, Nolan (2019, p. 54) summarizes how Fidesz-related oligarchs took over Hungary's 18 provincial newspapers since 2017. Most of them have been bought by Lőrinc Mészáros, while some of them are in the hands of the controversial Austrian businessman Heinrich Pecina, and the remaining were bought by the late media mogul Andy Vajna. In 2018, the government made all local papers the property of the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), swallowing up 476 outlets, and in this way, creating one of Europe's largest media holdings, in a country of less than 10 million.

As it can be seen, the Hungarian government has powerful positions across every type of media outlets, besides having public broadcasting and a large capacity to disseminate messages through billboards in information campaigns – another widely used tool, as we will see later. In

the next section, I will give an overview about how the Hungarian media depicted immigration based on Sik-Simonovits (2019). After that, I will present government campaigns that informed the electorate about immigration. The latter analysis will show the most important frames that Fidesz used and their frequency will also present some kind of agenda-setting.

The framing of the immigration debate

In January 2015, after the Charlie Hebdo massacre, the government displayed anti-immigration billboards across Hungary. In May 2015, they launched a public consultation of immigration and terrorism with 12 questions. A few from these questions blamed ‘Brussels’ (the European Union) for the mismanagement of migration. The campaign also focused on the economic threat immigration could pose to the country. In the communication of Fidesz, “migrants were not portrayed as victims of a humanitarian emergency in search of protection, but as ‘crimmigrant’ carriers of dystopia – of crime, chaos and ethno-religious pollution” (Thorleifsson, 2018, p. 323).

Sik – Simonovits (2019) carried out a content analysis of Hungarian media sources about immigration. In case of governmental sources, there is a decreasing trend of using the term refugee and the opposite trend in using the term migrant. The effect of media control can be showcased the best through the example of origo.hu. As the researchers state, their assumption was that as the ownership of Origo has moved from non-governmental towards state-controlled owners, the content of the articles also changed into more and more serving the government’s purposes. According to their research, the frequency of using the words ‘refugee’, ‘asylum seeker’, ‘refugee crisis’ declined, while ‘migrant’ and ‘migration’ became more prevalent. (Sik – Simonovits, 2019)

Regarding government campaigns, in June 2015, the government started a billboard campaign and a so-called national consultation about immigration. On these billboards, there were three kind of messages:

1. “If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our laws!”
2. “If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our culture!”
3. “If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away Hungarians’ jobs!”

(magyarnemzet.hu, 2015)

In newspaper advertisements, the billboard campaign was connected to the European Union as well, saying that the European Union wants to settle immigrants to Hungary, which endangers Hungarian jobs. (hvg.hu, 2015)

In May 2016, the government started another billboard campaign leading up to a referendum about the so-called compulsory settling, the idea of quotas for European Union member-states to accept refugees. The main message was: “Let’s send a message to Brussels in order for them to understand!” The campaign costed 3 billion HUF which is almost ten times more than any of the previous two billboard campaigns. (hvg.hu, 2016a) As Albert (2016) recounts, the government launched another information campaign in July 2016, called “Did you know?”. The government disseminated a lot of information, including false ones about immigration, the main messages included:

1. “From the beginning of the migrant crisis, more than 300 people died in terrorist attacks in Europe.”
2. “From the beginning of the migrant crisis, there was a significant rise in harassment cases against women in Europe.”

3. “The terrorist attack in Paris was carried out by migrants.”
4. “Almost 1 million migrants want to come to Europe solely from Lybia.”
5. “Last year, 1.5 million illegal migrants came to Europe.”
6. “Brussels wants to settle illegal migrants amounting to the population of a city to Hungary.”

(Albert, 2016)

Between May and 13 August, the Hungarian government broadcasted these messages about the quota referendum 10 481 times. During the Olympics, on public broadcasting channel M1 these were the most often used advertisements and on public broadcasting channel M4, these advertisements took up 1/5 of the advertisement time. (hvg.hu, 2016b) The anti-immigrant campaign between its beginning in 2015 and the quota referendum on 2 October costed more than the Brexit campaign (hvg.hu, 2016c). After the referendum, the government started a campaign with the text: “We let Brussels know: 98% NO! to compulsory settling” (nepszava.hu, 2016)

In 2017, the government started another national consultation, called “Stop Brussels!” which included statements about immigration as well:

1. “Brussels wants to enforce Hungary to let in illegal migrants”.
2. “The illegal migrants coming to Hungary are encouraged to commit illegal activities not just by human traffickers, but by international organizations as well”.

(hvg.hu, 2017a)

After this consultation, the government has a “thank you”-campaign as well, celebrating 99% agreement (hvg.hu, 2017b). In this same campaign, George Soros became involved as well,

depicting him as a ring-leader and supporter of illegal immigration. Later, Soros became the figurehead of Fidesz's billboard campaigns about immigration and Brussels, going as far as calling it the "Soros-plan". The government had a national consultation about the Soros-plan as well. (D. Kovács, 2019)

Finally, in the 2018 election campaign, the opposition was depicted as partners of Soros, portraying leaders of the opposition party on the same picture as George Soros, saying "They would tear down the fence together" (Sajó, 2018).

These campaigns show that Fidesz used its power to set the agenda about immigration on a large scale, spending a tremendous amount of money. On the other hand, we can see that they used all three kinds of frames discussed above: the first three messages related to the economic, cultural and security threat that immigrants pose to Hungary, and in different time periods between 2015-2018, they mostly used the security and the cultural frame. It is worth mentioning that beside the three frames known from the literature, by the end of 2016, a fourth type became prevalent as well: the sovereignty frame that depicted immigration as an issue that is forced upon Hungary by external forces (the EU). The categorization of messages is showcased in Table 2 below.

2. Table: Classification of the government's billboard and national consultation messages about immigration by frame time (2015-2017)

Period	Government message	Frame type
2015	If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our laws!	security
2015	If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our culture!	culture
2015	If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away Hungarians' jobs!	economic
2016	From the beginning of the migrant crisis, more than 300 people died in terrorist attacks in Europe.	security
2016	From the beginning of the migrant crisis, there was a significant rise in harassment cases against women in Europe.	security
2016	The terrorist attack in Paris was carried out by migrants.	security
2016	Almost 1 million migrants want to come to Europe solely from Lybia.	general
2016	Last year, 1.5 million illegal migrants came to Europe.	general
2016	Brussels wants to settle illegal migrants amounting to the population of a city to Hungary.	sovereignty
2017	Brussels wants to enforce Hungary to let in illegal migrants	sovereignty
2017	The illegal migrants coming to Hungary are encouraged to commit illegal activities not just by human traffickers, but by international organizations as well	security

Source: Own table (2022)

Analysis

In this chapter, I will write about the ways I aim to find the answer to my research question and show some figures which will help the understanding of the data analysis, and finally, present the results. As showcased earlier, I hypothesize that the rising salience caused by the immigrant shock and its presence in the media restructured voting preferences in a way that Fidesz could gather votes from the far-right. On the other hand, it could also affect left-leaning voters as well, depending on how much they saw immigration as a problem that only Fidesz would be able to tackle.

Hypotheses

Based on the literature, I have the following hypotheses:

1. Anti-immigration attitude and voting for Fidesz have a positive relationship.

Fidesz is commonly known as a right wing party who used anti-immigrant rhetoric before the 2018 parliamentary elections. This anti-immigrant rhetoric is a well-known right wing populist tool. Besides, we can see from previous surveys that the Hungarian population in general has negative attitude and opinion about immigration. With this hypothesis, I would like to see if anti-immigration attitudes are more common among Fidesz voters and if voting for Fidesz can be explained with this attitude.

2. The positive relationship between anti-immigration attitudes and voting for Fidesz has strengthened between 2010 and 2018, while it weakened in case of left-wing parties and Jobbik.

As we could see in other countries' cases, immigration as an issue became more and more important in the 21st century's political discourse and it has risen as one issue that influences

party preferences. Because of this fact and the campaign of Fidesz between 2015-2018, I hypothesize that Fidesz's messages either strengthened anti-immigration attitudes in their own electorate or other voters migrated to Fidesz due to this change in issue importance and issue ownership.

Background information for the interpretation of the results


This section gives a short overview about important figures and data that will help to contextualize our results. Necessary parts of the context are the issue salience of immigration, long-term trends on immigration attitude, the number of asylum seekers and the parliamentary results of Fidesz.

Salience of immigration in Hungary

As discussed in the theoretical part, the rising salience in itself might not mean people's preferences changed about immigration. Thus, in this chapter I give a brief overview about how the attitudes towards immigration were before the refugee crisis and see if there was any change after that.

Regarding the salience of immigration in Hungary, Figure 1 shows how the importance of the immigration issue rose from the beginning of 2015. This is based on Eurobarometer, where respondents need to name the two most important issues facing their country at the moment. By the end of 2015, the importance of immigration rose to 33,7% and remained above 20% through well after the 2018 parliamentary elections. The mentions of terrorism also became more frequent but remained between 4,5% and 8,5%. This rise intertwines with the attack on Charlie Hebdo, the influx of immigrants to Hungary in 2015 and the Bataclan attack. These events and the communication regarding the migration crisis together affected the sharp increase in the salience of these issues.

1. Figure: Mentions of migration and terrorism as most important problems facing Hungary, 2010-2018 (%)




Source: Eurobarometer (2020)

Messing and Ságvári (2018) conducted a cross-national analysis of attitudes towards migration where they find that almost half of the population thinks that nobody should be allowed to come and settle in Hungary. This figure means that the complete rejection of third country national migrants is the most widespread in Hungary compared to other post-communist countries, where the same opinion is shared by about the quarter of the population.

Long-term trends of xenophobia

Simonovits (2020) discussed a survey conducted by TÁRKI, where data shows that the level of xenophobia has reached an all-time high – 60% of the population were xenophobes, meaning they would not admit any asylum seekers into Hungary. As depicted on Figure 2, the ratio of xenophobes and thinkers (who would consider admitting asylum seekers) was always high in Hungary, but after 2015, the ratio of xenophobes rose significantly and people who were xenophiles (who would admit all asylum seekers into Hungary) basically disappeared, or shrunk to 1-2%.

2. Figure: The ratio of xenophobes, xenophiles and thinkers, 1992-2017 (%)



Source: Simonovits (2020, p. 162)

Simonovits (2020) also conducted focus group discussions, where an overwhelming majority of participants were against both labour migration and forced migration. She concluded that perceived threats have real consequences, regardless of their accuracy.

Number of asylum seekers and foreign citizens

These numbers are even more surprising if we look at number of asylum-seekers. Barna and Koltai (2019) looked at the aggregate number of asylum-seekers, foreign citizens living in Hungary and foreign citizens immigrating to Hungary. As Table 3 shows, “the number of foreign citizens residing in Hungary is less than two per cent of the total Hungarian population, even if we include the number of foreign citizens who immigrated into Hungary in the given year” (Barna – Koltai, 2019, p. 51). While the number of asylum-seekers dramatically decreased after 2015 and the physical closure of the borders, xenophobia still increased, as shown in Figure 2.

3. Table: Number of asylum-seekers arrived to, foreign citizens residing in, and foreign citizens immigrating to Hungary (2015 - 2017)

	Number of asylum-seekers arrived to Hungary	Number of foreign citizens residing in Hungary	Number of foreign citizens immigrating to Hungary
2015	177,135	145,968	25,787
2016	29,432	156,606	23,803
2017	3,397	151,132	36,453

Source: Barna - Koltai (2019, p. 51)

Before we go forward with the analysis, there are some takeaways from this chapter. We could see that the salience of immigration increased significantly in the time of the refugee crisis. We can also see that salience remained high and xenophobia increased in spite of the fact that the number of asylum-seekers decreased within a year. As for the government's communication, we could see that Fidesz kept immigration on the agenda for at least three years, between 2015 and 2018. In my opinion, this intensive period also meant that Fidesz grabbed the issue ownership of immigration and dominated the discussion in the media as shown previously.

Parliamentary results for Fidesz between 2010-2018

While Fidesz had a stronghold on the parliament continuously since 2010 by having 2/3 of the possible mandates, their share of votes have changed significantly, and they were helped by the previously mentioned changes in the electoral system after 2010. As Tóka (2018) says, participation in the 2018 election hit a record high in the modern history of the country, and despite – or because of – this great participation, Fidesz could increase its vote share by almost 4 percentage points. Tóka attributes the party's success mainly to their effective mobilization strategy which was primarily built on the issue of immigration and George Soros, but clarifies that the voter perception about economic well-being also contributed to Fidesz's steady growth in polls between 2016 and 2018. The author concludes that the prolonged immigration

campaign changed the demographic composition of Fidesz voters and served as an effective boost for participation.

4. Table: Share and number of Fidesz votes in Hungarian parliamentary elections, 2010-2018

	2010	2014	2018
Share of Fidesz votes	52,73%	43,55%	47,36%
Number of Fidesz votes	2 706 000	2 142 000	2 607 000

Source: Tóka (2018, p. 316)

Comparison of parliamentary elections through 2010-2018 based on European

Social Survey data

Data

In my analysis, I use European Social Survey (ESS). ESS gathers data every two years in several European countries since 2002. Data gathering has four fixed modules: social trust; political attitudes; subjective well-being; religion, identity and sociodemographic background. (Gerő-Messing, Ságvári, 2015) I considered ESS to be a good starting point because it contains information on voting behavior and has numerous measures on attitude towards immigration. As my research question aims to capture changes through time, ESS proved to be useful from this perspective as well.

In this analysis, three waves of ESS are included: the years of 2010, 2014 and 2018. All three were years of parliamentary elections in Hungary and data gathering happened after these elections, thus the datasets contain up-to-date information on voting behavior, attitude towards immigration and on other demographic measures as well. The reason I do not use earlier data such as the wave of 2006 is simple: not all the variables I would have liked to use were available from 2006. The cost of leaving out these variables seemed greater than including another wave in my analysis. In this chapter, I present the characteristics of these three datasets, data

preprocessing, the used variables, the changes I made on these variables, and descriptive statistics about the dependent and independent variables.

As evident from the research question, my dependent variable is about voting, namely ‘party voted for in last national election’. In one case, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that contains information whether the individual voted for a left-wing party or Fidesz through these three years. In the other case, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that contains information whether the individual voted for Fidesz or Jobbik, the main far-right party of Hungary in these years.

Before data pre-processing, the three datasets looked like the following: the 2010 survey had a total of 1561 respondents, with answers gathered after the 2010 parliamentary elections (ESS Round 5, 2010), the 2014 survey had 1698 respondents, with answers gathered after the 2014 parliamentary elections (ESS Round 7, 2014), and the 2018 survey also had 1698 respondents, with answers gathered after the 2018 parliamentary elections (ESS Round 9, 2018). As the European Social Survey’s (2020) sampling guidelines state, all samples need to be representative of all persons aged 15 and over and respondents are selected by strict random probability methods. On one hand, it means a trustworthy, representative survey for our analysis. On the other hand, it means that we have three sets of cross-sectional data, three snapshots in time about the Hungarian population’s standing on immigration and their voting behavior. Thus, it only allows us to compare these snapshots and needs to make us cautious about stating any causal relationship.

To create three categories, I had to make changes for the dependent variable (Party voted for in last national election) in all three waves of ESS. In my analysis, I call this variable Vote.

In 2010, I created a variable for voting with three categories Fidesz – KDNP voters, left-wing voters and Jobbik voters. The category for left-wing voters contains voters of three parties: Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP, Hungarian Socialist Party), Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (SZDSZ, Alliance of Free Democrats) and Lehet Más a Politika (LMP, Politics Can Be Different). By dropping other small parties that were either insignificant or are difficult to place on the ideological spectrum, and also dropping those who refused to answer the question (214 respondents) or the question was not applicable for them (460 respondents) because they were not eligible to vote or simply did not vote, we have a dataset of 869 individuals.

In 2014, I also created the above mentioned three categories for the voting variable. The category for left-wing voters contains voters of many parties: LMP was presented on the ballot alone, while a coalition of parties cooperated: MSZP, Együtt (Together), DK (Demokratikus Koalíció, Democratic Coalition), PM (Párbeszéd Magyarországért, Dialogue for Hungary) and MLP (Magyar Liberális Párt, Hungarian Liberal Party) were presented as one option together in 2014. By dropping other small parties that were either insignificant or are difficult to place on the ideological spectrum, and also dropping those who refused to answer the question (296 respondents) or the question was not applicable for them (526 respondents) because they were not eligible to vote or simply did not vote, we have a dataset of 846 individuals.

Finally, in 2018, I also created the above mentioned three categories for the voting variable. As Fidesz and KDNP were two distinct options in the surveys, I merged these two into one category. The creation of the category of left-wing voters was the most difficult in this year: this category contains the voters of DK, Együtt, LMP, MSZP, Párbeszéd, Momentum, Munkáspárt and MKKP. By dropping those who refused to answer the question (225 respondents) or the question was not applicable for them (515 respondents) because they were not eligible to vote or simply did not vote, we have a dataset of 946 individuals.

The independent variable I used was the respondent's answer on the following statement: 'Immigrants make country worse or better place to live'. This question is present in all three waves and respondents could evaluate it on a 0-10 scale, where 0 means 'Worse place to live', while 10 means 'Better place to live'. The mean of this question was 4,16 in 2010, 4,03 in 2014 and 3,87 in 2018, showing a negative overall tendency. I decided to use this measure instead of other possibilities because it captures a general opinion on immigration, while others are more specific, for example about the economic or cultural effects of immigration, or about different groups of people coming to Hungary. Nevertheless, all these measures are moving together, so the results would not be too different if I used some other variable. In my analysis, I call this variable Immigration attitude.

Although I carry out a simple OLS regression for these two variables between 2010 and 2018, I also built a model with other control variables that can influence voting behavior in order to have a better understanding about the size of the effect of attitude towards immigration. In the following, I present these variables and what changes I made from the original questions:


- Age: The age of the respondent, no changes made from the original variable
- Religion: Derived from the question 'How religious are you?' which was measured on a 0-10 scale, I created a dummy variable, where the values 0-5 mean that the respondent is not religious, while the values 6-10 mean that the respondent is religious.
- Income: Derived from the measure 'Household's total net income, all sources', I use income in the same way as ESS: there are 10 categories, namely the 10 deciles of income.
- Higher education: I created a dummy variable from the variable 'Highest level of education', where the two groups are (1) those without any higher education and (2) those with some kind of higher education.

- Residence: I created a dummy variable from the variable ‘Domicile, respondent’s description’, where living in a big city or in the suburbs or outskirts of a big city became one category, while living in a town, small city or country village became the other category.

Later on, when I use these variables, I will interpret them in the results chapter.

Before going through the methodology and the results, there are some important descriptive statistics about our two main variables as well. Figure 3 showcases the means of immigration attitude by party in all three waves. Of course in case of the left, we cannot talk about one party, but for the sake of simplicity, I use this word. In 2010, we can see that based on immigration attitude, Fidesz-voters are closer to left-wing voters, their means being 4,35 and 4,27 respectively. By 2014, all three parties’ means drop somewhat, Fidesz-voters’ attitude changing the most, while left-wing voters’ attitudes changing the least. This observation also means that the gap between these two parties widened in this regard. By 2018, the gap widens further, and Fidesz-voters produce a slightly smaller mean than Jobbik-voters. To put it differently, the attitude of left-wing voters and Jobbik-voters did not change dramatically between 2010 and 2018, while the attitude of Fidesz-voters went through a bigger shift, where the mean changed from 4,27 to 3,77.

3. Figure: Mean attitude towards immigration by party, 2010-2018




Source: Own figure based on ESS Round 5 (2010), ESS Round 7 (2014), ESS Round 9 (2018)

Figure 4 shows similar results from a different perspective. This graph is basically a collection of heatmaps in a matrix of election years and parties. The colors represent the voters' sentiment towards immigration: red means negative sentiment, green means positive sentiment. Naturally, the results are similar to the first graph, but it is worth to look at the yellow parts of this graph. From simple visual understanding, Fidesz-voters seem more similar to left-wing voters in 2010, but by 2018, they seem more similar to Jobbikvoters.

We can also see that from 2010 to 2018, the size of these yellow parts shrinks in case if Fidesz and Jobbik, meaning that people tended to take a stance different from the middle. In case of Fidesz, it mostly meant that Fidesz-voters' general attitude became more negative.

4. Figure: Share of different attitudes towards immigration within parties, 2010-2018



Source: Own figure based on ESS Round 5 (2010), ESS Round 7 (2014), ESS Round 9 (2018)

These descriptive statistics about the connection between these two variables lay the ground for the econometric analysis and give some background information about the changes and dynamics between the two. This brings us to the methodology and the results.

Methodology

It is essential to note that I do not aim to build a predictive model of voting choice. My goal is simply to analyze the variation of attitude towards immigration among voters of Hungarian

parties and gather enough statistical evidence that both the differences between parties and the changes in time can be described as significant.

To estimate these differences and changes, I use ordinary least square (OLS) models. In order to have interpretable results, I had to create two different dependent variables: one where the dummy variable is whether the respondent voted for Fidesz or a leftwing party, and one where the dummy variable is whether the respondent voted for Fidesz or Jobbik. This approach leads us to run the same models for two different datasets, one for Fidesz and the left-wing parties, and one for Fidesz and Jobbik.

As I stated, I will use the OLS model to test the hypotheses and the relationship between voting and immigration attitude, and I will test the robustness of the linear model with logit and probit models. I have cross-sectional data for three years, which, although individuals cannot be linked across cycles (independent observation), still provide an opportunity to examine the existence of a trend by comparing the three models. To investigate this, I run three OLS regressions for the three years and observe how the significance and magnitude of the effects changed over the period under review.

Results

In this section, I present the results of the OLS regressions. First, I discuss the results of the regressions where the only variables are the dependent variable (vote) and the independent variable (immigration attitude). Then, I discuss the models with all the variables listed above. All the output tables have three columns, where the columns represent the three election years. In this way, the change in the relationship can be captured.

Table 5 showcases how the relationship between vote and immigration attitude changed throughout 2010 and 2018 in case of Fidesz and left-wing parties. In 2010 and 2014, there is no

statistically significant relationship between the two, but by 2018, the independent variable becomes statistically significant on a 1% level. This coefficient means that if immigration attitude changes one point – in other words, it becomes more positive – the mean of the dependent variable decreases by 3,3 percentage point. In these simple models, the R-squared value is very low, meaning that while the independent variable is statistically significant in 2018, it does not explain much of the variation in the dependent variable.

5. Table: Output of OLS models with one variable, left-wing parties and Fidesz, 2010-2018

	2010	2014	2018
VARIABLES	Vote	Vote	Vote
Immigration attitude	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.033*** (0.008)
Constant	0.742*** (0.040)	0.661*** (0.044)	0.816*** (0.036)
Observations	691	642	767
R-squared	0.000	0.004	0.021

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Own table based on ESS Round 5 (2010), ESS Round 7 (2014), ESS Round 9 (2018)

In Table 6, we can observe the changes in the similar relationship between Fidesz and Jobbik. Here, we see the opposite of the previous table. In this dummy variable, Jobbik is coded as 0, while Fidesz is coded as 1, thus a more positive view on immigration meant an increasing mean for Fidesz. In 2010, there is a statistically significant relationship on a 5% level, which means that by increasing immigration attitude by 1 point, the mean of the vote variable also increases by 1,9 percentage point. By 2014, this difference becomes greater and the increase changes to 2,8 percentage point, while the result becomes statistically significant on a 1% level.

Finally, the relationship loses its statistical significance by 2018. The previous statement about the R-squared value holds true here as well, meaning that while the relationship is significant, it does not explain much of the variation – and explains nothing statistically by 2018. From the perspective of our analysis, I do not see these low R-squared values as a major problem, since this research does not aim to explain Hungarian voters’ behavior as a whole, but only the effect of immigration attitude. The changes in statistical significance and the possible substantive reasons behind it are the main focus. The implications of these results will be discussed later on in the Discussion and limitations chapter of the thesis.

6. Table: Output of OLS models with one variable, Jobbik and Fidesz, 2010-2018

	2010	2014	2018
VARIABLES	Vote	Vote	Vote
Immigration attitude	0.019** (0.007)	0.028*** (0.010)	-0.001 (0.007)
Constant	0.758*** (0.035)	0.615*** (0.042)	0.831*** (0.031)
Observations	599	533	636
R-squared	0.011	0.015	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Own table based on ESS Round 5 (2010), ESS Round 7 (2014), ESS Round 9 (2018)

After these simpler regression models, I included other control variables to see if the relationship between the dependent and independent variable changes. First, I present how the coefficients changes throughout 2010 and 2018 for the Fidesz and left-wing model and then I present the other significant control variables.

7. Table: Output of OLS models with multiple variables, left-wing parties and Fidesz, 2010-2018

	2010	2014	2018
VARIABLES	Vote	Vote	Vote
Immigration attitude	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.024** (0.011)	-0.039*** (0.010)
Age	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Religion	0.130*** (0.038)	0.206*** (0.047)	0.266*** (0.043)
Income	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.010 (0.009)	0.004 (0.009)
Higher education	-0.054 (0.048)	-0.022 (0.054)	0.009 (0.059)
Residence	-0.063 (0.039)	-0.175*** (0.046)	-0.007 (0.043)
Constant	0.914*** (0.087)	1.207*** (0.114)	0.881*** (0.107)
Observations	575	509	489
R-squared	0.042	0.115	0.094

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Own table based on ESS Round 5 (2010), ESS Round 7 (2014), ESS Round 9 (2018)

As for the independent variable, we can see some changes. While the independent variable remains statistically insignificant in 2010, it becomes significant on a 5% level by 2014. In 2014, a 1-point change in immigration attitude contributed to a 2,4 percentage point lower mean of Fidesz-voters. In 2018, the independent variable behaves similarly to the first model. Immigration attitude is statistically significant on a 1% level. By increasing immigration attitude by 1 point, the mean of the vote variable decreases by 3,9 percentage point. These numbers indicate that voters with a more negative attitude tended to vote for Fidesz, if we only look at

Fidesz and left-wing parties. On one hand, the statistical relationship strengthened throughout the election cycles, but not only its significance rose, the size of the coefficient increased as well.

Among the other variables, only age, religion and residence bare any statistical significance in these models. Age has negative coefficients in all three years, which means that older voters tended to vote for left-wing parties. While the statistical significance is there, I do not consider age to be of great importance in 2010 and 2018, because the coefficient's value is extremely low: a 10-year age-difference means a 3 percentage point difference in the means. In 2014, this effect was greater, so it might bear some substantive importance there.

In contrary to age, one's religiosity seems to play an increasing role in whether they vote for a left-wing party or Fidesz. When discussing these results, we also have to keep in mind that religion is a dummy variable, where religiosity has a rather hard definition: only those are regarded as religious who gave a score higher than 5 to this question. In 2010, changing this dummy variable from zero to one contributed to the increase of the mean with 13 percentage points – meaning a 13 percentage point higher result for Fidesz, *ceteris paribus*. This number increases to 20,6 percentage point by 2014 and to 26,6 percentage point by 2018, showing a rather strong positive tendency. All these coefficients were significant on a 1% level. Lastly, residence has a statistically significant negative coefficient in 2014. In this case, it means that those who live in towns or in villages tended to vote for Fidesz in the 2014 elections.

It is important to mention that neither age, nor religion correlate with immigration attitude, so the model avoids multicollinearity. The R-squared values are not high in these models, but all in all higher than in the simple ones. These demographic variables do not seem to be sufficient to explain voting behavior, but as stated earlier, a comprehensive model of voter choice was out

of the scope of this analysis. The results should give further evidence about the interaction between immigration attitude and party preference.

The same model is run with the other dummy dependent variable, where zero means voting for Jobbik and one means voting for Fidesz. From a general point of view, we see some similarities to the simple model in the behavior of the independent variable. In 2010 and 2014, immigration attitude is a statistically significant variable on a 5% level. In 2010, a 1-point move towards a more positive attitude means a 1,8 percentage point higher mean of Fidesz votes, *ceteris paribus*. By 2014, this same measure has a 2,6 percentage point value. This is in accordance with our descriptive statistics as well, because the graphs show a generally decreasing tendency of immigration attitude between 2010 and 2014 for Jobbik, but by 2018, their voters' attitude is slightly higher on average than it was in 2010. The significance of this variable diminishes by 2018, similarly to how there was no significant difference based on this variable between Fidesz and left-wing parties in 2010.

8. Table: Output of OLS models with multiple variables, Jobbik and Fidesz, 2010-2018

	2010	2014	2018
VARIABLES	Vote	Vote	Vote
Immigration attitude			
	0.018** (0.008)	0.026** (0.011)	-0.005 (0.010)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Religion	0.090*** (0.033)	0.071 (0.048)	0.061 (0.042)
Income	-0.008 (0.006)	0.009 (0.009)	0.014* (0.008)
Higher education			
	0.001 (0.043)	-0.000 (0.057)	0.021 (0.058)
Residence	-0.015 (0.033)	-0.054 (0.046)	-0.011 (0.039)
Constant	0.642*** (0.073)	0.339*** (0.122)	0.555*** (0.101)
Observations	496	419	400
R-squared	0.056	0.053	0.034

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Own table based on ESS Round 5 (2010), ESS Round 7 (2014), ESS Round 9 (2018)

Among the other variables, age, religion and income have statistically significant coefficients. The age variable was significant in all three models but in the opposite way compared to the previous regressions. Age had a statistically significant effect in voting for Fidesz, which means that in this subgroup, younger voters tended to vote for Jobbik, while older voters tended to vote for Fidesz. Also similarly to the left-wing models, this effect is rather small. In regard to religion, this variable only has statistical significance on a 1% level in 2010 and after that, its significance evaporates. In 2010, religious voters tended to vote for Fidesz: changing this

variable from non-religious to religious, Fidesz's vote share increased by 9 percentage point, *ceteris paribus*. This statistical difference diminished by the following elections. Lastly, income became significant on a 10% level in 2018, showing that those with higher income tended to vote for Fidesz. On the other hand, this value means that moving one income decile higher meant 1,4 percentage point higher mean for Fidesz, which may not bear too great substantive significance. As for the R-squared values, I evaluate them similarly to the left-wing models.

To sum up, these OLS regressions tell the story that differences in immigration attitude changed throughout the years and these changes are somehow connected to party or ideological lines as well. While the difference in this regard between left-wing parties and Fidesz increased to the extent that it became statistically significant, the difference between Jobbik and Fidesz decreased to the extent that it lost its statistical significance by 2018.

Discussion

Interpretation of results

The study demonstrates how the statistical relationship between immigration attitude and voting preferences changed between 2010 and 2018 in Hungary. In the analysis chapter, we could see that the statistical relationship between Fidesz and immigration attitude strengthened throughout this period, both in comparison with left-wing parties and the far-right party, Jobbik. More importantly in the case of the comparison with left-wing parties, this difference was not there in 2010, but it became statistically significant by 2014, before the migration crisis began. As for the differences between Fidesz and Jobbik, the statistical significance of the difference diminished by 2018, but it was present during the 2010 and 2014 elections.

The results are in line with the hypothesis that Fidesz and Jobbik voters share a similar attitude towards immigration and this common feature had a positive tendency in the last ten years. This hypothesis was based on the literature about the spatial theory of policy influence and the literature that analyzed the policy convergence between the two parties well before 2015.

The results also confirm Thorleifsson's (2017) claim that Fidesz was the one who moved on the ideological scale and Fidesz and Jobbik became closer. While Thorleifsson only discusses the parties' political communication and their policies, these results show that the attitude of their voters also became similar. While there is a theoretical debate whether policy convergence happened, or whether Fidesz tried to be more attractive to Jobbik voters, this research gives further support to that idea.

Regardless of policy goals or political strategies, the perception of Fidesz voters about immigration grew closer to Jobbik over the years. The two parties have – on average – likeminded voters about this issue. Based on the analysis of events that took place, this change

could be attributed to the immigration campaign, but there are other possible explanations as well.

Jobbik's re-positioning efforts could be an alternative explanation. This would mean that Jobbik voters' opinion about immigration changed in a positive direction, making them similarly opinionated to Fidesz voters. We know from the mean attitudes that this is not the case. As figure 3 and 4 showed, the mean attitude of Jobbik voters did not go through extreme changes between 2010 and 2018. On the other hand, there was substantial change in the attitude of Fidesz voters. When we compare left-wing voters and Fidesz voters, we see the same story.

This also leads the attention to another issue with understanding the results. While the analysis shows that the attitude of Fidesz voters became similar to that of Jobbik voters, it is not deductable from this analysis whether strongly anti-immigration Jobbik voters decided to vote for Fidesz, or those individuals who already voted for Fidesz changed their attitude in this period of time. To put it more simply, the change in the attitude of Fidesz voters can be internal or external. We talk about internal change if the attitude of established Fidesz voters were affected by the refugee crisis and the related media campaign, and their attitude became more negative. We can talk about external change if voters with a negative attitude on immigration who previously voted for a left-wing party or Jobbik decided to vote for Fidesz in 2018 either because they thought the issue to be very important or because they saw Fidesz as the most competent to tackle it.

The 4 percentage point increase in the share of Fidesz votes from 2014 to 2018 should lead to the conclusion that some kind of rearrangement of party preferences happened in the electorate, and this rearrangement should have something to do with the intensive anti-immigration campaign. But based on my analysis, I argue against this statement. While the campaign may have been successful in terms of gaining new supporters with a very negative opinion about

immigration, there is no sign of large-scale voter-migration from one party to another, neither from Jobbik, nor from left-wing parties. Beside the lack of evidence in vote shares, we also observe a surprising stability in the attitudes of left-wing and Jobbik voters. It also means that we cannot make an explicit statement that Fidesz was successful in their attempt to capitalize on the issue ownership of immigration, at least not in the theoretical sense where the goal would have been to decrease support for Jobbik.

On the other hand, I argue that the media campaign had other effects: Fidesz changed the opinion of their own voters and used the issue for voter mobilization with great effect. Since there is no evidence to the contrary, the thesis concludes that the change in attitude can be contributed to long-time Fidesz voters changing their minds, and following the agenda that their party set. In case of such a well-financed campaign that went on for years, this should not be surprising, but the fact that a statistically significant attitude difference between Fidesz and leftwing voters was not observed in 2010, but it was already present in 2014, makes the understanding of our results more complicated.

The appearance of a difference by 2014 could be explained by various factors. Fidesz had the highest vote share in 2010, and it was a rather special election from a few points of view: support for the traditional left-wing party collapsed because of numerous scandals; new parties emerged both on the left and right wing. This situation guaranteed Fidesz a high level of support in every demographic group, and this led to an average Fidesz voter not being that different from left-wing voters in terms of immigration attitude. After their first few years in government, this kind of support evaporated, and more conservative voters remained with Fidesz. This theory can also explain the decrease in their vote share from 2010 to 2014.

Another possible explanation is that Fidesz already drove the attitude of their voters to be more negative. If Fidesz influenced its voters to have more traditional values in other regards, and

not about immigration per se, the change in attitude about these other issues could have had an indirect effect on immigration attitude as well. While this is a possible explanation as well, the first one is more convincing to me because it is in line with the demographic changes of Fidesz voters and the decrease in vote share. Nevertheless, a mixed effect of these two explanations cannot be ruled out.

Beside changing the attitude of their voters, Fidesz seems to have used immigration to boost voter turnout in their favor as well. While the thesis does not deal with the campaign's effects on turnout, we can safely accept this conclusion based on the research conducted by Tóka (2018).

Limitations and further possibilities

Although the thesis presents a believable explanation behind the dynamics of immigration attitude and party preference, the analysis has its limitations. From a data analysis perspective, only cross-sectional data was available on voting decision and attitude towards immigration. It is clear that a lot of the uncertainty behind the presented results could be reduced if panel data was available. From a methodological perspective, it would also be better to compare the three political blocs (left-wing, Fidesz, Jobbik) in the same model to draw further conclusions. Potentially, this would make the analysis of Jobbik's re-positioning efforts possible.

One weakness of the analysis is the heavy concentration on Fidesz and giving less space to explore the positions and strategies of Jobbik and leftist parties. Most of the time, the thesis handles them as a constant with not too much change, which is an oversimplification.

Beside the sophistication of the role of other parties, a long-time analysis of the values and attitudes of Fidesz voters could also be considered. Because of data limitations, the 2002 and 2006 parliamentary elections could not be analyzed, which is unfortunate, because they could

be a better starting point in terms of attitudes and the electorate's preferences than the politically turbulent 2010 elections. Connecting this research to the analysis of those elections would be a worthy addition and would certainly expand our understanding about the dynamics between party preferences and attitudes.

Beside the further analysis of attitudes, the theory of partisanship is also left out of this analysis, but should be included in case of any comparative analysis on the topic. Obviously, the possibilities of changing issue ownership or the extent to which voters can be influenced through media campaigns must be conditional on the level of partisanship in the country. As Patkós (2016) illustrates, Hungary has a long-standing history of high levels of partisanship compared to other European countries. This gives further context and reasons why mostly Fidesz voters changed their attitudes, and it shows that partisanship should also be included in the model if we want to understand the size and direction of issue salience's impact.

Conclusion

This thesis analyzed the effect of immigration's increased issue importance on voting behavior in the 2018 elections in Hungary. The governing party started a media campaign against immigration after the start of the refugee crisis in 2015 and continued it until the parliamentary elections in 2018. This prolonged, well-financed campaign was unprecedented in the modern democratic history of the country, but the crisis and the campaign together gave a good opportunity to analyze the effects of the rising issue salience and understand the mechanisms through which salience can be generated and issue ownership can be grabbed by a party.

The thesis assumed that attitude of Fidesz voters would turn more negative towards immigration over the years, meaning that the relationship between negative attitude and voting for Fidesz would strengthen. This assumption turned out to be true, both in comparison with left-wing parties and Hungary's radical right party, Jobbik. The interesting problem was not this result in itself, but to explore whether this strengthening relationship stemmed from a rearrangement of party preferences among the electorate because of this new issue, or Fidesz simply influenced the opinions of their existing voters. The evidence in this study points to the latter. More precisely, after the results and the discussion of alternative explanations, the study concludes that the vast majority of change in attitude towards immigration stems from the governing party's media campaign influencing their own voters to harden their attitude, but it did not affect substantially the voters of other parties. This result is in line with the overbearing presence of government-related media in the country and the high level of partisanship as well.

These results should not be generalized about the effects of issue salience and the potentials in grabbing issue ownership, but they contribute to the discussion. Most democratic parties do not have the resources at hand that Fidesz does, and while their attempt in setting the agenda and mobilizing their voters was successful and brought them another election victory, they failed to

substantially weaken their far-right competitor. These results tell a lot about the difficulties parties have to face in a more democratic competition to convince voters about the importance of problems and their competence in solving them.

Appendix

Since the codes for the models are the same throughout the three waves of European Social Survey, I only include here the Stata do files for 2010.

Do-file of Fidesz and left-wing model, 2010

```
*** Fidesz and left wing voters
```

```
* recoding vote
```

```
drop fidesz
```

```
g fidesz=1 if prvtchu==1
```

```
replace fidesz=. if fidesz==0
```

```
replace fidesz=0 if prvtchu==4
```

```
replace fidesz=0 if prvtchu==6
```

```
replace fidesz=0 if prvtchu==13
```

```
*** attitude towards immigration
```

```
g migrant=.
```

```
replace migrant=0 if imwbcnt==0
```

```
replace migrant=1 if imwbcnt==1
```

```
replace migrant=2 if imwbcnt==2
```

```
replace migrant=3 if imwbcnt==3
```

```
replace migrant=4 if imwbcnt==4
```

```
replace migrant=5 if imwbcnt==5
```

```
replace migrant=6 if imwbcnt==6
```

```
replace migrant=7 if imwbcnt==7
```

```
replace migrant=8 if imwbcnt==8
replace migrant=9 if imwbcnt==9
replace migrant=10 if imwbcnt==10
```

```
ttest fidesz, by(migrant)
```

```
reg fidesz migrant
```

```
outreg2 using ess2010basicleft, append excel bdec(3)
```

```
*** religion: rlgdgr
```

```
g religion=.
```

```
replace religion=0 if rlgdgr<=5
```

```
replace religion=1 if rlgdgr==6
```

```
replace religion=1 if rlgdgr==7
```

```
replace religion=1 if rlgdgr==8
```

```
replace religion=1 if rlgdgr==9
```

```
replace religion=1 if rlgdgr==10
```

```
*** age: agea
```

```
g age=agea
```

```
replace age=. if agea==15
```

```
replace age=. if agea==16
```

```
replace age=. if agea==17
```

```
replace age=. if agea==18
```

```
replace age=. if agea==19
```


*** education

g edu=.

replace edu=0 if edlvdhu<=3

replace edu=0 if edlvdhu==4

replace edu=0 if edlvdhu==5

replace edu=0 if edlvdhu==6

replace edu=0 if edlvdhu==7

replace edu=0 if edlvdhu==8

replace edu=1 if edlvdhu==9

replace edu=1 if edlvdhu==10

replace edu=1 if edlvdhu==11

replace edu=1 if edlvdhu==12

replace edu=1 if edlvdhu==13

replace edu=1 if edlvdhu==14

*** income: hinctnta

g income=.

replace income=1 if hinctnta==1

replace income=2 if hinctnta==2

replace income=3 if hinctnta==3

replace income=4 if hinctnta==4

replace income=5 if hinctnta==5

replace income=6 if hinctnta==6

replace income=7 if hinctnta==7

replace income=7 if hinctnta==7

replace income=8 if hinctnta==8

replace income=9 if hinctnta==9
replace income=10 if hinctnta==10

*** placeofliving: domicil

g residence=.

replace residence=1 if domicil<=3

replace residence=0 if domicil==4

replace residence=0 if domicil==5

reg fidesz migrant age religion income edu residence

outreg2 using ess2010left, append excel bdec(3)

Do file of Fidesz and Jobbik model, 2010

*** Fidesz and Jobbik voters

* recoding vote

drop fidesz

g fidesz=1 if prtvtchu==1

replace fidesz=. if fidesz==0

replace fidesz=0 if prtvtchu==11

*** attitude towards immigration

g migrant=.

replace migrant=0 if imwbcnt==0

replace migrant=1 if imwbcnt==1

replace migrant=2 if imwbcnt==2

replace migrant=3 if imwbcnt==3

```
replace migrant=4 if imwbcnt==4
replace migrant=5 if imwbcnt==5
replace migrant=6 if imwbcnt==6
replace migrant=7 if imwbcnt==7
replace migrant=8 if imwbcnt==8
replace migrant=9 if imwbcnt==9
replace migrant=10 if imwbcnt==10
```

```
ttest fidesz, by(migrant)
```

```
reg fidesz migrant
```

```
outreg2 using ess2010basicjobbik, append excel bdec(3)
```

```
*** religion: rlgdgr
```

```
g religion=.
```

```
replace religion=0 if rlgdgr<=5
```

```
replace religion=1 if rlgdgr==6
```

```
replace religion=1 if rlgdgr==7
```

```
replace religion=1 if rlgdgr==8
```

```
replace religion=1 if rlgdgr==9
```

```
replace religion=1 if rlgdgr==10
```

```
*** age: agea
```

```
g age=agea
```

```
replace age=. if agea==15
```

```
replace age=. if agea==16
```

```
replace age=. if agea==17
```

replace age=. if agea==18

replace age=. if agea==19

*** education

g edu=.

replace edu=0 if edlvdhu<=3

replace edu=0 if edlvdhu==4

replace edu=0 if edlvdhu==5

replace edu=0 if edlvdhu==6

replace edu=0 if edlvdhu==7

replace edu=0 if edlvdhu==8

replace edu=1 if edlvdhu==9

replace edu=1 if edlvdhu==10

replace edu=1 if edlvdhu==11

replace edu=1 if edlvdhu==12

replace edu=1 if edlvdhu==13

replace edu=1 if edlvdhu==14

*** income: hinctnta

g income=.

replace income=1 if hinctnta==1

replace income=2 if hinctnta==2

replace income=3 if hinctnta==3

replace income=4 if hinctnta==4

replace income=5 if hinctnta==5

replace income=6 if hinctnta==6

```
replace income=7 if hinctnta==7
replace income=7 if hinctnta==7
replace income=8 if hinctnta==8
replace income=9 if hinctnta==9
replace income=10 if hinctnta==10
```

```
*** placeofliving: domicil
```

```
g residence=.
```

```
replace residence=1 if domicil<=3
```

```
replace residence=0 if domicil==4
```

```
replace residence=0 if domicil==5
```

```
reg fidesz migrant age religion income edu residence
```

```
outreg2 using ess2010fideszjobbik, append excel bdec(3)
```

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