

NATIONAL MINORITIES AND SELF-GOVERNANCE RIGHTS
A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Diverging Minority Rights in Western Europe

Master Thesis by
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ABSTRACT

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Western European states have conferred very different degrees of group autonomy to their historic national minorities. This diversity appears to be puzzling insofar as both large and small groups have obtained both significant and few self-governance rights. Most studies have until now focused on large sub-national groups that have been integrated in the nation-building process through regional or federal arrangements, or consist in individual case studies of smaller national minorities. Since it is important, however, to understand why states with common democratic standards confer different degrees of autonomy to their national minorities, this thesis studies with a *Multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA)* of 51 national minorities in Western Europe what factors led states to confer them self-governance rights and why these rights differ for supposedly similar groups.

The findings of the analysis suggest that the conferral of self-governance rights has to be understood through the complex interaction of at least seven variables. The support of a (1) kin-state, of (2) (co-)national minorities or of (3) similar minorities abroad appear to contribute to the conferred rights, especially when the rights conferral process starts with them. The (4) openness of state nationalisms and the (5) territorial concentration of a minority prove to be important for the conferral of considerable autonomy statutes. While the relevance of (6) minorities' size is ambiguous, (7) the degree of group mobilization appears to be an important necessary but, interestingly, non-sufficient condition for obtaining self-governance rights.

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Introduction

The ethno-national diversity of state populations is probably one of the major societal and political issues of our time. While ethnic diversity comes with an increasing inter-state migration and is a rather recent phenomenon (at least in its current intensity), national diversity comes with the historical existence of sub-national entities within nation-states and is a longstanding reality of statehood. Living together in this diversity can be problematic if political disagreements among people arise precisely along ethnic or national lines. Since ethnic and sub-national groups are usually numerically inferior and in a non-dominant position vis-à-vis the majority population, inter-group disagreements are coupled with the problem that one part of society – the majority – can impose its view on another – the minority.

This minority problem itself is quite old but its political relevance is not. As Jackson Preece (2005, p. 3) emphasizes, a shift of paradigm occurred in the mid-twentieth century in Europe insofar as human dignity and self-determination began to be conceived as crucial components of political legitimacy. Consequently, people started to be seen as having equal fundamental rights – also those who are a minority. The main problem is to determine what kind of rights.

In his famous theory on *Multicultural Citizenship*, Will Kymlicka (1995) suggested that ethnic and national minorities do not only have different demands but should also enjoy different rights. According to him, ethnic minorities seek to integrate into the mainstream society and want the state to facilitate that integration by adapting its institutions and laws to allow for cultural differences (pp. 11, 30). National minorities, he argues, seek to exist as distinct groups in parallel to the mainstream society and want the state to protect their existence by granting them autonomy through self-governance rights (pp. 10, 27).

If Kymlicka's conception seems to be quite straightforward, the ways of handling the difficulties that the cohabitation of majority and minority population poses to the management of public affairs vary considerably. Looking at ethnic minorities, one could argue that this is normal since the important variety of groups requires a just as important variety of solutions. For national minorities, however, this reasoning is less evident. They may also have group-based specificities and cultural differences, but these come with much less possible ways of granting autonomy.

Yet, some national minorities have received extensive self-government rights (e.g. the Scots in the United Kingdom), while others do not (e.g. the Croats in Italy). The intuition to explain this difference by minorities' group size is misleading insofar as there are also large groups with few (e.g. the Alsatians in France) and small groups with considerable autonomy (e.g. the Åland-Swedes in Finland). This discrepancy is surprising but has hitherto received little attention in the literature. Most existing studies focus indeed on the statute of large sub-national groups, like Scotland, Catalonia or Flanders, who have been integrated in the nation-building process through regional or federal arrangements (e.g. Keating, 2001; Requejo, 2005). Only few look at the statute of less protected or smaller groups, and those who do, do so only based on individual cases (e.g. Daftary, 2008; Semb, 2005; Willett, 2016).

Since it is important to understand why states with common democratic standards confer different degrees of autonomy to their national minorities, this thesis will build a conceptual framework for the comparison of self-governance rights – i.e. the right to take care of group-specific affairs – of national minorities – i.e. historic sub-national groups with linguistic and cultural specificities – in a comparable geographical and temporal space – i.e. in Western Europe from today until the origins of national minorities' autonomy in the early 20th century. Contrary to some of the previously cited studies, the ambition of the thesis is not to argue normatively which rights national minorities should have, but to explain based on a

systematic comparison of empirical evidence (1) *what factors led states in Western Europe to confer self-governance rights to their national minorities and (2) why these rights differ for supposedly similar groups.*

To answer this twofold question, I will proceed in three steps. In chapter one, I explain how the diversity of national minorities' self-governance rights has been approached politically, normatively and legally until now and I show that the literature has given little attention to this diversity beyond individual studies – although a cross-case comparison is both necessary for a comprehensive understanding and of academic and societal importance. After a conceptual clarification on national minorities, their rights and the factors that are studied as being related to them, the methodological procedure with one classification stage and two moments of analysis is specified. In chapter two (corresponding to the classification stage), I examine the degree of self-governance rights for all studied minorities and the relevance of the studied explanatory factors for their conferral. In chapter three (comprising both moments of analysis), I first compare self-governance rights and explanatory factors with a *Multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA)*. Secondly, I go beyond the constellational view of QCA by accounting for the procedural interaction of the variables.

The findings of the analysis suggest that the conferral of self-governance rights to national minorities in Western Europe has to be understood through the complex interaction of at least seven variables. The support of a (1) kin-state, of (2) (co-)national minorities or of (3) similar minorities abroad appear to contribute to the conferred rights, especially when the rights conferral process starts with them. The (4) openness of state nationalisms and the (5) territorial concentration of a minority prove to be important for the conferral of considerable autonomy statutes. While the relevance of (6) minorities' size is ambiguous, (7) the degree of group mobilization appears to be an important necessary but, interestingly, non-sufficient condition for obtaining self-governance rights. The presence or absence of national

minorities' self-governance rights seems hence not only to depend on deliberate but also on contingent factors, whose interaction is important to keep in mind for academics, policy makers and minority observers in general.

Chapter I.

Multinational States and Minority Self-governance

The rights that national minorities have obtained in Western Europe vary greatly. The objective of this first chapter is to explain (1) how national diversity and minority rights have been approached in the past and (2) why the existing diversity of rights is surprising but has yet not received a systematic examination by the literature despite its importance. On this basis, the study's (3) conceptual framework and (4) its methodological proceeding can be clarified.

1. NATIONAL DIVERSITY, NORMATIVE APPROACHES AND INTERNATIONAL MINORITY RIGHTS

Today, almost all states in the world are inhabited by a heterogeneous national population. The only exceptions to this rule are probably Iceland, Japan, Luxemburg and Portugal (Moynihan, 1993, p. 72).¹ Jutila (2017, pp. 21-22) explains that in the Westphalian international order in which only states were recognized as sovereign actors, this national diversity became problematic once so called nation-states started in the 18th century to strive for the unity between the state as political unit and the nationality of its population. This unification often followed the interest of the dominant nation to the detriment of (numerically inferior) non-dominant sub-national groups. This only changed after the birth of the international human rights movement in the second half of the 20th century – defending human dignity and self-determination – which helped the problem of sub-national minority groups to gain political relevance (Jackson Preece, 2005, p. 3).

This political relevance was picked up by normative theories of minority rights that dealt with the question of which national minority rights can be justified by differences in

¹ Moynihan (1993, p. 72) also mentions Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. I disagree with that insofar as there is a German minority in Denmark, a Frisian minority in the Netherlands and Sami as well as Kven minorities in Norway.

terms of national affiliation and cultural traditions.² The main opposition to special rights came from libertarian scholars. According to Kymlicka (1995, pp. 107-110), they argue that everybody should enjoy the same individual freedom and citizenship rights but providing special support and prerogatives to a particular group is unfair because it creates costs for others. Envisioning cultures as a market-place, they want people to choose freely which culture or nationality they want to adhere to, and if one culture disappears because it can no longer attract enough adherents, this is justifiable because it follows peoples' free choice. The main argument in favor of special minority rights comes from Kymlicka (1995, pp. 126-127) himself. Adopting a liberal-egalitarian perspective, he argues that many political decisions in a state will necessarily favor some cultural identities over others. With regard to national minorities, he advocates to correct this inequality by granting group-differentiated rights like territorial autonomy and guaranteed political representation so that all national groups have the same social, cultural and political opportunities. He admits that these rights create additional costs for the majority but judges them as less significant than the costs a minority would have to bear otherwise.

The most important international codifications of national minority rights have been realized within the United Nations Organization (UN) and the Council of Europe (Malloy, 2005). In 1992, the UN General Assembly adopted consensually the *Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities*. The declaration calls for freedom of culture and association, for the right to participation in political decisions that concern the minority (art. 2) and urges states to create the necessary conditions for that (art. 4). The non-binding character makes it, however, rather a declaration

² One should note that some disagreements exist even on the statute of diversity itself because it has been argued by scholars like Anderson (2003 [1983]) that nations are mainly *Imagined Communities* whose relevance is constructed by the people. Pure essentialists like Connor (1994) who would object that men and nationality are inherently tied by ancestry do almost no longer exist (Varshney, 2004, pp. 280-281). It is nevertheless reasonable to contend that national diversity, although it might be constructed to some extent, cannot that easily be deconstructed. The question follows how to deal with this diversity.

of good intentions. In 1994, the Council of Europe worked out the *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*. The convention affirms that the protection of national minorities is part of international human rights (art. 1), requires the equality of majority and minorities in public life (art. 4) and urges states to create the necessary conditions for minorities to develop their culture (art. 5), preserve their identity (art. 5) and participate in public life (art. 15). Although the Convention never clearly defines the concept of national minority and is again legally not binding, it received large international support and was implemented by many member states of the Council of Europe. Exceptions to this rule are France and Turkey, who did not sign the text. Belgium, Greece, Iceland and Luxemburg signed it but did not proceed to ratification.

When looking at this international legal prerogatives, one can see that national minority rights are above all approached as individual human rights, i.e. requiring the legal equality of people independently of their national belonging. Some collective rights exist in the form of guarantees for the use of their language, the preservation of their culture and the participation in decisions that concern the minority group. But there is no real consideration for group autonomy through some form of self-governance rights. Yet, there are national minority groups, even very small ones, which enjoy considerable self-government rights. The question is why.

2. THE PARADOXES OF MINORITY SELF-GOVERNANCE AND GROUP SIZE

The first, non-normative, but intuitive answer to the question of why national minorities enjoy considerable group autonomy is to focus on groups' population size. Following this reasoning, national minorities with a large group size would enjoy important self-governance rights, while smaller minorities would not. There are, however, not only large national minorities with extensive self-government rights like Scotland and Catalonia. Some national

minorities have indeed an important population size, like the Alsatians or Occitans in France, but do not enjoy much self-governance. Moreover, national minorities like the South-Tyroleans in Italy or the Åland-Swedes in Finland have an important autonomy statute but a much smaller population size. Finally, there are other small national minorities, like the Albanians or Croats in Italy, which do not have any self-governance rights at all.

Although there is conceptually no minimal number of group members for forming a minority (Deschênes, 1986, p. 291), most in-depth studies and cross-case comparisons have by now focused on large sub-national groups like Scotland and Catalonia (e.g. Keating, 2001; Requejo, 2005). These have been integrated in the national building process through regional or federal arrangements to accommodate their autonomy claims. At the same time, it has been shown by Erk and Anderson (2009) that these arrangements can create a “paradox” when, instead of facilitating the cohabitation between majority and minority population (e.g. Kymlicka & Straehle, 2001, p. 241), they lead minorities to amplify their demands (e.g. Jenne, 2007, p. 188).

This paradox is entirely reversed once the size of a historic minority becomes too small to exercise massive political pressure. A smaller minority size provides indeed much less potential for political disintegration so that states face fewer risks when granting them special rights. But these rights usually create manifest overrepresentations (Trebbe, 2009, p. 79) and, depending on the scope, become costly due to the absence of scale-benefits (Landes, 2011, p. 52). More generally, as Schnebel (2014) puts it, states face a “dilemma” when deciding between granting self-determination or promoting national integration.

When considering these dynamics behind the protection of national minorities, may they have a rather large or small group size, it remains unresolved why some groups obtained significant self-determination rights, while others did not – at least from a systematic point of view. There are indeed case studies that examine how one or few specific national minorities

have obtained particular rights from their state (e.g. Daftary, 2008; Semb, 2005; Willett, 2016) and that, in addition to the actual juridical prerogatives, explain which factors are at the origin of these rights (e.g. the presence of other minority groups, the political mobilization of the minority, its territorial situation or the national self-definition of the state, *cf. infra*). There is, however, no systematic analysis that tries to compare these factors and the obtained self-governance rights across all possible groups.

Since it is important to understand why states with common democratic standards confer different degrees of autonomy to their national minorities, this thesis will build a conceptual framework that allows for comparing national minorities' self-governance rights. Thereby, its ambition is not to develop a normative theory of the rights national minorities should have, but to understand through an empirical and systematic comparison *(1) what factors led states in Western Europe to confer self-governance rights to their national minorities and (2) why these rights differ for supposedly similar groups.*

3. CONCEPTUALIZING NATIONAL MINORITY RIGHTS AND THEIR CONFERRAL

The research question outlined involves three crucial terms that need further clarification. This section will therefore specify *(a)* how the present study defines national minorities, *(b)* what autonomy or self-governance rights precisely are and *(c)* what kind of explanatory factors are studied as being potentially related to it.

a) National Minorities in Western Europe

National minorities and their conceptualization have obtained particular attention in the works of the United Nations and the Council of Europe, related to the elaboration of the previously mentioned legal documents (Brunner & Küpper, 2002, pp. 15-16). For the UN studies,

Capotorti (1979, §568) and Deschênes (1985, §181) provided both extensive and largely similar definitions that share the following seven criteria for defining a national minority:

- (1) being citizen of a state.
- (2) constituting a numerical minority within that state.
- (3) being in a politically non-dominant position in that state.
- (4) sharing ethnic, religious,³ or linguistic characteristics differing from the majority.
- (5) sharing a sense of solidarity among minority members.
- (6) sharing the collective will to persevere as group.
- (7) aiming to achieve equality in fact and law.

The reflections in the Council of Europe, concluded by the adoption of *Recommendation 1201* (1993), came to a fairly similar definition. One important additional element (§1.b) that will be used as an eighth criterion in this study is that a national minority should be:

- (8) maintaining long-standing ties with that state.

This requirement emphasizes the ‘historicity’ of national minorities’ presence on the state-territory where they constitute a minority today (Kymlicka, 2011, p. 283). These eight criteria have not only been chosen because they were used before, but because they allow best to select the groups needed to answer the present research problem, i.e. sub-national groups that are conscious about proper ethno-cultural specificities and that have lived for a long time on the territory of a state where they are today non-dominant and in numerical inferiority.

Since national minority rights in Europe have been conferred at different moments and through different dynamics, the present study will focus on national minorities within Western Europe⁴ only. The reason for this decision is not that these states would be more advanced in protecting national minorities than Eastern European countries – they are not, as Johns (2003)

³ Religious beliefs can be coupled with cultural and ethnic specificities. Taken separately, however, I do not consider them as standalone criteria for constituting a national minority.

⁴ Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

nicely points out. But they form a distinct object of analysis since their nation-state building process and the evolutions through which they have conferred their national minority rights are more independent from external factors like the Soviet occupation and the dynamics of the EU eastern enlargement process. Although more restrictive, this focus will ensure the comparability of the studied cases.

Taking into consideration this focus and the eight previously mentioned criteria, I identified 51 national minorities as fulfilling the selection criteria.⁵ They are listed in Table 1.

Table 1: The 51 National Minorities in Western Europe

State	Minority	State	Minority	State	Minority
Austria	Croats	Germany	Frisians	Norway	Sami
Austria	Czechs	Germany	Sorbs	Spain	Andalousians
Austria	Hungarians	Italy	Albanians	Spain	Aragonese
Austria	Slovaks	Italy	Catalans	Spain	Basques
Austria	Slovenes	Italy	Croats	Spain	Catalans
Belgium	German-speakers	Italy	Francophones	Spain	Galicians
Denmark	Germans	Italy	Franco-provencalians	Spain	Valencians
Finland	Åland Swedes	Italy	Friulians	Sweden	Finns
Finland	Finland Swedes	Italy	Greeks	Sweden	Meänkieli
Finland	Sami	Italy	Ladini	Sweden	Sami
France	Alsations	Italy	Occitans	Switzerland	Francophones
France	Basques	Italy	Sardinian	Switzerland	Italians
France	Bretons	Italy	Sicilians	Switzerland	Romansh
France	Catalans	Italy	Slovenes	United Kingdom	Cornish
France	Corsicans	Italy	South-Tyroleans	United Kingdom	Manx Gaelic
France	Occitans	Netherlands	Frisians	United Kingdom	Scots
Germany	Danes	Norway	Kven	United Kingdom	Welsh

b) Minority Rights and Self-governance

When it comes to the rights of national minorities, different typologies have been elaborated in the past, focusing on different aspects of their protection (Brunner & Küpper, 2002,

⁵ Five other minorities came close to the selection criteria but were not included in the analysis. 1) The Walloons in Belgium count for less than half of the state population but cannot be considered as non-dominant. 2) The Faroe Islanders and 3) Greenlandic people belonging to Denmark have a quite specific colonial past which partly undermines criterion (8). 4) Groups in Northern-Ireland, an essentially contested space, have been excluded since neither British Unionists nor Irish Nationalists represent homogenous groups and cannot be considered as national minorities in the classical sense. 5) Roma minorities living in different states are not comprised because they do not entirely fulfil criteria (1), (6) and (8).

sections 4-5; Kymlicka, 1995, chapter 3). An extensive and comprehensive classification of cultural minority rights has been elaborated by Levy (2000, p. 25) who distinguishes between:

- (1) Symbolic rights (e.g. special holidays, flags, anthems)
- (2) Exemption rights (e.g. no electoral threshold for representatives)
- (3) Assistance rights (e.g. official translations, special funding)
- (4) External rules (e.g. territorial restrictions for other groups)
- (5) Internal rules (e.g. special obligations for own group members)
- (6) Judicial rights (e.g. own family law)
- (7) Special representation rights (e.g. minority quotas)
- (8) Self-government rights (e.g. cultural autonomy)

All these rights can be claimed in one or another form by national minorities. One should note, however, that rights (1) to (6) depend upon the particular needs and cultural specificities of minority groups. That they are conferred in a divergent manner by states seems hence to be normal and is not related to the present research puzzle. Special representation rights (7), in turn, can be independent from cultural specificities but often depend on other external factors like the voting system in place or the setting of circumscriptions in a state.⁶ Self-government (8) rights are the only ones that can be claimed independently of group traditions and backgrounds, the idea being that national minorities have the right to organize, implement or decide on group related issues. Varieties in the degree of conferred autonomy start to be more surprising, especially when they are independent of group sizes. This is why the present study only focuses on self-government rights or, to be precise, on different degrees of them grouped as 'self-governance rights'.

When trying to account for degrees of self-governance rights, they can be classified based on the extent to which the national minority is allowed to deal with its own affairs. I distinguish between four levels that were first theoretically deduced and then refined based on the empirical part of the research. They correspond to the (1) absence of collective rights, up

⁶ Moreover, having one representative out of several hundred (for example) provides only a limited amount of autonomy to a minority group.

to the rights (2) to organize, (3) to administrate and finally (4) to decide on the affairs of your group. These rights are conceived as hierarchically⁷ ordered, i.e. that a more advanced right implies at the same time the presence of a less advanced right. This will be important for the analysis later on. Furthermore, one should note the semantical difference between ‘self-governance’ rights, comprising the second, third and fourth degree, and ‘self-government’ rights, only referring to the fourth degree.

- (1) *Individual rights*, i.e. equal citizenship rights but no further self-governance.
→ Criterion: disposing of none of the below mentioned prerogatives.
- (2) *Self-organization rights*, i.e. organize and represent the affairs of your group.
→ Criterion: having a state supported minority organization that officially (legally) represents the group.
- (3) *Self-administration rights*, i.e. implementing the affairs of your group.
→ Criterion: having an own political body that administrates different group affairs (education system, culture subsidies,...) based on national legislation.
- (4) *Self-government rights*, i.e. deciding and implementing the affairs of your group.
→ Criterion: being part of a regional or federal autonomy arrangement.

c) Explanatory Factors for Conferring Self-governance Rights

To account for the variety of self-governance rights national minorities have obtained in Western Europe, the objective of this study is to compare the explanatory factors that led states to confer these rights across groups. It has been explained earlier that most existing studies on the rights of national minorities in Europe are single or low-n case studies. If the lack of a larger-n approach has been criticized, these studies are nevertheless very useful secondary sources insofar as they provide the necessary information for accounting which factors were important when governments conferred minority rights. Six have been identified in the literature, a seventh derives from the research puzzle.

⁷ This hierarchy is purely logical and does not have any normative significations, i.e. I do not postulate that one is better than another.

A first important factor to consider is whether the state nationalism is plural or dominant. According to Lecours and Nootens (2009, pp. 14-16), countries can indeed have a dominant nationalism, i.e. they see their state as being composed of a single and indivisible nation, or have a plural nationalism, i.e. they see their state as being composed of different nations none of which dominates. The assumption would be that states with a dominant nationalism are more reluctant to confer self-governance rights than states with a plural nationalism.

A second factor that will be examined is the presence or absence of political mobilization from national minorities in favor of receiving self-governance rights. As Colino (2008, pp. 578-580) and Daftary (2008, section 2) emphasize, significant mobilization in the form of political parties, organizations and pressure groups can force states to confer self-governance rights. To keep these mobilizations comparable across groups, the extent of claimed self-governance rights will be compared based on the four previously established levels: self-government, self-administration, self-organization and the absence of claims.

A third factor to account for is the existence (or not) of a so-called ‘kin-state’, i.e. a foreign state with a nationality which is identical to that of a minority abroad. Siegl (2010, pp. 229-231) and Schaefer-Rolffs (2014, pp. 88-90) show that the presence of such a state can have an effect on the rights that are conferred to national minorities abroad. An important aspect to consider is the actual significance of the kin-state presence for the conferred rights – because there might be none.

A fourth factor to examine, related to the previous, is the presence or absence of similar national minorities in other countries. If such transnational minorities are recognized and dispose of self-governance rights, this can indeed have spillover-effects for their counterparts abroad (Stępień, Petrétei, & Koivurova, 2015, pp. 122-124).

Beside these external considerations, a fifth factor to consider is the existence of other (co-)national minorities on the territory of a state. Following Keating (2015, pp. 128-129), the assumption would be that conferring self-governance rights to one minority can oblige a state to do so for the other minorities as well, or at least incite these to claim the same rights.

A sixth factor to account for is the territorial setting of a national minority group which can be dispersed or concentrated, i.e. living almost exclusively on a particular part of the territory or sharing it with other (majority or minority) groups. According to Coakley (2016), this territoriality is an important factor for the type of conferred minority rights, especially when it comes to non-territorial autonomy.

Finally, the size of the national minority groups will be taken into account. If the different group dynamics related to group size have been pointed out earlier as being unable to account solely for the diversity in self-recognition rights, they might bring important additional information in combination with other variables. The evaluation of group size must thereby be made both absolutely, i.e. in terms of the total number of group members, and relatively, i.e. as a percentage of the overall state population.

4. QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND PROCESS ORIENTED MODEL-BUILDING

The methodology used to study all these factors relies on a research design with one classification stage and two moments of analysis. The classification stage (which will be detailed in chapter two) will address the ‘what’ part of the research question and proceed in two steps. First, the degree of self-governance rights of the national minorities has to be examined. Based on the conferred rights, they will be classified in one of the four mentioned categories. Secondly, the relevance of each explanatory factor for the conferral of these rights will be examined. The relevance or non-relevance of a factor will be operationalized as

present or absent condition in the following analysis. All necessary information has been collected through documentary research, i.e. through the consultation of relevant monographies, journal articles, official documents and electronic sources. In case of ambiguities in the documentation, minority experts selected based on their personal expertise have been contacted to verify the accuracy and completeness of the previously collected information.

During the first moment of analysis (whose results will be detailed in the first part chapter three), the ‘why’ part of the research question will be addressed. With a *Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (QCA), the previously identified degrees of self-governance – operationalized as response variable – will be compared to the seven explanatory factors – operationalized as explanatory variables or so called ‘conditions’ in QCA. The objective is to examine if particular degrees of self-governance rights have similar origins. QCA makes this possible because it allows for relating the presence or absence of an outcome to the presence or absence of different conditions, while checking at the same time for the interaction of these conditions and trying to identify necessary and sufficient conditions. Since the self-governance rights of national minorities have been conceptualized through four different hierarchical degrees, four different QCA analyses have to be carried out, each of which will try to identify which constellations of conditions can be associated with an outcome. Since two of the explanatory factors will be operationalized as conditions with more than two values, the method is called *Multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA)*.

In the second moment of analysis (whose results will be detailed in the second part of chapter three), the ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions will be brought together by trying to account for the procedural interaction of the present or absent explanatory factors and the corresponding self-governance rights. When having a closer look at the seven factors, one can indeed see that they intervene at different moments of the rights conferral process. Minorities’

mobilization, the presence of a kin-state and the presence of other national or transnational minorities can be at the same the starting point of the conferring process or a purely contextual factor. The territorial setting and group size, in turn, are always contextual. The dominant or plural state nationalism can be seen as receptor or final condition of the process. Four models, illustrated by Table 2, can be deduced by this procedural reasoning and it will be examined for the 51 studied minorities to which extent the outcome of a rights conferral process is associated with its starting point and the intermediate variables (context and receptor). As Hak, Jaspers, and Dul (2015, p. 115) explain, similar so called *Temporal Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (TQCA) methods have been used by Caren and Panofsky (2005) and revisited by Ragin and Strand (2008). However, while these also try to account for the varying outcomes of identic conditions put in different sequences, the present study is only interested in identifying similar procedural patterns and not in reasoning on temporal counterfactuals.

Table 2: Models Accounting for the Explanatory Factors' Procedural Interaction and their Outcome

	Starting Point	Context	Receptor	Outcome
Model 1	Minority Mobilization	Pres./Abs. of a Kin-state → Pres./Abs. of Nation. Minorities Pres./Abs. of Transn. Minorities	+ Large/Small Size Dispers./Concentr. →	Domin./ Plural Nationalism ⇒ ?
Model 2	Kin-state Intervention	Pres./Abs. of Minority Mobilizat. → Pres./Abs. of Nation. Minorities Pres./Abs. of Transn. Minorities	+ Large/Small Size Dispers./Concentr. →	Domin./ Plural Nationalism ⇒ ?
Model 3	Spill-over of other Nation. Minorities	Pres./Abs. of Minority Mobilizat. → Pres./Abs. of a Kin-state Pres./Abs. of Transn. Minorities	+ Large/Small Size Dispers./Concentr. →	Domin./ Plural Nationalism ⇒ ?
Model 4	Spill-over of other Transnat. Minor.	Pres./Abs. of Minority Mobilizat. → Pres./Abs. of Nation. Minorities Pres./Abs. of a Kin-state	+ Large/Small Size Dispers./Concentr. →	Domin./ Plural Nationalism ⇒ ?

One final important methodological note is that QCA has a conjunctural vision on causality. This means that different factors or their combination can lead to an outcome does not exclude the possibility for other factors to do the same. As Berg-Schlosser, De Meur,

Rihoux, and Ragin (2009, p. 8) put it: “By using QCA, the researcher is urged not to specify a single causal model that best fits the data, as one usually does with statistical techniques, but instead to determine the number and characteristics of the different causal models that exist among comparable cases.” This is important for the analysis insofar as it emphasizes the conception of the present study to look for the impact of different factors on the conferral of minority rights – without having the pretentiousness of finding all exclusive possible origins of minority rights. As Jackson Preece (2005, p. 17) states: “minority rights are not natural givens but the constructions of particular historic moments”. The objective of this thesis is to deconstruct these constructions for a special group type – national minorities – in a comparable political context – Western Europe – at a particular moment in time – from the 20th century up to today.

Chapter II.

Mapping Diversity: Self-governance Rights and their Origins

The study's research puzzle, its conceptual framework and the methodological proceedings being settled, the objective of this second chapter is to identify (1) the actual degree of self-governance rights for the selected national minorities and (2) the actual relevance of the explanatory factors for their conferral. For both, the choices made during the classification will be explained. The results of this 'mapping diversity' chapter are summarized in the appendices.⁸

1. THE SELF-GOVERNANCE RIGHTS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES

When determining which of the four previously elaborated degrees of self-governance rights every selected national minority corresponds to (*cf.* Appendix 1), many classifications were fairly unproblematic. The autonomy statutes of large sub-state entities like Scotland, Catalonia or other regions in the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy were clearly forms of federal or region self-governance. The same is true for smaller groups like the Manx Gaelic on the Isle of Man, the Åland Swedes in Finland and the German-speakers in Belgium. The situation in Switzerland is a bit more specific insofar as the Francophone and Italian language groups do not have single federal sub-state entities. Since most cantons are, however, drawn along linguistic lines,⁹ one can still argue that they enjoy some form of federal autonomy too. As for self-administration rights, the Sami parliaments in the Nordic countries and the own school systems in the German-Danish border region are the best examples. The same is true for the advisory minority bodies in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands when it comes to what has been called self-organization rights.

⁸ The classifications in this chapter aim at preparing the data for the constellational *mvQCA* analysis in the first part of Chapter III. They will be slightly adapted for the procedural analysis in the second part of Chapter III.

⁹ The most important exceptions are the multilingual cantons of Fribourg, Grisons and Valais.

Other classifications were less straightforward and required particular reflections. First, all minority groups without self-administration and self-government rights obtained cultural subsidies or support for preserving their language from the state. While this is theoretically already some form of collective rights, it does not relate to the groups' self-governance statute and was therefore not taken into consideration. Furthermore, the same groups had one or more cultural associations to promote their culture and language. Sometimes, they assured even some interest representation that was consulted by the government. Since the right of association is, however, valid for every group of individuals independently of being a national minority, this has still been considered as an individual right. Only advisory bodies whose consultation by government or parliament is legally formalized have been considered as self-organization rights. That is why Swedes in Finland as well as Alsatians, Basques, Catalans and Occitans in France have been classified as having self-organization rights. In turn, the statutes of Albanians, Catalans, Croats, Franco-provencalians, Occitans and Greeks in Italy, Finns and Meänkieli in Sweden, as well as Romansh in Switzerland were classified as equaling individual rights.

Secondly, it had to be assessed whether the assemblies of regions that are not only inhabited by a minority group can be considered as the groups' institutions. While in the county of Cornwall, the share of people identifying as Cornish is only 6.7% (Brown, 2015), 86% of the people in Britany say to be Breton (Bretagne Culture Diversité, 2014). In the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the amount of people belonging to the Friulian community is estimated at 71% (Vidau, 2013, p. 34). There are none of such estimates for the Frisians in the Netherlands, but if one takes the number of speakers, at least 65% of the people in the Province of Friesland can be said Frisians (NPLD Europe (ed.), 2013). Except for the Cornish (who have been classified as having self-organization rights through the *Cornish Language Partnership*), one could therefore say that these groups are majoritarian in their region and

that the institutions are largely theirs. While the Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia has a special autonomy statute (Baldini & Baldi, 2014, p. 97), the competences exercised by the Regional Council of Brittany can be classified as administering the groups' affairs (Ministry of Interior (ed.), 2015). Since the Provincial States of Friesland deal primarily with territorial management and do, contrary to the two others, not really manage important group affairs (Dutch Central Administration (ed.), 2017), the Frisians in the Netherlands have been classified as having self-organization rights which come with its official advisory *Organ for the Frisian Language*.

Thirdly and finally, when looking at the groups which have been classified as having self-administration rights, one might wonder whether the administration of own school systems in the German-Danish border region is comparable to elected councils with administrative functions like those of the Sami. Given that these school systems have a democratic functioning and generate benefits of a similar nature, I argue that both are comparable.

2. THE EXPLANATORY FACTORS FOR THE CONFERRAL OF SELF-GOVERNANCE RIGHTS

When determining which of the previously identified explanatory factors was actually relevant for the conferral of self-governance rights to the selected national minorities (*cf.* Appendices 2 and 3), different proceedings were carried out. First, when assessing the degree of mobilization of a minority, there was a tension between the form and the content of the claims put forward. The same message can indeed be provided in different (more or less convincing) forms, just as a similar form can express very different messages. The focus of the present evaluation is set on the content of their claims because it can be better compared across cases. If ambiguities should arise over the results of the analysis, distinctions between

forms of expression will be made on a case-by-case basis in the interpretation. For the operationalization, the degree of self-governance rights a minority demanded was used, similar to those degrees that have been used in the previous chapter. One should note that, while some groups have quite univocal claims (e.g. the Sami in Nordic countries (Stępień et al., 2015, p. 133)), others comprise fractions issuing different demands (e.g. the Welsh in the United Kingdom (Keating, 2015, p. 128)). When the latter was the case, the claim of the major group fraction has been taken into account.

Secondly, when evaluating the existence of other (co-)national minorities, of transnational minorities and of a kin-state, another tension existed between their presence and their actual importance for the rights conferral. On the one hand, one could argue that their mere presence can already be an implicit incentive for a state to grant particular rights to its minorities. On the other hand, if one wants to assess the explicit relevance for the conferral of minority's rights, this mere presence is not enough. Since the latter is the aim of the present study, not the presence but the manifest importance of other minorities, transnational minorities and kin-states for the rights' conferral has been evaluated.

Thirdly, when evaluating the size of minority groups, some studies provided well documented estimates or even counts (e.g. for the Romansh in Switzerland (Federal Statistical Office, 2016a)). If such sources were not available, surveys with self-declared membership were used (e.g. for the Cornish in the United Kingdom (Brown, 2015)). When even such sources were not available, the estimated number of speakers was taken into account (e.g. for the Frisians in the Netherlands (NPLD Europe (ed.), 2013)). If this discrepancy in measurement would be problematic for studies that need statistical precision, it is not in the present case because the objective is to gain an approximation of group size and to assess whether a group can be classified as large or small minority. Moreover, this classification has not only to be made 'absolutely', i.e. based on an evaluation of the absolute number of group

members, but should also compare it ‘relatively’, i.e. as share of to the overall state population. When looking at these two measurements in Appendix 3, one can see that many groups can be easily classified as large because their population exceeds half a million people and counts for more than 5% of the state population. Similarly, many groups with a population of less than 100,000 and a population share of less than a single percent can be easily classified as small. Then, there are some groups like the South-Tyroleans in Italy as well as the Catalans, Corsicans and Basques in France whose population lies in between 100,000 and 500,000 people, but who still count for less than one percent of their state population. This small share led me to classify them as small as well. Finally, there are groups like the Frisians in the Netherlands, Finns in Sweden and Swedes in Finland whose population also lies in between 100,000 and 500,000 but who count for 2-5% of the state population. While this share would allow them to exercise already some political pressure through an own party, they are still far away from the independence dynamics of the sub-national entities that have been initially described and classified here as large minorities. I therefore consider them as small too.

Fourthly, it had to be assessed whether a minority lives almost exclusively on a particular part of the territory or whether it has to share it with other (majority or minority) groups (*cf.* Table 5). While some groups were obviously highly concentrated (e.g. the Åland Swedes in Finland) or highly dispersed (e.g. Czechs and Slovaks in Austria), many others presented some degree of concentration in one area but were more dispersed in another (e.g. the Sorbs in Germany or Romansh in Switzerland). Since territorial forms of autonomy require usually a high degree of concentration (Coakley, 2016), only groups with a continuously high presence on a territory have been considered as concentrated.

Finally, when evaluating the state nationalisms, only few could be classified without ambiguities. The French national vision of a single nation in an “indivisible republic” (art. 1,

French Constitution) was indeed a clear sign for a dominant nationalism, while Belgium being “a federal state composed by communities and regions” (art. 1, *Belgian Constitution*) has clearly a non-dominant nationalism. For the others, there was a legal and practical coexistence of a single predominating nation and the recognition of other national minority groups that could be classified neither as dominant nor as a plural nationalism. The theoretical scope had thus to be enlarged and to account for this, the approach of Palermo and Woelk (2003, p. 228) was useful as it allowed to distinguish between “agnostic liberal nation states” corresponding to the French case, “paritarian multinational states” corresponding to the Belgian and Swiss¹⁰ cases, and “national states of multinational and promotional aspiration” corresponding to the others.¹¹ State nationalisms will therefore be evaluated with three categories instead of two.

¹⁰ The initial distinction between dominant and non-dominant nationalisms would also have been problematic in the Swiss case because some argue that the Swiss national understanding is not plural but mono-national, without necessarily being dominant (Dardanelli, 2010). In turn, it can be described as “paritarian” without many problems, even if the term “multinational” has to be put into perspective.

¹¹ Palermo and Woelk (2003) make a fourth distinction which they call “repressive nationalist state” (p. 227), but it does not apply to any of the cases in this study.

Chapter III.

Explaining Diversity: Patterns of Conferring Self-governance Rights

Since the degree of self-governance rights and the relevance of the explanatory factors for their conferral have now been identified for every selected national minority, the objective of this last chapter is to understand why these rights differ so greatly for supposedly similar groups. In order to achieve that aim, (1) rights and factors will be first compared through a qualitative comparative analysis and (2) then examined vis-à-vis their order in the rights conferral process.

1. QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The basis for the *Multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA)* is the so-called truth table (*cf.* Table 5). It contains all the cases and their value for each variable as well as for the outcome. If different cases have all values in common, they are grouped in one row as single distribution (N indicating the number of cases per row). Two measurements are important in order to assess their relevance for the outcome and to identify contradictions. They will be used during the entire analysis.

The so-called *Consistency* measures the extent to which the value of a variable (or a combination of variables) is always associated with the same outcome. It is obtained by dividing the number of times the value of a variable (or combination of variables) and the outcome occur simultaneously by the number of times the variable takes that value [$\Sigma(\text{Var.Value, Outcome}) / \Sigma\text{Var.Value.}$] (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 124). A perfectly consistent variable (or combination of variables) is always associated with the same outcome and hence equals 1.

The so-called *Coverage* measures how much of the outcome a variable (or a combination of variables) can account for. It is obtained by dividing the number of times the

value of a variable (or a combination of variables) and the outcome occur simultaneously by the number of times the outcome occurs [$\Sigma(\text{Var.Value, Outcome}) / \Sigma\text{Outcome.}$] (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 130). A variable (or combination of variables) with perfect coverage can account for the entire outcome and hence equals 1.

When looking at the consistency scores for every distribution of cases, one can see that most of them are perfectly consistent. However, twelve distributions are not, which means that there are identical distributions of variables which correspond to different degrees of self-governance rights. Various possibilities have been suggested for dealing with such contradictions (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009, pp. 48-49; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, pp. 120-122). While adding, removing or changing variables would contradict the findings of the previous chapter, excluding the contradicting cases would undermine the initial conceptualization. The best option is to refine the measurement of some variables so that further differentiations are created. Since this did not resolve all contradictions and created further complexity in the model, I decided to address the contradictions in the analysis itself. The consistency scores that have been calculated for every single variable indicate that, in principle, there is no variable that, on its own, always leads to the same outcome.¹² In other words, no variable can, on its own, be called a *sufficient condition* for any of the outcomes.

When looking at the coverage scores for every distribution, one can see that none of the distributions can account for the majority of a present outcome. However, different variables have, on their own, perfect coverage scores. The presence of a mobilization that is at least as high as the obtained degree of rights shows, unsurprisingly, that minorities do not obtain rights they do not ask for. More interestingly, all minorities with self-government rights are concentrated, which makes the variable a *necessary condition* for the outcome.

¹² The only exception is the importance of similar transnational minorities. However, this is due to its single occurrence and should not be over-interpreted.

Table 3: Final mvQCA Truth Table with all Cases, their Variable Values and the Outcome

Cases	Size	Mobil	Minor	Trans	Kin	Nation	Terr	Outcome	N	Consistency	Coverage
ITA_Sard, ITA_Sicil, SPN_Basq, SPN_Catal, SPN_Galic, UK_Scots	1	4	0	0	0	2	1	4	6	1	0.316
SPN_Andal, SPN_Arag, SPN_Valen, UK_Welsh	1	4	1	0	0	2	1	4	4	1	0.211
SWI_Franc, SWI_Ital	1	4	0	0	0	3	1	4	2	1	0.105
ITA_Franc, ITA_Styrol	0	4	0	0	1	2	1	4	2	1	0.105
FIN_Aland, UK_Manx	0	4	0	0	0	2	1	4	2	1	0.105
ITA_Friul	1	4	0	0	1	2	1	4	1	1	0.053
BEL_Ger-sp	0	4	1	0	0	3	1	4	1	1	0.053
FRA_Cors	0	4	0	0	0	1	1	4	1	0.5	0.053
DMK_Germ, GER_Danes	0	3	0	0	1	2	0	3	2	0.5	0.250
NOR_Sami, SWE_Sami	0	4	0	1	0	2	0	3	2	1	0.250
ITA_Ladi	0	3	0	0	0	2	1	3	1	0.5	0.125
FIN_Sami	0	4	0	0	0	2	0	3	1	0.5	0.125
ITA_Slove	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	3	1	0.333	0.125
AUS_Czech, AUS_Slova, GER_Fris	0	2	1	0	0	2	0	2	3	1	0.214
AUS_Croats, AUS_Slove	0	3	0	0	1	2	0	2	2	0.5	0.143
AUS_Hung, GER_Sorbs	0	3	1	0	0	2	0	2	2	1	0.143
FRA_Alsat	1	3	1	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	0.071
FRA_Occit	1	3	1	0	0	1	0	2	1	1	0.071
NET_Fris	0	3	0	0	0	2	1	2	1	0.5	0.071
FRA_Catal	0	4	1	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	0.071
FRA_Basq	0	4	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	0.5	0.071
FIN_Swed	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	2	1	0.5	0.071
UK_Corn	0	4	0	0	0	2	0	2	1	0.5	0.071
ITA_Alba, ITA_Croats, ITA_Proven, ITA_Greeks	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	4	1	0.400
ITA_Catal, ITA_Occit	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	2	1	0.200
NOR_Kven, SWE_Meän	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	1	2	0.667	0.200
SWI_Rom	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	1	1	1	0.100
SWE_Finns	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	0.5	0.100
Consistency for outcome 4	0.812	0.730	0.385	0	0.429	0.409	0.704	Legend: Cases: COUNTRY_Minority Size: 1 = large, 0 = small Mobil: corresponds to the four right degrees Minor/Trans/Kin: 1 = relevant, 0 = not Nation: 3 = paritar., 2 = promot., 1 = agnost. Terr: 1 = concentrated, 0 = dispersed Outcome: the four right degrees			
Coverage for outcome 4	0.684	1	0.263	0	0.158	0.947	1				
Consistency for outcome 3	0.062	0.205	0	1	0.286	0.159	0.074				
Coverage for outcome 3	0.125	1	0	0.250	0.250	0.875	0.250				
Consistency for outcome 2	0.125	0.318	0.615	0	0.286	0.227	0.148				
Coverage for outcome 2	0.143	1	0.571	0	0.143	0.714	0.286				
Consistency for outcome 1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.074				
Coverage for outcome 1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.200				

*For the mobilization, consistency and coverage calculations consider larger or equivalent degrees of rights than the actual as one category and lower degrees as another.

** For the type of nationalism, consistency and coverage calculations consider paritarian and promotional visions as one category and agnostic visions as another.

During the in-depth analyses for every degree of self-government rights in the next four sections, the aim will be to identify what the different distributions leading to a same outcome have in common and how this can be expressed in the most parsimonious way (with few and short formulas). As Schneider and Wagemann (2012) explain, this so-called *minimization* process involves an algorithm that matches “similar conjunctions” (pp. 105-107) and eliminates specifications that logically lead to identical outcomes.¹³ In addition, it excludes “logically redundant prime implicants” (pp. 108-111), i.e. terms that are logically implied twice in a formula.¹⁴ This reduction potential is somewhat limited in the present case because the number of possible configurations is much higher than the actual number of observed cases. This is typical for a *mvQCA* (Cronqvist & Berg-Schlosser, 2009, pp. 74-76).¹⁵ Non-observed cases (so-called *logical remainders*) reduce the number of occurring similar conjunctions and hence the possibilities of minimization. For this reason, *simplifying assumptions* assuming the outcome of non-observed cases will be made by combining observed data with theoretical reasoning. This allows for further and final minimization. The process of minimization will be realized with the help of the *Tosmana*¹⁶ software.

Finally, one should note that the results of a QCA are “asymmetric” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 81), meaning that the information which explains the occurrence of an outcome does not necessarily explain its non-occurrence. Therefore, analyses usually have to be carried out for both the occurrence and non-occurrence of an outcome. In the present case, outcomes are hierarchically ordered. Hence, analyses of non-occurrence make sense and will be carried out for the highest and the lowest degree of self-governance only. Otherwise, the analysis would become multidirectional.

¹³ E.g. If, $A*B*C \rightarrow D$ and if, $A*B*\text{non-C} \rightarrow D$, then, $A*B \rightarrow D$ and the formula can be reduced.

¹⁴ E.g. If, $A*B*C + A*B*\text{non-C} + \text{non-A}*B*C + \text{non-A}*\text{non-B}*C \rightarrow D$, then, $A*B + \text{non-A}*C \rightarrow D$.

¹⁵ Five variables with two values, one variable with three values and one variable with four values correspond to $2.2.2.2.2.3.4 = 384$ possible configurations ($|k| = \prod^n .v$).

¹⁶ The program has been developed by Lasse CRONQVIST from the University of Trier. I used version 1.3.1.2.

a) *Self-government Rights*

The introductory section has already pointed out that high mobilization and territorial concentration are necessary conditions for the conferral of self-government rights. Now, it must be studied how they interact with other variables and how they are related to both the conferral and non-conferral of self-government rights.

The Conferral of Self-government Rights

The first raw minimization that was operated by *Tosmana* offered the following five solutions for explaining the outcome.

- (1) Size{1} * Mobil{4} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{1}
- (2) Size{1} * Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{3} * Terr{1}
- (3) Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{1}
- (4) Size{0} * Mobil{4} * Minor{1} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{3} * Terr{1}
- (5) Size{0} * Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{1} * Terr{1}

<p><i>Legend:</i> Variable{value} *: Logical AND +: Logical OR</p>
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All solutions underline the importance of territorial concentration and a mobilization equaling the fourth self-governance degree. Interestingly, solution (3) relativizes the importance of size. To further simplify these formulas and to obtain a less complex understanding, I only need to make a single simplifying assumption. Given that the presence of other minorities, transnational minorities and kin-states has exclusively been coded vis-à-vis their importance for the rights' conferral, and that in none of the cases their unimportance appeared to have contributed to the rights conferral, I can safely assume that their importance would only have further contributed to the conferral and hence leave them out of the formula. This simplification renders solutions (1) and (3), as well as (2) and (4) equal because size appears as a similar conjunction and can also be excluded from the formula. The only remaining distinction is their state's nationalism. This can be reduced by grouping the adjacent categories 2 and 3 through a logical OR, leaving a single formula which is perfectly consistent and covers 94.7% of the outcome (*cf.* Table 4).

Table 4: Final mvQCA Results for the Conferral of Self-government Rights

Origin	Formula	Consistency	Coverage
(1/2/3/4)	Mobil{4} * Nation{2+3} * Terr{1}	1	0.947
(5)	Size{0} * Mobil{4+} * Nation{1} * Terr{1}	0.250	0.053
(4*)	Size{0} * Mobil{4} * [Minor{1} + Kin{1}] * Nation{2+3} * Terr{1}	1	0.158

Thus, the main finding is that self-government rights are conferred foremost to territorially concentrated minorities calling for self-government rights in states with paritarian or promotional nationalisms – independently of their size or external support. However, two nuances have to be made.

First, concerning the unimportance of size and external support, these have indeed been cancelled out of the formula because both the Åland-Swedes and the Manx-Gaelic were able to obtain self-government rights through their own mobilizations. Now, one can wonder if that would also have been the case for the South-Tyrolean and Francophones in Italy as well as for the German-speakers in Belgium. For the latter, the paritarian state nationalism almost implies the spill-over effect of other minorities' rights. For the former, it is more difficult to evaluate if in a promotional nation-state like Italy, they would also have obtained the same statute without external (kin) support. Although I think that there is sufficient evidence in the data to support the first solution, I tried to account for the pertinent ambiguities by providing an additional formula (4*) which emphasizes the importance of external support for small minorities.

Secondly, there was one distribution whose self-government outcome contradicted the outcome of another case with an identical distribution. The Corsicans are indeed small, territorially concentrated and managed to obtain a special regional autonomy statute that can be seen as self-government rights, even in a state with an agnostic liberal nationalism like France. The Basques in France have similar characteristics and also called for self-government rights but obtained a statute equaling self-organization rights. The reason for this discrepancy is that both groups have probably similar mobilizations when it comes to their

claims, but the way they put them forward is different. In Corsica, the autonomist activism starting in the 1970s turned violent very soon,¹⁷ and it was only after lengthy negotiations that an agreement could be reached in 2000 (Daftary, 2008, pp. 292-298). In the Basque country, mobilizations were significant but did not reach an intensity that was able to push the French government towards the conferral of a similar statute (Gurrutxaga, 2005, pp. 87-89). It has been said earlier that the intensity of mobilization is much more difficult to compare, although it appears important here. For the sake of completeness, I added another formula (5), which might be inconsistent but reflects another constellation for the conferral of self-government rights.

The Non-Conferral of Self-government Rights

When trying to find a solution to describe the distribution of all minorities that did not obtain self-government rights, *Tosmana*'s raw minimization offered the following ten solutions.

- (1) Mobil{4} * Minor{1} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{1} * Terr{1}
- (2) Size{0} * Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{1} * Terr{1}
- (3) Size{0} * Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}
- (4) Size{0} * Mobil{3} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2}
- (5) Size{0} * Mobil{3} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}
- (6) Size{0} * Mobil{3} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}
- (7) Size{0} * Mobil{2} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}
- (8) Size{0} * Mobil{1} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2}
- (9) Size{0} * Mobil{1} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{3} * Terr{0}
- (10) Size{1} * Mobil{3} * Minor{1} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{1} * Terr{1}

Contrary to the previous analysis, few clear patterns appear at a first glance. The most important is probably that seven out of the ten solutions involve minorities that did not claim self-government rights. This might sound trivial but it explains 78.1% of the outcome (*cf.* Table 5). Moreover, it raises the question why some minorities claim self-government rights, while others do not. This should definitely be addressed by further research. For those who aspire to have self-government rights, two patterns appear.

¹⁷ As Daftary (2008) reports, two policemen were killed when they stormed an occupied wine depot in 1975 (p. 281). In 1998, the Prefect of Corsica was murdered (p. 282) and in 1999, two bombs exploded in the Corsican capital Ajaccio (p. 291).

First, the three Sami minorities and the Cornish in the United Kingdom live in states with promotional nationalisms but they are small and not territorially concentrated. In addition, except the transnational presence of the Sami, no other minorities or kin-states engendered spill-over effects. This is summarized by formula (3).

Secondly, the Bretons, Basques and Catalans are all concentrated and might even hope for spill-over effects from the Corsican statute. However, it seems difficult for them to push their claims forward in a French state with a liberal agnostic nationalism. Although this result is just as contradictory as in the previous section, it has to be underlined and is expressed by formula (1-2).

Table 5: Final mvQCA Results for the Non-Conferral of Self-government Rights

<i>Origin</i>	<i>Formula</i>	<i>Consistency</i>	<i>Coverage</i>
(4-10)	Mobil{1+2+3}	1	0.781
(3)	Size{0} * Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}	1	0.125
(1-2)	Mobil{4} * Nation{1} * Terr{1}	0.75	0.009

b) Self-administration Rights

For the conferral of self-administration rights, no variables have initially been identified with perfect consistence and coverage. States with promotional nationalism appear, however, to cover most of the outcome. The raw minimization operated with *Tosmana* provided four already quite reduced solutions.

- (1) Size{1} * Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{1} * Terr{1}
- (2) Size{0} * Mobil{3} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2}
- (3) Size{0} * Mobil{3} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}
- (4) Size{0} * Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}

Solution (1) corresponds to the Breton case, has no adjacent solutions and was mainly kept without changes for the final results (*cf.* Table 6). As earlier, one can wonder why the group did not obtain a statute similar to that of Corsica although it makes similar claims. Again, the group's mobilization did probably not convince the French liberal agnostic nationalism. Furthermore, one should note that the Breton statute comes with its position as

decentralized regional entity, which is rather unstable. It used indeed to be the case of Alsatians too, but they have now been integrated into a larger (Grand-Est) region along with other territories.

Solutions (2) and (3) can be combined insofar as one can validly make the simplifying assumption that the unimportance of other minorities, transnational minorities and a kin-state would not have provided them with fewer rights than they have, and with more than they claim. Solution (4) has to be kept unchanged because the previous assumption cannot be made. They claim indeed more self-governance rights than they have, and external support could have changed their statute.

Table 6: Final mvQCA Results for the Conferral of Self-administration Rights

<i>Origin</i>	<i>Formula</i>	<i>Consistency</i>	<i>Coverage</i>
(1)	Size{1} * Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{1} * Terr{1}	1	0.125
(2-3)	Size{0} * Mobil{3} * Nation{2}	0.364	0.500
(4)	Size{0} * Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}	0.750	0.375
(2-4*)	Size{0} * Mobil{3+4} * [Minor{1}+Trans{1}+Kin{1}] * Nation{2}	0.529	0.500

Thus, the main finding is that self-administration rights are conferred in states with promotional nationalism to small minorities who claim self-administration rights, or to small minorities which claim self-government rights but are not territorially concentrated and do not have external support. In addition, they may be obtained by large sub-state entities in states with an agnostic liberal nationalism. However, several nuances have to be noted regarding the contradictions that undermine the consistency of solutions (2-3) and (4).

First, the Frisians in the Netherlands have the same characteristics as the Ladini in Italy but have a self-organization statute rather than self-administration rights. Similarly, the Kven in Norway and Meänkieli in Sweden have the same characteristics as Slovenians in Italy but an individual rights statute. The reason for this discrepancy might be that the Ladini and Slovenians did not obtain their rights through the spill-over or external support of other minorities, transnational minorities or a kin-state. But they are in the very special situation of

constituting a minority within a minority. One could hence assume that it was easier for them to mobilize in sub-state groups with autonomy statutes like South-Tyrol (for the Ladini) and Friuli-Venezia Giulia (for the Slovenians).

Secondly, the Croats and Slovenians in Austria have the same characteristics as the Germans in Denmark and Danes in Germany but also enjoy self-organization rights rather than self-administration. This discrepancy may come with the very special situation of the German-Danish border region where the rights' conferral of both minorities was not only facilitated by kin-state support but also thanks to the reciprocal kinship (Malloy, 2015, pp. 185-186). This reciprocity situation did not exist between Austria and former Yugoslavia (EURAC, 2010a, pp. 8, 15), and might explain the absence of conferred self-administration rights.

Thirdly and finally, the Cornish in the United Kingdom have the same characteristics as the Sami in Finland but dispose of a self-organization statute. This discrepancy is more difficult to explain. The Sami in Finland did indeed have neither direct nor indirect external support but their longstanding claims (Engmann, 1995, pp. 200-202), which were advanced more steadily and unanimously than in Cornwall (Willett & Tredinnick-Rowe, 2016, pp. 777-780), might be one reason. Moreover, Finnish nationalism has been defined as promotional but the country's very special situation of a quasi-bilingual state (*Constitution of Finland*, sections 17, 122) might have made elites more open to the conferring sub-national groups a special statute.

The observations based on these contradictions led me to compose a fourth alternative formula (2-4*) which might contain some logical redundancies but underlines the persistent importance of (indirect) external support and better balances consistency and coverage. In addition, one should note that except the Ladini, who are also covered by that solution, all other minorities are territorially dispersed.

c) Self-organization Rights

The conferral of self-organization rights is not related to variables with important consistency or coverage scores. The raw minimization carried out by *Tosmana* provided the following seven reduced formulas.

- (1) Size{1} * Mobil{3} * Minor{1} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{1}
- (2) Size{0} * Mobil{4} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{1} * Terr{1}
- (3) Size{0} * Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2}
- (4) Size{0} * Mobil{3} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}
- (5) Size{0} * Mobil{3} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}
- (6) Size{0} * Mobil{3} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2}
- (7) Size{0} * Mobil{2} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}

Formulas (1) and (2) refer to minorities within nationally agnostic liberal France and can be grouped by associating the mobilization degrees with a logical OR. While the importance of other minorities appears to be logically redundant, this cannot be said with certainty of transnational or kin-state support. Interestingly, Alsatians and Occitanians do not follow the ambitions of Basques, Bretons and Catalans to have an autonomy statute like Corsica, but want to have a regional self-administration like the Bretons. The absence of such a statute is difficult to explain since Alsatians used to form a French region but have later been integrated into a larger (Grand-Est) region. The Occitan territory is large enough for being an own region but has never been one in the past and is not homogeneously habituated by the Occitan minority.¹⁸ In both cases, the way their claims are put forward might not be at the height of its content. Finally, one should note that the previously mentioned contradiction between the Corsican and the Basque (and Catalan) statutes applies here in the same way.

Solution (7) corresponds to small dispersed minorities claiming self-organization rights in states with promotional nationalisms. The importance of other minorities for their rights appeared to be a similar conjunction and was left out. Solutions (3) to (6) comprise small minorities with mobilization degrees three and four in states with promotional nationalisms.

¹⁸ The French regional fusion of 2016 created a region called *Occitania*, but it comprises only 12 out of the 30 departments with Occitan populations (Coste, 2016). The Region of Brittany comprises at least four out of the five departments with Breton populations.

When grouping these categories, the importance of other minorities and kinship cancels out. As for the territoriality, only the Frisians in the Netherlands are concentrated but this appears not to have changed their statute.

Table 7: Final mvQCA Results for the Conferral of Self-organization Rights

<i>Origin</i>	<i>Formula</i>	<i>Consistency</i>	<i>Coverage</i>
(1-2)	Mobil{3+4} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{1}	0.667	0.286
(7)	Size{0} * Mobil{2} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}	0.800	0.286
(3-6)	Size{0} * Mobil{3+4} * Trans{0} * Nation{2}	0.353	0.428

Although the minimization has allowed for developing quite reduced solutions (*cf.* Table 7), it is difficult to draw an overall lesson. The existing contradictions raise two main questions: why do the minorities that claim self-administration rights not obtain them although they have similar characteristics to those who do and why do minorities who claim self-organization rights obtain them although they have characteristics similar to minorities who also claim them but have only individual rights?

For the first question, it has been explained earlier that, although it was not captured by the coding, the indirect external support and reciprocal kinship contributed to the conferral of self-administration rights for Ladini and Slovenes in Italy and the German-Danish border region. For the second question, the answer is more difficult. One could indeed argue again that the Meänkieli in Norway and Finns and Kven in Sweden were not able to mobilize as much as the Swedes in Finland were, or that the bilingual national understanding in Finland was particularly open to the rights conferral. However, one could also argue that the Meänkieli in Norway and the Finns and Kven in Sweden are just as much consulted by the government as the Swedes in Finland and the Cornish in the United Kingdom are, but that their statute is just not officialized through a legal requirement. I think that there is something to both explanations. On the one hand, their statutes might come *de facto* close to each other.

But *de jure*, a legally securer situation derives for the Swedes in Finland and Cornish in the United Kingdom.

Based on these further explanations, the conferral of self-organization rights might be understood as corresponding to small and usually dispersed minorities in states with promotional nationalism, which claim self-organization rights and are mobilized enough to obtain them, or which claim self-government and self-administration rights but do not have the necessary mobilization or external support for obtaining them. In addition, self-organization rights have been conferred to large minorities in states with a liberal agnostic nationalism, which claimed self-governance or self-administration rights but did not obtain them either.

d) Individual Rights

Minorities with individual rights appear to be small and to have no spill-over effect or support from other minorities, transnational minorities or a kin state. The interactions of these variables with others in relation to both the conferral and the non-conferral of individual rights have now to be studied.

The Conferral of Individual Rights

The raw minimization calculated by *Tosmana* did not allow for much reduction but provided the following four formulas for explaining the conferral of individual rights.

- (1) $\text{Size}\{0\} * \text{Mobil}\{1\} * \text{Minor}\{0\} * \text{Trans}\{0\} * \text{Kin}\{0\} * \text{Nation}\{2\}$
- (2) $\text{Size}\{0\} * \text{Mobil}\{1\} * \text{Minor}\{0\} * \text{Trans}\{0\} * \text{Kin}\{0\} * \text{Nation}\{3\} * \text{Terr}\{0\}$
- (3) $\text{Size}\{0\} * \text{Mobil}\{2\} * \text{Trans}\{0\} * \text{Kin}\{0\} * \text{Nation}\{2\} * \text{Terr}\{0\}$
- (4) $\text{Size}\{0\} * \text{Mobil}\{3\} * \text{Minor}\{0\} * \text{Trans}\{0\} * \text{Kin}\{0\} * \text{Nation}\{2\}$

Formulas (1) and (2) can be combined by the supposedly trivial but still important observation that they comprise minorities that did not ask for any self-governance rights. This is the case for 70% of the outcome (*cf.* Table 8) and should, as stated similarly earlier, attract the interest of further research regarding why minorities develop different degrees of

mobilization. Formulas (3) and (4) can be combined by merging the adjacent degrees of mobilization through a logical OR.

Table 8: Final mvQCA Results for the Conferral of Individual Rights

Origin	Formula	Consistency	Coverage
(1-2)	Mobil{1}	1	0.7
(3-4)	Size{0} * Mobil{2+3} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}	0.6	0.3

The main finding is that minorities with individual rights do not ask for any self-governance rights or do so, but are small, territorially dispersed and do not have external support from other minorities, transnational minorities or a kin-state. The second part of this intermediate conclusion involves some contradictions that concern the Kven in Norway and the Finns and Meänkieli in Sweden. They have been discussed in the previous sections and are partly related to what follows – the reasons for conferring more than individual rights.

The Non-Conferral of Individual Rights

While no variable appears to be a necessary condition for conferring more than individual rights, large group size and external support from other minorities, transnational minorities or a kin-state can be considered as sufficient conditions. The raw minimization operated with *Tosmana* provided the following twelve formulas.

- (1) Size{1} * Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{3} * Terr{1}
- (2) Size{1} * Mobil{4} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{1}
- (3) Size{1} * Mobil{3} * Minor{1} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{1} * Terr{1}
- (4) Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{1}
- (5) Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{1} * Terr{1}
- (6) Size{0} * Mobil{4} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{1} * Terr{1}
- (7) Size{0} * Mobil{4} * Minor{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}
- (8) Size{0} * Mobil{4} * Minor{1} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{3} * Terr{1}
- (9) Size{0} * Mobil{3} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2}
- (10) Size{0} * Mobil{3} * Minor{0} * Trans{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}
- (11) Size{0} * Mobil{3} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}
- (12) Size{0} * Mobil{2} * Trans{0} * Kin{0} * Nation{2} * Terr{0}

Formulas (1) to (5) have in common that they comprise large groups. While that would on its own already be sufficient for a consistent outcome, one can validly assume that a

certain degree of mobilization is also necessary to obtain more than individual rights – in the present case, degrees three and four have been observed. Formulas (4) and (5) also comprise small groups which, taken together with solutions (6) to (12), appear to obtain more than individual rights once they mobilize. However, the previously observed contradictions can only be excluded when emphasizing the importance of some external support through other minorities, external minorities or a kin-state – like solution (4-12*) does.

Table 9: Final mvQCA Results for the Non-Conferral of Individual Rights

<i>Origin</i>	<i>Formula</i>	<i>Consistency</i>	<i>Coverage</i>
(1-5)	Size{1} * Mobil{3+4}	1	0.390
(4-12)	Size{0} * Mobil{2+3+4}	0.893	0.610
(4-12*)	Size{0} * Mobil{2+3+4} * [Minor{1}+Trans{1}+Kin{1}]	1	0.366

2. PROCESS ORIENTED MODEL-BUILDING

In the first section of the analysis, the *mvQCA* made it possible to understand the most important constellations for the conferral of different degrees of self-governance rights. The objective of this second analytical section is to go beyond these constellations and to examine to which extent the outcome of a rights conferral process is associated with its starting point and the intermediate variables.

In the last section of the first chapter, four different procedural models accounting for the conferral's starting point, contextual variables and the states' nationalism as receptor or final condition have been developed both theoretically and through preliminary observations. Based on the classifications in chapter two (*cf.* Appendix 2), every minority has been assigned through the starting point of its rights conferral process to one of the four models – starting with (a) an own mobilization, (b) kin-state support, (c) rights of other (national) minorities and (d) rights of transnational minorities. To account for the procedural interaction of the variables, their coding has been adapted to some extent.

First, the four starting point variables are coded vis-à-vis the level of rights that was claimed by the minority (like before), but also vis-à-vis the level of rights supported by the kin-state or detained by other minorities or transnational minorities. The reason for this adaptation is to allow for more differentiation in the starting point variable when relating it to the outcome.

Secondly, when the presence of other minorities, transnational minorities or a kin-state are contextual variables, they are coded from now on vis-à-vis their mere presence or absence, not their importance or unimportance for the rights' conferral. The reason for this adaptation is that the idea of 'importance of the rights conferral' is already captured by the starting point variable.

Thirdly, the procedural analysis only makes sense for minorities that actually claim self-governance rights. Absent claims might be caused by the interaction of different variables but there is nothing they could interact with to explain the (non-)conferral of self-governance rights. Since not the former but the latter is the question of this thesis, minorities without self-governance claims are not included in this procedural analysis.

a) Model 1: Rights Obtained Through Own Mobilization

The truth table for the first procedural model (*cf.* Table 10) comprises all cases that appeared to obtain their rights starting with their own mobilization. In addition, the minorities which were mobilized but did not obtain self-governance rights are also included because their (unsuccessful) mobilization could be an interesting counterfactual.¹⁹ When looking at the consistency scores, one can see that except for two cases, all distributions are perfectly consistent. The remaining inconsistency is, furthermore, the only one of all four models. The

¹⁹ Moreover, the absence of their rights cannot be explained by any spill-over effects or support from other minorities, transnational minorities or a kin-state.

coverage scores are calculated vis-à-vis the outcome level and not the entire model. Over-interpretations based on a limited number of cases should therefore be avoided.

Table 10: Truth Table for Model 1 – Rights Obtained Through own Mobilization

Cases	Start	Context					Receptor	Outcome	N	Cons.	Cover.
	Mobil	Other	Trans	Kin	Size	Terr	Nation				
SPA_Galic, UK_Scots, ITA_Sard, ITA_Sicil	4	1	0	0	1	1	2	4	4	1	0.364
SPA_Basq, SPA_Catal	4	1	1	0	1	1	2	4	2	1	0.182
FIN_Aland, UK_Manx	4	1	0	0	0	1	2	4	2	1	0.182
SWI_Franc, SWI_Ital	4	1	0	1	1	1	3	4	2	1	0.182
FRA_Cors	4	1	0	0	0	1	1	4	1	1	0.091
FIN_Sami	4	1	1	0	0	0	2	3	1	1	0.250
ITA_Slove	3	1	0	1	0	0	2	3	1	1	0.250
ITA_Ladi	3	1	0	0	0	1	2	3	1	1	0.250
FRA_Bret	4	1	0	0	1	1	1	3	1	1	0.250
FRA_Basq	4	1	1	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	0.250
NET_Fris	3	0	1	0	0	1	2	2	1	1	0.250
UK_Corn	4	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	0.250
FIN_Swed	2	1	0	1	0	0	2	2	1	0,5	0.250
SWE_Finns	2	1	0	1	0	0	2	1	1	0,5	0.333
NOR_Kven, SWE_Meän	3	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	1	0.666

The cases which obtained self-government rights all show, like before, territorial concentration and varying sizes. Other minorities are present for all of them, whereas transnational minorities and kin-states only appear occasionally. Interestingly, all types of states' nationalism are represented, which shows that none of them excludes *per se* the conferral of self-government rights. For the other degrees of rights, patterns are less clear.

Self-administration rights appear to be usually conferred to minorities with small sizes, whereas their territoriality varies. Other minorities are present for all of them, while some have kin-states or transnational minorities. The claims of the Sami in Finland and the Bretons in France exceed their degree of rights. When comparing them to the cases which do have self-government rights, the Sami might lack territorial concentration. Bretons, in turn, have

managed to obtain their own region but were unable to benefit from the Corsican statute, as explained in the previous section.

Self-organization rights are only conferred to small minorities, their territoriality and the presence of other groups or a kin-state varies. For almost all of them, claims exceed rights. The Cornish might, like the Sami before, lack territorial concentration for obtaining self-government rights. The Frisians are in the particular situation of having their own institutions but were not able to obtain significant group-related competences. The Basques, like the Bretons, did not manage to obtain a statute similar to that of Corsica.

Minorities with individual rights, finally, do not differ greatly from minorities with self-organization rights. Interestingly, the Finns in Sweden and the Swedes in Finland have, despite their similar characteristics and reciprocal national constellation, divergent rights, which might be explained through the already invoked Finnish bilingual nationalism.

The results show that mobilization might be an important necessary condition for the conferral of rights, but presents almost no sufficiency at all. Even the procedural analysis provided only little additional information about the constellations in which mobilization succeeds and in which it does not. Further research should therefore not only address why minorities mobilize and develop different claims but also under which conditions these claims succeed.

b) Model 2: Rights Obtained Starting with Kin-state Support

The truth table for the second procedural model (*cf.* Table 11), where the rights conferral process starts with the support of a kin-state, shows not only perfectly consistent distributions but also a very consistent association between the degree of rights supported by the kin-state and the final degree of rights obtained by the minority. In the Austrian case, the precise extent of Yugoslavia's support was difficult to evaluate but appears to be rather of the second than of

the third rights degree. Interestingly, it is also in Austria where the rights claimed by the minorities exceed those initially supported by the kin-state. That underlines that there is also room for the evolution of claims, especially when then initially supported level of rights is rather low.

The results of this second model show thereby that kin-state support as starting point for the rights conferral process is a good indicator for the finally obtained rights. The claims that are developed by minorities appear to follow this support but might evolve on lower degrees.

Table 11: Truth Table for Model 2 – Rights Obtained Through Kin-state Support

Cases	Start	Context					Receptor	Outcome	N	Cons.	Cover.
	Kin*	Mobil	Other	Trans	Size	Terr	Nation				
ITA_Franc, ITA_Styrol	4	4	1	0	0	1	2	4	2	1	0.666
ITA_Friul	4	4	1	0	1	1	2	4	1	1	0.333
DMK_Germ	3	3	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	1	0.500
GER_Danes	3	3	1	0	0	0	2	3	1	1	0.500
AUS_Croat, AUS_Slove	2(3)	3	1	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1

*Sources: for Italy, *cf.* Langereau (1975, pp. 19-25) and Kusstatscher (2008, pp. 8-10); for Denmark and Germany, *cf.* Schaefer-Rolffs (2014, p. 89); and for Austria, *cf.* EURAC (2010a, pp. 8-9).

c) Model 3: Rights Obtained in the Image of Other Minorities

The truth table for model three (*cf.* Table 12), illustrating the rights conferral process starting with rights obtained at the image of other (co-)national minorities, also shows perfect consistency. Surprisingly, spill-over effects only took place for self-government and self-organization but not for self-administration rights – although there are two cases where the latter could have happened, namely for the Frisians and Sorbs in Germany. Both cases are also the only ones where the spill-over of other minorities’ rights did not result in an identical statute.

Frisians and Sorbs have indeed, at the image of the Danes in Germany, an official representation at the Ministry of Interior. But they do not have a school system organized on

their own. For the Frisians, this might be due to the absence of such claims.²⁰ For the Sorbs, self-administration claims exist but have not yet been met, probably due to the absence of a reciprocal kin-state relationship like the one with Denmark.²¹

Other minorities do also claim more rights than those obtained in the image of other minorities. The Alsatians, Occitans and Catalans in France obtained an own public office for language promotion and interest representation, in the image of the Basque language office. While the Basques and Catalans want, however, a statute similar to that of Corsica, the Alsatians and Occitans aspire to be an own region like Britany. In Austria, Hungarians developed claims similar to the ones made by the Slovenians and Croats.

The results of this third model show that the rights obtained by national minorities might profit other minorities of the state, but that the latter do not necessarily obtain all the rights of the former – especially if they are in a state with an agnostic liberal nationalism or do not have further external support.

Table 12: Truth Table for Model 3 – Rights Obtained in the Image of other Minorities

State	Start	Context					Receptor	Outcome	N	Cons.	Cover.
	Other	Mobil	Trans	Kin	Size	Terr	Nation				
UK_Welsh, ²² SPA_Arag, SPA_Andal, SPA_Valen	4	4	0	0	1	1	2	4	4	1	0.800
BEL_Ger-sp	4	4	0	1	0	1	3	4	1	1	0.200
AUS_Czech, AUS_Slova	2	2	0	1	0	0	2	2	2	1	0.250
FRA_Alsat	2	3	0	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	0.125
FRA_Occit	2	3	1	0	1	0	1	2	1	1	0.125
AUS_Hung	2	3	0	1	0	0	2	2	1	1	0.125
FRA_Catal	2	4	1	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	0.125
GER_Fris	3	2	1	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	0.125
GER_Sorbs	3	3	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	0.125

²⁰ One should note that the Danish school system even provides education in Frisian for the Frisians in South-Schleswig (Jürgensen, 2014, p. 59).

²¹ The Foundation for the Sorbian People already exercises some cultural and education administration but is not an exclusively Sorbian institution (Rein, 2015, p. 167).

²² Wales first rejected self-government in a referendum in 1979. It was in a second referendum in 1997 that competence devolution was finally accepted by 50.3% (Keating, 2015, p. 128).

d) Model 4: Rights Obtained in the Image of Transnational Minorities

The fourth and last model that has been developed comprises only two cases. The Sami in Norway and Sweden profited indeed from the rights obtained by their Finnish counterparts. Their additional claims are also tightly linked to those of the Finnish Sami. The reason for the absence of self-government rights for all of them is probably their territorial dispersion. The relevance of these two cases for the overall model is difficult to assess. But for the sake of empirical completeness, it should also be considered.

Table 13: Truth Table for Model 4 – Rights Obtained in the Image of Transnational Minorities

State	Start	Context					Receptor	Outcome	N	Cons.	Cover.
	<i>Trans</i>	<i>Mobil</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Kin</i>	<i>Size</i>	<i>Terr</i>	<i>Nation</i>				
NOR_Sami, SWE_Sami	3	4	1	0	0	0	2	3	2	1	1

Conclusion

Western European states have conferred very different degrees of group autonomy to their historic national minorities. This diversity appeared to be puzzling insofar as both large and small groups have obtained both significant and few self-governance rights. Previous case studies point to six explanatory factors that have, together with minorities' group size, been compared to the obtained degree of self-governance rights for 51 national minorities.

The results of the *Multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis* suggest that territorial concentration, high group mobilization and non-dominant state nationalisms play an important role in the conferral of self-government rights. Self-administration rights, in turn, are usually obtained by minorities which claim self-administration rights and have external support, or by minorities which aspire self-government rights but lack external support and territorial concentration. Organizational rights in form of group representations appear to be conferred foremost to small and dispersed minorities which lack the external support for obtaining territorial autonomy or self-administration rights, and can also be related to the presence of a dominant state nationalism for larger minorities. The absence of any form of self-governance rights, finally, seems above all to be due to the absence of mobilization.

When accounting for the procedural interaction of the variables, it appears that in rights conferral processes starting with the support of a kin-state, transnational minorities or the rights of other (co-)national minorities, the eventually obtained degree of self-governance rights is closely associated to the degree of rights supported or obtained by these three. Group mobilization may be an important pre-condition for obtaining self-governance rights but proves, even at the beginning of the rights conferral process, to be no guarantee for the obtained self-governance rights.

Throughout the analysis, three difficulties have been encountered which should put these findings into perspective and incite for further research in the field. First, the distinction between the first and second degree of rights, i.e. between individual and self-organization rights, proved to be relevant both theoretically and empirically for most groups. Some cases, being officially consulted without legal requirement, showed nonetheless to fall somewhat within the distinction so that one can question how important the qualitative difference between both categories really is. Secondly, different contradictions arose over minorities having identical characteristics but different degrees of rights. While solutions have been suggested for most of them in the interpretation of the results, in-depth comparisons would be interesting for further insights. Thirdly, for reasons of comparability, the degree of mobilization has been examined vis-à-vis the content of claims and not vis-à-vis the way in which claims were stated – although the later sometimes proved necessary for further differentiation. Consequently, it would be useful to develop a systematic way to compare both the content and the form of group mobilizations.

Moreover, given that one of the most interesting findings of the study pointed to group mobilization as both necessary but also very insufficient condition, further research should especially address why some national minorities mobilize while others do not, and why some mobilizations succeed while others do not, independently of constellational factors.

Beyond these results and additional questions, the Master thesis comprised three general lessons or contributions – methodologically, empirically and societally. Methodologically, it developed a research design which operationalized self-governance rights and explanatory factors in a way that allowed for a constellational and procedural comparison of a large number of minority groups. Empirically, it went beyond individual or small-n case studies to compare such an important number of groups analytically. Societally, it allowed to get a better understanding of why states with common democratic standards confer different

degrees of self-governance to their national minorities, showing that there is more to group autonomy than just group sizes and dynamics of secession or costs.

Indeed, while group mobilization, territorial concentration and sometimes also external support and state nationalism prove important in different constellations and procedures, this attracts attention to those minorities who do not have a concentrated territory, who do not have external support, who live in a state with a dominant nationalism, and who are not able to mobilize or who do not succeed in their mobilization. Because, independently of the question whether having more or less rights is good or bad – which was and is not the object of this thesis – the presence or absence of national minorities' self-governance rights seems not only to depend on deliberate but also on contingent factors, whose interaction is important to keep in mind for academics, policy makers and minority observers in general.

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CONSULTED EXPERTS

- Gorter, Durk. Research Professor, *Basque Foundation for Science* (Bilbao). Consulted via E-Mail from May 2nd to May 14th, 2017 on the rights of the Frisians in the Netherlands.
- Ferraro, Filippo. Researcher, *European Academy* (Bolzano). Consulted via E-Mail from May 12th to May 19th, 2017 on the rights of the Albanians, Catalans, Greeks, Croats, Franco-provençaliens, Occitans and Ladini in Italy, and the Romansh in Switzerland.
- Mikel, Hubert. Secretary General, *Austrian Centre for Ethnic Groups* (Vienna). Consulted via E-Mail from May 18th to May 22th, 2017 on the rights of the Croats, Czechs, Hungarians, Slovaks and Slovenes in Austria.

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Appendix 1: National Minorities' Degree of Self-governance Rights

State	Minority	Rights	Sources	Classified as
Austria	Croats	Advisory minority councils (<i>Volksgruppenbeiräte</i>) are composed by the federal government for each minority to advise and represent the interests of the minority to the government.	Marko (2008); <i>Federal Act on the Legal Status of Ethnic Groups in Austria</i>	Self-organ. (2)
	Czechs			
	Hungarians			
	Slovaks			
	Slovenes			
Belgium	German-speakers	Constitute a federal sub-state entity with exclusive legal competences.	Bouhon, Niessen, and Reuchamps (2015); <i>Belgian Constitution</i>	Self-govern. (4)
Denmark	Germans	Organize as <i>League of German People of North-Schleswig</i> which coordinates its cultural member associations, an own party and administrates an own school system.	Schaefer-Rolffs (2014); <i>Statutes of the League of German People of North-Schleswig</i>	Self-admin. (3)
Finland	Åland Swedes	Dispose of a far-reaching territorial autonomy with exclusive legal competences.	Hepburn (2014); <i>Act on the Autonomy of Åland</i>	Self-govern. (4)
	Finland Swedes	Elect the <i>Swedish Assembly (Folktinget)</i> , which officially represents the interests of the minority to the government and parliament.	Folktinget (ed) (2015); <i>Act on the Swedish Assembly in Finland;</i> <i>Finnish Language Act</i>	Self-organ. (2)
	Sami	Elect their own parliament, which represents their interests to the government, administrates state subsidies and has to be formally consulted by the national parliament for Sami related issues.	Stępień et al. (2015); <i>Sami Parliament Act</i>	Self-admin. (3)
France	Alsations	The <i>Alsatian Cultural Council</i> was installed by the Region of Alsace to promote the groups' language and culture, and to assure an official representation function.	Alsacian Region (ed) (2015); Grand-Est Region (ed) (2016)	Self-organ. (2)
	Basques	The <i>Public Office for the Basque Language</i> was installed by national and regional state entities to promote the groups' language and culture, and to assure an official representation function.	Coyos (2012)	Self-organ. (2)
	Bretons	The <i>Region of Brittany</i> is a regional sub-state entity with administrative competences.	Sempé (2012)	Self-admin. (3)
	Catalans	The <i>Public Office for the Catalan Language</i> was installed by the Region of Occitania to promote the groups' language and culture, and to assure an official representation function.	Regional Council of Occitania (2016)	Self-organ. (2)
	Corsicans	The <i>Region of Corsica</i> is a decentralized state entity with additional competences and a special autonomy statute allowing for the adaptation of national laws under the supervision of the National Assembly.	Daftary (2008); <i>Corsica Law</i>	Self-govern. (4)
	Occitans	The <i>Public Office for the Occitan Language</i> was installed by the Region of Occitania to promote the groups' language and culture, and to assure an official representation function.	Roux (2017); <i>Constitutive Convention of the Public Office for the Occitan Language</i>	Self-organ. (2)

Germany	Danes	Are represented (with state officials) in the <i>Advisory Commission for Questions of the Danish Minority at the Federal Ministry of Interior</i> . The <i>Danish School Association for South-Schleswig</i> is allowed to organize an own school system.	Schaefer-Rolffs (2014); Malloy (2015); <i>Constitution of Schleswig-Holstein</i>	Self-admin. (3)
	Frisians	Organize as <i>Frisian Council - North</i> (Northfrisians) and <i>Seelter Union</i> (Eastfrisians), and are represented through these (with state officials) in the <i>Advisory Commission for Questions of Frisian People at the Federal Ministry of Interior</i> .	Pan and Pfeil (2006, Chapter 6)	Self-organ. (2)
	Sorbs	Organize as <i>Domowina</i> and are represented (with state officials) in the <i>Advisory Commission for Questions of the Sorbian People at the Federal Ministry of Interior</i> . The <i>Foundation for the Sorbian People</i> subsidizes cultural and education activities but is largely composed by state officials.	Rein (2015); <i>States-Treaty between Brandenburg and Saxony on the Establishment of the Foundation for the Sorbian People</i>	Self-organ. (2)
Italy	Albanians	The Albanian language is recognized by the Italian law and in regional autonomy statutes. The group has different cultural associations but no officially consulted interest representation.	Institut de Sociolingüística Catalana (ed.) (1996a); Sierp (1999); Ferraro (consulted expert)	Individ. rights (1)
	Catalans	The Catalan language is recognized by the Italian law and promoted through the municipality statute of Alghero. The group has different cultural associations but no officially consulted interest representation.	Sierp (1999); Institut de Sociolingüística Catalana (ed.) (1996b); Minder (2016b); Ferraro (consulted expert)	Individ. rights (1)
	Croats	The Croatian language is recognized by the Italian law and the Region of Molise. The group has different cultural associations but no officially consulted interest representation.	Sierp (1999); Minority Rights Group (ed.) (2017a); Ferraro (consulted expert)	Individ. rights (1)
	Francophones	Dispose of the <i>Autonomous Region of the Aosta Valley</i> , which is a regional sub-state entity with a special statute and own legal competences.	Baldini and Baldi (2014); <i>Special Statute for the Aosta Valley</i>	Self-govern. (4)
	Franco-provencalians	The Franco-provencalian language is recognized by the Italian law and the Region of Piedmont. The group has different cultural associations but no officially consulted interest representation.	Chiarini (2013); Ferraro (consulted expert)	Individ. rights (1)
	Friaulians	Are a majority in the <i>Autonomous Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia</i> , which is a regional sub-state entity with a special statute and own legal competences. In addition, the <i>Regional Agency for the Friulian Language</i> was installed by the Regional Council with important representative and administrative competences.	Vidau (2013); <i>Regional Law for the Protection, Enhancement and Promotion of the Friulian Language</i>	Self-govern. (4)
	Greeks	The Croatian language is recognized by the Italian law and the Region of Calabria. The group organizes through different <i>Comunità e Confraternite Elleniche</i> but there is no officially consulted interest representation.	Minority Rights Group (ed.) (2017b); <i>Statutes of the Federation of Hellenic Communities and Fraternities in Italy</i> ; Ferraro (consulted expert)	Individ. rights (1)
Ladini	Are represented in South-Tyrolean provincial institutions and organize an own school system.	Spagnoli (2015); Autonomous Province Bolzano – South Tyrol (ed) (2017); Ferraro (consulted expert)	Self-admin. (3)	

	Occitans	The Occitan language is recognized by the Italian law and the Region of Piedmont. The group organizes as <i>Chambra d'Oc</i> , which is consulted by regional authorities but without formal statute.	Chiarini (2013); Ferraro (consulted expert)	Individ. rights (1)
	Sardinian	Constitute the <i>Autonomous Region of Sardinia</i> , which is a regional sub-state entity with own legal competences.	Baldini and Baldi (2014); <i>Special Statute for Sardinia</i>	Self-govern. (4)
	Sicilians	Constitute the <i>Autonomous Region of Sicily</i> , which is a regional sub-state entity with own legal competences.	Baldini and Baldi (2014); <i>Special Statute for Sicily</i>	Self-govern. (4)
	Slovenes	The <i>Regional Consultative Commission for the Slovenian Linguistic Minority</i> was installed and has to be consulted by the regional authorities. In addition, Slovenian minority schools are administrated by the minority.	Vidau (2013); <i>Regional Law on the Protection of the Slovenian Linguistic Minority</i> ; <i>Presidential Decree on the Institution of a Regional School Commission for the Instruction in Slovenian.</i>	Self-admin. (3)
	South-Tyroleans	The <i>Autonomous Province of Bolzano – South Tyrol</i> exercises the legal competences of the <i>Autonomous Region Trentino Alto-Adige</i> on its territory.	Siegl (2010); <i>Special Statute for Trentino-South Tyrol</i>	Self-govern. (4)
Netherlands	Frisians	The <i>Province of Friesland</i> is a decentralized state entity with administrative territorial competences. The <i>Organization for the Frisian Language</i> represents the interests of the group to the Dutch government.	Gorter, Riemersma, and Ytsma (2001); <i>Constitution of Kingdom of the Netherlands</i> ; <i>Law on the Use of the Frisian Language</i>	Self-organ. (2)
Norway	Kven	Organize and voice their interests as <i>Kven Association</i> , which is consulted by the government, but without formal statute.	Ryymin (2001); Verrill (2014)	Individ. rights (1)
	Sami	Elect their own parliament, which represents their interests to the government, administrates state subsidies, protects cultural heritage and makes Sami school curricula.	Stępień et al. (2015); <i>Sami Act</i>	Self-admin. (3)
Spain	Andalousians	Constitute regional sub-state entities with exclusive legal competences.	Colino (2008); León (2010); <i>Spanish Constitution</i>	Self-govern. (4)
	Aragonese			
	Basques			
	Catalans			
	Galicians			
Valencians	CEU eTD Collection			
Sweden	Finns	Organize and voice their interests through the <i>Sweden Finnish Delegation</i> , which is consulted by the government, but without formal statute.	Mänty (2012)	Individ. rights (1)
	Meänkieli	Organize and voice their interests through the <i>Svenska Tornedalingars Riksförbund – Tornionlaaksolaiset</i> which is consulted by the government, but without formal statute	Arola, Kunnas, and Winsa (2013)	Individ. rights (1)
	Sami	Elect their own parliament which represents their interests to the government, administrates state subsidies and appoints the Sami school board.	Stępień et al. (2015); <i>Sami Parliament Act</i>	Self-admin. (3)

Switzerland	Francophones	Correspond largely to groups of cantons which constitute federal sub-state entities with exclusive legal competences. They have, furthermore, a guaranteed representation in the government.	Kriesi and Trechsel (2008); <i>Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation</i>	Self-govern. (4)
	Italians			
	Romansh	Organize and voice their interests through the <i>Lia Rumantscha</i> which is consulted by the government, but without formal statute.	Lechmann (2005) ; Ferraro (consulted expert)	Individ. rights (1)
United Kingdom	Cornish	The <i>Cornish Language Partnership</i> was installed as an institution to promote the Cornish language and represent its interests.	Ferdinand (2013)	Self-organization (2)
	Manx Gaelic	The <i>Isle of Man</i> disposes as so called <i>Crown Dependency</i> of a proper insular autonomy with exclusive legal competences.	Tkacik (2008)	Self-govern. (4)
	Scots	Constitutes a regional sub-state entities with some exclusive legal competences.	Jeffery and Wincott (2006); <i>Scotland Act; Wales Act</i>	Self-govern. (4)
	Welsh			

Appendix 2: National Minorities' Degree of Mobilization and the Importance of other Minorities, Transnational Minorities or a Kin-state for their Rights

State	Minority	Claimed Rights	Sources	Importance of other minorities, transnational minorities or a kin-state	Sources
Austria	Croats	Self-admin. (3)	KKVO (ed) (2011)	Kin-state (Yugoslavia)	EURAC (2010a)
	Czechs	Self-organ. (2)	Mikel (consulted expert)	Other minorities	EURAC (2010a)
	Hungarians	Self-admin. (3)	Mikel (consulted expert)	Other minorities	EURAC (2010a)
	Slovaks	Self-organ. (2)	Mikel (consulted expert)	Other minorities	EURAC (2010a)
	Slovenes	Self-admin. (3)	Mikel (consulted expert)	Kin-state (Yugoslavia)	EURAC (2010a)
Belgium	German-speakers	Self-govern. (4)	Brüll (2005)	Other minorities	Bouhon et al. (2015)
Denmark	Germans	Self-admin. (3)	Schaefer-Rolffs (2014)	Kin-state	Schaefer-Rolffs (2014)
Finland	Åland Swedes	Self-govern. (4)	Hepburn (2014)	None (own mobilization)	Hepburn (2014)
	Finland Swedes	Self-organ. (2)	Folktinget (ed) (2015)	None (own mobilization)	Engmann (1995) ; Folktinget (ed) (2015)
	Sami	Self-govern. (4)	Stępień et al. (2015)	None (own mobilization)	Stępień et al. (2015)
France	Alsations	Self-admin. (3)	Agrikoliansky (2003)	Other minorities	Klein (2016)
	Basques	Self-govern. (4)	Gurrutxaga (2005)	None (own mobilization)	Jauréguiberry (2008)
	Bretons	Self-govern. (4)	Pasquier (2004)	None (own mobilization)	Pasquier (2003)
	Catalans	Self-govern. (4)	Gonter (2016)	Other minorities	Andreu (2015)
	Corsicans	Self-govern. (4)+	Daftary (2008)	None (own mobilization)	Daftary (2008)
	Occitans	Self-admin. (3)	Assémat (2011); Latrubesse (2009)	Other minorities	Benaset (2017)
Germany	Danes	Self-admin. (3)	Schaefer-Rolffs (2014)	Kin-state	Schaefer-Rolffs (2014)
	Frisians	Self-organ. (2)	Jürgensen (2011)	Other minorities	Nordfriisk Instituut (ed) (2015)
	Sorbs	Self-admin. (3)	Rein (2015)	Other minorities	Nordfriisk Instituut (ed) (2015)
Italy	Albanians	Individ. rights (1)	Ferraro (consulted expert)	–	–
	Catalans	Individ. rights (1)	Ferraro (consulted expert)	–	–
	Croats	Individ. rights (1)	Ferraro (consulted expert)	–	–
	Francophones	Self-govern. (4)	Sandri (2012)	Kin-state	Langereau (1975)
	Franco-provencalians	Individ. rights (1)	Ferraro (consulted expert)	–	–
	Friaulians	Self-govern. (4)	Coluzzi (2007)	Kin-state (Yugoslavia)	EURAC (2010b)
	Greeks	Individ. rights (1)	Ferraro (consulted expert)	–	–

	Ladini	Self-admin. (3)	Ferraro (consulted expert)	None (own mobilization)	Peterlini (2012)
	Occitans	Individ. rights (1)	Ferraro (consulted expert)	–	–
	Sardinian	Self-govern. (4)+	Baldini and Baldi (2014)	None (own mobilization)	Baldini and Baldi (2014)
	Sicilians	Self-govern. (4)+	Baldini and Baldi (2014)	None (own mobilization)	Baldini and Baldi (2014)
	Slovenians	Self-admin. (3)	Vidau (2013)	None (own mobilization)	Vidau (2013)
	South-Tyroleans	Self-govern. (4)	Kusstatscher (2008)	Kin-state	Kusstatscher (2008)
Netherlands	Frisians	Self-admin. (3)	Dingtiid (ed.) (2015)	None (own mobilization)	Gorter (consulted expert)
Norway	Kven	Self-admin. (3)	Verrill (2014)	–	–
	Sami	Self-govern. (4)	Stępień et al. (2015)	Transnational	Stępień et al. (2015)
Spain	Andalousians	Self-govern. (4)	Colino (2008)	Other minorities	Colino (2008)
	Aragonese	Self-govern. (4)	Colino (2008)	Other minorities	Colino (2008)
	Basques	Self-govern. (4)+	Colino (2008)	None (own mobilization)	Colino (2008)
	Catalans	Self-govern. (4)+	Colino (2008)	None (own mobilization)	Colino (2008)
	Galicians	Self-govern. (4)+	Colino (2008)	None (own mobilization)	Colino (2008)
	Valencians	Self-govern. (4)	Colino (2008)	Other minorities	Colino (2008)
Sweden	Finns	Self-organ. (2)	Mänty (2012)	–	–
	Meänkieli	Self-admin. (3)	Arola et al. (2013)	–	–
	Sami	Self-govern. (4)	Stępień et al. (2015)	Transnational	Stępień et al. (2015)
Switzerland	Francophones	Self-govern. (4)	Kriesi and Trechsel (2008)	None (own mobilization)	Kriesi and Trechsel (2008)
	Italians	Self-govern. (4)	Kriesi and Trechsel (2008)	None (own mobilization)	Kriesi and Trechsel (2008)
	Romansh	Individ. rights (1)	Ferraro (consulted expert)	–	–
United Kingdom	Cornish	Self-govern. (4)	Willett and Tredinnick-Rowe (2016)	None (own mobilization)	Ferdinand (2013)
	Manx Gaelic	Self-govern. (4)	Belchem (2000)	None (own mobilization)	Belchem (2000)
	Scots	Self-govern. (4)+	Keating (2015)	None (own mobilization)	Keating (2015)
	Welsh	Self-govern. (4)	Keating (2015)	Other minorities	Keating (2015)

– : No source indicated that a group does not have self-organization, -administration or -government rights because of the presence of other minorities, transnational minorities or a kin-state.

+ : Some groups went even further in their claims and demanded actual independence. This is important to consider in the analysis.

Appendix 3: National Minorities' Size and Territorial Setting

State	Minority	Absolute Size	Source	Relative Size*	Classified as	Territoriality	Source
Austria	Croats	45,194	Statistics Austria (2017)	0.52	Small	0	Statistics Austria (2001, p. 19)
	Czechs	11,035		0.13	Small	0	Austrian Centre for Ethnic Groups (2001, p. 10)
	Hungarians	25,884		0.30	Small	0	Statistics Austria (2001, p. 19)
	Slovaks	3,343		0.04	Small	0	Austrian Centre for Ethnic Groups (2001, p. 10)
	Slovenes	17,953		0.20	Small	0	Statistics Austria (2001, p. 17)
Belgium	German-speakers	76,645	DG-Stat (2016)	0.67	Small	1	Niessen, Bouhon, and Reuchamps (2016, p. 257)
Denmark	Germans	15,000	Malloy (2005, p. 204)	0.26	Small	0	Malloy (2005, p. 189)
Finland	Åland Swedes	29,214	ASUB Åland (2016)	0.53	Small	1	Daftary (2001, pp. 20-21)
	Finland Swedes	261,763	Statistics Finland (2013)	4.76	Small	0	Suski (2008, pp. 199-201)
	Sami	8,000	Stępień et al. (2015, p. 118)	0.15	Small	0	Stępień et al. (2015, p. 121)
France	Alsations	1,080,000	OLCA (2012)	1.61	Large	1	Huck, Bothorel-Witz, and Geiger-Jaillet (2007, pp. 60-61)
	Basques	295,972	Allevi (2017)	0.44	Small	1	Allevi (2017)
	Bretons	2,863,445	Bretagne Culture Diversité (2014, p. 3); INED (2016)	5.96	Large	1	Bretagne Culture Diversité (2014, p. 3); INED (2016)
	Catalans	450,000	Minder (2016a)	0.67	Small	1	Minder (2016a)
	Corsicans	330,354	INED (2016)	0.49	Small	1	Daftary (2001, pp. 20-21)
	Occitans	1,200,000	Alet (2013)	1.79	Large	0	Alet (2013)
Germany	Danes	50,000	Malloy (2005, p. 204)	0.06	Small	0	Malloy (2005, p. 189)
	Frisians	62,000	Pan and Pfeil (2000, p. 61)	0.07	Small	0	Gudauskytė (2006, p. 25)
	Sorbs	60,000	Rein (2015, p. 164)	0.07	Small	0	Honnigfort (2014)
Italy	Albanians	80,000	Institut de Sociolingüística Catalana (ed.) (1996a)	0.13	Small	0	Freixeiro and Zeggi (2016)
	Catalans	43,000	Minder (2016b)	0.07	Small	1	
	Croats	2,000	Minority Rights Group (ed.) (2017a)	0.003	Small	0	
	Francophones	21,646	Istat (2016); Sandri (2012, p. 293)	0.04	Small	1	
	Franco-provencaliens	70,000	KUB Center on Multilingualism (ed.) (1996)	0.12	Small	0	Chiarini (2013, pp. 11-12)

	Friaulians	850,000	Vidau (2013, p. 34)	1.40	Large	1	Freixeiro and Zeggi (2016)	
	Greeks	15,000	Minority Rights Group (ed.) (2017b)	0.02	Small	0		
	Ladini	20,548	ASTAT (2016, p. 15)	0.03	Small	1		
		Occitans	50,000	Chiarini (2013, p. 3)	0.08	Small	1	Chiarini (2013, pp. 11-12)
		Sardinian	1,300,000	Minority Rights Group (ed.) (2017c)	2.14	Large	1	Freixeiro and Zeggi (2016)
		Sicilians	4,700,000	Ethnologue (ed.) (2002)	7.74	Large	1	
		Slovenes	100,000	Vidau (2013, p. 37)	0.16	Small	0	
		South-Tyroleans	314,604	ASTAT (2016, p. 15)	0.52	Small	1	
Netherlands		Frisians	400,000	NPLD Europe (ed.) (2013)	2.34	Small	1	
Norway		Kven	12,000	Verrill (2014, p. 2)	0.23	Small	0	Ryymin (2001, p. 54)
		Sami	40,000	Stępień et al. (2015, p. 118)	0.76	Small	0	Stępień et al. (2015, p. 121)
Spain	Andalousians	8,411,204	Statista (2017)	18.11	Large	1	Colino (2008, pp. 574-575)	
	Aragonese	1,317,465		2.84	Large	1		
	Basques	2,166,230		4.66	Large	1		
	Catalans	7,412,194		15.96	Large	1		
	Galicians	2,714,085		5.84	Large	1		
	Valencians	4,934,032		10.62	Large	1		
Sweden	Finns	250,000	Hult (2004, p. 190) ; Mänty (2012, p. 2)	2.50	Small	0	Mänty (2012, p. 2)	
	Meänkieli	55,000	Hult (2004, p. 190) ; Arola et al. (2013, p. 1)	0.55	Small	0	Arola et al. (2013, pp. 1-2)	
	Sami	15,000	Stępień et al. (2015, p. 118)	0.15	Small	0	Stępień et al. (2015, p. 121)	
Switzerland	Francophones	1,717,211	Federal Statistical Office (2016a)	20.4	Large	1	Zanoli (2006)	
	Italians	547,150		6.50	Large	1		
	Romansh	42,088		0.50	Small	0		
Unit. Kingd.	Cornish	37,500	Brown (2015)	0.06	Small	0	Brown (2015)	
	Manx Gaelic	87,780	World Bank Group (2017)	0.13	Small	1	Tkacik (2008, pp. 374, 384)	
	Scots	5,373,000	ONS (2016)	8.16	Large	1	Keating (2015, pp. 132-133)	
	Welsh	3,099,100		4.71	Large	1		

*Percent of the total population size of the state which was obtained via Eurostat (2017) for the EU member states and via Federal Statistical Office (2016b) for Switzerland.