The Political Economy of
the Territorial Regime in Post-Soviet Russia

by

Ekaterina Paustyan

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Abstract

This dissertation studies the dynamics of the territorial regime in post-Soviet Russia. It consists of three separate studies that employ Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The first study investigates the factors accounting for the signing of bilateral treaties between Moscow and the Russian regions in the period of 1994-1998. The results of the analysis suggest that President Yeltsin formed a broad coalition with both authoritarian and democratic regional heads by negotiating bilateral agreements with them. This strategy allowed Yeltsin to win the 1996 presidential election, yet in the long run, it had contributed to the preservation of authoritarian enclaves in Russia. These findings demonstrate that in a situation of high political polarization a multi-level territorial setting can push the national executive to interfere with a democratic process. The second study concerns gubernatorial incumbency and analyzes the factors accounting for the reappointment of incumbent governors by President Medvedev between 2008 and 2012. The results support the argument that the incumbents remain in office as long as they fulfill the main "federal priorities," that is, high electoral results and political stability. These findings suggest that being dependent on electoral results, the regional executives not only in the ethnic regions but also in the regions with a predominantly ethnic Russian population have influenced electoral outcomes mobilizing voters on behalf of the regime. Finally, the third study deals with politically sensitive transfers in Russia focusing on the case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup. The results of the analysis indicate that the distribution of federal transfers

that are sensitive to political bargaining is highly dependent on the political connections of regional elites rather than driven by the consistent strategy of the federal government. This finding is consistent with previous studies demonstrating that the regional governments in Russia play an important role in directing the flows of federal transfers. These results suggest that the move towards authoritarian federalism happened in Russia without fully sacrificing political authority of the regional governments. As a result, the multi-level territorial structure even in the authoritarian context causes some uncertainty, engenders certain flexibilities, and provides the power-sharing mechanisms that political actors can exploit.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The territorial regime reflects power dependencies of national political and territorial systems. It regulates the interactions between governments of sub-national units and the national government, and specifies the division of powers between them. Constitutions or supreme governing documents define the type of national territorial regime. In democracies, the territorial regime is embedded into the country's legislative framework and has inbuilt institutional safeguards (Filippov et al., 2004; Obydenkova and Swenden, 2013). Yet outside of the democratic context, both formal rules and informal practices shape the national territorial regime. For example, China is formally a unitary state but *de facto* its provinces enjoy significant autonomy with respect to economic policy. That is why China tends to be classified as an authoritarian federation rather than a unitary state (Libman and Rochlitz, 2019, 3-4).

Russia represents an even more striking example. The Constitution of the Russian Federation was adopted in 1993. Since then, the territorial and political regimes in Russia have changed dramatically–though without any significant constitutional reform. In the 1990s, the federation was decentralized and asymmetrical due to signed bilateral agreements between the regional governments and the federal government. After being

elected as president in 2000, Vladimir Putin initiated several reforms that aimed to re-centralize state power and to decrease asymmetrical federal practices yet did not eliminate these practices completely. For example, all bilateral agreements with the regional governments had been cancelled by the mid-2000s. The government of the Republic of Tatarstan, however, managed to negotiate a new agreement in 2007 that was signed for ten years and eventually expired in 2017.

Furthermore, in September 2004, President Putin proposed to abolish the direct elections of regional executives in all Russian regions. The appointment procedure was in force between February 2005 and October 2012, after that, direct elections were re-introduced. The decision to end gubernatorial elections *de facto* implied the abolishment of the term limit in office. As a result, some incumbent governors were reappointed and remained in office, with their tenure being not limited by any institutional constraints such as term limits or a compulsory retirement age.

Finally, since the early 2000s fiscal flows in Russia have become highly centralized, making the regional governments more dependent on federal transfers. In turn, the governments in some regions have developed various strategies to attract federal funds. For example, until recently the federal government generously funded celebrations commemorating millennial and centennial anniversaries of Russian cities such as 1100 years of Pskov in 2003, 1000 years of Kazan in 2005, 1000 years of Yaroslavl in 2010, and 300 years of Omsk in 2016 (Kommersant, 2014).

The transformation in Russia's territorial regime has been embedded in the change of the national political regime. The examples above, however, suggest that a centralized authoritarian regime still permits some asymmetrical practices. *To provide a better understanding of the interplay between the territorial and political regimes, this dissertation studies the political and economic factors accounting for the receipt of competencies, benefits, and resources from the center in post-Soviet Russia.* It consists of three studies.

1.1 Research questions

The first study investigates the bilateral treaty signing process between regional governments and the center between 1994 and 1998. Initially, the regional governments signed the Federation Treaty with the central government in March 1992. This treaty determined the extent of autonomy for the regions within the federation and, in fact, precluded a unitary arrangement for Russia (Busygina et al., 2018). The governments of the republics of Chechnya and Tatarstan, however, refused to sign the Federation Treaty and insisted on negotiating separate agreements with the center. The first treaty was prepared for Chechnya in October 1992, yet negotiations did not succeed (Shakhray, 2014). The first bilateral treaty with Moscow was eventually signed by the government of Tatarstan in 1994. In total, out of 89 regions, the governments of more than 40 regions signed similar bilateral agreements with the center between 1994 and 1998. Previous studies (Söderlund, 2003; Dusseault et al., 2005) explain why some regions signed treaties earlier than others and propose an economic explanation. However, more puzzling is why some regional governments managed to negotiate a treaty while others did not and what political factors accounted for a signed treaty. To investigate these issues, the first study raises the following research question: *What are the factors accounting for the signing of bilateral treaties with Moscow in the period of 1994-1998?*

The second study deals with a puzzle related to the tenure of incumbent governors in Russia. The decision of President Putin to abolish direct gubernatorial elections in 2004 implied the end of office term limits–the maximum of two five-year terms. As a result, while in some regions new governors were appointed, in other regions incumbent governors were reappointed and remained in office. There is consensus in the literature that the results of national elections determine the (re)appointment prospects of governors (Reuter and Robertson, 2012; Reuter, 2013; Rochlitz, 2016; Reisinger and Moraski, 2017). Since the

heads of ethnic regions deliver the highest electoral results (Reisinger and Moraski, 2010), we should expect that they have the best chances of staying in office. However, this is not the case. It is not the incumbents in the ethnic republics but the incumbents in the regions with a predominantly ethnic Russian population, *oblasts* and *krais*, that have remained in office the longest. For example, the governor of Belgorod Oblast, Evgeny Savchenko, has been in office since 1993 and is currently serving his seventh consecutive term; the region has not seen a transfer of power for the past quarter-century. To unpack the puzzle of gubernatorial tenure in Russia, the second study addresses the following research question: *What factors account for the reappointment of incumbent governors in Russia between 2008 and 2012?*

The third study concentrates on the distribution of federal transfers. Existing literature investigates if the center allocates transfers in favor of their core constituents or targets swing regions (Treisman, 1999; Popov, 2004; Starodubtsev, 2018). Recent studies, however, suggest that regional elites may have leverage over federal transfer policy (Sharafutdinova and Turovsky, 2017; Turovsky and Gaivoronsky, 2017). Although the amount of federal funds allocated to the regions has decreased due to the economic slowdown, the federal government still commits to expensive projects that boost politically sensitive transfers. For example, the 2014 Sochi Olympics became one of the most costly Olympic Games ever (Golubchikov, 2016). The FIFA World Cup hosted by Russia in 2018 similarly turned out to be the most expensive in its history (RBK, 2018b). The case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup is particularly compelling as out of fourteen initially nominated venues, eleven were selected to host the event. The results of the selection process came as a surprise for many observers, as the city of Krasnodar with two football clubs playing in the Russian Premier League was not selected while Saransk that had none was selected (Expert, 2012). To investigate these issues, the third study raises the following research question: *What factors account for the choice of venues for the 2018 FIFA World Cup Russia?*

1.2 Theoretical approach

This dissertation builds on the definition of a territorial regime proposed by Gibson (2012) who differentiates among different types of territorial regimes based on intergovernmental and inter-provincial dimensions. The former refers to a centralization-decentralization continuum and captures the degree of autonomy that sub-national units enjoy. The latter specifies how rights and prerogatives are distributed among the sub-national units and shows the extent of (un)even distribution of competencies among them (Gibson, 2012, 18-19).

Decentralization refers to a process through which powers, competencies, responsibilities, and/or resources are transferred from the central government to the lower-level governments (Falleti, 2005, 328). Three types of decentralization are theorized in the literature. *Administrative* decentralization means that the governments at lower levels can administer and deliver different social and administrative services. Sometimes, administrative decentralization also includes the devolution of decision-making authority over these policies (Falleti, 2005, 329). *Fiscal* decentralization implies that lower-level governments are granted some fiscal autonomy. It may include the policies that aim to increase the revenues at the lower level by creating new local taxes or delegating some tax competencies that were previously assigned to the national level. Finally, *political* decentralization includes policies that promote political authority or electoral capacities of sub-national actors (Falleti, 2005, 329).

The distribution of competencies, powers, responsibilities, and resources between the center and lower-level governments is traditionally perceived as a result of bargaining between them (Falleti, 2005). The researchers build on the assumption of "symmetrical autonomy" meaning that the competencies are transferred symmetrically among the constituent units of the state (Mcgarry, 2007). However, asymmetries are widely present

in multi-level territorial systems. Constitutional or *de jure* asymmetries imply that constituent units of the state have different levels of constitutionally guaranteed autonomy (Agranoff, 1999; Popelier and Sahadžić, 2019a). In turn, *de facto* asymmetries are not written in the constitution but rather result from the political practice as well as the actual implementation of law (Martinez-Vazquez, 2007).

Asymmetries are present in different aspects of decentralization. For example, with respect to *administrative* decentralization, sub-national units may have different competencies in different policy areas. With regard to *fiscal* decentralization, sub-national units may receive additional funds in a non-transparent manner. In the case of *political* decentralization, government officials in some sub-national units may be elected by the local residents while in others appointed by the center. The studies in this dissertation deal with these kind of asymmetries.

To explain their emergence, the dissertation combines actor-centered and institutional accounts suggesting the distribution of different competencies, powers, and responsibilities is a result of bargaining between national and sub-national politicians (Riker, 1964; Filippov et al., 2004; Filippov, 2005; Tafel, 2011). Different institutional arenas can accommodate the debates over the allocation of intergovernmental authority among federal and sub-national politicians. Intergovernmental bargaining can take place within formal state structures when sub-national politicians are embedded into the system of power-sharing institutions. Alternatively, intergovernmental bargaining takes place outside of formally established institutions and inevitably produces asymmetrical federal solutions. This dissertation concentrates on political and economic factors accounting for the emergence and persistence of asymmetrical practices in center-region relations in Russia over the last thirty years. The individual studies describe these factors more in detail.

1.3   Methodology

Previous analyses of center-region relations adopt either a large-N strategy or focus on single cases. The studies belonging to the first group aim to reveal an average or net "effect" of one independent variable keeping everything else constant. For example, in their analysis, Dusseault et al. (2005, 122) study "what independent variable has the most explanatory power analyzing failure or success in the bilateral treaty process." They found that economic issues were the main significant determinant of the bilateral process. This type of analysis assumes that such an "effect" is symmetrical across different kinds of cases. However, if economic issues were the main factor determining why some regions signed a bilateral treaty earlier than others, then why was Moscow, the richest Russian region, the last to receive a treaty? Furthermore, why was the mayor of Moscow, Yury Luzhkov, ordered to prepare the draft of a treaty immediately after Yeltsin's re-election in 1996?[1] The context matters and it shapes the outcome. For this reason, the studies in the second group take a causes-of-effects perspective on causality (Mahoney, 2010; Goertz and Mahoney, 2012; Rohlfing, 2012), which suggests explaining "why specific cases have particular outcomes" rather than estimating "the average effect of particular independent variables" (Mahoney, 2010, 132). Such studies opt for providing in-depth understanding of single cases (Stoner-Weiss, 1997; Gel'man et al., 2000; Petrov and Titkov, 2010).

The strength of these types of studies is that they employ the unique data collected by the researchers themselves. In contrast, quantitative analyses tend to rely on existing data. In the Russian case, data availability and quality is an important issue. For example, during the 1990s the Russian Federal State Statistical Office (*Rosstat*) provided only fragmented statistical data on Russian regions. Data on the composition of the gross regional product

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[1]Kommersant (1996).

are available starting from 1995. More systematic regional data are accessible only for the period from the late 1990s-early 2000s yet the quality of official data sources still leaves much to be desired. On the other hand, the challenge for qualitative studies is how to draw lessons for other cases; large-N analyses typically do not have this problem of generalizability. To combine the strengths of both approaches and to identify regularities that are sensitive to cases and contexts, the studies in this dissertation employ Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) introduced by Ragin (1987). This method represents a novel procedure for "identifying and generalizing about the causes of outcomes in individual cases and sets of comparable cases" (Mahoney, 2010, 133). By combining the elements of variable-oriented and case-oriented methods, QCA provides more opportunities for making inferences regarding the cases.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis is a set-theoretic method. All set-theoretic methods share four main similarities. First, they operate on membership scores of cases in sets. For example, the Russian Federation is a post-Soviet country, meaning that the Russian Federation has a full membership in a set of post-Soviet countries. It is very important that the analysis does not operate on existing data. The raw data are first collected but then calibrated or transformed into membership scores of cases in sets. Second, set-theoretic methods perceive relations between social phenomena as set relations. For example, out of 85 Russian regions, 49 are oblasts. This means that a set of Russian regions is then a superset of the set of oblasts. Third, set-theoretic methods reveal necessary and sufficient conditions. Necessary conditions imply that if we remove or change them, we also remove or change the outcome. Sufficient conditions mean that once they occur, the outcome is destined to occur. Finally, set-theoretic methods emphasize causal complexity unfolding through equifinality, conjunctural causation, and asymmetry (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Equifinality means that several conditions or combinations of conditions can produce the same outcome; therefore,

there might be several sufficient paths to an outcome. Conjunctural causation refers to a situation when a single condition leads to the outcome only in a combination with other conditions and may not produce the outcome on its own. Finally, asymmetry suggests that the absence of conditions leading to the outcome may not lead to the absence of the outcome. For this reason, the analysis of occurrence and non-occurrence of the outcome is performed separately. Furthermore, it implies multifinality, meaning that the same factor can produce different outcomes depending on the context. Qualitative Comparative Analysis differs from other set-theoretic methods because it aims at causal interpretation, makes use of truth tables, and relies on the principle of logical minimization (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The individual studies explain its protocol in detail.

1.4   Scope of the studies

The territorial regime defines vertical relations between the national and regional governments, and regulates horizontal interactions among sub-national units (Gibson, 2012, 17). The focus of this dissertation is on intergovernmental interactions, in particular, on vertical relationships between the central government and regional governments. It neither studies the horizontal interactions among sub-national units nor considers local or municipal levels because they require separate and more detailed analysis. In addition, the studies in this dissertation deal with governmental actors and do not investigate interactions with non-state actors (Alcantara et al., 2016; Behnke et al., 2019).

The Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted in 1993 listed 89 sub-national units: 49 oblasts, 21 republics, six krais, two cities of federal significance, ten autonomous okrugs, and one autonomous oblast. In the dissertation, I refer to all of them as 'regions.' Between 2004 and 2008 came the next wave of territorial changes. Six autonomous okrugs merged with five oblasts and krais. As a result, the number of autonomous okrugs decreased to

four, out of which three okrugs still territorially belong to oblasts but one does not belong to any region. Due to these changes the number of sub-national units in Russia decreased to 83. Figure 1.1 below displays the map of the Russian Federation as of the end of 2012 and shows the regions included in the three analyses.[2]

Figure 1.1: Map of the Russian Federation

Note: The regions included in the analyses are in dark grey.

The temporal and spacial scope of the studies in the dissertation are as follows. The first empirical study concentrates on the period between 1994 and 1998 when the bilateral treaties were signed. The second study focuses on the period of 2008-2012 that corresponds to the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev. As previous accounts suggest that Medvedev was

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[2]In March 2014, Russia annexed two Ukrainian territories, Crimea and Sevastopol, meaning that since then there are 85 sub-national units in Russia. These two regions are not considered in the dissertation. The regions that are not included in any of the three studies are the following: Adygea, Gorno-Altay, Karachay-Cherkessia, Chechnya, as well as Kamchatka, Chita, Pskov, Smolensk, Tula, Tyumen, and Nenets, Chukotka, Yamalo-Nenets, and Khanty-Mansy autonomous okrugs.

unwilling to reappoint incumbent governors (e.g., Turovskii, 2010), the analysis explores why he still reappointed some of them. Finally, the last study focuses on the period from January 2007 to October 2012 starting from two years preceding the announcement by the Russian Football Union that Russia would bid for the FIFA World Cup and ending in September 2012 when the final list of selected championship venues was announced.

1.5 Outline and main findings

To reveal the factors accounting for the signing of center-region treaties, the first study examines the interplay of the following four factors: demanding sovereignty, having an elected executive, voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election, and having the status of a donor region. Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 64 cases reveals two sufficient combinations of conditions leading to a signed treaty, namely, voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election and having the status of a donor region or having an appointed executive and voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election. These results imply that Yeltsin built a broad coalition by signing bilateral treaties with the heads of authoritarian ethnic regions as well as with the heads of democratic regions with a predominantly ethnic Russian population. This strategy allowed Yeltsin to win the 1996 presidential election. Yet, in the long term, it contributed to the preservation of authoritarian regimes in Russia. These findings support the argument by Gibson (2012) that continuity of sub-national authoritarian enclaves is conditional upon the strategies of coalition-building employed by a national executive. They confirm previous studies demonstrating that the authoritarian regression in the 2000s was embedded in the center-region relations of the 1990s (Golosov, 2011). The new insight of the analysis is that in a situation of high political polarization multi-level territorial settings can push the incumbent to interfere with a democratic process.

The second study unpacks the puzzle related to the tenure of incumbent governors by investigating the interplay of the four factors: the ability of governors to mobilize voters, to keep stability in the regions, the effectiveness of governors in managing their territories, and the popularity of governors. Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 26 cases reveals that the ability to mobilize voters and deliver high voting results at national elections, contrary to expectation, has not guaranteed the reappointment of incumbent governors. On the other hand, the failure to deliver high electoral results has been among sufficient conditions leading to the dismissal of incumbents. The analysis also detects two sufficient combinations of conditions accounting for gubernatorial reappointment that confirm the argument that incumbents remain in office as long as they fulfill the main "federal priorities," that is, high electoral results and political stability (Busygina et al., 2018; Libman and Rochlitz, 2019). These findings suggest that being dependent on electoral results, the regional executives not only in the ethnic regions but also in the regions with a predominantly ethnic Russian population have influenced electoral outcomes by mobilizing voters on behalf of the regime.

Finally, to explore the distribution of politically sensitive transfers in Russia, the third study examines the interplay of the ability of regional elites to deliver high voting results and to keep stability in the regions, the administrative capacity of the regions, and the lobbying power of governors. Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 14 cases reveals that the lobbying power of governors has been necessary for the selection as a World Cup venue. These results are consistent with the previous literature, confirming that regional governments in Russia influence the distribution of politically sensitive transfers. Taking into account that these transfers have been increasing over the past years, it is no surprise that the regional elites have developed various lobbying strategies and mechanisms for attracting them.

1.6 Contribution

The Russian case demonstrates that a multi-level territorial setting creates unpredictable power dynamics in center-region relations. In the early 1990s, a national democratic regime coexisted with emerging sub-national authoritarian regimes. The findings of the first study are consistent with previous literature suggesting that as early as the mid-1990s the regional governments became pivotal in determining the outcome of national election (Golosov, 2011; Reisinger and Moraski, 2017). President Yeltsin was the first who used the political resources of authoritative governors during his 1996 presidential campaign. Later, President Putin employed this model of center-region relations nationwide. Existing studies suggest that the ability of regional elites to deliver high electoral results has become a crucial element of intra-elite bargaining and territorial politics in Russia more generally.

The studies in this dissertation, however, show that high voting results could not guarantee alone either the reappointment of incumbent governors or the receipt of politically sensitive transfers. On the other hand, the failure to deliver high voting results has been among sufficient conditions leading to dismissal of incumbent governors as well as to the non-receipt of federal additional funds. In contrast to the 1990s, the model of the intergovernmental interactions emerged in the 2000s suggests that high voting results are not necessary for being rewarded by the center. However, the failure to do so is sufficient for being punished by the center.

This dissertation also contributes to the scholarship on methodology to study multi-level politics. Set-theoretic reasoning has been present in the literature on federalism and multi-level governance since Riker (1964). He argued that the two necessary conditions of the federal bargain are "the expansion condition" and "the military condition" (Riker, 1964, 12). The former refers to the unwillingness or inability of central elites to impose centralization by force. The latter means the need for a military and diplomatic unity. He

also suggested that these two conditions together are sufficient (Riker, 1964, 13). However, at that time he was not able to assess the hypothesis of sufficiency and asserted only the hypothesis of necessity, studying "all the instances of the creation of a federalism" (Riker, 1964, 13). Today, with the analytical leverage of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987) and the development of specialized software (Oana and Schneider, 2018; Dusa, 2019), researchers studying territorial politics are able to assess the hypotheses of necessity and sufficiency. The studies in this dissertation represent the first attempts to utilize QCA for the study of center-region relations in Russia. Their findings suggest that this methodology can reveal hidden complexities in the functioning of multi-level territorial systems.

1.7 Thesis structure

The thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter outlines the interplay between the political and territorial regimes in Russia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The third chapter investigates the political economy of center-region agreements signed between 1994 and 1998. The fourth chapter explains the puzzle of gubernatorial turnover, studying reappointments of incumbent governors in the period of 2008-2012. The fifth chapter deals with politically sensitive transfers studying the case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup Russia. The final chapter concludes.

Chapter 2

From democratic to authoritarian federalism? Conceptualizing Russia's territorial regime

2.1 Introduction

'Territorial regime' refers to how politics is organized across territory. It is embedded into the national political regime, which determines the power-sharing mechanisms between the national and sub-national actors. The two main dimensions of a territorial regime are the extent of (de)centralization and the degree of (a)symmetry (Gibson, 2012). Existing literature tends to concentrate on the (de)centralization dimension assuming "symmetrical autonomy" among the constituent units of the state (Mcgarry, 2007). In practice, asymmetrical arrangements are quite widespread in multi-level territorial systems due to the heterogeneity of sub-national units' size, population, structural endowments and cultures (Tarlton, 1965). As these differences are present in federal and even unitary states today, they are not regarded as distinctive (Kahn, 2002). Instead, scholars focus on

constitutional asymmetry, which implies that constituent units of the state enjoy different levels of constitutionally guaranteed autonomy (Agranoff, 1999; Mcgarry, 2007; Popelier and Sahadžić, 2019a). For example, section 133 of the British North America Act (1867) states that the English and French languages "can be used in the legislature of Canada and Quebec as well as in Courts" and does not mention any other provinces (Gagnon and Garon, 2019, 93). Similarly, Article 68 of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation grants to the ethnic regions, republics, the right to have own official language in addition to the Russian language.

However, the Russian case is particularly compelling because following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has featured many other asymmetries which were not written in the Constitution but rather resulted from political practice as well as the implementation of certain laws (Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). Although the extent of *de jure* asymmetries in Russia today is much more modest than twenty years ago (Kremyanskaya, 2019), *de facto* asymmetries in center-region interactions still remain. For example, in December 2010, President Medvedev signed a Federal Law that prohibited calling the heads of Russia's republics 'presidents.' By 2015, twenty republics had eliminated the position of the president. However, Tatarstan remains an exception as its head is still called the president. Similarly, police in Russia are exclusively subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs; however, the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has his own private army of more than 5000 highly trained, personally loyal soldiers. They formally belong to a motorized regiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs but in fact act as Kadyrov's personal protective service (The New Times, 2016).

While the transformation in Russia's territorial regime has been directly linked to the change in the national political regime, the examples above suggest that a centralized authoritarian regime in Russia still permits some asymmetrical federal practices. This chapter suggests that in the absence of institutionalized federal structure intergovernmental

interactions take place outside of formal state institutions. The Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted in 1993, failed to institutionalize intergovernmental bargaining venues. At the same time, it provided for strong chief and regional executives. As a result, center-region interactions have taken the shape of executive bargaining. In contrast to institutionalized bargaining that takes place within central state structures, executive bargaining takes place in the form of spontaneous and less institutionalized interactions occurring outside of formally established institutions. Even in an authoritarian setting, the multi-level territorial system creates power-sharing mechanisms that political actors fully exploit. Their informal interactions inevitably lead to asymmetrical federal solutions. The next section in this chapter outlines the dimensions of territorial regimes and then links them to national political regimes.

2.2 Linking territorial and political regimes

Unitarism and federalism represent two distinctive types of territorial regimes. Within each type there can be significant institutional variation (Gibson, 2012). While many states have distinct features of federal or unitary systems, there are more and more examples of states that combine elements of both systems in varying configurations (Watts, 2013, 19). For example, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom have evolved in such a way that their classification as unitary or federal is a matter of debate (Watts, 2013; Popelier and Sahadžić, 2019a). Both unitary and federal states can be classified according to the extent of (de)centralization and the degree of (a)symmetry.

Decentralization is a process of state reform through which powers, competencies, responsibilities, and resources are transferred from the central government to the governments at lower levels (Falleti, 2005, 328). Usually, three types of decentralization are central in the literature (Rodden, 2004; Falleti, 2005; Treisman, 2007). *Administrative*

decentralization implies that the lower-level governments administer and deliver such social services as education, healthcare, social welfare, or housing. In some cases, administrative decentralization may also entail the transfer of decision-making authority over these policies (Falleti, 2005, 329). *Fiscal* decentralization means that sub-national governments are granted some fiscal autonomy. It may also include the policies that aim to increase the revenues of sub-national governments, for example, by creating new sub-national taxes or delegating tax authority that was previously national. Finally, *political* decentralization refers to the set of policies that promote political authority or electoral capacities of sub-national actors (Falleti, 2005, 329).

Researchers have traditionally perceived the distribution of different competencies, powers, responsibilities, and resources between the center and lower-level governments as a result of bargaining between them (Falleti, 2005). They build on the assumption of "symmetrical autonomy" meaning that the competencies are devolved symmetrically among the constituent units of the state (Mcgarry, 2007). However, asymmetries are present in multi-level territorial systems due to the differences among the sub-national units' geography, population, resource endowments, culture, or language (Tarlton, 1965). These differences are widespread in federal and unitary states. In fact, it is impossible to construct a state composed of units that are symmetrical in all respects (Kahn, 2002).

Asymmetry can be present in different aspects of decentralization. For example, with respect to administrative decentralization, sub-national units may have different competencies to set salaries or fire and hire personnel. With regard to fiscal decentralization, sub-national units may have different revenue assignments or tax authorities, or receive additional funds in a non-transparent manner. In the cases of political decentralization, government officials in some sub-national units may be selected or appointed by the residents without any interference from the center (Martinez-Vazquez, 2007, 246).

Constitutional or *de jure* asymmetries are of particular interest to legal scholars as they refer to differences in status, prerogatives, and competencies, as well as fiscal power among constituent units of the state (Stepan, 2000; Popelier and Sahadžić, 2019b). By contrast, *de facto* asymmetries are not reflected in law but rather result from informal practices in center-region relations (Martinez-Vazquez, 2007, 246). *De jure* as well as *de facto* asymmetries may lead to a situation when some sub-national units enjoy privileges in their status, competencies and/or fiscal powers, or, on the contrary, are disadvantaged in comparison with other sub-national units. The Basque Country in Spain, for example, has larger fiscal autonomy than other entities (Popelier and Sahadžić, 2019b, 6). In Canada, Yukon, Nunavut, and the Northwest Territories have a less autonomy compared with other territories (Mcgarry, 2007, 114). Asymmetry is present in federal and unitary states that transfer different degrees of autonomy to their constituent units depending on the demands advanced by these units (Congleton et al., 2003; Conversi, 2007).

The territorial regime is embedded into the national political regime, meaning that (de)centralization and (a)symmetry are present in democracies and autocracies. Existing research tends to concentrate on decentralization in democracies. Much less is known about factors promoting decentralization in autocracies. A common view until recently was that autocracies "are unlikely to decentralize power" because decentralization can be risky for the stability of the regime (Falleti, 2011, 138). Yet the cases of China (Landry, 2008) and Kazakhstan (Busygina et al., 2018) suggest that autocrats actively promote fiscal and administrative decentralization while refraining from any kind of political decentralization keeping local officials under control.

All long-standing democracies, whether unitary or federal, display some degree of asymmetry. For example, Scotland has an asymmetrical status within the United Kingdom, operating its own parliament, legal and educational systems as well as with its own church (Stepan, 2000, 143). In Belgium, Brussels has status of a separate region along with

Flanders and Wallonia (Swenden, 2002). Asymmetrical center-region relations are similarly present in autocracies. For example, Hong Kong and Macau in China are among the most fiscally autonomous regions in the world (Buhi, 2019, 123).

Consequently, authority is distributed between the governments at different levels in unitary and federal systems in a similar way. The key distinction between them is in the location of ultimate political authority. In unitary states, the central government retains the ultimate authority. Although the central government may grant administrative or fiscal competencies to constituent units, it may overrule them on any matter (Watts, 2013, 20). In turn, in federal states, constituent units actively cooperate with the central government to make certain policy decisions (Rodden, 2004, 489). Bargaining, through which authority is distributed and then re-distributed between the constituent units and the center is quite distinctive in federal states. It is largely shaped by the national political regime. The next section elaborates on the process of authority distribution in democratic and authoritarian federations.

2.3   Democratic and authoritarian federalism

In his seminal book on federalism, Riker (1964, 11) defined a state as federal if the following conditions are met: "(1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee . . .   of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere." Yet due to a recent drive for decentralization, today central governments even in unitary states tend to delegate their responsibilities to lower-level governments granting them autonomy to deal with certain policy issues.

Federal systems are commonly defined today as polities combining self-rule with shared-rule (Elazar, 1987, 12).[3] Two mechanisms establish institutional linkages between the constituent units and the federal center. Inter-institutional mechanisms create "authority relationships" of self-rule assigning competencies among sub-national units and the federal center independently of each other (Broschek, 2013, 98-99). Intra-institutional mechanisms establish "authority relationships" of shared-rule by ensuring that sub-national units are represented on the federal level (Broschek, 2013, 98-99). A combination of institutions emphasizing self-rule and shared-rule is present in every federation, yet in different variations making each federal union unique (Kropp, 2019, 216).

A particular federal design is an ultimate outcome of the bargaining among national and sub-national politicians (Riker, 1964; Filippov et al., 2004; Filippov, 2005; Tafel, 2011). The original federal bargain represents an agreement between national and sub-national politicians regarding their competencies and the rules that will structure their interactions in the future. Federal bargains are generally reflected in the constitutional language that protects autonomy of the constituent units. A national constitution defines the formal structure of the federal government. It describes how the executive, legislative, and judicial powers are implemented, if there are regular elections, and who qualifies as a citizen. The credibility of constitutional provisions requires the presence of a strong, independent constitutional court (Rodden, 2004, 489-490). Such informal elements as the party system and political culture result from the functioning of formal and informal institutions (Bednar, 2008, 4).

Furthermore, the participation of constituent units in central government decision-making is essential for federations. Majorities or even super majorities of the

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[3]Federalism represents a normative term referring to a particular ideology or practice and broadly means "the advocacy of multi-tiered government combining elements of shared-rule and regional self-rule" (King, 1982; Watts, 2008, 8).

constituent units may be required for a wide range of policy changes. Finally, according to Riker (1964, 51), it is "the structure of the system of political parties ... [that] encourages or discourages the maintenance of the federal bargain." The electoral incentives of political parties are important parts of the design and practice of intergovernmental interactions because political parties facilitate coalition-building between national and regional politicians (Busygina et al., 2018, 61). There is a significant difference in how intergovernmental bargaining is institutionalized in democracies and autocracies.

Democratic federations have multi-layer governmental structures and the chief policy makers are publicly elected at each level (Filippov et al., 2004, 9). In democratic federations, the principles of self-rule and shared-rule are embedded in the constitution. They specify how the constituent units participate in the central decision-making that affects their interests. The debates over the allocation of intergovernmental authority among federal and sub-national politicians in democracies tend to take place within formally established institutions.[4] Institutionalized bargaining concerns the distribution of the costs and benefits of specific policies and reforms as well as the definition of jurisdictional boundaries (Filippov et al., 2004, 77). Constitutional courts have sufficient power to resolve disputes between the center and regions (Obydenkova and Swenden, 2013, 88). These institutional "safeguards" go together with a developed multi-level party system where political parties represent the platforms binding together political candidates (Riker, 1964; Bednar, 2008; Filippov and Shvetsova, 2013). Sub-national politicians, embedded into the system of formal democratic institutions, typically have a motivation to maintain the federal bargain.

However, in large federal democracies authoritarian sub-national regimes can coexist together with a democratic national center (Gibson, 2005, 2012). Such coexistence creates

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[4]Institutions broadly refer to formal and informal "rules of the game" (North, 1995).

a situation of "regime juxtaposition," which occurs when two tiers of government with authority over the same territory function under different sets of norms, rules, and practices that govern the selection and behavior of national leaders. "Regime juxtaposition" leads to constant tensions between sub-national and national arenas, and creates "strategic challenges" for sub-national authoritarian incumbents (Gibson, 2012, 5). Sub-national authoritarian incumbents undermine the democratic political process by establishing "boundary control" that prevents political competition at the regional level (Gibson, 2012, 25). The coexistence of sub-national authoritarian enclaves together with a democratic national center contributes to hybridization of national territorial and political regimes.

The persistence of authoritarian enclaves depends on the strategies of territorial control pursued by the local elites as well as on the strategies of governance and coalition-building employed by a democratically elected national government (Gibson, 2012). Presidential control over authoritarian enclaves is vital for turning undemocratic incumbents into allies. As authoritarian regional executives control local electoral processes, they may be attractive political allies and important providers of votes at national elections. The possibility to control sub-national autocrats creates an incentive for the national executive to sustain rather than dismantle authoritarian enclaves (Giraudy, 2013, 61).

Democratic transition entailing dismantlement of authoritarian enclaves can happen either due to party-led or center-led transition (Gibson, 2012, 32). In the former case, sub-national democratization occurs through party competition as the leaders of national political parties build a coalition with regional opposition parties and invest their resources to defeat the incumbent party. The strengthening of regional party capabilities by national parties is the mechanism driving change in the local power balance. In the latter case, democratic transition results from the intervention by national state authorities leading to the "exogenous reorganization" of the regional rules and the shift in the power balance (Gibson, 2012, 32). The inverse process of "territorial authoritarianization," meaning the

transformation from sub-national authoritarianism to national autocracy, has not been sufficiently theorized in the existing literature.

Conventional theories of federalism question the possibility to conceptualize authoritarian settings as federal. Autocracies undermine the principle of vertical separation of powers making the federal structure a mere formality (Livingston, 1956; Benz and Sonnicksen, 2017; Kropp, 2019). The case of the Soviet Union suggests that a vertically integrated party structure maintains a hierarchical concentration of power and resources, and does not allow for any territorial dispersion of power (Burgess and Gagnon, 2010). In contrast, Filippov et al. (2004, 9-10; 89) argue that the Soviet Union was "ostensibly federal" yet not democratic, however, the mechanisms of its survival were similar to those that "encouraged stability in any democratic federation, although they were not based on any system of formal constitutional incentives." In his book on federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Keil (2014, 23-24) details "the Socialist Tradition of Federalism" and argues that:

> The application of federalism in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia . . . took place outside of a democratic framework since it was undermined by one-party rule. The fundamental element of "self-rule" and "shared-rule" was, therefore, not implemented since the leaders of the sub-units and the leaders of central level did not have opposite interests.

The main implication of this "tradition" is that the party members had the possibility to champion greater autonomy for their regions via informal channels. As a result, some regions enjoyed "more rights, more funds and resources, and more independent ethnic policies" (Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999, 67). The centralized power structure left extensive space for intergovernmental bargaining, though it was not formally institutionalized in the Soviet constitution. Although there were debates among scholars concerning the federal nature of the Soviet Union, no one questioned its authoritarian nature. Authoritarian

regimes today are more sophisticated in their organization, combining the authoritarian distribution of power with such institutions that are normally associated with democracy: elections, legislatures, and political parties (Schedler, 2002, 2006; Levitsky and Way, 2002). In such regimes, multi-level territorial settings create additional challenges for the central elites, who must balance between delegating some autonomy to sub-national elites and trying to keep them under control. Multi-level territorial structures in autocracies engenders some uncertainty, incorporates certain flexibilities, and contains power-sharing mechanisms that political actors can exploit (Kropp, 2019, 217-218).

As the political process in autocracies is centered on the results of national elections, the ability of regional executives to mobilize voters represents an important asset in bargaining with the center. However, in contrast to democracies, where regional elites' commitment to a federal bargain is rooted in political incentives, in autocracies such incentives do not provide for corresponding commitment. Instead, the center may compensate troublesome constituent units with generous transfers (Busygina et al., 2011, 9-10). As a result, the executive bargaining in autocracies may provoke two contradicting logics of center-region interactions. On the one hand, the center, being dependent on the regional elites during national elections, may reward politically loyal regions. On the other hand, taking into account the informal nature of elite interactions, the most connected regional elites may extract more resources from the center. In autocracies, the federal bargain is maintained by complex interactions between regional and central elites who are interested in the preservation of status quo that enables them to preserve their power and extract resources from the state. The next section defines the territorial regime in Russia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

2.4 Defining the territorial regime in post-Soviet Russia

2.4.1 The legacy of the Soviet territorial regime

The Russian Empire was largely unitary, governed by the Tsar with unlimited authority. At the same time, it had certain features of a confederation, as some of its regions had special status.[5] Following the 1917 October Revolution, the Russian Empire was renamed into the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Its 1918 Constitution declared that the country was a republic and a federation. With the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922, it became the largest republic. Between 1923 and 1929, the State Planning Committee (*Gosplan*) had been implementing the territorial reform that aimed to create large territories based on the principle of economic regionalization (Shishkov, 2009, 67). As a result, the territorial structure had been significantly modified. Oblasts and krais fully replaced *gubernii* and ethnic regions that were non-existent in Tsarist Russia emerged. The number of the regions varied during the Soviet times.[6]

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[5]The Russian Empire was divided into *gubernii*, *oblasti* and *gradonachal'stva*; each of which was governed by the common or special rule. The territories governed by the common rule historically belonged to the core of the Russian state, while the territories governed by the special rule were integrated as the result of military campaigns or exploration. The common rule was spread over 49 *gubernii* in the European part of the country. The special rule was spread over nine *gubernii* of the Kingdom of Poland; six *gubernii*, four *oblasti* and two *okrugs* of the Caucasus Krai; the TransCaspian Oblast; three *oblasti* of the Turkestan Krai; five *oblasti*; two *general-gubernatorstva*; two *gubernii* and other conquered tribes (Svod Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1892). The Grand Duchy of Finland was not mentioned by the Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire as it had autonomous status with its own constitution and parliament. Governors (*gubernatory*) were appointed by the Tsar to rule these territories. Along with *gubernii*, there were larger territorial units, *general-gubernatorstva* that typically included several *gubernii* or *oblasti*. *General-gubernatorstva* were located mostly in the border regions, on ethnic territories. Moscow and Saint Petersburg had also a status of *general-gubernatorstv* and were ruled by governors-general. The Provisional Government established following the 1917 February Revolution abolished *general-gubernatorstva* and replaced governors with *gubernskie komissary* who were appointed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Pyzhikov, 2003, 162-163).

[6]The 1937 Constitution listed all constituing units for the first time. They included six krais, 49 oblasts, 16 autonomous soviet socialist republics, and five autonomous oblasts. The 1978 Constitution fixed further changes in the territorial structure: along with 76 pre-existing sub-national units it named two cities of

Contemporary Russia–the Russian Federation–inherited the Soviet territorial structure as defined in the 1978 Constitution.[7] It was created based on both ethnic and territorial principles (Smirniagin, 1998; Busygina and Taukebaeva, 2015). The constituent units displayed large disparities in their territory, population, ethnic composition, as well as in economic and industrial resources (Obydenkova, 2004). Furthermore, the Communist party played an essential role in keeping diverse territories of the Soviet Union together (Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999, 67). The first secretaries of the Regional Committees of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (*ispolkomy*) made the key decisions in the regions along with the chairmen of the Regional Executive Committees of the Soviets of People's Deputies. The first secretaries being built into the vertically organized power structure were used to extensive bargaining with the center.

2.4.2   Russia's hybrid territorial and political regimes

The executives in the center and the regions were largely outgrows of the old Communist power apparatus and were unified in their interest to preserve their power (Heinemann-Grüder, 2002, 153). In March 1992, the regional executives signed the

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"republican subordination" as well as ten autonomous okrugs that constituted parts of oblasts and krais. They included autonomous soviet socialist republics, autonomous oblasts, and later - national okrugs. Autonomous oblasts and national okrugs constituted parts of either oblasts or krais. Therefore, in the Soviet Union the major distinction between oblasts and krais was that the latter used to include an autonomous oblast (Smirniagin, 1998).

[7]Yet several changes in the status of some regions took place between 1990 and 1993. The number of republics within Russia increased from 16 to 21. In 1992, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic split into two parts, the Republic of Chechnya and the Republic of Ingushetia. Moreover, out of five, four autonomous oblasts that used to be parts of krais (Adygeia, Gorno-Altay, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Khakassia) obtained the status of a republic. The remaining autonomous oblast (the Jewish Autonomous Oblast) exited Khabarovsk Krai and became a separate territorial unit. Chukotka Autonomous Okrug similarly exited Magadan Oblast and became a separate territorial unit in 1993 but nine other autonomous okrugs remained parts of krais and oblasts (Smirniagin, 1998, 22). To prevent further territorial changes, President Yeltsin signed a special law that imposed a moratorium on changes in the territorial structure and established a transition period until July 1995.

Federation Treaty with the central government formally expressing their intention to preserve the territorial integrity of the country (Busygina et al., 2018, 65). The heads of the republics of Chechnya and Tatarstan, however, refused to sign the Treaty and insisted on negotiating to negotiate separate arrangements with the center. The first bilateral treaty with Chechnya was finalized in October 1992, yet negotiations failed. Increasing tensions between the republic and the center eventually led to the Chechen war of 1994-1996. In the meantime, preparatory work on the treaty with Tatarstan started. It was finalized and signed in February 1994, following the adoption of the new Constitution of the Russian Federation in December 1993.

The Constitution established a super-presidential system with the chief executive having extensive legislative and judicial powers (Articles 85 and 90). On the other hand, the federal legislation provided for strong regional executives who obtained sufficient powers at the expense of legislatures (Gel'man et al., 2000; Golosov, 2018). The Constitution also prescribed that all regions are entitled to have their chief executives elected, yet failed to specify the modes of their selection (Golosov, 2018, 2). While initially regional executives were supposed to be elected by the population of the regions, the national executive received provisional powers from the parliament to appoint and dismiss them following the antidemocratic coup d'etat in August 1991. The ethnic republics, however, passed their own legislation, which instituted executives either elected by the population or appointed by the regional legislative assemblies. Until 1996, when the first country-wide gubernatorial elections took place, President Yeltsin appointed and dismissed regional executives in all regions (with the exception of the ethnic republics and some other regions).

Though regional executives were directly elected starting in 1996, the president's constitutional prerogatives made them dependent on the central government in matters that could facilitate regional incumbency, such as access to federal property and tax cuts. On the other hand, popularly elected governors who could not be dismissed by the center

might create alternative centers of personal popularity and power. More importantly, they could alienate any prospects for electoral support of the national executive in their regions. Because the electoral system was easily corrupted, candidates for the national executive became highly dependant on regional executives for "support" in any electoral campaign (Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1997, 40).

Such concentration of executive power at the expense of legislatures discouraged the development of a national party system (Hale, 2007). Before 2003, the majority of regional legislative assemblies were elected on the basis of single-member districts and first-past-the-post electoral systems. As a result, most deputies between 1999 and 2003 were elected as independents (Reuter, 2013, 107). The lower chamber of the Russian parliament (the State Duma) was similarly formed in such a way that failed to promote the formation of regionally based political parties. Up until the 2003 State Duma elections, only a minority of parties had country wide organization "to glue the federation together" (Ross, 2005, 348). In turn, the upper chamber of the parliament (the Federation Council) was controlled by the regional executives. It was comprised of two representatives from each region, including the regional executive and the head of the regional legislative assembly. Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1997, 40) pointed out that the power triangle formed by the State Duma, Federation Council, and Presidency could open the door to a balanced federal system. To avoid deadlocks, it might stimulate political elites in all branches at all levels to rely on parties as their main coordinating mechanism. However, the deficiencies inbuilt in Russia's federal structure have blocked this scenario and executive bargaining became a key mechanism for coordinating center-region interests.

The shared-rule dimension of Russian federalism was realized not via formal parliamentary debates in the Federation Council but rather through bilateral informal negotiations of regional executives (Filippov et al., 2004; Obydenkova and Swenden, 2013). Between 1994 and 1998, the regional executives of more than 40 regions followed

Tatarstan and negotiated similar bilateral treaties with the president. The treaties granted additional autonomy to the regions and specified the general principles of the division of powers between the federal and regional governments. Each treaty was supplemented by additional agreements concerning more specific policy issues. The number and scope of these agreements varied from region to region "depending on particular policy concerns and resource endowments" (Stoner-Weiss, 1999, 91).

This bilateral process became detrimental not only for the development of federalism but also for the development of democracy. As Stepan (2001, 328) noted, the fact that Russia had forty-six bilateral treaties that were negotiated and signed by the president and the regional executives "without being signed, or even shown to the Russian Parliament ... is procedurally exceptional in a democratic federation." Some bilateral treaties also contained the provisions violating the federal constitution. The Constitutional Court could do little to enforce compliance from the regional governments as they "either disputed the standing of the court or simply ignored the rulings" (Taylor, 2007, 433).

The weakness of local political parties made it easier for regional executives, who typically had no ties with any party, "to monopolize power in the face of competitive elections or even thanks to such elections" (Gel'man, 2010, 15). The development of a nation-wide party system was largely suppressed by the emergence of regional party substitutes, that is, political machines of regional executives (Hale, 2007; Busygina et al., 2011, 8). As a result, many of the political regimes that emerged in the Russian regions in the 1990s displayed the features of sub-national authoritarianism (Golosov, 2011, 2018; Reisinger and Moraski, 2017). The existence of sub-national authoritarian regimes along with a relatively democratic federal center contributed to the hybridization of Russia's both territorial and political regimes in the 1990s.

After ascending to the presidential office in 2000, Putin initiated several reforms to increase the influence of the center over the regions. In May 2000, the president signed

a package of decrees with the aim of "strengthening the unity of the state." The first major reform of the federal system included the division of the country into seven federal districts and the appointment of a presidential envoy in each of them (Ross, 2005, 356). The boundaries of these districts aligned with the boundaries of the districts for the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs (Taylor, 2007, 431).[8] This reform was implemented to provide the center with additional mechanisms of regional control.

Then, Putin proposed the removal of governors and chairs of regional legislative assemblies from the Federation Council. Instead, from January 2002, they were replaced by two delegates from each region selected by the legislative assemblies and regional executives. Concomitantly, this reform meant that regional executives losing their seats in the Council also lost their immunity from criminal prosecution and became more vulnerable (Ross, 2005, 357). Furthermore, a new amendment to the law granting the president the power to dismiss popularly elected regional executives as well as to resolve regional legislative assemblies was adopted. This amendment gave the right to the president, parliament, general prosecutor, and regional assemblies to recommend a regional executive for removal (Ross, 2005, 358). Finally, the regional governments were supposed to receive around 50 percent of total tax income. Under Putin, the share of the central government had increased from 51 percent in 2001 to 62 percent in 2002 (Taylor, 2007, 433). These measures weakened regional executives and, as a result, their position in bilateral negotiations with the center. To compensate the regional executives, the president created the State Council, a new presidential advisory body, in September 2000. The State Council, chaired by the president, is composed of all regional executives and is supposed to meet every three months. The Council also has a presidium consisting of the seven governors from each

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[8]Five of the first envoys were *siloviki*, meaning they had a background in the army or security services. Each envoy had a staff of around 500 officials, 70 percent of whom similarly were *siloviki* (Ross, 2005, 356).

of the federal districts; its membership rotates every six months. The presidium meets with the president every month. This new body, however, has more symbolic than real law-making functions (Ross, 2005, 357-358).

Putin also initiated a campaign that aimed to bring regional legislation in line with the federal constitution, with a special commission overseeing this work. The federal prosecutor instructed presidential envoys that the legislation was supposed to be brought up in line with the constitutional norms by January 1, 2001 (Ross, 2005, 359). As a result of this reform, all bilateral treaties with the regions were cancelled by the mid-2000s. Tatarstan, however, became an exception: its president managed to negotiate a new agreement in 2007–though this expired in 2017.

Since 2000, there have been many amendments to election and party legislation. In fact, new electoral and/or party laws were adopted at almost every new round of regional and national elections (Ross and Panov, 2019, 359).[9] After December 2003, the electoral law required the legislative assemblies to elect at least half of their deputies through party lists (Reuter, 2013, 107). In the 2003 State Duma elections, the newly created "party of power," United Russia (*Edinaya Rossiya*), secured 37.6 percent of the popular vote. Yet in the 2007 elections, its share skyrocketed to 64.3 percent (Golosov, 2014a, 272).

This success was largely the result of gradual cooptation of regional executives and their resources into the "power vertical." First, in September 2004, Putin proposed to abolish the direct election of regional executives: between 2005 and 2012, the heads of all Russian regions were appointed by the Presidential Administration. Their appointment prospects were highly dependent on the results of national elections (Reuter and Robertson, 2012; Rochlitz, 2014). The incumbent governors who could deliver more votes to the regime

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[9]As scholars document, between 2003 and 2016, the 2001 Law on Political Parties was amended 36 times and the Law "On Fundamental Guarantees of Electoral Rights" was amended 78 times (Hutcheson, 2017).

were allowed to stay in office for several consecutive terms. While gubernatorial tenure was formally limited to the maximum of two five-year terms in 1999[10], Putin promoted the so-called third-term amendment to this law through the State Duma in early 2001. It stated that the counting of gubernatorial terms began from the first election after the law was adopted in 1999 (Slider, 2008, 110). The regional executives could run for a third term–some for a fourth–even though these extensions of their tenure violated regional charters and republican constitutions (Ross, 2005, 358). The abolishment of gubernatorial elections implied the abolishment of the term limit. As a result, the regional executives could stay in office, facing no institutional constraints such as term limits or a compulsory retirement age.

Empirical studies demonstrate that even as appointed officials the regional executives retained significant autonomy and expanded their power at the regional arena (Demchenko and Golosov, 2016; Golosov and Konstantinova, 2016). For example, they received the right to appoint city mayors in their regions (Kononenko, 2018). Therefore, despite, the general trend towards re-centralization of state power and weakening the influence of regional executives in federal politics, some of them could still successfully negotiate with the center and stay in office.

Under Putin, the national system of electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2006) replaced the sub-national authoritarian regime that had emerged under Yeltsin. This type of political regime combines authoritarian patterns of power distribution and reproduction with partially competitive elections, legislatures, and political parties–the institutions that are normally associated with democracy (Golosov, 2018, 1-2). While Kropp (2019, 222) suggests that "homogeneity and subordination are supporting pillars of non-democracies,"

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[10]Federal law "On the General Principles of the Organization of the Legislative (Representative) and Executive Organs of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation."

meaning that the national autocrat may want to establish political homogeneity within the federation by setting up a hegemonic party and coopting regional elites into the "power vertical" (see also Svolik, 2012). However, today United Russia does not dominate in all regions, nor does the Kremlin win in all regional elections. In their recent empirical analysis, Ross and Panov (2019) document that there is a variation in support for United Russia as well as in degrees of contestation in regional legislative assemblies. Their results suggest that Putin's centralizing policies aimed to put the regions under control rather than to make them homogenous.

The "varieties of authoritarianism" that emerged in the Russian regions in the 2000s are now embedded into the national authoritarian system. It is sustained by complex interactions between regional and central elites who have self interest in the maintenance of institutional *status quo*, enabling them to preserve their power and extract resources. As a result, in the authoritarian context, the multi-level territorial structure still establishes some power-sharing mechanisms that political actors can exploit. Such complexity in the relationship between regional and national elites adds an element of hybridity to the regime, making it more fluid.

2.5   Conclusion

In democracies, regional politicians, being embedded in the system of formal federal institutions, have political incentive to commit to the federal bargain. In sub-national authoritarian regimes or autocracies, motivations of regional elites to maintain the bargain are context specific and are dependant on particular strategies of control and coalition-building employed by the national elites. Consequently, a multi-level territorial structure adds complexity and some degree of hybridization of center-region interactions in democracies and autocracies alike.

Federalism is argued to perforate the "monolithic bloc of authoritarianism" (Kropp, 2019, 226) creating certain possibilities for elite bargaining. As the political process in autocracies is centered on the results of national elections, the ability of regional executives to mobilize voters on behalf of the regime is argued to be an important asset in bargaining with the center. Previous studies suggest that political loyalty was the main factor affecting the receipt of benefits from the center in Russia in the 2000s (Reuter, 2013; Starodubtsev, 2018).

The studies in this dissertation first trace the reasons behind the emergence of authoritarian federalism in Russia. Then, they explore whether the ability of regional elites to deliver high voting results has been necessary for receiving additional competencies (e.g., a bilateral treaty), benefits (e.g., reappointment), and resources (e.g., federal transfers) from the center in Russia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they investigate what combinations of political and economic conditions have been sufficient for receiving these preferences from the center.

Chapter 3

The political economy of bilateral center-region treaties in Russia

3.1 Introduction

In July 2017, the deputies of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan appealed to President Putin with a request to extend the 2007 treaty between the Republic and the central government (Antonov, 2017). Two months later, however, it was announced that Tatarstan would not seek the extension of this treaty (Kommersant, 2017). With its expiration, the era of bilateral agreements between the federal government and the regions came to an end. It started in 1994 when Tatarstan signed the first treaty. In total, more than 40 regions negotiated similar bilateral treaties between 1994 and 1998.[11] However, following the appointment of Vladimir Putin as the Chairman of the Presidential Commission for the Preparation of Treaties in July 1998, the treaty signing process was discontinued. After being elected president in 2000, Putin established a special commission

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[11]See Table A.1 for the list.

to examine to what extent the bilateral treaties were in line with the Constitution and federal legislation (Ross, 2003). Eventually, all treaties had been canceled by the mid-2000s. Yet the government of Tatarstan managed to negotiate a new agreement in 2007. Compared with the 1994 treaty, it contained a more modest list of distributed powers yet still had symbolic value for the regional elite (Shaikhutdinova, 2016, 145). This treaty expired in 2017.

The bilateral treaties enhanced the autonomy of the regions and led Russia toward a more decentralized and asymmetrical federal system (Solnick, 1996; Lynn and Novikov, 1997; Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999; Stoner-Weiss, 1999; Stepan, 2000; Watts, 2008; Chuman, 2011). Previous studies (Söderlund, 2003; Dusseault et al., 2005) concentrate on the timing of the treaties and explain why some regions signed them earlier than others. More puzzling, however, is why some regions managed to negotiate a treaty while others did not. To address this puzzle and to provide a better understanding of the balance of powers between the center and the regions in the period of 1994-1998, this chapter studies the factors accounting for the signing of bilateral treaties with Moscow. It employs Qualitative Comparative Analysis to detect necessary and sufficient conditions leading to a signed treaty. This method can untangle complex causal relations and reveal different paths leading to the same outcome, which is likely to be the case in the treaty signing process. Combining institutional and actor-centered arguments (Filippov et al., 2004; Tafel, 2011), the analysis examines the interplay of the factors of demanding sovereignty, having an elected executive, voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election, and having a status of a donor region.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 64 cases reveals two sufficient combinations of conditions accounting for a signed treaty: voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election and having a status of a donor region or having an appointed executive and voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election. In contrast to previous studies (Söderlund, 2003;

Dusseault et al., 2005) that provide an economic explanation for treaties, this analysis puts forward a political explanation. The results suggest that by signing bilateral treaties in exchange for political support President Yeltsin built a broad coalition with both democratic and authoritarian sub-national leaders. This strategy allowed Yeltsin to win the 1996 presidential election, yet, in the long run, it contributed to the preservation of sub-national authoritarian regimes in Russia. This is in line with the argument by Gibson (2012) that the persistence of regional authoritarian enclaves is conditional upon the strategies of territorial control pursued by the local elites as well as upon the strategies of governance and coalition-building employed by a national leader. These findings also suggest that in a situation of high political polarization, multi-level territorial settings can push the incumbent to interfere with a democratic process. Furthermore, these results confirm the argument that the authoritarian consolidation in Russia in the 2000s was embedded in the center-region relations of the 1990s (Gel'man, 2010; Golosov, 2011; Reisinger and Moraski, 2017).

The chapter is structured following a standard protocol of Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The second section conceptualizes the outcome and provides background on the bilateral treaties. The third section reviews relevant literature and lists the main causal conditions that are expected to produce the outcome. The fourth section describes the methodology, data, and the calibration strategy. The fifth section presents the results of the analysis of the occurrence and non-occurrence of the outcome and then discusses them. The final section concludes.

3.2 Russia's emerging federalism and the bilateral treaties of 1994-1998

The formation of the Russian Federation in the 1990s was, in fact, "choice without choice" (Busygina et al., 2018, 64). At that time, federal setting could best accommodate the interests of both the center and the regions holding the country together. There was no consensus, however, "on the inherent value of the federal project" among the federal and regional elites (Kahn, 2000, 2002, 145). Several alternative projects varied from the proposal to create a symmetrical federation with all sub-national units being equal in their status to the proposal to preserve ethnic regions merging the rest (Lynn and Novikov, 1997; Busygina et al., 2018, 64). In March 1992, the regional governments signed with the federal government the Federation Treaty (*federativnyi dogovor*) that determined the extent of regional autonomy within the federation (Starodubtsev, 2018).

The Treaty aimed to fill in the legislative gap before the adoption of the new Constitution. It contained three separate agreements: one with ethnic republics; one with krais, oblasts, and the cities of federal significance; and one with autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts—and each agreement differed in the number and scope of powers transferred to the regions (Starodubtsev, 2014; Hooghe et al., 2016, 437-438). It granted more competencies to the ethnic regions than to the regions with a predominantly Russian ethnic population. For this reason, the representatives of the latter opposed the inclusion of the Treaty in the new Constitution. When the Constitution was adopted in December 1993, it ignored the Federation Treaty and formally proclaimed that all federal units were equal. Although, in fact, the Constitution granted more rights to the ethnic regions than to the regions with a predominantly Russian ethnic population. For example, the ethnic republics obtained the right to have a second official language, a constitution, and to elect a president of the republic.

Some inconsistencies between the Federation Treaty and the Constitution predetermined "the bargaining logic and instability of Russian federalism" (Obydenkova and Swenden, 2013, 90). The governments of the republics of Chechnya and Tatarstan, however, refused to sign the Federation Treaty and insisted on negotiation of separate agreements with the center (Mukharyamov and Senatova, 1995). The first treaty was initially prepared for Chechnya in October 1992, yet negotiations failed (Shakhray, 2014). In the meantime, preparatory work on the treaty with Tatarstan had started. The official delegations first reached an agreement concerning the distribution of oil extracted on the territory of Tatarstan (Khakimov, 1996, 30). At that time, the republic annually produced 28 million tons of oil–but was entitled to only eight million tons, sending the rest to the center (Kokh and Aven, 2013, 160). According to the new agreement, Tatarstan could keep 13.8 million tons of oil on its territory in 1992. Negotiations continued and new agreements on higher education, oil transportation, environmental protection, property rights, defense industry, and custom regulation entered into force in 1993. The bilateral treaty (*dogovor*) was finally signed in February 1994.[12] It was accompanied by additional agreements (*soglashenia*) on foreign economic relations, banking, monetary and exchange policies, fiscal relations, and crime prevention. An agreement on military cooperation was signed separately on March 5, 1994. [13]

Due to these agreements, Tatarstan obtained sufficient economic autonomy and could follow its own privatization plan, leave a larger sum of tax revenues in the regional budget, and establish relations with foreign states. The bilateral treaty also recognized the citizenship of Tatarstan and acknowledged that the republican authorities could deal with "the issues of republican citizenship." Commenting on the significance of the signed

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[12]For the analysis of treaty provisions see Kahn (2002, 151-157) and Crosston (2004, 32-33).

[13]Full texts of all agreements are available in Khakimov (1996, 52-76). For a detailed analysis of some agreements see Crosston (2004, 60-66).

bilateral treaty for the republic, President Mintimer Shaimiyev stated that: "everyone has come to believe that the federation can be asymmetrical... and this is not just someone's wish, but a reality [so] the center has accepted the signing of treaties with the republics" (Faizullina, 1994).

Once the treaty with Tatarstan had been signed, governments in other regions attempted to negotiate similar agreements. The central government positively responded to these attempts.[14] Sergey Shakhray, a deputy prime minister and chair of the State Committee for Federalism and Nationalities Policy, emphasized that "it is legally and economically possible to conclude treaties similar to the one signed with Tatarstan with each subject of the Russian Federation" (Kahn, 2002, 157). In July 1994, President Yeltsin established a presidential commission to deal with the preparation of treaties to speed up a treaty signing process. Shakhray was appointed as Chairman of this Commission.

Between 1994 and 1995, six more treaties were signed with the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria, Bashkortostan, North Ossetia, Sakha, Buryatia, and Udmurtia. In 1996, Sverdlovsk Oblast became the first ethnically Russian region that negotiated a treaty with the center. In total, 46 regions signed 42 'extraconstitutional' treaties between 1994 and 1998.[15] The treaties defined the general principles of the division of powers between regional and federal governments (Solnick, 1995; Stepan, 2000; Saikkonen, 2016). Each treaty was supplemented by additional agreements that concerned specific policy areas. Their number, as well as scope, varied from region to region "depending on particular policy concerns and resource endowments" (Stoner-Weiss, 1999, 91). For

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[14]It should be acknowledged that a violent armed conflict with Chechnya that started in 1994 similarly made a significant impact on the overall willingness of the center to negotiate bilateral arrangements with the regions.

[15]This discrepancy is because some Russian oblasts and krais have administrative jurisdiction over autonomous okrugs located on their territory. Therefore, when a treaty was signed with Irkutsk and Perm oblasts as well as with Krasnoyarsk Krai, the autonomous okrugs constituting their parts (Ust-Orda Buryat, Komi-Perm, Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets) and Evenki autonomous okrugs) also received a treaty.

example, Tatarstan received the bilateral treaty together with additional agreements on foreign economic relations, banking, monetary and exchange policies, fiscal relations, military affairs, and crime prevention. On the other hand, Buryatia signed supplementary agreements on mineral resources, economic activity in the area of Lake Baikal, foreign economic relations, emergency management, and economic development of the republic. This chapter acknowledges the differences among these agreements; however, it does not consider them in the empirical analysis as data are limited and very fragmented. The texts of agreements are available only for 19 out of 42 treaties signed with the regions. Consequently, this analysis focuses on bilateral treaties alone.

3.3   Conditions of a signed treaty

Different institutional arenas accommodate the debates over the allocation of intergovernmental authority among federal and sub-national politicians (Filippov et al., 2004; Tafel, 2011). If sub-national politicians have institutionalized representation at the center, bargaining tends to take place within formal state structures. In contrast, more spontaneous and less institutionalized interactions occurring outside of formally established institutions take the shape of bargaining that is dominated by national and sub-national executives. The treaty signing process in Russia represented as a kind of 'executive bilateralism' (Tafel, 2011, 267-270) resulting from strong pressure by sub-national actors preferring *ad hoc* bargaining (Filippov et al., 2004, 124). It is well documented that the "impetus for the treaties came from the regions themselves and not from the center" (Stoner-Weiss, 1999, 90).[16] Following these arguments, the present study concentrates on the factors that could give the regional executives some leverage negotiating a treaty with

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[16]Shakhray makes a similar statement in a contemporary interview (Izvestia, 1996).

the president. The analysis, however, does not include such context-specific factors as the violent armed conflict with Chechnya that started in 1994. Following the argument by Tafel (2011, 263) that "violent and secessionist pressures from particular regional actors are likely to produce bilateral concessions," this analysis assumes that the conflict with Chechnya had an impact on the overall willingness of the center to negotiate bilateral arrangements with the regions.

The first condition included in the analysis is *demanding sovereignty.* ('Autonomy' would perhaps be a more precise term, but the term 'sovereignty' is in closer alignment with Russian discourse of the 1990s.) In June 1990, the Russian parliament passed the declaration of sovereignty and several Russian regions followed suit. More declarations of sovereignty followed in response to Yeltsin's famous call in August 1990 '*to take as much sovereignty as the regions can swallow.*'[17] Adopting these declarations, the regional governments did not aim at obtaining real independence from Russia. Instead, they sought a higher status for their regions within the new federation as well as control over economic resources on their territory (Treisman, 1997; Solnick, 2000; Herrera, 2005).[18] In fact, bargaining that began with assertions of sovereignty might be "continued with the negotiation of treaties and agreements, frequently by the very same political actors in force" (Kahn, 2000, 83). Consequently, it is plausible that the regional leaders who demanded sovereignty from the center could successfully negotiate a treaty a few years later.

The second condition is *having an elected executive.* Existing accounts acknowledge that the treaty negotiation process, similar to the adoption of declarations of sovereignty, was "extremely elite-dominated" (Kahn, 2000, 64). From initiation to signature, it involved the president and a regional executive who played an important role in center-region relations

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[17]Yeltsin (1990) made this statement in Kazan, Tatarstan, and later in Ufa, Bashkortostan.

[18]See Lapidus (1999) and an interview with the ex-Minister of the Economy Andrey Nechaev in Kokh and Aven (2013).

in Russia (Petrov, 2010; Sharafutdinova and Turovsky, 2017, 162). Neither the legislative bodies nor the general public played any role in the treaty negotiation process (Stepan, 2000; Kahn, 2002; Crosston, 2004, 11). For this reason, it is important that between 1991 and 1995, some of the regional executives were appointed by President Yeltsin or by the regional legislative assemblies, while others were directly elected by the public.[19] The governors seeking a popular mandate could have higher leverage than appointed executives both within the regions and vis-à-vis the center (Solnick, 1996; Tolz and Busygina, 1997; Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999, 73). As a result, elected executives could be expected to be more successful in negotiating treaties with the center than appointed executives.

The third condition included in the analysis is *voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election*. During the 1996 presidential campaign, Yeltsin explicitly indicated that the treaty signing process would be discontinued if the Communist candidate Gennady Zyuganov won the election (Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999, 73).[20] On the other hand, Yeltsin promised that new treaties would be signed in exchange for electoral support. Therefore, the 1996 presidential election represented a 'golden opportunity' for regional executives without a treaty to obtain one (Tolz and Busygina, 1997, 404). It is quite likely that the regional heads could support Yeltsin expecting benefits from his re-election.

Finally, the fourth condition is *being a donor region*. Russian regions are classified as either donors to the federal budget or recipients of federal funds. Existing studies (Söderlund, 2003; Dusseault et al., 2005) show that the regions not dependent on federal transfers were likely to obtain a treaty at the early stage of the treaty signing process. The wealth of the regions might also enhance "the ability of governors to promote their

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[19]In November 1991, the Congress of People's Deputies imposed a moratorium on the election of regional executives until December 1, 1992. In fact, this moratorium remained in force until 1996 when the first county-wide gubernatorial elections took place.

[20]Especially taking into account that the results of the 1995 State Duma elections revealed strong popular support for the Communist party, receiving 157 out of 450 seats.

interests in Moscow" and negotiate a treaty (Tolz and Busygina, 1997, 406).

Previous studies support the expectation that the presence of any of these conditions are positive factors toward the outcome of a signed treaty. This analysis, rather than untangling their average effect, aims to reveal their complex interaction and to detect what factors or combinations of factors have been necessary and sufficient for a signed treaty. As necessity means that the outcome could not be achieved without the condition and implies a very strong relationship, none of the four conditions is expected to be necessary for a signed treaty. Sufficiency requires the presence of a condition or a combination of conditions where the outcome is also present. Previous accounts demonstrate that status as a donor region has played an important role in the treaty signing process and suggest that donor regions were more likely to obtain a treaty first (Söderlund, 2003; Dusseault et al., 2005). Furthermore, several studies concentrating on the early stage of the treaty signing process highlight that Yeltsin tended to negotiate more actively with the heads of republics who demanded sovereignty and were popularly elected (Kahn, 2000, 2002; Filippov et al., 2004; Tafel, 2011). A combination of these three conditions (having the status of a donor region, demanding sovereignty, and having an elected executive) is expected to be sufficient for a signed treaty at the early stage of the negotiation process. Finally, based on Tolz and Busygina (1997) and Filippov and Shvetsova (1999) voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election is expected to be sufficient at the later stage of the treaty signing process.

3.4 Methodology, data, and calibration

3.4.1 Methodology

The study employs Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a set-theoretic method which conceives relations between social phenomena as set relations. QCA is suited to

exploration of complex causality that unfolds through equifinality, conjunctural causation, and asymmetry (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).[21]   Similar to other set-theoretic methods, QCA operates on data which consist of membership scores of cases in sets (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 6). Once the raw data are collected, they need to be 'calibrated' or transformed into membership scores of cases in sets. The present study employs fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), which incorporates differences between cases in kind and in degree. It operates on sets where cases have full membership (1), full non-membership (0), as well as partial membership (0.5>) and partial non-membership (0.5<). The calibration has been performed following the 'indirect method' that requires an initial grouping of cases according to several set-membership scores (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 35). The cases in the present analysis have been classified with 0, 0.33, 0.67, and 1 fuzzy-set membership scores. Following the standard of good practice in QCA (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 32), the rest of the section reports the data sources and explains the calibration procedure.

3.4.2 Calibration of the outcome a signed treaty

The outcome of interest is a signed treaty–further denoted as "TREATY." Out of 89 Russian regions 25 were left out for a variety of reasons. First, nine autonomous okrugs that territorially belong to other regions were excluded, as their inclusion would create significant ambiguity and duplication in the analysis. Second, Chechnya, which had a violent armed conflict with Moscow, was excluded as negotiations with Chechnya were

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[21]Equifinality means that several conditions or combinations of conditions can produce the outcome. As a result, there might be several alternative paths leading to the same outcome. Conjunctural causation refers to the situation when a single condition leads to the outcome only in a combination with other conditions and may not produce the outcome on its own. Finally, asymmetry suggests that the absence of conditions leading to the outcome may not produce the absence of the outcome. For this reason, the analysis of the occurrence and non-occurrence of the outcome is performed separately.

driven by unique motives than with the other regions. Third, out of 43 regions with no bilateral treaty, data on the position of the governors regarding the treaty signing process is not available for 15 regions;[22] therefore, they were similarly excluded.

Data on the treaty signing process was gathered via the *Integrum* dataset that contains regional and federal press reports. Texts of the treaties were collected at the official online portal of legal information.[23] The regions that had no treaty have either full (0) or partial (0.33) non-membership in the outcome set. The cases of failed negotiations and non-attempts to sign a treaty were assigned a score of 0. For example, bilateral negotiations with the republics of Khakassia and Ingushetia failed as their heads refused to sign treaties that had been approved by Moscow (Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999, 74). Some regional executives explicitly stated that bilateral treaties hold little value for their regions; for example, the governor of Belgorod Oblast Evgeny Savchenko said so in his interview to Belgorodskaya Pravda (1998)). Such cases of failed negotiations and non-attempts to obtain a treaty were assigned a score of 0. In other cases, the regional officials had already prepared a treaty draft, which, however, had not been eventually signed. The governor of Kemerovo Oblast Aman Tuleev confirmed that the draft of a bilateral treaty had been submitted to Moscow for approval (Interfaks-Aif, 1998). Similarly, the government of the Moscow Oblast finalized the draft of a bilateral treaty in 1998 (Domnysheva, 1998). However, neither Kemerovo nor Moscow oblasts had eventually signed a treaty and received a score of 0.33.

The remaining 42 regions that managed to obtain a treaty have either partial (0.67) or full membership (1) in the outcome set. There is a substantial qualitative difference

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[22]They are the republics of Adygea, Gorno-Altay, Karachay-Cherkessia as well as Vladimir, Kamchatka, Kurgan, Penza, Pskov, Smolensk, Tambov, Tula, Tyumen, Chita oblasts, Primorsky Krai, and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.

[23]Available at http://www.pravo.gov.ru.

between the treaties signed with the republics at the early stage of the treaty signing process and the treaties that were negotiated later (Chuman, 2011; Hooghe et al., 2016). Similar to Tatarstan, the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria, Bashkortostan, and North Ossetia obtained extended competencies in citizenship, while the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) secured the right to establish its own fund of precious metals and stones as well as the right to issue mining licenses and to allocate mining quotas. Therefore, these five republics were assigned a score of 1. On the other hand, the republics of Buryatia, Udmurtia, and Komi received quite modest competencies in comparison with other republics that signed a treaty earlier. Therefore, they were assigned a score of 0.67 along with the remaining 37 regions with a treaty – as their treaties did not aim to extend competencies of the regions and mainly concerned economic, legal, and cultural issues.

The calibration procedure is performed in R. Using a fractional logit model, these fuzzy-set membership scores are regressed on the raw data (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 35). The indirect method of calibration is usually applied to interval-scale data. Therefore, the categorical data at hand has been transformed into interval-scale data. A score of 1 was assigned to the cases of failed negotiations and non-attempts; 2 – to the cases that had only a treaty draft; 3 – to the cases that signed a treaty at the later stage; and 4 – to the cases that managed to negotiate the most preferential treaty.

3.4.3 Calibration of the conditions

Demanding sovereignty (SOV)

During the early 1990s, the claims of regional heads represented a continuum and ranged from secessionist threats to demands for greater 'sovereignty.' This analysis employs a new index of regional demands of sovereignty between 1990 and 1993. It was constructed using the index of 'separatist activism' in the ethnic regions proposed by Treisman (1997,

225-228) and the index of 'regional activism' in the ethnically Russian regions by Herrera (2005, 34-35). Additional data were collected via the *Integrum* dataset. The index includes four components: claims of unilateral change in the administrative status of the region or adoption of the declaration of sovereignty (STAT); the adoption of the regional Constitution before December 1993 (CONST);[24] the assertion that regional law takes precedence over federal law (LEG); and the assertion of economic autonomy (ECON). Except for CONST, three other indicators are weighted equally and have a maximum score of 1. The maximum score for CONST is 2 as the regions that had not adopted a regional constitution or a statute by the end of 1993 but had its draft at hand received scores of 1 (out of 2). The total maximum score for the index is five (see Table A.2).

To transform the total score into a fuzzy-set membership score a more restrictive benchmark is set, so the cases with the index score from 0 to 3 are regarded as non-members of the set of the regions demanding sovereignty: cases with the index score of 0 are receive a set score of 0, while cases with scores from 1 to 3 receive a set score of 0.33. The cases with the index score of 4 and 5 are regarded as the members of the set and get a score of 0.67 and 1, correspondingly.

Having an elected executive (ELECT)

Until 1996, the heads of some regions were appointed by the president, yet the heads of others were publicly elected or appointed by regional legislative assemblies. Lavrov (1997, 284-289) provides data on elections and appointments of regional executives. Thilo Bodenstein kindly shared his dataset on the tenure of Russian governors (personal communication, March 2018). To assign a fuzzy-set membership score to cases, the

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[24]The index by Treisman covers the period between 1990 and 1994; the index by Herrera, the period between 1990 and 1993. Since the Constitution was adopted in December of 1993, the new index includes only the period before its adoption and covers the period between 1990 and 1993.

following two aspects were considered: whether the executives were appointed, publicly elected, or appointed by the regional parliament, and the length of executives' tenure (to make sure that the executive stayed in office long enough to negotiate a treaty). The cases of appointed executives who resigned, were dismissed, or lost the next election received a score of 0. The cases of appointed executives who remained in office at least for two terms were assigned a score of 0.33. The cases of elected executives who resigned, were dismissed or lost the next election got the score of 0.67. Finally, the cases of elected executives who remained in office for at least two terms received a score of 1.

For calibration, the raw data have been transformed into interval-scale data. The cases of appointed executives who stayed in office for less than two terms get a score of 1, and the cases of appointed executives who stayed in office for at least two terms or more receive a score of 2. The cases of elected executives who stayed in office for less than two terms receive a score of 3, and the cases of elected executives who stayed in office for at least two terms or more get a score of 4.

Voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election (VOT)

The 1996 presidential election took place in two rounds. Lavrov (1997, 278-283) provides data on electoral results in each region. The cases were calibrated in the following way. The cases received a score of 0 if the oppositional candidate (Zyuganov) had the majority of votes in a region in both rounds; and 0.33 if only in the second round. The cases were scored 0.67 if Yeltsin received the majority of votes only in the second round and 1 – if in both rounds. For calibration, the raw data have been transformed into interval-scale data. The cases where Zyuganov got the majority in both rounds were assigned a score of 0, the cases where he won only in the second round received 1. The cases where Yeltsin got the majority of votes only in the second round are assigned a score of 3, and the cases where he received the majority in both rounds got a score of 4.

Having the status of a donor region (DON)

Donor regions in Russia transfer a significant share of taxes collected on their territory to the federal budget and do not receive equalization grants (*dotatsii na vyravnivanie*) from the center (Zubarevich, 2018). Crosston (2004, 137) provides a list of donor regions in the period between 1993 and 1997.[25] To calibrate the set of donor regions, the following logic applied. If between 1993 and 1997 a region had never been a donor, it got 0; if one or two times, 0.33; if three or four times, 0.67; and if five times, 1. However, taking into account that the republics of Tatarstan and Sakha (Yakutia) were donors before they signed their treaties in 1994 and 1995, respectively, they were assigned a score of 1. In addition, the Republic of Komi was assigned a higher score of 0.67 as it was a donor region two times, in 1993 and 1994, before it signed a treaty in 1996. Table A.3 and Table A.4 provide the raw data and the calibrated data set, respectively.

3.5   Results and discussion

3.5.1   The analysis of the outcome, a signed treaty

Once data have been calibrated, the next step is to perform the analysis of necessity and sufficiency.[26] Necessity implies that the outcome cannot be achieved without the condition. Typically, the condition is considered necessary if it passes a consistency threshold of at least 0.9 (Ragin, 2006). As expected, none of the four conditions either in its presence or in its absence reaches the threshold of 0.9. Table A.5 reports the parameters of fit.[27]

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[25]The list of donor regions in Russian is available at: `http://www.politika.su/reg/donory.html`.

[26]For the analyses, the R programming packages 'QCA' (Dusa, 2019) and 'Set Methods' (Oana and Schneider, 2018) were used.

[27]An additional check was performed to detect SUIN conditions, which stand for "sufficient, but unnecessary part of a condition that is insufficient, but necessary for the outcome" (Schneider and

Sufficiency means that a condition or a combination of conditions is present where the outcome is also present. The analysis of sufficiency requires the creation of a truth table, which shows all possible combinations of conditions. The number of possible combinations is equal to 2^n, where n is the number of conditions included in the analysis. Table 3.1 below displays the truth table.

Table 3.1: Truth table, outcome a signed treaty

									Cases	
Row	SOV	ELECT	VOT	DON	OUT	n	incl.	PRI	Treaty	No Treaty
16	1	1	1	1	1	7	1.000	1.000	BA, KO, SA, TA, KYA, SPE, SVE	-
4	0	0	1	1	1	3	1.000	1.000	MUR, PER, SAM	-
12	1	0	1	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	MOW	-
3	0	0	1	0	1	10	0.964	0.900	AMU, IVA, KGD, KIR, KOS, LEN, MAG, ROS, SAK	KLU
8	0	1	1	1	1	4	0.946	0.799	IRK, NIZ, YAR	MOS
11	1	0	1	0	1	3	0.943	0.667	CHE, VLG	ARK
5	0	1	0	0	0	11	0.749	0.536	BU, CU, ME, SE, BRY, OMS, ORE	KK, MO, BEL, ORL
1	0	0	0	0	0	13	0.741	0.440	ALT, AST, KDA, KHA, SAR, ULY, VOR	KEM, KRS, NVS, STA, RYA, VGG
7	0	1	1	0	0	8	0.705	0.364	KB, UD, TVE	DA, KL, NGR, TOM, YEV
15	1	1	1	0	0	3	0.634	0.110	-	IN, KR, TY
6	0	1	0	1	0	1	0.623	0.248	-	LIP
2	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-	-	-
9	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-	-	-
10	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-	-	-
13	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-	-	-
14	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-	-	-

Consistency threshold = 0.94.
? indicates that a row is a logical remainder.

Wagemann, 2012, 79). The analysis reveals one combination of conditions that appears necessary: not demanding sovereignty or having a status of a donor region (sov+DON). Since it does not stand for any higher-order concept, it is not interpreted substantially.

The first column displays the row number as it appears in the R output; therefore, it is not sequential. Columns two through five indicate the status of the four causal conditions: 1 means present; 0, absent. The column "OUT" denotes whether a given row is sufficient for the outcome: 1 is sufficient; 0, not sufficient. The decision about sufficiency depends on row's consistency score displayed in the column "incl." and PRI score showed in the column "PRI."[28] The recommended inclusion score for consistency is higher or equal to 0.75 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010, 10). Taking into account a significant gap in consistency scores between rows 11 and 5, a consistency score of higher or equal to 0.94 and, consequently a PRI score of higher or equal to 0.65, are set as benchmarks for sufficiency in the present analysis. The column "n" indicates the number of cases that belong to a given row; and the column "Cases" displays them. The column "Treaty" includes the cases exhibiting the outcome and the column "No Treaty" includes the cases displaying the absence of the outcome. Rows 2, 9, 10, 13, and 14 are the "logical remainder" rows: they exhibit logically possible combinations of conditions for which no empirical evidence exists (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 152).

The analysis of sufficiency is based on minimization of sufficient truth table rows applying rules of the Boolean algebra to reduce their complexity.[29] A standard analysis produces conservative, parsimonious, and intermediate solution formulas. The conservative solution is based only on empirically observed evidence, while the parsimonious solution is also based on assumptions about the logical remainders, which contribute to parsimony. The intermediate solution is based only on those simplifying assumptions that at the same time represent easy counterfactuals. Therefore, the intermediate solution is often but not necessarily always less complex than the conservative solution and more complex

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[28]PRI stands for proportional reduction in inconsistency and indicates how much it helps to know that a given X is a subset of Y and not a subset of not Y (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 242).

[29]The Quine-McCluskey algorithm is used to logically minimize the truth table and to produce solutions.

than the parsimonious solution. Typically, all three solution formulas are reported, and one is selected for substantive interpretation (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 174). In the present analysis, these three formulas are identical, meaning that neither simplifying assumptions nor easy counterfactuals are possible. The conservative solution formula is reported in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3.2: Conservative solution formula, outcome a signed treaty

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
VOT*DON +	0.889	0.794	0.388	0.233	**BA**, **KO**, **SA**, **TA**, **IRK**, **MUR**, **NIZ**, **PER**, **SPE**, **YAR**	MOS
elect*VOT	0.716	0.524	0.340	0.185	**KOS**, **ROS**, **SAM**, **MOW**	ARK, KLU
Overall solution	0.758	0.617	0.573			

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

The solution formula suggests that two combinations of conditions account for a signed treaty, namely, voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election (VOT) and having the status of a donor region (DON) or not having an elected executive (elect)[30] and voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election (VOT). It is important to note that although VOT has appeared in both solution terms, it cannot be considered necessary because its consistency as a necessary condition is only 0.651.[31] The overall solution consistency is 0.758. It is acceptable yet less than one as there are several deviant cases. The solution coverage, which indicates how much of the outcome is in line with the solution, is 0.573. This coverage value is quite modest, meaning that many cases remain uncovered by the

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[30]It means having an appointed executive.

[31]Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 227-231) explain the reasons for appearance of false necessary conditions.

solution. However, taking into account a very restrictive consistency cut-off set at 0.94, this coverage is still satisfactory. The first combination of conditions (VOT*DON) has a high consistency of 0.889 and decent coverage of 0.388. Typical cases include the republics of Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Sakha, and Komi along with Irkutsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Perm, Yaroslavl, Murmansk oblasts, and Saint-Petersburg. These cases also represent uniquely covered cases meaning that they belong to only one solution term. The Moscow Oblast is a deviant case as it displays the sufficient combination of conditions but lacks the outcome. The second combination of conditions (elect*VOT) has slightly lower parameters of fit. Its consistency is 0.716 and coverage is 0.340. Typical cases include Kostroma, Rostov, Samara oblasts and Moscow, while Arkhangelsk and Kaluga oblasts represent deviant cases. The 'unique coverage' measure shows how much of the outcome is solely explained by the solution path; it is 0.233 and 0.185 for the first and the second paths, respectively. The next subsection reports the results of the analysis of no signed treaty.

3.5.2 The analysis of the outcome, no signed treaty

The analysis does not reveal any necessary conditions. Although not being a donor (don) comes close to the 0.9 threshold, its relevance is only 0.485 meaning that it represents a trivial necessary condition and should not be interpreted substantially. Table A.6 reports the parameters of fit. Table A.7 displays a truth table representation for the outcome no signed treaty. Based on the gaps in consistency scores and PRI values, a sufficiency threshold is set equal to or higher than 0.83. As rows 11 and 12 have high consistency values of 0.886 and 0.907, respectively, but low PRI values of 0.333 and 0.000, they are excluded from the minimization procedure. The analysis of sufficiency yields three formulas.

The parsimonious and intermediate solution formulas look identical and are reported in Table A.8. The conservative solution is presented in Table 3.3 below and is interpreted substantially.

Table 3.3: Conservative solution formula, outcome no signed treaty

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
vot*DON +	0.917	0.834	0.123	0.101	**LIP**	-
ELECT*VOT*don	0.799	0.668	0.315	0.293	**IN**, **KL**, **KR**, **NGR**, **TOM**	KB, UD, TVE
Overall solution	0.822	0.704	0.416			

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters indicate absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

The solution formula includes two sufficient combinations of conditions, namely, not voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election (vot) and having the status of a donor region (DON) or having an elected executive (ELECT) and voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election (VOT) and not having the status of a donor region (don). Solution consistency and PRI value are at the acceptable level of 0.822 and 0.704, respectively. Solution coverage is only 0.416 meaning that less than half of all cases are 'covered' by these results.

The first combination of conditions (vot*DON) indicates that donor regions not voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election did not manage to obtain a treaty. Only one case, Lipetsk Oblast, displays this combination of conditions. This combination has a high consistency of 0.917 due to the lack of deviant cases. Yet its coverage is only 0.123 because it explains only one case. The second combination of conditions (ELECT*VOT*don) suggests that the regions with elected executives that voted for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election and did not have the status of a donor region were unable to sign a treaty. Its coverage is 0.315, and consistency is 0.799. The unique coverage of the first term is 0.101; of the second term, 0.293. Typical cases include Novgorod and Tomsk oblasts as well as the republics of Ingushetia, Kalmykia, and Karelia. The republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Udmurtia along with Tver Oblast represent deviant cases.

Three deviant cases cast doubt on substantive sufficiency of this solution term. Especially taking into account, that the head of Ingushetia did not sign a draft of the treaty that had been already approved by the center. The reason, however, was not the disapproval of the treaty, but "the desire to further improve the terms of the agreements" (Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999, 74). Therefore, this combination provides inconsistent evidence and should not be interpreted substantially. Overall, these results are in line with the findings of the analysis of a signed treaty. However, taking into account low coverage of the first term and three deviant cases that displays the second term, the conclusion is that the proposed model better explains a signed treaty rather than no treaty. For this reason the subsection below reports the results of the robustness checks performed for the analysis of a signed treaty only.

3.5.3   Robustness tests

To test the robustness of the results, Wagemann and Schneider (2015, 41) suggest to check if changes in the calibration, in the case selection, and in the raw consistency levels produce any "substantively different results." As the first modification, the data have been calibrated following the "direct" method. It employs a logistic function that fits the raw data in-between the three qualitative anchors, that is, 1 meaning full membership, 0.5 denoting the point of indifference, and 0 meaning full non-membership (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 35). The choice of the new calibration anchors was guided by the substantial difference between the raw values. Different calibration anchors are set for the condition sets and the outcome set. Calibrating the outcome, the distinction has been made between the cases with a treaty that receive a score of 1 and with no treaty that receive a score of 0, with 0.4 serving as a crossover point. Table 3.4 below shows the alternative calibration anchors for the outcome set and the condition sets.

Table 3.4: Alternative calibration strategies

Set label	Set type	Fully out	Cross over	Fully in
TREATY	fuzzy	0	0.4	1
SOV	fuzzy	0	2.5	5
ELECT	fuzzy	1	2.5	4
VOT	fuzzy	1	2.5	4
DON	fuzzy	0	2.5	5

The conditions sets ELECT and VOT have 1 as their minimum score and 4 as their maximum. In the condition set ELECT the cases of appointed executives who stayed in office for less than two terms have a score of 1 and the cases of appointed executives who remained in office for more than two terms have a score of 2. The cases of elected executives who stayed in office for less than two terms have a score of 3, and the cases of elected executives who remained in office for more than two term have a score of 4. Consequently, 2.5 is a meaningful cut-off point.

The same logic has applied for selecting a threshold for the condition set VOT. The cases where the oppositional candidate Zyuganov received the majority of votes in both rounds have a score of 1 and the cases where Zyuganov received the majority of votes only in the second round have a score of 2. The cases where Yeltsin received the majority of votes only in the second round have a score of 3 and the cases where Yeltsin received the majority in both rounds have a score of 4. As a result, 2.5 is the appropriate cut-off point. Two other condition sets (SOV and DON) have 0 as their minimum score and 5 as their maximum score. To calibrate them the mid-point of 2.5 is selected as a crossover point. This crossover is in line with the calibration of the set DON in the main analysis. However, this crossover point is less restrictive than the one set to calibrate the set SOV in the original analysis. The first alternative analysis relies on the data calibrated following the 'direct' method described above. For the analysis of a signed treaty, a sufficiency threshold is set to 0.78 taking into account gaps in consistency scores as well as PRI values. The conservative,

parsimonious, and intermediate solution formulas look identical and consist of the same terms as the ones produced by the original analysis. Table A.9 reports the solution and the parameters of fit.

Using the calibrated data set from the analysis above, the second alternative analysis has been performed with 57 cases. The republics of Tatarstan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Bashkortostan, North Ossetia, Sakha, Buryatia, and Udmurtia were excluded as their authorities signed a treaty earlier than the governments of other regions. The conservative, parsimonious, and intermediate solutions are the same. The first two solution terms look identical as the ones in the analysis above, while the third term–not demanding sovereignty and having an elected executive and not voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election and not having a status of a donor region (sov*ELECT*vot*don)–has appeared due to the inclusion of one additional truth table row in the minimization procedure. Table A.10 shows that this new term has five typical and three deviant cases. Consequently, it provides inconsistent evidence for sufficiency and should not be interpreted substantially.

The third alternative analysis has been performed with the originally calibrated dataset but with a lower consistency threshold set to 0.745. As in the second analysis above, this modification allows for the inclusion of one additional truth table row into the minimization procedure. The conservative solution is reported in Table A.11. Its third term (ELECT*vot*don) again provides inconsistent evidence for sufficiency and should not be interpreted substantively.

Overall, none of these modifications has led to any substantively different results than the results of the original analysis of a signed treaty, meaning they are quite robust. However, the results of the analysis of no signed treaty display more variation across different modifications suggesting they are less robust and more sensitive to changes. For this reason, the discussion in the next subsection concentrates only on the results of a signed treaty.

3.5.4 Discussion of the results

The analysis has yielded two combinations of conditions that are sufficient for a signed treaty. The first combination, that is, voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election and having the status of a donor region (VOT*DON), suggests that political and economic factors have played an important role in the treaty signing process. The presence of having the status of a donor region (DON) in this combination is in line with the previous accounts demonstrating that donor regions were more likely to receive a treaty first (Söderlund, 2003; Dusseault et al., 2005). However, neither demanding sovereignty (SOV) nor having an elected executive (ELECT) is present in this term. In contrast, having the status of a donor region (DON) is combined with voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election (VOT). This combination goes beyond previously stated expectations and implies two insights.

First, the heads of the regions that signed a treaty long before the 1996 presidential election tended to vote for Yeltsin in 1996. In fact, in four regions out of six, Yeltsin received in the second round more votes than the oppositional candidate Zyuganov. This is because his re-election was a guarantee that the competencies negotiated earlier would remain in force. Zyuganov favored re-nationalization, strong central power, and expressed negative attitudes regarding bilateral treaties (Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999, 73). For these reasons, the heads of the donor regions with a treaty publicly supported Yeltsin. For example, the President of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev emphasized at a press conference in February 1996 that Yeltsin granted significant economic independence to the republic by signing the 1994 bilateral treaty and explicitly stated that he would support Yeltsin at the forthcoming presidential election (Delovoi Mir, 1996). Similarly, the head of Bashkortostan Murtaza Rakhimov expressed his full support to Yeltsin pointing out that "only Boris Yeltsin can guarantee the fulfillment of bilateral treaties signed between the center and the regions." The President of Sakha (Yakutia) Mikhail Nikolaev publicly supported the start of Yeltsin's

presidential campaign in April 1996 arguing that this election would determine 'the future of the country' (Segodnya, 1996). Even the governor of Yeltsin's native region, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Eduard Rossel[32] after signing a treaty in January 1996 emphasized that the new competencies would be "realized only if Russia's leadership remains stable," meaning only if Yeltsin would be re-elected (Rossiiskie Vesti, 1996).

Second, this combination of conditions indicates that voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election combined with having the status of a donor region has been sufficient for obtaining a treaty at the later stage of the treaty signing process. Yeltsin negotiated with the governors without a treaty during his presidential campaign, promising to sign new treaties in exchange for electoral support. The regional governments planning to sign a treaty were well aware that "Yeltsin's re-election was the best assurance that negotiated promises would indeed be honored" (Kahn, 2002, 162). Therefore, they were interested in Yeltsin's re-election. For example, a draft of the bilateral treaty with the government of Yaroslavl Oblast where Yeltsin received the majority of votes in both rounds was finalized only following Yeltsin's re-election and was eventually signed in October 1997 (Severnyi Krai, 1997).

The second combination of conditions suggests that the governments in regions having appointed executives and voting for Yeltsin (elect*VOT) managed to sign a bilateral treaty as well. This combination of conditions has not been theorized in existing literature. The presence of voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election confirms the argument by Filippov and Shvetsova (1999) and Tolz and Busygina (1997, 404) that the presidential

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[32]Rossel became famous for his project of the Ural Republic that was supposed to have a higher status within Russia than Sverdlovsk Oblast. He even attempted to launch republican currency, the Ural francs, after discovering in local depositaries the Ural francs printed by the White Army (Nechaev, 2010, 196). The Constitution of the Ural Republic came into force in late October 1993. However, in November 1993, Yeltsin dismissed Rossel from his position and appointed a new governor. In August 1995, Rossel was elected as governor again. In January 1996, he signed a bilateral treaty with President Yeltsin.

election represented a 'golden opportunity' for regional executives without a treaty to obtain one. The new insight of this analysis is that it was not elected executives, as expected, but appointed executives who managed to negotiate a treaty following Yeltsin's re-election. For example, Yeltsin appointed the governor of Samara Oblast Konstantin Titov in 1991. While treaty negotiations initially started in 1995, its draft was finalized only in November 1996 following Yeltsin's re-election and the treaty was eventually signed in August 1997 (IGPI, 1997). Similarly, the mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov ordered preparation of a draft bilateral treaty immediately after Yeltsin's re-election (Kommersant, 1996). The governor of Rostov Oblast Vladimir Chub, who was initially appointed by Yeltsin in 1991, managed to obtain a treaty during the presidential campaign. Yeltsin, visiting Rostov Oblast, signed a treaty with Chub five days before the first round of the presidential election. In turn, Chub reassured the president that he would receive high support of the citizens in the forthcoming election (IGPI, 1996b).

Previous studies tend to focus on the early stage of the negotiation process when the treaties were signed with the heads of ethnic republics (Filippov et al., 2004; Tafel, 2011). They suggest that Yeltsin built a coalition with the republican leaders keeping the executives in the regions with a predominantly ethnic Russian population under strict executive control. In contrast, this analysis shows that the 1996 presidential election became a good opportunity for governors without a treaty to negotiate one. The argument that Yeltsin relied on the political resources of regional heads to win the election implies that they were actually able to deliver expected electoral results. There is evidence confirming that the regional authorities indeed attempted to 'improve' Yeltsin's results between the two election rounds. For example, in Tatarstan, Yeltsin's share in the first round was 38.34 percent and Zyuganov's share 38.1 percent. However, in the second round, Yeltsin's share increased to 61.45 percent while Zyuganov's share decreased to 32.31 percent (IGPI, 1996c). The regional authorities in Tatarstan made significant efforts

to guarantee Yeltsin's victory in the second round. For example, they met with all chiefs of administration and demanded "either to ensure Yeltsin's victory or 'to face the consequences'" (Löwenhardt, 1997, 142).

Similar mechanisms were employed in Bashkortostan and Rostov Oblast where Yeltsin's share in the second round was much higher than in the first round. In the first round in Bashkortostan, Yeltsin received only 34.19 percent, while Zyuganov won 41.86 percent; in the second round, Yeltsin's share reached 51.01 percent and Zyuganov's share only 43.14 percent. In the first round in Rostov Oblast, Zyuganov received 35 percent of votes, surpassing Yeltsin's 29 percent of votes. In the second round, Yeltsin's share increased by more than 20 percent, reaching 50.7 percent. In the second round, Zyuganov received 44.2 percent of votes (IGPI, 1996b). Even in Samara Oblast to 'improve' the performance of Yeltsin the governor fired the heads of three municipalities where Yeltsin's results were the lowest (IGPI, 1996a). There, Yeltsin received the majority of votes in both rounds. In the first round, Yeltsin received 36.13 percent of votes; Zyuganov, 35.17 percent. In the second round, Yeltsin's share was 51.95 percent; Zyuganov's, 42.69 percent (IGPI, 1996a).

Facing strong political competition from the communist candidate Zyuganov at the presidential election, Yeltsin perceived an alliance with regional autocrats as the "lesser evil" than electoral defeat. This argument posits that under high political polarization, multi-level territorial settings can push the incumbent to interfere with a democratic process. Furthermore, the results are in line with previous accounts demonstrating that President Yeltsin was the first who brought the political resources of governors to his service promoting noncompetitive elections in the regions willing to support him (Golosov, 2011; Reisinger and Moraski, 2017, 20). By signing a treaty in exchange for political support, Yeltsin won the 1996 election. This strategy, however, has led to the preservation of authoritarian enclaves, which served as a base for the authoritarian regression in the 2000s.

3.5.5 And the first shall be the last: why no treaty for Tatarstan?

The last bilateral treaty was signed with Moscow in June 1998. Since July 1998, when Vladimir Putin became the Chair of the presidential commission for the preparation of treaties, the center did not negotiate any new treaties with the regions. Furthermore, in June 1999, President Yeltsin approved a federal law (119-FZ) on the principles and the order of delineation of responsibilities between the center and the regions. It proclaimed the supremacy of the Constitution and federal laws and stressed that regional legislation should be in line with them. The last article of the law stated that if the treaties and agreements previously signed between the center and the regions do not correspond to federal legislation, they must be revised within three years.

In 2001, President Putin dissolved the commission which dealt with the preparation of bilateral treaties (Petrov, 2003). Instead, he set up a new commission to examine whether the content of these treaties was in line with the Constitution and the federal legislation (Ross, 2003). On the other hand, in his address to the Russian parliament in 2002, President Putin noted that since the Russian Constitution assumes the possibility to sign bilateral treaties with the regions, they are legitimate. He also pointed out that "in such a country as Russia, we need to pay special attention to regional differences, [therefore] the necessity to sign treaties with some regions may arise" (Putin, 2002). Putin, however, emphasized that all treaties with the regions concerning the distribution of powers must go through the official procedure, just like federal laws.

Tatarstan became the only region that managed to renegotiate a new treaty with the center. In October 2004, a working group headed by the representative of the republican parliament, Farid Mukhametshin, and a presidential envoy in the Trans-Volga federal district, Sergey Kiriyenko, started drafting a new treaty (Vorobieva, 2006). The text of the treaty was prepared within one year and was approved by the parliament of Tatarstan in October 2005 (Kusznir, 2007, 4). Then, the draft had to be approved by the federal

parliament. President Putin submitted it to the State Duma in November 2006. It passed the readings in February 2007 (Kusznir, 2007, 4). However, the Federation Council rejected the draft, pointing out that some of its provisions were unconstitutional (Kusznir, 2007, 4). Therefore, work on the text continued until June 2007 when the Federation Council finally approved it (Kommersant, 2007). Compared with the 1994 treaty, the new treaty contained a more modest list of distributed powers, but it had large symbolic value for the regional elite (Chebankova, 2010; Shaikhutdinova, 2016, 145).

The treaty was signed for 10 years. Therefore, in late 2016-early 2017 experts started commenting on the possibility of its extension. For example, in December 2016, Farid Mukhametshin said that "the republic would insist on the extension of the treaty" (Mukhametshina and Churakova, 2017). In January 2017, a representative of Tatarstan in the upper chamber of the Russian parliamen, Oleg Morozov, argued that "the treaty might be renewed in an abridged version" (Ugarov, 2017). In July, the republican TV reported that the parliament voted for sending a proposal to President Putin which called "to set up a commission to work on legal issues associated with the treaty and to preserve the title "president" for the head of the republic" (GTRK Tatarstan, 2017). No reaction followed from the center. Only in August, did Sergey Kiriyenko from the Administration of the President comment that Russian statehood is not built upon the contractual principle (Novaya Gazeta, 2017). This statement implied that the center declined to renegotiate the treaty. Soon after, in September, the President of the republic, Rustam Minnikhanov, stated that there was no need for a new treaty and pointed out that other means were available to interact with Moscow Kommersant (2017). In December, he confirmed that the republic was not going to seek the extension of the treaty (Idiatullin and Antonov, 2017).

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has studied the factors accounting for the signing of center-region treaties in the period between 1994 and 1998. The analysis has revealed two combinations of conditions leading to a signed treaty, namely, voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election and having the status of a donor region or having an appointed executive and voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election. These findings support the political explanation for treaties and suggest that at the later stage of the treaty signing process executive bargaining had led to the formation of a broad coalition with both democratic and authoritarian sub-national leaders. This strategy of executive bargaining, in the short-run, allowed Yeltsin to win the 1996 presidential election. Yet in the long-term, it contributed to the preservation of authoritarian enclaves, which became a base for the authoritarian regression in Russia in the 2000s.

These findings are in line with the argument by Gibson (2012, 5) that "continuity or change in sub-national authoritarianism is driven not by local causes alone but also by interactions between local politics and the national territorial system in which they are embedded." Furthermore, these results confirm previous literature demonstrating that the consolidation of electoral authoritarianism in Russia in the 2000s was deeply embedded in the center-region relations of the 1990s (e.g., Reisinger and Moraski, 2017). The new argument that the study makes is that, in a situation of high political polarization, multi-level territorial settings push the incumbent to interfere with a democratic process. This argument implies that facing severe competition from one political opponent, the national executive perceives an alliance with regional autocrats as the "lesser evil" than electoral defeat.

It is necessary to outline several limitations. There is a substantial qualitative difference between the treaties negotiated at the early stage of the treaty signing process and the

rest as the former contained more important competencies. This study does not explain the differences in the content and scope of the treaties. Instead, it explains why the governments of some Russian regions managed to sign a treaty while others did not. In addition, the analysis builds on the assumption that the openness of the center to treaty negotiations remained stable over time. However, the center might have initially intended to sign bilateral treaties only with Chechnya and Tatarstan because of their refusal to sign the 1992 Federation Treaty (Vek, 1995, interview with Sergey Shakhray). Later, the center might have perceived these treaties as a means to obtain electoral support. Finally, this analysis concentrates on bilateral treaties as they granted more autonomy to regional governments. However, in the 1990s, the regional governments took a striking amount of autonomy *de facto* rather than via negotiations with Moscow (Stoner-Weiss, 1999). This analysis has focused on *de jure* rather than *de facto* autonomy; the latter requires a separate investigation.

Chapter 4

Explaining the tenure of incumbent governors in Russia

4.1 Introduction

The relationship between federalism and authoritarianism is complex. Authoritarian political systems are likely to transform federalism into a formality, imposing political centralization from the top. Following the re-centralization reforms of the early 2000s, the literature on Russian federalism (Ross, 2003; Orttung and Reddaway, 2004; Slider, 2008; Gel'man and Ryzhenkov, 2011) suggested that as the influence of the center over the regions had increased significantly, little remained of Russian federalism. With the abolishment of direct gubernatorial elections in 2004, it was argued that the governors would start playing by the rules set from above (Petrov, 2010; Starodubtsev, 2014). Recent studies (Demchenko and Golosov, 2016; Golosov and Konstantinova, 2016), however, demonstrate that the governors integrated into the 'power vertical' have retained sufficient autonomy and even expanded their power in the regional arena. Governors have remained important political players despite being appointed by the president.

This chapter studies the puzzle posed by the tenure of incumbent governors in Russia. In September 2004, President Putin proposed to abolish popular elections of regional executives in all Russian regions and introduced a new system of appointment that was in force between 2005 and 2012.[33] The decision to end gubernatorial elections, however, implied the end of the term limit in office–the maximum of two five-year terms. As a result, some incumbent governors were reappointed and remained in office, with their tenure not being limited by any institutional constraints such as the term limit or compulsory retirement age.

There is consensus in the literature that the results of national elections determine the (re)appointment prospects of governors (Reuter and Robertson, 2012; Reuter, 2013; Rochlitz, 2016; Reisinger and Moraski, 2017). As the heads of ethnic regions deliver the highest electoral results (Reisinger and Moraski, 2010), we should expect that they have the best chances of staying in office. However, this is not the case. It is not the incumbents in the ethnic regions but the incumbents in the regions with a predominantly ethnic Russian population that have remained in office the longest. For example, the Belgorod Oblast Governor Evgeny Savchenko has been in office since 1993 and is currently serving his seventh consecutive term–the region has not seen a transfer of power for the past quarter-century. To address the puzzle related to the tenure of incumbent governors in Russia, this chapter raises the following research question: *What factors account for the reappointment of incumbent governors in Russia between 2008 and 2012?*

The analysis concentrates on the period of 2008-2012 that corresponds to the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev. Previous studies suggest that, in contrast to Putin, Medvedev was less willing to reappoint incumbent governors (Turovskii, 2010; Blakkisrud, 2011). By dismissing incumbents he attempted to carry out "progressive political change in Russia"

[33]In 2012, popular elections were re-introduced.

(Moses, 2014, 1398). Therefore, this chapter explores why he nonetheless reappointed some of them. The analysis investigates an interplay of such factors as the ability of governors to mobilize voters and to keep stability in the regions, the effectiveness of governors in managing their territories, as well as the popularity of governors. Rather than untangling their average effect, this study aims to detect what factors or combinations of factors have been necessary and sufficient for gubernatorial reappointment and dismissal. Fuzzy-set QCA of 26 cases reveals that delivering high voting results at national elections, contrary to expectations, has not been necessary for the reappointment of incumbent governors. On the other hand, the failure to deliver high electoral results has been among sufficient conditions leading to the dismissal of incumbents. The analysis also detects two sufficient combinations of conditions accounting for gubernatorial reappointment that confirm the argument that the incumbents remain in office until they fulfill the main "federal priorities" of high electoral results and political stability (Busygina et al., 2018; Libman and Rochlitz, 2019). These findings suggest that being dependent on electoral results, the regional executives not only in the ethnic regions but also in the regions with a predominantly Russian ethnic population have influenced electoral outcomes by mobilizing voters on behalf of the regime. In so doing, they have contributed to the authoritarian regression that took place in Russia during the 2000s.

The chapter is structured as follows. The next section outlines the puzzle of gubernatorial tenure. The third section concentrates on the reappointment of incumbents between 2008 and 2012. The fourth section outlines the main conditions. The fifth section describes the data and the calibration principles. The sixth section presents and discusses the results. The final section concludes.

4.2   Gubernatorial tenure in Russia

Russia's national executive Boris Yeltsin first spoke in the spring of 1991 about the creation of the position of a regional executive (a governor) who would be elected by the population (Tolz and Busygina, 1997, 410). The first gubernatorial elections took place in Moscow, Leningrad (later renamed Saint Petersburg), and the Republic of Tatarstan in June 1991. However, because some regional executives supported the August 1991 anti-democratic coup d'état, direct elections in some regions were postponed and Yeltsin received the right to dismiss and appoint governors there. Yeltsin made the new appointments while assuring that the people were soon to elect regional executives. However, several months later, a new resolution imposed a moratorium on direct elections until December 1992, mainly to prevent the Communists from winning the elections. While the newly adopted 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation prescribed that all regions are entitled to have elected executives, it did not specify the modes of their selection (Golosov, 2018, 2). As a result, they have varied over time.

In the 1990s, gubernatorial elections were postponed in all regions with the exception of the republics because their own legislation required their heads to be popularly elected or appointed by the regional legislative assembly. In October 1994, Yeltsin signed a decree stating that, until indicated otherwise, popular elections of regional executives could take place only if he authorized them. In August 1995, Yeltsin authorized gubernatorial elections in the Sverdlovsk Oblast, but already in September he signed another decree to prolong the moratorium on direct elections until 1996 (Gel'man et al., 2000, 99). Eventually, Yeltsin authorized elections in twelve other regions in December 1995. However, as many incumbents lost to opposition candidates from the Communist Party, he again postponed gubernatorial elections. Previous accounts suggest that this prohibition was supposed to "facilitate the mobilization of voters" by the regional governments in support of Yeltsin's

re-election next summer (Gel'man et al., 2000, 98). In addition, from late 1995 to early 1996, several incumbents were dismissed because they lacked necessary mobilization abilities (Turovskii, 1996).

The first round of country-wide gubernatorial elections took place between 1996 and 1997 following Yeltsin's re-election in July 1996. In this period, 55 regions elected their heads; 48 of them had elections for the first time since 1991 (Solnick, 1998, 48). Ethnic regions, however, held elections at least once before 1996. The Soviet incumbents tended to receive the majority of votes at these elections because they managed to build strong political machines (Kahn, 2002; Hale, 2003). As a result, in the 1990s, executives in the ethnic regions had stayed in office the longest.

In September 2004, President Putin proposed to abolish direct gubernatorial elections in throughout Russia, including the ethnic regions. The appointment procedure initially implied that the president nominated a gubernatorial candidate for the approval of a regional legislative assembly, which formally had an option to reject a suggested candidate. In December 2005, this procedure was reversed: it was the largest party in a regional legislative assembly–often the United Russia party (*Edinaya Rossiya*)–that could propose potential candidates to the president. Since July 2009, following consultations with the department of domestic politics at the Presidential Administration, the leadership of United Russia submitted a list of at least three candidates to the president. After that, the president selected one candidate and nominated him or her for the approval of the regional legislative assembly. This approval was rather symbolic as assemblies unanimously approved the nominated candidates.

Governors were appointed for five years, yet the president could dismiss the incumbent earlier and appoint a new governor instead. In cases of reappointment, however, the tenure of the incumbent could be quite long as he or she did not face any institutional constraints. Although in 1999 gubernatorial tenure was formally limited to the maximum

of two five-year terms, in early 2001 the law was reinterpreted in such a way that the counting of terms began from their first election after the law was adopted in 1999 (Slider, 2008, 110). Consequently, the incumbents could remain in office for more than the original limit of two terms. For example, the President of the Republic of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev had already served two terms in the 1990s, yet ran for office in 2001 and was again re-elected.

The 2004 decision to end gubernatorial elections implied complete abolishment of the term limit as there were no formal constraints regarding the reappointment of incumbents. Even following the reintroduction of popular elections in 2012, the incumbents could still remain in office because in 2015 President Putin signed an amendment to federal law stating that the terms of governors are to be counted from 2012. However, as Table 1 below suggests, it is not the incumbents in the *republics* but the incumbents in *oblasts* and *krais* that have stayed in office the longest in the 2000s.

To address this puzzle, the analysis concentrates on the reappointment of incumbent governors by President Medvedev between 2008-2012. The next section describes the dataset of gubernatorial reappointments and dismissals.

4.3   Reappointment of incumbent governors between 2008 and 2012

The initial procedure of gubernatorial appointment involved presidential nomination of a gubernatorial candidate for the approval of a regional legislative assembly. Before the nomination, the president was supposed to consult with a presidential envoy (*polpred*) in the corresponding federal district (Goode, 2007, 372). The regional legislative body had the option to reject a suggested candidate and to propose a new candidate. However, if the regional legislative body rejected the candidate nominated by the president three times, the

Table 4.1: Tenure of incumbent governors in Russia in 2005-2020

No	Region	Governor	Term starts	Reappointment year	Re-election year	Term ends	Tenure
1	Kaluga Oblast	Artamonov	2000	2005; 2010	2015	2020	20
2	Marii El Republic	Markelov	2000	2009	2015	2017	17
3	Udmurtia Republic	Volkov	2000	2009	-	2014	14
4	Krasnodar Krai	Tkachev	2000	2007; 2012	-	2015	15
5	Astrakhan Oblast	Zhilkin	2004	2009	2014	2018	14
6	Belgorod Oblast	Savchenko	1993	2007	2012; 2017	In office	27
7	Kemerovo Oblast	Tuleev	1997	2005; 2010	2015	2018	21
8	Kurgan Oblast	Bogomolov	1996	2009	-	2014	18
9	Vladimir Oblast	Vinogradov	1996	2005; 2009	-	2013	17
10	Kursk Oblast	Mikhailov	2000	2005; 2010	2014	2018	18
11	Penza Oblast	Bochkarev	1998	2005; 2010	-	2015	17
12	Tambov Oblast	Betin	1995; 1999	2005; 2010	-	2015	20
13	Ulyanovsk Oblast	Morozov	2004	2006; 2011	2016	In office	16
14	Lipetsk Oblast	Korolev	1998	2005; 2010	2014	2018	20
15	Chita Oblast (Zabaikalsk Krai)	Geniatulin	1996	2008	-	2013	17

Source: Author's dataset.

president could dissolve it. The appointment procedure was slightly modified in December 2005, as along with a presidential envoy, the largest party in a regional legislative assembly could also suggest potential candidates to the president.

Since July 2009, it was the political party with the most seats in a regional assembly that proposed at least three gubernatorial candidates to the president. When the term of an incumbent governor was expiring, the regional leadership of the United Russia party (which had the majority in all regional parliaments) started official consultations with the Presidential Administration concerning potential gubernatorial candidates. At this stage, the domestic politics department of the Presidential Administration played a crucial role in suggesting potential candidates. Then, 45 days before the expiration of the gubernatorial term, the leadership of United Russia submitted a list of candidates to the president. In ten days, the president selected one candidate and nominated him or her for the approval

of the regional legislative assembly. However, as before, their approval tended to be rather symbolic; assemblies unanimously approved nominated candidates.

Governors were appointed for five years, yet the president could dismiss them earlier because they 'lost the President's confidence.' At the later stage of the appointment process, power transfer happened in a region if the incumbent governor was not included in the list of nominated candidates or was included in the list but was not selected by the president. Finally, the incumbent governors could leave their office because of promotion to the federal level, voluntary resignation, or death.

To explain the long-term tenure of incumbent governors, this analysis concentrates on reappointments made by President Medvedev in the period from 2008 to 2012. It is selected because previous accounts suggest that Medvedev explicitly intended to replace incumbent governors (Turovskii, 2010; Blakkisrud, 2011). Some scholars even argue that by dismissing incumbents Medvedev attempted to carry out "progressive political change in Russia" (Moses, 2014, 1398).

I have constructed a dataset of gubernatorial reappointments and dismissals that starts in May 2008, when President Medvedev made his first appointment, and ends in May 2012, when Medvedev's presidential term ended. As the first step, I compiled a list of all incumbent governors relying on the public dataset of Russian governors' biographies created by the International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow.[34] The list included 50 incumbents, out of which 15 were reappointed by President Medvedev. Governors of Belgorod and Leningrad oblasts Evgeny Savchenko and Valery Serdyukov are not included in this list. Savchenko was reappointed by President Putin in 2007 and then re-elected in 2012. Serdyukov was similarly reappointed by President Putin in 2007, but did not subsequently run for

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[34]The dataset and the codebook are available at `https://iims.hse.ru/en/csid/databases`.

re-election and resigned in late May 2012. In addition, Oleg Chirkunov is not included in the list as he was not popularly elected but appointed as the governor of Perm Oblast and then Perm Krai once it was established in December 2005. Then, I excluded 17 incumbents who were promoted or voluntarily resigned, namely, the promotions of Viktor Tolokonskii in Novosibirsk Oblast, Viktor Ishaev in Khabarovsk Krai, Aleksandr Khloponin in Krasnoyarsk Krai, and Valentina Matvienko in Saint Petersburg; and resignations of Vyacheslav Pozgalev in Vologda Oblast, Mikhail Kuznetsov in Pskov Oblast, Yury Evdokimov in Murmansk Oblast, Egor Stroev in Oryol Oblast, Dmitry Zelenin in Tver Oblast, Yury Luzhkov in Moscow, Murtaza Rakhimov in Bashkortostan, Murat Zyazikov in Ingushetia, Vyacheslav Shtyrov in Sakha (Yakutia), Roman Abramovich in Chukotka, Segei Katanodov in Karelia, Aleksandr Chernogorov in Stavropol Krai, Pyotr Sumin in Chelyabinsk Oblast.

Then, I excluded 5 cases when incumbents publicly asked the president not to consider them as candidates (Mintimer Shaimiev in Tatarstan, Yury Neelov in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Nikolai Volkow in Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Vladimir Chub in Rostov Oblast, and Boris Gromov in Moscow Oblast), and two cases, for which no systematic data were available (Aleksandr Lebed' in Khakassia and Aleksandr Filipenko in Khanty-Mansy Autonomous Okrug). As a result, the dataset includes 15 reappointment and 11 dismissals–26 cases in total (see Table B.1 for the list.)

4.4   Conditions of gubernatorial reappointment

The "top-down" explanation tends to dominate the existing literature. It posits that the (re)appointment of governors has been entirely depended on the Presidential Administration. This implies that as long as governors fulfill the main "federal priorities," high electoral results and political stability, they could remain in office (Busygina et al.,

2018, 67). Empirical studies confirm that the results of the State Duma elections had the strongest effect on appointment chances of governors (Reuter and Robertson, 2012; Rochlitz, 2016; Reisinger and Moraski, 2017; Libman and Rochlitz, 2019). Based on these results, *the ability of governors to mobilize voters* is the first condition in the analysis.

Electoral incentives are likely to matter more in the periods before elections and less in the periods after elections (Reuter and Robertson, 2012, 1016). As governors play a vital role in maintaining political stability in the regions (Sharafutdinova, 2010; Zubarevich, 2015b), this condition could account for the reappointment of incumbents during the economic and financial crisis of 2008-2009 and a wave of mass protests of 2011-2012. Consequently, *the ability of governors to keep stability* in the regions is the second condition in the analysis. So far, it has not been systematically evaluated in empirical studies.

According to the alternative, *"bottom-up"* explanation, the efficiency of incumbents in governing their territory as well as their popularity could also account for their reappointment. It is plausible that the former is likely to matter in times of economic crisis (Konitzer, 2005). However, Reuter and Robertson (2012) find "weak and inconsistent evidence" that economic indicators have any effect. Rochlitz (2016, 15) even shows a negative relationship between average economic performance of a governor[35] and the likelihood of his or her reappointment. This study evaluates whether the efficiency of governors as perceived by the Kremlin has played any role in the reappointment of incumbents in times of crisis. Therefore, *the efficiency of governors in managing their territory* is the third condition included in the analysis.

Previous empirical studies provide mixed evidence concerning the impact of the popularity of governors on their (re)appointment chances. Reuter and Robertson (2012, 1034) find that the relationship between the popularity of incumbents and the likelihood

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[35]Rochlitz (2016, 12-13) describes in detail the constructed measure.

of their appointment has changed over time, playing a more important role in the period prior to 2008. By contrast, Rochlitz (2016, 15) finds a strong positive effect of popularity on (re)appointment chances of governors. This analysis assesses whether the popularity of incumbents has played any role at the later stage of the appointment process; consequently, *the popularity of governors* is the fourth condition.

The broad expectation is that these conditions lead to the reappointment of governors in their presence. However, this analysis is different from previous accounts in three respects. First, rather than untangling their 'average effect' it detects what conditions or combinations of conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for gubernatorial reappointment. Second, it concentrates on the reappointment of incumbent governors. This outcome has not been tackled by any of the existing studies that focus on gubernatorial appointments (Reuter and Robertson, 2012; Rochlitz, 2016; Reisinger and Moraski, 2017). Third, in contrast to previous accounts that assume symmetric causation, this study performs separate analyses of gubernatorial reappointment and dismissal.

The theoretical expectation is that *the ability of governors to mobilize voters* has been necessary for gubernatorial reappointment as necessity implies that the outcome could not be achieved without the condition. Sufficiency, on the other hand, requires the presence of a condition or combinations of conditions where the outcome is also present. The "top-down" logic of gubernatorial reappointment suggests that *the ability of governors to mobilize voters* combined with *the ability of governors to keep stability* is sufficient for gubernatorial reappointment. Following Reuter (2013), who finds that popular governors can better mobilize voters for the United Russia party, the third expectation is that *the ability to mobilize voters* combined with *the popularity of governors* is also sufficient for the reappointment of incumbents. The final expectation is that *the ability to mobilize voters* combined with *the effectiveness of incumbent governors in managing their territory* is sufficient for reappointment.

The present analysis is limited to political and economic factors and does not account for all potentially relevant factors. For example, Petrov (2010) claims that a public conflict between a governor and the center has often led to the dismissal of the incumbent. Indeed, Moscow's Yury Luzhkov, reappointed in 2007, was dismissed in 2010 because of a conflict with President Medvedev. Similarly, Bashkortostan's Murtaza Rakhimiv and Dagestan's Mukhu Aliev, both reappointed in 2006, resigned in 2010 because of their conflict with the center. Such conflicts, however, tended to happen quite sporadically and require a separate consideration and, therefore, are not included in this analysis.

Some authors also emphasize the increasing role of people with a background in security and military services (*siloviki*) under Putin and suggest that the president could have a motivation to dismiss an incumbent and to appoint a *silovik* instead (Bremmer and Charap, 2006; Petrov, 2012). However, Buckley et al. (2014) have examined the background of all newly appointed governors and found that *siloviki* accounted for only nine percent of them. Therefore, this condition is not considered in the present analysis.

Finally, as only the party with the majority of seats in a regional legislative assembly had the power to suggest potential gubernatorial candidates to the president, membership of the incumbents in the United Russia party might also matter as it dominated regional assemblies across the country (Petrov and Titkov, 2010; Moses, 2014, 1397). However, Reuter (2010, 2013) demonstrates that strong incumbent governors tended to join United Russia much later than less independent governors. Consequently, in this analysis, I assume that the membership in United Russia is not as important for the incumbents as for the newly appointed governors.

4.5 Method, data, and calibration

4.5.1 Method

Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) proceeds in several steps. First, raw data are collected and then calibrated, meaning that the cases are assigned membership scores in the condition sets and the outcome set. I employ Fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) that establishes differences in kind and in degree between the cases. It operates on sets where cases have full membership, full non-membership, as well as partial membership and partial non-membership. I have opted for 'direct' calibration, which employs a logistic function to fit the raw data between three qualitative anchors denoting full inclusion in the set, the crossover point, and full exclusion from the set.

4.5.2 Calibration of the outcome, gubernatorial reappointment

The outcome of interest is *the reappointment of incumbent governor* (REAP). If a governor was reappointed by President Medvedev, he[36] gets 1, if dismissed – 0. Then, I set 1 as the point of inclusion, 0 - as the point of exclusion, with 0.2 serving as the crossover point (see Table 4.2 below).

4.5.3 Calibration of the conditions

The ability of governors to mobilize voters (VOT)
The results of the presidential and State Duma elections are of interest to the center. In the 2008 presidential election, Dmitry Medvedev received the majority of votes in all Russian regions. The results of the State Duma elections, however, display more variation across

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[36]All incumbents in this analysis are males.

Table 4.2: Calibration strategies

Set label	Set type	Fully out	Cross over	Fully in
REAP	fuzzy	0	0.2	1
VOT[1]	fuzzy	40.00	51.00	65.00
		30.00	51.00	55.00
STAB	fuzzy	30,000	20,000	10,000
EFF	fuzzy	70	40	20
POPUL	fuzzy	30.00	40.00	50.00

[1] Calibration anchors are for the 2007 and 2011 data, respectively.

the country. In 2007, the share of votes for the United Russia party varied from 48.78 to 99.36. In 2011, its share varied from 29.04 percent to 99.48 percent. I collected the data on the share of the United Russia party in the 2007 and 2011 elections and considered in the analysis the results of the elections that took place prior to the reappointment or dismissal of the incumbent. The database on economic and political indicators for the Russian regions in 1998-2014 provides information about the electoral results.[37]

To assign membership scores to cases, I set 40 percent as the point of exclusion for the 2007 election data. The exclusion cut-off is lowered to 30 percent for the 2011 election data as United Russia received a lesser share of the votes than in 2007. The crossover is set at 51 percent as this is a majority of votes. To indicate the point of inclusion, I followed Reuter and Robertson (2012, 1028) who emphasize that "some regions are more disposed than others to voting for United Russia" and suggest that "the concept to be measured here is the governor's ability to generate votes for United Russia above some exogenously set baseline" and not just to deliver a majority of votes. This baseline is often close to the national average. Therefore, the inclusion point for the 2007 election data is set to 65 percent. United Russia's average in the 2007 and 2011 elections is 65.01 and 49.16 percent,

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[37]The dataset and the codebook are available at https://iims.hse.ru/en/csid/databases.

respectively. Since the crossover point for the 2011 election data almost fully overlaps with the 2011 national average, the inclusion point is set to 55 percent.

The ability of governors to keep stability in the regions (STAB)

In this analysis, protest activity is taken as a proxy for social and political stability in the Russian regions. There are several sources providing information about protest activity across the country. For example, the Russian protest event database by Lankina[38] contains detailed data on protests in the Russian regions. However, it systematically covers mainly political protests and contains limited information about their turnout. The website `www.ikd.ru` used to provide data on social and economic protests and also allowed searching for individual regions. Yet this website is no longer available. For this reason, I have relied on the monitoring reports published by the Communist Party that provide extensive data on political, social, and economic protests and their turnout.[39]

The data on protests' turnout in each region one year preceding the reappointment or dismissal of the incumbent governors were employed in the calibration. To assign fuzzy-set membership scores to cases, I relied on the gaps observable in the raw data and set the following cutoff points: 30,000 participants, 20,000 participants, and 10,000 participants as the point of exclusion, crossover, and inclusion, respectively.

The effectiveness of governors in managing their territory (EFF)

In 2007, the Kremlin introduced a system for evaluating the efficiency of governors consisting of 43 indicators. It included 319 indicators in 2010. In August 2012, another presidential decree introduced a new list of 12 more general indicators for evaluating governors' performance. Once gubernatorial elections were reintroduced in late 2012, these indicators were no longer used for the assessment of regional executives. (Rochlitz et al.,

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[38]The database and the codebook are available at `https://popularmobilization.net/about/`.

[39]The reports are available at `https://kprf.ru/analytics/`.

2015; Rochlitz, 2016; Libman and Rochlitz, 2019, 58-59). The integral index shows the rank of all governors from 1 to 83 depending on their performance in managing a regional economy as well as such policy spheres as healthcare, education, construction, and housing. As the evaluation is based on statistical data and on assessments of citizens, the integral index may correlate with the approval rating of governors. Having this in mind, I employed a component of the integral index that is specifically related to statistical economic indicators of the region and governors' performance: "working efficiency of executive authorities." The ICSID dataset provides the integral index of governors' efficiency as well as its components. To assign fuzzy-set membership scores to cases, I relied on the gaps in the raw data and set 70 as the point of exclusion, 40 as the crossover point, and 20 as the point of inclusion in the set.

The popularity of governors (POPUL)

Several public opinion surveys rank governors according to their popularity. For example, the Russian Public Opinion Polling Center (*VTSIOM*) collects data about the satisfaction of citizens with government performance and public services measured as a percentage of total positive responses. An alternative source are GeoRating surveys conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (*Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie*) in 68 Russian regions. The respondents were asked, "Do you think the leader of your region is doing a good job or a bad job?" The results of only the March 2009 survey are publicly available, while other survey data are private. John Ora Reuter kindly shared the commercial data by the Public Opinion Foundation (personal communication, January 2020). The database includes the approval and disapproval rates of the governor. For the analysis, the data on the approval and disapproval of the incumbents one year preceding their reappointment or dismissal was used.

To assign fuzzy-set membership scores to cases, I considered both the approval and disapproval rate of the incumbents and then set the approval rate of 30, 40 and 50 percent

as the exclusion, crossover and the inclusion points, correspondingly. These decisions are supported by case evidence. For example, the approval rating of Aleksandr Volkov in Udmurtia was 29.00 percent while his disapproval rate reached 55.25 percent. The approval and disapproval rates of Nikolay Merkushkin in Mordovia were 46.5 and 21.25 percent, respectively. Table B.2 and Table B.3 display the raw and calibrated data.

4.6 Results and discussion

4.6.1 The analysis of the outcome, gubernatorial reappointment

Once the data have been calibrated, the next step is to perform the analysis of necessity and sufficiency.[40] A condition is considered necessary if it passes a consistency threshold of at least 0.9 (Ragin, 2006). In line with expectation, the ability of governors to mobilize voters passes the 0.9 consistency threshold (Table B.4 reports the parameters of fit). However, relevance of this condition is only 0.348, which indicates its trivialness and implies that it should not be interpreted as a substantially necessary condition (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 236-237).

The analysis of sufficiency is based on the logical minimization of sufficient truth table rows. Table 4.3 below displays the truth table representation of set membership scores of 26 cases in the condition sets and the outcome set. The first column indicates the row number as it appears in the software output. Columns two through five display the status of four conditions: 1 means present; 0, absent. The column "OUT" denotes if a truth table row is sufficient for the outcome. The consistency score displayed in the column

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[40]For the analysis, the R packages 'QCA' (Dusa, 2019) and 'Set Methods' (Oana and Schneider, 2018) were used.

"incl." along with the PRI score shown in the column "PRI"[41] determine the decision about sufficiency. The suggested cut-off point for consistency is higher or equal to 0.75 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010, 10). Following this recommendation as well as taking into account the gaps in consistency and PRI scores, the consistency cut-off is set to 0.75. The column "n" shows how many cases belong to a given row; and the column "Cases" names them. The columns "Reappointment" and "Dismissal" speak for themselves.

The analysis of sufficiency applies Boolean algebra to reduce the complexity of sufficient truth table rows. It produces three types of solution formulas, namely, conservative, parsimonious, and intermediate.[42] In the present analysis, the parsimonious solution formula displays model ambiguity (Table B.5). The conservative and intermediate solution formulas are identical and are reported in Table 4.4 below. The analysis provides substantive interpretation of this formula.

The solution formula displays two sufficient combinations of conditions. The first combination is the ability of governors to mobilize voters and to keep stability combined with the effectiveness of governors in managing their territory (VOT*STAB*EFF). The second combination is the ability of governors to mobilize voters and to keep stability combined with the popularity of governors (VOT*STAB*POPUL). The solution consistency is 0.893, which is quite high. The solution coverage, which shows how much of the outcome is in line with the results, is 0.541. This is quite modest and suggests

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[41]PRI means proportional reduction in inconsistency and indicates "how much it helps to know that a given X is specifically a subset of Y and not a subset of Y" (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 242).

[42]The conservative solution formula is the most complex one as it is based only on empirically observed evidence. The parsimonious solution formula is based on assumptions about the logical remainders, which contribute to parsimony and are called simplifying assumptions. As a result, it is the least complex solution. Finally, the intermediate solution formula is based only on those simplifying assumptions that at the same time represent easy counterfactuals, meaning they are consistent with theoretical directional expectations. Therefore, the intermediate solution is often–but not necessarily–less complex than the conservative solution and more complex than the parsimonious solution (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 174).

Table 4.3: Truth table, outcome gubernatorial reappointment

									Cases	
Row	VOT	STAB	EFF	POPUL	OUT	n	incl.	PRI	Reappointment	Dismissal
14	1	1	0	1	1	4	0.948	0.936	Korolev_LIP Markelov_ME Merkushkin_MO Morozov_ULY	-
16	1	1	1	1	1	2	0.916	0.898	Artamonov_KLU Tuleev_KEM	-
15	1	1	1	0	1	2	0.790	0.726	Betin_TAM Vinogradov_VLA	-
12	1	0	1	1	0	3	0.682	0.617	Bochkarev_PNZ Tkachev_KDA	Rossel_SVE
11	1	0	1	0	0	6	0.562	0.479	Dar'kin_PRI Volkov_UD	Chernyshov_ORE Fedorov_CU Kulakov_VOR Shaklein_KIR
13	1	1	0	0	0	5	0.546	0.466	Bogomolov_KGN Mikhailov_KRS	Batdyev_KC Ilyumzhinov_KL Torlopov_KO
9	1	0	0	0	0	2	0.476	0.317	Zhilkin_AST	Maksyuta_VGG
7	0	1	1	0	0	2	0.466	0.269	-	Polezhaev_OMS Kress_TOM
1	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-	-	-
2	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-	-	-
3	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-	-	-
4	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-	-	-
5	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-	-	-
6	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-	-	-
8	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-	-	-
10	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-	-	-

Consistency cut-off = 0.75.
? indicates that a row is a logical remainder.

that many cases remain uncovered by these results. Two conditions, VOT and STAB, are present in both sufficient combinations. None of them is, however, individually necessary for the outcome. Consistency of this intersection is only 0.634. Figure B.1 further confirms that the intersection of VOT*STAB should not be regarded as necessary because of five deviant cases. These two conditions should be rather interpreted as very important INUS

Table 4.4: Conservative solution formula, outcome reappointment

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
VOT*STAB*EFF +	0.864	0.838	0.407	0.143	**Betin_TAM** **Vinogradov_VLA** Artamonov_KLU
VOT*STAB*POPUL	0.941	0.933	0.398	0.134	**Korolev_LIP** **Markelov_ME** **Merkushkin_MO** Artamonov_KLU
Overall solution	0.893	0.878	0.541		

[1] Capital letters denote presence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.
[3] The intermediate solution formula is identical; directional expectations hold that all conditions contribute to the outcome in their presence.

conditions. 'INUS' means "Insufficient but Necessary part of a combination that is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the outcome" (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 4).

The first sufficient combination (VOT*STAB*EFF) has a consistency of 0.864 and coverage of 0.407. Typical cases include the governors of Tambov, Vladimir, and Kaluga oblasts. The consistency of the second combination (VOT*STAB*POPUL) is 0.941 and its coverage is 0.398. The unique coverage, which indicates how much of the outcome is explained by the single solution path, is 0.143 and 0.134 for the first and the second combinations, respectively. The governors of Lipetsk and Kaluga oblasts along with the heads of the republics of Mari El and Mordovia represent the typical cases. Figure B.2 displays a sufficiency plot of the conservative solution formula, which also shows that the governors of Kemerovo and Ulyanovsk Oblasts represent "deviant cases for consistency in degree" (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013). The next subsection reports the results of the analysis of gubernatorial dismissal.

4.6.2 The analysis of the outcome, gubernatorial dismissal

The analysis of necessity reveals that none of the four conditions in either presence or absence passes the threshold of 0.9. Table B.6 reports the parameters of fit. For the analysis of sufficiency, a consistency cut-off is set to 0.75. The conservative solution formula that is presented in Table 4.5 below provides richer evidence and, therefore, is selected for substantive interpretation.[43]

Table 4.5: Conservative solution formula, outcome gubernatorial dismissal

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
VOT*stab*eff*popul +	0.757	0.683	0.264	0.192	**Maksyuta_VGG**	Zhilkin_AST
vot*STAB*EFF*popul	0.803	0.731	0.208	0.136	**Polezhaev_OMS**	
					Kress_TOM	
Overall solution	0.800	0.754	0.400			

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters indicate absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

The analysis detects two sufficient combinations of conditions. The first is the ability of governors to mobilize voters combined with the absence of the other three conditions (VOT*stab*eff*popul). The second is the ability of governors to keep stability in the region and the effectiveness of governors in managing their territory combined with the absence of the other two conditions (vot*STAB*EFF*popul). The solution consistency is 0.800, which is an acceptable level. Solution coverage is only 0.400 meaning that many cases remain 'uncovered' by these results.

The first combination has consistency of 0.757 and coverage of 0.264. The unique coverage is 0.192 and 0.136 for the first and the second combinations, respectively. The governor of Volgograd Oblast represents a typical case. The governor of Astrakhan Oblast

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[43]The truth table is displayed in Table B.7. For the parsimonious and intermediate solution formulas see Table B.8.

is a deviant case. Future comparison of the most typical case, Maksyuta in Volgograd Oblast, with the most deviant case, Zhilkin in Astrakhan Oblast, looks quite promising as they display the same combinations of conditions but differ in the outcome (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013, 2019). The consistency of the second combination is 0.803, its coverage is 0.208. Typical cases include the governors of Omsk and Tomsk oblasts. The next subsection reports the results of the robustness tests.

4.6.3   Robustness tests

To test the robustness of the results, Wagemann and Schneider (2015, 41) suggest to check if changes in the calibration, in the case selection, and in the raw consistency levels produce any "substantively different results." For the first alternative analysis, the ability of governors to deliver high electoral results can be calibrated differently. In 2007, United Russia received 59.53 percent of votes in the Republic of Khakassia. This result was perceived in the local media as a failure, though. Based on this evidence, I set the higher cross over point at 59.60 percent. For the second alternative analysis, I have excluded the incumbents who served in office only one term before being reappointed or dismissed, as they had the shortest tenure. These cases are Aleksandr Zhilkin and Sergey Morozov in Astrakhan and Ulyanovsk oblasts whose terms started in 2004 and 2005, respectively; and also Nikolay Shaklein in Kirov Oblast who was elected in 2004. Finally, for the third alternative analysis, I employed the integral index of governors' effectiveness to calibrate the condition of the effectiveness of governors in managing their territory.

I have not performed the alternative analysis altering the consistency cut-off as it would be either below the recommended inclusion score of 0.75 or significantly higher than that. In the former scenario, the results would be less consistent but would 'cover' more cases, while in the latter - solution consistency would increase, yet its coverage would decrease. Taking into account that the main analysis of the reappointment is based on minimization

of three truth table rows, the increase in consistency cut-off would be highly restrictive. The alternative solution formulas are reported in Table B.9, Table B.10, and Table B.11. They are identical to the solution formula produced in the main analysis of the reappointment outcome, meaning the results of the analysis are quite robust. The next subsection provides substantive interpretation of the results.

4.6.4 Discussion of the results

The analysis shows that the ability of incumbent governors to deliver high electoral results could not guarantee their reappointment. This is a very important insight as previous studies find a strong relationship between the electoral results and the chances of gubernatorial (re)appointment (Reuter and Robertson, 2012; Rochlitz, 2016; Reisinger and Moraski, 2017; Libman and Rochlitz, 2019). The present analysis reveals that the ability to deliver high electoral results, in fact, represents a trivial necessary condition, meaning that it cannot be linked to either reappointment or dismissal–it is present in both.

There are two possible interpretations of this finding. The first interpretation is that the center simply expects all governors to deliver high electoral results so this is an established 'rule of the game.' Consequently, there are no rewards for those who comply with the rules. The second interpretation is that the incumbent governors having stayed in office for many years are better skilled in delivering votes. Existing literature posits that to deliver votes, regional elites rely on political machines that are based on informal elite networks (Reuter, 2013; Golosov, 2014b; Hertel-Fernandez, 2016). These theories assume that the longer the regional patron stays in office, the more extensive networks he or she builds, and the more effective they are in mobilizing voters (Frye et al., 2014, 2019a,b). Although this assumption is plausible, little empirical work has assessed it so far meaning it should be further explored.

The analysis of sufficiency has revealed two paths leading to gubernatorial reappointment. The first is the ability to mobilize voters and to keep stability in the regions in combination with the effectiveness of incumbents in managing their territory (VOT*STAB*EFF). The second is the ability to mobilize voters and to keep stability in combination with the popularity of incumbents (VOT*STAB*POPUL). These findings suggest that an intersection of VOT*STAB represents a very important pair of INUS conditions, which is in line with the *"top-down"* explanation. It posits that until the main "federal priorities," that is, high voting results and political stability in the region, are fulfilled the incumbents stay in office (Busygina et al., 2018; Libman and Rochlitz, 2019).

On the other hand, this analysis suggests that intergovernmental interactions in Russia are quite complex and there is still some space for the *"bottom-up"* dynamics. It is a combination of fulfilled "federal priorities" either with the effectiveness of incumbents in managing their territory or with the popularity of incumbents. The latter scenario has been theorized in previous studies. For example, Reuter (2013) finds that the United Russia party performs better when governors are popular. He argues that "even as appointed officials, regional governors remained by far the most powerful players in Russian regional politics" Reuter (2013, 106). However, no previous analysis has found empirical support for the former scenario because they aimed to find "an average effect" of certain independent variables (Reuter and Robertson, 2012; Rochlitz, 2016; Reisinger and Moraski, 2017). Yet it is quite plausible that during the economic crisis, President Medvedev paid attention to the development of the regional economy and rewarded a few incumbents who performed well. If so, then further analysis is needed to explain why these incumbents have performed as effective managers in the absence of any incentives from the center.

4.7 Conclusion

Previous studies suggest that under Putin the ability of regional elites to deliver high electoral results has become a crucial element of intra-elite bargaining, and of territorial politics in Russia more generally. This analysis, however, shows that the ability to deliver high voting results could not guarantee the reappointment of incumbent governors in Russia between 2008 and 2012. On the other hand, it reveals that the failure to do so has been among sufficient conditions leading to the dismissal of incumbents. The analysis also detects two sufficient combinations accounting for gubernatorial reappointment. They support the argument that the incumbents stay in office until they fulfill the main "federal priorities"–high electoral results and political stability in the regions.

In contrast to the 1990s, when it was the executives in the ethnic regions who stayed in office the longest, in the 2000s it was the incumbents in the regions with a predominantly Russian ethnic population (*oblasts* and *krais*) who had the longest tenure. The findings of this analysis suggest that, being dependent on electoral results, the regional executives not only in the ethnic regions but also in the regions with a predominantly Russian ethnic population have relied on strong political machines to influence electoral outcomes.

According to the literature on comparative federalism, elections at the sub-national level is a distinctive feature of democratic federations (Filippov et al., 2004). The puzzle of Russian federalism is that, despite the return to gubernatorial elections in 2012, it still displays clear authoritarian features (Obydenkova and Swenden, 2013; Kropp, 2019; Libman and Rochlitz, 2019). Therefore, further research needs to study how authoritarian federations mimic democratic federations by combining institutions that are associated with democracy (*e.g.,* elections) with authoritarian distribution and reproduction of power.

Chapter 5

Politically sensitive transfers in Russia: The Case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup

5.1   Introduction

The 2000s witnessed re-centralization of fiscal flows that made regional governments in Russia more dependent on federal transfers. Existing studies concentrate on electoral effects of transfers and study if the center favors their core constituents or targets swing voters; core constituents provide regular electoral support to the center, while electoral results in swing regions tend to vary. Empirical evidence, however, is rather mixed (Popov, 2004; Starodubtsev, 2009, 2018). Several studies suggest that this ambiguity is a result of economic factors. For example, Frye et al. (2015) showed that the regions with a higher share of votes for the United Russia party received more transfers from the center during the economic crisis of 2008-2010. Marques II et al. (2016) found that the allocation of federal funds in Russia was conditional on regions' economic growth as core regions tended

to receive more transfers when economic growth was slow while swing regions tended to receive more transfers when economic growth was fast.

However, recent studies suggest that regional elites may also have leverage over federal transfer policy (Sharafutdinova and Turovsky, 2017; Turovsky and Gaivoronsky, 2017; Petrov and Nazrullaeva, 2018). For example, until recently, the federal government has generously funded celebrations commemorating millennial and centennial anniversaries of Russian cities such as 1000 years of Kazan in 2005, 1000 years of Yaroslavl in 2010, and 300 years of Omsk in 2016 (Kommersant, 2014). The federal government also regularly commits to expensive projects. The 2014 Sochi Olympics became one of the most costly Olympic Games ever (Golubchikov, 2016; Flyvbjerg and Stewart, 2016). Furthermore, Russia hosted the 2018 FIFA World Cup, which has been similarly recognized as the most expensive in its history (RBK, 2018b).

The case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup is particularly intriguing as, out of fourteen initially nominated venues, only eleven were selected to host the event. The results of the selection surprised many observers because the city of Krasnodar, with two football clubs playing in the Russian Premier League, was not selected while Saransk in the Republic of Mordovia and Volgograd, which have none, were selected (Expert, 2012; Ash, 2018). The localities chosen to host the championship received significant federal transfers. To shed light on the logic behind their distribution, this chapter raises the following research question: *What are the factors accounting for the choice of venues for the 2018 FIFA World Cup Russia?*

The analysis evaluates the "rewarding loyalty" and the "political connections" hypotheses. It examines the interplay of the following four factors: the ability of regional elites to deliver high voting results and to keep stability in the regions, strong administrative capacity of the regions and the lobbying power of governors. Rather than untangling their 'average effect,' this study employs Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to detect

what factors or combinations of factors have been necessary and sufficient for the choice of the World Cup venues. QCA is appropriate for the structural comparison of a middle number of cases and can reveal multiple paths leading to the same outcome, which is likely to be the case in the selection process. Furthermore, QCA combines the elements of variable-oriented and case-oriented methods and has greater possibilities for drawing inferences with respect to cases (Ragin, 1987).

The analysis detects that the lobbying power of governors is a necessary condition for the selection as a World Cup venue. It also reveals two sufficient combinations of conditions accounting for this outcome. The first combination is the inability of regional elites to deliver high voting results, their inability to keep stability in the regions, and the lobbying power of governors. The second combination is the ability of regional elites to deliver high voting results, strong administrative capacity of the regions, and the lobbying power of governors. These results support the "political connections" hypothesis. They suggest that well-connected regional elites are able to extract additional resources from the center.

An important insight of the analysis is that the cases belonging to the second sufficient combination (e.g., Kazan and Saransk in the republics of Tatarstan and Mordovia, respectively), along with the lobbying power of governors, display both the ability to deliver high voting results and strong administrative capacity. This configuration of conditions means that although the regional elites might have been rewarded by the center for delivering votes, the actual capacity to fulfill the World Cup-related projects on time was also evaluated by the center. These results suggest that the center has adopted a complex strategy selecting the FIFA World Cup venues. Overall, this analysis has confirmed previous studies (e.g., Sharafutdinova and Turovsky, 2017) demonstrating that the regional governments in Russia play an important role in the distribution of federal transfers.

The chapter is structured as follows. The next section defines the outcome and provides the background on the distribution of politically sensitive transfers in Russia. The third section presents alternative explanations. The fourth section outlines the theoretical model and lists the main causal conditions that are expected to account for the outcome. The fifth section describes the methodology, data, and the calibration strategy. The sixth section presents and discusses the results. The final section concludes.

5.2 Politically sensitive transfers in Russia

The system of federal funds in Russia includes formula-based unconditional transfers as well as discretionary transfers that are subjected to political bargaining. In the 1990s, federal transfers accounted for around 12.7 percent of regional revenues (Libman and Rochlitz, 2019, 21). In the 2000s, the central government has been allocating more funds to the regions. Federal transfers peaked at 1.8 trillion rubles accounting for 23 percent of average regional revenues in 2011, making the regional governments more dependent on the center (Zubarevich, 2015a, 3). Though the dependence of different regions on transfers varies significantly. For example, the North Caucasus republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia as well as the Siberian republics of Tuva and Altai are heavily dependent on federal transfers, which account for more than 75 percent of their total revenues (Zubarevich, 2018). On the other hand, the share of federal funds is less than five percent in the revenues of Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and the resource-rich regions such as Tyumen Oblast, Yamal-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi autonomous okrugs (Libman and Rochlitz, 2019, 22).

The Russian government allocates to the regions different types of transfers. Some of them are subjected to political bargaining, while others are not. For example, discretionary grants (*dotatsii*) are divided into equalization grants (*dotatsii na vyravnivanie*) and extraordinary bailout grants (*dotatsii na sbalansirovannost*). Equalization grants represent

non-earmarked and non-matching transfers allocated to underdeveloped and poor regions. They are intended to reduce the gaps in the regions' revenue per capita and their size is formula-based. The wealthiest so-called 'donor regions' transfer a significant share of taxes collected on their territory to the federal budget and do not receive equalization grants from the center. However, they may receive extraordinary bailout grants that are allocated to the regions for multiple purposes. They intend to "compensate regions for losses of tax revenues or increased expenditure burdens that result from federal policies" (De Silva et al., 2009, 75). As a result, while the distribution of equalization grants follows clear criteria and is not subjected to political bargaining, the allocation of extraordinary bailout grants is not transparent and is often driven by political considerations (Frye et al., 2015; Zubarevich, 2018).

In addition to discretionary grants, Russian regions also receive subsidies (*subsidii*) and subventions (*subventsii*) from the center. Subsidies represent earmarked matching transfers, which provide financing, for example, to industries as well as enterprises seen by the federal government as important and worthy of additional support. Subventions refer to earmarked non-matching transfers, which are allocated to finance regional bodies that perform functions of the federal government. Political factors have a strong effect on the distribution of subsidies, while the allocation of subventions is more subjected to unified rules and allows "little wiggle room for regional elites" (Frye et al., 2015, 15-16).

Finally, 'other transfers' include federal targeted programs (*federalnye tselevye programmy*),[4] federal targeted investment programs (*federalnye adressnye investitsionnye programmy*), and additional transfers. Federal targeted programs aim to contribute to the social and economic development of specific regions. They often target problematic and geopolitically important regions and tend to be politically motivated (Sharafutdinova

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[4]Targeted programs are also defined as capital transfers (De Silva et al., 2009, 76).

and Turovsky, 2017, 163). Large-scale projects such as the 2012 APEC Summit, the 2014 Winter Olympics, and the 2018 FIFA World Cup were financed through various channels, including federal targeted programs and federal targeted investment programs. Their distribution, however, is less transparent and provides more opportunities for rent-seeking (Frye et al., 2015, 16).

There is a consensus in the literature on federal transfers in Russia (Sharafutdinova and Turovsky, 2017; Turovsky and Gaivoronsky, 2017) that extraordinary bailout grants, along with subsidies, belong to politically sensitive transfers–yet there is no common understanding of the nature of 'other transfers.' In their analysis, Turovsky and Gaivoronsky (2017, 544) do not consider 'other transfers' because, in their view, they "are small and too versatile." They qualify extraordinary bailout grants and subsidies as politically determined transfers and report their decrease, starting from 2012. This is puzzling taking into account the on-going preparations for the 2013 Universiade Kazan, the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, and the 2018 FIFA World Cup. These projects were financed through different programs, including targeted federal programs that go under 'other transfers,' meaning 'other transfers' constitute an important part of politically sensitive transfers in addition to extraordinary bailout grants and subsidies. The distribution of 'other transfers' remains understudied in the literature, however, its relevance is increasing. As Table C.1 demonstrates, 'other transfers' varied from seven to twenty-one percent of total transfers between 2009 and 2019, with politically sensitive transfers accounting for almost half of all transfers allocated to the regional governments in this period.

Expensive projects boost politically sensitive transfers (Turovsky and Gaivoronsky, 2017). Official costs of hosting the FIFA World Cup Russia reached 678 billion rubles (11.8 billion U.S. dollars) with half of this amount being covered from the federal budget (RBK, 2018b; The Moscow Times, 2018). Expenditures on the championship varied significantly across the regions. For example, costs in Moscow exceeded 188 billion rubles

(3.3 billion U.S. dollars), while in Tatarstan they totaled 4.4 billion rubles (0.08 billion U.S. dollars). On the other hand, Moscow received only 0.03 billion rubles of federal funds, while Tatarstan - 1.9 billion rubles (see Figure C.1 for data on other regions). These estimates are based on program documents, meaning the actual amount of federal transfers spent in each region is likely to be higher (RBK, 2018a). As no reliable data are available, the present analysis does not aim to explain the differences in the amount of federal funds received by the regions preparing for the championship. It builds on the assumption that transfers associated with the World Cup represent politically sensitive transfers, meaning the venues selected to host the event received significant amounts of these transfers. Consequently, the outcome to be explained is the selection of the World Cup venues.

5.3 Evaluating alternative explanations

Following the economic arguments of Turovsky and Gaivoronsky (2017); Starodubtsev (2018), one may expect that such factors as economic development or investment attractiveness of the nominated venues could play some role in the selection process. Table C.2 shows the data on the average gross regional product (GRP) per capita and the average rank of investment potential of the nominated regions between 2007 and 2011. On the one hand, these data suggest that some candidates like Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and Tatarstan had higher than average GRP per capita, while other regions, like the Republic of Mordovia, Rostov, and Volgograd oblasts were below the national average. On the other hand, except for Mordovia, all other candidates had above average investment rating. As a result, the final selection of the championship venues cannot be explained either by their GRP per capita or by their investment rating. It is more likely that these criteria were taken into account at the early stage of the selection process when the Russian Organizing Committee proposed the list of potential venues.

Other factors such as the size of the population and available sports infrastructure might also be taken into consideration during the selection process. However, the capital of Mordovia, Saransk, with less than 300,000 inhabitants, was selected while Krasnodar and Yaroslavl, each with more than 600,000 inhabitants, were not (FIFA, 2010). In addition, except for Moscow and Yekaterinburg, those stadiums according to the FIFA (2010, 11-12) required "major renovation," the stadiums in all other nominated venues were proposed "to be built." The construction of the stadiums was financed from the federal budget. The major candidates, Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Sochi, and Kazan in Tatarstan, already had developed infrastructure. For example, Moscow's Luzhniki stadium was renovated and Otkritie Arena was newly-built. The construction of Saint Petersburg stadium was initiated already in 2007. Kazan Arena was constructed for the 2013 Summer Universiade. Sochi's Fisht Stadium was built for the 2014 Winter Olympics. The city of Krasnodar was the only one of the remaining candidates that had a private investor, Sergey Galitsky, the owner of the "Krasnodar" football club, who was ready to co-finance the construction of the new stadium. Following its non-selection as the World Cup venue, Galitsky spent around 300 million U.S. dollars on the construction of a new private stadium. Its construction was finished in 2016 two years before the start of the FIFA World Cup in Russia (RIA News Sport, 2018).

The city of Krasnodar even has two football clubs, "Krasnodar" and "Kuban," playing in the Russian Premier League. In 2011, the games with "Krasnodar" were well attended by football fans. After the non-selection of the city, Galitsky wrote the following in his Twitter account: "the most soccer-mad city was shut out, I simply cannot believe that" (Expert, 2012; The New York Times, 2018). The evidence above suggests that neither the availability of private investors nor the development of football in the region has played any significant role in the selection process. Instead, this process driven by political considerations of Russia's officials.

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The FIFA Inspection Commission visited and formally assessed the candidate cities according to several criteria including availability of sports infrastructure and accommodation, championship investment program, hosting concept, and legacy (see Table C.3 for some of them). The chairman of the Local Organizing Committee, Vitaly Mutko, stated that the final selection would be made based on mutual consultations with the FIFA Commission but then added that eventually "we would make a final choice that the FIFA Executive Committee would approve" (Sovetskii Sport, 2011). This statement confirms that the selection of the World Cup venues was eventually made by the Russian officials rather than determined by the FIFA bureaucrats.

5.4   Conditions of selection as a World Cup venue

This study proposes a political explanation for the outcome of the selection process. It evaluates two alternative hypotheses. The "rewarding loyalty" hypothesis posits that the regional elites are rewarded for their loyalty to the Kremlin. First, "loyalty" refers to the ability of the regional elites to deliver high voting results (Hale, 2003; Gilev, 2017). Previous studies (e.g., Frye et al., 2015; Starodubtsev, 2018) confirm that electoral politics matters for transfers and demonstrate that the center tends to reward politically loyal regions. Yet in an electoral authoritarian regime (Schedler, 2006), regional governments are expected to deliver high voting results. For example, in the presidential elections, Vladimir Putin receives a majority of votes in all Russian regions, although in some of them his results are exceptionally high. For example, Putin received 87.06, 92.84, and 99.76 percent of votes in the republics of Mordovia, Daghestan, and Chechnya, respectively, in 2012.

By contrast, the results of the State Duma elections display more variation across the regions. In 2011, the share of votes for the United Russia party varied from 29.04 percent in Yaroslavl Oblast to 99.48 percent in Chechnya. Consequently, more efforts are needed

to deliver high voting results at the State Duma elections. The ex-governor of Mordovia and then Samara Oblast, Nikolay Merkushkin, famously stated that if the governor "gives '97 percent' to United Russia... the Kremlin would listen to him" (Ivolgin, 2016). Based on these considerations, *the ability of the regional elites to deliver high voting results* is expected to be rewarded by the center.

However, electoral incentives matter more in the periods before the elections and less after the elections (Reuter and Robertson, 2012). Consequently, the center may have also rewarded the elites that are able to control protest activity in their regions as by doing so they contribute to the political stability of the regime (Robertson, 2007; Gel'man, 2010). Taking into account the economic and financial crisis of 2008-2009 as well as the massive protests of 2011-2012, *the ability of elites to keep stability in the regions* is similarly expected to be rewarded by the center.

According to the "political connections" hypothesis, the regional elites with strong links to the Kremlin have been competing for obtaining the right for their region to host the championship. The regional elites consciously cultivate their relations with the center, maintaining regular contacts with federal executives. For example, bureaucrats in the Republic of Tatarstan frequently invite federal officials "to join celebrations, to showcase successful projects, and to participate in official meetings and other events and holidays" (Sharafutdinova and Turovsky, 2017, 167). Consequently, *strong administrative capacity* is expected to enhance the ability of the regional elites to secure additional funds from the federal budget.

Finally, the governors have extensive networks in the Presidential Administration and are able to reach not only federal officials but the president directly. Politically connected governors are more "likely to do better in quiet, intra-elite bargaining than their counterparts without such connections (Robertson, 2007, 788). Empirical analyses (Turovsky and Gaivoronsky, 2017) confirm that the governors with strong lobbying skills

and extensive networks are successful in bringing additional transfers to the region. As following Russia's selection as the World Cup host, the regional "heavyweights" tried to do their best to win the right for their regions to host the event (Kosinov, 2011), *the lobbying power of governors* is similarly expected to play an essential role in bringing additional transfers to the regions.

The four conditions are expected to contribute to the outcome in their presence. The analysis aims to reveal necessary and sufficient conditions or combinations of conditions accounting for the selection of the World Cup venues. As necessity means that the outcome cannot occur without the condition, none of the four conditions is expected to be necessary. In turn, sufficiency implies the presence of a condition or a combination of conditions, where the outcome is also present. The analysis evaluates if the ability of regional elites to deliver high voting results combined with their ability to keep stability in the regions or strong administrative capacity of the regions combined with the lobbying power of governors are sufficient for the outcome.

5.5 Method, data, and calibration

5.5.1 Method

The study employs Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to reveal necessary and sufficient conditions accounting for the selection of the World Cup venues. QCA belongs to set-theoretic methods, which perceive relations between social phenomena as set relations. QCA is associated with complex causality that unfolds through equifinality, conjunctural causation, and asymmetry.[10] It is suitable to reveal multiple paths leading to the same

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[10]Equifinality means that several conditions or combinations of conditions can produce the same outcome. Conjunctural causation refers to the situation when a single condition leads to the outcome only in combination with other conditions. Asymmetry suggests that conditions leading to the outcome may

outcome which is likely to be the case in the selection process. QCA combines the elements of variable-oriented and case-oriented methods (Ragin, 1987). Therefore, it has greater possibilities for drawing inferences with respect to cases.

Similar to other set-theoretic methods, QCA operates on data, which consist of membership scores of cases in sets (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 6). Once the raw data for the outcome and the conditions have been collected, they have to be calibrated or transformed into membership scores of cases in sets. The study employs fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) that establishes qualitative differences in kind and in degree among the cases and allows differentiation not only between full membership and non-membership of cases in sets, but also between their partial membership and partial non-membership. The rest of the section reports the data sources and explains the calibration procedure.

5.5.2 Calibration of the outcome, selection as a World Cup venue

The starting point of the analysis is January 2007, which refers to two years preceding the official notification by the Russian Football Union that Russia would bid for hosting the FIFA World Cup (RBK, 2018a). In May 2009, Prime-Minister Putin supported the idea and asked Vitaly Mutko to prepare the official bid (Kommersant, 2009). In December 2010, at the FIFA headquarters in Zurich, the Selection Committee chose Russia as the host of the 2018 World Cup. The final list of selected championship venues in Russia was announced on 29 September 2012. Consequently, this is the endpoint of the analysis.

The outcome of interest is *the selection as a World Cup venue*, hereafter denoted as SEL. The unit of analysis in the study is a region and not a city because, while individual cities were competing for the right to host the event, it was regional rather than city officials that negotiated with the center. It is important to note in this respect that two

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not lead to the non-occurrence of the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).

cities, Krasnodar and Sochi, were nominated from the same region, Krasnodar Krai. They are labelled in the empirical analysis as KDA I and KDA II, respectively.

The population includes both positive and negative cases, meaning both the ones that were selected to host the FIFA World Cup and the ones that were not. Initially, fourteen venues were in the proposal presented by the Russian Football Union in January 2009. They were arranged in five clusters, including 1) the Northern-Western cluster (Saint Petersburg and Kaliningrad), 2) the central cluster (Moscow and Podol'sk in Moscow Oblast), 3) the Volga cluster (Yaroslavl, Nizhniy Novgorod, Samara, and Volgograd along with Kazan and Saransk in the republics of Tatarstan and Mordovia, respectively), 4) the Southern cluster (Krasnodar, Sochi, and Rostov-on-Don), and 5) the Ural cluster (Yekaterinburg in Sverdlovsk Oblast).

Along with the regions that were nominated, the heads of three other regions expressed explicit interest in hosting the event, namely, Voronezh Oblast as well as the republics of Chechnya and Daghestan. The governor of Voronezh Oblast, Aleksey Gordeev, appealed to federal officials, asking them to consider the region as a potential venue for the World Cup following the drop out of Podol'sk in Moscow Oblast in October 2011 (Kosinov, 2011). Furthermore, after Russia's selection as a World Cup host in December 2010, the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, proposed that some football games could take place in the capital of the republic as its newly constructed 30,000-seat stadium, Akhmat Arena, was planned to be opened in May 2011 (Ponomarev, 2011).

The head of Daghestan, Magomedsalam Magomedov, similarly suggested that the republic could be a venue for the World Cup, emphasizing that the new owner of the Anzhi football club, Suleiman Kerimov, was ready to invest in the construction of a new stadium in the republic (Ponomarev, 2011). The presidential envoy, Aleksandr Khloponin, even asked the Local Organizing Committee to consult with FIFA about the possibility including Daghestan in the list of venues hosting the World Cup. However, Khloponin

later announced that the inclusion of Daghestan was not possible because of security considerations (Moi Daghestan, 2011). Since these three regions had not been officially nominated to host the event, they are not included in the analysis. The population consists of fourteen venues, which the Russian Football Union initially proposed as potential hosts in January 2009.

To assign fuzzy-set membership scores to cases, I employed the 'indirect' or theoretical method of calibration opting for a four-value fuzzy scale (Ragin, 2009). The cases have been classified with 0, 0.33, 0.67, and 1 fuzzy-set membership scores. Podol'sk in Moscow Oblast, which was initially in the Russian bid, but later withdrew, receives a score of 0. The reason for its withdrawal was the disagreement between the Local Organizing Committee and the regional government concerning the need to build a new 40,000 seat stadium. The government proposed to renovate existing facilities but the Organizing Committee rejected it (Kommersant, 2011). Yaroslavl Oblast as well as Krasnodar Krai (meaning the city of Krasnodar), which were nominated yet did not pass the final selection procedure, are assigned a score of 0.33.

The primarily candidates for hosting the event were Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Tatarstan (Kazan) and Krasnodar Krai (meaning Sochi). These four hosted the FIFA Confederations Cup in 2017. The head of the Local Organizing Committee, Vitaly Mutko, explicitly stated that they were "the main pillars of the Russian bid" (Sport-Express, 2011). As a result, Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Tatarstan and Krasnodar Krai (meaning Sochi) receive a score of 1. The remaining candidates that were selected, namely, Samara, Rostov, Volgograd, Kaliningrad, Nizhniy Novgorod, and Sverdlovsk oblasts as well as the Republic of Mordovia, get a score of 0.67. The next subsection describes the calibration strategies of the four condition sets.

5.5.3 Calibration of the conditions

The ability of regional elites to deliver high voting results (VOT)

To assess the ability of regional elites to deliver high voting results, I considered the State Duma and the presidential elections. The International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (ICSID) of the Higher School of Economics in Moscow provides a public database on political elites and economic performance in Russia, which includes regional voting indicators.[44] Using this dataset, I collected data on the State Duma elections in 2007 and 2011, as well as on the presidential elections in 2008 and 2012, considering the results of the United Russia party in each region and the share of votes for Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 and Vladimir Putin in 2012.

After that, I calculated the mean and the median values and then assigned a raw score to each case in each election round having four rounds in total. If the share of votes for United Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, and Vladimir Putin is more than 50 percent, then the case gets a score of 1. If the share of votes is higher than both 50 percent and the national average, the case receives a score of 2. The mean value is selected as a benchmark because it is more restrictive in comparison with the median value.[45] As a result, the minimum score that the case has is 0, while the maximum score is 8. As the next step, I transformed this raw score into a fuzzy-set membership score. The cases with scores of 1 and 2; 3 and 4; 5 and 6; 7 and 8 were assigned fuzzy scores of 0, 0.33, 0.67, and 1, correspondingly. As a result, to be regarded as a member of the set, the case should always display the share of votes that is higher than 50 percent and at least two times higher than the national average.

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[44]The database and the codebook are available at `https://iims.hse.ru/en/csid/databases`.

[45]Table C.4 provides descriptive statistics.

The ability of regional elites to keep stability (STAB)

Protest activity is taken as a proxy for political stability in the regions. The Russian protest event dataset by Lankina[46] lists the main protests across Russia and provides information on their turnout. It contains the data for the entire period under consideration, however, it seems to under-report protest activity. For example, in their detailed account of protests activity in Tymen Oblast, Lobanova and Semenov (2013) report 261 protest events in the period of 2008-2012. In contrast, Lankina's dataset records only 18 protests in this region for the same period.

The monitoring reports published by the Communist Party[47] represent the alternative source of data. They include information about the protests organized by the Communist Party but also about other political, social, and economic protest events and their turnout. The systematic data, however, are available only for the period of 2008-2011. I collected the information on total protest turnout for this period in each case and then assigned the fuzzy-set membership scores of 0, 0.33, 0.67, and 1 to the cases with almost no, low, moderate, and high protests' turnout, respectively. These distinctions were made based on the observable gaps in the data.

Strong administrative capacity of the regions (CAP)

Strong administrative capacity has been operationalized in previous analyses (Sharafutdinova and Turovsky, 2017, 168) as voter turnout since "getting a high turnout in Russia is often associated with administrative pressure and mobilization." This operationalization, however, is not sufficient in the case of the FIFA World Cup as its preparation, on the one hand, required capacity to attract federal funds for financing sports projects. On the other hand, it required a proven ability to complete sports-related projects

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[46]The dataset is available at `https://popularmobilization.net/about/`.

[47]The reports are available at `https://kprf.ru/analytics/`.

on time. The Ministry of Sports provides data on the fulfillment of sports-related federal targeted programs in the regions in the period of 2006-2013.[48] In addition, the all-Russian register of sports facilities lists newly constructed sports venues starting from November 2011.[49] The cases with low, moderate, high, and very high administrative capacity received a score of 0, 0.33, 0.67, and 1, correspondingly.

The lobbying power of governors (LOB)

There are several measures for assessing the lobbying power of governors. For example, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* publishes expert evaluations of how effectively regional executives have been lobbying for their regions, in particular, by influencing decisions of the central government related to the financial support of the regions (Petrov and Nazrullaeva, 2018, 122). Another indicator is the tenure of governors, as "the more time a governor spends in power, the more he/she could be expected to learn about the various lobbying mechanisms and acquire necessary connections" (Sharafutdinova and Turovsky, 2017, 167). These indicators, however, cannot account for gubernatorial turnover.

Alternatively, Sharafutdinova and Turovsky (2017) use visits of federal officials to the region as a proxy for the lobbying capacity of governors. This measure is also problematic as federal officials visit regions for a variety of reasons including emergencies. Petrov and Nazrullaeva (2018, 128) highlight that "much of the most important lobbying occurs during meetings with the president – either in Moscow or in the regions." This indicator best captures the ability of governors to reach the president. Therefore, using the official presidential website,[50] I collected data on bilateral meetings between the governors and the president in either one of the presidential residences or during his visits to the regions.

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[48]The report is available at `https://www.minsport.gov.ru/documents/`.

[49]The register is available at: `https://data.gov.ru/opendata/7703771271-typesportobjects`.

[50]`www.kremlin.ru`.

Additionally, using the Public.Ru database, I gathered data on the meetings of Vitaly Mutko, the chair of the Local Organizing Committee, with the governors. In his interview about the preparations for the FIFA World Cup, Mutko once noted:

> There is such a thing as enthusiasm and the willingness to implement our plans. For example, the federal targeted program. We annually allocate 13 billion rubles for the construction of sports facilities in the regions. There are governors who lead the parade, they come to my office every month to report about what has been done (Expert, 2012).

Once these data have been collected, I assigned fuzzy-set membership scores of 0, 0.33, 0.67, and 1 to the regions whose governors had rare, occasional, regular, and frequent meetings, respectively. Table C.5 provides the calibrated dataset.

5.6   Results and discussion

5.6.1   The analysis of the outcome, selection as a World Cup venue

The first step in running Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is the analysis of necessity.[51] Necessity implies that the outcome could not have been achieved without the condition. Empirically, the condition is commonly considered necessary if it reaches a consistency threshold of at least 0.9 (Ragin, 2006). The present analysis reveals that the lobbying power of governors is necessary for the selection as a World Cup venue. It has a consistency value of 0.965 and relevance of 0.799.[52] The next step in QCA is the analysis of

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[51]The R packages 'QCA' (Dusa, 2019) and 'Set Methods' (Oana and Schneider, 2018) were used.

[52]See Table C.6 for the parameters of fit and Figure C.2 for the necessity plot.

sufficiency. Sufficiency means that the condition or the combination of conditions is present where the outcome is also present. The analysis of sufficiency is based on minimization of sufficient truth table rows, which together contain all possible combinations of conditions. Table 5.1 below displays the truth table representation of 14 cases in the outcome set and the condition sets.[53]

Table 5.1: Truth table, outcome selection as a World Cup venue

| | | | | | | | | | Cases | |
Raw	VOT	STAB	CAP	LOB	OUT	n	incl.	PRI	SEL	Not SEL
4	0	0	1	1	1	4	0.924	0.877	NIZ, SAM, SPE, MOW	-
16	1	1	1	1	1	3	0.924	0.859	ROS, MO, TA	-
2	0	0	0	1	1	3	0.890	0.756	VGG, SVE, KAL	-
12	1	0	1	1	1	2	0.845	0.665	KDA II	KDA I
3	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.711	0.000	-	MOS
5	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.711	0.000	-	YAR

[1] Consistency threshold = 0.80.

The first column displays the row number as it appears in the software output. For this reason, it is not sequential. Columns two to five indicate the status of four conditions, 1 is present, 0 is absent. The column "OUT" indicates if a given row is sufficient for the outcome, with "1" denoting sufficiency. The decision about sufficiency depends on each row's consistency score displayed in the column "Cons" as well as on row's PRI score shown in the column "PRI."[54] A recommended inclusion score for consistency is 0.75 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010, 10). Based on the gaps in consistency scores, 0.80 is set as a consistency threshold in the present analysis. The column "Cases" contains the cases that belong to a given row. The columns "SEL" and "Not SEL" name them.

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[53]The truth table reports only empirically covered rows and does not display "logical remainder" rows, for which no empirical evidence exists.

[54]PRI is defined as proportional reduction in inconsistency. It indicates how much it helps to know whether a given X is a subset of Y and not a subset of not Y (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 242).

The standard analysis of sufficiency produces conservative, parsimonious, and intermediate solution formulas.[55] The parsimonious and intermediate solution formulas are identical.[56] The conservative solution is selected for substantive interpretation and reported in Table 5.2 below. Figure C.3 displays the sufficiency plot of this solution formula.

Table 5.2: Conservative solution formula, outcome selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
vot*stab*LOB +	0.942	0.911	0.572	0.290	**VGG SVE KAL NIZ SAM SPE MOW**	-
VOT*CAP*LOB	0.888	0.818	0.569	0.287	**ROS MO TA KDAII**	KDAI
Overall solution	0.923	0.889	0.859			

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters absence, * stands for logical AND, + for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

The conservative solution formula consists of two sufficient combinations of conditions. The first combination is the following: the inability of regional elites to deliver high electoral results and their inability to keep stability in the regions combined with the lobbying power of governors (vot*stab*LOB). The second combination is the ability of regional elites to deliver high electoral results combined with strong administrative capacity of the regions and the lobbying power of governors (VOT*CAP*LOB). The overall solution consistency is 0.923. The solution coverage, which indicates how much of the outcome is in line with the solution term, is 0.889.

The consistency of the first combination (vot*stab*LOB) is 0.942. Its coverage is 0.572. The typical cases include Volgograd, Kaliningrad, Nizhniy Novgorod, Samara,

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[55]The conservative solution is based only on empirically observed evidence, while the parsimonious solution is also based on assumptions about the logical remainders which contribute to parsimony. The intermediate solution is based only on those simplifying assumptions that represent easy counterfactuals at the same time. The intermediate solution is often but not necessarily always less complex than the conservative solution and more complex than the parsimonious solution.

[56]See Table C.7.

and Sverdlovsk oblasts as well as Saint Petersburg and Moscow. The consistency of the second combination (VOT*CAP*LOB) is 0.888 and its coverage is 0.569. The typical cases include Rostov Oblast, the republics of Mordovia and Tatarstan along with Krasnodar Krai (meaning Sochi). The deviant case is Krasnodar Krai (meaning the city of Krasnodar). The unique coverage of the first combination and the second combination is 0.290 and 0.287, respectively. The next subsection reports the results of the analysis of the absence of the outcome.

5.6.2 The analysis of the outcome, non-selection as a World Cup venue

The analysis reveals that none of the four conditions in either presence or absence is necessary for the outcome, that is, non-selection as a World Cup venue. Table C.8 reports the parameters of fit. Based on observable gaps in consistency scores, a threshold of 0.95 is set to identify sufficient combinations of conditions. Table C.9 displays the truth table. The parsimonious solution formula is selected for substantive interpretation and is reported in Table 5.3 below.[57] Simplifying assumption 1110 has been excluded from the minimization procedure as it contradicts the directional expectations.

Table 5.3: Parsimonious solution formula, outcome non-selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
vot*lob	0.901	0.754	0.643	-	YAR MOS
Overall solution	0.901	0.754	0.643		

[1] Small letters indicate absence, * stands for logical AND.
[2] Simplifying assumptions are 0000, 0110.

[57]See Table C.10 and Table C.11 for the conservative and intermediate solution formulas, respectively.

The solution formula includes one sufficient combination of conditions, that is, the inability of regional elites to deliver high electoral results and the lack of gubernatorial lobbying power. The solution consistency is 0.901 and solution coverage is 0.643. The typical cases include Yaroslavl and Podol'sk in Moscow oblast.

5.6.3 Robustness tests

To test robustness of the results, Wagemann and Schneider (2015, 41) suggest "to check whether changes in the calibration, in the case selection, in the raw consistency levels lead to substantively different results." For the first alternative analysis, the set of the regions delivering high voting results is calibrated differently, namely, using the (less restrictive) median value instead of the mean value that was employed in the original analysis. The alternative conservative solution formula represents a subset of the original solution. Table C.12 displays the parameters of fit. The analysis of the outcome, that is, non-selection as a World Cup venue, yields a parsimonious solution formula that is fully identical to the one in the main analysis.

The second alternative analysis has been performed with ten cases, excluding the so-called "main pillars"–Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Krasnodar Krai (meaning Sochi), and Tatarstan–as their selection as championship venues was never in doubt. The alternative conservative solution again represents a subset of the original solution formula. Table C.13 reports the parameters of fit. Yet the analysis of the non-outcome gives a more complex parsimonious solution formula than the one in the original analysis–see Table C.14.

Finally, for the third alternative analysis, the consistency threshold has been increased to 0.85, meaning the exclusion of truth table row twelve from the minimization procedure. The alternative conservative solution formula is more complex than in the original analysis as it displays all four conditions in their presence. Table C.15 displays the parameters of fit. The alternative analysis of the non-outcome has not been performed as there is no

possibility to either increase or decrease the consistency threshold. Overall, the results of the main analysis are quite robust to modifications in the calibration, the case selection, and the consistency thresholds. The next subsection provides substantive interpretation of the results.

5.6.4   Discussion of the results

The chair of the Local Organizing Committee, Vitaly Mutko, emphasized that following the withdrawal of Podol'sk in Moscow Oblast from competition, out of thirteen candidates, the selection of only four (Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Tatastan and Sochi in Krasnodar Krai) was guaranteed. To be selected, the remaining candidates should demonstrate so-called "working enthusiasm," meaning they were expected to submit monthly updates to the Organizing Committee regarding their progress with preparation for the championship (Expert, 2011). This statement implies that strong administrative capacity of the regions should have played a key role in the selection process.

The analysis reveals instead that the lobbying power of governor was necessary for the selection of the World Cup venue. Additionally, the analysis detects two sufficient combinations of conditions, that is, the inability of regional elites to deliver high voting results, the inability to keep stability in the region, and the lobbying power of governors (vot*stab*LOB) or the ability of regional elites to deliver high voting results, strong administrative capacity, and the lobbying power of governors (VOT*CAP*LOB). These results suggest that politically connected regional elites are able to extract additional funds from the center.

One week preceding the official announcement of the selected venues, Mutko named Mordvia, Volgograd, Yaroslavl, Kaliningrad, and Rostov oblasts as the most problematic candidates. He suggested that two out of these five were highly likely not be selected (Expert South, 2012). Eventually, only Yaroslavl Oblast was excluded from this list,

along with Krasnodar Krai (meaning a city of Krasnodar), which had been regarded as a most likely candidate. At the same time, the two problematic venues, Kaliningrad and Volgograd, were selected. They had weak administrative capacity yet their governors managed to lobby the right for their regions to host the championship. For example, the governor of Kaliningrad Oblast, Georgy Boos, who was appointed in 2005, had onnections at the federal level as he used to work as the head of the State Tax Service of the Russian Federation. Following his appointment as a governor, Boos had regular meetings with the president. In August 2009, he officially joined Russia's bid committee and participated in all international events promoting Russia's bid (Khomenko, 2009).[58] Despite being dismissed from the position of a governor in September 2010, Boos managed to secure for Kaliningrad the right to host the FIFA World Cup. This case supports the argument by Libman and Rochlitz (2019, 120) that the newly appointed 'governor-outsiders' (so-called *Varangians*) could successfully lobby for additional resources and federal support due to their extensive connections to the center. This analysis reveals that well-connected governors could receive federal funds even when lacking both the ability to deliver high electoral results and to keep stability in their regions (vot*stab*LOB).

Saransk in the Republic of Mordovia displays the second sufficient combination of conditions (VOT*CAP*LOB). On the one hand, it had a proven record of being one of the most loyal regions. On the other hand, authorities of the republic successfully demonstrated their capacity to build sports facilities and organize sports events, with the head of the republic, Nikolay Merkushkin, having extensive connections to the center. For example, the international forum "Russia – Sports Nation" with more than 4,500 participants took

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[58]Boos also had important informal connections with federal officials. For example, the first deputy of prime-minister, Igor Shuvalov, who was responsible for preparing the Russia's bid and was the head of the Russian delegation in Zurich in December 2010, became a godfather of Boos's younger daughter in July 2010 (REGNUM, 2010).

place in Mordovia in September 2011.[59] Moreover, Merkushkin was a part of Russia's official delegation to Zurich where the winners of the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cup bids were announced. Merkushkin had been in office as the head of the republic since 1995. In May 2012, however, he was appointed as a governor of Samara Oblast, another region that was selected to host the championship. In an interview with a local newspaper, Merkushkin emphasized that he met three times with Vladimir Putin and two times with Dmitry Medvedev before this decision was made. According to Merkushkin, when Putin asked him to move to Samara Oblast, he agreed but asked to keep Saransk in the list of the FIFA World Cup venues in return (Voronina, 2012). This case suggests that although the regional elites might have been rewarded by the center for delivering high electoral, they also had to demonstrate strong administrative capacity as well as to be well-connected to the center. While several accounts (e.g., Ash, 2018) pointed out that the inclusion of Mordovia in the list of final venues could be explained by the "rewarding loyalty" logic alone, this analysis reveals that the center has adopted a more complex strategy selecting the FIFA World Cup venues.

Finally, while Sochi represents a typical case, the city of Krasnodar is a deviant case. The non-inclusion of the latter surprised many observers as it has never been mentioned as a problematic venue. Vitaly Mutko stated that the final choice was guided by the principle that one city is selected from one region (Expert, 2012). However, this principle was never spelled out before the official announcement of the final venues. The non-inclusion of Krasnodar suggests that the selection process was accompanied by intense competition among the elites who lobbied for attracting additional resources to their regions. It provoked unpredictable power dynamics that eventually resulted in a paradoxical situation where a primary candidate for inclusion was actually excluded, while 'outsiders' got in.

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[59]The forum was hosted for the first time by Tatarstan in 2009 and then by Moscow in 2010.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter contributes to the literature on the distribution of politically sensitive transfers in Russia by studying the case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup. The analysis reveals that gubernatorial lobbying power was necessary for selection as a World Cup venue. Additionally, the analysis detects two sufficient combinations of conditions accounting for this outcome. The first combination is the inability of regional elites to deliver high voting results, the inability to keep stability in the regions, and gubernatorial lobbying power. The second combination is the ability of regional elites to deliver high voting results, strong administrative capacity, and gubernatorial lobbying power. These results suggest that well-connected political elites were able to secure the right for their regions to host the championship and, as a result, to to extract additional resources from the center. Since politically sensitive transfers have been increasing over the last decade, it is not surprising that regional elites have developed lobbying strategies for securing them.

Furthermore, while previous accounts (Ash, 2018) pointed out that the inclusion of some venues, for example Saransk in the Republic of Mordovia, was exclusively driven by the "rewarding loyalty" logic, this analysis shows that the center has followed a more nuanced strategy for selecting the FIFA World Cup venues. These findings provide strong support for the "political connections" hypothesis. They confirm previous studies (e.g., Sharafutdinova and Turovsky, 2017) demonstrating that the regional governments in Russia play an essential role in the distribution of federal transfers. Overall, this analysis suggests that in autocracies the federal bargain is sustained by complex relationships between federal and regional elites that allow them to preserve their power and extract resources from the center.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This dissertation makes a three-fold contribution to the literature. First, it advances our understanding of the relationship between the territorial and political regimes by studying the emergence of authoritarian federalism in Russia. The three empirical studies suggest that a multi-level territorial setting creates unpredictable power dynamics in center-region relations and inevitably contributes to the hybridization of the political regime, making it more adaptable. Second, the results shed light on the interactions between federal and regional elites in Russia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The three studies show that center-region interactions involve complex bargaining whose outcome is determined by various combinations of political and economic factors, and inevitably leads to asymmetrical federal solutions. Third, the studies in this dissertation employ Qualitative Comparative Analysis to investigate what conditions or combinations of conditions have been necessary and sufficient for the receipt of competencies, benefits, and resources from the center in post-Soviet Russia. This novel approach provides a methodological contribution to the scholarship on sub-national politics in Russia and on multi-level politics more generally.

6.1   Main findings

The first study demonstrates that by signing bilateral treaties in exchange for political support, President Yeltsin formed a broad coalition with both authoritarian and democratic sub-national leaders. This strategy allowed Yeltsin to win the 1996 presidential election yet, in the long-run, it also contributed to the preservation of authoritarian regimes in the Russian regions. These results support the argument by Gibson (2012) that the persistence of regional authoritarian enclaves is conditional upon the strategies of governance and coalition-building employed by a national leader. Additionally, they confirm previous studies (Golosov, 2011) showing that the consolidation of electoral authoritarianism in Russia in the 2000s was deeply embedded in the center-region relations of the 1990s. The novel argument that the study makes is that, in a situation of high political polarization, a multi-level territorial setting pushes the national executive to interfere with democratic processes. Facing fierce competition from the opposition, the national executive perceives an alliance with regional autocrats as a "lesser evil" than the electoral defeat.

The second study provides novel empirical evidence suggesting that the ability of incumbent governors to deliver high electoral results cannot be linked either with their reappointment or dismissal. In the electoral authoritarian regime, the delivery of high electoral results represents an established "rule of the game," meaning everyone has to deliver. Consequently, the compliance with the rules does not entail any rewards in return. The analysis confirms that the incumbents stay in office as long as they fulfill the main "federal priorities," that is, high electoral results and political stability in the regions (Busygina et al., 2018). In some cases, a combination of high electoral results, political stability, and the effectiveness of incumbents in managing their territory has been sufficient for their reappointment, meaning the incumbent governors have performed not only as voter mobilizers but also as effective managers creating "pockets of efficiency" in their regions.

The third study finds that the lobbying power of governors was a necessary condition for selection as a World Cup venue and, as a result, for the receipt of politically sensitive federal transfers. The analysis suggests that politically connected regional elites are able to extract additional resources from the center. These findings are consistent with existing literature demonstrating that the regional governments in Russia play an important role in the distribution of federal transfers (e.g., Sharafutdinova and Turovsky, 2017). Taking into account that politically sensitive transfers have been increasing over the past years, it is no surprise that the regional elites have developed various lobbying strategies and mechanisms for attracting them. In fact, the most connected regional elites are able to receive more funds from the center due to the informal nature of elite interactions.

In contrast to democratic federations where regional elites' commitment to a federal bargain is rooted in political incentives, in authoritarian federations such incentives are absent. Therefore, the federal bargain in autocracies is maintained by complex interactions between regional and central elites who are interested in the preservation of a status quo that enables them to keep their power and extract resources from the center. Furthermore, multi-tiered electoral authoritarian regimes mimic democratic federations by combining institutions that are associated with democracy (e.g., elections) with authoritarian distribution and reproduction of power. The need to constantly keep elections under control, however, pushes the national executive to make informal arrangements with the regional executives. In this case, the multi-level territorial structure even in the authoritarian context creates certain flexibilities and provides the power-sharing mechanisms that political actors fully exploit.

6.2 Limitations

The three empirical studies in this dissertation focus on executive elite bargaining. However, authoritarian regimes tend to have two power hierarchies: an executive hierarchy and a control hierarchy (Yakovlev, 2015). The executive hierarchy is involved in actual policy making, while the control hierarchy monitors and controls the executive one. Therefore, one may argue that the analysis of the control hierarchy, that is, the security services, and their relations with the regional executives is essential for understanding center-region interactions. The empirical studies do not focus on this type of relations as they rather reflect intra-regional power dynamics. Furthermore, recent analyses do not confirm that the interests of the security services and the governors clash with each other. For example, Yakovlev and Aisin (2019) do not confirm that the regional heads of the Federal Security Service are appointed to initiate investigations on regional governors. Furthermore, they show that in some cases the chief security services are appointed by the center to support the governor. The analysis of the relationship between security services and governors is beyond the scope of this dissertation and requires separate investigation.

Furthermore, as the three empirical studies concentrate on the role of political and economic factors in intergovernmental interactions, they do not consider ethnicity as a relevant factor. However, one may argue that this is an important factor because Russia is a multi-ethnic federation. The first study builds on previous research suggesting that the treaty signing-process was accompanied by competition for control over economic resources by regional and federal elites with ethnicity playing a secondary role (Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999). The second study mainly focuses on the reappointment of incumbent governors in the regions with a predominantly Russian ethnic population. Finally, the third study deals with transfers that are sensitive to political bargaining. The distribution of transfers to troublesome ethnic elites require separate investigation.

6.3   Setting agenda for future research

In his annual address to the Russian Parliament in January 2020, President Putin proposed several amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation.[60] In March 2020, a deputy of the State Duma, Valentina Tereshkova, proposed to nullify (*obnulit'*) presidential term limits, which implied that Putin would be able to run for re-election again once his term expires in 2024. Tereshkova's amendment was added to the list of changes suggested by Putin earlier. These amendments were supposed to be introduced following a national voting scheduled for April 2020. As a result, the main task assigned to the regional governments was to organize the national voting on constitutional amendments smoothly.

Recent developments with the COVID-19 pandemic have dramatically changed this agenda. President Putin made his first address concerning the situation with COVID-19 in late March 2020. He announced one week of paid holidays and encouraged citizens to self-isolate. On April 2, 2020 Putin made another address and then signed a decree,[61] introducing a national regime of self-isolation until the end of April 2020. Furthermore, the decree granted additional competencies to the regional executives regarding the implementation of quarantine measures including decisions concerning the closure of enterprises and additional restrictions on free movement in their regions.

In addition to a nation-wide regime of self-isolation, the governors implemented a wide spectrum of measures that varied significantly from region to region. For example, some governors initiated the closure of their region's borders, which was beyond granted competencies.   Experts of Peterburgskaya politika (2020) have recently calculated a so-called index of "virus-sovereignity" in the Russian regions. The difference between high, medium, and low index ratings indicates to what extent the measures introduced

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[60]The text of the address is available at `http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62582`.

[61]The decree is available at `http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/63134`.

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by the governors deviated from the measures announced nation-wide. According to the report, 14 regions score high as their authorities implemented quite restrictive measures. For example, the head of the Republic of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, imposed limitations on both the entrance to as well as the exit from the region for residents and non-residents alike. In addition, Kadyrov announced a curfew from 8 p.m. to 8 a.m. strictly prohibiting any outdoor activities. The governor of Chelyabinsk Oblast, Aleksey Teksler, limited entry into the region for non-residents. The head of the Gorno-Altay Republic, Oleg Kharakhordin, suspended air traffic with Moscow. Furthermore, he imposed a two-week mandatory quarantine for everyone entering the region. The governors of the regions assigned the "medium" index implemented some additional restrictions on free movement. For example, the heads of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Belgorod Oblast, and Perm Krai suspended bus traffic with neighboring regions. In addition, the governor of Belgorod Oblast, Evgeny Savchenko, ordered records be kept of all Muscovites entering the region. The group with the "low" index includes 36 regions (Moscow and Moscow Oblast are not considered by the experts). In this group, the regional authorities preferred not to introduce any additional measures except for the regime of self-isolation announced nation-wide.

It is difficult at present to assess the long-term consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for the development of center-region relations in Russia. It is clear, however, that the previous status quo has been shaken and new configurations of informal arrangements between the national and regional executives are likely to emerge in the future. The federal response to the pandemic has already entailed the transfer of decision-making autonomy to the lower level. Therefore, further research needs to assess the extent of autonomy transferred to the regions as well as the asymmetrical response that it has provoked.

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Appendix A

Appendix Chapter 3

Table A.1: The list of the regions with a signed bilateral treaty, 1994-1998

No	Region	Date
1	Tatarstan	15/02/1994
2	Kabardino-Balkaria	01/07/1994
3	Bashkortostan	03/09/1994
4	North Ossetia	23/03/1995
5	Sakha	29/06/1995
6	Buryatia	29/09/1995
7	Udmurtia	17/10/1995
8	Sverdlovsk Oblast	12/01/1996
9	Kaliningrad Oblast	12/01/1996
10	Krasnodar Krai	30/01/1996
11	Orenburg Oblast	30/01/1996
12	Komi	20/03/1996
13	Khabarovsk Krai	24/04/1996
14	Omsk Oblast	19/05/1996
15	Irkutsk Oblast	27/05/1996
16	Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug	27/05/1996
17	Chuvashia	27/05/1996
18	Sakhalin Oblast	29/05/1996
19	Perm Oblast	31/05/1996
20	Komi-Perm Autonomous Okrug	31/05/1996
21	Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast	08/06/1996
22	Rostov Oblast	11/06/1996
23	Tver Oblast	13/06/1996
24	Leningrad Oblast	13/06/1996
25	Saint-Petersburg	13/06/1996
26	Altai Krai	29/11/1996
27	Briansk Oblast	04/07/1997
28	Vologda Oblast	04/07/1997
29	Magadan Oblast	04/07/1997
30	Saratov Oblast	04/07/1997
31	Chelyabinsk Oblast	04/07/1997
32	Samara Oblast	01/09/1997
33	Astrakhan Oblast	30/10/1997
34	Kirov Oblast	30/10/1997
35	Murmansk Oblast	30/10/1997
36	Ulyanovsk Oblast	30/10/1997
37	Yaroslavl Oblast	30/10/1997

No	Region	Date
38	Krasnoyarsk Krai	01/11/1997
39	Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug	01/11/1997
40	Evenki Autonomous Okrug	01/11/1997
41	Mari El	20/05/1998
42	Amur Oblast	20/05/1998
43	Voronezh Oblast	20/05/1998
44	Ivanovo Oblast	20/05/1998
45	Kostroma Oblast	20/05/1998
46	Moscow	16/06/1998

Source: Klimanov (2003, 54-55).

Table A.2: Index of regional demands of sovereignty, 1990-1993

No	Region	STAT	CONST	LEG	ECON	TOTAL
1	Altai Krai	0	1	0	1	2
2	Amur Oblast	1	0	0	1	2
3	Arkhangelsk Oblast	1	1	1	1	4
4	Astrakhan Oblast	0	0	0	0	0
5	Bashkortostan	1	1	1	1	4
6	Belgorod Oblast	0	1	0	1	2
7	Briansk Oblast	0	0	0	1	1
8	Buryatia	1	1	0	1	3
9	Chelyabinsk Oblast	1	1	1	1	4
10	Chuvashia	1	0	0	0	1
11	Dagestan	1	1	0	0	2
12	Irkutsk Oblast	1	1	0	1	3
13	Ingushetia	1	2	1	1	5
14	Ivanovo Oblast	0	0	0	0	0
15	Jewish Autonomous Oblast	1	0	0	0	1
16	Kabardino-Balkaria	1	0	1	0	2
17	Kaliningrad Oblast	1	0	0	1	2
18	Kalmykia	1	1	0	0	2
19	Kaluga Oblast	0	0	0	0	0
20	Karelia	1	2	0	1	4
21	Kemerovo	0	0	0	1	1
22	Khabarovsk Krai	1	0	0	1	2
23	Khakassia	1	0	0	0	1
24	Kirov Oblast	0	1	0	0	1
25	Komi	1	1	1	1	4
26	Kostroma Oblast	0	0	0	0	0
27	Krasnodar Krai	0	1	0	0	1
28	Krasnoyarsk Krai	1	1	1	1	4
29	Kursk Oblast	0	1	0	1	2
30	Leningrad Oblast	1	0	0	1	2
31	Lipetsk Oblast	0	0	0	1	1
32	Magadan Oblast	0	0	0	1	1
33	Mari El	1	0	0	0	1
34	Mordovia	1	0	0	0	1
35	Moscow	1	1	1	1	4
36	Moscow Oblast	0	1	0	0	1
37	Murmansk Oblast	0	0	0	1	1

No	Region	STAT	CONST	LEG	ECON	TOTAL
38	Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast	0	0	0	0	0
39	North Ossetia	1	1	0	0	2
40	Novgorod Oblast	0	1	0	1	2
41	Novosibirsk Oblast	1	0	0	1	2
42	Omsk Oblast	0	0	0	1	1
43	Orenburg Oblast	1	0	0	0	1
44	Oryol Oblast	1	0	1	1	3
45	Perm Oblast	1	0	0	0	1
46	Rostov Oblast	0	0	0	1	1
47	Ryazan Oblast	0	0	1	0	1
48	Saint-Petersburg	1	1	1	1	4
49	Sakha	1	2	1	1	5
50	Sakhalin Oblast	0	0	0	1	1
51	Samara Oblast	0	0	0	0	0
52	Saratov Oblast	0	1	0	0	1
53	Stavropol Krai	0	0	0	0	0
54	Sverdlovsk Oblast	1	2	0	1	4
55	Tatarstan	1	2	1	1	5
56	Tomsk Oblast	1	1	0	1	3
57	Tuva	1	2	1	1	5
58	Tver Oblast	0	1	0	0	1
59	Udmurtia	1	0	0	1	2
60	Ulyanovsk Oblast	0	0	0	0	0
61	Volgograd Oblast	0	1	0	1	2
62	Vologda Oblast	1	1	1	1	4
63	Voronezh Oblast	1	0	0	1	2
64	Yaroslavl Oblast	0	0	0	1	1

Sources: Treisman (1997, 226-227) for the republics, the autonomous okrug and the autonomous oblast; Herrera (2005, 34-35) for oblasts and krais. Additional sources include: Gel'man (1993); Kahn (2000, 60); Shlapentokh et al. (1997, 109); Kommersant (1991a,b, 1992); Kommersant-Daily (1992a,b,c, 1993a,b,c); Segodnya (1993); Zhurnal Ogoniok (1992); Izvestia (1993); Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta (1993); Belgorodskaya Pravda (1993); Gorodskie Vesti (1993); Moskovskie Novosti (1993); Nezavisimaya Gazeta (1991, 1992a,b,c,d,e, 1993a,b,c); Rossiiskaya Gazeta (1993, 1998); Saratovskie Vesti (1993); Moskovskaya Pravda (1993).

Table A.3: The list of cases and the raw data

No	Case	Case label	SOV	ELECT	VOT	DON	OUT
1	Altai Krai	ALT	2	1	1	0	3
2	Amur Oblast	AMU	2	1	4	0	3
3	Arkhangelsk Oblast	ARK	4	1	4	1	2
4	Astrakhan Oblast	AST	0	2	1	0	3
5	Bashkortostan	BA	4	4	3	5	4
6	Belgorod Oblast	BEL	2	4	1	2	1
7	Briansk Oblast	BRY	1	3	1	0	3
8	Buryatia	BU	3	4	1	0	3
9	Chelyabinsk Oblast	CHE	4	1	4	2	3
10	Chuvashia	CU	1	4	1	0	3
11	Dagestan	DA	2	4	3	0	2
12	Irkutsk Oblast	IRK	3	4	4	3	3
13	Ingushetia	IN	5	4	4	0	1
14	Ivanovo Oblast	IVA	0	1	4	1	3
15	Jewish Autonomous Oblast	YEV	1	4	4	0	2
16	Kabardino-Balkaria	KB	2	4	4	0	4
17	Kaliningrad Oblast	KGD	2	1	4	0	3
18	Kalmykia	KL	2	4	4	0	1
19	Kaluga Oblast	KLU	0	1	3	0	2
20	Karelia	KR	4	4	4	1	2
21	Kemerovo	KEM	1	1	1	0	2
22	Khabarovsk Krai	KHA	2	2	1	0	3
23	Khakassia	KK	1	3	1	0	1
24	Kirov Oblast	KIR	1	1	4	0	3
25	Komi	KO	4	4	4	4	3
26	Kostroma Oblast	KOS	0	1	3	0	3
27	Krasnodar Krai	KDA	1	1	1	0	3
28	Krasnoyarsk Krai	KYA	4	4	4	5	3
29	Kursk Oblast	KRS	2	1	1	1	2
30	Leningrad Oblast	LEN	2	1	4	1	3
31	Lipetsk Oblast	LIP	1	4	1	5	1
32	Magadan Oblast	MAG	1	1	4	0	3
33	Mari El	ME	1	3	1	0	3
34	Mordovia	MO	1	3	1	0	2
35	Moscow	MOW	4	2	4	5	3
36	Moscow Oblast	MOS	1	4	4	3	2
37	Murmansk Oblast	MUR	1	1	4	3	3

Continued on next page

	Case	Case label	SOV	ELECT	VOT	DON	OUT
38	Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast	NIZ	0	4	4	3	3
39	North Ossetia	SE	2	4	1	0	4
40	Novgorod Oblast	NGR	2	4	4	0	1
41	Novosibirsk Oblast	NVS	2	1	1	0	2
42	Omsk Oblast	OMS	1	4	1	0	3
43	Orenburg Oblast	ORE	1	4	1	1	3
44	Oryol Oblast	ORL	3	4	1	0	1
45	Perm Oblast	PER	1	1	4	3	3
46	Rostov Oblast	ROS	1	2	3	1	3
47	Ryazan Oblast	RYA	1	1	1	2	1
48	Saint-Petersburg	SPE	4	3	4	3	3
49	Sakha	SA	5	4	4	5	4
50	Sakhalin Oblast	SAK	1	1	4	0	3
51	Samara Oblast	SAM	0	2	4	5	3
52	Saratov Oblast	SAR	1	1	1	0	3
53	Stavropol Krai	STA	0	1	1	0	2
54	Sverdlovsk Oblast	SVE	4	4	4	5	4
55	Tatarstan	TA	5	4	4	5	4
56	Tomsk Oblast	TOM	3	4	4	1	2
57	Tuva	TY	5	4	4	0	2
58	Tver Oblast	TVE	1	3	3	1	3
59	Udmurtia	UD	2	3	4	0	3
60	Ulyanovsk Oblast	ULY	0	2	1	1	3
61	Volgograd Oblast	VGG	2	1	1	1	2
62	Vologda Oblast	VLG	4	1	4	2	3
63	Voronezh Oblast	VOR	2	1	1	0	3
64	Yaroslavl Oblast	YAR	1	4	4	3	3

Table A.4: The calibrated dataset

No	Case	Case label	SOV	ELECT	VOT	DON	OUT
1	Altai Krai	ALT	0.33	0	0	0	0.67
2	Amur Oblast	AMU	0.33	0	1	0	0.67
3	Arkhangelsk Oblast	ARK	0.67	0	1	0.33	0.33
4	Astrakhan Oblast	AST	0	0.33	0	0	0.67
5	Bashkortostan	BA	0.67	1	0.67	1	1
6	Belgorod Oblast	BEL	0.33	1	0	0.33	0
7	Briansk Oblast	BRY	0.33	0.67	0	0	0.67
8	Buryatia	BU	0.67	1	0	0	0.67
9	Chelyabinsk Oblast	CHE	0.67	0	1	0.33	0.67
10	Chuvashia	CU	0.33	1	0	0	0.67
11	Dagestan	DA	0.33	1	0.67	0	0.33
12	Irkutsk Oblast	IRK	0.67	1	1	0.67	0.67
13	Ingushetia	IN	1	1	1	0	0
14	Ivanovo Oblast	IVA	0	0	1	0.33	0.67
15	Jewish Autonomous Oblast	YEV	0.33	1	1	0	0.33
16	Kabardino-Balkaria	KB	0.33	1	1	0	1
17	Kaliningrad Oblast	KGD	0.33	0	1	0	0.67
18	Kalmykia	KL	0.33	1	1	0	0
19	Kaluga Oblast	KLU	0	0	0.67	0	0.33
20	Karelia	KR	0.67	1	1	0.33	0.33
21	Kemerovo	KEM	0.33	0	0	0	0.33
22	Khabarovsk Krai	KHA	0.33	0.33	0	0	0.67
23	Khakassia	KK	0.33	0.67	0	0	0
24	Kirov Oblast	KIR	0.33	0	1	0	0.67
25	Komi	KO	0.67	1	1	0.67	0.67
26	Kostroma Oblast	KOS	0	0	0.67	0	0.67
27	Krasnodar Krai	KDA	0.33	0	0	0	0.67
28	Krasnoyarsk Krai	KYA	0.67	1	1	1	0.67
29	Kursk Oblast	KRS	0.33	0	0	0.33	0.33
30	Leningrad Oblast	LEN	0.33	0	1	0.33	0.67
31	Lipetsk Oblast	LIP	0.33	1	0	1	0
32	Magadan Oblast	MAG	0.33	0	1	0	0.67
33	Mari El	ME	0.33	0.67	0	0	0.67
34	Mordovia	MO	0.33	0.67	0	0	0.33
35	Moscow	MOW	0.67	0.33	1	1	0.67
36	Moscow Oblast	MOS	0.33	1	1	0.67	0.33
37	Murmansk Oblast	MUR	0.33	0	1	0.67	0.67

No	Case	Case label	SOV	ELECT	VOT	DON	OUT
38	Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast	NIZ	0	1	1	0.67	0.67
39	North Ossetia	SE	0.33	1	0	0	1
40	Novgorod Oblast	NGR	0.33	1	1	0	0
41	Novosibirsk Oblast	NVS	0.33	0	0	0	0.33
42	Omsk Oblast	OMS	0.33	1	0	0	0.67
43	Orenburg Oblast	ORE	0.33	1	0	0.33	0.67
44	Oryol Oblast	ORL	0.33	1	0	0	0
45	Perm Oblast	PER	0.33	0	1	0.67	0.67
46	Rostov Oblast	ROS	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.67
47	Ryazan Oblast	RYA	0.33	0	0	0.33	0
48	Saint-Petersburg	SPE	0.67	0.67	1	0.67	0.67
49	Sakha	SA	1	1	1	1	1
50	Sakhalin Oblast	SAK	0.33	0	1	0	0.67
51	Samara Oblast	SAM	0	0.33	1	1	0.67
52	Saratov Oblast	SAR	0.33	0	0	0	0.67
53	Stavropol Krai	STA	0	0	0	0	0.33
54	Sverdlovsk Oblast	SVE	0.67	1	1	1	0.67
55	Tatarstan	TA	1	1	1	1	1
56	Tomsk Oblast	TOM	0.67	1	1	0.33	0.33
57	Tuva	TY	1	1	1	0	0.33
58	Tver Oblast	TVE	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67
59	Udmurtia	UD	0.33	0.67	1	0	0.67
60	Ulyanovsk Oblast	ULY	0	0.33	0	0.33	0.67
61	Volgograd Oblast	VGG	0.33	0	0	0.33	0.33
62	Vologda Oblast	VLG	0.67	0	1	0.33	0.67
63	Voronezh Oblast	VOR	0.33	0	0	0	0.67
64	Yaroslavl Oblast	YAR	0.33	1	1	0.67	0.67

Table A.5: Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome a signed treaty

Condition	Consistency of Necessity	Coverage of Necessity	Relevance of Necessity
SOV	0.578	0.810	0.894
ELECT	0.562	0.574	0.679
VOT	0.651	0.605	0.648
DON	0.436	0.819	0.932
sov	0.824	0.719	0.689
elect	0.553	0.627	0.749
vot	0.397	0.507	0.736
don	0.766	0.577	0.486

Table A.6: Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome no signed treaty

Condition	Consistency of Necessity	Coverage of Necessity	Relevance of Necessity
SOV	0.626	0.754	0.867
ELECT	0.618	0.543	0.664
VOT	0.550	0.440	0.565
DON	0.346	0.560	0.850
sov	0.843	0.632	0.629
elect	0.516	0.503	0.691
vot	0.506	0.554	0.755
don	0.888	0.575	0.485

Table A.7: Truth table, outcome no signed treaty

									Cases	
Row	SOV	ELECT	VOT	DON	OUT	n	incl.	PRI	No Treaty	Treaty
15	1	1	1	0	1	3	0.909	0.780	IN, KR, TY	-
12	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.907	0.000	-	MOW
11	1	0	1	0	1	3	0.886	0.333	ARK	CHE, VLG
6	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.875	0.752	LIP	-
7	0	1	1	0	1	8	0.831	0.636	DA, KL, NGR, TOM, YEV	KB, UD, TVE
4	0	0	1	1	0	3	0.795	0.000	-	MUR, PER, SAM
8	0	1	1	1	0	4	0.786	0.201	MOS	IRK, NIZ, YAR
1	0	0	0	0	0	13	0.768	0.499	KEM, KRS, NVS, STA, RYA, VGG	ALT, AST, KDA, KHA, SAR, ULY, VOR
5	0	1	0	0	0	11	0.710	0.464	KK, MO, BEL, ORL	BU, CU, ME, SE, BRY, OMS, ORE
3	0	0	1	0	0	10	0.672	0.100	KLU	AMU, IVA, KGD, KIR, KOS, LEN, MAG, ROS, SAK
16	1	1	1	1	0	7	0.496	0.000	-	BA, KO, SA, TA, KYA, SPE, SVE
2	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-	-	-
9	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-	-	-
10	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-	-	-
13	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-	-	-
14	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-	-	-

Consistency threshold = 0.83.
? indicates that a row is a logical remainder.

Table A.8: Parsimonious solution formula, outcome no signed treaty

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
sov*vot*DON +	0.917	0.834	0.123	0.101	**LIP**	-
ELECT*VOT*don	0.799	1.000	0.315	0.293	**IN**, **KL**, **KR**, **NGR**, **TOM**	KB, UD, TVE
Overall solution	0.822	1.000	0.416			

[1] Intermediate solution looks identical.

[2] Capital letters denote presence, small letters indicate absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

[3] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

Table A.9: Alternative conservative solution formula 1, outcome a signed treaty

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
VOT*DON +	0.943	1.000	0.357	0.187	**BA**, **KO**, **SA**, **TA**, **KYA**, **IRK**, MOW, MUR, **NIZ**, PER, SAM, **SPE**, **SVE**, **YAR**	MOS
elect*VOT	0.913	0.894	0.402	0.232	**AMU**, **CHE**, **IVA**, **KGD**, **KIR**, **KOS**, **LEN**, **MAG**, MOW, MUR, PER, **SAK**, SAM, **ROS**, **VLG**	ARK, KLU
Overall solution	0.911	0.899	0.589			

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters indicate absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

Table A.10: Alternative conservative solution formula 2, outcome a signed treaty

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
VOT*DON +	0.931	0.910	0.344	0.151	**KO**, **KYA**, **IRK**, MOW, MUR, **NIZ**, PER, SAM, **SPE**, **SVE**, **YAR**	MOS
elect*VOT +	0.910	0.892	0.463	0.263	**AMU**, **CHE**, **IVA**, **KGD**, **KIR**, **KOS**, **LEN**, **MAG**, MOW, MUR, PER, **SAK**, SAM, **ROS**, **VLG**	ARK, KLU
sov*ELECT*vot*don	0.757	0.663	0.225	0.129	**CU**, **OMS**, **ORE**, **BRY**, **ME**	KK, MO, BEL
Overall solution	0.841	1.000	0.743			

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters indicate absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

Table A.11: Alternative conservative solution formula 3, outcome a signed treaty

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
VOT*DON +	0.889	0.794	0.388	0.233	**KO**, **KYA**, **IRK**, MOW, MUR, **NIZ**, PER, SAM, **SPE**, **SVE**, **YAR**	MOS
elect*VOT +	0.716	0.524	0.340	0.185	**AMU**, **CHE**, **IVA**, **KGD**, **KIR**, **KOS**, **LEN**, **MAG**, MOW, MUR, PER, **SAK**, SAM, **ROS**, **VLG**	ARK, KLU
ELECT*vot*don	0.666	0.453	0.213	0.194	**CU**, **OMS**, **ORE**, **BRY**, **ME**	KK, MO, BEL
Overall solution	0.726	1.000	0.767			

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters indicate absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

Appendix B

Appendix Chapter 4

Table B.1: Cases selected for the analysis

No	Region	Region code	Governor	Case label	Year	Outcome
1	Astrakhan Oblast	AST	Aleksandr Zhilkin	Zhilkin_AST	2009	reappointment
2	Udmurtia	UD	Aleksandr Volkov	Volkov_UD	2009	reappointment
3	Vladimir Oblast	VLA	Nikolay Vinogradov	Vinogradov_VLA	2009	reappointment
4	Kemerovo Oblast	KEM	Aman Tuleev	Tuleev_KEM	2010	reappointment
5	Mordovia	MO	Nikolay Merkushkin	Merkushkin_MO	2010	reappointment
6	Kursk Oblast	KRS	Aleksandr Mikhailov	Mikhailov_KRS	2010	reappointment
7	Marii El	ME	Leonid Markelov	Markelov_ME	2010	reappointment
8	Primorsky Krai	PRI	Sergey Dar'kin	Dar'kin_PRI	2010	reappointment
9	Lipetsk Oblast	LIP	Oleg Korolev	Korolev_LIP	2010	reappointment
10	Kurgan Oblast	KGN	Oleg Bogomolov	Bogomolov_KGN	2010	reappointment
11	Penza Oblast	PNZ	Vasily Bochkarev	Bochkarev_PNZ	2010	reappointment
12	Tambov Oblast	TAM	Oleg Betin	Betin_TAM	2010	reappointment
13	Kaluga Oblast	KLU	Anatoly Artamonov	Artamonov_KLU	2010	reappointment
14	Ulyanovsk Oblast	ULY	Sergey Morozov	Morozov_ULY	2011	reappointment
15	Krasnodar Krai	KDA	Aleksandr Tkachev	Tkachev_KDA	2012	reappointment
16	Karachay-Cherkessia Republic	KC	Mustafa Batdyev	Batdyev_KC	2008	dismissal
17	Kirov Oblast	KIR	Nikolay Shaklein	Shaklein_KIR	2009	dismissal
18	Sverdlovsk Oblast	SVE	Eduard Rossel	Rossel_SVE	2009	dismissal
19	Voronezh Oblast	VOR	Vladimir Kulakov	Kulakov_VOR	2009	dismissal
20	Volgograd Oblast	VGG	Nikolay Maksyuta	Maksyuta_VGG	2010	dismissal
21	Kalmykia Republic	KL	Kirsan Ilyumzhinov	Ilyumzhinov_KL	2010	dismissal
22	Orenburg Oblast	ORE	Aleksey Chernyshev	Chernyshov_ORE	2010	dismissal
23	Komi Republic	KO	Vladimir Torlopov	Torlopov_KO	2010	dismissal
24	Chuvashia Republic	CU	Nikolay Fedorov	Fedorov_CU	2010	dismissal
25	Omsk Oblast	OMS	Leonid Polezhaev	Polezhaev_OMS	2012	dismissal
26	Tomsk Oblast	TOM	Viktor Kress	Kress_TOM	2012	dismissal

Table B.2: The raw data

No	Case label	VOT_raw1	VOT_raw2	STAB_raw	EFF_raw	POPUL_raw	REAP_raw
1	Zhilkin_AST	58.00	58.00	26250	45	38.50	1
2	Volkov_UD	60.57	60.57	45125	17	29.00	1
3	Vinogradov_VLA	56.75	56.75	11560	30	29.25	1
4	Tuleev_KEM	76.82	76.82	7958	6	79.75	1
5	Merkushkin_MO	93.41	93.41	16150	44	46.50	1
6	Mikhailov_KRS	62.74	62.74	7020	70	20.75	1
7	Markelov_ME	67.54	67.54	4610	57	45.50	1
8	Dar'kin_PRI	54.87	54.87	23694	32	27.50	1
9	Korolev_LIP	62.30	62.30	14730	42	50.75	1
10	Bogomolov_KGN	64.43	64.43	7175	59	21.00	1
11	Bochkarev_PNZ	70.31	70.31	27403	16	42.00	1
12	Betin_TAM	59.79	59.79	13900	30	23.00	1
13	Artamonov_KLU	61.65	61.65	16680	18	52.25	1
14	Morozov_ULY	66.24	66.24	9407	45	56.25	1
15	Tkachev_KDA	56.15	56.15	22648	15	44.50	1
16	Batdyev_KC	92.90	92.90	14500	77	20.00	0
17	Shaklein_KIR	55.38	55.38	30910	36	27.25	0
18	Rossel_SVE	62.04	62.04	26403	9	51.33	0
19	Kulakov_VOR	57.46	57.46	39770	39	14.25	0
20	Maksyuta_VGG	57.74	57.74	220549	41	23.25	0
21	Ilyumzhinov_KL	72.43	72.43	7340	80	20.00	0
22	Chernyshov_ORE	60.31	60.31	21990	38	12.00	0
23	Torlopov_KO	62.06	62.06	8820	47	19.25	0
24	Fedorov_CU	62.27	62.27	27240	36	38.75	0
25	Polezhaev_OMS	39.60	39.60	15363	25	35.75	0
26	Kress_TOM	37.51	37.51	8458	26	36.75	0

[1] Columns VOT_raw1 and VOT_raw2 contain the same data. For Tkachev_KDA, Polezhaev_OMS, and Kress_TOM the data show the share of United Russia in 2011, for other cases - in 2007. See the script for the calibration.

Table B.3: The calibrated dataset

No	Case label	VOT	STAB	EFF	POPUL	REAP
1	Zhilkin_AST	0.81	0.14	0.38	0.39	0.95
2	Volkov_UD	0.88	0.00	0.97	0.04	0.95
3	Vinogradov_VLA	0.77	0.92	0.81	0.04	0.95
4	Tuleev_KEM	1.00	0.97	0.99	1.00	0.95
5	Merkushkin_MO	1.00	0.76	0.40	0.87	0.95
6	Mikhailov_KRS	0.92	0.98	0.05	0.00	0.95
7	Markelov_ME	0.97	0.99	0.16	0.83	0.95
8	Dar'kin_PRI	0.69	0.25	0.76	0.02	0.95
9	Korolev_LIP	0.92	0.83	0.45	0.96	0.95
10	Bogomolov_KGN	0.94	0.98	0.13	0.00	0.95
11	Bochkarev_PNZ	0.98	0.10	0.97	0.64	0.95
12	Betin_TAM	0.86	0.86	0.81	0.01	0.95
13	Artamonov_KLU	0.90	0.73	0.96	0.97	0.95
14	Morozov_ULY	0.96	0.96	0.38	0.99	0.95
15	Tkachev_KDA	0.98	0.31	0.98	0.79	0.95
16	Batdyev_KC	1.00	0.83	0.03	0.00	0.05
17	Shaklein_KIR	0.72	0.04	0.64	0.02	0.05
18	Rossel_SVE	0.91	0.13	0.99	0.97	0.05
19	Kulakov_VOR	0.80	0.00	0.54	0.00	0.05
20	Maksyuta_VGG	0.80	0.00	0.48	0.01	0.05
21	Ilyumzhinov_KL	0.99	0.98	0.02	0.00	0.05
22	Chernyshov_ORE	0.88	0.36	0.57	0.00	0.05
23	Torlopov_KO	0.91	0.96	0.33	0.00	0.05
24	Fedorov_CU	0.91	0.11	0.64	0.41	0.05
25	Polezhaev_OMS	0.17	0.80	0.90	0.22	0.05
26	Kress_TOM	0.13	0.97	0.89	0.28	0.05

Table B.4: Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome reappointment

Condition	Consistency of Necessity	Coverage of Necessity	Relevance of Necessity
VOT	0.942	0.639	0.348
STAB	0.682	0.674	0.694
EFF	0.647	0.629	0.656
POPUL	0.518	0.810	0.902
vot	0.127	0.448	0.904
stab	0.382	0.513	0.735
eff	0.426	0.586	0.773
popul	0.526	0.471	0.519

Table B.5: Parsimonious solution formula, outcome reappointment (two models)

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	(M1)	(M2)	Typical cases
VOT*STAB*EFF +	0.864	0.838	0.407	0.143	0.143	0.280	**Betin_TAM** **Vinogradov_VLA** Artamonov_KLU
STAB*POPUL	0.912	0.900	0.398	0.052	0.134		**Korolev_LIP** **Markelov_ME** **Merkushkin_MO** Artamonov_KLU
VOT*eff*POPUL	0.889	0.867	0.228	0.020		0.101	**Korolev_LIP** **Markelov_ME** **Merkushkin_MO** **Morozov_ULY**
Overall solution (M1)	0.873	0.856	0.541				
Overall solution (M2)	0.862	0.842	0.508				

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters indicate absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

[3] Simplifying assumptions for M1 are 0101 and 0111; for M2 - 1001.

Figure B.1: Necessity plot, VOT*STAB

Figure B.2: Sufficiency plot, conservative solution formula, outcome reappointment

Table B.6: Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome dismissal

Condition	Consistency of Necessity	Coverage of Necessity	Relevance of Necessity
VOT	0.793	0.407	0.245
STAB	0.520	0.389	0.547
EFF	0.602	0.443	0.559
POPUL	0.219	0.259	0.702
vot	0.298	0.795	0.962
stab	0.565	0.573	0.761
eff	0.496	0.515	0.745
popul	0.839	0.568	0.570

Table B.7: Truth table, outcome dismissal

									Cases	
Row	VOT	STAB	EFF	POPUL	OUT	n	incl.	PRI	Dismissal	Reappointment
7	0	1	1	0	0	2	0.803	0.731	Polezhaev_OMS Kress_TOM	-
9	1	0	0	0	1	2	0.757	0.683	Maksyuta_VGG	Zhilkin_AST
13	1	1	0	0	0	5	0.599	0.529	Batdyev_KC Ilyumzhinov_KL Torlopov_KO	Mikhailov_KRS Bogomolov_KGN
11	1	0	1	0	0	6	0.598	0.521	Chernyshov_ORE Shaklein_KIR Kulakov_VOR Fedorov_CU	Volkov_UD Dar'kin_PRI
12	1	0	1	1	0	3	0.489	0.383	Rossel_SVE	Bochkarev_PNZ Tkachev_KDA
15	1	1	1	0	1	2	0.444	0.274	-	Vinogradov_VLA Betin_TAM
16	1	1	1	1	1	2	0.253	0.096	-	Tuleev_KEM Artamonov_KLU
14	1	1	0	1	1	4	0.236	0.064	-	Markelov_ME Merkushkin_MO Korolev_LIP Morozov_ULY
1	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-	-	-
2	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-	-	-

Consistency threshold = 0.75.

? indicates that a row is a logical remainder.

Table B.8: Parsimonious solution formula, outcome dismissal

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
vot*popul +	0.795	0.727	0.270	0.137	**Polezhaev_OMS** - **Kress_TOM**	
stab*eff*popul	0.757	0.683	0.264	0.132	**Maksyuta_VGG**	Zhilkin_AST
Overall solution	0.779	0.729	0.402			

[1] Small letters indicate absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Intermediate solution formula looks identical.
[3] Simplifying assumptions are as follows: 0000, 0010, 0100.
[4] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

Table B.9: Alternative conservative solution 1, outcome reappointment

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
VOT*STAB*EFF +	0.847	0.815	0.362	0.098	**Betin_TAM** Artamonov_KLU
VOT*STAB*POPUL	0.938	0.929	0.397	0.132	**Korolev_LIP** **Markelov_ME** **Merkushkin_MO** Artamonov_KLU
Overall solution	0.882	0.864	0.495		

[1] Capital letters denote presence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

Table B.10: Alternative conservative solution 2, outcome reappointment

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
VOT*STAB*EFF +	0.852	0.826	0.425	0.163	**Betin_TAM** **Vinogradov_VLA** Artamonov_KLU
VOT*STAB*POPUL	0.930	0.920	0.372	0.110	**Korolev_LIP** **Markelov_ME** **Merkushkin_MO** Artamonov_KLU
Overall solution	0.879	0.862	0.535		

[1] Capital letters denote presence * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

Table B.11: Alternative conservative solution 3, outcome reappointment

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
VOT*STAB*EFF +	0.896	0.877	0.403	0.145	**Betin_TAM**
					Vinogradov_VLA
					Artamonov_KLU
					Merkushkin_MO
					Tuleev_KEM
VOT*STAB*POPUL	0.942	0.933	0.386	0.128	**Korolev_LIP**
					Markelov_ME
					Morozov_ULY
					Artamonov_KLU
					Merkushkin_MO
					Tuleev_KEM
Overall solution	0.919	0.908	0.531		

[1] Capital letters denote presence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

Appendix C

Appendix Chapter 5

Table C.1: Transfers to the Russian regions, 2009-2019, percent

Transfer type	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Equalization grants	23	26	23	24	27	26	30	33	36	32	31
Extraordinary bailout grants	12	7	9	7	11	14	9	8	8	9	8
Subsidies	33	27	29	34	33	24	25	23	25	19	23
Subventions	18	25	19	17	18	19	21	21	19	16	17
Other transfers	14	15	20	18	11	17	15	14	11	15	21
Politically sensitive transfers, total	59	49	58	59	55	53	49	45	44	43	52

Sources: Zubarevich (2014, 160), Akindinova et al. (2016, 34), author's calculations.

Figure C.1: Structure of the 2018 FIFA World Cup costs, billion rubles

Sources: RBK (2018a); Karnaukhov and Chumakova (2018).

Table C.2: Economic characteristics of the nominated regions, 2007-2011 average

No	Region	GRP per capita	EXPERT-RA ranking
1	Krasnodar	175 437.42	2.60
2	Saint Petersburg	322 221.32	2.80
3	Moscow	712 147.08	4.00
4	Tatarstan	256 329.46	5.00
5	Volgograd	157 494.32	5.80
6	Samara	211 016.14	5.00
7	Mordovia	117 565.38	7.00
8	Rostov	140 199.00	3.20
9	Nizhniy Novgorod	182 008.70	5.00
10	Sverdlovsk Oblast	226 503.00	4.00
11	Kaliningrad	195 664.28	6.20
12	Yaroslavl	177 727.36	6.00
13	Moscow Oblast	243 311.60	3.40

Sources: Rosstat, Russian Regions. Social and Economic Indicators 2013, available at `http://www.gks.ru`; EXPERT-RA, Ratings of regions' investment attractiveness, available at `https://raexpert.ru/rankings`.

EXPERT-RA categorical ranking was transformed into a continuous scale: 1–1A, 2–2A, 3–3A, 4–1B, 5–2B, 6–3B1, 7–3B2, 8–1C, 9–2C, 10–3C1, 11–3C2, 12–3D.

Table C.3: Main characteristics of the candidate cities

No	City	No of inhabitants	International airport	Stadium	Football club
1	Krasnodar	710686	yes	To be built	yes
2	Sochi	337947	yes	To be built	no
3	Moscow	10508971	yes	Major renovation	yes
4	Kazan	1130717	yes	To be built	yes
5	Saint Petersburg	4581854	yes	To be built	yes
6	Volgograd	981909	yes	To be built	no
7	Samara	1134716	yes	To be built	yes
8	Saransk	296054	yes	To be built	no
9	Rostov-on-Don	1048991	yes	To be built	yes
10	Nizhniy Novgorod	1272527	yes	To be built	no
11	Yekaterinburg	1332264	yes	Major renovation	no
12	Kaliningrad	420480	yes	To be built	no
14	Yaroslavl	606336	yes	To be built	no
15	Podol'sk				

Source: FIFA (2010, 6-11, 30).
[1] Football club playing in the premier league between 2007 and 2011.

Table C.4: Descriptive statistics, voting results, percent

Elections	Mean	Median	Min.	Max.	Sd.	N
2007 State Duma elections	65.01	61.77	48.78	99.36	11.10	83
2008 Presidential elections	69.76	67.25	59.26	91.92	8.42	83
2011 State Duma elections	49.16	43.54	29.04	99.48	16.91	83
2012 Presidential elections	64.42	61.85	46.95	99.76	10.29	83

Source: Dataset on political elites and economic performance in Russia, available at `https://iims.hse.ru/en/csid/databases`.

Table C.5: Calibrated dataset

	Case	Case label	VOT	STAB	CAP	LOB	SEL
1	KDA I	Krasnodar I	0.33	0.33	1	1	0.33
2	MOS	Moscow Oblast	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0
3	YAR	Yaroslavl	0	1	0.33	0	0.33
4	VGG	Volgograd	0	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.67
5	SAM	Samara	0	0	0.33	0.67	0.67
6	MO	Mordovia	1	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
7	ROS	Rostov-on-Don	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67	0.67
8	NIZ	Nizhniy Novgorod	0	0.67	0.33	0.67	0.67
9	YEK	Yekaterinburg	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.67
10	KAL	Kaliningrad	0	0.33	0	0	0.67
11	KAD II	Krasnodar II	0.33	0.33	1	1	1
12	SPE	Saint Petersburg	0.33	0	0.33	1	1
13	MOW	Moscow	0.33	0	1	1	1
14	TA	Tatarstan	1	0.67	1	1	1

Table C.6: Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome selection as a World Cup venue

| Condition	Consistency of Necessity	Coverage of Necessity	Relevance of Necessity
VOT	0.604	0.809	0.841
STAB	0.497	0.874	0.928
CAP	0.856	0.827	0.722
LOB	0.965	0.900	0.799
vot	0.607	0.809	0.839
stab	0.785	0.846	0.799
cap	0.356	0.769	0.906
lob	0.282	0.663	0.882

Figure C.2: Necessity plot, LOB

Figure C.3: Sufficiency plot, conservative solution formula, outcome selection as a World Cup venue

Table C.7: Parsimonious solution formula, outcome selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
LOB	0.900	0.864	0.965	-	VGG SVE KAL NIZ SAM SPE MOW KDA II ROS MO TA	KDA I
Overall solution	0.900	0.864	0.965	-		

[1] Capital letters denote presence.
[2] Simplifying assumptions are 0101, 0111, 1001, 1101.
[3] Intermediate solution formula looks identical.

Table C.8: Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome non-selection as a World Cup venue

Condition	Consistency of Necessity	Coverage of Necessity	Relevance of Necessity
VOT	0.712	0.474	0.657
STAB	0.712	0.622	0.812
CAP	0.785	0.377	0.418
LOB	0.712	0.330	0.372
vot	0.714	0.473	0.654
stab	0.856	0.459	0.531
cap	0.641	0.688	0.877
lob	0.785	0.917	0.968

Table C.9: Truth table, outcome non-selection as a World Cup venue

									Cases	
Raw	VOT	STAB	CAP	LOB	OUT	n	incl.	PRI	Not SEL	SEL
3	0	0	1	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	MOS	-
5	0	1	0	0	1	1	1.000	1.000	YAR	-
12	1	0	1	1	0	2	0.691	0.335	KDA I	KDA II
2	0	0	0	1	0	3	0.660	0.244	-	VGG SVE KAL
16	1	1	1	1	0	3	0.535	0.141	-	ROS MO TA
4	0	0	1	1	0	4	0.457	0.123	-	NIZ SAM SPE MOW

[1] Consistency threshold = 0.90.

Table C.10: Conservative solution formula, outcome non-selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
vot*STAB*cap*lob +	1.000	1.000	0.499	0.144	YAR
vot*stab*CAP*lob	1.000	1.000	0.499	0.144	MOS
Overall solution	1.000	1.000	0.643		

[1] Capital letters indicate presence, small letters absence, * stands for logical AND, + denotes logical OR.

Table C.11: Intermediate solution formula, outcome non-selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
vot*stab*lob +	1.000	1.000	0.570	0.073	MOS
vot*STAB*cap*lob	1.000	1.000	0.570	0.073	YAR
Overall solution	1.000	1.000	0.643		

[1] Capital letters indicate presence, small letters absence, * stands for logical AND, + denotes logical OR.
[2] Directional expectations are 0000.

Table C.12: Alternative conservative solution formula 1, outcome selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases	Deviant cases
stab*LOB +	0.913	0.867	0.750	0.324	**VGG SVE KAL SAM SPE MOW** NIZ KDAII	KDAI
VOT*CAP*LOB	0.857	0.786	0.641	0.215	**ROS MO TA** NIZ KDAII	KDAI
Overall solution	0.900	0.864	0.965			

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

Table C.13: Alternative conservative solution formula 2, outcome selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
vot*stab*LOB +	0.918	0.837	0.688	0.441	**VGG SVE KAL SAM NIZ**
VOT*STAB*CAP*LOB	0.890	0.673	0.497	0.250	**ROS MO**
Overall solution	0.938	0.878	0.938		

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

Table C.14: Alternative parsimonious solution formula 2, outcome non-selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
lob +	0.917	0.754	0.785	0.217	**MOS YAR**
VOT*stab	1.000	1.000	0.712	0.144	**KDA I**
Overall solution	0.929	0.804	0.929		

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.
[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.

Table C.15: Alternative conservative solution formula 3, outcome selection as a World Cup venue

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. cov.	Typical cases
vot*stab*LOB +	0.942	0.911	0.572	0.396	**VGG SVE KAL SAM NIZ SPE MOW**
VOT*STAB*CAP*LOB	0.924	0.859	0.427	0.250	**ROS MO TA**
Overall solution	0.959	0.939	0.822		

[1] Capital letters denote presence, small letters absence, * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

[2] Uniquely covered cases are in bold.