SOWING THE SEEDS OF CHANGE: THE EU'S APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

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Abstract

As an emerging branch of research, environmental peacebuilding seeks to examine the transformative potential of environmental cooperation in conflict and post-conflict scenarios. It rests upon the assumption that the environment's natural resources can act as a mechanism for cooperation and, ultimately, more peaceful encounters. A common thread amongst recent formations of environmental peacebuilding suggests that engaging with the notion of hybridity is conducive to its effective implementation. The central guiding research question for this paper is therefore to what extent does the EU's approach to environmental peacebuilding fit within the emerging analytical paradigm. Research is conducted by way of discourse analysis of the EU's framing of environmental peacebuilding within EEAS policy documents, instruments and operational documents. The key findings are that the dominant discursive framings in EU texts regarding the environment-conflict-peace nexus are still beholden to the 'threat multiplier' representation of environmental degradation and climate change. However, crucially, there is an increasing recognition within EU discourse of the productive potential of environmental cooperation at each stage of the conflict life cycle. Furthermore, in terms of hybridity, the EU actively seeks to promote inclusive and contextual environmental peacebuilding approaches but remnants of a liberal peacebuilding model endure.

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Contents

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, researchers have increasingly sought to interrogate the links between the environment, peace, conflict and security. Following the introduction of securitisation theories and the emergence of the environmental security concept, environmental issues such as climate change and natural resource degradation, have often been formulated in academic and policy circles as security concerns.[1] However, over the past two decades, an emerging branch of research has begun to examine the influence of natural resources and the environment on peace and conflict, seeking to examine the most effective means to manage natural resources to build lasting peace. Emerging as a response to the focus within security studies on the environment's role in the onset of armed conflict, environmental peacebuilding rests on the premise that natural resources can act as a foundation for peace and cooperation, rather than a driver of conflict alone. Understanding the linkages between the environment, conflict and peacebuilding is thus essential to build sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. As a result, international actors engaging in environmental peacebuilding interventions need to ensure that holistic and multidisciplinary approaches are pursued.

The European Union (EU) has sought to promote itself as a leader in the field of international environmental politics for some time.[2] Since the early 2000s, with a particular focus on climate change, the ambition of EU measures has gradually increased, the mix of policies has broadened, and the integration of climate policy into related policy areas has advanced.[3] The

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[1] Maria Julia Trombetta, "Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the Discourse," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21, no. 4 (2008): 585–602, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570802452920.

[2] Bertil Kilian and Ole Elgström, "Still a Green Leader? The European Union's Role in International Climate Negotiations," *Cooperation and Conflict* 45, no. 3 (2010): 257, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836710377392.

[3] Ingmar von Homeyer, Sebastian Oberthur, and Andrew J. Jordan, "EU Climate and Energy Governance in Times of Crisis: Towards a New Agenda," *Journal of European Public Policy* 28, no. 7 (2021): 959, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1918221.

pattern of continuing growth in the field culminated in the launch of the ambitious European Green Deal by the European Commission in 2019. Concurrently, researchers have noted that the EU has been at the forefront in the securitization of the environment, and the subsequent securitisation of climate change.[4] The EU is now recognised as one of the most vocal proponents on the international stage of the need to address security risks linked to climate change.[5] However, there have been very few attempts as yet to locate the EU's ambitions and priorities at the intersection of environmental action and peacebuilding within the environmental peacebuilding paradigm.

Therefore, the central guiding research question for this paper is, to what extent does the EU's approach to environmental peacebuilding fit within the emerging analytical paradigm? Research is conducted by way of discourse analysis of the EU's framing of environmental peacebuilding within policy documents, instruments and operational documents. Analysis will focus on documents published by the European External Action Service (EEAS) given that it is the primary instrument of the EU's external action. Analysis will focus discourse emerging since 2016, as this marks a new era of EU external action underpinned by the launch of the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS).

Drawing on extant environmental peacebuilding literature, analysis will uncover whether the EU adopts a cooperative or resource-risk perspective to environmental peacebuilding, which causal mechanisms it seeks to promote in environmental peacebuilding practice, and where on the conflict life cycle it places the most emphasis. Drawing on the literature in relation to the EU's successful securitization of climate change, and particularly its framing of climate change as a

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[4] Kamil Zwolski and Christian Kaunert, "The EU and Climate Security: A Case of Successful Norm Entrepreneurship?," *European Security* 20, no. 1 (2011): 33, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2010.526108.
[5] Niklas Bremberg, Hannes Sonnsjo, and Malin Mobjork, "The EU and Climate-Related Security Risks: A Community of Practice in the Making?," *Journal or European Integration* 41, no. 5 (2019): 624, https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2018.1546301.

'threat multiplier', examination will uncover how this discourse fits within traditional conceptions of environmental peacebuilding. Furthermore, this paper will uncover whether the environmental security framing remains the dominant or exclusive discourse in EU texts, or whether an alternative approach is emerging. Even if the environmental peacebuilding paradigm has not yet been formally adopted in EU discourse, analysis will reveal whether it presents a more useful analytical tool to capture the EU's objectives and practices at the axis between the environment, conflict and peace. Finally, a common thread amongst recent formulations of environmental peacebuilding suggests that engaging with a hybrid peace formation is central to its effective implementation. This paper will therefore seek to reveal whether the EU pursues hybrid environmental peacebuilding approaches. This will include analysis of the question of whether a true hybridity is attainable or whether the legacy of liberal imagery is too ingrained within EU for genuine hybridity to be realized.

This paper has been split into three parts. As an emerging analytical paradigm, the first section seeks to tease out more substantively what environmental peacebuilding is and which recurring concepts emerging from literature seem vital to elucidate but also concretize the paradigm. As it has been identified as a core precondition for effective environmental peacebuilding programming, the second section will undertake a detailed conceptual analysis of hybridity in peacebuilding scholarship. This will include analysis of the benefits and critiques of hybridity as a conceptual tool, as well as drawing out the key prescriptive elements that emerge regarding peacebuilding design and implementation. Finally, the third section will engage empirically with EU material from the angle of hybridity and sustainable environmental peacebuilding, which will uncover how environmental peacebuilding in EU discourse is being crafted.

Chapter 1 – Analytical paradigm of environmental peacebuilding

Environmental peacebuilding

Environmental peacebuilding examines the transformative potential of environmental cooperation in conflict and post-conflict scenarios.[6] It relies upon the assumption that the environment's natural resources can act as an instrument for cooperation and peace. The definition of environmental peacebuilding adopted by Ide et al, provides a useful starting point as it reflects the paradigm's complexity and integratedness across the full conflict life cycle: "environmental peacebuilding comprises the multiple approaches and pathways by which the management of environmental issues is integrated in and can support conflict prevention, mitigation, resolution and recovery."[7] Environmental peacebuilding therefore seeks to provide an inclusive paradigm which is capable of linking various phases of the conflict cycle in an integrated way.[8] It represents a sideways step away from common conceptions of resource scarcity as a trigger for conflict.[9] Cooperation over the environment's inherent characteristics is presented as a mutually beneficial solution removed from the zero-sum rationale of conflict.

Environmental peacebuilding has been identified as a malleable and somewhat imprecise paradigm. In fact, authors argue that beyond its basic assumptions, environmental peacebuilding has thus far struggled to establish a coherent theoretical framework.[10] According to Ide et al, environmental peacebuilding has been identified in scholarship as operating along three

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[6] McKenzie F. Johnson, Luz A. Rodríguez, and Manuela Quijano Hoyos, "Intrastate Environmental Peacebuilding: A Review of the Literature," *World Development* 137, no. 105150 (2021): 1, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105150.

[7] Tobias Ide et al., "The Past and Future(s) of Environmental Peacebuilding," *International Affairs* 97, no. 1 (2021): 2–3, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa177.

[8] Ibid., 2.

[9] Anais Dresse et al., "Environmental Peacebuilding: Towards a Theoretical Framework," *Cooperation and Conflict* 54, no. 1 (2019): 102, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836718808331.

[10] Dresse et al., "Environmental Peacebuilding."

dimensions: (1) security, (2) livelihoods and economy, and (3) politics and social relations.[11] The

livelihoods and economy dimension arises from the fact that poverty and insecure employment are

key predictors in the emergence of conflict and failure of peacebuilding efforts.[12] Fair and

sustainable natural resource management is a key element in the provision of basic services, and

in the post-conflict scenario it is essential to avoid food and water scarcity and in rebuilding

agricultural infrastructure.[13] The security dimension, on the other hand, encompasses the notion

that tensions over natural resources can turn violent, and therefore the inclusive and sustainable

management of such resources is key to avoiding and resolving such conflicts.[14] This dimension,

therefore, incorporates common conceptions of environmental security in which environmental

factors act as aggravating influences in intergroup tensions. Finally, the political and social

dimension, engages with the notion that environmental challenges present an opportunity for

cooperation between actors, including fostering trust between social groups and political leaders.[15]

Successful environmental cooperation can incentivize the establishment of institutions which

support further integration and conflict resolution.[16] Environmental cooperation can thus

contribute to negative (e.g., the absence of violence) as well as to positive forms of peace (e.g.,

integration between social groups).[17]

Krampe and Swain argue that environmental peacebuilding scholarships tends to adopt one

of two perspectives: a cooperation perspective and a resource risk perspective.[18] A cooperation

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[11] Ide et al., "The Past and Future(s) of Environmental Peacebuilding."

[12] Ibid., 3.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid., 4.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Tobias Ide, "The Impact of Environmental Cooperation on Peacemaking: Definitions, Mechanisms, and Empirical Evidence," *International Studies Review* 12, no. 3 (2019): 329, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy014.

[18] Florian Krampe and Ashok Swain, "Environmental Peacebuilding," in *The Oxford Handbook of Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation*, ed. Oliver P. Richmond and Gëzim Visoka (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 566.

perspective underlines the potential of environmental cooperation to contribute to peace through spill-over effects. It primarily, though not exclusively, focuses on the *inter*state level and often on conflict prevention rather than post-conflict peacebuilding.[19] One of the challenges with this line of research is that it does not tend to empirically test the impacts of environmental cooperation on peace, but rather sees environmental cooperation an endpoint in itself.[20] On the other hand, the resource risk perspective highlights resource-based instability, particularly with regards to *intra*state conflicts, and it emphasises the need to mitigate these risks via environmental cooperation to maintain the absence of violence.[21] The challenge of this approach though is that the emphasis on resource-induced conflict stresses the securitization of natural resources and therefore neglects the opportunities natural resource management opens for generating positive peace.[22]

Some scholars have, however, suggested that existing scholarship has failed to produce a causal understanding of the role natural resource management in post-conflict settings and its contribution to positive peace legacies.[23] Krampe et al suggest three causal mechanisms through which natural resource governance could facilitate processes of sustaining positive peace. The first is, 'the contact hypothesis' whereby the facilitation of intergroup cooperation reduces bias and prejudice between parties.[24] The second is, 'the diffusion of transnational norms', whereby the introduction of environmental and other good-governance norms, such as gender mainstreaming, supports human empowerment and strengthens civil society.[25] The third mechanism is, 'equitable

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[19] Ibid.

[20] Florian Krampe, Farah Hegazi, and Stacy D. VanDeveer, "Sustaining Peace through Better Resource Governance: Three Potential Mechanisms for Environmental Peacebuilding," *World Development* 144, no. 105508 (2021): 3, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105508.

[21] Krampe and Swain, "Environmental Peacebuilding," 566.

[22] Krampe, Hegazi, and VanDeveer, "Sustaining Peace through Better Resource Governance," 4.

[23] Ibid., 2.

[24] Ibid., 5.

[25] Ibid., 6.

state service provision' wherein the provision of public services addresses the fundamental needs of communities, and in doing so grows state legitimacy and state-society relations i.e. it re-kindles the social contract.[26] These mechanisms allow for greater understanding of the dynamics and steps of environmental peacebuilding in post-conflict scenarios and, importantly, provide key actionable development and peacebuilding processes for relevant actors derived from academia.[27]

Whilst environmental peacebuilding incorporates a rich vein of research into the potential of natural resources to support post-conflict recovery, it also highlights the risk of natural resource mismanagement in re-kindling conflict.[28] Without proper due care and attention at the design stage, post-conflict recovery based on shared management of natural resources can reignite mistrust between actors. Political emphasis on rapid post-conflict reconstruction interventions and subsequent peacebuilding can also lead to improper exploitation of natural resources, unsustainable environmental practices, and threats local livelihoods reliant on natural resources.[29] Externally promoted peacebuilding processes can also provide opportunities for the external actors to take advantage of natural resources for their own economic and strategic benefit.[30] Thus, the promotion of equitable and sustainable natural resource management is key in environmental peacebuilding programming.

Environmental peace-making

Environmental peacebuilding encompasses the role of the environment in conflict prevention, conflict-resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding, but the narrower focus of environmental cooperation as a pacifying mechanism for conflict parties is often referred to as

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[26] Ibid., 7.
[27] Ibid., 2.
[28] Krampe and Swain, "Environmental Peacebuilding," 569.
[29] Ibid., 571.
[30] Ibid.

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environmental *peace-making*.[31] The appeal of such an approach is clear, it solves two problems - environmental issues and intergroup conflict - with one solution, environmental cooperation.[32] It follows that cooperation, as an interactive process, has the potential to transform a situation from a potentially violent encounter into a productive encounter.[33] In "The Impact of Environmental Cooperation on Peace-making: Definitions, Mechanisms, and Empirical Evidence," Ide concluded that environmental peace-making can be effective in at least some contexts, but success is strongly dependent on the presence of contextual factors. Relevant contextual factors include the absence of high-intensity conflict, external support, and locally accepted environmental knowledge.[34] Others believe that contextual factors such as a history of conflict or cooperation will be a relevant factor.[35] Furthermore, in the context of environmental peacebuilding, and peacebuilding studies more broadly, it is often helpful to understand peace operating on a continuum ranging an absence of violence, as the most basic condition, to some form of symbolic rapprochement, to substantial integration.[36]

Ide identified four mechanisms connecting environmental cooperation to different formations of peace: (i) improving the environmental situation and reducing resource scarcity, (ii) increasing understanding and trust between groups, (iii) cultivating interdependence and the realization of mutual gains, and (iv) building institutions which lead to the establishment of communication channels and conflict resolution mechanisms regarding environmental.[37] Overall, building institutions, and building trust and understanding are the most impactful mechanisms in

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[31] Ide et al., "The Past and Future(s) of Environmental Peacebuilding," 4.
[32] Ide, "The Impact of Environmental Cooperation on Peacemaking," 328.
[33] Krampe and Swain, "Environmental Peacebuilding," 567.
[34] Ide, "The Impact of Environmental Cooperation on Peacemaking," 340.
[35] Krampe and Swain, "Environmental Peacebuilding," 568.
[36] Ide, "The Impact of Environmental Cooperation on Peacemaking," 330.
[37] Ibid., 331–32.

contributing to peace.[38] Improving the environmental situation certainly role to play in achieving a form of peace which resembles an absence of conflict, but it is unlikely to play a role in establishing symbolic rapprochement.[39] Finally, cultivating interdependence appears to play only a minor role in effective environmental peace-making operations.[40] These findings point to some important considerations for domestic and international policymakers. In the first instance, external support (e.g., through mediation or supervision) increases the chances for success. Secondly, institution building for conflict resolution and natural resource management is a valuable step in environmental peace-making. Finally, environmental cooperation ought to be designed in conflict-sensitive and sustainable way to avoid negative side effects.[41]

Bottom-up and hybrid approaches in environmental peacebuilding

Critics have argued that there is a tendency within environmental peacebuilding studies to frame environmental cooperation as 'high-politics', failing to appreciate the complexity and internal dissensions that may exist within local communities and instead imposing a top-down definition of a homogenous local.[42] Rather, in order to grasp the motivations and efficacy of environmental cooperation, it is necessary to appreciate the "diverse biophysical, political and social settings of environmental cooperation, the variety of interests and values underlying human–environment interactions."[43] This might consequently uncover conflicting interests at different governance levels over the use of natural resources, or even consensus amongst local groups as to routes to peace. In these cases, environmental governance acts as a framework to create, validate

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[38] Ibid., 341.
[39] Ibid., 333.
[40] Ibid., 339.
[41] Ibid., 341.
[42] Dresse et al., "Environmental Peacebuilding," 103.
[43] Ibid.

and reform institutions in the resolution of environmental conflicts.[44] The challenge for environmental peacebuilding is therefore to move beyond a rational choice, neoliberal conceptions of environmental cooperation, which rely on the mutually beneficial outcomes in a cost-benefit calculation.[45] Such conceptions will often fail to marry up with local capacities and priorities. They might also fail to appreciate the multifaceted, long-term nature of environmental challenges, as well as the "the social, cultural and political identities that are vested in the immaterial values of natural resources."[46] As a result, initiatives founded on such a conception of environmental peacebuilding are unlikely to be achieve legitimacy and/or sustainability.

In fact, in recent years a number of studies in environmental peacebuilding have examined the potential, and challenges, that come with the relatively new-found approach promoted by the international community for the production of 'hybridized' institutions. Under this approach, international support and the promotion of liberal ideals such as human rights and democracy mix with local traditions, customs, and agency to produce a new form of institution. On one hand, Johnson argues that institutional hybridity, despite its risks, has the potential to enhance the capacity of diverse groups to participate in post-conflict environmental governance and to integrate institutional reform across scales of governance.[47] He argues that the international community must reconceptualize what constitutes 'strong governance' and the avenues by which it can be achieved. In doing so, the international community must avoid the technical, neoliberal approaches which tend to be pursued which can often have the effect of inadvertently perpetuating illiberal outcomes.[48] On the other hand, Ide et al argue that hybridized institutions can, in fact, be

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[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] McKenzie F Johnson, "Fighting for Black Stone: Extractive Conflict, Institutional Change and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone," *International Affairs* 97, no. 1 (2021): 81–101, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa056.
[48] Ibid., 100.

damaging.[49] They identify the *tara bandu* in Timor-Leste as a pure form of successful, local, endogenous environmental peacebuilding. As a practice which is strongly shaped by local cultural traditions and spiritual relations, it cannot be understood in terms of Western/liberal conceptions of rational choice and utility maximization.[50] As a broader representation of attempts at hybridization by international actors, when adopted by the international or state actors as a form of hybridized institution it results in its detachment from the local context, and it represents a real or perceived transfer of power from the local to the external.[51] Thus, the very legitimacy and efficacy upon which the institution relies upon is undermined.

Environmental peacebuilding in practice and climate-change

Conceptually, environmental peacebuilding emerged along separate political and academic pathways but in recent years the two have converged.[52] International organisations are increasingly looking to environmental cooperation as a peacebuilding device, particularly with regards to natural resource-driven conflicts. Environmental peacebuilding also features in funding opportunities channelled through bilateral agencies or multilateral funds such as the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the UN-EU Partnership on Natural Resources, Conflict and Peacebuilding.[53] The approaches adopted by international organisations to environmental peacebuilding have accordingly been the focus of various studies within environmental peacebuilding scholarship. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), in particular, has come under extensive academic scrutiny.[54] Dalmar argues that knowledge acquisition through

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[49] Tobias Ide, Lisa R Palmer, and Jon Barnett, "Environmental Peacebuilding from below: Customary Approaches in Timor-Leste," *International Affairs* 97, no. 1 (2021): 103–17, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa059.
[50] Ibid., 116.
[51] Ibid., 115.
[52] Krampe and Swain, "Environmental Peacebuilding," 564.
[53] Dresse et al., "Environmental Peacebuilding," 100.
[54] See: Krampe and Swain, "Environmental Peacebuilding."

issue-linkage has shaped UNEP's interest in peacebuilding, and that its organizational environment has provided the setting in which its knowledge of the environment-security nexus evolved.[55] Krampe, on the other hand, examines how *ownership* is addressed in UNEP environmental peacebuilding discourse, finding that UNEP reports contribute to the reinforcement of power inequalities, as international ownership is consistently prioritized and local actors are framed as a risk in the context of natural resource management.[56]

No comprehensive attempt, however, has been made as yet to examine the extent to which the EU's approach to environmental peacebuilding fits within the emerging analytical paradigm. From a peacebuilding perspective, the EU has only fairly recently been recognized as an actor with a systematic approach to regional and international peacebuilding.[57] Extensive research has, however, been carried out in respect of the EU's role in the securitization of the environment and climate change. In the 1990s attempts were made within EU circles to securitise the environment and environmental degradation, but by the mid-2000s its focus had changed to the securitisation of climate change.[58] Scholars have argued that epistemic communities within the EU are at the forefront of norm entrepreneurship in the securitization of climate change.[59] In fact, along with several of its member states, the EU has been one of the most active actors in advocating a climate security discourse internationally.[60] Conceptually, climate security seeks to capture the risks and

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[55] Natalia Dalmer, "Building Environmental Peace: The UN Environment Programme and Knowledge Creation for Environmental Peacebuilding," *Global Environmental Politics* 21, no. 3 (2021): 147–68, https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00617.

[56] Florian Krampe, "Ownership and Inequalities: Exploring UNEP's Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding Program," *Sustainability Science* 16 (2021): 1159–72, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-021-00926-x.

[57] Annika Björkdahl, Oliver Richmond, and Stefanie Kappler, "The Emerging EU Peacebuilding Framework: Confirming or Transcending Liberal Peacebuilding," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24, no. 3 (2011): 449–69, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2011.586331.

[58] Zwolski and Kaunert, "The EU and Climate Security."

[59] Ibid.

[60] Beatriz Pérez de las Heras, "Climate Security in the European Union's Foreign Policy: Addressing the Responsibility to Prepare for Conflict Prevention," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 28, no. 3 (2020): 336, https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2020.1731438.

threats to both humans and states that arise from the negative effects of climate change.[61] Scholars have noted that the EU has displayed a combination of both geopolitical and human logic in the EU's climate security strategy.[62] However, the most common formation of climate security framing within EU discourse is the conception of climate change as a 'threat multiplier' which exacerbates existing tensions and instabilities.[63] Although climate security has become an established norm in EU discourse, critics have argued that the EU has failed to translate such climate security discourses to substantive EU policy outcomes.[64] Pérez de las Heras notes that climate security is beginning to be addressed more systematically in the EU's external action, particularly within the CFSP, but further work is required to mainstream climate security into EU conflict prevention policy.[65] Research conducted by Bremberg et al illustrates that the discursive frame of 'threat multiplier' is used frequently amongst EEAS practitioners.[66] Notably, however, practitioners highlighted that the sporadic and fractured nature of the EU climate policy work and its appropriate institutional setting led to "conceptual confusion" over how to more precisely frame the challenges presented by climate change and what the appropriate response from the EU ought to be.[67]

Environmental peacebuilding studies have suggested that the discrete issues presented by climate change can, in fact, provide an opportunity for intergroup cooperation. According to Abrahams, the "near-ubiquitous" 'threat multiplier' discourse in conflict security studies, portrays a one-dimensional relationship between climate change and conflict which effectively limits

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[61] Bremberg, Sonnsjo, and Mobjork, "The EU and Climate-Related Security Risks," 623.
[62] Pérez de las Heras, "Climate Security in the European Union's Foreign Policy," 340.
[63] Zwolski and Kaunert, "The EU and Climate Security," 23.
[64] Bremberg, Sonnsjo, and Mobjork, "The EU and Climate-Related Security Risks," 624.
[65] Pérez de las Heras, "Climate Security in the European Union's Foreign Policy," 345.
[66] Bremberg, Sonnsjo, and Mobjork, "The EU and Climate-Related Security Risks," 631.
[67] Ibid.

prospects of alternative interpretations and approaches that might generate productive interventions.[68] Instead, conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change and disaster risk reduction techniques can allow progress to be made in advancing human development, protecting local ecosystems, addressing livelihood insecurities that influence violence.[69] Furthermore, case-studies from various fragile societies including Bangladesh, Nepal and Palestine demonstrate that climate change adaptation projects have the potential to contribute to the preservation of local ecosystems, livelihoods and political stability.[70] Similarly, Kalilou argues that acacia gum tree planting initiatives in the Sahel region has the potential to develop local infrastructure, economic security and community cooperation, thereby reducing induced migration, local resource conflicts and armed group recruitment.[71] He highlights that in order design such initiatives in a conflict-sensitive way, projects must include local actors, particularly marginalised groups, so as to maximise practical impact and prevent inflaming local tensions.[72] Therefore, a recurring and important aspect of environmental peacebuilding, particularly within recent scholarship, is the need to embrace hybrid formations of peace in which programs are contextually formed and encourage scalar representations of voices and interests.

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[68] Daniel Abrahams, "Conflict in Abundance and Peacebuilding in Scarcity: Challenges and Opportunities in Addressing Climate Change and Conflict," *World Development* 132 (2020): 2, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104998.
[69] Richard Matthew, "Integrating Climate Change into Peacebuilding," *Climatic Change* 123 (2013): 91–92.
[70] Janpeter Schilling et al., "Resilience and Environmental Security: Towards Joint Application in Peacebuilding," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 29, no. 2 (2017): 107–27, https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2017.1305347.
[71] Ousseyni Kalilou, "Climate Change and Conflict in the Sahel: The Acacia Gum Tree as a Tool for Environmental Peacebuilding," *International Affairs* 97, no. 1 (2021): 201–18, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa178.
[72] Ibid., 217.

Chapter 2 – Conceptual framework of hybridity

Conceptual pillars

In order to draw out the value of hybridity within the environmental peacebuilding paradigm, a deeper conceptual interrogation of hybridity in peacebuilding is necessary. Hybridity, emerging from its post-colonial roots, has become an essential concept for critical studies scholars in peacebuilding research. Some scholars, in accordance with Johnson's line of argument, suggest that local-led initiatives, if done right, represent an opportunity to reintroduce notions of empathy and the social contract into peacebuilding practices with liberal peacebuilding models giving way to a more authentic and agential way of doing peacebuilding. Others, however, argue that hybridity is little more than a buzzword, mired by liberal dispositions and which inadvertently tends to lead to illiberal outcomes.[73]

In post-colonial terms, the concept of hybridity is the output from the interaction between hegemony and attempts to decolonize people and culture, whilst recognizing the strategies of those who resist the various forms of colonization.[74] It engages with processes of indeterminacy, uncertainty, and breakage; transforming the subaltern from the object of colonial rule to a political subject with capacity to resist hegemonic power. Hybridity has been adopted by critical studies scholars in peacebuilding research in which the role of the colonizer is replaced by international peacebuilding actors. Broadly speaking, hybridity in peacebuilding seeks to capture the intertwined relationship between the local and the international in which the activities, needs,

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[73] Samer Abboud, "Imagining Localism in Post-Conflict Syria: Prefigurative Reconstruction Plans and the Clash Between Liberal Epistemology and Illiberal Conflict," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 14, no. 4 (2020): 543–61, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2020.1829360.

[74] Oliver P Richmond, "The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace: Negative or Positive?," *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 1 (2015): 52, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836714537053.

interests and experiences of local groups interact with the goals, norms, and practices of international actors. Within this space, different actors unite, adapt, and resist to different extents on different issues to produce a unique hybrid form of peace. From a conceptual standpoint and according to its post-colonial roots, hybridity liberates from binary visions of good and evil, states and non-states, West and non-West, tradition and modernity.[75] Visions of homogeneous forms or impacts dissolve and are replaced by a range of ambiguous and context-specific realities. The shift away from binaries and absolutes permitted by hybridity allows for a more realistic exploration of the true interfaces of peace and security interventions, recognising the hegemony of the external liberal model alongside the heterogeneous specificities of the local environment.[76]

Richmond argues that following the failure of liberal interventionism, a 'local turn' emerged in international peacebuilding, which recognised the need to include local voices in fostering sustainable peace. However, local-led peacebuilding practices by international actors tend to fall into Westphalian statebuilding traps, adopting coercive practices of othering and ordering thereby disempowering most local voices.[77] Instead, it is important to engage with those who cannot speak, the subaltern, through embracing concepts of the everyday and empathy.[78] This means conducting "unscripted conversations" with the local in order to recognise their needs, custom and culture with contextual understanding.[79] Such a post-liberal approach will allow a

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[75] Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond, "The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders: A Reappraisal of the Hybrid Turn in Peacebuilding," *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 2 (2016): 228, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1099440.

[76] Jenny H. Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity: Accounting for Notions of Power, Politics and Progress in Analyses of Aid-Driven Interfaces," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 7, no. 2 (2012): 12.

[77] Oliver P. Richmond, "Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-Local Hybridity via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding," *Journal of Intervention & Statebuilding* 3, no. 3 (2011): 331, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970903086719.

[78] Ibid., 330.

[79] Ibid.

social contract to be formed between the local and the international, who can engage with each other to produce a new, hybrid form of peace.[80]

Mac Ginty underlines the role of resistance in hybrid peace formation. Hybrid peace emerges when various actors unite and conflict to different extents on different issues to produce a blended peace.[81] He argues that local actors are artful and agential, capable of resisting and adapting liberal peace interventions to produce a hybridized form of peace. The power to resist will, however, be dependent on context, and the extent to which traditional or indigenous structures and norms are intact in post-conflict scenarios.[82] Resistance and subversion can take many forms; local actors might cooperate with some aspects of the liberal peacebuilding model and oppose others. Local forms of dispute resolution and reconciliation which draw on traditional indigenous or customary norms may not conform to liberal peace-making models but may have more affective purchase thereby granting them sustainability and legitimacy.[83] Their promotion and co-option by international actors can be an important form of hybridisation.

Challenges to hybridity's conceptual utility

Hybridity in peacebuilding, however, remains a contentious issue. The most frequently cited issue is that it still rests on essentialist notions of 'the other'.[84] Whilst hybridity, in theory, attempts to move away from binary forms, critics argue that it inadvertently treats 'the local' and 'the international' as homogenised opposing subjects. For example, according to Sabaratnam, hybrid peacebuilding scholars have failed to address systematically the issues of 'Eurocentrism'

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[80] Ibid., 339.
[81] Roger Mac Ginty, "Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace," *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 4 (2010): 397.
[82] Ibid., 402.
[83] Ibid., 408.
[84] Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity," 13.

in international peacebuilding studies.[85] She argues that scholars' conception of hybrid peace typically relies upon the ways in which the 'liberal' and the 'non-liberal', as two ontologically distinct elements, are 'rescued and reunited' via hybridity in the everyday and empathy.[86] Whilst scholars have sought to underline the fact that hybridity does not promote essentialising 'the local', but rather the local is used to represent a plurality of political space, according to Sabaratnam there remains much conflation, interchangeability and slippage between these conceptions of the 'local'.[87] This therefore introduces an ontology of otherness, understood as cultural distinctiveness and alterity which repeatedly appears throughout hybridity in conceptions of a 'post-liberal' peace.[88]

The second frequently voiced concern with hybrid peacebuilding is that issues of injustice and extant power differentials are obscured. Although the colonised or subaltern are seen as being active agents in fostering peace in the post-conflict space, there is a concern that not all locals will have the capacity to engage with international actors in the same way.[89] Nadarajah and Rampton argue that hybridity effectively "reproduces the liberal peace's logics of inclusion and exclusion, and through a reconfiguration of the international interface with resistant 'local' orders, intensifies the governmental and biopolitical reach of liberal peace for their containment, transformation, and assimilation."[90] They argue that hybridity has emerged as a method for international actors faced with rejection of previous liberal peacebuilding models, to engage with locals and their indigenous structures within a more nuanced power/knowledge framework, rendering them knowable and

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[85] Meera Sabaratnam, "Avatars of Eurocentrism in the Critique of the Liberal Peace," *Security Dialogue* 44, no. 3 (2013): 259–78.
[86] Ibid., 266.
[87] Ibid., 267.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity," 14.
[90] Suthaharan Nadarajah and David Rampton, "The Limits of Hybridity and the Crisis of Liberal Peace," *Review of International Studies* 41, no. 1 (2015): 50, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210514000060.

amenable to international peacebuilding practices.[91] Furthermore, whilst rejecting 'top-down' statist strategies of liberal peacebuilding in favour of empathetic and 'agonistic' engagement with the local and the everyday, hybrid peace approaches adopt politics of inclusion and exclusion for peace.[92] Intricacies of power differentials at the local level, e.g., men/women and educated/non-educated, and their capacity to interact with international actors is often ignored.[93] Local agents are selected for the internationally assisted peacebuilding programmes who are amenable to cooperation, tolerance, and non-violence that makes ethnic and religious coexistence and 'locally negotiated' peace possible. Therefore, the same ordering and measuring used in liberal peacebuilding models relative to the state are reflected in hybrid peacebuilding models but in the contexts of the local and the everyday.[94]

International interventions which instrumentalise 'hybridity' typically envisage external trusteeship via receptive 'native' administration.[95] Employing emancipatory language as its justification, international actors withhold power from all but the national elites, who are propped up by international blessing.[96] Nonetheless, it is argued that such attempts by international actors to instrumentalise hybridity and which effectively reproduce tokenistic engagements with the local designed to save the foundations liberal peacebuilding model, represent a misappropriation of a true form of 'hybridity'.[97] In fact, according to Mac Ginty and Richmond, the policy interest in hybrid political orders by international actors, is similar to their championing of 'resilience'.[98] Framed along lines of pragmatism, allowing communities to draw on their own coping

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[91] Ibid., 60.
[92] Ibid., 63.
[93] Peterson, "A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity," 14.
[94] Nadarajah and Rampton, "The Limits of Hybridity and the Crisis of Liberal Peace," 65.
[95] Mac Ginty and Richmond, "The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders," 225.
[96] Ibid., 233.
[97] Ibid., 225.
[98] Ibid., 226.

mechanisms and wisdom, resilience as instrumentalized by international actors, portrays a neoliberal approach which promotes the responsibilisation of the individual.[99] A question therefore arises as to whether hybridity is useful only as a descriptive lens which recognizes the complexity of the post-conflict milieu or whether it has more prescriptive potential.

Constructing hybrid peace

Pol Bargués-Pedreny and Elisa Randazzo argue that hybridity in peacebuilding scholarship adopts a dual role. In its first role, it is a descriptive concept which captures the interaction between agents and interests in post conflict settings which challenges linear assumptions of interventions and opens space for locally legitimate peace. In its second role, hybridity is used as a positive, emancipatory framework to be utilized purposefully in reaction to the dominance of liberal or illiberal practices.[100] The notion of hybridity displays itself as an operational tool when a distinction is made between the processes of hybridisation and the outcomes of hybrid peace.[101] Both conceptions, however, contain risks that challenge its utility as concept in peacebuilding discourse. In its first iteration, if hybridity is seen as a real-world condition out-with the reach of impositions, predictions and causal analyses, any form of external intervention is doomed to failure no matter how nuanced and context-sensitive it is.[102] In its second iteration, when hybridity is repurposed as a problem-solving tool in which peacebuilders are granted more space for selection of legitimate and appropriate forms of agency, liberal peacebuilding tendencies tend to resurface. The authors argue that in order for hybridity in peacebuilding to recover its critical edge and

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[99] Ibid.

[100] Pol Bargués-Pedreny and Elisa Randazzo, "Hybrid Peace Revisited: An Opportunity for Considering Self-Governance?," *Third World Quarterly* 39, no. 8 (2018): 1544, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1447849.

[101] Ibid., 1547.

[102] Ibid., 1544.

conceptual soundness, it must at least engage with the possibility for withdrawal.[103] This would

challenge the thinking that peacebuilding is the only mechanism available to address the root

causes of conflict, and it would weaken the paternalistic ethos underpinning contemporary

humanitarianism. Withdrawal is likely to be particularly pertinent where hybrid peace processes

prolong the crisis of neoliberal governance and become mired by structural inequality and cultural

alienation.[104]

Mac Ginty and Richmond suggest that whilst the most important contribution that hybridity

can provide is as an analytical device it does still hold some practical power through

"contextualized, anarchic and evolutionary forms of hybrid political order" as a way of securing

local legitimacy, rather than pre-planned constructions of hybrid political orders.[105] A localized

process of peace formation arises from contextual and mediated, local, national and international

legitimacy.[106] Hybridity is thus "a more local but scalar mixing of ideas, norms and personnel,

with power in full view."[107] Drawing on this study and earlier research conducted by Richmond,

the following steps required of international peacebuilding actors in developing hybrid forms of

peace, provide a useful starting point:

1. Empathy, welfare and the everyday form the basis of a social contract between societies,

post-conflict polities, and internationals.

2. Peacebuilding actors must not work from blueprints but instead develop strategies based

upon contextual multilevel consultation. This will involve building relations with local partners

which reach as far as possible across host communities, including marginalised groups. This means

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[103] Ibid., 1554.
[104] Ibid., 1544.
[105] Mac Ginty and Richmond, "The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders," 221.
[106] Ibid., 231.
[107] Ibid.

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avoiding entrenching domestic elite power relations and their respective positionality. International actors should consider their role to be in mediating global norms or institutions with local norms and values.

3. Peacebuilding actors should maintain the norms and systems they are trying to encourage, such as democracy and human rights as policymakers are not immune from methodological ethics and must acknowledge peacebuilding's reflexive qualities (though their broadening and deepening could be envisaged).

4. Peacebuilding actors must detach themselves from 'peace-as-governance agenda'. This means placing human needs, particularly economic and security needs before free market reform, and alongside democracy, second generation human rights, and a rule of law that protects the citizen and not just wealth.

5. Peacebuilding must not be a covert mechanism to export liberal notion of peace, but instead seek open and free communication between post-conflict locals and peacebuilders about the nature of peace appropriate in each context.[108]

Boege argues that the liberal peacebuilding models which seek to build states in the image of the Western Weberian state need to be abandoned in favour of a post-liberal peace formation based on hybrid political orders.[109] Doing so requires an openness to legal pluralism, including an integration of customary and state law and the development of arrangements for constructive

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[108] Oliver P. Richmond, "A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday," *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 3 (2009): 579–80, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210509008651; Mac Ginty and Richmond, "The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders," 231.

[109] Volker Boege, "How to Maintain Peace and Security in a Post-Conflict Hybrid Political Order - The Case of Bougainville," *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 3–4 (2010): 330–52; Volker Boege, "Hybrid Political Orders and Customary Peace," in *The Oxford Handbook of Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation*, ed. Oliver P. Richmond and Gëzim Visoka (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 613–27.

cooperation of state and non-state providers of order and security.[110] This may cause frictions with Western conceptions of human rights and equality, but it benefits from a legitimacy to the public otherwise unattainable by liberal statebuilding initiatives. Thus, there is a need for international actors to accept a higher degree of risk and volatility than they may be accustomed to carry, including working with more 'unsafe' implementing partners and beneficiaries than in the past.[111]

Finally, the EU's approach to the integration of the local in peacebuilding practices has become the subject of increased scrutiny, particularly with regards to its promotion of 'resilience'. According to Joseph and Juncos, one of the key arguments in favour of the rise of resilience in EU interventions is that it is "consistent with peacebuilding's "local turn" … as well as arguments for hybridity."[112] However, they find that despite rhetoric contained in EU policy documents, embracing complexity and non-linearity, promoting local ownership, and supporting individual local agency has been lost from focus when it comes to implementation.[113] In order for the EU to make real progress, it must support local actors in taking meaningful control of the organizational spaces at which capacity building and peacebuilding is targeted. This means going beyond a rhetorical transfer of 'ownership' to local and, instead, provide support to spaces in which international and local actors concerned, can work productively together to achieve mutually agreeable goals. This inherently means a willingness on the part of the EU to cede absolute control to allow space and time for programmes to "develop in their own dynamic and messy way."[114]

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[110] Boege, "How to Maintain Peace and Security in a Post-Conflict Hybrid Political Order - The Case of Bougainville," 349.
[111] Ibid., 352.
[112] Jonathan Joseph and Ana E. Juncos, "A Promise Not Fulfilled: The (Non) Implementation of the Resilience Turn in EU Peacebuilding," *Contemporary Security Policy* 41, no. 2 (2020): 291, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1703082.
[113] Ibid., 288.
[114] Timothy Edmunds, Ana E. Juncos, and Gilberto Algar-Faria, "EU Local Capacity Building: Ownership, Complexity and Agency," *Global Affairs* 4, no. 2–3 (2018): 236, https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2018.1528878.

Chapter 3 – Research design and analysis

Research design and methodology

The aim of this chapter is to draw out how the EU represents itself as an actor with regards to environmental peacebuilding. This will be achieved through discourse analysis of EU policy documents, instruments and operational documents emanating from the EEAS. Analysis will be built upon the environmental peacebuilding analytical paradigm described in Chapter 1, as well as a mobilisation of the conceptual framework of hybridity explored in Chapter 2. Discourse analysis is the methodology selected as it allows insight into how repeated representations in discourse - in this instance regarding the relationship between the environment and conflict - translate into statements and practices through which certain language and framings become institutionalized over a period of time.[115] In this case, focus will be paid to both the degree of continuity and change within the EU discourse on the relationship between the environment and conflict. As discourse maintains a degree of consistency in social relations, it produces qualifications for action and the limits of possible outcomes.[116] The focus on change will allow tracking of the emergence or dissolution of certain signs, tropes, or metaphorical schema with regards to the relationship between the environment and conflict.[117] Discourse analysis thus provides a platform to show the similarities and differences between representations, and in doing seek to capture any cultural changes in the representations of reality.[118] This will include analysis of the EU's use of the textual

[115] Iver B. Neumann, "Discourse Analysis," in *Qualitative Methods in International Relations : A Pluralist Guide*, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, Research Methods Series (Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 61.

[116] Ibid., 62.

[117] Kevin C. Dunn and Iver B. Neumann, *Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research* (University of Michigan Press, 2016), 104.

[118] Neumann, "Discourse Analysis," 62.

mechanism of presupposition in which discourses construct understandings about the relationship between environmental factors and conflict, and in doing so construct a world in which such understandings are recognised as true.[119] Highlighting and challenging such understandings, provides insight into the work discourses are doing in the production of knowledge, while also opening up space for alternative constructions of knowledge.[120]

In respect of its environmental policy more broadly, the EU has sought to underline its holistic and integrated approach to tackling environmental degradation by empowering various actors within its structure including the European Commission, the EU Foreign Affairs Council, and the EEAS to take part in climate diplomacy.[121] However, the EU's policy and practice in peacebuilding is primarily directed through the EEAS. Therefore, analysis will primarily be concerned with EEAS policy documents and instruments. In order to more fully grasp the official and public language deployed by the EEAS to mobilize its approach to environmental peacebuilding, this paper has engaged with different types of discursive sources: (i) policy documents and instruments, (ii) implementation reports, operational guidelines and job profiles. The scope of the analysis has been restricted to documents from 2016-2022. The starting point for analysis is the EUGS launched in 2016 as it marked the start of a new era for the EU as a foreign policy actor, establishing a new set of priorities and objectives which would guide the EU's external action going forward. From a discourse analysis perspective, the EUGS thus represents a canonical text from which multiple other policy documents and instruments have developed. Thereafter, analysis will turn to the EEAS's Concept on EU Peace Mediation and related operational guidance as mediation has become a key medium in which the EU seeks to establish

itself as an international peacebuilding actor. Finally, the third section of analysis will cover the EEAS's ground-breaking Climate Change and Defence Roadmap and the related Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security. Analysis in this section will be complemented by examination of the discursive framings within job profiles for the newly created environmental advisor role which is as a key aspect of the Roadmap and Concept. Therefore, analysis of this documentation will draw out how the EU's approach to environmental peacebuilding has progressed over the past 6 years since the introduction of the seminal EUGS. The mapping and layering of discourse within EEAS documents will illuminate valuable information regarding the EU's approach to environmental peacebuilding.

The EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy

The EUGS identifies five broad priorities for the EU's external action: security outside and inside the EU; resilience of states and societies, particularly its neighbours; an integrated approach to conflict and crises; cooperative governance in a regional context; and global governance for sustainable development, human rights, and equitable access to resources.[122] Environmental action and climate change feature prominently throughout the document. This includes multiple efforts to reinforce a conception of climate security in which climate change and 'resource stress' is a 'threat multiplier' which "catalyses water and food scarcity, pandemics and displacement."[123] Climate security is also addressed as part of the EU's approach to resilience, as the EU seeks to enhance energy and environmental resilience within the surrounding regions.[124] In this context, environmental degradation is seen as something which exacerbates potential conflicts due to

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[122] European External Action Service, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy," June 2016, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf.
[123] Ibid., 29.
[124] Ibid., 27.

desertification, land degradation and water and food scarcity.[125] The EU will also support governments to develop sustainable responses to food production and the use of water and energy through development, diplomacy, and scientific cooperation.[126]

Since its adoption in 2016, the EU has published three implementation reports reviewing the functioning of the EUGS. The latest and most comprehensive report published in 2019, "The EU Global Strategy in Practice - Three years on, looking forward" (the Implementation Report), looks at the progress achieved over the previous three years and provides direction moving forward. It reinforces the twin-pillared focus of EU external action which simultaneously supports the development of resilience in states and societies, whilst adopting an integrated approach to conflicts and crises. From an environmental perspective, the Implementation Report, underlines that the current ecological crisis we are facing is 'driving' and 'exacerbating' insecurity and conflict.[127] It also notes that 'climate resilience' has become a central element of foreign policy. This includes climate action as an integral part of the EU's work on conflict prevention and sustainable security, through promoting the sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystems and addressing the illegal exploitation of natural resources and wildlife trafficking. [128] Furthermore, it notes that its integrated approach to conflicts and crises seeks to develop a:

> holistic approach to conflicts, bearing in mind their identity, humanitarian, socioeconomic, security, environmental and energy dimensions; their time cycles with preventive, crisis management and peacebuilding phases often unfolding erratically; and their different geopolitical dimensions playing out at local, national and international levels.[129]

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[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.
[127] European External Action Service, "The EU Global Strategy in Practice - Three Years on, Looking Forward," June 2019, 29, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_global_strategy_2019.pdf.
[128] Ibid., 40.
[129] Ibid., 24.

This therefore suggests that the EU's integrated approach to conflicts, at least conceptually, opens the door for the incorporation of environmental action and natural resource management at each stage of the conflict cycle, therefore moving positioning of environmental issues and climate change at the onset of conflict. This also displays EU sensitivity to hybridity in peace formation, recognising the need to appreciate the scalar impacts of conflict. Also recognising conflicts 'unfolding erratically' points to a more contextual approach to peacebuilding moving beyond blueprint strategies. Ultimately, however, retreating to conventional rhetoric, the Implementation Report suggests that going forward more emphasis on conflict prevention and peacebuilding is needed through systematically integrating climate-security because of the "threat multiplying effect of climate change, environmental degradation and food and water insecurity."[130]

Concept on EU Peace Mediation

The EU has identified peace mediation as a central tenant to its peacebuilding activities. On 2 December 2020, the EEAS published a working document entitled "Concept on EU Peace Mediation" (the 2020 Concept) alongside a more comprehensive a 34-page annex titled "Peace Mediation Guidelines of the European External Action Service" (the Guidelines). Shortly thereafter, the European Council published the "Council Conclusions on EU Peace Mediation" (the Council Conclusions). Replacing the 2009 Concept on EU Mediation, the 2020 Concept sets out to bolster "the EU's role as a leading peace mediation, conflict prevention and peacebuilding actor."[131] Mediation, defined as a process of assisting negotiations between conflict parties and transforming conflicts, seeks to locate "inclusive political solutions" to conflict prevention and

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[130] Ibid., 25.
[131] European External Action Service, "Concept on EU Peace Mediation," December 2, 2020, 1, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eeas_20201336_working_document_on_concept_on_eu_peace_media tion.pdf.

sustainable peace.[132] A primary feature of EU mediation is that the EU is a 'value-based actor' meaning that its actions should at all times engage with the values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights. Nonetheless, the EU must also embrace "a sense of humility and respect for local contexts."[133] Inclusive process designs and implementation entails "giving voice to all groups" and "leaving no-one behind", which will lead to the formation of a more durable peace.[134] The 2020 Concept also demonstrates a degree of self-reflexivity as the EU must ensure that it 'does no harm' in its peace mediation efforts. This means that there will be instances where it is *not* useful for the EU to engage, depending on political and historical context, and how the EU is perceived locally by stakeholders.[135] Therefore, the EU is seen to engage with aspects of hybrid peace formation as it encourages the need to conduct contextual and inclusive dialogues with a range of actors, including marginalised groups, or the subaltern. Furthermore, its self-reflexive approach, recognising the challenges to the EU's legitimacy as a result of its colonial past, engages with the notion of withdrawal as advocated by Bargués-Pedreny and Randazzo.[136] However, on the other hand, its positioning as 'value-based actor' devoted to the promotion of western norms, illustrates a reluctance to move beyond a liberal statebuilding model.

The EU's approach to environmental factors in peace mediation is contained under the principle 'climate and natural resources.' This initially presents the typical framing of environmental degradation as a "catalyst for tensions."[137] This is also reflected in the Councils Conclusions which suggest that environmental degradation is an issue which not only exacerbates

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[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid., 3.
[134] Ibid., 4.
[135] Ibid., 8.
[136] Bargués-Pedreny and Randazzo, "Hybrid Peace Revisited," 1554.
[137] European External Action Service, "Concept on EU Peace Mediation," 7.

conflict but also endangers attempts at peacebuilding.[138] However, significantly, the 2020 Concept goes onto acknowledge that "cooperation incentives between conflict parties that recognise the role played by environmental factors and improve access to natural resources… may create entry-points for mediation and dialogue."[139] 'Dialogue' is defined here as an open-ended process aiming to create a "culture of communication and search for common ground" which can lead to "confidence-building and improved interpersonal relations and understanding."[140] This, therefore, demonstrates a concrete recognition of the EU engaging with the environmental peacebuilding paradigm. Moving beyond the inflammatory role of the environmental factors in conflict situations, it seeks to adopt an environmental *peace-making* perspective. Cooperation around the management of natural resources is presented as an entry point for conflicting parties to collaborate. In doing so it, presents opportunities for both a negative form of peace - an absence of violence - and a positive form of peace – the fostering trust and some form of symbolic rapprochement between social groups. This is an important step forward in EU policy on peace formation in light of Ide's research on the efficacy of environmental peace-making processes in which external support through mediation or supervision is a key contextual factor in boosting the chances of successful outcomes.[141]

The Guidelines are designed to translate peace mediation policy into practice. They are principally aimed at providing guidance to EEAS peace mediation practitioners (evident from the foreword's opening "Dear EU Peace Mediation practitioners"[142]), but they also perform as "a

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[138] Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on EU Peace Mediation," December 7, 2020, 4, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13573-2020-INIT/en/pdf.
[139] European External Action Service, "Concept on EU Peace Mediation," 7.
[140] Ibid., 2.
[141] Ide, "The Impact of Environmental Cooperation on Peacemaking," 341.
[142] European External Action Service, "Peace Mediation Guidelines," December 2020, 4, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eeas_mediation_guidelines_14122020.pdf.

source of inspiration to the broader community of practitioners."[143] Therefore, the Guidelines seek to reinforce the EU's epistemic authority in the field, in which the EU is presented as an expert of peace mediation. From an environmental perspective, the primary focus of the Guidelines is to encourage recognition of the force of climate change in exacerbating conflicts. Nonetheless, as with the 2020 Concept, attention is also paid to the potential for natural resources in forging cooperation and conflict resolution. It is suggested that actors working together to address climate and environmental issues can have a "spillover effects" in the resolution of broader conflict issues.[144] Furthermore, it underlines the potential in the fact that environmental degradation is a shared concern, and solutions tend to be "tangible, local and quantifiable."[145]

Therefore, the EEAS appears willing to move beyond a perceiving the connection between climate change and conflict as a linear phenomenon, and recognising that climate change can, in fact, present opportunities for cooperation and peacebuilding towards development and adaptation programming.[146] Framing shared climate action as an opportunity to deliver tangible and local results, is consistent with Abrahams's argument that climate cooperation opens space for a formation of peace "which speaks to the different climate-related needs of groups from different places and, in essence, bridges the separate spaces that experienced the most acute climactic and conflictual impacts."[147] Furthermore, reference to the 'spillover' effects of natural resource cooperation, is indicative of the 'cooperation perspective' identified by Krampe and Swain in environmental peacebuilding scholarship, whereby breaking down barriers through environmental

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[143] Ibid., 5.
[144] Ibid., 23.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Abrahams, "Conflict in Abundance and Peacebuilding in Scarcity," 9.
[147] Ibid.

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peacebuilding can be a gateway to wider-reaching and more substantive cooperation and institution-building.[148]

The need to connect to the local in environmental peacebuilding efforts is reiterated in the practical guidance to EU mediators. It recommends that that understanding the relations between environmental degradation and the root causes of conflicts calls for direct engagement with "local expertise" and "the communities affected."[149] According to the Guidelines, in order to understand the relationship between natural resources and conflict, one must "assess the benefits that arise from them, the livelihoods that depend upon them and the negative impacts of their exploitation."[150] This involves engaging both men and women, as they are likely to hold different views of the environment, but also the main environmental stakeholders which according to the EU are "farmers, herders, exploiters and businesses, indigenous populations."[151] Therefore, again this represents encouragement of a hybrid form of environmental peacebuilding. Direct engagement with a broad range of local actors, including controversial ones, to gain a contextual understanding of their respective priorities and values, is essential to collaboratively identify a hybrid form of peace.

On the other hand, as is evident from the earlier reference to benefit of shared climate action lying in its propensity for 'quantifiable' solutions, the Guidelines demonstrates a commitment to technocratic and measurable environmental peacebuilding practices. It states that environmental and climate related disputes often call for "specific expertise and technical solutions" requiring mediators to connect peace process experts with technical experts.[152] Local

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[148] Krampe and Swain, "Environmental Peacebuilding," 569.
[149] European External Action Service, "Peace Mediation Guidelines," 23–24.
[150] Ibid., 24.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid.

experts with an understanding of customary and statutory law can make "an important contribution" and "traditional chiefs, elders and other local leaders" may have "pertinent experience of finding equitable solutions" to conflicts over natural resources.[153] However, it is implicit that experts will predominantly be external and part of the role of the mediator is to "translate" local "knowledge and language" into effective localised solutions.[154] In doing so, the EEAS reinscribes a paternalistic ethos which has underpinned liberal humanitarianism, where true 'ownership' of peacebuilding practices in retained by the international actor. In order to engage with a truer version of hybridity in which local and international actors coalesce and resist through environmental cooperation to produce a new hybrid form of peace, a new framing is required from the EU. Such a framing must seek to foster a partnership between different scales of actor in design and implementation of peace mediation initiatives.

Furthermore, the Guidelines goes on to suggest that "natural resource related issues need to be negotiated with a mutual gains perspective, which requires skilled mediators who know how to achieve trade-offs"[155] Here, the EU falls into neoliberal rational choice conceptions of environmental cooperation. Instead, as advocated by Dresse et al, there is a need to move beyond a conception of environmental cooperation which is driven by a cost-benefit calculation or a 'mutual-gains' perspective and contextually identify and support the values and priorities of different actors which might be attached to the intangible values of natural resources.[156] This is the only way that locally negotiated cooperative relations can be formed which are granted legitimacy in the eyes of all stakeholders.

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[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Dresse et al., "Environmental Peacebuilding," 103.

Finally, the Guidelines also illustrates a commitment to move beyond environmental peace-making in the resolution of conflicts and acknowledge the role of sustainable recourse management in post-conflict peacebuilding. Peace agreements from resulting from mediation initiatives must be 'climate-proofed' so that there is 'room for manoeuvre' to support their viability in the event of climate shifts.[157] This will include integrating benefit-sharing and community-development measures and supporting local communities' climate resilience through sustainable and equitable sharing of natural resources.[158] Therefore, the EEAS displays a willingness to acknowledge and embrace the role that climate challenges can have at the multiple stages of the conflict cycle, moving beyond the recognition of its role in the onset of conflict.

Climate change and Defence Roadmap and the Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security

One of the biggest steps taken by the EU to incorporate environmental and climate factors into security and defence policy, particularly with regards to the CSDP, was the adoption of the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap (the Roadmap) in November 2020. It seeks to provide actions addressing the links between defence and climate change as part of the wider climate-security nexus.[159] However, as has been identified, the primary focus of the instrument appears to be 'greening' CSDPs in order to lessen their strain on local resources.[160] Nonetheless, it does also contain some more substantive directions in relation to how CSDP missions and operations can approach the climate-security nexus in host countries. In this respect, the Roadmap reverts to

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[157] European External Action Service, "Peace Mediation Guidelines," 24.
[158] Ibid.
[159] European External Action Service, "Climate Change and Defence Roadmap," November 9, 2020, 2, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12741-2020-INIT/en/pdf.
[160] Richard Youngs, "The EU's Indirect and Defensive Approach to Climate Security," in *The EU and Climate Security: Toward Ecological Diplomacy*, ed. Olivia Lazard and Richard Youngs (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021), 8, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/07/12/eu-and-climate-security-toward-ecological-diplomacy-pub-84873.

conventional conceptions of the climate-security nexus in which environmental degradation caused by climate change can aggravate existing tensions in conflict settings, ultimately leading to increased violence and generating additional humanitarian needs for military and civilian missions. Accordingly, actions are needed to 'mainstream' environmental aspects into mission mandates, including developing an operational concept on climate change and crisis management, and standard operating procedures covering environmental aspects in the implementation of CSDP missions.[161] A key recommendation coming out of the Roadmap is that it recommends that "the deployment of an environmental advisor as a standard position in CSDP missions and operations, contributing to the successful implementation of the SOPs on climate and environment."[162] This therefore reflects a similar approach that the EU has taken in deploying gender equality advisors and human rights advisors to CSDP missions.

The "Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security" (the 2021 Concept) sets out to address some of the actions within the Roadmap by providing EU actors with "a framework for operational approaches and principles when addressing the linkages between climate change, environmental degradation and peace and security in the external action context."[163] The 2021 Concept introduces a policy framework that is multidimensional, multi-phased, multi-level and multilateral. It seeks to address different stages of the conflict including prevention, peacebuilding, crisis response and stabilisation, and it encourages an approach to the climate-security nexus which involves international, regional, national and local community levels.[164]

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[161] European External Action Service, "Climate Change and Defence Roadmap," 5.
[162] Ibid., 6.
[163] European External Action Service, "Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security," October 5, 2021, 3, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12537-2021-INIT/en/pdf.
[164] Ibid.

The 2021 Concept notes that in order to build and sustain peace, it is essential to address the effects of climate changes it can act as a "risk multiplier" and it can "contribute to the complexity of the conflict."[165] However moving beyond such framing, it provides that in instances where violence has already erupted, the focus should not only be on the environmental factors exacerbating insecurity, but also environmental factors promoting resilience.[166] It notes that "communal efforts towards the preservation of cultural and natural heritage" from adverse effects of climate change can be a "proactive element of building and securing peace."[167] Furthermore, addressing environmental degradation can "give new impetus to bring communities together for conflict resolution and peacebuilding", as sustainable resource management at each stage of the conflict cycle, particularly through "cooperative governance and local dispute settlement mechanisms" can "build confidence and support peace and stability."[168] Therefore, in line with the environmental peacebuilding paradigm, the EU identifies that the challenges presented by climate change can open opportunities for cooperation. In doing so, the facilitation of intergroup cooperation can have knock-on effects of reducing extant biases and prejudices, thereby offering hope for a more sustainable peace.[169] Furthermore, as promoted by Boege and Mac Ginty, the EU is seen to support legal pluralism and local forms of dispute resolution and reconciliation which are more likely to have affective purchase in hybridized settings.[170]

When it comes to translating ideational ambitions into EU policy reforms, the 2021 Concept primarily focuses on policy changes which can help to mitigate the aggravating effects of

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[165] Ibid., 4.
[166] Ibid., 3–4.
[167] Ibid., 8.
[168] Ibid., 2021.
[169] Krampe, Hegazi, and VanDeveer, "Sustaining Peace through Better Resource Governance," 5.
[170] Mac Ginty, "Hybrid Peace," 408; Boege, "How to Maintain Peace and Security in a Post-Conflict Hybrid Political Order - The Case of Bougainville," 349.

climate change on conflict, such as increasing the climate focus in the EU's Early Warning System. However, it does also propose a number of policy changes with regards to conflict resolution and stabilisation. Building upon the 2020 Peace Mediation Concept and in the EEAS's most concrete recognition of the concept of environmental peacebuilding, it notes that "efforts will also be undertaken to enhance support to environmental peace-making in priority countries" as "expertise to bring issues related to climate change and environmental degradation into peace negotiations and consequent agreements needs to be curated, cultivated and acted upon."[171] This will involve strengthening the capacity of mediator networks to address environmental issues, sharing specialised training modules amongst Member States, continuing dialogue with other regional actors on mediation and conflict prevention with an environmental focus, and developing a pool of EU experts on water conflict and land degradation. Furthermore, in relation to the EU's Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration policy, whilst natural resource competition and exploitation raise security risks, climate change might also be a chance to promote resilience-building, such as supporting "climate resilient livelihoods" in agriculture-reliant societies. Finally, building on the Roadmap, the 2021 Concept argues that the deployment of environmental advisors within civilian CSDP missions will be critical in ensuring that EU policy on environment and climate change in crisis response is implemented effectively.[172]

Introduction of the environmental advisor role

The Roadmap and the 2021 Concept therefore highlight that embedding environmental advisors within CSDP missions is a key step in mainstreaming climate change and environmental aspects into the planning, implementation and reporting of CSDP mandates. Thus far,

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[171] European External Action Service, "Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security," 6–7.
[172] Ibid., 7.

environmental advisor roles have been established for the CSDP missions and operations in Mali, Central African Republic (CAR), Somalia, and Niger.[173] Closer analysis into the roles and responsibilities of these actors, provides valuable insight into their capacity to integrate environmental factors into the various stages of CSDP missions and operations. Whilst the roles are inevitably similar in design, there are some notable differences. In the first instance, in terms of reporting structures, environmental advisors in Niger and Mali report directly to the Head of Mission, but in CAR and Somalia, they report to the Chief of Staff. This is notable as the proximity of the environmental advisor to the Head of the Mission will play a key role in their ability to influence a mission's direction and priorities. A common criticism directed at the design of the role of gender advisor, is that they are situated too far away from the Head of Mission in order to effect meaningful change in gender mainstreaming.[174] Deiana and McDonagh argue that it is crucial that role of gender advisor is positioned close to the chain of command as it "grants access to (some) senior management procedures and opportunities to build a shared repertoire of WPS [Women, Peace and Security] practices."[175] Such access is important to allow gender advisors to effectively carry out their duties of "providing strategic advice to different lines of operations in

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[173] European External Action Service, "01-2021 Call for Contributions for the EUCAP Sahel Mali - Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell (RACC): Annex 1 Requirements and Job Description," February 19, 2021, http://www.vss.justice.bg/root/f/upload/30/Annex-I-Requirements-and-Job-Descriptions_Mali.pdf; European External Action Service, "01-2021 Call for Contributions for the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA): Annex 1 Requirements and Job Description," February 19, 2021, http://www.vss.justice.bg/root/f/upload/30/Annex-1-Requirements-and-Job-Descriptions_RCA.pdf; European External Action Service, "03-2021 Call for Contributions for the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP SOMALIA): Annex 1 Requirements and Job Description," October 20, 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/annex_1_eucap_somalia_3-2021_cfc_requirements_and_job_descriptions.docx.pdf; European External Action Service, "02-2022 Call for Contributions for the European Union CSDP Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger): Annex 1 Requirements and Job Description," April 12, 2022, https://www.cmcfinland.fi/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Annex-1-Requirements-and-Job-Descriptions_docx.pdf.
[174] Louise Olsson et al., "Gender, Peace and Security in the European Union's Field Missions" (Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy., 2014), 26, https://fba.se/contentassets/bcfe134c7ace454c964c1cf68f856474/fba_csdp_rapport_s5_web_141217.pdf.
[175] Maria-Adriana Deiana and Kenneth McDonagh, "Translating the Women, Peace and Security Agenda into EU Common Security and Defence Policy: Reflections from EU Peacebuilding," *Global Society* 32, no. 4 (2018): 426, https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2018.1474183.

the headquarters, attending (a number of) management meetings where gender expertise and advice might be requested, particularly in the creation of the Mission Implementation Plans where the programme of mission's activities is set out."[176]

Most of environmental advisor roles contain the same general duties and activities including, acting as the focal point for environmental and climate issues, providing staff training, supporting the development of a systematic climate and environment analysis capacity regarding the implementation of the Mission's mandate, assessing the environmental situation of the host country and analysing the mission's environmental footprint. A significant part of their role is thus constrained to 'greening' the mission, as opposed to understanding and addressing environmental impacts on conflict and how the environment and natural resource management can be capitalised upon for peaceful encounters. It is evident environmental advisors, are constrained by scope of the existing mission mandate, having not been involved in the design or negotiation of said mandate. It is noteworthy that both the CAR mission and the Mali mission contain a generic duty to "pursue analysis on the nexus of security, climate and environmental situation in the host state and potential implications on the mission mandate."[177] Whilst such an analysis is undoubtedly valuable, the most important aspect is how the subsequent findings can be operationalised which will depend on the scope of the mission mandate. In Niger, the role entails a duty to "carry out an assessment of climate change in Niger and the extent to which it could have an impact on the core thematic areas

[176] Ibid.
[177] European External Action Service, "01-2021 Call for Contributions for the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA): Annex 1 Requirements and Job Description," 14; European External Action Service, "01-2021 Call for Contributions for the EUCAP Sahel Mali - Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell (RACC): Annex 1 Requirements and Job Description," 64.

of the mission (counter terrorism, migration and organized crime)."[178] This therefore reflects the assumption that climate change represents an aggravating factor in conflict sensitive areas.

Therefore, it is apparent that whilst environmental advisors may have influence over environmental mainstreaming in CSDP missions (although that may be tempered by their respective proximity to the Head of Mission), their impact on the planning and design of mission mandates is limited. Environmental advisors are being parachuted into existing missions with the primary function of 'greening' operations. Therefore, whilst theoretically the role of environmental advisor has the potential to move the agenda forward in terms of integrating environmental factors into peacebuilding operations, there are significant restricting factors in the mobilisation of this responsibility.

Inclusive approaches within the 2021 Concept

The EU also to underline an inclusive and contextual approach within the 2021 Concept. The risks to peace and security arising from conflict are likely to be conflict specific and therefore analysis to the specific factors which promote such risks is required including, livelihood patterns such as transhumance and migration practices, as well as formal and informal governance structure. This will allow the EU to identify the most vulnerable populations as well helping the EU find "best fit approaches in a context-specific manner."[179] The 2021 Concept also that because of the context specific nature of the issues, local knowledge systems must play a key part in finding effective solutions. To this end "traditional knowledge of local communities" should be supported "as a resource for climate strategies building resilience."[180] Local engagement is underlined as key

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[178] European External Action Service, "02-2022 Call for Contributions for the European Union CSDP Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger): Annex 1 Requirements and Job Description," 7.
[179] European External Action Service, "Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security," 11.
[180] Ibid.

to ensuring that embedded solutions are sustainable. This therefore aligns with Abrahams's research, in which programming framed around the identification of peacebuilding opportunities created by climate change can "better account for the context-specific realities that shape the climate conflict relationship, while allowing organizations to navigate the complex realities of development implementation."[181] However, the 2021 Concept also goes onto to provide that:

> Partnerships will not be limited to international organizations and third countries. Cooperation with research bodies and think tanks as well as with different local and civil society actors will be strengthened in order to deepen the understanding of the climate and security nexus and to identify the best approaches. Engaging more with the private sector, especially at a local level, will also be *considered* [emphasis added].[182]

Here local civil society actors are a potentially useful 'resource' to feed information to EU-owned service delivery and further engagement with local private sector actors will only be pursued if deemed appropriate. However, as discussed, in order for the EU to achieve a truly hybrid form of peace, actors from a wide range of sectors and scales, need to be actively integrated into process design and implementation.

Returning again to the role of the environmental advisor, the extent of local engagement within the role is limited. The roles contain general obligations to 'liaise' with the local and international entities involved in the promotion of environmental issues. They also tend to include a duty to advise local authorities on 'awareness' of environmental issues and mitigation techniques. Therefore, in terms of external engagement it is apparent that environmental actors will primarily engage with local counterparts in national authorities. In order to reflect and achieve a hybrid form of environmental peacebuilding it is essential to move beyond entrenching domestic elite power relations and their respective positionality, and instead build relations with local

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[181] Abrahams, "Conflict in Abundance and Peacebuilding in Scarcity," 10.
[182] European External Action Service, "Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security," 13.

partners which reach as far as possible across local society, including marginalised groups. However, the Somalian role does include an obligation to seek opportunities with international and local actors for enhanced coordination and cooperation regarding environmental aspects of the Mission, including participating in coordination mechanisms and working groups.[183] Furthermore, for the purposes of its climate change-security analysis, the advisor in Niger is to "liaise with local counterparts in the authorities and also with civil society in order to ensure that the assessment is comprehensive and inclusive."[184] In order to contextually integrate environmental aspects into CSDP operations, such responsibilities ought to be included as a minimum for each environmental advisor role.

EU Parliament Resolution

On 7 July 2022, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the EEAS's Climate Change and Defence Roadmap in which they urge more action in 'environment-related peacebuilding' across EU policy areas:

> [the European Parliament] believes that environment-related peacebuilding should be reinforced, as it is one of the overall sustainable and fair solutions addressing the effects of climate change and can also present opportunities to build peace, while fostering dialogue and cooperation at the local, national and international level… and presenting opportunities to adopt a transformational approach to address the root causes of conflict and structural drivers of marginalisation.[185]

It goes onto underline the importance of EU actors developing mechanisms to monitor and evaluate outcomes and the lessons learned in linking climate adaptation and peacebuilding. It also

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[183] European External Action Service, "03-2021 Call for Contributions for the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP SOMALIA): Annex 1 Requirements and Job Description," 44.
[184] European External Action Service, "02-2022 Call for Contributions for the European Union CSDP Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger): Annex 1 Requirements and Job Description," 7.
[185] European Parliament, "European Parliament Resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EEAS's Climate Change and Defence Roadmap (2021/2102(INI))" (Strasbourg, France: European Parliament, June 7, 2022), 11, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0223_EN.pdf.

highlights the need to integrate environment-related peacebuilding into updated EU concepts on Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, in order to strengthen the resilience of the relevant local governance structures, in particular as regards the quality of security services, inclusivity, accountability and transparency.[186] From an operational perspective, the Resolution also suggests that there is a need to strengthen the EU's environment-related peacebuilding and climate-security by "including tasks and support efforts relating to mediation, dialogue, the protection of civilians, conflict resolution and reconciliation in order to ease climate induced tensions between different communities competing over scarce resources."[187] To this end, adapted missions ought to focus on integrated peacebuilding, environment-related peacebuilding, and climate adaptation measures, as well as boosting civilian conflict prevention capacities. This will include missions focusing on scare resources contributing to conflict, building resilience in critical infrastructure, and protecting biodiversity.

Therefore, it is clear to that the European Parliament sees the need for further mainstreaming of environmental peacebuilding throughout EEAS policy and practice. It is significant to note that a previous version of the Report from the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs included a number of direct references to "environmental peacebuilding" which were subsequently amended to 'environment-related peacebuilding' indicating that there remains something of an epistemological rejection of environmental peacebuilding in EU discourse.[188]

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[186] Ibid., 12.
[187] Ibid., 13.
[188] Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament, "Draft Report on the EEAS's Climate Change and Defence Roadmap" (Strasbourg, France: European Parliament, October 27, 2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/AFET-PR-697665_EN.pdf.

Conclusion

This paper has sought to examine the extent to which the EU's approach to environmental peacebuilding fits within the emerging analytical paradigm. The research findings demonstrate that the dominant discursive framings within emerging policy documents, instruments and operational documents from the EEAS are still beholden to the 'threat multiplier' representation of environmental degradation and climate change. However, crucially, there is an increasing appetite within EU discourse to encourage the promotion of key tenets of the environmental peacebuilding paradigm, even if there is an apparent reticence to adopt the concept 'environmental peacebuilding' itself. The EU has recognised the value in contextual and inclusive cooperation on sustainable natural resource management in opening new pathways to build and retain peaceful communities across the whole conflict lifecycle. This therefore represents something of a paradigm shift within EU discourse.

Regarding climate security, the EU is increasingly recognising that cooperation between conflicting parties over the shared challenges presented by environmental degradation as a potential route to both negative and positive forms of peace. As a result, environmental peacebuilding may be a more useful analytical tool to better capture the EU's priorities and objectives in this field. Doing so, may help to alleviate the 'conceptual confusion' currently felt by EU practitioners with regards to the challenges presented by climate security, and what the appropriate responses from the EU ought to be.[189] However, as noted by the European Parliament Resolution, further work is needed to mainstream the paradigm across a wider range of policies and instruments. Furthermore, returning to Krampe et al's causal mechanisms for natural resource

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[189] Bremberg, Sonnsjo, and Mobjork, "The EU and Climate-Related Security Risks," 631.

governance sustaining positive peace, EU discourse is cognisant of its role in reducing intergroup biases and its ability to facilitate the spread of transnational norms such as equitable and sustainable resource management, but further attention is needed in EU discourse on the potential for equitable state service provision to re-kindle the social contract between states and citizens.[190]

The extant literature demonstrates that a key aspect to effective environmental peacebuilding paradigm is a willingness to engage with hybridised forms of peace. However, whilst aspects of a productive form of hybridity are being incorporated in EU imagery, liberal residues remain. In order to engage with a truer form of hybridity in environmental peacebuilding a number of ideational hurdles must be overcome. In the first instance, EU framings of environmental peacebuilding need to move beyond reductionist cost-benefit motivations, and instead interact with contextual understandings of priorities and concerns. Furthermore, there is a need to move beyond idealist, value-driven interventions which display unwavering support to the construction of a Westphalian state. Instead, there is a need to positively engage with actors, institutions and governance systems which might not sit comfortably within Western-liberal peacebuilding models, to open a space for processes of resistance, adaptation and accommodation. As a result, the emerging hybridised forms of governance are more likely to gain legitimacy and sustainability in the local context.

This paper has primarily sought to conduct analysis of documentation emanating from the EEAS as the central arm of the EU's external action. However, as has been recognised in academic literature, the EU's policy and practice, particularly with regards to climate security, is often dispersed and disorganised. Therefore, alternative discourses with regards to the EU's approach to environmental peacebuilding may exist within other institutional corners. Furthermore, this paper

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[190] Krampe, Hegazi, and VanDeveer, "Sustaining Peace through Better Resource Governance," 7.

has been restricted to analysis of documents and discourses that are publicly available. Therefore, whether the positions and approaches presented are ultimately reflected in practice is outwith the scope of this paper. Indeed, particularly with respect to local-led approaches to peacebuilding, scholars have found that EU discourse and practice often do not match up.[191] Nonetheless, as an initial attempt to locate EU discourse within the environmental peacebuilding paradigm, the findings in this paper reveal valuable insight into how repeated representations in relation to environmental peacebuilding imagery become institutionalized over a period of time, which produces qualifications for action and the limits of possible outcomes. As such, the findings in this paper provides a useful springboard for further research into whether the EU's representations of its own actorness in environmental peacebuilding are consistent with the experience of EU practitioners, such as the newly established environmental advisors, on the ground.

Additionally, further research would benefit from analysis of EU case-studies including closer inspection of CSDP missions and operations, as well as local projects supported by the EU which engage with environmental peacebuilding activities. This will allow greater insight as to the extent to which operations and projects are designed and implemented according to the environmental peacebuilding paradigm and where improvements need to be made. This will also provide an opportunity to highlight the experiences of the beneficiaries and locals involved in such programs. Finally, whilst the EU is making slow progress in embracing the environmental peacebuilding paradigm, further research into the epistemic communities within the EU responsible for pushing through this sea change and their respective motivations, would provide valuable insight into the trajectory and longevity of these changes.

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[191] Joseph and Juncos, "A Promise Not Fulfilled," 288.

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