

ANALYZING PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

By

Karolína Púllová

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Associate Professor Matthijs Bogaards

Vienna, Austria

(2021)

Author's Declaration

I, the undersigned, Karolína Púllová, candidate for the MA degree in Political Science declare herewith that the present thesis is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of the work of others, and no part of the thesis infringes on any person's or institution's copyright. I also declare that no part of the thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

Vienna, 01/06/2021

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Púllová', is written on a light-colored rectangular background. Below the signature is a solid black horizontal line.

Signature

Abstract

Arend Lijphart's typology of democratic systems, where he differentiates between majoritarian and consensus democracies, has been regarded as one of the most prominent and influential typologies of modern democratic systems. However, in recent decades its usefulness as a typology of democratic systems started to be questioned, as many scholars by replicating his work revealed that some of his core findings do not hold outside his sample of mature democracies. The present thesis tests the usefulness of Lijphart's typology, firstly by analyzing institutional constellation in two of the newest democracies from the Central and Eastern European region – Croatia and Serbia, and, secondly by mapping more recent institutional changes and developments in the sample of ten Central and Eastern European democracies, which were previously analyzed by Andrew Roberts in 2006. The results show that Lijphart's typology is not useful in explaining realities in Croatia and Serbia. Furthermore, the empirical findings reveal that Central and Eastern European democracies are gradually shifting towards more consensus, but in some cases also towards more majoritarian settings.

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Matthijs Bogaards, for his time, patience, kindness, and invaluable advices, which steered me through this research. On a similar note I would like to thank Robin Bellers, for providing me with helpful advices and helping me to sharpen my academic writing skills.

I am also indebted to my remarkable boyfriend Martin, for being the rock and the light throughout my studies. Special thanks go to my parents, who encouraged me to stay in academia for another year, and made the opportunity to study at CEU possible.

Last but not least, I want to thank my Eastern European friends, who helped me to translate Croatian and Serbian articles and literature.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Theory	4
1.1 The importance of institutions and the development of institutional focus	4
1.2 Lijphart's place in institutional debate and Patterns of Democracy	7
1.3 Lijphart's typology of democratic systems	8
1.3.1 Where do the Central and Eastern European democracies stand?	15
Chapter 2: Methodology	19
2.1 Replication, research questions, and expectations.....	19
2.2 Case selection and time period	23
2.2.1 Croatia and Serbia	23
2.2.2 Ten CEE countries	25
2.3 Data and measurements	25
Chapter 3: Empirical Findings	30
3.1 Croatia and Serbia	30
3.2 Ten CEE democracies	37
Conclusion.....	43
Appendices	46
Appendix A: The Freedom House Index and Polity score for CEE countries.....	46
Appendix B: Changes on executives-parties and federal-unitary dimensions for the sample of ten CEE democracies	47
Appendix C: Two-dimensional map of democracy - data for 12 CEE countries.....	48
References	49

List of Tables

Table 1: Characteristics of majoritarian and consensus models as ideal types	13
Table 2: Executive – parties dimension variables and measurements.....	26
Table 3: Federal – unitary dimension variables and measurements.....	27
Table 4: Executives – parties dimension scores for the cases of Croatia and Serbia.....	31
Table 5: Federal – unitary dimension scores for the cases of Croatia and Serbia.....	33
Table 6: Correlations between ten variables of 12 CEE democracies.....	36
Table 7: Average values of ten CEE democracies in the period 1990-2005 and 2006-2018..	37
Table 8: Correlations between ten variables of ten CEE democracies.....	42
Table 9: Changes on executives-parties dimension for the sample of ten CEE democracies.	47
Table 10: Changes on federal-unitary dimension for the sample of ten CEE democracies	47

List of Figures

Figure 1: The two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy and the positions of 12 CEE democracies	40
--	----

Introduction

What democracy is emerging in Central and Eastern Europe? This is the question that gained momentum among political scientists right after the fall of communism and the subsequent gradual integration of these newly emerged Central and Eastern European democracies into Euro-Atlantic structures. It still continues to be the center of attention for many scholars, especially in light of more recent disturbing developments and democratic deconsolidation in this region. Many scholars (e.g. Dvořák, 2012; Fortin, 2008; Roberts, 2006) in their attempts to understand the form, functioning, and/or quality of democracy and democratic institutions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) turned to the typology of democratic systems developed by Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart.

Lijphart's famous typology, where he differentiates between majoritarian and consensus democracies based on a complex set of institutional variables, has been regarded as one of the most influential and prominent typologies of modern democratic systems (Bormann, 2010; Vatter, 2009), and since its introduction in 1984, it has become a kind of *sine qua non* in the field of comparative political science (Dvořák, 2012). Nevertheless, his typology has focused mainly on mature first and second-wave democracies, for which it met a substantial amount of criticism, as it was found that this typology appears to be incapable of capturing patterns outside Lijphart's sample of mature democracies (Bormann, 2010; Croissant and Schächter, 2010; Fortin, 2008; Roberts, 2006).

In this regard, the same conclusion was reached in the case of Central and Eastern European democracies. Andrew Roberts (2006) in his replication study of Lijphart's seminal research was not able to find the same consistent 'patterns of democracy' with the specific institutional constellation in his sample of ten CEE democracies¹ as Lijphart discovered in

¹ Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

connection with his democracies. This led him to conclude that Lijphart's widely-used typology does not apply to and explain institutional constellations in the CEE region. Moreover, he categorized the patterns emerging in his sample of ten CEE democracies as 'hybrids', as they quite consistently mixed Lijphart's consensus and majoritarian categories.

This thesis aims to join the replication chorus of Lijphart's seminal work *Patterns of democracy*, and test the usefulness of his typology, firstly by extending the scope of Lijphart's research to the newest CEE democracies – Croatia and Serbia. The goal of this part of the study is to investigate how well Lijphart's typology of consensus and majoritarian systems fit the realities of these countries, or whether Croatia and Serbia rather follow the same hybrid patterns as other CEE democracies analyzed by Roberts (2006). Secondly, this thesis aims to map more recent institutional changes and developments of individual CEE democracies, which were previously analyzed by Roberts (2006), and based on which he concluded that CEE patterns are hybrids not corresponding with Lijphart's theoretical expectations. This argument could be regarded, from a certain point of view, as preliminary, given that at the time of Roberts' analysis these countries were quite immature democracies, with only a few years of democratic experience. Therefore, their institutions and institutional constellations were still subject of change. By analyzing these developments, this study seeks to explore whether Roberts' set of ten CEE democracies were, as he also suggests, only consensus/majoritarian governments in the making, which only needed more time to become fully and consistently consensus/majoritarian.

The research in this thesis firstly reveals that Lijphart's patterns do not fit the realities in Croatia and Serbia, and that the typology of consensus and majoritarian systems is not helpful in explaining the institutional constellation in these two countries. The research also shows that patterns in both countries are 'hybrid', similar to those found by Roberts (2006) in his sample of ten CEE democracies. In connection with the second part focused on the development of

Robert's sample of CEE democracies, the research shows that institutions in the ten CEE democracies are indeed changing, and that they are gradually shifting towards more consensus, but in some cases also towards more majoritarian settings.

Chapter 1: Theory

Political institutions, their design, and constellation are the center of focus of this thesis. Thus, it can be considered justifiable to begin this chapter by outlining the important role of institutions and the development of the institutional debate. There exist several institutional approaches that map the diversity of opinions on why institutions matter. Subsequently, this chapter will introduce Arend Lijphart's typology of democratic systems and seminal work *Patterns of Democracy*, followed by a brief overview of its criticism, primarily focused on the strand of criticism concerning the generalizability of Lijphart's typology. In this regard, the final part of this chapter will discuss the realities in Central and Eastern European countries.

1.1 The importance of institutions and the development of institutional focus

First and foremost, it would not be an exaggeration to attribute central importance to the study of institutions in the field of political science (Högström, 2011; Lijphart, 1999; Powell, 1982; Putnam, 1993; Roller, 2005). As noted by Stephen Bell (2002: 1), proponents of institutionalism were always able to honestly claim that institutions make up a large part of the political environment and governance is chiefly carried out within and through institutions, and thus institutions should be at the center of interest of political science as a scientific discipline.

Even though there exist a plethora of different definitions and understandings of institutions (see Bell, 2002; Hall, 1986; Levi, 1990; March and Olsen, 2011; North, 1990), it is arguably not necessary to enumerate them, as they all come down to one important point - that institutions matter. And that they matter to a large degree (Parsons, 2007). Broadly speaking, they matter as they represent entities that shape, influence, and constrain political behavior, decision making (Bell, 2002: 1), preferences of actors (Levi, 1990), and create ties that bind citizens despite the plethora of factors that separate them (March and Olsen, 2011: 5). At the

same time, only very few scholars would argue that political institutions, either formal or informal, do not have any effect on social, economic, or political variables, and ultimately also the overall performance of democratic countries (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2015; Högström, 2011).

But the truth be told, the level and form of attention dedicated to institutions have varied over time (Bell, 2002). Rhodes (2011) admits that many connect the study of institutions directly with new institutionalism, also known as neo-institutionalism. However, the existence of new institutionalism automatically suggests that first, there had to exist an old institutionalism, and that these two strands have to differ in some aspects (Peters, 1998: 205).

Old institutionalism, from current point of view, put minimal effort into cumulative theory building, as the focus was on description rather than explanations (Bell, 2002: 4).² Also, the research conducted under the baton of the old institutionalist approach was focused more on normative evaluation, striving to determine how well particular institutions achieve predetermined normative ideals (Bell, 2002; Goodin and Klingemann, 1998; Rhodes, 2011). Subsequently, new institutionalism differs from its ‘older version’ in several important aspects. First of all, the proponents of new institutionalism deem the more or less purely descriptive approach insufficient. Thus, rather than simply describing the institutions, the new institutionalists aim to explain them as a dependent variable and, moreover, they perceive institutions also as an independent variable, which can possibly stand as an explanation for other phenomena (Peters, 1998: 206).³ Furthermore, new institutionalism developed into three main categories: rational choice, sociological, and historical institutionalism, which,

² It is, however, important to note that old institutionalism is not ‘dead’ (Bell, 2002). Description of institutions and institutional arrangements still play an important role in social science researches.

³ New institutionalism was not a direct response to old institutionalism as it may seem from this brief overview, but rather to behavioral revolution, which downturned the role of institutions (see Rhodes, 2011).

interestingly, besides their shared label of new institutionalism and emphasis on the role of institutions, differ significantly (Koelble, 1995; Schmidt, 2014).⁴

Firstly, the rational choice branch of new institutionalism, as the name suggests, treats the actors as rational but at the same time selfish and utility-maximizing beings, while political institutions are understood as “intervening variables” able to affect individuals’ choices and actions (Koelble, 1995: 232).⁵ In the rational choice understanding, institutions serve to restrict this utility-maximizing behavior of individuals, which could hinder stable decision-making (Goodin and Klingemann, 1998).

Secondly, historical institutionalism, in comparison with rational choice, places much greater emphasis on the ability of institutions to shape individuals’ behavior, choices, and actions (Hall and Taylor, 1996), but actors are still perceived as choice-making subjects (Bell, 2002: 8). Moreover, historical institutionalists underline that the original institutional choices have a pervasive impact. Put in other words, the (structural) choices made at the beginning, during the formation of certain institutions or policy areas have an enduring as well as constraining effect on future choices and actions (Greener, 2005; Peters, 1998).⁶

Lastly, the third generally recognized strand, sociological institutionalism, places its focus mainly on the culture and norms of individual actors in the process of creation or alteration of institutions, while institutions and individual behavior are perceived as mutually constitutive and reinforcing (Nichols, 1998: 484 – 485).

However, it is important to at least briefly mention that it is possible to identify also other approaches within the institutionalist school of thought. In addition to these three main

⁴ They differ in definitions of institutions, objects and the ways how they deal with change (Schmidt, 2014).

⁵ However, Koelble (1995: 237) additionally emphasizes that individuals take institutions into account but they do not necessarily determine their choices.

⁶ This outlined dynamic is a result of path dependency, meaning that once the path has been taken, it takes a considerable amount of effort to change the course of the path (Greener, 2005).

approaches, some scholars, for example Vivien Schmidt (2008, 2010), argue that the field of political science in recent decades witnessed a turn to ideas and discourse, which consequently formatted the fourth strand within new institutionalism - discursive institutionalism. Meryl Kenny (2014), on the other hand, highlights the formation of feminist institutionalism. Colin Hay (2006) mentions constructivist institutionalism as one of the most recent additions to the institutionalism family. Thus, apparently, new institutionalism is not necessarily restricted only to the three beforementioned approaches.

1.2 Lijphart's place in institutional debate and Patterns of Democracy

The resurrection of the interest in institutions after the behavioral revolution is typically ascribed to March and Olsen (1984) and their work *The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life*, where they emphasized the necessity to rediscover institutions (Grofman, 2000; Nkwachukwu, 2007; Roller, 2005). However, according to Bernard Grofman (2000: 44), the field of comparative politics revived the interest in institutions long before the establishment of new institutionalism. In this regard, Grofman (2000: 45) attributes a central role to Arend Lijphart's work on the explanatory power of institutions, which undoubtedly places Lijphart into a diverse set of scholars who identify themselves within the school of new institutionalism.⁷ Similarly, also Roller (2005) or Crepaz et. al. (2000) identify Lijphart's more recent work as groundbreaking for institutionalists, in the way he was able to demonstrate that the design of political institutions matters in how democracies work and perform.

To be more specific, the abovementioned points are the praised contributions that Lijphart presented in his seminal work *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in*

⁷ Additionally, Grofman (2000: 44) suggests that Lijphart and also his students, who were inspired by his work, should be recognized as a separate branch within the general group of new institutionalism.

Thirty-Six Countries (1999, 2012), which is also the work at the center of attention of this thesis. However, it would be a mistake to diminish the focus and also the contribution of Lijphart's (1999, 2012) work solely to demonstrating the link between the institutional constellation and performance of democratic countries. As summarized by Wilsford (2000), Lijphart made several critical contributions in the area of democratic theory. First, as was already mentioned, he helped to turn the focus of comparative political scientists back to institutions and their impact on politics and outcomes. And second, but not less important contribution is his development and elaboration of the typology of democratic systems based on certain institutional characteristics and their arrangements, which became on the one hand widely utilized but on the other hand fiercely debated and criticized (Wilsford, 2000: 1-3).⁸ In connection with assessing the institutional effect on performance, this typology, inter alia, enables scholars to study the ramifications of entire dimensions of democracy, instead of looking at individual institutions (Bogaards, 2017: 8). The following part of the thesis will outline this influential typology in much greater detail.

1.3 Lijphart's typology of democratic systems

Typologies can be broadly understood as “organized systems of types” (Collier et al., 2012: 217), or as Matthias Lehnert (2007: 63) suggests, typology is a “theoretically or empirically derived concept which systematically orders complex phenomena according to a limited number of attributes”. The notion of types has played an important part ever since the dawn of empirical research in social sciences (Kluge, 2000). Notwithstanding some harsh criticism that labeled typologies as old-fashioned, outdated, or even primitive (see Collier et al.,

⁸ These points are presented also in his earlier work *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (1984). Lijphart's later work *Patterns of Democracy* (1999, 2012) represents its further development, including several substantial changes (Bormann, 2010).

2012: 218-222 for an overview) many social scientists still consider them a valuable scientific tool,⁹ to which they devote a considerable amount of intellectual energy so as to develop new typologies or improve existing ones (Elman, 2005; Lehnert, 2007).

Over the last decades, the study of democracies has encountered numerous attempts to identify and measure certain indicators with the aim to empirically assess dissimilar models within an overarching group of democracies (Maleki and Hendriks, 2014). As summarized by Bormann (2010: 3), for a considerable amount of time the key differentiation of democracies was the classic typology of parliamentary and presidential systems, where the distinction between these types is based on their different kind of legitimacy (Linz, 1985: 2-6).¹⁰ Although this rather undemanding typology was able to cover a vast majority of democratic countries, its “discriminatory power” was minimal (Bormann, 2010: 3). Moreover, the placement of some democracies becomes awkward as their political system appears neither parliamentary nor presidential, like Switzerland (Bächtiger et al., 2006).

In this regard, Lijphart’s (1999, 2012) typology of democratic systems represents, according to many scholars, a more exhaustive, comprehensive, and systematic alternative to this classic conceptualization of democratic systems (Ginsburg et al. 2013; Maleki, 2015; Sonnicksen and Tokatli, 2019), identified by some scholars also as “the single most influential typology of modern democracies” (Mainwaring, 2001: 171), “landmark in the study of institutions” (Taagepera, 2003: 1), or as “the most influential institutional text in political science during the post-war period” (Lane and Ersson, 2000: 207)

⁹ As noted by Sonnicksen and Tokatli (2019: 29), they make sense of the observable (to some extent also imaginable) world.

¹⁰ In parliamentary system the parliament is the only institution which is democratically legitimated and the government derives its authority from the confidence of parliament. Subsequently, in presidential systems the democratic legitimacy has both the elected president and parliament (Linz, 1985: 2-5).

In this widely-used typology, Lijphart distinguishes between two types: majoritarian and consensus democracy, which differ mainly in the degree of concentration of political power between institutions (Croissant and Schächter, 2010: 174).¹¹ As Lijphart (1999: 2) mentions in the introductory part of his research, the contrast between these two types arises from the most basic idea of democracy - that this notion should represent a “government by and for the people”. In this regard, the governing can be done, on the one hand, by the majority and in accordance with the preferences of the majority of people, which represents the essence of the majoritarian system of democracy. In such settings, the power is concentrated within the hands of few individuals and few institutions, so it allows the majority to control political decision-making. There is, however, also a possibility that the political power can be diffused so as to maximize the number of actors who are allowed to have a say in decision-making. This is the essence and rationale behind the consensus model of democracy (Lijphart, 1999).

Based on these differences, some scholars present these ideal types of majoritarian and consensus democracy as a choice between efficiency/effectiveness and representativeness. As mentioned by Novák (2001: 27-37), because the decision-making authority in the majoritarian system has the advantage of concentrated power it is capable of faster reactions and precludes the inability to decide, therefore, it could be considered more efficient. The consensus system, on the other hand, has to accommodate demands posed by a number of different actors/institutions, hence, more effort is expended on creating consensus and mutual understanding between various parties than on the pace of decision-making. Consequentially, in consensus settings, representativeness comes at the expense of efficiency/effectiveness, in the sense that consensus decision-making bodies are unable to react promptly. Nevertheless, as Lijphart (1999) suggests, we should not fall victim to conventional wisdom advocating this

¹¹ It is important to note that majoritarian and consensus models of democracy are, on the one hand, polar types, as they assist in mapping real-world democracies. But, on the other hand, they can also be regarded as ideal types, as they capture a specific view of democracy (Bogaards, 2000; 2017).

relationship and its effects. Effectiveness is not connected only with the speed of policy-making and at the same time ability to make fast decisions does not automatically result in effectiveness as swift decisions do not necessarily mean good or/and wise decisions. Lijphart quite contrarily points to the beneficence of long and complicated procedures, which are arguably present in a consensus system, and their ability to yield more premeditated, therefore more beneficial and successful long-term policies without exclusion of critical segments of the population (1999: 258 – 260). Resultantly, the consensus model of democracy can be equally or even more effective than its majoritarian counterpart, which leads to labeling the consensus type as (normatively) superior compared to majoritarian type and a better option for *every* democracy (Andeweg, 2001), but especially for those with heterogeneous societies, where majority rule appears to be undemocratic and dangerous, and for countries designing their first democratic constitutions (Lijphart, 1999: 32-33; 302).¹²

Later in the research, he shows, based on the analysis of his empirical sample, that consensus form of democracy is not only better at representing but outperforms majoritarian democracy also in other important aspects, which drives Lijphart to conclude that consensus democracy is a “kinder and gentler form of democracy” (1999: 275-300).¹³ They are more likely to be welfare states, have a more effective government, greater representation of women or better environmental performance to mention just a few out of many variables examined either by Lijphart or other scholars (see Bogaards, 2017: 9-14)

The degree to which existing democratic countries fit into one of these aforementioned models is measured by ten institutional indicators in two separate dimensions. One dimension, which is referred to as the ‘executives-parties dimension’, analyzes the division of power within

¹² Minorities that are constantly excluded from decision-making may feel excluded and consequently lose their faith in the regime (Lijphart, 1999: 33)

¹³ In the newer edition of *Patterns of Democracy* (2012) Lijphart was able to present even stronger association of consensus democracy with positive performance (see Bogaards, 2017).

the central government and includes relations between the cabinet, parliament, political parties, and interest groups, thus reflecting the degree of collective decision-making. The other dimension, referred to as the ‘federal-unitary dimension’ deals with the diffusion of power in the territory of the state through the relations between the central (federal) and regional governments, between the chambers of parliament, and the existence and powers of a central bank and of an independent constitutional court (Lijphart, 1999: 2-4). According to Lijphart’s findings, these institutional elements which serve to differentiate between majoritarian and consensus systems, cluster independently along these two dimensions (Table 1). In more detail, variables on each dimension are strongly related to each other, while the connection between variables that belong to different dimensions is weak (Lijphart, 1999: 245). To mention a cursory example, a democracy with a federal and decentralized government is likely to also have a bicameral structure, rigid constitution, judicial review, and independent central bank.

This clustering gives rise to what Lijphart calls a “two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy” (Lijphart, 2012: 239-254),¹⁴ where based on the dominance of either majoritarian or consensus features in both dimensions, existing democracies can be divided into four categories - majoritarian-unitary, majoritarian-federalist, consensus-federalist, and consensus-unitary democracies.¹⁵ In other words, countries make a choice between consensus and majoritarian settings on two separate dimensions of democracy (Roberts, 2006: 46). Importantly, according to Lijphart, each and every democratic country can be placed on this conceptual map, whether at one of the ends of the continuum (consensus/majoritarian), or somewhere in between.

¹⁴ Interestingly, Lijphart was originally expecting to discover a one-dimensional map of democracies, consisting solely of majoritarian and consensus democracies. His findings, however, revealed that there exists a two-dimensional map of democracy comprising in total four types of democracy (Bormann, 2010: 4).

¹⁵ Therefore, Lijphart’s types of consensus and majoritarian democracy actually cover only two out of four quadrants on the two-dimensional map of democracy (Bogaards, 2017).

Table 1: Characteristics of majoritarian and consensus models as ideal types. Source: Lijphart (2012)

	<i>Variable</i>	<i>Majoritarian model</i>	<i>Consensus model</i>
<i>Executives -parties dimension</i>	<i>Executive power</i>	Concentration of executive power in single-party majority	Executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions
	<i>Relations between executive and legislative</i>	Dominant executive	Executive – legislative balance of power
	<i>Party system</i>	Two-party system	Multiparty system
	<i>Electoral system</i>	Majority system and high disproportionality	PR system and low disproportionality
	<i>Interest group system</i>	Pluralist interest group	Corporatist interest group
<i>Federal - unitary dimension</i>	<i>Degree of centralization</i>	Unitary and centralized government	Federal and decentralized government
	<i>Bicameralism</i>	Unicameral legislature	Strong bicameralism
	<i>Constitution</i>	Flexible constitution	Rigid constitution
	<i>Judicial review</i>	Absence of judicial review	Presence of judicial review
	<i>Central bank autonomy</i>	Central banks dependent on executive	Central bank independence

Lijphart is, however, quite unclear about why there occurs correlation between variables in two separate dimensions and does not explain in much detail why he finds these patterns that he presents. Even though he explains that Britain apparently had a substantial influence on its colonies and their choice of majoritarian institutional settings, or that the Scandinavian culture of Nordic countries influenced their choice of more consensus institutions (Lijphart, 1999: 250-253), it still does not shed a clear light on the correlations between the variables within two dimensions. In this regard, Rein Taagepera (2003) offers a more detailed explanation of Lijphart’s patterns and the logical interconnection of variables in both dimensions. Based on his interpretation of the first dimension (executives-parties dimension), electoral rules have an influence on the party system and disproportionality, which then have an effect on cabinet life (duration) and type of coalition. Concerning the second dimension (federal-unitary dimension),

Taagepera (2003: 1-12) presents that federalism appears to be directly connected with rigid constitutions as a rigid constitution solidifies the relations and rights of central and local governments. Subsequently, rigid constitution is arguably connected with the existence of judicial review as it provides another 'layer of protection' for local governments. Moreover, federalism is directly connected with bicameralism as it gives power and voice to local units. The existence of independent central banks is also possibly connected with federalism as independent central bank takes power away from central government and minimizes the possibility that central government could arbitrarily put a financial burden on local units (Taagepera, 2003).¹⁶

Lijphart in *Patterns of Democracy* performs his analysis and unfolds the empirical reality specifically for a group of thirty-six consolidated democracies. He considers this sample to be sufficiently diverse to critically test the existence of clustering of indicators on two separate dimensions, originally discovered in his earlier work *Democracies*. As mentioned above, based on this sample Lijphart was able to successfully confirm the existence of clustering and of the two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy, however, still the majority of analyzed countries were developed Western post-industrial and parliamentary democracies, which consequently became a subject of extensive criticism (e.g. Croissant and Schächter, 2010; Fortin, 2008; Roberts, 2006) as it questions the argument that the conceptual map is truly suitable for every democracy.

¹⁶ But unitary countries are more or less free to choose from these institutions (Taagepera, 2003).

1.3.1 Where do the Central and Eastern European democracies stand?

As much as was Lijphart's typology of democratic systems praised, so it was harshly criticized. According to Málová and Dolný (2013), the critical reactions invoked by this typology and theory can be divided into four main streams – theoretical criticism concerning the assumptions and constructions of models of democracy, methodological criticism concerning the selection and operationalization of indicators, empirical criticism on the subject of analysis and findings, and criticism of the normative assessment of consensus democracy.

Due to the limited space of this thesis, it is not possible to address every criticism made in connection with Lijphart's work. However, arguably it is not even necessary as the main driving force behind the research in this thesis is the criticism on the subject of applicability and usefulness of the typology beyond the scope of the original sample of 36 mature democracies. In this regard, there was myriad of attempts to replicate Lijphart's study and extend the empirical scope to new democracies in Asia (Croissant and Schächter, 2010), Africa (Reynolds, 1999; Van Cranenburgh and Kopecký, 2004), area of Pacific and Caribbean (Anckar, 2000), and Central and Eastern Europe (Fortin, 2008; Roberts, 2006).¹⁷ The vast majority of these replication studies identified that the typology cannot capture the patterns, and the clustering of the institutions does not hold up outside the scope of the original sample of advanced democracies (Bormann, 2010). Resultantly, the majority of these replication studies label Lijphart's theory archaic.

Andrew Roberts' (2006) focus on ten new democracies from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (namely Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) reveals that despite their general proximity to developed Western democracies and the influence of these democracies in the CEE region, new

¹⁷ Some scholars went even further and tried to apply this typology on subnational level in the systems of Switzerland (Vatter, 2002), or Germany (Freitag and Vatter, 2008).

democracies significantly diverge from expectations postulated by Lijphart (1999, 2012). Roberts argues that the patterns of democracy emerging in CEE democracies are hybrids, in the sense that they mix Lijphart's consensus and majoritarian categories within both dimensions, therefore, they are not clearly majoritarian nor consensual. For example, on the federal-unitary dimension in almost all CEE cases, the majoritarian structures of unitary government and unicameralism coexist with consensus structures like the existence of judiciary review, rigid constitutions, and central bank independence (Roberts, 2006: 43-46; Dvořák, 2012). Subsequently, on the side of executives-parties dimension, CEE democracies also show their own pattern of highly consensus structures of types of cabinets and durability of government coexisting with quite high levels of disproportionality and pluralist interest groups, which should be typical rather for majoritarian systems (Roberts, 2006: 39-43). Moreover, after adding the sample of ten new democracies to the original sample of Lijphart's thirty-six democracies, the correlation significantly weakened. In other words, the correlation of variables for 46 democracies revealed much weaker relations between the variables in both dimensions than did Lijphart's original study (Roberts, 2006: 47). Jessica Fortin (2008) later supported these findings drawing from an even larger sample of 19 post-communist countries.

Roberts (2006) blames for this aforementioned hybridity mainly the shared authoritarian past in the form of the communist regime of CEE countries, which pushed some institutions to the majoritarian side, and international pressure, which, on the contrary, dragged certain institutions to the consensus side. Therefore, these countries ended somewhere in-between. On the one hand, Communism significantly influenced economic, political systems, civil society, and without doubts also the formation of institutions after the fall of the Iron Curtain (Simpser et al., 2018). The legacy of the past regime can be held responsible especially for the inability of these countries to adopt consensus structures like bicameralism, corporatism and because Communism successfully destroyed historical parties and all contemporary parties are basically

‘brand new’, it is rather unsurprising that the degree of disproportionality is high in these countries (Innes, 2002; Kitschelt, 1992). On the other hand, the fact that the environment to which these third-wave democracies¹⁸ emerged was much less respectful of individual national sovereignty also played an important role in the formation of institutions in new democracies (Lewis, 2001). In connection with CEE countries, it is possible to mention especially the role of the European Union (EU). All of these post-communist countries expressed their interest in EU membership, and the EU, therefore, acquired a position where it could influence their democratization and formation of democratic institutions (Haukenes and Freyberg-Inan, 2012).¹⁹ Lijphart (1999) categorizes the EU as the system closer to the consensus model of democracy and according to Haukenes and Freyberg-Inan (2012: 1270), the EU favors this type of democracy also in its candidate countries.

Moreover, in connection with this hybridity, the important and decisive element is also the suddenness with which these democracies emerged. Every democracy was at some point in history an authoritarian regime, therefore, every democracy has an authoritarian past. However, first and second-wave democracies, which are in the center of Lijphart’s focus in *Patterns of democracy*, emerged under different settings and could enjoy an ‘unoccupied space’ so they could gradually evolve and develop their democratic institutions. Third-wave democracies no longer enjoyed this luxury (Huntington, 1991; Rose and Shin, 2001).

Importantly for the research in this thesis, Roberts (2006) concludes his work with two interesting assumptions. Firstly, this beforementioned ‘hybridity’ is very likely to occur also in other new democracies that emerged during the third wave of democratization, as such

¹⁸ A so-called “third wave of democratization” started in the 1970s in southern Europe, then spread to Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, southern Asia and Central and Eastern Europe (Huntington, 1991).

¹⁹ Via the politics of conditionality (Haukenes and Freyberg-Inan, 2012). EU conditionality represents an effective bargaining tool through which the EU can influence aspiring members to undergo certain reforms (Wakelin, 2013). Consequently, by fulfillment of certain conditions, aspiring members can receive certain benefits from the side of the EU (like EU membership) (Szarek-Mason, 2010).

democracies presumably share the features of authoritarian legacy and sudden emergence into an interconnected global community not respectful of national sovereignty. Secondly, he suggests that the sample of ten post-communist democracies might be only consensus democracies in the making and as their systems stabilize throughout the years, the communist legacies will recede and they are likely to become consistently consensus democracies. Therefore, it becomes both reasonable and desirable to verify these assumptions – if other new post-communist democracies that were not included in Roberts’ study hold this hybridity pattern and also if the countries included in Roberts’ sample became consistently consensus democracies.

Chapter 2: Methodology

The purpose of this part of the thesis is to introduce the research methodology for this replication study. Firstly, this chapter will discuss the important role of replication studies in the field of social science. Following this, the chapter will specify the two main research questions and present the expected findings. The second part of this chapter will justify the selection of cases and the period of analysis. Lastly, the measurements and data sources will be presented.

2.1 Replication, research questions, and expectations

In spite of Gary King's famous article *Replication, Replication* (1995), where he argues that replication in political science deserves considerably more attention and importance than it had at that time, replication studies still continue to be surprisingly rare (Freese and Peterson, 2017; Wuttke, 2019). According to Caroline Park (2004), the main reason that replication studies do not enjoy popularity among social science researchers is that researchers usually doubt the utility and the benefit of conducting a replication. Publishers and/or grant providers oftentimes put pressure on researchers to come up with new and original research/theory, while replications receive 'so what is the point? It has already been done' type of attitude (Bornstein, 1990).

Consequently, some feel that social sciences are 'infected' with one-shot unverified theories that are being diffused as uncontested truth (Park, 2004: 189-190). In this regard, it has to be argued that replication has an important role as a 'guard dog' inspecting the robustness, reproducibility, and/or generalizability of the findings before they can become a proper widely-used theory. It can be also said that replications have a role as a filter separating the wheat from the chaff (Amir and Sharon, 1990).

However, as was already mentioned in the previous chapter, there is no scarcity of replication studies of Lijphart's research. This fact can be explained by two fundamental reasons. Not only that his findings were so striking that other scholars were (figuratively) forced to verify if they hold in different settings, but Lijphart also provides a very detailed and transparent description of his variables, data, and measurements which markedly facilitates any kind of replication attempt.

This thesis aims to join this replication chorus, firstly by extending the empirical scope of countries to which a typology of majoritarian and consensus democracy was applied, which represents a replication of Lijphart's (1999, 2012) but at the same time of Roberts' (2006) study.²⁰ More specifically, this thesis applies Lijphart's typology of democratic systems to Croatia and Serbia (which are countries not included in Roberts' nor Lijphart's empirical sample),²¹ to investigate how well Lijphart's theory fits the realities of these countries. Or whether they 'behave' as predicted by Roberts. And, secondly, by updating Robert's (2006) original sample of ten CEE democracies, to explore whether these countries were truly only 'consensus governments in the making', which only needed more time to become fully and consistently consensus (or possibly majoritarian). Therefore, this thesis aims to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: How well does Lijphart's distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracy capture the institutional patterns in Croatia and Serbia?

RQ2: To what extent has the institutional framework in the 10 Central and Eastern European democracies evolved and changed over time?

²⁰ As Robert's study is primarily a replication and extension of Lijphart's *Patterns of Democracy*.

²¹ Croatia was included in Fortin's (2008) replication of Lijphart's study. However, her analysis was done while Croatia had approximately only seven years of democratic experience. Moreover, the analysis of Croatia presented in her study was rather parsimonious, as Fortin's focus was mostly on overall results of her sample of 19 post-communist countries.

In connection with the first presented research question, it was already mentioned that Roberts' (2006) research uncovered that his sample of ten CEE democracies are, what he calls, hybrids, in the sense that they mix Lijphart's consensus and majoritarian categories, causing that the cohesion between variables does not hold in CEE settings in the same way as theorized by Lijphart. This hybridity appears to be caused primarily by certain historical factors under which these countries democratized (Roberts, 2006: 38). Namely the legacy of the authoritarian regime and international influence as explained before. Even though Croatia and Serbia democratized in a later period,²² their democratization circumstances were not vastly different from CEE countries which basically started their democratization process right after the fall of the Iron Curtain. They are still considered to be third-wave democracies that abruptly emerged from authoritarian regimes into an environment rather intolerant of national sovereignty. Moreover, both Croatia and Serbia expressed their interest in becoming EU members as well as the aforementioned ten CEE democracies.²³ Hence, the EU could also significantly exert its influence and play a key role in consolidating (more consensus) democratic institutions in these countries.

These considerable similarities in democratization circumstances in Croatia and Serbia in comparison with other CEE countries included in Roberts' sample lead to an expectation that hybrid patterns will be present also in the cases of Croatia and Serbia. Such findings would provide support for the argument that Lijphart's typology is archaic and unable to explain patterns of democracy beyond his original sample. This presented general expectation corresponds with the hypothesis outlined by Roberts (2006), where he predicts a rather strong connection between country democratizing during the third wave of democratization and the

²² Both Croatia and Serbia experienced a period of democratic stagnation during the first decade after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The period of gradual democratization started in 2000, both in Croatia and Serbia (Dimitrijevic, 2015; Finn, 2019).

²³ Croatia officially applied for EU membership in 2003 and became a full member in 2013. Serbia formally applied in 2009 (European Commission, 2017).

adoption/emergence of hybrid institutional patterns. Therefore, following Roberts, this thesis postulates that: *Hybrid patterns found in the case of 10 CEE democracies are present also in the cases of Croatia and Serbia.*

Regarding the second research question, focused on the development of the sample of 10 CEE democracies, it can be expected that there will be some degree of change in the institutions and institutional constellation of the aforementioned sample. Roberts (2006) does not offer a very detailed explanation about why he expects the institutional framework to change (and become vastly more consensual), only that he expects it to happen. However, a similar ‘experiment’ was performed by Lijphart (1999, 2012) on his sample of mature democracies, where he showed that institutions certainly can and do change.²⁴ Furthermore, as was already noted, these democracies emerged rather hastily and so did their democratic institutions and constitutions. Resultantly, the systems “resembled bundles of compromises rather than acts of legal professionalism” (Málová and Haughton, 2001: 7). Hence, it is very likely that these countries had to undergo certain institutional changes throughout the years.

Still, no radical transformations should be expected. Firstly, Lijphart’s (1999, 2012) analysis also showed that overall the institutional systems appear to be relatively stable, and even though there might occur certain changes, major changes (e.g. change from clearly majoritarian to clearly consensus system) are rather unlikely. Secondly, a rather large body of research (e.g. Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2020; Roaf et al, 2014; Simpser et al., 2018) shows that even after three decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern European countries are still tied, and in many aspects influenced by their communist heritage. Hence, it is likely that communist legacy did not fully recede as hypothesized by Roberts (2006), but still prevents any major changes, and continues to disable the transformation to a

²⁴ Lijphart (1999) divided his period of analysis to two parts – 1945 – 1970 and 1971-1996. In his second edition (2012) he performed the analysis on the period 1945-1980 and 1981-2010;

consistently consensus democracy. Drawing from this logic, this thesis postulates that: *In the case of the sample of ten CEE democracies, certain institutional changes have taken place but overall, they did not become clearly and consistently consensual democracies.*

2.2 Case selection and time period

2.2.1 Croatia and Serbia

The decision to perform the replication of Lijphart's research on the cases of Croatia and Serbia originates from the reality that these are the only two countries that are part of the Central and Eastern European region²⁵ and at the same time were able to gain the status of democracy and maintain this status constantly for the period of at least one decade.

Lijphart, to build his argument in *Patterns of Democracy*, relies on the sample of countries that had been labeled democracies for a period of at least 19 years (1999: 49) based on Freedom House ratings, where the countries are rated as free, partly free and not free.²⁶ Lijphart argues that sets of criteria used by Freedom House closely resemble the criteria suggested by Robert Dahl (1971) in his seminal work *Polyarchy*, which are still widely regarded as minimal criteria for democracy. Therefore, countries rated as free in Freedom House can be regarded as having democratic status (Lijphart, 1999: 46-49). However, in recent years Freedom House Index (FHI) came under considerable scrutiny and criticism for being biased

²⁵ It has to be noted that there is no fixed list of countries which belong under the group of CEE countries. For example, OECD (2001) labels as CEE countries only Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. However, many other sources such as Brinza (2019), Deak et al. (2013), Goncalves (2016), National Democratic Institute (2021), or Stanzel (2016) add to this group also Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Ukraine. As there is no consensus, all these countries were considered (see Appendix A).

²⁶ In the second edition of *Patterns of Democracy*, Lijphart changes this length to more than 20 years (2012: 47); Roberts (2006: 39) also uses solely Freedom House Index for his case-selection.

and non-transparent (Steiner, 2012). Still, FHI continues to be used by scholars more frequently than any of its alternatives (Bush, 2017).

Due to this criticism of FHI, many academics advise to use a combination of Freedom House and Polity index, which can, reportedly, effectively compensate for the shortcomings of both these indices and contribute to the robustness (Hadenius and Teorell, 2005; Roessler and Howard, 2009; Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2017; Wahman et al., 2013). In this regard, the democracy status of considered CEE countries and their duration were assessed both on FHI, where the condition is that a country is labeled *free*, and Polity Index, where the condition is that a country has a score greater than or equal to 6 (see Appendix A).²⁷

Moreover, the decisive factor also was that they were not included in Roberts' empirical sample based on which he generated the hypothesis concerning hybrid institutional patterns nor Lijphart's original sample of 36 democracies based on which he formulated his typology. For all these reasons, it can be argued that Croatia and Serbia represent a suitable sample of new democracies that can help to evaluate whether Lijphart's typology is truly 'archaic' and cannot capture patterns of democracies from the CEE region.

The period being analyzed for these two countries extends from the year when the 'founding' democracy elections²⁸ took place, which for both countries marks the year 2000 (Bochsler, 2010; Dimitrijevic, 2015; Finn, 2019), to 2018, when the Polity review for these countries ends.²⁹

²⁷ The Polity IV scale ranges from -10 to +10, where -10 to -6 stands for autocracies, -5 to +5 stands for anocracies and +6 to +10 stands for democracies.

²⁸ First free parliamentary elections after the period of authoritarianism that have 'launched' or 're-launched' democracy.

²⁹ The Freedom House index offers data and information until 2020, however, Polity data for Croatia and Serbia is accessible only until the year 2018. Therefore, it is possible to justify the democracy status of these countries only until 2018, as FHI alone was regarded as insufficient.

2.2.2 Ten CEE countries

The group of cases connected with the second presented research question consists of all ten countries analyzed by Roberts (2006) in his replication study. Roberts' period of analysis extends from 1990, when the vast majority of these countries held their first free elections after the fall of communist rule, up to 2005. Since this part of the thesis aims to investigate how much (or how little) these ten democracies changed over time and whether they shifted their positions towards consensual model of democracy, the thesis examines the period after this presented time frame. Therefore, the starting point of the analysis is 2006 to 2018, which is the last year included in the Polity index for these countries.³⁰ The length of this period is roughly equal to the period analyzed by Roberts (2006). Since all ten CEE countries analyzed by Roberts were able to maintain their status of democracy for the whole period of interest of this part of the thesis (2006-2018), it is not necessary to exclude any country or adjust the timeframe to fit the status of individual countries.

2.3 Data and measurements

The selection of indicators used by Lijphart (1999, 2012) in his original research and subsequently also by Roberts (2006) in his replication study received throughout the years a substantial amount of criticism, documented in an already immense body of scholarly literature (Bogaards, 2000; Bormann, 2010; Coppedge, 2018; Málová and Dolný, 2013; Roller, 2005; Taagepera, 2003; to mention a few). Even though the research in this thesis is aware of this criticism and problems stemming from Lijphart's choice of indicators, the replicative nature of this thesis focused primarily on the empirical import of new country data indicates the need to

³⁰ Therefore, 2018 is the last year when it can be justified that these countries were still democracies as mentioned before in connection with Croatia and Serbia.

use the original indicators employed in *Patterns of Democracy* (see Mills et al., 2010).³¹ The operationalization of individual variables is described in Table 2 and Table 3.

Table 2: Executive – parties dimension variables and measurements. Source: Lijphart (1999, 2012)

	Executives – parties dimension variables	Measurement
1.	Party system type	Measured by the effective number of parties (ENP) index developed by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera (1979), which is able to apprise of the number of parties in a party system. The formula is as follows: $\text{ENP} = 1 / \sum s_i^2$ (s_i represents the share of seats of the i -th party in the parliament (Lijphart, 2012: 66)).
2.	Executive power concentration	Measured by averaging the percentage of time that minimal winning and one-party cabinets were in power in the country during the analyzed period (Lijphart, 2012: 98).
3.	Relations between executive and legislative	Measured by average cabinet durability during the analyzed period. A cabinet ends when there occurs a change in prime ministership, party composition, coalitional status, and parliamentary election (Lijphart, 2012: 119-124).
4.	Level of electoral disproportionality (electoral system)	Measured by the index of disproportionality presented by Michael Gallagher (1991) which ranges from 0 to 100. ³² The formula is as follows: $G = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum (v_i - s_i)^2}$ (v_i stands for vote percentage and s_i stands for seat percentage (Lijphart, 2012: 145).
5.	Interest group system (Corporatism)	Measured by Alan Siaroff's (1999) index of corporatism based on 8 indicators, which ranges from 1 (weak or absent corporatism) to 5 (high degree of corporatism).

³¹ In replication studies, the adopted methods and methodology should be as close as possible to the original study (Whitehead, 2017).

³² The lower the value, the lower is the disproportionality and vice versa.

One part of the main body of data for the first dimension comes from Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Final Reports, which are published periodically after each election and provide comprehensive information and the necessary data about election results, political parties, and party systems of 58 countries, but most importantly about Croatia, Serbia and the ten CEE democracies. The other part of the data comes from *Comparative Political Data Set* (CPDS) developed by Armingeon et al. (2020), which covers the period from 1960 to 2018. CPDS provides important information about the type of cabinets in power and about the changes in the cabinet. However, Armingeon et al. (2020) do not cover the case of Serbia, for which is, therefore, used *Who Governs in Europe and Beyond* database developed by Bértoa (2021). Regarding the ‘Interest group system’ variable, the thesis uses ranking developed by Detlef Jahn (2016)³³ supplemented by data from Jelle Visser (2019) about unionization, number of unions, strike levels, work councils, and other Siaroff’s variables. Data about Croatia and Serbia are based on Visser (2019), and individual country studies, as these countries are missing from Jahn’s (2016) study.³⁴

Table 3: Federal – unitary dimension variables and measurements. Source: Lijphart (1999, 2012)

	Federal - unitary dimension variables	Measurement
1.	Degree of centralization	Measured by a 5-point scale developed by Lijphart (2012: 178), where: 1.0 stands for unitary and centralized states 2.0 stands for unitary and decentralized states 3.0 represents semi-federal states ³⁵ 4.0 represents federal and centralized states 5.0 represents federal and decentralized states ³⁶

³³ Jahn (2016) attempts to provide an updated version of (Siaroff’s) corporatism ranking. Jahn includes Siaroff’s, Lijphart’s and Roberts’ samples of countries.

³⁴ Therefore, it has to be noted that Croatia and Serbia may be subjects to greater error.

³⁵ Democracies that cannot be unequivocally classified as federal or unitary (Lijphart, 2012: 177).

³⁶ The initial distinction (federal/unitary) represents a guaranteed division of power and can be observed based on the constitutions of individual states (Lijphart, 2012: 175-177). Subsequently, the second division (centralization/decentralization) represents whether the division exists in practice (is there truly a strong non-central government?), which can be observed based on the share of subnational expenditures and revenues, whether

2.	Bicameralism	<p>Measured by a 4-point cameral scale developed by Lijphart (2012: 199), where:</p> <p>1.0 stands for unicameral systems</p> <p>2.0 represents weak bicameral systems, where chambers are asymmetrical and congruent</p> <p>3.0 represents medium bicameral systems, which are symmetrical and congruent or vice versa</p> <p>4.0 stands for strong bicameral systems, which are symmetrical and incongruent.³⁷</p>
3.	Rigidity of constitution	<p>Measured by a 4-point scale developed by Lijphart (2012: 208), where the division is based on a majority necessary to amend the constitution:</p> <p>1.0 simple majority</p> <p>2.0 between simple majority and two-thirds</p> <p>3.0 two-thirds</p> <p>4.0 greater than two-thirds</p>
4.	Judicial review	<p>Measured by a 4-point scale developed by Lijphart (2012: 215), which is initially based on whether the judicial review is present and secondly on the level of activism of the court:</p> <p>1.0 no judicial review</p> <p>2.0 weak judicial review</p> <p>3.0 medium judicial review</p> <p>4.0 strong judicial review</p>
5.	Central bank autonomy	<p>Measured by CBI index developed by Cukiermann, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) ranging from 0 (lowest degree of independence) to 1 (highest degree of independence). Index measures independence using 16 legal variables divided into 4 clusters – chief executive officer (CEO), policy formulation, objectives, limitations on lending to the government.</p>

issues and political actors are significant only for the specific subnational level and independent from national level or whether subnational units have their own constitution or special autonomous status (Fortin, 2008; Lijphart, 2012; Schneider, 2003).

³⁷ Symmetrical chambers can be understood as those with equal (or only slightly unequal) legal/constitutional powers (to enact laws the consent of both houses is necessary and the lower house cannot easily override veto and amendments posed by the upper house) and democratic legitimacy. Asymmetrical are those chambers which are unequal in this matters. Subsequently, incongruence represents a state when the chambers have different partisan composition. On the contrary, congruence means that party/ coalition has majority in both chambers – resultantly, the composition is same or at least very similar. Congruence oftentimes occurs when the upper and lower chamber members are elected by similar electoral system and at the same time or when the upper house is appointed by lower house (International IDEA, 2014: 5-6; Lijphart, 2012: 192-195)

For the second dimension, the research in this thesis draws information primarily from constitutions of individual countries, as well as from a number of individual country studies, and from Armingeon et al. (2020) whose dataset provides partial data about federalism, bicameralism, and judicial review.³⁸ The independence of individual central banks is assessed based on Garriga's (2016) dataset, which provides all the necessary data and updated information about 182 countries to build the updated Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) index and ranking.³⁹

³⁸ Partial in the sense that Armingeon et al. (2020) provide information only about whether there is or is not judicial review/second chamber/centralization of state structure in the country. They do not provide information about their strength.

³⁹ Garriga (2016) provides data only until 2013, therefore possible recent developments are not reflected in this dataset.

Chapter 3: Empirical Findings

This chapter aims to present the realities of institutional constellations in Central and Eastern Europe. The findings for the cases of Croatia and Serbia will be firstly presented, and secondly the institutional changes in ten CEE democracies will be mapped.

3.1 *Croatia and Serbia*

As was already mentioned, Lijphart's executives-parties dimension comprises of five variables, where consistently consensus government is characterized by a multi-party system, greater dispersion of executive power in the form of prevalence of multiparty minority and surplus majority cabinets, balance between executive and legislature, low levels of disproportionality and a strong level of corporatism (Bormann, 2010). By contrast, the majoritarian government represents the opposite (see Table 1). On the other hand, Roberts (2006) highlights the existence of a hybrid type, characterized by mixing and matching Lijphart's consensus and majoritarian elements, which causes a lack of cohesion between variables. Where do Croatia and Serbia stand in this first dimension?

Table 4 presents the scores for both countries in the first (executives-parties) dimension. On the party system type variable, Croatia, as well as Serbia appear to be quite clearly on the consensus side of the scale. Both countries have a little less than four parties in their party systems.⁴⁰ Even though the number of parties in Croatia and Serbia is considerably higher than

⁴⁰ However, it is worth mentioning that the number of effective parties may be underestimated, especially in the case of Serbia. In the region of post-communist countries, Serbia is specific in the sense that there is not a different threshold for multiparty coalitions, therefore, oftentimes large parties join with a number of smaller and micro parties and form a very broad coalition (Bochsler, 2010). Serbian scholars (e.g. Goati, 2004; Orlović, 2008; Vučićević, 2010; Vukomanović, 2005) express confusion on how to approach these broad coalitions, which results in discrepancies in results. Some scholars (Vukomanović, 2005) count parties in a coalition separately, and others (Orlović, 2008) count coalitions as one party. In this thesis the parties were counted as suggested by Vucicević (2010: 45): parties which are part of a coalition are treated as separate if they within a year after the elections left the pre-electoral coalition, formed a separate parliamentary group, gained executive power despite being part of a

the average number of parties of Lijphart's sample, it still does not reach the average number of parties in Roberts' sample of CEE democracies. Still, these realities of Croatia and Serbia undoubtedly indicate a multiparty system, which is a consensus characteristic.

Table 4: Executives – parties dimension scores for the cases of Croatia and Serbia

	Parties		Cabinets		Executive		Disproportionality		Corporatism	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
Croatia	3.98	32	23.7	39	1.66	38	8.03	20	2.7	16 - 19
Serbia	3.86	31	13.2	44	1.15	46	5.63	31	3	7 - 12
Lijphart (2012) mean	3.18		60.3		5.35		8.55		2.02	
Roberts (2006) mean	4.38		33.7		1.92		8.02		2.2	

Note: to facilitate comparison, this table presents ordinal ranking for the set of 48 countries - Lijphart's (2012) 36 democracies, Roberts' (2006) 10 democracies, Croatia, and Serbia. The ranking ranges from 1 (most majoritarian) to 48 (most consensus).

On the second variable, the concentration of executive power, Croatia and Serbia are again clearly, and this time also rather highly consensual. Minimal winning and one-party cabinets are both rather rare in the two countries. Serbia did not experience a one-party cabinet during the whole analyzed period, while in Croatia a one-party cabinet was formed only for a short period in 2006. Although minimal winning coalition cabinets were more frequent, most cabinets were of the excessive majority or multiparty minority, which is according to Lijphart a consensus trait.

These countries are highly consensual also in connection with the degree of executive dominance, which is the third variable. Cabinets both in Croatia and Serbia are 'short-lived' as they tend to serve something over one year of their four-year term before they are changed and/or unseated. Moreover, in neither of these cases were the governments re-elected without

losing coalition or not being included in the government despite being a part of the winning coalition. To retain consistency, coalitions in other cases were counted in the same way, even though they were not as broad.

being intact. Such reality indicates, according to Lijphart, that there exists a balance of power between executive and legislative, which is a characteristic of a consensus type of democracy.

As in the case of Roberts' sample of ten CEE democracies, this initially highly consensual pattern of Croatia and Serbia starts to dissolve when turning to the variable regarding the electoral systems.⁴¹ Even though Croatia and Serbia belong to the group of countries with a proportional electoral system, which should consequently lead to a low degree of disproportionality, their levels of disproportionality are, in fact, relatively high.⁴² In this sense, Croatia and Serbia adopted consensus designs of the electoral system, which behave in a rather majoritarian fashion. But such reversal is not surprising as it corresponds with Roberts' assumption and, therefore, with one of the general expectations of this thesis as was previously discussed.

Finally, in the last variable of this dimension, the interest group system, Croatia and Serbia also stray from a (consistently) consensus pattern as they show highly majoritarian features. Even though there is no (to my knowledge) comprehensive measure of interest group system for Croatia and Serbia, many scholars highlight that both countries behave in a highly pluralist manner. Both countries have a quite high number of uncoordinated, weak, and rivaling unions, weak and unorganized employer structures, governments which tend to prioritize certain groups, and are rarely willing to lead a constructive dialogue with social partners (Cekik, 2015; Kosović and Copil, 2016; Vučićević, 2010). Even though there were some attempts to anchor institutions to strengthen corporatist features,⁴³ the situation did not significantly change

⁴¹ The vast majority of Roberts' CEE democracies were quite highly consensus on the first three variables but majoritarian in connection with electoral system and corporatism variables.

⁴² Even though the degree of disproportionality in Serbia may seem rather low in comparison with other Central and Eastern European countries (including Croatia), it is still higher than it should be expected from a country with a proportional system (Lijphart, 2012). For example, predominant majority of countries with proportional electoral system included in Lijphart's (1999, 2012) sample have the level of disproportionality ranging from 1-5. Also important to bear in mind is that this number is an average, which is easily affected by outliers. In the case of Serbia this average was affected by elections in 2008, which resulted in a low level of disproportionality (2.18). Other levels of disproportionality were higher.

⁴³ E.g. Socio-economic Councils in Croatia and Serbia (AICESIS, 2014).

and corporatist features remained a mere façade as in other CEE countries (Vučićević, 2010). Due to this reality, Croatia and Serbia were placed in the upper half of the corporatism index, indicating vastly pluralist ‘behavior’. However, since the Croatian situation slightly improved towards the more corporatist structures, mainly after accession to the European Union, Croatia scored lower than Serbia. Still, it has to be taken into account that Croatia is much closer to Serbia than to more corporatist countries (Kosović and Copil, 2016).

Moving to the second dimension (federal-unitary), according to Lijphart a consensus state is represented by a federal setting with a bicameral structure, rigid constitution, presence of judicial review, and independent central bank. Majoritarian settings are reversed (see Table 1) (Bormann, 2010). In this regard, Croatia and Serbia, however, show mixed results, again very similar to those found by Roberts (2006) in his sample of ten CEE democracies (Table 5).

Table 5: Federal – unitary dimension scores for the cases of Croatia and Serbia

	Federalism	Bicameralism	Constitution	Judiciary	Central Bank
Croatia	1.5	1.0	3.0	2.0	0.71
Serbia	1.5	1.0	3.2	2.0	0.74
Lijphart (2012) mean	2.3	2.2	2.7	2.2	0.35
Roberts (2006) mean	1.0	1.5	3.1	3.1	0.60

In connection with the first variable, federalism, both countries are usually classified as unitary,⁴⁴ albeit decentralized states as in recent decades they introduced law reforms aimed at transferring more competencies from the central to local government levels (European Committee of the Regions, 2021; Klarić, 2017; Kleibrink, 2015; Kmezić et al., 2016). However, this decentralization exists in both cases more or less ‘on paper’ and is not materialized and effective in practice. Consequently, central governments still have too many competencies at

⁴⁴ Which is stated also in their constitutions.

the expense of local units, and they are still financially and politically dependent on central authorities. Therefore, Croatia and Serbia are still quite (but not fully) centralized, which caused that they were placed in between unitary centralized and unitary decentralized structures (Halid and Meri, 2009; Klarić, 2017; Mojsilovic and Klaciar, 2011). Majoritarianism continues to be present also in connection with cameral structures as Croatia and Serbia have unequivocally unicameral structures (European Committee of the Regions, 2021).

This initially majoritarian pattern starts to crumble when turning to the remaining three variables, namely constitutional rigidity, judiciary review, and independence of the central bank. As in the case of Roberts' sample of ten CEE democracies, Croatia and Serbia also 'behave' in a rather consensus fashion. They have rigid constitutions, that require a two-thirds majority vote of all representatives to amend it. Serbia additionally requires also a republic referendum to endorse the amendment, when the amendment concerns for example, the preamble, principles of the Constitution, human rights and freedoms, etc. Therefore, Serbia has a score of a more rigid constitution than Croatia.

Likewise, both countries lean towards the consensus side on the fourth variable as the judicial review – a consensus trait – is present. Croatia and Serbia are countries that have adopted the centralized European model of constitutional adjudication, which is distinguished by the existence of an independent state body (Constitutional Court) with the power of judicial review (Beširević, 2014). However, the judicial review in these countries is only weak. Croatian and Serbian Constitutional Courts are de jure independent but they are corrupted, inactive and their overall performance is rather unsatisfactory (Banić, 2016; Barić, 2016; Beširević, 2014; Bumin, 2017; Sustainable Governance Indicators, 2020).

Finally, the measurements of central bank independence reveal that both Croatia and Serbia have highly independent central banks, hence they are unequivocally consensus in this

regard. For comparison, none of the countries from Lijphart's (1999, 2012) sample, and only one country from Roberts' sample show such a high degree of independence.⁴⁵

Drawing from these findings, Croatia and Serbia do not correspond with Lijphart's theoretical expectations, and they cannot be labeled as consensus or majoritarian type on either of the dimensions, which amplifies the skepticism expressed in connection with generalizability and plausibility of Lijphart's theory. Both countries rather appear to be consistently following 'mixed' patterns described by Roberts in connection with his sample of ten CEE democracies, which he coined 'hybrid' – on executives-parties dimension countries initially follow the consensus model, which gradually starts to crumble once turning to the fourth variable. On the second dimension, countries firstly follow the majoritarian model, but then turn to a consensus design (Roberts, 2006). These findings correspond with the first expectation presented in this thesis.

Moreover, after repeating Lijphart's (1999, 2012) correlation analysis (Table 6) it can be seen that the clear cohesion of statistically significant correlations, one of Lijphart's main findings, is absent in the post-authoritarian CEE region as expected.⁴⁶ Only a mere fraction of Lijphart's statistically significant correlations hold in CEE realities, even after raising the significance level to 0.1, due to the small sample of 12 countries. Nevertheless, the majority of them have the wrong sign and some correlations occur where they should not be.⁴⁷ Even though these findings are not striking, given the previous replication studies (e.g. Croissant and Schächter, 2010; Fortin, 2008), they further support Roberts' prediction that 'new' (i.e. third-

⁴⁵ In connection with Cukierman et al.'s (1994) index; Czechia has a slightly higher level of independence than Croatia (Roberts, 2006: 44).

⁴⁶ Correlation matrix includes ten CEE democracies analyzed by Roberts (2006), plus Croatia and Serbia analyzed in this thesis; Important to mention, after adding Croatia and Serbia to Roberts' original sample of ten CEE democracies all the statistically significant relationships weakened or even disappeared. Correlations also weakened when Croatia and Serbia were added to the total sample of ten CEE democracies plus 36 Lijphart's democracies. In the later analysis, changes in correlations were visible but, naturally, very mild as only two countries were added.

⁴⁷ E.g. correlation between judicial review, electoral system and interest group system.

wave) democracies ‘behave’ differently than theorized by Lijphart, and at this point it becomes clear that Lijphart’s distinction between majoritarian and consensus government does not apply to and cannot explain the institutional realities in Croatia or Serbia. This argument can be even further supported by Croatia’s and Serbia’s location very close to the center on Lijphart’s two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy (see Figure 1).⁴⁸

What is also interesting is that although it seems that Croatia and Serbia were consistently following alternative hybrid patterns as discussed above, there is no significant or satisfactory evidence from the correlation matrix (Table 6) that such distinctive CEE hybrid patterns truly occur.

Table 6: Correlations between ten variables of 12 CEE democracies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
[1]	1.000									
[2]	-0.140	1.000								
[3]	-0.531*	-0.057	1.000							
[4]	-0.345	-0.007	0.615**	1.000						
[5]	-0.195	0.372	-0.508*	-0.044	1.000					
[6]	-0.214	-0.316	-0.278	-0.024	0.267	1.000				
[7]	-0.030	0.072	-0.074	-0.283	-0.005	-0.291	1.000			
[8]	-0.393	0.175	-0.130	-0.010	0.161	0.030	0.457	1.000		
[9]	0.218	0.062	0.484	0.546*	-0.500*	-0.640**	-0.119	-0.133	1.000	
[10]	0.114	-0.071	0.200	0.168	-0.293	0.380	-0.424	-0.558*	0.197	1.000

Notes: [1]: Party system type; [2]: Executive power concentration; [3]: Relations between executive and legislative; [4]: Level of electoral disproportionality (electoral system); [5]: Interest group system; [6]: Degree of centralization; [7]: Bicameralism; [8]: Rigidity of constitution; [9]: Judicial review; [10]: Central bank independence;

** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level

* Statistically significant at the 0.1 level

However, these findings should be taken with a pinch of salt due to the small sample of only 12 countries, which limits the statistical power of the performed analysis.

⁴⁸ Lijphart’s map aims to situate individual democracies between majoritarian and consensus democracy.

3.2 Ten CEE democracies

This part of the thesis aims to map the development and institutional changes of Roberts' sample of ten CEE democracies and also analyze whether these democracies became consistently consensus as predicted by Roberts (2006). To explore whether these democracies shifted towards more consensus (or possibly more majoritarian) design, scores from two roughly equal periods are compared, which are visualized in detail in Appendix B.

Firstly, the average scores of variables from the first and second periods are compared (Table 7), to analyze whether there emerged a general trend towards more consensus (or probably more majoritarian) democracy. However, since these averaged scores do not capture individual changes, also differences between the first and second-period scores of individual countries are analyzed.

Table 7: Average values of ten CEE democracies in the period 1990-2005 and 2006-2018. Source: Roberts (2006) and author's calculations

	Variable	1990 - 2005	2006 - 2018	Difference
Executives- parties dimension	<i>Parties</i>	4.38	4.04	- 0.34 (M)
	<i>Cabinets</i>	33.7	35.0	+ 1.3 (M)
	<i>Executive</i>	1.92	1.9	- 0.02 (C)
	<i>Disproportionality</i>	6.94	6.68	- 0.26 (C)
	<i>Corporatism</i>	2.5	2.52	+ 0.02 (M)
Federal- unitary dimension	<i>Federalism</i>	1.0	1.27	+ 0.27 (C)
	<i>Bicameralism</i>	2.2	2.2	0
	<i>Constitutions</i>	3.1	3.1	0
	<i>Judiciary</i>	3.1	2.65	- 0.45 (M)
	<i>Central Bank</i>	0.60	0.84	+ 0.24 (C)

Note: the last column shows overall differences between the first and second periods and whether they indicate the movement towards more majoritarian (M) or consensus (C) settings.

The general picture is of relative stability. As can be seen from Table 7, the overall differences between the first and second period in individual variables are rather minor, some

of them are even negligible. What is, however, more important, these results do not point to a trend towards a more consensus democracy. Only four out of ten variables show this trend, and only two of them – federalism and central bank independence, are considerable.⁴⁹ Almost all CEE democracies experienced a radical shift towards greater central bank independence in the last decade and made certain progress in the direction of decentralization (Dedu and Stoica, 2012; Garriga, 2016; UCLG, 2016).⁵⁰

Yet, the results also do not indicate that the general trend of ten CEE democracies is towards more majoritarian government. Of the four variables which reflect a shift towards more majoritarian settings, only two variables appear to be relatively significant: the effective number of parties, which decreased by approximately one-third of a party, and the strength of judicial review.⁵¹ Even though the power of judicial review is still present in all ten CEE democracies, in almost half of these countries (mainly in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) it weakened, which is a result of declining independence, activism, and growing influence of governments, most notably in the cases of Hungary and Poland (Chronowski et al., 2019; Sadurski, 2012; Smith, 2019; Sustainable Governance Indicators, 2020; Ziolkowski, 2020). Two remaining variables - bicameralism and constitutional rigidity, remained completely intact. This is barely surprising given that they are anchored in constitutional provisions, which are seldom subjects of change (Lijphart, 2012: 250).

Even though the general trend does not point toward a more consensus democracy, many individual countries made indeed a certain progress towards more consensus-oriented settings.

⁴⁹ The changes in remaining variables are not considered considerable because the degree of executive dominance decreased only by 1 percent and electoral disproportionality decreased by less than 4 percent.

⁵⁰ Regarding decentralization, this process in CEE democracies is still unfinished and the central governments remain largest players (Horga, 2017). However, in last decades, the countries under scrutiny made certain legal and practical progress towards decentralization (Péteri, 2016; UCLG, 2016). Therefore, it is reasonable to ascribe them a higher score than Roberts (2006) initially ascribed.

⁵¹ The number of minimal winning one-party cabinets increased only by less than 4 percent and the degree of corporatism decreased by less than 1 percent. Therefore, the changes in these variables are not considered as considerable.

This is evident from tables visualized in Appendix B but more clearly from the two-dimensional map of democracy (Figure 1), which depicts the position of ten CEE democracies in the period analyzed by Roberts (2006), and subsequent change of position in the later period analyzed in this thesis.⁵² As can be seen in Figure 1, there are many shifts from higher to lower (more consensus) positions, which can be explained by a substantial shift of a predominant majority of countries towards more independent central banks, and the progress in decentralization as mentioned above. Furthermore, Estonia and Latvia received more consensus scores on the variable concerning judicial review because of their considerably active and efficient courts (Sustainable Governance Indicators, 2020).

The map also depicts some noteworthy shifts from right to left, which again implies a movement towards more consensus positions. Some countries experienced a little less electoral disproportionality throughout the years, which may signify that the connection between the electorate and the parties has strengthened (Enyedi and Deegan-Krause, 2019). Also, minimal winning one-party cabinets became less frequent, and cabinet duration decreased in many cases.

However, one of the most sizeable changes go in the opposite direction (i.e. majoritarian), which arguably explains why the overall trend is not pointing toward generally more consensus democracy. The most notable changes in this direction are those of Hungary and Poland. These transformations are the most evident on the executives-parties dimension, where both countries shifted to considerably majoritarian characteristics on four out of five variables (Appendix B). Additionally, Hungary shifted to a more majoritarian position also on the federal-unitary dimension, where Poland remained relatively unchanged. Although judicial

⁵² In the previous chapter it was argued that no such a thing as two-dimensional pattern of democracy exists in CEE settings. However, placing individual countries on two-dimensional map arguably facilitates the understanding of trends and effectively depicts the overall changes of individual countries; It is important to bear in mind that the scores are standardized, therefore, all changes are relative to the changes in other countries (see Lijphart, 2012: 249-254); To have greater and more diverse sample, also the score for the entire sample of 46 democracies was analyzed. The positions on the map changed and CEE countries were closer to center, but the direction of the changes remained the same.

review in both countries became weaker, Poland was able to counterbalance this decrease by an increase in central bank and federalism variables. Hungary received more consensus score only in relation to central bank independence, while the federalism score remained unchanged because of the trend towards re-centralization in Hungary (Loewen, 2018; Péteri, 2016). However, their development towards majoritarian settings is only little surprising, as it corresponds with serious episodes of degradation and erosion of democratic institutions, and attempts to re-centralize and increase the power of central government (Bustikova and Guasti, 2017; Loewen, 2018; Ponczek, 2021). Moreover, these developments of Hungary and Poland arguably add weight to Lijphart’s argument that consensus democracies are superior to majoritarian with regard to quality of democracy (Lijphart, 2012: 274-294).

CEU eTD Collection




Figure 1: The two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy and the positions of 12 CEE democracies
 Note: Individual data are presented in Appendix C

Because of these notable changes, Lijphart's correlation analysis was repeated again for the set of 'updated' ten CEE democracies (Table 8). Still, the clear patterns of statistically significant correlations among the institutional features are absent. However, in comparison with the previous correlation matrix (Table 6), the number of correlations and their significance visibly increased (especially in the first dimension), and quite many correspond with Lijphart's findings. Still, they represent only a fraction of expected correlations.

Nevertheless, in brief, it is possible to state that some individual countries from Robert's sample of ten CEE democracies appear that they truly were, but at the same time still continue to be consensus democracies in the making.⁵³ These findings correspond with Roberts' expectation,⁵⁴ yet only partially, given that not all of these countries made progress towards generally more consensus-oriented democracy on both dimensions – some CEE countries rather appear to be majoritarian democracies in the making. Plus the majority of individual changes were relatively small, and, in conclusion, they did not lead to the emergence of consistently consensus governments in every respect.⁵⁵ This described reality, nonetheless, corresponds with the second expectation posed in this thesis as it was postulated that certain institutional changes certainly have taken place but, in the end, they did not lead to a radical transformation in the form of clearly and consistently consensual democracy. Although changes in some countries (Hungary and Poland) lead to emergence of almost consistently majoritarian design and dominantly majoritarian position at least on the first dimension.

⁵³ As they moved towards more consensus design on some variables but still have difficulties with the adoption of such design on other variables. Therefore, in the end, they remain hybrids.

⁵⁴ As mentioned before, Roberts (2006) expected that as the systems of these democracies stabilize throughout the years and communist legacies recede, they will become more consistently consensus.

⁵⁵ For example, a large degree of electoral disproportionality, majoritarian interest group relations, unicameral structures but also unitary settings and only limited progress in decentralization still remain thorns in the eye in the vast majority of cases.

Table 8: Correlations between ten variables of ten CEE democracies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
[1]	1.000									
[2]	-0.698**	1.000								
[3]	-0.656**	0.817***	1.000							
[4]	-0.387	0.505	0.613*	1.000						
[5]	-0.669**	0.185	0.219	0.355	1.000					
[6]	-0.643**	-0.699**	-0.664**	-0.632*	-0.310	1.000				
[7]	-0.244	-0.278	-0.189	-0.351	0.174	0.248	1.000			
[8]	-0.321	-0.297	-0.017	-0.027	0.604*	0.024	0.488	1.000		
[9]	0.818***	-0.428	-0.424	-0.217	-0.680**	0.365	-0.314	0.570*	1.000	
[10]	-0.180	-0.096	0.120	-0.075	0.400	-0.169	0.176	0.553*	-0.028	1.000

Notes: [1]: Party system type; [2]: Executive power concentration; [3]: Relations between executive and legislative; [4]: Level of electoral disproportionality (electoral system); [5]: Interest group system; [6]: Degree of centralization; [7]: Bicameralism; [8]: Rigidity of constitution; [9]: Judicial review; [10]: Central bank independence;

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level

** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level

* Statistically significant at the 0.1 level

Conclusion

Lijphart's differentiation between consensus and majoritarian governments has been regarded as one of the most prominent and influential theories of institutional forms ever since its first appearance in 1984. However, in recent decades, in the light of the third wave of democratization, increasing criticism weakened the dominant position of this theory, as many scholars by replicating Lijphart's work revealed that some of his core findings do not apply beyond his original sample of mature democracies.

In this regard, this thesis set two main goals. The first was to join this replication chorus by extending the empirical scope of countries to which Lijphart's typology of democratic systems was applied, by adding Croatia and Serbia, to see whether this typology explains realities in these newest CEE democracies. Secondly, the thesis aimed to analyze whether, and to what extent the relatively young democracies changed as they became more mature, hence, to a certain degree qualitatively closer to Lijphart's original sample. More specifically, this thesis analyzed the more recent developments for the sample of ten CEE democracies, which were already previously analyzed by Roberts (2006), and consequently classified by him as hybrids in relation to Lijphart's typology.

The research in this thesis revealed two important findings. First of all, the performed analysis reveals that Lijphart's typology is not helpful in explaining the realities in Croatia and Serbia. Both countries rather appear to be consistently following Robert's 'hybrid' patterns, characterized mainly by mixing consensus and majoritarian elements, like other CEE democracies. Consequently, not only can Croatia and Serbia not be labeled as clearly consensus or majoritarian on either of the dimensions, but the clustering of variables in two separate dimensions also fails to emerge because of the lack of association and cohesion between the ten variables. In the end, this apparent deviation of Croatia and Serbia from Lijphart's expectations

and typology provides another piece of important evidence, which gives more weight to the criticism questioning the generalizability, plausibility, and overall usefulness of Lijphart's classification schemes (Croissant and Schächter, 2010; Fortin, 2008; Roberts, 2006).

The second important finding is that CEE democracies appear to be gradually shifting towards more consensus, but in some cases also towards more majoritarian 'territory'. The analysis of the institutional changes and developments show that in recent decades all ten countries experienced certain changes in both Lijphart's dimensions. In this regard, especially the adoption of more decentralized structures and the substantial increment in the degree of central bank independence showed as the most influential changes that caused that the vast majority of these countries moved towards a more consensus position on the federal-unitary dimension. The only exception was Hungary, which shifted towards more majoritarian structures on this dimension. The developments on executives-parties dimension mostly reflected a variety of smaller changes without any of them being the most influential.

Yet, these developments did not lead to the emergence of clearly and consistently consensus/majoritarian governments that would reflect the cohesion between variables on both dimensions. Even though Hungary, Poland, and also Slovenia come significantly close, and have quite strong majoritarian/consensus position especially on the executives-parties dimension. But most countries still, in the end, remain overall only consensus/majoritarian governments in the making. However, this evidence that the institutional settings in CEE countries certainly can and do change strongly suggests that hybrid patterns may not be the 'final stage' for these countries. Future developments may possibly lead to the emergence of even more consistently consensus/majoritarian governments that will correspond with Lijphart's theoretical expectations. The same applies for the cases of Croatia and Serbia – following the development of ten CEE democracies, it can be expected that future changes in

these countries will lead to (somewhat) more consistently consensus/majoritarian governments. This provides a fertile ground for future research.

The research in this thesis can be regarded as a first step laying the foundations for future research, which should focus more on ‘so what’?. Data and findings from this thesis can serve to explore whether (and to what extent) these institutional developments resulted in fundamental changes in policymaking and/or performance of individual countries. This should be investigated especially in connection with countries where the changes were the most striking – like Hungary and Poland. In this regard, an important topic for future research, of which the surface was barely scratched in this thesis, is whether the upsetting phenomenon of democratic backsliding in the CEE region can be traced back to the institutional choices of these countries. This thesis outlined that some of CEE countries, especially Hungary and Poland, shifted towards a vastly more majoritarian model, which is claimed to score less in terms of democratic and other qualities (Lijphart, 2012: 274-294), while in these countries the health of democracy truly appears to be deteriorating. However, whether there indeed exists a connection needs to be yet uncovered. And the final question stemming from this thesis is that when Lijphart’s typology of democratic systems cannot properly explain realities in the CEE region, what typology can?

On a final note, it is important to bear in mind that the presented findings should be taken with a pinch of salt, chiefly because of the small sample of cases based on which the analyses were performed.

Appendices

Appendix A: The Freedom House Index and Polity score for CEE countries

1991 -2005 (FHI; Polity IV)	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Albania	PF; 3	PF; 5	PF; 5	PF; 5	PF; 5	PF; 0	PF; 5	PF; 5	PF; 5	PF; 5	PF; 5	PF; 7	PF; 7	PF; 7	PF; 9
Belarus	PF; 7	PF; 7	PF; 7	PF; 8	PF; 0	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Croatia	NF; -3	NF; -3	PF; -3	PF; -3	PF; -5	PF; -5	PF; -5	PF; -5	PF; 1	PF; 8	F; 8	F; 8	F; 8	F; 8	F; 9
Macedonia	NF; 6	NF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9
Montenegro	NF; -5	NF; -5	PF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -6	NF; -6	NF; -6	PF; 7	PF; 7	PF; 7	F; 6	F; 6	F; 6
Serbia	NF; -5	NF; -5	PF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -6	NF; -6	NF; -6	PF; 7	PF; 7	F; 7	F; 6	F; 6	F; 6
Ukraine	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 5	PF; 7	PF; 7	PF; 7	PF; 7	PF; 7	PF; 7	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 6	F; 6
2006 - 2020 (FHI; Polity IV)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Albania	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF	PF
Belarus	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF; -7	NF	NF
Bosnia and Herzegovina	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Croatia	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F	F
Macedonia	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF	PF
Montenegro	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	F; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF; 9	PF	PF
Serbia	F; 8	F; 8	F; 8	F; 8	F; 8	F; 8	F; 8	F; 8	F; 8	F; 8	F; 8	F; 8	F; 8	PF	PF
Ukraine	F; 7	F; 7	F; 7	F; 7	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 6	PF; 4	PF; 4	PF; 4	PF; 4	PF; 4	PF	PF

Appendix B: Changes on executives-parties and federal-unitary dimensions for the sample of ten CEE democracies

Table 9: Changes on executives-parties dimension for the sample of ten CEE democracies

	Parties		Cabinets		Executive		Disproportionality		Corporatism	
	1990 - 2005	2006 - 2018	1990 - 2005	2006 - 2018	1990 - 2005	2006 - 2018	1990 -2005	2006 - 2018	1990 - 2005	2006 - 2018
Bulgaria	2.98	3.75	70.3	23.07	1.97	1.63	7.22	6.93	3	3
Czech. Rep.	4.08	4.51	39.3	26.92	2.78	1.44	6.43	6.83	2.2	2.2
Estonia	5.06	4.31	45.2	42.3	1.57	1.74	6.05	3.57	2	2
Hungary	3.33	2.11	0	84.62	3.5	3.25	10.34	12.05	1.9	3
Latvia	5.79	5.19	13.9	19.23	0.94	1.31	5.57	3.6	2.6	2.6
Lithuania	4.24	5.17	45.4	11.54	2.25	1.65	8.27	10.87	2.6	2.6
Poland	5.11	2.87	43.7	65.39	1.48	3.1	9.09	7.7	2.7	3
Romania	3.57	3.09	29.4	11.54	1.46	1.12	5.67	4.03	3.2	3.2
Slovakia	4.62	4.40	25.8	50	1.62	1.9	6.63	7.08	2.7	2
Slovenia	4.99	5.0	24	15.38	1.58	1.86	4.1	4.13	1.6	1.6
Mean	4.38	4.04	33.7	35.0	1.92	1.9	6.94	6.68	2.5	2.52
Difference	- 0.34 (M)		+ 1.3 (M)		- 0.02 (C)		- 0.26 (C)		+ 0.02 (M)	

Table 10: Changes on federal-unitary dimension for the sample of ten CEE democracies

	Federalism		Bicameralism		Constitution		Judiciary		Central Bank	
	1990 - 2005	2006 - 2018	1990 - 2005	2006 - 2018	1990 - 2005	2006 - 2018	1990 - 2005	2006 - 2018	1990 - 2005	2006 - 2018
Bulgaria	1.0	1.3	1.0	1.0	4.0	4.0	3.0	2.0	0.55	0.86
Czech. Rep.	1.0	1.3	2.0	2.0	2.5	2.5	3.0	3.0	0.73	0.83
Estonia	1.0	1.3	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.5	0.78	0.85
Hungary	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	2.0	0.67	0.87
Latvia	1.0	1.3	1.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	0.49	0.89
Lithuania	1.0	1.3	1.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.5	0.53	0.84
Poland	1.0	1.3	2.0	2.0	3.5	3.5	4.0	2.0	0.68	0.88
Romania	1.0	1.3	3.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	2.0	2.0	0.34	0.85
Slovakia	1.0	1.3	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.5	0.62	0.67
Slovenia	1.0	1.3	2.0	2.0	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.0	0.63	0.86
Mean	1.0	1.27	2.2	2.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	2.65	0.60	0.84
Difference	+ 0.27 (C)		0		0		- 0.45 (M)		+ 0.24 (C)	

Appendix C: Two-dimensional map of democracy - data for 12 CEE countries

	1990 - 2005		2006 - 2018	
	Executives-parties	Federal-unitary	Executives-parties	Federal-unitary
Bulgaria (BGR)	0,8432921	0,2303757	0,1318456	-0,2370479
Czech Republic (CZE)	0,1671075	0,1356666	-0,3787871	-0,3855822
Estonia (EST)	-0,1068216	0,5043047	-0,4629983	-0,1366134
Hungary (HUN)	0,3642568	0,0413015	1,462249	0,4256279
Latvia (LVA)	-0,8426584	0,590466	-0,7287365	-0,3113717
Lithuania (LTU)	0,3567428	0,5394658	-0,09921785	-0,4074533
Poland (POL)	0,05395346	-0,4038368	1,055252	-0,4113463
Romania (ROU)	0,1574556	0,2366038	-0,1379762	-0,7054844
Slovakia (SVK)	-0,1726857	0,7083054	0,2097952	0,4125511
Slovenia (SVN)	-0,9358725	-0,02042292	-0,9361957	-0,7055099
	2000 - 2018			
	Executives-parties		Federal-unitary	
Croatia (CRO)	0,07830048		0,04567599	
Serbia (SRB)	-0,187745		-0,0540676	

Note: To place each country on a two-dimensional map, the indicator values of each dimension had to be averaged. However, before they had to be standardized, as each variable was measured on different scale. Additionally, it was necessary to adjust their signs so that high values represent either majoritarianism or consensus, and low values represent opposite characteristic. Following Lijphart's (1999, 2012) map, high values were ascribed to majoritarianism and low values to consensus. Therefore, the sign of the effective number of parties and of every variable connected with the second dimension had to be reversed (Croissant and Schächter, 2010; Lijphart, 1999, 2012).

References

- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2015). Political Institutions and Comparative Development. *National Bureau of Economic Research*, 2(1), pp. 10-13.
- AICESIS. (2014). *Social and Economic Council*. [online]. Available at: <http://www.aicesis.org/database/organization/164/> (Accessed: 11 May 2021).
- Amir, Y. and Sharon, I. (1990). Replication Research: A “Must“ for the Scientific Advancement of Psychology. *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality*, 5(4), pp. 51-70.
- Anckar, D. (2000). Westminster democracy: A comparison of small island states varieties in the Pacific and the Carribean. *Pacific Studies*, 23(3-4), pp. 57-76.
- Andeweg, R.B. (2000). Consociational Democracy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3(1), pp. 509-536.
- Andeweg, R.B. (2001). Lijphart versus Lijphart: The cons of consensus democracy in homogenous societies. *Acta Politica*, 36(2), pp. 117-139.
- Armingeon, K., Wenger, V., Wiedemeier, F., Isler, CH., Knopfel, L., Weisstanner, D. and Engler, S. (2020). *Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2018*. Zurich: Institute of political Science, University of Zurich.
- Banić, S. (2016). ‘Activism and Self-Restraint of the Croatian Constitutional Court in the Constitutionalization of the Legal Order’ in Glaser, H. (ed.) *Constitutional Jurisprudence*. Baden: Nomos, pp. 179-200.
- Barić, S. (2016). *The Transformative Role of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia: From the ex-Yu to the EU*. Sarajevo: Analitika: Center for Social Research.
- Bächtiger, A., Schwarz, D. and Lutz, G. (2006). *Parliamentary Practices in Presidentialism? A Swiss Perspective on Governance in a Separation of Powers Framework*. Bern: University of Bern.
- Bell, S. (2002). ‘Institutionalism’ in Summers, J. (ed.) *Government, Politics, Power and Policy in Australia*. Melbourne: Pearson Education Australia, pp. 363-380.
- Beširević, V. (2014). “Governing without judges”: The politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 12(4), pp. 954-979.
- Bértoa, C. F. (2021). *Who Governs in Europe and Beyond*. [online]. Available at: <https://whogoverns.eu/cabinets/> (Accessed: 28 April 2021).
- Bogaards, M. (2000). The Uneasy Relationship between Empirical and Normative Types of Consociational Theory. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 12, pp. 395-424.
- Bogaards, M. (2015). Making a difference: an interview with Arend Lijphart. *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 9(1), pp. 83-96.
- Bogaards, M. (2017). ‘Comparative Political Regimes: Consensus and Majoritarian Democracy’ in Thompson, W. (ed.) *Oxford Research Encyclopedia, Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bochsler, D. (2010). ‘Political Parties in Serbia’ in Stojarová, V and Emerson, P.H. (eds.) *Party Politics in the Western Balkans*. New York: Routledge, pp. 99-118.

- Bormann, N.C. (2010). Patterns of democracy and its critics. *Living Reviews in Democracy*, 2(2), pp. 1-14.
- Bornstein, R.F. (1990). Publication, politics, experimenter bias and the replication process in social science research. *Journal of Social Behavior & Personality*, 5(4), pp. 71-81.
- Brinza, A. (2019). The 17 + 1 Mechanism: Between China and the United States. *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 5(2), pp. 213-231.
- Bumin, K.M. (2017). Judicial Institutionalization and Judicial Activism of the Post-Communist Constitutional Courts. *Journal of Politics and Law*. 10(2), pp. 54-72.
- Bush, S. (2017). *Should we trust democracy ratings? New research finds hidden biases*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/07/why-do-we-trust-certain-democracy-ratings-new-research-explains-hidden-biases/> (Accessed: 23 April 2021).
- Bustikova, L. and Guasti, P. (2017). The Illiberal Turn or Swerve in Central Europe? *Politics and Governance*, 5(4), pp. 166-176.
- Cekik, A. (2015). *Lobbying by Interest Groups in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia: Findings From a Survey of Associations*. [online]. Available at: <http://isppi.ukim.edu.mk/images/873658Lobbying-by-IGs-in-Macedonia-Montenegro-and-Serbia.pdf> (Accessed: 11 May 2021).
- Coppedge, M. (2018). *Rethinking Consensus vs. Majoritarian Democracy*. [online]. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3271512 (Accessed: 27 April 2021).
- Collier, D., LaPorte, J. and Seawright, J. (2012). Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor. *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(1), pp. 217-232.
- Crepaz, M.M.L, Koelble, T.A. and Wilsford, D. (2000). *Democracy and Institutions: The Life Work of Arend Lijphart*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Croissant, A. and Schächter, T. (2010). Institutional patterns in the new democracies of Asia: Forms, origins, and consequences. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 11(2), pp. 173-197.
- Cukierman, A., Webb, S.B. and Neyapti, B. (1992). Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes. *The World Bank Economic Review*, 6(3), pp. 353-398.
- Dahl, R.A. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New haven: Yale University Press.
- Deak, A., Naumenko, D. and Schulzova, H. (2013). *Energy Security in Central and Eastern Europe: Towards a Common Approach*. [online]. Available at: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/energy-security-in-cee_f.pdf (Accessed: 26 April 2021).
- Dedu, V. and Stoica, T. (2012). Central Bank Independence. *Theoretical and Applied Economics*, 18(8), pp. 97-102.
- Dimitrijevic, D.A. (2015). Democratization in Serbia: An Analysis of Rational Choice and Structuralist Explanations. *Review of European and Russian Affairs*, 9(1), pp. 1-16.
- Dvořák, P. (2012). Hledání typologie demokracií pro Východní Evropu. *Středoevropské politické studie*, 14(2-3), pp. 272-314.
- Elman, C. (2005). Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics. *International Organization*, 59, pp. 293-326.

- Enyedi, Z. and Deegan-Krause, W. (2019). 'Voters and Parties in Eastern Europe' in Fagan, A. and Kopecky, P. (eds.). *The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics*. London: Routledge, pp. 169-183.
- European Commission. (2017). *European Neighborhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations*. [online]. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/node_en (Accessed: 21 April 2021).
- European Committee of the Regions. (2021). *Division of Powers*. [online]. Available at: <https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/Pages/Serbia.aspx> (Accessed: 11 May 2021).
- Finn, V. (2019). Democracy in Croatia: From stagnant 1990s to rapid change 2000-2011. *International Political Science Review*, 42(2), pp. 197-212.
- Fortin, J. (2008). Patterns of democracy? Counterevidence from nineteen post-communist countries. *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 2(2), pp. 198-220.
- Freese, J. and Peterson, D. (2017). Replication in Social Science. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 43, pp. 147-165
- Freitag, M. and Vatter, A. (2008). Patterns of democracy: A sub-national analysis of the German Länder. *Acta Politica*, 44(4), pp. 410-438.
- Fuchs-Schündeln, N. and Schündeln, M. (2020). The Long-Term Effects of Communism in Eastern Europe. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 34(2), pp. 172-191.
- Gallagher, M. M. (1991). Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems. *Electoral Studies*, 10, pp. 33-51.
- Garriga, A.C. (2016). Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Dataset. *International Interactions*, 42(5), pp. 849-868.
- Ginsburg, T., Cheibub, J.A. and Elkins, Z. (2013). *Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Law School
- Goati, V. (2004). *Partije i partijski sistemi Srbije*. Niš: OGI Centar.
- Goncalves, M. (2016). 'Eastern Europe Regional Bloc: CEE and CIS' in Romero, P.J. and Edwards, J.A. (eds.) *Eastern European Economies: A Region in Transition*. Hampton: Busines Expert Press, pp. 39-63.
- Goodin, R.E. and Klingemann, H.D. (1998). *A New Handbook of Political Science*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Greener, I. (2005). The Potential of Path Dependence in Political Studies. *Political Studies Association*, 25(1), pp. 62-72.
- Grofman, B. (2000). 'Arend Liphart and the New Institutionalism' in Crepaz, M.M.L, Koelble, T.A. and Wilsford, D. (eds.) *Democracy and Institutions: The Life Work of Arend Lijphart*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 43-74.
- Hadenius, A. and Teorell, J. (2005). *Assessing Alternative Indices of Democracy*. Lund: Lund University Department of Political Science.
- Halid, K. and Meri, Š. (2009). Preliminary Decentralization in Croatia – Reform Process or Political Rhetoric. *Ekonomiju Misao Praksa DBK*. 18(2), pp. 233-258.

- Hall, P.A. (1986). *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hall, P.A. and Taylor, R.C. (1996). Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. *Political Studies*, 44(5), pp. 936-957.
- Haukenes, K. and Freyberg-Inan, A. (2012). Enforcing consensus? The hidden bias in EU democracy promotion in Central and Eastern Europe. *Democratization*, 20(7), pp. 1268-1296.
- Hay, C. (2006). 'Constructivist Institutionalism' in Rhodes, R.A., Binder, S.A. and Rockman, B.A. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 56-74.
- Horga, I. (2017). From decentralization to recentralization in central and eastern Europe: the case of Romania. *Pôle Sud*, 46(1), pp. 63-78.
- Högström, J. (2011). *Quality of Democracy: A Comparative Study*. Östersund: Mid Sweden University.
- Huntington, S.P. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Chronowski, N., Varju, M., Bárd, P. and Sulyok, G. (2019). Hungary: Constitutional (R)evolution or Regression in Albi, A. and Bardutzky S. (eds.) *National Constitutions in European and Global Governance: Democracy, Rights, the Rule of Law*. Hague: T.M.C Asser Press, pp. 1439-1488.
- International IDEA. (2014). *Bicameralism (Legislatures with Two Chambers)*. Stockholm: International IDEA
- Innes, A. (2002). Party Competition in Postcommunist Europe. *Comparative Politics*, 35(1), pp. 85-104.
- Jahn, D. (2016). Changing of the guard: trends in corporatist arrangements in 42 highly industrialized societies from 1960 to 2010. *Socio-Economic Review*, 14(1), pp. 47-71.
- Kenny, M. (2014). A Feminist Institutional Approach. *Politics & Gender*, 10(4), pp. 679-684.
- Key, E.M. (2016). How are we doing? Data access and replication in political science. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 49(2), pp. 268-272.
- King, G. (1995). Replication, Replication. *Political Science & Politics*, 28, pp. 444-452.
- Kitschelt, H. (1992). The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe. *PS: Politics & Society*, 20(1), pp. 7-50.
- Klarić, M. (2017). *Problems and Developments in the Croatian Local Self-government*. Split: Faculty of Law University of Split.
- Kleibrink, A. (2015). *Political Elites and Decentralization Reforms in the Post-Socialist Balkans*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kluge, S. (2000). *Empirically Grounded Construction of Types and Typologies in Qualitative Social Research*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1124/2499> (Accessed: 19 April 2021).
- Kmezić, S., Dulić, K., Jocović, M. and Kaluderović, J.(2016). *Fiscal Decentralisation and Local Government Financing in Serbia and Montenegro*. Maribor: Institute for Local Self-Government and Public Procurement Maribor.

- Koelble, T.A. (1995). The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology. *Comparative Politics*, 27(2), pp. 231-243.
- Kosović, N and Copil, D. (2016). Assessing Labour Strength in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia: How To Explain The Differences? *The European Journal of Applied Economics*, 13(1): pp. 36-46.
- Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. (1979). Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 12(1), pp. 3-27.
- Lane, J.E. and Ersson, S. (2000). *The New Institutional Politics: Performance and Outcomes*. London: Routledge.
- Lehnert, M. (2007). 'Typologies in Social Inquiry' in Gschwend, T. and Schimmelfennig, F. (eds.) *Research Design in Political Science – How to Practice What They Preach*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 62-82.
- Levi, M. (1990). 'A logic of institutional change' in Cook, K.S. (ed.) *The Limits of Rationality*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Lewis, P.G. (2001). The Third Wave of Democracy in Eastern Europe: Comparative Perspectives on Party Roles and Political Development. *Party Politics*, 7(5), pp. 543-565.
- Lijphart, A. (1984). *Democracies: Patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty-one countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of Democracy: Government forms and performances in thirty-six countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, A. (2012). *Patterns of Democracy: Government forms and performances in thirty-six countries* (2d ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Linz, J.J. (1985). Democracy: Presidential or Parliamentary Does it Make a Difference? [online]. Available at: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABJ524.pdf (Accessed: 19 April 2021).
- Loewen, B. (2018). From decentralization to re-centralization: Tendencies of regional policy and inequalities in Central and Eastern Europe. *Halduskultuur*, 18(2), pp. 103-126.
- Mainwaring, S. (2001). Two models of democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 12(3), pp. 170-175.
- Maleki, A. (2015). *Patterns of culture and models of democracy: Towards the cultural compatibility thesis of democracy*. Tilburg: Tilburg University.
- Maleki, A. and Hendriks, F. (2014). The relation between cultural values and models of democracy: a cross-national study. *Democratization*, 22(6), pp. 1-30.
- March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1984). The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life. *The American Political Science Review*, 78(3), pp. 734-749.
- March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (2011). 'Elaborating the "New Institutionalism"' in Goodin, R.E. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Málová, D. and Dolný, B. (2013). "Patterns of Democracy" Arendta Lijpharta a jeho kritika. *Annales Scientia Politica*, 2(1), pp. 10-19.
- Málová, D. and Haughton, T. (2001). *Emergence and Divergence: Institutional Change in Central and Eastern Europe and the Impact of Europe*. Florence: European University Institute.

- Mills, A., Durepos, G. and Wiebe, E. (2010). 'Replication' in Mills, A., Durepos, G. and Wiebe, E. (eds.) *The Encyclopedia of Case Study Research*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Mojsilovic, M. and Klacar, B. (2011). *Decentralisation In Serbia: From Inefficient State to Strong Local Self-Government*. [online]. Available at: http://www.centaronline.org/postavljen/64/1103_Serbia_PolicyPaper_Decentralisation.pdf (Accessed: 11 May 2021).
- National Democratic Institute. (2021). *Central and Eastern Europe*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.ndi.org/central-and-eastern-europe> (Accessed: 26. April 2021).
- Nichols, P.M. (1998). Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism and Analysis of the World Trade Organization. *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law*, pp. 461-511.
- Nkwachukwu, O. (2007). *Explaining the Institutionalisation of Power-sharing in Nigeria: A Hypothesis*. [online]. Available at: <https://politicalscience.ceu.edu/sites/politicalscience.ceu.hu/files/attachment/basicpage/59/orji.pdf> (Accessed: 19 April 2021).
- North, D.C. (1990). *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Novák, M. (2001). *Jakou demokracii pro nové demokracie? Konsensuální model, efektivit a kulturně homogenní země*. Prague: Charles University in Prague.
- O'Donnell, G. (1999). Delegative Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 5(5), pp. 55-69.
- OECD. (2001). *Glossary of Statistical Terms*. [online]. Available at: <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=303> (Accessed: 23 April 2021).
- Orlović, S. (2008). *Politički život Srbije – između partokratije i demokratije*. Belgrad: Službeni glasnik.
- Park, C. L. (2004). What is the value of replicating other studies? *Research Evaluation*, 13(3), pp. 189-195.
- Parsons, C. (2007). *How to Map Arguments in Political Science*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Peters, B.G. (1998). 'Political Institutions, Old and New' in Goodin, R.E. and Klingemann, H.D. (eds.) *A New Handbook of Political Science*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Péteri, G. (2016). *Decentralization in Eastern Europe: grab the moment!* [online]. Available at: <https://publicgoods.eu/decentralization-eastern-europe-grab-moment> (Accessed: 20 May 2021).
- Ponczek, C. B. (2021). *Addressing Polish and Hungarian domestic developments in broader context*. Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis.
- Powell, G.B. (1982). *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Putnam, R.D. (1993). What makes democracy work? *National Civic Review*, 82(2), pp. 101-107.
- Reynolds, A. (1999). *Electoral systems and democratization in southern Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rhodes, R.A.W. (2011). 'Old Institutionalism an Overview' in Goodin, R.E. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Roaf, J., Atoyan, R., Joshi, B. and Krogulski, K. (2014). *25 Years of Transition Post-Communist Europe and the IMF*. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
- Roberts, A. (2006). What kind of democracy is emerging in Eastern Europe? *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 22(1), pp. 37-64.
- Roessler, P. and Howard, P. (2009). 'Post-cold war political regimes: When do elections matter?' In Lindberg, S. (ed.) *Democratization by elections: A new mode of transition*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, pp. 101-127.
- Roller, E. (2005). *The Performance of Democracies: Political Institutions and Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rose, R. and Shin, D. Ch. (2001). Democratization backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 31(2), pp. 331-354.
- Sadurski, W. (2012). Judicial Review in Central and Eastern Europe: Rationales or Rationalizations? *Israel Law Review*, 42(3), pp. 500-527.
- Schmidt, V. (2008). Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11(1), pp. 303-326.
- Schmidt, V. (2010). Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth 'new institutionalism'. *European Political Science Review*, 2(1), pp. 1-25.
- Schmidt, V. (2014). 'Institutionalism' in Gibbons, M.T. (ed.) *The Encyclopedia of Political Thought*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 1836-1839.
- Schneider, A. (2003). Decentralization: Conceptualization and Measurement. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 38(3), pp. 32-56.
- Siaroff, A. (1999). Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies: Meaning and Measurement. *European Journal of Political Research*, 36(2), pp. 175-205.
- Simpser, A., Slater, D. and Wittenberg, J. (2018). Dead But Not Gone: Contemporary Legacies of Communism, Imperialism, and Authoritarianism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 21, pp. 419-439.
- Smith, D. B. (2019). *Enforcing a Right to an Independent Judiciary Against Hungary in Response to Forthcoming Implementation of New Administrative*. Chicago: University of Chicago Law School.
- Sonnicksen, J. and Tokatli, M. (2019). *Varieties of Parliamentarism. Towards a typology of parliamentary government*. [online]. Available at: <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/paperproposal/41e6c15e-87d4-49fa-834a-96e0bfc4d602.pdf> (Accessed: 19 April 2021).
- Spisak, A. (2017). *The Danube Valley: central Europe's answer to Silicon Valley*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/8bc3f48a-09ad-11e7-ac5a-903b21361b43> (Accessed: 26 April 2021)
- Stanzel, A. (2016). *China's Investment and Influence: The Future of 16 + 1 Cooperation*. London: European Council on Foreign Relations.

- Steiner, N.D. (2012). Testing for a Political Bias in Freedom House Democracy Scores: Are U.S. Friendly States Judged To Be More Democratic? *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 18, pp. 329-394
- Sustainable Governance Indicators. (2020). *To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?* [online]. Available at: https://www.sginetwork.org/2020/Democracy/Quality_of_Democracy/Rule_of_Law/Judicial_Review (Accessed: 11 May 2021).
- Szarek-Mason, P. (2010). *The European Union's Fight Against Corruption: The Evolving Policy Towards Member States and Candidate Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taagepera, R. (2003). Arend Lijphart's Dimensions of Democracy: Logical Connections and Institutional Design. *Political Studies*, 51(1), pp. 1-19.
- UCLG. (2016). *Subnational Governments around the World: Structure and Finance*. [online]. Available at: https://www.uclg.org/sites/default/files/global_observatory_of_local_finance-part_iii.pdf (Accessed: 18 May 2021).
- Van Cranenburgh, O. and Kopecký, P. (2004). Political Institutions in New Democracies: (Not so) Hidden Majoritarianism in Post-apartheid South Africa. *Acta Politica*, 39(3), pp. 279-296.
- Vatter, A. (2002). *Kantonale Demokratien im Vergleich: Entstehungsgründe, Interaktionen und Wirkungen politischer Institutionen in den Schweizer Kantonen*. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
- Vatter, A. (2009). Lijphart expanded: three dimensions of democracy in advanced OECD countries. *European Political Science Review*, 1(1), pp. 125-154.
- Visser, J. (2019). *ICTWSS Database*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute of Advanced Labor Studies.
- Von Soest, C. and Grauvogel, J. (2017). Identity, procedures and performance: how authoritarian regimes legitimize their rule. *Contemporary Politics*, 23(3), pp. 287-305.
- Vučičević, D. (2010). Lijphart's Conceptual Map of Democracy: The Case of Serbia. *Serbian Political Thought*, 1(2), pp. 41-59.
- Vukomanović, D. (2005). Dinamika partijskog sistema Srbije (1990-2005). *Srpska politička misao*, 14(1), pp. 29-52.
- Wahman, M., Teorell, J. and Hadenius, A. (2013). Authoritarian regime types revisited: Updated data in a comparative perspective. *Contemporary Politics*, 19(1), pp. 19-34.
- Wakelin, E. (2013). *EU Conditionality: An Effective Means for Policy Reform?* [online]. Available at: <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/43900> (Accessed: 20 April 2021).
- Whitehead, D. (2017). *What is replication in research?* [online]. Available at: <https://www.researchgate.net/post/What-is-replication-in-research> (Accessed: 4 May 2021).
- Wilsford, D. (2000). 'Studying Democracy and Putting It into Practice: The Contributions of Arend Lijphart to Democratic Theory and Actual Democracy' in Crepaz, M.M.L, Koelble, T.A. and Wilsford, D. (eds.) *Democracy and Institutions: The Life Work of Arend Lijphart*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 1-18.
- Wuttke, A. (2019). Why Too Many Political Science Findings Cannot be Trusted and What We Can Do About it? A Review of Meta-scientific Research and a Call for Institutional Reform. *German Political Science Quarterly*, 1(60), pp. 1-22.

Ziólkowski, M. (2020). Two Faces of the Polish Supreme Court After “Reforms” of the Judiciary System in Poland: The Question of Judicial Independence and Appointments. *European Papers*, 5(1), pp. 347-362.