

Protesting on the Streets while in Parliament?
Exploring Extra-Parliamentary Activity of a Within-System Political Party
in Pakistan

By

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Abstract

The extra-parliamentary activity of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) presents the paradox of a within-system political party that has a substantial stake in the system engaging in disruptive protests that endanger that very system. This M.A thesis attempts to answer this paradox and generate hypotheses for this phenomenon for the broader population of cases through a qualitative case study of the PTI. This M.A thesis also attempts to bridge the gap between literature on political parties and social movements by showing the utility of borrowing certain concepts from social movement literature in explaining the disruptive character of political parties. Building on Katz and Mair's (1993) three faces of political parties, this M.A thesis theorises a new face of the party, party on the street, to explain the protest character of the PTI and the costs associated with it. Through an examination of the political structure of Pakistan, this M.A thesis reveals an incentive structure for opposition parties to engage in extra-parliamentary activity. By comparing the PTI with the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in opposition, political learning by the PPP and party agency in shunning extra-parliamentary activity from 2013 onwards is illustrated. This comparison generates two hypotheses towards the end: 1) where structural incentives exist for engaging in extra-parliamentary activity for opposition parties, past central government experience acts as an intervening variable and moderates party behaviour and 2) volatility of political allegiances and reliance of party leadership on local political bosses increases the likelihood of extra-parliamentary activity by within-system opposition parties as it creates the incentive to create a crisis-like situation.

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List of Abbreviations

PPP

PML-N

PML-Q

PTI

Pakistan Peoples Party

Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz

Pakistan Muslim League Quaid

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

1. Introduction

Pakistan's latest transition to electoral democracy beginning from 2008 presents a peculiar case. Resonating with Huntington's main thesis in his seminal work "Political Order in Changing Societies" (1968), it appears to show that modernization leads to instability. More specifically, Pakistan's democratization is ostensibly engendering modern forms of associations in which ideas of freedom of expression and freedom to protest are being adopted by different associations and political parties. While it may be the case that opening up of the political system has emboldened erstwhile reluctant groups to express themselves more forcefully, interestingly, the manner in which these ideas are being appropriated by different groups has led to potentially system-destabilizing situations. Whereas divided societies typically have violent demonstrations and Pakistan is no exception, the peculiarity lies in the emergence of a political party that gained prominence in the second general elections of the present spell of electoral democracy and has engaged in extra-parliamentary activity ever since.

The research question that this M.A thesis aims to answer in light of this paradox is why a political party in Pakistan, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which has within-system goals and a substantial stake in the political system engages in extra-parliamentary activity that risks destabilizing that very system. In attempting to answer this question, a qualitative case study will be done with the aim of being a hypothesis-generating case study for the broader population of cases exhibiting extra-parliamentary activity or disruptive behavior for opposition parties. At different places in the case study, comparisons would be made with Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which is the leading opposition party in parliament. In answering

this research question, this M.A thesis will highlight the theoretical lacuna that exists in political party literature in explaining extra-parliamentary activity by a political party that has within-system goals and borrow conceptual elements from social movement literature by showing them to be more developed in explaining certain aspects of this phenomenon. The costs associated with extra-parliamentary activity for a within-system party will be presented by showing them to be a consequence of a party taking on the face of party on the street. Party on the street is an original contribution of this M.A thesis that builds up on Katz and Mair's (1993) three faces of the party by adding an additional face. The face of party on the street will describe the characteristics of the party when it engages in extra-parliamentary activity and it will be illustrated by the case of the PTI. This will then be juxtaposed with the PTI's face of party in public office to show how the level of radicalization of the face of party on the street is transient but overshadows the much sober face of party in public office with the latter having obvious dividends in terms of projecting a much more developed image of the party. The PTI's choice to still adopt its face of party on the street will then be shown to be a rational choice given the structural incentives that accrue from projecting an image of system destabilizing crisis for the ruling party. In laying down these structural incentives, first the overall system of patronage politics in Pakistan will be discussed, which will show how political parties depend on local politicians for electoral victory and the manner in which the latter's autonomy from the former creates incentives for defections towards political parties likely to be electorally successful. Second, the role of the military in stunting the growth of political parties would be discussed to highlight how the incentive structure for politics of expediency was created both for national and local political leaders. This political backdrop to the case of local dynamics and the role of the military to the case is introduced late in the M.A thesis because the hypotheses generated at the end directly develop from linking this state of affairs to the comparative analysis of the PTI and the PPP. In concrete terms, it will be shown that while the

PPP did engage in politics of expediency when it was in opposition in the early 1990s by using extra-parliamentary activity to create pressure for the ouster of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) government through the involvement of the military, its principled stance to not engage in such tactics when it was in opposition following the 2013 general elections indicates political learning. A brief comparison with the PML-N in opposition will also show a similar pattern as while it did solicit the support of the military in bringing down the government of the PPP in that period of electoral democracy twice (1988 – 1999), it did not go to the same extreme levels when it was in opposition from 2008 to 2013.¹ An understanding between the two parties to adhere to acceptable bounds of opposition can be viewed as a logical consequence of their experience in running the central government in the period starting from 1988 to 1999 as they firsthand experienced that their transience in office is a direct result of increased involvement of the military in the political sphere. Running central government is the one factor that sets these two parties apart from the PTI, which has only been in the provincial government. By showing the behavior of the PTI to be rational and with the PPP exhibiting the same behavior in the 1990s, the different behavior of the PPP in opposition from 2013 to 2017 would be made generalizable on the basis of political party acting in a structural context driven by self-interest, but with an altered, long-term perception of it due to political learning. This would form the basis of the main hypothesis that this case study will generate, which is that where structural incentives exist for engaging in extra-parliamentary activity for opposition parties, past central government experience acts as an intervening variable and moderates party behavior. The second related hypothesis of this M.A thesis is that volatility of political allegiances and reliance of party leadership on local political bosses increases the

¹ PML-N is only briefly introduced later in this M.A thesis just to illustrate that it exhibits a similar pattern to the PPP. The PML-N is not the main party in comparison as it was in government and the target of PTI's extra-parliamentary activity at the time as opposed to the PPP which was the main opposition party. Hence, the PTI's actions can be juxtaposed with the PPP's actions through the comparison.

likelihood of extra-parliamentary activity by within-system opposition parties as it creates the incentive to create a crisis-like situation.

This chapter will introduce the case of the PTI and justify the case selection as well as the methodology employed. This will be followed by a literature review in which after examining the lacuna in social movement literature and political parties with respect to extra-parliamentary activity, the theoretical context of political parties and social movement literature will be given. Subsequently, case specific literature on within-system political parties engaging in extra-parliamentary activity will be engaged to show how that does not provide any theoretical framework to examine the case of the PTI.

1.1 The Case

The PTI is a political party that not just aspires for office through elections, but also chooses to take the route of extra-parliamentary protests. The PTI's character as a party pioneering extra-parliamentary protests began after the general elections of 2013 when it became the third largest party in the lower chamber of Pakistan's national legislature, the National Assembly, (The Telegraph 2013) and formed a coalition government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the same elections by being the single largest party in its provincial legislature (Usman 2013). This seems peculiar at the outset as for the party to engage in extra-parliamentary activity while being a formal part of the political system appears to self-contradictory behavior.

Strangely, the PTI's actions have both accepted democratic principles as the legitimate basis for a political regime while showing through words and deeds a disregard for them. For example, it participated in the 2013 general elections with the slogan of change but through

parliamentary democracy.² It gained 28 out of 342 seats in the National Assembly and became the second largest opposition party in the lower chamber (The Telegraph 2013). As mentioned previously, it gained enough seats in the provincial legislature of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to form government there. Hence, not only through its words and actions the PTI has acknowledged and participated in the electoral process, it has a major stake in it as well. However, at the same time it has engaged in politics of sit-in and agitation. For example, in its 2014 sit-in outside the parliament in which the main demand was the resignation of the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, it asked its followers to engage in civil disobedience, which entailed not paying taxes, utility bills (Hassan and Houreld 2014) and for overseas fund transfers to take place through hundi (Geo News 2014), an illicit means that circumvents the paying of official fee on them as well as any documentation. The events leading up to this sit-in were partly the result of government intransigence to the PTI's demand of investigating electoral rigging by audit of four constituencies that the PTI believed were sites of gross rigging (Malik 2013; Dawn 2014). Ultimately, following a national tragedy in which primary school students were killed in a terrorist attack on Army Public School in Peshawar did the PTI decide to end its sit-in and agree to a judicial commission to investigate electoral rigging, taking back its earlier demand of the resignation of the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (Dawn 2014). Similarly, in 2016 the PTI threatened to lockdown Islamabad, the Pakistani capital, with the same demand of resignation of the then Prime Minister Sharif. This bout of protest was triggered by the names of the three children of Sharif in the leaks of a law firm based in Panama, Mossack Fonseca, through an investigation carried out by the International Consortium of Independent Journalists, which indicated that the first family held offshore accounts (Haider and Dilawar 2017). With deadlock between the government and opposition regarding the specific manner in which investigation over the first family's offshore wealth would take place, the PTI decided

² For example, see its election manifesto 2013 (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf 2013)

to increase the stakes. Until the Supreme Court of Pakistan intervened and gave guarantees that an investigation would be carried out against Sharif that led to the PTI to stop its plan (A. Khan 2016), the PTI led a march chiefly from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to the capital relying on its chief minister in the province to gather supporters and personnel to lockdown the capital (Ullah and Zia 2016).

1.2 Case Selection

Extra-parliamentary activity by a within-system political party is not just limited to Pakistan. As will be discussed later, FIDESZ in Hungary, the Democratic Front in Montenegro, and the Great Indonesia Movement, the Democratic Party, and the Prosperous Justice Party in Indonesia all show instances of this phenomenon. However, where FIDESZ lent support to the 2006 anti-government protests by private citizens rather than create them (Szabó 2011) and so did the Democratic Party and the Prosperous and Justice Party in Indonesia (Mietzner 2017), the PTI itself pioneered the extra-parliamentary protests. Moreover, in the case of Indonesian political parties, Indonesia's President Joko Widodo used coercion on opposition parties in parliament to make them more pliant towards his presidency (Mietzner 2016) and in that way brought the parliament under his control (Mietzner 2017). However, in the period of electoral democracy in which the extra-parliament activity of the PTI has emerged in Pakistan, there has been no recorded incident of such mass coercion of political parties in parliament by the head of the executive. The case of the Democratic Front is an exceptional case since Montenegro has not witnessed a change of government since its independence, whereas in Pakistan governments have frequently changed whenever it has been an electoral democracy. Hence, Pakistan stands as the extreme case on the dimension of extra-parliamentary activity by a political party without any case-specific factor that may outright explain that dimension. By showing the phenomenon under discussion in the most

pronounced manner, the extreme case allows for exploring possible explanations “in an open-ended fashion” (Gerring 2008, 654). In this way, the primary utility of this case study lies in generating hypotheses for this scantily explored phenomenon and illuminating the causal pathways of those hypotheses. Moreover, the PTI exhibits certain characteristics of a social movement in addition to those of a political party. This makes it the perfect example to engage with the literature of the two strands in showing how concepts can be borrowed to explain this puzzling case that defies straightforward classification.

Within the case, drawing a comparison with the largest opposition party in parliament, the PPP presents a suitable comparative lens at places where it is needed. This case selection is suitable for comparison as it allows “focusing relation on key variables” (Lijphart 1971, 690) by controlling for the rest. This is because both the PPP and the PTI operate in the same political landscape. The position of the PPP in terms of formal political power is also very similar to the PTI. In the National Assembly, the PPP outnumbers the PTI by merely 14 seats³. The PPP has also formed provincial government in Sindh. However, in terms of variation on the key variables, the actions of the PTI and the PPP show that to be very high. Contrary to the difficulty in categorizing the PTI, the PPP is an archetypical case of Sartori’s (1966) “responsible constitutional opposition” that takes the political system’s legitimacy as acceptable and directs its energies of opposition towards the government instead of the political system. In addition to keeping its energies focused on keeping the government in check, it has also supported it when the PTI’s actions threatened the stability of the system. For example, when the PTI had staged a sit-in outside the parliament and went on to unsuccessfully storm the parliament building, the PPP formally supported the then Prime

³ The PPP as of April 22, 2018 has a total of 46 seats in the National Assembly (National Assembly of Pakistan n.d.). The PTI has 32 seats (National Assembly of Pakistan n.d.)

Minister Sharif and condemned the actions of the PTI (Dawn 2014). During the threat of lockdown of the capital, the PPP termed it a ‘criminal act’ on the part of the PTI (Wasim 2016). While interparty rivalry to a considerable degree can be a plausible explanation for the lack of support of the PTI’s actions by the PPP, it does not explain why the PPP has not engaged in such tactics itself. The explanation of lack of capacity on the part of the PPP to engage in collective action like the PTI can be ruled out since the PPP has in the early 1990s engaged in similar protests⁴ and in the recent past organized mass rallies and processions.

1.3 Methodology

The hypothesis generating case study being done in this M.A thesis would use existing literature on political parties and social movements to place the case in a theoretical context. In order to examine the structure of patronage politics in Pakistan, the historical role of the PPP and PML-N in the country’s politics, and the military’s role in shaping the incentive structure for political actors, secondary sources in the form of published research articles and books by historians and political scientists on the case of Pakistan will be predominantly used as the basis of information with the occasional use of news sources. When examining the case of the PTI in the present period of electoral democracy, given the scarcity of published work, mostly news sources would be relied upon to provide information. This would include reputable national newspapers of Pakistan, namely Dawn, The News, and Express Tribune; online published news stories from reputable electronic news media outlets Geo News and Samaa News; and foreign news media outlets namely Reuters, BBC News, Al-Jazeera, the Guardian, the Independent, the Telegraph, New York Times, and the Wire. Information and data on political parties has also been gained by official websites of the Government of Pakistan such

⁴ These protests will be illustrated later in the thesis.

as the National Assembly of Pakistan and Pakistan Bureau of Pakistan as well as by an independent NGO Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT).

This case study begins with plausible explanations of extra-parliamentary protests by exploring existing explanations proposed for other cases and showing their lack of congruence with the case of the PTI. Consequently, it delves into an in-depth examination of the case by bringing into focus the historical development of the political structure and behavior of political actors in that structure thereby locating the explanation in structural factors and agency showed by political parties. Hence, it uses Lijphart's (1971) approach of "starting out with more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses, and attempt to formulate definite hypotheses" (692) as a methodological starting point. Moreover, through explanations that are concretely rooted in the context of Pakistani politics for the research question of this case study, it generates hypotheses by moving up the ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970). This is in line with the approach proposed by Sartori (1991) of relating universals to particulars without losing the general law that the comparison might illuminate to the particularities of the case.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Theoretical Context

The case of the PTI sits in the middle of two major strands of literature, which are political parties and social movements. There is little common linkage between these strands of literature mainly for the reason that social movements are described as existing outside mainstream formal channels for people “who lack regular access to representative institutions” (Tarrow 2011, 7) while the very function of political parties, traditionally understood, is to gain formal representation in mainstream institutions through electoral success. However, even within literature on political parties and more specifically on opposition parties, there are distinctions that somewhat blur this dichotomy between social movements and political parties. Broadly, opposition is divided into “a responsible constitutional opposition” (already defined in the preceding section) and “irresponsible unconstitutional opposition” (Sartori 1966). Irresponsible unconstitutional opposition directs its energies against the political system since it has little chance of coming to power (Sartori 1966). The formulation of these two types of opposition also finds its parallels in Kirchheimer’s (1964) (quoted in Brack and Weinblum, 2011) categorization of “classic opposition” and “principled opposition” respectively. In this M.A thesis, in order to shed the terms of their normative semantics, responsible constitutional opposition would be referred to as within-system opposition while irresponsible unconstitutional opposition would be referred to as anti-system opposition.

One aspect that follows for the anti-system opposition is its rejection of formal means of coming to power through the ballot, and using non-traditional means of meeting its demands. It is here that political parties and social movements converge to a very limited degree. However, this convergence should not be overstated. Where social movements have their

primary purpose of fulfilling a particular goal, political parties want public office whether through parliamentary or extra-parliamentary means. The point being made is that this convergence can be used to facilitate an understanding of the phenomenon being discussed here through borrowing from literature on the two strands.

The scant literature that exists on the overlap of social movements and political parties covers just a handful of areas. One is the genesis of political parties. For example, McAdam and Tarrow (2010) mention that a diverse number of political parties ranging from the National Fascist Party in Italy and the Nazi Party in Germany to the quintessential conservative Republican Party of the United States started as social movements. Szabo (2011), in the case of Hungary, shows that FIDESZ was a political party that grew out of a social movement of student protestors in the 1980s with the aim of challenging the communist regime and Leftist ideology. Other literature is predominantly focused on success of social movements with either political parties acting as an instrument for that endeavor or the object of change. For example, Wolbrecht (2000) shows the change of party positions on the issue of women's rights in the United States as the women's movement gathered support for itself in the 1960s. Cowell-Meyers (2014) goes beyond this and tries to show the manner in which a movement-party can achieve better results for its movement agenda by using tools that a political party has at its disposal.

One consequence of development of literature on social movements and political parties as mutually distinct areas is that both use different terms to describe the same phenomenon. Specific to the topic under discussion, extra-parliamentary demonstrations are described in social movement literature as disruptive action. First, expounding on extra-parliamentary activity existing within the literature on political parties, it can be divided into two types

according to Ekman and Amnå (2012). The first type is legal extra-parliamentary protests and these involve “demonstrating, participating in strikes, protests and other actions” (Ekman and Amnå 2012, 295). Second is illegal extra-parliamentary activity and this involves, among other things, “civil disobedience actions, sabotaging or obstructing roads or railways...squatting buildings, (and) violence [sic.] confrontations with political opponents or the police.” (ibid. 295). In social movement literature, it is natural that disruptive action exists outside the parliament, hence coming under the broader umbrella of extra-parliamentary activity. However, departing from the parliamentary-institution centered focus of terminology in political science literature, the distinctions in social movement literature allow the incorporation of more dimensions. For example, non-violent disruptive action refers to “protest tactics that significantly interrupt the routine operations in some public setting or of some target without escalating into violence” (Wang and Piazza 2016, 1679) while violent disruptive tactics involve “physical damage to persons or property” (Wang and Piazza 2016, 1679). While non-violent disruptive action can both be legal or illegal and violent disruptive action always illegal, the distinction on the basis of violence can help in examining on a much more substantial basis the degree to which a political party is willing to go in its disruptive action beyond dichotomies of legal and illegal.

In political party literature, characteristically extra-parliamentary activity is usually carried out by groups that “deliberately stand outside the parliamentary sphere” (Ekman and Amnå 2012, 290). For this reason, most of the literature on extra-parliamentary opposition is about anti-system political parties, predominantly Leftist parties. For example, Shell (1970) notes that extra-parliamentary opposition of the Left in postwar Germany was against the institutions of representative democracy buttressed by the belief of the Left to have better ideological basis of socialism on which to base democracy. Similarly, Resnick (1973) observes that

“parliamentarism” derives from seventeenth and eighteenth century liberal theory standing out in opposition to the Left based “extra-parliamentarism,” notably witnessed in “student and youth movements of North America and Western Europe in the late 1960s (that) insisted that parliamentarism spells co-optation and that ‘elections equal treason’” (65). Naturally, this leaves little room for analyzing the “extra-parliamentarism” of within-system political parties.

The little existing literature on within-system political parties that engage in extra-parliamentary activities also does not fit onto the case under discussion. In the section below, this literature will be analyzed in the context of the PTI to see if it can illuminate the case or whether the case can add to the theory.

2.2 Case Specific Literature

Szabo (2011) through his study of FIDESZ shows that FIDESZ was a political party that grew out of a social movement of student protestors in the 1980s with the aim of challenging the communist regime and Leftist ideology. While it finished its protest character in 1992 by becoming a right-wing party by purging itself of youth activists, it regained its extra-parliamentary character from 2002 to 2010 albeit in different form. In that period its decision to partake in extra-parliamentary activity was a top-down decision of a properly formed political party rather than a social movement in the process of becoming a political party (ibid.). Having formed government from 1998 to 2002 but losing the general elections of 2002 to the “social-liberal coalition” of MSZP and SZDSZ, FIDESZ “re-asserted its image as the anti-communist dissent movement, as it indeed was from 1988 – 1990” (Szabó 2011, 57).

FIDESZ’s case shows two things. First, a party that has formerly been in government can engage in extra-parliamentary activity as a matter of strategy for electoral success. However,

this must be noted with the qualification that the extra-parliamentary activity of the party did not initiate the public protest. Rather, it was public outrage at the leaked speech of then incumbent Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in 2006 in which he criticized his own government (Szabo 2011) and resulted to a citizen-led wave of protests that FIDESZ capitalized on as a strategy for electoral success (BBC News 2006). Hence, FIDESZ 's actions cannot be classified as initiating disruption. In fact, they are more congruent to an opposition party using the general anti-government sentiments to its advantage. The second thing that the case of FIDESZ shows is that a party that has emerged out of a social movement is likely to revert to the symbolisms and image of that social movement for matters of political expediency. In other words, when a political rival can be conflated with the same phenomenon opposing which was the party's *raison d'être*, then the party is sure to make the most political capital out of it, even if it has to resort to its pre-party extra-parliamentary character. The latter aspect is particularly relevant to the PTI as while it did not emerge through a social movement per se, its starting goal of purging the state and society from corruption (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf n.d.) resembles the apolitical goal of social movement than a coherent path to electoral success that political parties characterize. Similarly, its extra-parliamentary activity has been centered around the issue of government corruption in one way or the other. In 2014, it was electoral fraud involving corruption by various state institutions while in 2016 it was the alleged corruption of the prime minister at the time.

Extra-parliamentary activity by a political party is also found in Montenegro. The largest opposition party in Montenegro's parliament, the Democratic Front, engages in extra-parliamentary activity (Freedom House 2017). In Montenegro's case certain factors stand out as the country has not yet witnessed a change in government from the ruling party, the Democratic Party of Socialists, while being an electoral democracy. Possible reasons for this

state of affairs are a dominant political party that effectively excludes opposition by labelling it anti-state coupled with a citizenry that due to patron-client relationships votes in fixed patterns (Baća 2017). However, this does not fit Pakistan's case as change of government has been a recurring feature of Pakistan in the years it has been an electoral democracy.

The explanation proposed by Mietzner (2017) in the case of Indonesia of a political party engaging in extra-parliamentary demonstrations because the head of the executive consolidates his power and "grip over the parliament" (Mietzner 2017, 165) also needs to be explored in case of Pakistan. Whereas the case of Indonesia involved the President of Indonesia Joko Widodo using coercion on leaders of parliamentary parties to quell opposition against him (Mietzner 2016) and turn a parliamentary minority in his favor into a majority (Mietzner 2017), it more broadly indicates that extra-parliamentary activity of political parties is likely to increase if parliament is reduced to a rubber stamp for the executive without providing the opportunity for real opposition from within it. This explanation is especially relevant to Pakistan because its history with authoritarianism has impeded the development of institutional ethos that recognizes parliamentary supremacy. Moreover, since military coups rendered national parliaments into nothing more than rubber stamps, the act of making parliament a center of power from within would have to be a novel one, without any institutional blueprint to fall upon. Notwithstanding this history, the parliament of Pakistan in the present period of electoral democracy is not powerless as evidenced by its overall parliamentary powers index score of 0.44 in Fish and Koeing (2009). Moreover, this score needs to be revised in light of the eighteenth constitutional amendment made to the Constitution of Pakistan that substantially empowered the parliament and undid most of the distortions done to the constitution by

preceding military governments. More concretely, survey items 10, 20, and 24 need to be re-evaluated in light of this constitutional amendment as examined in Table 1.⁵

Table 1: Re-examination of the Score of National Assembly of Pakistan in Light of the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment

Survey Item No.	Survey Item	Re-examination in light of 18 th Amendment	Score change (Yes/No)
10	“the legislature is immune from dissolution by the executive” (Fish and Kroenig 2009, 8).	While change in article 58(2)(b) of the constitution through the eighteenth amendment undid the discretionary power of the president to dissolve the assembly, it did not take the power of the executive from dissolving the assembly. This is because the prime minister through his binding advice to the president can still dissolve assemblies. However, as the prime minister is dependent upon the legislature for his office while the president is not thereby creating a powerful disincentive for the prime minister to not dissolve the National Assembly, this substantive shift cannot be recorded in Fish and Koeing’s criteria.	No
20	“The legislature’s approval is necessary for the declaration of war” (Fish and Kroenig 2009, 20).	Previously the answer to this question seemed to be negative because of power of the president to unilaterally impose emergency in a province on account of “internal disturbance beyond the power of a Provincial Government to control” (Fish and Kroenig 2009, 109) as it would come under a “vaguely specified condition” (11). However, this was given a simultaneous ratification condition by the provincial government concerned in article 232 through the eighteenth amendment. Hence, the scope of the declaration by president was narrowed down to “war or external aggression” (National Assembly of Pakistan 2017, 137) and parliamentary ratification (each house) narrowed down to 10 days in case of unilateral declaration by president. Hence	Yes

⁵ This evaluation was done by examining the most updated version of the constitution of Pakistan available on the website of the National Assembly dated March 30, 2017.

		this would meet Fish and Kroenig’s criteria of “retroactive approval by the legislature ... (constituting an affirmative for this survey item given) the executive’s war-declaration powers are limited to the case of foreign attack” (11).	
24	“The legislature reviews and has the right to reject appointments to the judiciary, or the legislature itself appoints members of the judiciary” (Fish and Kroenig 2009, 11).	Article 175(A)(12) further amended by the nineteenth amendment gives parliamentary committee derived from the National Assembly and Senate members gives right of review and power to reject nominees of the commission for judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court and this makes it meet the criteria of the survey item.	Yes

Source: Own compilation

Following the revision in Table 1, the revised parliamentary powers index score of the National Assembly of Pakistan would become 0.50,⁶ the same as the median score. In comparison to other countries that have shown extra-parliamentary activities, Pakistan’s National Assembly score is relatively low. The score of Indonesia’s House of Representatives is 0.56 (Fish and Kroenig 2009). However, as stated previously, the problem with Indonesia’s parliament is that of an overbearing head of executive who has stifled opposition inside parliament through coercion. Perhaps, this to a degree illustrates Desposato’s (2012) criticism of Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) exclusion of “political actors with competing power” (392) as that has a significant bearing on the actual strength of the legislator. As far as National Assembly of Hungary is concerned, its parliamentary powers index score is 0.75 (Fish and Kroenig 2009) while that of Montenegro has not been evaluated by Fish and Kroenig (2009). At the surface,

⁶ Since each survey item is weighted equally in the index (Fish and Kroenig 2009, 13) and the affirmative answer of two survey items increases the score by 0.06 points (the total number of survey items are 32).

this suggests that strength of the legislature is not an accurate predictor of extra-parliamentary activity.

Instead of parliamentary weakness, engaging in extra-parliamentary politics can be a matter of party strategy. For example, it is the same parliament that the PPP and the PTI are a part of; however their approach towards extra-parliamentary politics is starkly different. In order to show that extra-parliamentary activity is independent of parliamentary participation, a closer inspection of the level of participation of the PTI and PPP in the national legislature is merited. Moreover, if elected representatives of both the PTI and PPP participate in parliamentary proceedings fairly regularly, then it can be reasonably inferred that they consider the parliament to have some value as to merit their time. This would also substantiate the earlier claim that strength of the legislature is not an accurate predictor of extra-parliamentary activity.

The record of the PTI's members of the National Assembly shows considerable involvement in the legislative process, which is contrary to the antipathy towards formal institutions that it exhibits when it is out in the streets. For its 24 out of 25 representatives in the National Assembly elected on general seats (data for one Member National Assembly is not available), their attendance of the plenary sessions for 2015 to 2016 was 65.7 percent⁷ (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency 2016). In comparison, for the PPP, out of 35 of its 37 MNAs elected on general seats, the average percentage of attendance of plenary sessions of the National Assembly for 2015 to 2016 was 46.7⁸ (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency 2016). Where the PTI's MNAs score an average of 37.54, the

⁷ This is a little under one standard deviation above the mean attendance (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency 2016). This approximation is based on the metric used by PILDAT and exact data is not available.

⁸ This is a little under one standard deviation below the mean (ibid.).

PPP's MNA's score 34.11 based on the scoring of MNA's developed by Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency for the year 2015 to 2016.⁹

If participation in the legislature is a suitable indicator of a party's perceived confidence in parliament, which in turn has a bearing on whether that party engages in extra-parliamentary activities, then it should be the PPP rather than the PTI to take recourse to that. Evidence to the contrary suggests that in the case of Pakistani political parties, parliamentary participation does not inversely correspond with extra-parliamentary activity.

As is evident, there is little theory that speaks directly to the case under study. In order to address this theoretical lacuna, different aspects of theory would be borrowed from political party literature and social movement literature to explain this puzzling behavior of the PTI. In the subsequent chapter, Katz and Mair's (1993) three faces of party would be used as a starting point to develop a new face of the party – party on the street – to describe the PTI's behavior when it engages in extra-parliamentary activity and to illustrate the cost that putting on this face imposes on the party.

⁹ PILDAT's scoring adds values for each category weighted by their importance in order to arrive at the score for each MNA. Here the average of the scores of the MNA's was taken for each party provided in PILDAT's report in order to give the overall position of the party's performance in the legislature. The categories are: Committees membership, committees chaired, resolutions, calling attention notices, questions, private member bills introduced, and attendance in plenary sessions.

3 A New Face: Party on the Street

3.1 Theoretical Description

Katz and Mair's (1993) classification of the three faces of political parties provides a good framework through which motivation of actors within those faces can be explained. The three faces of political parties as conceptualized by Katz and Mair (1993) are party in public office, party on the ground, and party central office. Party in public office is made up of members of the party that, as the name suggests, hold public office and this includes both executive office as well as membership of the parliament. Hence, even an opposition party has its face of party in public office given that it wins seats in the national or provincial legislature or even the local councils (*ibid.*). The party on the ground includes the non-office holding members of the party. This includes its general activists and registered supporters. The party central office is the organizing body of the party, which consists of its national leadership as well as the party secretariat (*ibid.*). The party central office can have its members drawn both from the party in public office and party on the ground. The motivations for actors in the party in public office are gaining electoral success to ensure the continuation of personal rewards of public office and realizing policy objectives (*ibid.*). In case of the latter, as achieving some desired policy objective would be personally linked to the member, "members of the party in public office are more likely to see compromise as incremental movement toward a desired goal rather than a partial retreat from a correct position" (Katz and Mair 1993, 596). For members of party on the ground, formulating party policy and adhering to it as well as making public statements constitutes their incentives, in addition to social capital that may accrue from membership as well as possible nomination for public office (Katz and Mair 1993). As far as party central

office is concerned, while the actors within it do not have any explicit motivations other than acquiring or maintaining influence over party on the ground and party in public office, its function of mediating the link between the party on the ground and the party in public office as well as overseeing the party (Katz and Mair 1993) has a bearing on the path that the party would take. These three faces of parties then overlap to quite a degree, with one side of the party sometimes dominating the other.

The case of the PTI suggests that there might be a fourth face of the party – party on the street. While constitutive of members of party on the ground, party in public office and party central office, party on the street is different from them in terms that its agenda is making the government acquiesce through pressure on the street. In fact, party on the street is the face of the party that starts to draw similarities with social movements. It acts as if formal channels of power are not responsive to its demands and thereby takes the extra-parliamentary route. This is similar to Tarrow's (2011) conception of contentious collective action, which is the “basis of social movements, not because movements are always violent or extreme, but because it is the main and only recourse that most ordinary people possess to demonstrate” (7). Puzzlingly, it is not ordinary people here who feel that demonstration is the only recourse but a political party that has access to the state.

Party on the street faces a particularly troubling dilemma that social movements also sometimes encounter, although not in the same degree. For a social movement, the very idea of challenging the system from the outside prevents it from adopting “formal techniques or relationships... (as) activists worry that professionalization and formalization may limit the options, resources, and appeal of the movement, and destroy its integrity in the process” (Cowell-Meyers 2014, 64). At the peak of its activism and discrediting the formal system for its dysfunctionality in

the fulfilment of its goals, party on the street is a face that has to momentarily shed all its linkages to party in public office. For anti-system opposition parties, this is relatively straightforward as they do not have a party in public office to begin with. However, within-system parties have a great deal to lose for dissolving its party in public office, not just in terms of personal benefits that members of party in public office accrue but also the bargaining power of the party as a whole, even if it has a modest presence in the parliament. Moreover, since this is a transient face, the costs of keeping the theatrics necessary for this face are hard to reconcile with other permanent faces of the party. What results are statements made in this face that are not followed up and a sobering up of behavior as soon as party on the street is dissolved. However, since the party needs something substantial to show its supporters for putting up this face, it also risks getting trapped in its own rhetoric. As the demands of political parties can best be addressed through formal channels, which are the very channels that are discredited by party on the street, viable options of meeting those demands become increasingly restricted. In essence, for the party on the street the government cannot be trusted while it is only the government that has the authority to fulfill its demands. Taken in conjunction with the highly public uncompromising stance that party on the street takes, either innovative solutions involving other organs of the state have to be involved that have relative independence from the government such as the judiciary or the military, in case of military dominated hybrid regimes, or continue with the disruptive tactic until the movement either dies down or dislodges the government from the outside. Below, a stylized case of the PTI will be used to illustrate this face of the party.

3.2 The PTI's Face of Party on the Street

Descriptively, the face of the PTI's party on the street tends to be anti-system. It distances itself from the mainstream political parties and labels them as corrupt and in collusion with each

other to service their own personal interests to the detriment of the public good. It is disruptive, violates bounds of peaceful demonstrations by disobeying laws and uses street pressure to hold demonstrations in violation of government regulations. It makes rigidity of its demands its modus operandi and does not shy away from un-tempered verbal attacks towards political opponents.

In its 2014 sit-in the chairman of the PTI, Imran Khan, addressing charged rallies asked all of his 33 lawmakers in the National Assembly to resign from their seats (BBC News 2014). While this announcement was followed by 30 MNAs of the PTI collectively submitting their resignations (Ghumman 2014), once the peak phase of face of party on the street was over the party chose not to send its lawmakers individually to the speaker of the National Assembly to personally verify their resignations and that deprived the Speaker of the legal basis through which the resignations could be accepted (The News International 2014). This shows that the party used the resignations merely as theatrics for its face of party on the street to the absence of real commitment to follow up on the rhetoric which it indulged in during that phase. However, it is interesting to note that not even these theatrics were played for its majority in the provincial assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on the likely consideration that it could not use legal niceties in that case since the Speaker of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly was backed by the party (Dawn 2017) and individual presence before him could not be avoided on the pretext of antipathy towards him. Where the stakes were higher i.e. losing provincial government and no legal nuances to help renege on the promise later, the party on street was reluctant to indulge in theatrics over them. Moreover, the provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had direct value for party on the street both in the 2014 sit-in and the 2016 lockdown as it provided the party with the resources to increase the number of persons on the

ground. Therefore, it was unwise for the PTI to jeopardize its provincial assembly majority to feed its anti-system rhetoric.

The PTI found itself in a difficult situation when it was either unable to carry forward the momentum of protest until its demands were met as in the 2014 sit-in or prevent the escalation of the situation to outright violence while keeping its stance rigid as in the 2016 threat of lockdown. In both of these cases, there was, of course, the intransigence of the ruling party at play as well, however analysis over its causes is beyond the scope of this study. With regard to the PTI through its lens of party on the street, the dilemma became apparent. In 2014, with the sit-in fizzled out (Masood 2016), the leading opposition party distanced from it (Dawn 2014), and the ruling party firmly in government, the PTI did not have the leverage to make the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resign. To make matters more complicated for the PTI, its party on the street had moved well beyond the demand of investigating electoral rigging that precipitated the crisis as it had made clear that it would stop at nothing short of the resignation of Sharif (BBC News 2014). Therefore, with the party on the street no longer the frontline face of the party or the chief decision making one, any decision by party in public office for compromise that the government would agree to stood the risk of being perceived as capitulation by the party leadership by both its general supporters¹⁰ and party on the ground.¹¹ Moreover, as investigating electoral rigging came under the purview of the Election Commission of Pakistan, which although an independent body but mistrusted by the PTI on the allegation that it was complicit in the rigging (Muhammad 2014) and hence resignation of

¹⁰ For example, these letters to the editor for newspapers shed insight to public perception of Imran Khan's decision to end sit-in short of then Prime Minister Sharif's resignation (Majeed 2014), and (Saleem 2016).

¹¹ For example, an in-depth newspaper article on the party chairman Imran Khan for the 2014 sit-in mentions, "There were many critics within the party who talked of a protest fatigue that resulted from the 126 days of sit-ins in Islamabad back in 2014 – only to turn back empty handed, PTI sources say" (Khan, Khan and Raj 2016).

Sharif was necessary for him to not have any influence on its investigation, the possibility of usual channels addressing the PTI demands had effectively been precluded by it. The national tragedy of a terrorist attack on Army Public School in Peshawar on December 14, 2014 was a moment when politics was set aside to unify for fighting terrorism and at this juncture the sit-in was called off by the PTI although with the agreement that judicial investigation would be carried out over its allegation of electoral rigging (Dawn 2014). This was the very option that was offered by the government to the PTI at the height of its protest but at that moment it was the PTI chairman who rejected it (Dawn 2014). Hence, for a sit-in that was dying a slow death and discrediting the party in the process, it took a moment of national crisis to provide the party with a way to dissolve its party on the street without losing face. The 2016 threat of lockdown shows a different pathway that party on the street took, which indicates that party on the street learns from its past mistakes. Here instead of keeping its demands rigid, the PTI bargained at the peak of its protest, settling for an independent judicial investigation on the offer of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, instead of remaining adamant on the resignation of the prime minister. Interestingly, it also shows the extent of disruptive action that the party on the street is willing to go to. In 2014, the sit-in was predominantly non-violent disruptive action except at its peak when the PTI party chairman Imran Khan alongside Pakistan Awami Tehreek leader Tahir ul Qadri asked their followers to enter the parliament house, which had been deemed out of bounds for the protest by the government (Boone 2014). This naturally elicited a response by the security personnel stationed to protect the parliament house and nearby sensitive buildings, which left three people dead and estimated 400 injured (Boone 2014). Since, the PTI faced opprobrium for engaging in this violent disruptive action in 2014, for its 2016 threat of lockdown, it marched its supporters from the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and upon confrontation with the security force of the provincial government of Punjab, which had the potential of turning violent (The Express Tribune 2016), it decided to obviate that eventuality

by compromising. For this decision, the party received criticism as its supporters saw that as an embarrassing reneging on the threat by the party leadership (Samaa News 2016).

More broadly, party on the street presents the case of a trade-off that involves disruptive action. Elsbach and Sutton (1992), mention that social movements have to tread a delicate balance when engaging in ‘culturally illegitimate activities’ as it may at one end lead to publicity for their goals while also dissuade broader population from supporting them. Recent literature on disruptive tactics used by social movements have drawn nuanced distinctions on the degree of usefulness of disruptive protests. For example, in their study of protests in the United States, Wang and Piazza (2016) propose that for social movements targeting government entities, disruptive protests are least likely to be violent as violence invites state repression and hence have a greater chance of failure. As has been shown, party on the street faces a precarious situation when it comes to violent disruptive action as drawing a line not to engage in it shows capitulation while engaging in it results in alienation of general party supporters.

3.3 The Contrasting Face of Party on the Street: The PTI’s Party in Public Office

The PTI’s party on the street can be contrasted with its face of party in public office to show how inherently self-contradicting the party becomes once it chooses to adopt its face of party on the street. In addition to parliamentary participation, which was discussed previously, even the quality of that participation suggests a polarized behavior of the party in public office to that of party on the streets.¹² For example, its criticism of federal budgets of 2014 – 2015, 2015 – 2016, and 2016 – 2017 have mostly revolved around substantive policy issues. For instance,

¹² While here news reports have been relied upon to demonstrate the face of party in public office, the ideal research design would include an examination of formal parliamentary debates of PTI’s parliamentarians and interviews with them and PTI’s elected ministers of the provincial government.

in the budget 2014 – 2015, the party leadership pointed to excessive sales tax, electricity tariffs, need for broadening of tax base (Ghumman 2014), and its favoritism of foreign companies at the detriment of local ones (Muhammad 2014) among other things as shortcomings of the budget. The debate for budget 2015 – 2016 in the National Assembly saw the PTI leadership criticizing the increase in supplementary grants of the government as well as the sales tax, and pointed to the need for making the Federal Board of Revenue independent (A. Khan 2015). For the 2016 – 2017 budget, the party leadership in the National Assembly challenged the authenticity of the statistics of the government, indicated the specter of rising public debt, and pointed to the slow speed with which the government was increasing its electricity production capacity (Zaidi 2016).¹³ In other instances as well when the party on the street was not active, the party leadership indulged in meaningful and less populist criticism of the government. This included, on different instances, criticism of failing to attract foreign direct investment by the government (Ghumman 2015), risk of losing jobs over agreement with the International Monetary Fund and accompanying currency devaluation as well as the need for inclusion of opposition in policy on privatizing state owned enterprises (Haq 2013). Moreover, at the level of provincial assembly the quality of debate and criticism of the PTI's party in public office was substantive. For example, it launched a 'white paper' in 2017 in which it highlighted the PML-N run Punjab government's shortfalls in various areas notably health, education, agriculture, crime rate, and management of public funds (Dawn 2017). Hence, its party in public office displays characteristics of within-system parties by challenging the government on substantive policy issues.

¹³ Instead of using news reports and by only examining budget debates to analyze the PTI's quality of debate in the legislature, the ideal research design would do a qualitative assessment of the PTI debates from official debate transcripts and Hansards of the National Assembly and the Senate respectively from 2013 to 2017.

In light of these polarizing faces of party in public office and party on the street of the PTI, it appears puzzling as to why would the party adopt the latter face in the first place considering that it has the technical expertise to challenge the government on substantive issues coupled with the costs and risks associated with party on the street. The party did not succeed in getting the resignation of then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on either protest orchestrated by party on the street and what it gained was already on the table in one form or the other before its protests adopted their violent or potentially disruptive face. In the 2014 sit-in, the government had offered the option of independent judicial investigation before the PTI leadership asked its followers to enter the parliament building while in the 2016 threat of lockdown of the capital, the option of independent judicial investigation into the financial affairs of the first family was already being negotiated between the government and opposition, with the deadlock existing over the terms of reference of the investigation request that was to be sent to the Supreme Court (Hussain 2016). What the PTI gained through its protest was an ex-ante acceptance of the investigation by the Supreme Court, which it had previously declined, and a short deadline by the Supreme Court for the government and opposition to agree to the terms of reference of the investigation against the first family (Boone 2016). Since, the straightforward dividends of adopting the face of party on the street do not justify the cost of alienating the support base of the party, losing face through compromise that is starkly public, as well as the risk of violent confrontations, it stands to reason that there is a missing factor that makes that risk worthwhile to take. It will be argued here that this factor is the frailty of political parties, which is a factor of politics of expediency dictated by local dynamics of political power structure and the involvement of the military in political affairs. The result of this state of affairs is the possibility of immediate turning of a party's fortunes through creation of a condition of crisis for the ruling party.

In the chapter below, this M.A thesis will explore the political and social structure that political parties find themselves enmeshed in and the consequences that structure has on the path that a political party would take. This would then be brought in the context of military involvement in politics to answer the research question. Finally, a comparison with the PPP and briefly of the PML-N in opposition would be used to build the proposed hypotheses of this study.

4. Structural Incentives versus Party Agency

4.1 Local Dynamics of Political Party Structure

Patronage politics is a permanent feature of most mainstream political parties of Pakistan (Rizvi, 2009; Javid 2011; and Hasnain 2008). Patronage politics involves selected benefits given by the patron to the client to cultivate traditional clientilistic linkages (Kopecky and Mair 2012) instead of provision of goods for the general public. In the case of Pakistan, the patron-client relationship usually dominates the countryside, and in this ownership of land and in some cases perceived religious authority provides means of patronage to local landed elite through which they secure the support and deference of the peasants and other social groups, including electoral support (Javid 2011). Once in public office, access to the state opens up other means of patronage to these local bosses that takes the shape of recruitment to public office such as schools and hospitals (Hasnain 2008). The important implication of patronage politics on the structure of political party organization in Pakistan is twofold. One relates to politicians and the other to voters. For politicians, it allows individual politicians to develop a personal reputation independent of any party affiliation. While Hasnain (2008) shows that party factionalism promotes patronage politics,¹⁴ the causal link can be the other way round as well as the independence that individual politicians gain by patronage politics allows them to switch

¹⁴ Using data from the election commission of Pakistan for years 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997 (when Pakistan was an electoral democracy from 1988 to 1997 prior to the military coup of 1999), Hasnain (2008) shows a high degree of party factionalism captured inversely by the number of candidates running for elections on the same party ticket.

political parties when it is expedient to do so. At the level of voters, the consequence of traditional clientelist networks is that voters are not responsive to political consequences of the policy positions that their patrons represent and this makes “alternation in political power an artefact of elite decisions” (Hopkin 2006, 407).

The two consequences combined reveal that, first, on the whole it is political parties that have to vie for the support of these local bosses for electoral victory and, second, policy positions of political parties vis-à-vis the electorate do not have primary bearing on their electoral appeal. Hence, for national political parties there is a disjunct between the national level leaders of these political parties who define the policy outlook of the party and the electorate, with local politicians bridging this gap. Essentially, local level politicians have a certain degree of autonomy in conducting their business when in power as they are more directly responsible to the electorate than parties, which act as binding platform for these politicians to organize themselves around.

Political parties in Pakistan exhibit stratararchy as conceptualized by Katz and Mair (1995) according to which autonomous spheres exist between local party officials and its national leadership. However, in the case of Pakistan’s political parties there are some qualitative differences. First, the stratararchy in Pakistan’s political parties is between local bosses allied with the party, not local party officials as in Katz and Mair’s (1995) theorization, and national leadership of the party. Second, the emphasis in Pakistani case is on the autonomy of the local bosses allied with the party from the national leadership and not vice versa. This resonates with Koole’s (1996) critique of Katz and Mair’s (1995) idea of stratarchy in which he contends that “local party branches have a certain autonomy in local affairs, but when acting together they are still able to wield considerable power on the national professionals” (518). In the case of

Pakistan, this is not so much an exercise in collective action by local bosses allied with the party. Rather, it takes the form of pressure on the national leadership of the party to maintain a position of strength. Since even a few defections by these local bosses can signal to others that the party is in trouble thereby presenting the threat of enmasse defections, parties find themselves in extremely vulnerable positions.¹⁵

4.2 Military Rule and Deliberate Stunting of National Political Parties

Historically, Jalal (1995) traces the weak organization of political parties in Pakistan to the stalling of elections for 24 years after its independence, which was due to bureaucratic and military consolidation dictated by the imperatives of state building coupled with the interest of West Pakistani local politicians to prevent the numerically preponderant East Pakistanis to gain control through representative democracy. Hence, individual clout of local politicians developed early on at the expense of strong party consolidation. During the military regime of Ayub Khan from 1958 to 1969, “selected social and economic groups with localized instead of provincial or national political appeal were extended state patronage and offered other nostrums in return for their tacit support of military and quasi-military rule” (Jalal 1995, 56).

¹⁵ More broadly, loose party allegiances and domination of local political elites to the detriment of national level heads of political parties makes for a volatile political system and this observation can also be used to understand regime stability through the lens of political parties particularly in competitive authoritarian regimes as conceptualized by Levitsky and Way (2002). For example, McAdam and Tarrow (2010) mention that in non-democratic countries reactive electoral mobilization is common, which they define as “escalating protest in the wake of an election” (534). More specifically, this can be said to be a feature of competitive authoritarian regimes. Donno (2013) shows that elections in competitive authoritarian regimes have a greater degree of misconduct than those in hegemonic authoritarian regimes. This is because while competitive authoritarian regimes may have better a legal structure for elections than hegemonic authoritarian regimes, the greater chance of success of opposition parties in them compels the incumbents to engage in electoral misconduct (ibid.). Bringing this in light of loose party hold over local bosses, it can be analyzed whether reactive electoral mobilization can lead to defections into the opposition camp inside the parliament and further increase the chance of ouster of government as a result of protests.

Shah (2014) also notes that this military regime instituted a system that developed a local political base at the expense of political parties. This trend of entrenching local politicians at the expense of development of national political party organization has been a recurrent feature of the two other temporally significant periods of military rule of General Zia ul Haq (Siddiqa 2007, 86) and General Pervez Musharraf¹⁶ (Siddiqa 2007, 99). Hence, strengthening of local politicians is to a great extent a product of military rule in Pakistan, which deliberately stunted development of party organization at the national level by rewarding those politicians who were willing to align themselves with the powers that be at opportune moments. This has created an incentive structure for local politicians that is independent of party interests in which their status and privileged position stems from pursuing the most politically expedient course.

4.3 Military Dominance During Civilian Rule and its Implication for Political Parties

The precariousness of the political parties in Pakistan is exacerbated by the powerful position of the military whenever Pakistan has been a formal electoral democracy. Historically, the dominance of the military in the internal affairs of Pakistan has been widely discussed in literature.¹⁷ More directly, in the present period of electoral democracy starting from 2008 following the end of military rule,¹⁸ the public rejection of the directives of civilian government by the military on various occasion as well as its suggestions to civilian government to pursue a certain course demonstrates that the military is not under the control of the civilian

¹⁶ General Pervez Musharraf in his published memoir admits to forming a political party Pakistan Muslim League Quaid from the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz using support of local political bosses from Gujrat, who were erstwhile members of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (Musharraf 2006).

¹⁷ For example, see (Ahmed 2013), (Alavi 1983), (Jalal 1990), (Jalal 1995), (Jalal 2014), (Shah 2008) and (Siddiqa 2007).

¹⁸ The military rule started in 1999 with General Pervez Musharraf toppling the elected government of Nawaz Sharif.

government.¹⁹ Being in a dominant role, although not as overtly as under direct military rule, the military has been able to exert significant influence on political parties. In the period of civilian rule from 1988 to 1999, the machinations of the military in engineering the political landscape are best demonstrated by the decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in what is popularly known as the Asghar Khan case. In that judgment, the Supreme Court of Pakistan found that the head of the military, Chief of Army Staff General Aslam Beg and head of the Inter-Services Intelligence Lt. Gen Asad Durrani influenced the elections through giving out funds to different parties in order to prevent the victory of the PPP in the 1990 elections (Dawn 2012). The military was even able to engineer the fall of governments thrice during this time using the president, who is indirectly elected, to use his constitutional powers of dissolving the parliament (Jalal 2014; Shah 2014; Siddiq 2007). Through the dismissal of three governments by the president working at the behest of the military establishment and one directly through a military coup in 1999 in the 11 years that Pakistan was an electoral democracy starting from 1988, the fickleness of democracy and the helplessness of national level political leaders in front of the military leadership was made definitive.

Naturally, the precariousness that political parties find themselves in during periods of electoral democracy has the consequence that even national leaders have to turn to the military to provide them with support in defeating their political opponents. As the period from 1988 to 1999

¹⁹ For example, the Interior Minister, under whom the armed forces formally come, was denied entrance by Pakistan Rangers into premises of an accountability whose premises it was guarding (Qarar 2017). Pakistan Rangers is a paramilitary force derived from the military but under formal command of the Interior Ministry. In another instance, the military spokesperson publicly rejected an official notification from the Prime Minister Office (Sikandar 2017). In other instances, the military has given the impression of being an autonomous body from the civilian government by suggesting to the civilian government to pursue a certain course. For example, during the 2014 sit-in, the then Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif “called on the government and the protestors to avoid the use of force” (Nelson and Siddiq 2014).

shows, any such partnerships between political leaders and the military establishment have been transient, with the military turning against the political party that it had patronized only a few years earlier. For example, the same leader of the PML-N, Nawaz Sharif, who was allegedly among one of the recipients of funds distributed by the military in 1990 to bring about the fall of the government of the PPP, was later asked to resign by the military when he was prime minister after a stand-off between him and the military backed president (Shah 2014, 173). At this moment Benazir Bhutto of the PPP presented herself as “an alternative prime ministerial candidate when the army was not happy with Sharif” (Siddiqi 2007, 95) while also continuing the military’s policy on key foreign policy issues (Shah 2014). When the national leadership of the two largest mainstream parties is willing to accept the military’s dominant role in exchange for short term political goals resulting in frequent change in government, then this sends the signal to local politicians of the transience of party in public office and creates a systematic incentive structure for politics of expediency.

4.4 Politics of Expediency in the Present Era of Electoral Democracy

The legacy of the politics from 1988 to 1999 naturally cannot be ignored in explaining the tenuous hold that national level leadership of political parties have over local politicians whose support is crucial in winning elections. Moreover, with a military coup that resulted in the exile of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto from the country for eight years (Jones 2017; Wilkinson 2007) and the Inter-Services Intelligence engineering a breakaway faction of the PML-N to form a party, Pakistan Muslim League Quaid (PML-Q), loyal to the military dictator while undermining the PPP (Jalal 2014), there was little strength that these parties could build on to institute party control once Pakistan returned to civilian rule again in 2008. Their dependence on the very same local political bosses was made evident by the number of defectors that the PML-N was willing to take in the general elections of 2013. 18 of its winning candidates in the

National Assembly had won in 2002 elections as members of PML-Q (Election Commission of Pakistan 2013). When political parties are themselves willing to look the other way to accommodate defectors to win elections, then the cost of defection becomes negligible given that the candidate is able to win elections. Hence, even in the latest period of electoral democracy as long as local politicians are able to retain their political clout, their political success in terms of finding their way into the executive hinges less on party loyalty and more on the continuation of their privileged position.

4.5 The PTI's Actions Revealing the Structural Incentives Driving its Extra-Parliamentary Activity

The active role of the military in structuring the political landscape of Pakistan in which leaders of political parties are no less complicit makes for an electoral dynamic in which electoral success can be achieved by creating a crisis-like situation. With the military having assumed the role of arbiter in national affairs and its intelligence wing, the ISI, active in forging and breaking alliances (Siddiqa 2007; Shah 2014), political parties have the option of conniving with the military to re-engineer the political calculus in their favor and/or create that perception to encourage defections into their camp.

The PTI's engagement in extra-parliamentary activity can be illustrated as being driven by that electoral calculus. The speeches of the PTI chairman Imran Khan during the 2014 sit-in contained mentioning of a cricketing metaphor of the "third umpire" soon raising his finger to signal that then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif would be dismissed was widely perceived as reference to the Chief of Army Staff intervening and ousting the prime minister (Boone 2014; Nordland 2015). The subsequent involvement of the Chief of Army Staff in an attempt to broker a deal between the PTI and the PML-N (Boone 2014), although unsuccessful, lends some credence to that perception. Moreover, the party president of the PTI at the time resigned

in the midst of the sit-in claiming that Khan had colluded with the military to oust the prime minister (Nelson 2014). After being impeached from office by the Supreme Court and with corruption investigations against him being carried in Accountability Court, Sharif alleged that the 2014 sit-in was engineered by certain elements in the military for his decision to initiate the treason trial against former military ruler Pervez Musharraf²⁰ (Al Jazeera 2018). While the involvement of the military in engineering the 2014 sit-in cannot be credibly established, nevertheless it can be observed that the PTI both created the perception of impending military intervention for ousting the prime minister and to an extent relied on it to send the signal that the ruling party is in trouble. Since, this face of party on the street carries considerable risk as had been illustrated previously, the only circumstance in which the risk appears to be worthwhile is if it held the potential of the ouster of then Prime Minister Sharif. This is because even if the ouster would not result in a complete change in government, it would at least send the signal to local politicians allied with the party of the turning of fortune of the ruling party. As the precariousness of the situation that the government was involved in can be witnessed in the involvement of then Chief of Army Staff, which would be the least preferred option for the ruling party given how past interventions by army chiefs turned out, the gamble by the PTI can be seen as reasonable.

Another significant aspect of disruptive action by the PTI in the backdrop of the looming threat of military intervention involves the repressive capacity of the government. Since violent disruptive action puts pressure on the government to engage in repression thereby leading to state instability, the incentive to engage in violent disruptive protest by a political party looking

²⁰ Nawaz Sharif also alleged that the chief of a certain intelligence agency during the 2014 sit-in told him to either resign or go on a long leave (Al Jazeera 2018). However, the Prime Minister's allegations need to be considered in light of his own legal woes resulting from corruption references against him and the construction of a narrative of victimhood to elicit sympathy.

for a shortcut to oust the government also increases. This is because an elected government in Pakistan only has at its disposal full control over the police force, which may be underdeveloped to control unrest. In this case, deployment of the military is not preferable as consequences for it can range from concessions to the military that would further increase its sphere of influence to unwillingness of the military to return to the barracks, which is justified by it for the sake of fixing instability caused by civilian government. Here, engaging in disruptive activity, even violent one, becomes a desirable means of creating instability large enough to make the government rely on military help. If the protesting party believes that it has the support of the military then it can be hopeful that the military would support it in replacing the incumbent government. The 2014 sit-in illustrates this as the PTI explicitly showed that it was under the impression of military support. However, as later events showed, the military did not come to its aid when it indulged in violent disruptive tactics by entering the premises of the parliament and the Rangers stationed by the government did as they were told and protected the sensitive state buildings there. Evidently, the gamble by the PTI did not pay off on this occasion, something that seemed as a real possibility at the height of the sit-in.

The threat of lockdown of the capital illustrated a face of party on the street that may have been less certain of military help in its favor due to past experience but that was still hopeful for bringing down the ruling party by creating an even bigger crisis-like situation. In this case, in absence of overt references to the military acting as arbiter, the stakes were increased by the PTI by announcing that it would paralyze the city. This was in marked contrast to its previous protest that was presented initially as within the acceptable democratic bounds and only later changed to a disruptive one. However, as discussed previously, the increased threat of violence that this disruptive action entailed also became the very factor for the PTI itself to compromise. Nevertheless, the compromise does not rule out the likelihood of a party strategy behind it to

create a threat of crisis big enough to invite military intervention and encourage defections into its camp.

4.6 The PPP and the PML-N's Agency in the Presence of Structural Incentives

As described previously the PPP refrained from siding with the PTI or even launching its own disruptive protests in the present period of electoral democracy. However, it did engage in disruptive political activity in the period that Pakistan was an electoral democracy from 1988 to 1999. For example, in 1992 as head of the leading opposition party, leader of the PPP at the time Benazir Bhutto marched towards the capital on the allegation that elections of 1990 that brought the PML-N to power were rigged (Iqbal 2014). Her actions created the pressure that contributed to the ouster of the Sharif government by then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 1993 (ibid.). Bhutto led another march to the capital the following year when the Sharif government was reinstated by the Supreme Court (ibid.). This time, as previously mentioned, Sharif and the President were asked to resign by the Chief of Army Staff.

The PPP, therefore, shows a case of political learning. Witnessing that the benefit that it gained by using these extra-parliamentary tactics and siding with the military was each time short term and later proved to contribute to the transience of its time as the ruling party, the PPP learned not to engage in this brand of politics in the future.²¹ It is not just the PPP, however, that learned this particular dynamic of Pakistani politics. The PML-N also demonstrated that it had realized that colluding with the military resulted in all of them losing at the end. The Charter of Democracy signed by both Sharif and Bhutto in 2006 when military dictator General Musharraf

²¹ This assertion comes with the understanding that it is ascribing motives to actors within the PPP. While these motives are being projected on the party by using its actions as their basis, it is realized that the most credible way of establishing them would be through interviews done with the leadership of the PPP.

was still in power contained commitments that political parties will not undermine each other through extra-constitutional means and the support of the military will not be solicited by any political party to overthrow a democratically elected government (Dawn 2006). While the PPP showed much greater adherence to this principle as demonstrated by its support to the ruling party when it was in opposition after 2013 than the PML-N when it was in opposition from 2008 to 2013, neither party directly solicited the support of the military nor created a crisis big enough for the ruling party that could potentially have system destabilizing effects. The PML-N did hold a march to the capital in 2009 but with the single agenda of making the PPP led government restore judges that were dismissed by the preceding military regime (Al Jazeera 2009). When the government accepted this demand while the long march was still underway and not yet reached the capital, it was called off by the PML-N in consultation with other political leaders that were also part of it (Dawn 2009). The PML-N also filed a petition against Asif Ali Zardari, co-chairman of the PPP and President of Pakistan at the time, in the Supreme Court when the ruling government was embroiled in controversy over allegedly seeking US assistance in establishing civilian supremacy over the military while in return offering to take action in line with US interests in certain key areas of foreign policy (Jalal 2014). Sharif also sided with the Supreme Court when it asked the PPP elected Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani to write to the Swiss government to open cases of money laundering against Zardari and supported the court verdict of disqualifying him from holding the office of the prime minister (Jalal 2014). While these events showed that the PML-N was willing to bend the principles agreed upon in the charter of democracy just enough to make things difficult for the ruling party at the time, it did not go to the extent of inviting military support itself either overtly or covertly or engage in extra-parliamentary activity to the extent of creating a system threatening crisis.

The factor that stands out in both the PPP and PML-N and is missing in the PTI is experience in running the central government. It appears that political learning of the sort that dissuades a political party from engaging in disruptive action to the extent of potentially destabilizing the system and refraining from playing this risky gamble of inviting military intervention happens once political parties have found themselves repeatedly on the receiving side of military intervention. This invites the question of whether the PTI will forsake extra-parliamentary activity once it has had the opportunity of running central government. While this can of course only be known when and if the PTI becomes an opposition party with that experience, the causal mechanisms highlighted in this M.A thesis of general loss of autonomy for elected governments and the strengthened role of the military that extra-parliamentary activity results in would suggest a moderation of party behavior in the future. In other words, what the PTI right now is what the PPP was in the period 1988 to 1999 and in the future, it is likely that the PTI may turn into what the PPP is at the present moment.

4.7 The Hypotheses

Since the PTI's taking on the face of party on the street has been shown to be a rational choice as the costs of portraying a disruptive face of the party and the possibility of losing face through compromise on account of being unsuccessful was offset by the dividend of possibly imploding the ruling party from within by creating a crisis-like situation, the behavior could be generalized to other political parties that find themselves in a similar incentive structure. Similarly, as the PPP in opposition exhibited the same behavior of engaging in extra-parliamentary activities when it was in opposition in the 1990s, its choice of refraining from this behavior when in opposition from 2013 to present and the attendant explanation for it can also be generalized to other political parties. This is further reinforced by the PML-N also

behaving in a pattern similar to that of the PPP with the same explanatory framework applying to it.

The main hypothesis that this M.A thesis has generated is that where structural incentives exist for engaging in extra-parliamentary activity for opposition parties, past experience of running central government acts as an intervening variable and moderates party behaviour. While the structural incentives highlighted in this case study are bringing over a sudden change in government through military intervention, which is invited by creating a crisis-like situation, these can be more broadly generalized to systematic arrangements that make the dividend for putting on the face of party on the street greater than its costs. Central government is emphasized in the hypothesis since experience in running it gives the political party a greater ownership of the political system as compared to running provincial government or membership of parliament and the attendant perspective of recognizing the long-term interests of preserving the political system over short-term gains.

Another related hypothesis that this M.A thesis has generated is that volatility of political allegiances and reliance of party leadership on local political bosses increases the likelihood of extra-parliamentary activity. Since in electoral democracies ruling parties usually need to maintain their parliamentary majorities to continue running the government, volatile allegiances at the base makes for unstable governments. This creates the incentive for opposition parties to increase the pressure on the ruling government enough to cause defections at the base and effect change in government. In such a political setting, extra-parliamentary protests appear as a potent means of increasing pressure on the ruling party by creating a crisis-like situation.

5. Conclusion

The research question presented at the start of this this M.A thesis was that why does a political party in Pakistan, PTI, which has within-system goals and a substantial stake in the political system engages in extra-parliamentary activity that risks destabilizing that very system. The answer identified for this question is that there are structural incentives that exist for the PTI in the form of creating a crisis big enough to invite military intervention and create a perception that the ruling party is in trouble to encourage defections of local political bosses away from it. The comparison with PPP in opposition revealed that it also responded in the same manner to these structural incentives when it was in opposition in the 1990s; however, it stopped doing so in the present period starting from 2013. A brief description of the PML-N in opposition from 2008 to 2013 also revealed a similar pattern of the main opposition party refraining from engaging in extra-parliamentary activity that could risk jeopardizing the continuity of the political system. The factor that stood out in both of these parties was their prior experience in running central government and their subsequent commitment to respecting acceptable bounds of opposition in democracy appeared to stem from that experience. This was demonstrated in both of these parties signing the Charter of Democracy, which stated commitment to not traverse certain limits, especially that of inviting military intervention, in opposition. By showing the behavior of the PTI to be rational and with the PPP exhibiting the same behavior in the 1990s, it was inferred that the behavior of the PPP in opposition from 2013 to 2017 was the continuation of the same rational self-interested party but with a wider, long-term perception of that self-interest. Hence, the explanation identified in this M.A thesis for the research question was generalized into two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that where structural incentives exist for engaging in extra-parliamentary activity for opposition parties, past experience of running central government acts as an intervening variable and moderates

party behavior. The second hypothesis of this case study is that volatility of political allegiances and reliance of party leadership on local political bosses increases the likelihood of extra-parliamentary activity.

This M.A thesis has endeavored to become the starting point of a theoretical debate on the scarcely discussed phenomenon of within-system political parties engaging in extra-parliamentary demonstrations. As the population of within-system political parties is small as mentioned in the start of this M.A thesis, further development of this research will also have to be through in-depth comparative case studies. With respect to the first hypothesis identified in this study, it can be tested using the case of FIDESZ in Hungary to identify the causal mechanisms through which FIDESZ's behavior was moderated in the years immediately preceding and following its experience in government from 1998 to 2002 and how its extra-parliamentary protest character re-emerged in opposition afterwards but in a diluted form as compared to the its pre-1990 dissident movement character. The case of FIDESZ can further add value to this theoretical debate by showing not just how experience in central government can moderate party behavior but also how anticipating that experience can transform the party's extra-parliamentary character. An additional research avenue for the first hypothesis is by testing it in the case of Indonesian political parties: The Great Indonesia Movement (Gerinda), the Democratic Party (PD), and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The comparative case study of these three political parties in which PD has former experience in central government can reveal whether its role in extra-parliamentary protests was more restrained than the other two political parties. The second hypothesis of this M.A thesis can also be factored in this comparative case study to test if it has significant explanatory value.

This M.A thesis has contributed to the literature on political parties and social movements. It has bridged the gap between literature on political parties and social movements beyond simply explaining genesis of political parties or success of social movements that could be made more likely through the organizational resources of political parties. It has shown how some concepts can be borrowed from social movement literature to explain protest behavior of political parties to a greater degree of precision. Combining theory on disruptive action found in social movement literature with the framework of three faces of political parties formulated by Katz and Mair (1993), this M.A thesis has made an original contribution in the form of the face of party on the street. In the absence of any coherent theory on understanding the behavior of the party when it engages in extra-parliamentary protests, this face of the party provides a theoretical framework to understand the behavior of within-system political parties when they engage in extra-parliamentary protests and the costs associated with that face. Through illustrating the theoretical description of the face of party on the street with the case of the PTI, the theoretical framework has been grounded in an empirical mold and aiding in its conceptualization. Moreover, relying on existing work on the politics of Pakistan, this M.A thesis has presented a lens through which party behavior in Pakistan can be analyzed in its structural context. Where existing published work was not available, specifically in the current period of electoral democracy in Pakistan that started from 2008, this M.A. thesis used news reports to weave a narrative of the behavior of the PTI, PPP, and briefly that of the PML-N to show how these parties have responded to structural incentives of extra-parliamentary activity and in the case of latter two parties explicated the manner in which these parties have shown agency through their experience in running central government. Finally, by drawing the broader implications of the causal mechanism identified through the case study, this M.A thesis formulated two hypotheses on political opposition engaging in extra-parliamentary activity.

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