Doctoral Dissertation

The Thirteenth-Century "International" System and the Origins

of the Angevin-Piast Dynastic Alliance

By Wojciech Kozłowski

Supervisor: Balázs Nagy

Submitted to the Medieval Studies Department, and

the Doctoral School of History

Central European University, Budapest

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Medieval Studies,

and

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

Budapest

2014

Table of Content

PREFACE

The central question of this study is what inspired Charles I and Władysław Łokietek to establish a dynastic marriage in 1320 and in what context it happened. This inquiry is strongly interconnected with an additional interest in whether and how the "international" environment, in which both figures formed and strove to achieve their goals and objectives, can be characterized. The research objectives are achieved by developing and employing theoretical perspective, drawn from International Relations (IR) theories, to historical material in order to generate well substantiated interpretation of the causes and context of the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320.

This study was essentially born out of dissatisfaction with the breadth and scope of modern accounts about medieval political history. While coming to CEU, first for the MA and then for PhD program, my intention was to re-think the Angevin-Piast relations in the fourteenth century in order to render a refreshed interpretation of the succession that happened in 1370. In that year, after King Kazimierz the Great of Poland had died, another king, Louis the Great of Hungary, got fairly smoothly into his shoes. My original research problem was to reexamine how and why the inter-dynastic relations developed into the direction that resulted in a short period of dual Hungarian-Polish monarchy (1370-1382).

It was clear that meaningful reconsideration of the succession of 1370 would require another look at the marriage contract that was made in 1320 and which involved Charles I of Hungary and Elisabeth, a daughter of King Władysław Łokietek of Poland. Apparently, it was also self-evident that for tracing the origins of the Angevin-Piast cooperation, an investigation of the succession crisis of the early fourteenth century would prove useful. At that turbulent period, the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary lost their natural lords, while the kingdom of Poland was undergoing the process of restoration. In the 1300s, Charles I of Anjou and Władysław Łokietek found themselves fighting the Přemyslids in order to establish their lordships in Hungary and Poland respectively.

It was less obvious, however, how far before the year 1300 my study should reach. On the one hand, there was no sense in pursuing the Angevin-Piast relations preceding the

Angevin very arrival to Central Europe. On the other hand, it was difficult to ignore rather intensive political and military ties between the Árpáds and some of the Piast dukes that rapidly developed during the reign of Béla IV and continued towards the end of the thirteenth century. Although there was not much chance to identify preliminary succession treaties between those two dynasties before 1300, it still remained an open question, to what extent the brotherhood-in-arms and tradition of close "international" cooperation (especially with the dukes of Cracow) could have its impact on Charles I and Łokietek's political calculations, when they decided to strike a marriage contract.

As I mentioned earlier, this study was inspired by deficiencies and shortages of standard political histories of the late medieval Central Europe. Initially, there was only a hunch that I had been nurturing since my first MA in history, which had grappled with the notion of "political role" of Grand Duke Witold of Lithuania in the kingdom of Poland ruled by Władysław Jagiełło (1386-1434). While reading a growing number of political histories, I came to realize that this traditional genre of writing history was becoming more and more demanding from those who wanted to go beyond an erudite accumulation of names, places, persons, facts, and dates. There was a sense of frustration when my own writing boiled down to compiling accounts and interpretations of previous historians. Without knowing, I longed for an interdisciplinary approach and thus, I turned to Political Science for inspiration, conceptual frameworks, and terminologies. My hope was that borrowing strategies of thinking about politics from another field would actually inform my own inquiry. I only had to find ways to deal with an apt reservation, raised by numerous senior colleagues, that Political Science was never designed to understand medieval politics. In their opinion, comprehending the past was a task left for historians who were better educated to walk through the thick forests of medieval cultural "otherness". Unfortunately, I fairly quickly noticed that historians for a long time practically did not problematize medieval politics but explained its phenomena as if they emerged in the modern world (I elaborate on this matter later in the Introduction).

As a result, I spent quite a time in search for alternative approaches to medieval political history. In particular, I was increasingly concerned about ways of linking modern reflection about international politics with the realities lurking from the medieval source material. In one of my earliest attempts to make sense of the "international" developments

in Central Europe in the turn of the fourteenth century,[1] I discussed a notion of "succession crisis", expressed my findings regarding how medieval political history had been done, and put forward some blurred intuitions about the validity of employing Political Science to unraveling the complexities of Central European "international" politics. The following observations still appear relevant here:

As recent examinations of historiography have shown, political history is regaining its place in scholarship. However, it is more inclined to study the rituals and symbols of government,[2] or examine political culture, elite networks and the interplay of political power and social influence in various localities.[3] Such approaches shed a great deal of light on "traditional" political history and equip a historian with far broader understanding of medieval political realities. Throughout the twentieth century, parallel to changes in the field of history, Political Science and its derivative discipline, International Relations, gradually evolved. Theoretical analyses of governments, political institutions and international bodies, along with reflection on political systems, their features, motivations, and agents, created a set of models and an entire intellectual "toolbox" that claimed to describe the workings of modern politics successfully.[4] …

Politics in the Middle Ages has already received generic characteristics. Decades of research have marked and outlined several features that are described in juxtaposition with national states, a natural environment for European historians of the previous two centuries. From the perspective of well-organized, bureaucratic, and powerful states, medieval societies, who were primarily organized around concepts of kinship,[5] looked very stateless and anarchic. I agree with Rees Davies, who speaks about "cut-out and oversimplified models of medieval society often presented as a precursor of the modern world."[6] Such a patronizing attitude carried presumptions of the underdevelopment and backwardness of medieval society and its political organization. This, consciously or unconsciously, was a prejudiced approach that

---

[1] Wojciech Kozłowski, "Developing the Concept of 'Succession Crisis': New Questions to Social and Political Circumstances of Łokietek's Rise to Power," *Studia Mediaevalia Bohemica* 3 (2011): 231–48.

[2] Susan Reynolds, "The Historiography of the Medieval State," in *Companion to Historiography*, ed. Michael Bentley (London; New York: Routledge, 1997), 113.

[3] Rees Davies, "The Medieval State: The Tyranny of a Concept?," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 16, no. 2 (June 2003): 282.

[4] Kozłowski, "Developing," 232.

[5] Rhys Jones, "Mann and Men in a Medieval State: The Geographies of Power in the Middle Ages," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series* 24, no. 1 (1999): 65.

[6] Davies, "The Medieval State: The Tyranny of a Concept?," 280.

assumed there was only one way development.[7] Founded in an evolutionary setting, it put a major emphasis on pointing out the lacks and prematurity of medieval society or measured its political life through lenses of modern criteria.[8] The "absence description" prevailed over the more "contextually based" approach. Thus, popular notions evolved about "feudal anarchy," the apparent weakness of effective "public" power, the prominence of "universal bodies" (the empire and the papacy), and the absence of coercive power or lack of ideas of sovereignty.[9],[10]

During my ongoing investigations for approaches that would help me to avoid making assumptions about Łokietek or Charles I's motivations in their politics by looking at their actions through the lenses that I had grown up with due to observing contemporary international relations, I encountered the so-called New Political History. While learning more about the outcomes of the research carried out within the framework of the New Political History, I got reassured how much political culture was influential in shaping practices and mechanisms of medieval "international" politics. Issues of honor and prestige and methods of resolving conflicts by means of ritualized performances emerged as critical elements of how the political system in the Middle Ages functioned.

However, I came to understand that particular findings about the practicalities of the "international" politics required one more step forward to be made. Namely, I began thinking whether a more structured picture of the medieval "international" system could be provided, that is, whether the combination of factual knowledge and of deepening comprehension of the particular political culture would suffice to render a form of an explanatory theory of medieval international relations. In other words, I was fascinated by an idea that one could search for patterns, mechanisms, and structures that would apply to behaviors of medieval "international" actors for most of the time and in the most cases.

By thinking so, I ventured to enter the field of International Relations (IR) Theories in order to equip myself with inspiring intellectual and methodological tools to reflect and conceptualize particular workings of medieval politics.

---

[7] Cf. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton Studies in Culture/power/history (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000), 7.
[8] Davies, "The Medieval State: The Tyranny of a Concept?," 281.
[9] Piotr Górecki, "The Early Piasts Imagined: New Work in the Political History of Early Medieval Poland," *The Mediaeval Journal* 1 (2011): 82.
[10] Kozłowski, "Developing," 234.

As it was stated above, this study was born out of dissatisfaction with existing accounts on Central European "international" politics in the turn of the fourteenth century. Hence, its primary aim was to provide a meaningful analysis of this period that would – to my best efforts – amend for deficiencies existing in scholarly literature. Those shortcomings were less related to limited utilization of the extant source material, which provided historians with accumulated data on facts and events. It was the method of interpretation that required reconsideration by taking advantage of existing scholarship about medieval political culture and by discovering ways of merging it with thinking characteristic to International Relations (IR) theories.

INTRODUCTION

General Remarks

How to make sense of the late medieval "international" politics? Is the still upholding stereotype in historical IR valid, when it claims that before the middle of the seventeenth century there was no international system that could be meaningfully investigated with IR methods? More specifically, is it possible to theorize political phenomena that occurred in the thirteenth and fourteenth century in Central Europe and beyond, and avoid being accused with anachronism? Would such theorizing equip historian with new explanatory powers? Is there any scientific value in starting a conversation between a historian of medieval "international" politics and an IR theorist, fundamentally focused on contemporary global affairs? In other words, how an IR theorist would respond to the world of international politics as depicted by various medieval source material? Or, perhaps, medieval political history is an already conceptually exhausted and harvested field with very little issues left after the reapers?

These are the underlying questions that have been guiding and inspiring my scholarly work throughout my PhD program. My research can be approached from two perspectives. In terms of its content, this is a "transnational" (a debated term in case of medieval society), comparative "international" politics, grappling with complexities of dynastic relations in the kingdoms of Bohemia, Hungary and Poland in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In terms of concepts and methods, however, this is a pioneering attempt to utilize and adapt great potential of IR theoretical reflection in order to render a new image of late medieval "international" politics. Those two inter-mingled perspectives of my research entail three fundamental intellectual challenges: 1) the mastery of Central European source material of the period; 2) the powerful grip of "national" historiographies (Czech, Hungarian, German, Polish and Slovak) that so far only occasionally have been brought together; 3) the skillful command of IR theoretical traditions, paradigms and debates corresponding with profound and well-established knowledge about medieval political culture and its substantial "otherness" in relation to modern sensibilities. The interdisciplinary underpinnings of my project are particularly challenging, because bridging IR scholarship (developed and

elaborated in the specific contexts of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century international system) and traditional political history of the late Middle Ages (itself meticulously explored and analyzed by generations of historians) is an innovation that only has to find its place in the scholarly environment and prove its validity.

I would argue, against some criticisms I have already encountered, that this undertaking is very promising in conceptualizing medieval "international" politics as long as it is not done by means of mere theory application. Specifically, in the heart of this project lies the conviction that meaningful investigation of this politics requires new theorization, that is, something more than adapting certain existing theories. The project also builds on another assertion that IR theories "should not be regarded as non-dynamic, a-historical intellectual constructs", for they "have been created by someone, somewhere and presumably for some purpose".[11] Since IR scholarship can provide concepts, frameworks, terminologies, and specific ways of reflecting about international realities – in other words, it delivers building blocks for efficient theory-construction – immersing into this field seems to me an opening and essential step to developing necessary abilities to begin theorizing a new field.

Such theorizing determines and recognizes the elements of medieval political culture, seeks values and principles, patterns and routinized practices that forged political interests of medieval actors and shaped their "international" behaviors. The PhD dissertation I have prepared, *The Thirteenth-Century "International" System and the Origins of the Angevin-Piast Alliance*, showcases how my scholarly project, essentially aiming at making sense of medieval "international" politics, has been carried out.

Therefore, my opening claim is that the field of medieval politics can prove fertile and productive, if approached with historical accurateness and rigor yet enriched with inspiring, powerful and structurally-solid IR traditions of thinking about international systems. Going along these lines demands, however, some justification; without it many historians look at my project with reservations. I shall address them in Chapter 1 that deals with IR theorizing in the medieval context.

---

[11] Knud Erik Jørgensen, *International Relations Theory: A New Introduction* (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 207.

A Brief Overview of the Dissertation

To begin with, in one paragraph I will summarize the historical problem of my dissertation.

In Summer 1320, Elisabeth, a daughter of Władysław Łokietek, freshly made King of Poland, married Charles I of Anjou, King of Hungary. Charles I's two oldest sons died at young age but Louis, his third son, inherited the Hungarian kingdom and was crowned in 1342. In the meantime, Casimir, Elisabeth's brother and Louis's uncle, succeeded to the Polish crown after Łokietek, his father. In the following decades, Casimir and Louis repeatedly discussed the issue of Louis' prospective succession in Poland in case Kazimierz did not have offspring. The available source material suggests that some prearrangements in this matter had been already made in the 1320s between Charles I and Łokietek or between Charles I and Casimir in the 1330s. As a result, in 1370, shortly after Casimir's death, Louis was crowned King of Poland. Judging from what happened in the Angevin-Piast relations throughout the fourteenth century, it appears fairly evident that the dynastic marriage of 1320 was a real showdown which laid foundations for the future cooperation of these two houses, and ultimately resulted in a personal union of two Central European kingdoms. At the core of my historical inquiry was to find out what were the circumstances that brought the marriage of 1320 into being. Therefore, on the one hand, my dissertation asks a conventional historical question: what happened in Central Europe between 1300 and 1320 that made the Angevin-Piast dynastic marriage possible? On the other hand, it strives to document and determine principles, values and driving forces that motivated lords in their "international" behaviors.

The innovative approach of this study is based on the concept that before individual motivations of Charles I and Władysław Łokietek are elucidated (as elements central for conventional political history), a broad analysis of "international" practices is carried out. In other words, this study advances its argument in two ways. First, by using empirical material, it strives to identify actors, structures, and modes of interactions that were characteristic to the thirteenth-century "international" system in Latin Christendom (with reference to primary neo-realist assumptions). It also seeks to unravel how political interests of individual actors were shaped (by introducing a concept of "lordly identity" along the constructivist strand). Second, having established a broad context for Charles I and Łokietek pursuing their politics,

it implements theoretical conceptualizations to solve the puzzle of the Angevin-Piast dynastic marriage of 1320.

This research faces dilemmas that need to be addressed. The most fundamental challenge derives from its pioneering and innovative character. This sort of analysis and theorization has never been done before and it is going against well-established and customary ways of pursuing medieval political history. Its validity, however, does not rest on its novelty as such, but on the fact that it offers much better documented interpretation of "international" behaviors of medieval actors that the conventional method used to provide. Namely, it replaces historian's assumptions and intuitions with empirical evidence about how political interests of medieval lords were forged.

Sources and Argument-Building

This study is divided into five chapters. At the first sight each of them represents a piece of separate research and only two of them are overtly related to the title of the dissertation. Namely, Chapter 2 deals with "international" system of the thirteenth-century Latin Christendom and Chapter 5 is directly devoted to determining the context, in which the Angevin-Piast alliance of 1320 emerged. This possible impression of incoherence and inconsistency can be amended, once the logic of this study is laid down in a structured way. In this subsection the matter of the dissertation ordering, argument-building and providing evidence is discussed.

I will start, however, with an important disclaimer regarding the repeated usage of the term "international" throughout the text in quotation marks, whenerver it pertains to medieval political realities. There is a certain logic behind it. Namely, I am fairly convinced that in the thirteenth century it is impossible to talk about international relations without implying certain organization of the international system that is appropriate to the fairly contemporary international system of sovereign nation states. Since this entire study argues for distincitive characteristics of medieval "international" politics in comparison to its modern equivalent, I have been particularly conscious – by the very employment of specific terminology – not to make confusing statements about how things were ordered in the thirteenth- and early fourteenth century. As I show later in the text, the logic of the thirteenth-century system of lordships was not international but indeed inter-lordly. Unfortunately, the term "inter-lordly"

as being an unestablished neologism seems to face resistance put up by fellow historians (yet in fact it has been already used on a few occasions). Apparently, the term "inter-dynastic" could fit well into the context but it still generates some reservations. Namely, the practical usage of the term "dynasty" tends to describe significant and powerful ruling families and it is not widely applied to lesser nobles or even oligarchs, whose presence and activity on the "international" scale did not extend beyond one generation; in other words "dynasty" implies lineage and some degree of longevity, while the "international" system of lordships – as defined in this study – was not only flexible and susceptible to vehement and disruptive changes, but also populated with lesser lordships (although locally dominant and influential) that never developed into what scholars would now call "dynasties". Consequently, there are three good reasons to stick to the term "international" in quotation marks whenever it describes medieval realities. First, alternative terminology is still problematic and does not clarify the case fully. Second, "international" is a handy convention that triggers right associations with phenomena that occur not within one's household (domestic politics in contemporary terminology) but between strangers (foreign policy). Third, this study engages heavily in discussion with theories of international relations and builds on their conceptual frameworks. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, comprehensiveness and identification it appears meaningful to retain "international" instead of pushing forward new formulations.

What was the context and what motivations pushed Charles I and Władysław Łokietek to establish a dynastic marriage in 1320? – this is the essential research question I am striving to address in this study. In addition, I focus on the "international" environment, in which both figures played out their goals and objectives. These two research objectives are strongly interconnected, because the assumption underlying my argument is that international politics occurs in particular historical context but also in certain social setting, which provides meaning to historically recorded actions. Drawing on this assumption, the logic of this work can be succinctly summarized as follows:

Chapter 1 introduces basic terminologies and theoretical concepts, which inform analyses performed in subsequent chapters, as well as puts forward arguments why this theoretically-driven approach can prove useful and contribute to the scholarly field.

Chapter 2 tackles with the problem where does the thirteenth-century "international" politics of Latin Christendom take place. It investigates the arrangement of the "international"

environment in order to determine what was the "international" world, into which Charles I and Łokietek were born.

Chapter 3 shifts focus from the "international" environment to lordly identities, which were shaped in this environment through political culture, that forged the political interests and routinized practices of lords. In other words, the chapter seeks to identify how political culture transformed natural "international" environment and what type of thinking about "international" politics it provoked as well as how lords' behavior responded to this transformation. The scope of its analysis is confined chiefly to the Polish lands between 1200 to 1300.

Chapter 4 attempts to test the findings of Chapter 3 against a different historical setting. It strives to find out how lordly identity determined on the example of the Polish lands correspond with identities and patterns of behavior identified during Charles I and Wenceslas III's competition over the throne of the kingdom of Hungary in the early fourteenth century. More specifically, the chapter evolves around the research question whether lordly identities of Charles I and Łokietek are comparable and thus, whether those identities can be generalized and theorized.

Chapter 5 builds on the analyses carried out in the previous chapters and seeks to determine the origins of the Angevin-Piast marriage as perceived with the help of the concept of lordly identity and reflection on the structure of "international" environment.

Since all five chapters are exploring various aspects of the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century "international" system, the materials used for inquiry and argument-building are also specific to each chapter. What follows is an overview of my research methods that shall legitimize claims I make in conclusions.

Chapter 1 provides the setting for the rest of the study. It voices my criticism regarding conventional ways of analyzing medieval "international" politics, argues for more conceptually-driven approaches to this phenomenon as well as offers a crticial overview of attempts of theorizing medieval realities made by a few IR scholars, revealing their underlying assumptions and familiarizing the reader with the IR perspective on medieval "international" politics.

Next, the chapter introduces the fundamental concepts used throughout the study and addresses issues and criticism raised by fellow historians at the earlier stages of reading the manuscript of this dissertation. First, the concept of lordship as a basic "international" unit is proposed. The concept builds upon Thomas Bisson's research on the development of lordships in Europe in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and the scholarly debate this research triggered. For deeper conceptualization of lordship as a specificly medieval "international" unit, the opinions of Susan Reynolds, Bjorn Weiler, and John Watts are invoked. However, it has to be underlined that this section of Chapter 1 is not a self-standing study on lordships but rather an attempt to define their "international" nature. Second, the chapter introduces realist tradition in IR scholarship which is meant to familiarize non-specialist reader in principal logics of this disciplinary strand and – most of all – its relevance in researching the medieval "international" environment. Here, the theoretical proposals and conceptions posed by Kenneth Waltz – one of the most recognizable figures within the realist paradigm – are elucidated as well as it is argued for justified adaptation of them into medieval system of lordships. Third, the terminologically confusing concept of "anarchy" is explicitly addressed. As it turned out throughout the work on this study, it was problematic for medievalists to accept and internalize the notion of "anarchy" as it is commonly used in IR scholarship. Since it is a critical term in characterizing meaningfully international environment, this subsection seemed necessary to make distinction between standard understanding of "anarchy" (implying disorder, destruction, bloodshed, and death) and its IR equivalent that suggests the lack of a system-wide government, but does not immediately entail the state of permanent war. Fourth, the chapter reaches out to another significant strand in IR theorizing and, drawing on Alexander Wendt's cultural theory of international system, it applies constructivist approach and develops the concept of lordly identity. As the adaptation of Waltz is essential for understanding the logic of Chapter 2, the application of constructivism remains central for Chapters 3 and 4.

Chapter 2 has three objectives. First, it attempts to theoretically comprehend the environment in which the thirteenth-century "international" politics took place. With the help of conceptual toolkit provided by Waltz it strives to identify the ordering principle of the thirteenth-century "international" system of Latin Christendom, that is, to determine whether this arrangement was anarchical (where "international" units are equal before each other in

terms of their nature and functions) or hierarchical (where the units are ranked according to certain logic) or, as it is ultimately argued, hybrid. The importance of making this distinction lays in the conviction that various arrangements induce different "international" behaviors. The analysis is based on the database (compiled from and tested against wide reading of secondary literature, and occasionally supported by reference to primary source material) of major political events, which occurred in the period from 1200 to 1300, from the area of Latin Chirstendom (excluding Scandinavia, Central Europe and the Latin lordships in the Middle East). The analysis is principally focused on the papacy as the only possible "international" unit that could effectively build hierarchical structures throughout Latin Christendom and surveys instances, in which the popes acted as apparent lord-superiors who dominated other European rulers. Subsequently, the genuine papal attempts to coordinate Christian society are confronted with the outcomes of the pontiffs' interventions (or the lack of them), and then conclusions are made about the coexistence and interconnection between the hierarchies imposed by political culture (that recognized the papal Christianity-wide claims as meaningful) and actions carried out by "international" units under the condition of the lack of system-wide government (which could mitigate suspicion and fear otherwise spreading among "international" players). Second, the chapter challenges views popular with standard IR accounts that regard medieval "international" politics impossible to theorize due to its hierarchical ordering. According to those accounts the medieval system more resembled imperial arrangement than a regular state-system and thus, it remained beyond the interest of traditionally conceived IR theory. My argument is that system-level anarchy and culturally induced hierarchy are two essential and indispensable components of the thirteenth-century "international" system and they cannot be easily tucked into too rigidly defined conventions. I am basically showing the paradox of co-existence of system-level anarchy and system-level hierarchy that derive: the first from the nature of how the units are arranged; the second from the political culture that attempts to bridle the consequences of naturally unsupervised "international" system. Third, utilizing the results of the analysis of "international" phenomena characteristic to the thirteenth-century Latin Christendom and building on number of studies that examine expressions of political culture in various settings and contexts, the chapter presents an opening general characteristics of the thirteenth-century "international" system of Latin Christendom, attempting to agree anarchy with hierarchy by pointing to different forms of hierarchical ordering than the one proposed by Waltz. By doing

so, it offers a smooth transition from neorealist structural analysis to culturally-informed constructivist inquiry that is carried out in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3 argues for essential "otherness" of the thirteenth-century "international" politics as compared to modern notions and standards. By bringing into the picture the culturally-driven hierarchical ordering principle of the "international" system and by seeking to establish the content of lordly identity, the chapter recognizes the significance of the unique "rules of the game" (as they made sense to the thirteenth-century lords) and tries to establish an interpretative framework for elucidating adequately – that is, more on the well-researched grounds and less on the basis of researcher's currently held convictions about how international politics operates – the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320. The central objective of this chapter is to determine Władysław Łokietek's lordly identity, defined according to the constructivist approach. The chapter's logic presupposes that surveying the "international" sub-system of the Polish lands and their adjacent neighborhoods in search for lordly routinized practices and patterns of behavior will shed light on pool of choices that Łokietek had as an informed player on the "international" stage. Analogically to the method used in Chapter 2, the analysis is based on another database (complied from various studies on medieval political history of Poland critically tested against the extant source material, be it annals, chronicles or charters) that covers the period 1200 to 1300 of the intra-Piast conflicts as well as it surveys the mechanisms of lordship-building phenomena in Central Europe. Chapter 2 alike, the possibly up-to-date scholarship is primarily used for collecting data about facts and events, and only secondarily for its interpretations. Numerous dubious assertions have been checked with relevant source material. Towards the end of the chapter, while discussing belonging to Christian society as one of sub-categories of lordly identity, a few allusions to English School in IR theory are made as well as a brief yet illustrative statistical source-based inquiry about the papal practice of receiving Christian lords under his protection is conducted. On the whole, the survey character of the chapter allows to make wide-range comparisons and connections that ultimately reveal patterns of behavior and routinized practices of lords, which provide the empirically-informed content to the concept of lordly identity.

Chapter 4 is different in nature from the previous two. It is no more a survey of "international" phenomena over hundred years with a large geographical scope and thus based on data mostly gathered from the secondary literature. Instead, the chapter thoroughly

investigates the source material related to the succession rivalry in the kingdom of Hungary in the first decade of the fourteenth century in order to identify what does the competition between the Angevins and Přemyslids over the emptied throne of Hungary showcase in regard to practical workings of lordly identities as developed and elaborated in Chapter 3. By comparing individual goals and strategies to attain them of two major rivals, Charles I and Wenceslas III, the chapter argues for significant correspondence in behavioral patterns and routinized practices observed among those two contestants and among the Polish dukes. On these grounds the conclusion is made that Charles I's lordly identity was to high degree comparable to Łokietek's identity (as established in Chapter 3), and this judgement is later used for two purposes: 1) as a reassertion of the inter-subjective character of lordly identity; 2) as a legitimate framework for interpreting Charles I's motivations that resulted in his marriage with Elisabeth in 1320.

Chapter 5 explicitly addresses the issue of the Angevin-Piast marriage contract of 1320. Its aim is to employ the theoretical frameworks established and tested in the previous chapters to make sense of how that dynastic marriage came about. The idea behind this chapter is that once the structure of the "international" system is established and the impact of its cultural factor (through lordly identity) recognized, the interpretation of the origins of the Charles-Łokietek cooperation can be meaningfully rendered. Moreover, the chapters 1 to 3 can serve as both empirical and theoretical evidence and support for any explanation that may emerge. The nature of this chapter is, therefore, similar to the preceding one. It is no more a survey but an inquiry about what sort of political agendas brought the kings of Hungary and Poland to agree upon a formation of close dynastic bonds. In the light of the findings about the thirteenth-century "international" system and the role of lordly identity in shaping lords' political interests and objectives, the source material about the Angevin-Piast marriage is interrogated; next, Central European scholarly literature is examined and interpreted; subsequently, Charles I and Łokietek's "international" agendas between 1310 to 1320 are analyzed (using the primary sources and with the help of secondary literature); ultimately, on the basis of collected material and with reference to the structure and workings of the thirteenth-century "international" system (as conceptualized throughout the entire study), the chapter puts forward a reconsidered interpretation of the dynastic and political

motivations behind Charles I and Łokietek's decisions that laid foundations for the future dynastic alliance and in 1320 resulted in the Angevin-Piast marriage.

CHAPTER 1.
THEORIZING "INTERNATIONAL" RELATIONS IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES

Why to Theorize?

It is true that there is a common opinion among medievalists that political history, understood as an erudite accumulation of facts, events, and the identification of their causal interconnections, is an almost exhausted field. This view is generally based on a well-known fact that most of political historical events in the Middle Ages have been already investigated and interpreted by generations of scholars. Throughout the nineteenth and half of the twentieth century historical studies gave preference to state history that concentrated chiefly on political events and great persons.[12] In the field of medieval studies, this "traditional" variant was centered on formal institutions and conceptualized in terms drawn from late-modern statecraft.[13] Given the development of nationalisms in Europe during the inter-war period, and particularly in relation to the growing civilizational and cultural competition between the Germans and the Slavs in Central Europe (before and after World War II), Polish medieval historiography, for instance, tended to perceive political matters, specifically related to the emergence and sustenance of the Polish state, as fundamental issues for historical inquiry. In consequence, a popular conviction emerged that in the realm of political history everything has been already said. Over time studies dealing directly with politics lost their prominence to other fields of historical research, largely inspired by social sciences. As I was once told by a senior colleague, I should drop my interest in medieval politics, for I could not bring anything new to the field.

Initially, I would agree with that statement. For instance, in the area of my closest interest, that is, the dynastic relations between the rulers of Hungary and Poland in the turn of the fourteenth century, the works of Jan Dąbrowski,[14] produced almost hundred years ago,

---

[12] Cf. Georg G. Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge* (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1997), 31–32.

[13] Górecki, "The Early Piasts," 81.

[14] For instance: Jan Dąbrowski, "Z czasów Łokietka. Studia nad stosunkami polsko-węgierskimi w XIV w. Częśc I," *RAU. Wydział Hist.-Filoz.* 34 (1916): 278–326; and a recently republished book of 1914: Jan Dąbrowski,

seemed to explore the topic so exhaustively that next generations of Polish historians chiefly quoted them in their studies. Since in Central Europe the extant source material does not normally reveal new political data, it is hard to challenge meticulous archival work carried out, in this case, by Dąbrowski. However, at some point I was struck with an idea that as long as the amount of factual knowledge remains constant, it is their interpretation that matters most. And there are deficiencies in ways conventional medieval political history is done.

Namely, my experience reveals that, in general, medievalists are natural realists. This is quite understandable since fundamental realistic tenets (self-regard; power maximization; security and self-preservation; an anarchic international system) resonate soundly in the reluctantly theoretical ear. On the whole, medieval political historians are not trained in political theory and thus they are inclined to approach medieval politics through common sense, that is, they base their explanations on standard logic, the scope of their own knowledge and understanding of the period, and (often unconsciously) according to their individual prejudices, convictions, and beliefs about politics, its features, resources, and aims. This fact itself is not bad, because a historian's training has been designed to equip him with skills to comprehend and, consequently, make sense out of the source material he researches. Ideally, due to his mastery of the available data, he will be able to interpret this data in a contextualized form. The problems occurs when a historian begins to interpret and explain behaviors and motivations of medieval "international" actors by unintentionally drawing from his under-theorized convictions and assumptions about how politics functions.

A brief example of application of this practice. In Chapter 5 I analyzed Central European scholarly literatures' interpretations of the Angevin-Piast dynastic marriage of 1320 between King Charles I of Hungary and Elisabeth, a daughter of King Władysław Łokietek of the Piasts. All worked with the same available source material but their interpretations differed due to their assumptions about how international system operates. And so, it is particularly a German and Polish perspective to perceive the "international" system in the fourteenth century as an environment populated with blocks of alliances that in their concept and logic are strikingly similar to blocks known from the twentieth century: the Triple Entente vs. the Central Powers

---

Elżbieta Łokietkówna 1305-1380 (Cracow: Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych Universitas, 2007).

(World War I), the Allies vs. the Axis (World War II), and the NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact (Cold War).

In response to this way of grappling with medieval "international" realities, I would argue that prior to any interpretative efforts it is essential to acknowledge the fundamental "otherness" of the late medieval "international" system. And this recognition has been already done. A new strand, called New Political History that is exemplified among others by: Gerd Althoff,[15] Thomas N. Bisson,[16] Zbigniew Dalewski,[17] Eric Goldberg,[18] Piotr Górecki,[19] and Björn Weiler,[20] specifically investigates the "otherness" of medieval political culture.[21]

As Björn Weiler recently expressed: *the reality of medieval politics, from what we can judge, was infinitely more complex than modern historiographical traditions would suggest*.[22] This striking complexity, which included means of communication, administration, and government as well as a diversity of actors, overlapping interests and jurisdictions, and philosophical and theological concepts, convinced me that it is necessary to bring together the databases of conventional political histories of the Middle Ages and confront them with findings and conclusions made by culturally- and power-oriented medievalists. This combination of factual data with the cultural context, in which this data was generated, required some arrangement, order and intellectual coherence. In my view, it needed a theory.

---

[15] See for instance: Gerd Althoff, *Family, Friends and Followers: Political and Social Bonds in Medieval Europe* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Gerd Althoff, *"Selig sind, die Verfolgung ausüben": Päpste und Gewalt im Hochmittelalter* (Stuttgart: Theiss, 2013).

[16] Thomas N. Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of European Government* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009).

[17] Zbigniew Dalewski, *Ritual and Politics: Writing the History of a Dynastic Conflict in Medieval Poland* (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

[18] Eric Joseph Goldberg, *Struggle for Empire: Kingship and Conflict under Louis the German, 817-876* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

[19] A few examples: Piotr Górecki, *Economy, Society, and Lordship in Medieval Poland, 1100-1250* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992); Warren Brown and Piotr Górecki, eds., *Conflict in Medieval Europe: Changing Perspectives on Society and Culture* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); and: Piotr Górecki, Nancy Van Deusen, and János M. Bak, eds., *Central and Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages: A Cultural History*, International Library of Historical Studies 51 (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2009).

[20] Björn K. U. Weiler, *Kingship, Rebellion and Political Culture: England and Germany, c.1215-c.1250* (Basingstoke [England] ;New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

[21] The strand's primary assumptions Górecki set out in one of his recent articles: *However it is named, the new political history presumes that the realities of earlier medieval Europe cannot adequately be understood with concepts and categories drawn from late-modern law, politics, and administration. Therefore, the updated discipline examines, at least as a point of departure, an altogether different range of phenomena. These are fundamentally centered on power*: Górecki, "The Early Piasts," 82.

[22] Weiler, *Kingship*, XV.

It must be admitted here that medieval political history and IR theories hardly ever intersect. Both sides are largely unaware of each other's work and do not see much common grounds. While there were some attempts by IR scholars to theorize medieval politics (to be overviewed in the next section),[23] their works were almost completely ignored by medievalists. Also, to my best knowledge the latter have not tried to approach medieval politics with theoretical lenses.[24] While IR scholars are theorizing, they draw from interpretations and conclusions made by historians. While medievalists are interpreting medieval "international" realities, they stick to source material but avoid more general questions that could reveal patterns and modes of behavior, and instead choose to follow their "political instincts". As a result, both disciplines develop parallel to each other without much interaction.

An Overview of Theorizing Attempts[25]

In 1992, Markus Fischer published *Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices*.[26] He put forward his argument alongside neorealist positions expounded in a groundbreaking study by Kenneth N. Waltz.[27] From the very beginning, Fischer clearly expressed his goal to falsify tenets maintained by, as he called them, the "critical theorists".[28] He set out to undermine their two essential premises: first, that international politics is marked by historical change, and second, that discourse shapes practice.[29] Hence, he chose to

---

[23] To my best knowledge, these are the only examples: Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 427–66; Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales: Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse of History," *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 479–91; Benno Teschke, "Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages: History and Theory," *International Organization* 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 325–58; Andrew Latham, "Theorizing the Crusades: Identity, Institutions, and Religious War in Medieval Latin Christendom," *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 223–43; Andrew Latham, *Theorizing Medieval Geopolitics: War and World Order in the Age of the Crusades* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

[24] However, there has been some deepened reflection about implications coming from the pressure generated by the dominant political culture. See, for instance: John Watts, *The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300-1500* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 43–157. Timothy Reuter and Janet Laughland Nelson, *Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities* (Cambridge, UK ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Weiler, *Kingship*. Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900-1300* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

[25] This section draws on fragments of my article "Theorizing Medieval Politics. Report from the Field" submitted for publication to: *Studia z dziejów średniowiecza* 19 (2014): in press.

[26] Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 427–66.

[27] Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). About its significance in the IR field, see: Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight, "The End of International Relations Theory?" *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 414.

[28] His critics in general disliked Fischer's all-encompassing term which made one out of a number of approaches in IR theories. This is why I am using quotation marks while referring to this term.

[29] Fischer, "Feudal Europe," Spring 1992, 428.

theorize the Middle Ages not for their own sake but in order to prove the "critical theorists" wrong. According to Fischer, they believe(d) that the transformation from a medieval to a modern international system was the best evidence for their fundamental claim about change which occurs in international relations throughout history and about the power of discourse (i.e., of the dominant cultural and social normative narrative).

Fischer assumed that if he could theoretically elucidate medieval international politics with typically neorealist concepts this would empirically disprove his adversaries' opinions. Therefore, he claimed:

If the politics of the three major periods of Western history [ancient, medieval and modern – wk] *were found to be essentially the same, this would make it much more difficult for critical theorists to demonstrate historical change and much easier for neorealists to show that anarchic power politics constitutes the universal condition*.[30]

Fischer theorized medieval politics by contrasting the dominant social and political discourse with the political practice, showing that this discourse, although distinct from its ancient and modern counterparts, did not, in fact, affect political behaviors. He argued that political actors, that is, feudal lords, were: fighting for exclusive territorial control, protecting themselves by military means, subjugating each other, balancing against power, forming alliances and spheres of influence, and resolving conflicts by the use and threat of force.[31] In his view, medieval "international" politics was in the deepest sense organized correspondingly to the modern system. He thus pointed to a fundamental and universal principle which governed the international realm by nature, that is, rational inclination:

to strive for exclusive control over manpower and thus territory in order to maximize the chances for survival in a condition where central protection is absent.[32]

Fischer's analysis showed the so-called feudal period as omnipresent war, bloodshed, brutality, law-breaching, and terrifying anarchy. He created an image that vividly demonstrated power politics in its purest form, in which peasants and churchmen lived in permanent stress and fear for their lives, menaced by savage lords, rampaging across fields in

---

[30] Ibid., 433.
[31] Ibid., 428.
[32] Ibid., 461.

search of booty, wealth, and land. The powerless Church, townsmen, and peasantry were exposed to the cruelty of knights and lords. Judging from Fischer's narrative, one would expect that if the powerless did not disappear from the face of the earth it must have almost been a miracle.

This violent picture was chiefly made of two components. First and foremost, by an arbitrary anthropological claim that:

there is an unchanging essence of human nature that prevents us from replacing the natural world of selfish power politics with a social construct based on changed understandings, new forms or fresh ideas.[33]

Fischer argued that medieval politics, in the way he had depicted, was valid evidence for his claim. Second, for the sake of his empirical analysis, he reconstructed:

feudal discourse on the basis of medieval political thought, gleaned primarily from the works of Otto Brunner, Aron Gurevich, and Walter Ullmann and the essays in The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, edited by J. H. Burns. It [Fischer's study – wk] analyzes feudal practices with the help of two kinds of sources: first, the general accounts offered by leading scholars of medieval history, including those of Marc Bloch, Robert Boutruche, John Mundy, Jean-Pierre Poly and Eric Bournazel, and Susan Reynolds; and, second, the in-depth studies undertaken by Georges Duby and focusing on the Maconnais in southeastern France, seminal works that benefited from an exceptional number of surviving local documents.[34]

In sum, Fischer's points were based on a set of arbitrary assumptions about anthropological positions that conflicted with the anthropology of his adversaries[35] and on a number of historical works by prominent medieval scholars.

Fischer's article stirred up heated debate. In 1993, Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil responded with a fierce critique in *Medieval tales: neorealist "science" and the*

---

[33] Ibid., 465.
[34] Ibid., 433.
[35] Fischer quoted Max Horkeimer's, a member of the Frankfurt School and an essential scholar in the development of the critical theory, claim about human nature: *the term 'human nature' … does not refer to an original or an eternal or a uniform essence … [since] new individual and social qualities arise in the historical process*; Ibid., 429.

abuse of history.[36] They did not present their own theorization of medieval "international" politics, but focused instead on explaining why the way Fischer had done it was unacceptable. First, they blamed him for abusing his sources, that is, historians' works he used as foundations for his analysis. In general, Fischer was guilty of using out-dated literature for his overall picture of feudal society. His critics accused him of misinterpreting or interpreting his sources too freely and bending them to his line of argumentation.[37] Furthermore, Fischer also committed a classical *pars pro toto* failure by taking a case study, with all its peculiarities and distinctiveness, as representative for the whole of medieval Europe. Besides, Fischer's attempts to draw similarities between medieval feudal lords and modern states were, in the eyes of Hall and Kratochwil, absolutely misplaced because they ignored "the events and structures of medieval political life", and thus significantly distorted them.[38]

Hall and Kratochwil clearly opposed the ahistorical, meaning universal or perennial, principles that governed Fischer's account. By challenging the adequacy of Fischer's image of the feudal period in medieval Europe, they refuted his conclusions. Next, they argued briefly that meaningful talk about the Middle Ages cannot happen without acknowledging the existence of certain social institutions, inherently different from their modern equivalents.[39] In short, Hall and Kratochwil supported their opinion that a power-politics narrative did not satisfactorily explain the medieval "international realm" and recapitulated their claims about the importance of socially constructed norms which characterize the actions taken by political actors and give grounding for historically specific institutions.[40]

In 1998, Benno Teschke entered this discussion from a neomarxist perspective by publishing "Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages,"[41] which later (in 2003) – with minor changes – became a chapter in his book *The Myth of 1648* .[42] Not surprisingly, Teschke was also dissatisfied with Fischer's account. Yet he disagreed primarily with the whole

---

[36] Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales: Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse of History," *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 479–91.
[37] Ibid., 483.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid., 487.
[40] Ibid., 486.
[41] Benno Teschke, "Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages: History and Theory," *International Organization* 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 325–58.
[42] Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations* (London ;New York: Verso, 2003).

neorealist paradigm, which engendered an "ahistorical structuralism".[43] To him, applying timeless categories to medieval stateless society was a sheer conceptual anachronism that translated into erroneous analyses.[44] To amend these failures, he explained, IR scholars sought to re-historicize their discipline, although they took different tracks for comprehending large-scale and long-term geopolitical transformation.[45]

In turn, Teschke was preoccupied with ahistorical change and devoted to uncovering the dynamics of this change.[46] He pinpointed the most important contextual change in the international realm in the second millennium, which was the shift from a medieval to a modern international system.[47] In order to unravel the mechanisms of this transition, he asked questions about the nature of feudalism in the European Middle Ages and was interested in what distinguished medieval geopolitical relations from modern and early modern interstate relations.[48]

His account was established on the material and objective pillars of social property relations (thus similar to Fischer's). He put forward two cardinal assumptions; first, that:

the nature and dynamics of international systems are governed by the character of their constitutive units, which, in turn, rests on the specific property relations prevailing within them.

Second, that:

the dynamics of medieval change were bound up with contradictory strategies of reproduction between and within the two major classes, the lords and the peasantry.[49]

In general, Teschke claimed that the structural conflict between the lords and the peasants, i.e., the tension originating from reasons external to human agency (property relations), formulated the character of units in the international system. This was because a set of property relations generated specific authority relations. In practice, this meant that since the peasants held possession of the means of subsistence, the feudal nobility enforced

---

[43] Ibid., 42.
[44] Ibid., 48.
[45] Ibid., 42.
[46] Teschke, "Geopolitical Relations," Spring 1998, 326.
[47] Ibid., 330.
[48] Ibid., 325.
[49] Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, 46.

access to their production by use of political and military force.[50] In brief, according to this logic the character of the feudal lords was essentially forged by their attempts to maximize their income, either by squeezing the peasantry or by different forms of territorial expansion.[51] These characteristics subsequently influenced the nature of and set the limits for the dynamics of the international system. Teschke asserted that:

The geopolitical system was characterized by constant military rivalry over territory and labor between lords, and within and between their 'states'. The geopolitical dynamic of medieval Europe followed the zero-sum logic of territorial conquest.[52]

In terms of the violent picture of feudal Europe, Teschke concurred well with Fischer. In his view, feudal lords followed a concept of political power called 'domination', which included all social practices which kept dependents in a subordinate position and generated personalized anarchy, that is, every lord was his own conflict unit.[53] Hence, violence and making war were a dominant strategy and rationale of the feudal lords, and, thus, a culture of war prevailed.[54] This culture was basically fueled by the rule of political accumulation, which triggered conflict and made inter-lordly relations inherently non-pacified and competitive.[55]

The difference between Fischer and Teschke was therefore not in the descriptive parts of their accounts, which sound similar, but on the more profound level of explaining causes for such violent political conditions. Fischer sought recourse in anthropological assumptions, whereas Teschke founded his arguments in Marxist axioms about the primordial significance of property relations. Teschke's account was also intentionally more period specific, although all-encompassing in his generalizations. However, he openly asserted that:

One of the weaknesses of the IR debate on the Middle Ages is that none of its participants deemed it necessary to specify his statements in time and space. About which Middle Ages are we talking?[56]

---

[50] Teschke, "Geopolitical Relations," Spring 1998, 326, 338.
[51] Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, 59.
[52] Ibid., 47.
[53] Ibid., 61, 64.
[54] Ibid., 61.
[55] Ibid., 46, 61.
[56] Teschke, "Geopolitical Relations," Spring 1998, 349.

Teschke's account was based on historians whose expertise lay in the field of so-called feudal Europe, 900-1200. In his methods, therefore, he followed Fischer's example and reconstructed medieval feudalism as it was depicted in works of prominent historians, for instance, Marc Bloch, Eric Boumazel, Francois Ganshof, Otto Hintze, Witold Kula, Heinrich Mitteis, Jean-Pierre Poly, and Timothy Reuter. Clearly, Teschke was not interested in making references to other scholars, notably Susan Reynolds, who, in the 1990s, questioned the very existence of feudalism and its social implications in Europe.[57]

In 2011, Andrew A. Latham published an article "Theorizing the Crusades: Identity, Institutions, and Religious War in Medieval Latin Christendom"[58], which he subsequently enlarged in his book, *Theorizing Medieval Geopolitics* (issued in 2012). His point of departure was again the reference to theorizing efforts by his fellow IR scholars of other theoretical allegiances. He therefore expressed his dissatisfaction with previous accounts by neorealists (Fischer) and neomarxists (Teschke), which – in his opinion – failed to produce a convincing account of medieval politics.[59] Regarding the crusades, Latham maintained that they remain an unresolved puzzle in IR theories, since the existing IR literature has failed to provide convincing motives for their emergence and long duration.[60] Moreover, he was the first, to my best knowledge, to answer my question, explicitly and positively, about the possibility of theorizing a medieval international system meaningfully. He asserted:

While not denying the historical specificity of the world orders of early, high and late Latin Christendom, it seemed to me not only that the conceptual toolkit of contemporary IR was adequate to the task of engaging with and making sense of the medieval world (or at least the late medieval world), but that this world was actually of a piece with our own. … This era [the Middle Ages – wk] *is worthy of study as a distinct and important period in the history of international relations – I now take as a given.*[61]

Latham studied the recent historiography of the crusades extensively. By referring to works of historians, he denounced the validity of Fischer's and Teschke's accounts by claiming

---

[57] Cf. Susan Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
[58] Andrew Latham, "Theorizing the Crusades: Identity, Institutions, and Religious War in Medieval Latin Christendom," *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 223–43.
[59] Andrew Latham, *Theorizing Medieval Geopolitics: War and World Order in the Age of the Crusades* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1.
[60] Latham, "Theorizing the Crusades," 2011, 223.
[61] Latham, *Theorizing Medieval Geopolitics*, 2012, 2–3.

that their descriptions of the medieval realities were incompatible with the "now-standard historiographical view". This view no longer upheld the realm of material interests as a main motivator for crusading endeavors, but rather located its source in the sphere of religious beliefs.[62] As a result, since Fischer's and Teschke's descriptions did not correspond to the outcomes of the most recent empirical studies, their arguments and principal assumptions were also *per force* invalidated. Latham, therefore, could justifiably return to the issue of discourse that constituted an agent and imbued this agent with interests. By reconstituting discourse in the center of the debate, rejecting Fischer's anthropological statements and Teschke's axioms about property relations, he automatically challenged the very concept of objective interests, which in turn, if I understand correctly, could be deduced from the external claims about human beings, social reality, and the world. Instead, Latham proposed a constructivist approach to political interests, which views them as socially constructed and interpreted entities. This entails that such interests cannot be assumed[63] (deduced from the reality) but instead should be specified and determined through a careful examination of the discourse.[64] Therefore, political interests were not to be declared arbitrarily because their nature was inter-subjective, that is, they were historically specific constellations of norms, mentalities, and beliefs,[65] which – in my understanding – would have to be induced from ample empirical evidence.

Briefly, medieval geopolitics in Latham's terms was not a given reality, rendered either by nature or constituted through perennial and inherent class conflict, but a product, an outcome of certain social, institutional, and cultural developments which engendered historically specific "war-making units", "structural antagonisms", and "cultural understandings of 'geopolitcs'".[66]

In his analysis Latham expressed his concern about making proper use of the existing historiography. He was aware of the deficiencies that featured in the studies of his fellow IR scholars, and thus he sought guidelines for how to engage in "historically informed political science scholarship".[67] He readily used recent works by Susan Reynolds and Thomas Bisson,

---

[62] Latham, "Theorizing the Crusades," 2011, 224.
[63] Ibid., 228.
[64] Latham, *Theorizing Medieval Geopolitics*, 2012, 23.
[65] Ibid., 57.
[66] Ibid., 9.
[67] Latham, "Theorizing the Crusades," 2011, 224.

and availed himself of the extensive literature that discussed medieval political thought. Relatively speaking, the bibliography of medieval scholarship he collected for the sake of his analysis was much greater in volume than that of his predecessors. It seems he *de facto* consulted more historical than genuinely IR literature, an act showing his sincere attempt to make sense out of complex medieval realities.

Latham's essential point on the theoretical level was to introduce "religion" as an irreducible motive force in international relations.[68] He pointed to "religious identity" as a causal variable which would eventually need to be embraced seriously by IR scholarship.[69] He explained that human motivation derives from particular religious identities and associated political projects. In his opinion, this was an adequate alternative for other explanations which referred to "hidden logic" and stressed either modes of production or the transhistorical logic of self-help under anarchy or the war-prone pathologies of certain actors on the international stage.[70] Consequently, since no "deeper" socio-economic structures and causes were needed to make sense of late medieval politics, he recommended studying international politics as a political phenomenon which "can be adequately theorized in terms of structuring and regulative effects of political forces".[71]

Latham's point in regard to theorizing crusades and medieval geopolitics was rather complex. First, he identified a "cultural script" which defined the logic and dynamics of political life and called it a "statist project".[72] This project involved the pursuit of internal and external sovereignty and was well established "in the social imaginary of the ruling class of Latin Christendom" by 1300 at the latest,.[73] The very existence of this "new global cultural script", which enacted the logic of state-building, laid foundations, Latham proposed, for an international system, which emerged sometime in the thirteenth century with the crystallization of an idea of statehood and its progressive implementation.[74]

Second, crusades emerged as a product of the Gregorian reform in the Latin Church in the second half of the eleventh century. The reformed Church attempted to function as other

[68] Latham, *Theorizing Medieval Geopolitics*, 2012, 139.
[69] Ibid., 140.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid., 139.
[72] Ibid., 53.
[73] Ibid., 60.
[74] Ibid., 133.

existing polities, i.e., as a corporate-sovereign state: the Church-state. This newly formed entity, which was run by the clergy, strived to act as an autonomous unit of rule with a distinctive war-making capacity.[75] Such a transformation of the Church from an entity subordinated to the emperor and monarchs into a distinctive political actor driven by its own peculiar moral purposes[76] generated tensions and antagonisms that forced the Church to wage wars. This new identity of the Church, which was assumed and implemented by the reform movement, changed the political and social context in which the Church had existed previously and, therefore, the Church reached toward the discourse of "just war", "holy war", and "penitential war", and developed it in order to secure "raw materials out of which the radically new social institution of 'crusade' was constructed".[77]

In short, the Gregorian reform invented a new religious identity for the Latin Church which required its transformation into a state-like entity governed by a distinct group, the clergy, in order to pursue its morally and spiritually informed goals by means of armed crusaders. Through this innovation, the Church established a monopoly on power within the spiritual domain of Latin Christendom, which manifested itself as the "moral authority" of the Church and enabled it to define "just causes" and specify "enemies of the Church".[78] Consequently, military orders emerged as a unique feature of the Church-state organization.[79] In this view, the Latin Church itself became a socially constructed phenomenon.[80]

In sum, these overview accounts represented three different IR theorizing traditions. Fischer assumed a neorealist perspective which embraced medieval politics from a transhistorical angle and attempted to explain the medieval "international realm" in terms of material power politics which derived from humans' natural inclination to self-seeking practices, which in turn automatically engendered anarchy as an ordinary condition of the international system. Hall and Kratochwil, while criticizing Fischer, stressed the social context

---

[75] Ibid., 108. Latham, "Theorizing the Crusades," 2011, 237.

[76] These moral purposes were: to reform Latin Christendom; to recall sinners from error to truth, to act as agents of moral and spiritual renewal, and to intervene in the world to restore justice. Cf. Latham, *Theorizing Medieval Geopolitics*, 2012, 113.

[77] Ibid., 108.

[78] Latham, "Theorizing the Crusades," 2011, 238.

[79] Ibid., 239.

[80] Cf. for instance: *With the accession of Gregory VII in 1073, however, this process of renewal and revitalization took a different track: it evolved from being an essentially legal and hortatory effort—involving both the promulgation of canons proscribing these practices and a variety of efforts designed to delegitimize them—to one focused on transforming the papacy into a powerful institution capable of more effectively pursuing the socially constructed values and interests of the reform Clergy*: Ibid., 231.

as an essential motivator for human behavior and, hence, pointed to the medieval discourse as a starting point for any meaningful theorizing. Teschke adopted a neomarxist paradigm and, while agreeing with Fischer about the violent behaviors of medieval actors, he set out to explain the functionalities of the medieval "international" stage by means of a socio-economic constellation of factors. He claimed that a set of property relations between the lords and the peasantry produced a specific type of unit in the international system and, subsequently, the characteristics of these units (molded by property relations) constituted a historically specific international system. Finally, Latham approached medieval politics from a constructivist position and, like Hall and Kratochwil, emphasized a socially constructed and historically contingent discourse as the key element of medieval political architecture. Therefore, he sought out a "global cultural script" which he believed dominated the late Middle Ages and used it as the defining and constitutive context for all the medieval political architecture. Consequently, in his account, nothing in the political realm depended on human nature or was universal, because the units, structures, and institutions were totally socially devised phenomena.

Determining Fundamental Theoretical Concepts

Lordship

Lordship is perhaps the most essential term of this study. It encompasses most political entities that populated Latin Christendom in the thirteenth century, be it territories controlled by nobles or more powerful magnates, counties, independent cities, duchies, kingdoms (including the papal states and imperial lands) as well as domains ruled by ecclesiastical elites, that is, abbots, bishops and archbishops. There were hundreds or maybe thousands of them. Not all power structures functioning in Latin Christendom were lordships though. Lordship was constituted by the relations of control and domination over a given territory and people living there. It was, therefore, a form of public power structure that in its actions and decisions could be considered as acting on its own with some form of independence.

Since this study, alongside the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320, has been dedicated to getting firmer hold of the thirteenth-century "international" system, considered as the natural environment in which the inter-dynastic politics happened, it is a fundamental task to grapple with a problem of what the standard "international" units were, that is, what sort of political

entities inhabited the system and how they could be characterized. My argument, which I elaborate below, is that those entities were lordships.

I will begin with an overview of Thomas Bisson's recent study on lordships.[81] There are two reasons for using his work more extensively: first, it discusses lordships in a way close to my own perception and provides a helpful introduction to how they developed before the thirteenth century, that is, at the outset of my own inquiry; second, the book puts forward a set of assumptions about the medieval "international" system that can be meaningfully utilized as a point of departure in my own theorization.

Anything to be said about the thirteenth-century "international" system and lordships as standard units, which inhabited the system, should begin with a fairly obvious disclaimer that this system did not emerge *ex nihilo* but was deeply rooted in what had preceded it. Since all history is continuous,[82] medieval politics, however constant and unchanging it may appear, was equally susceptive to transformations as politics in other periods. This practically means that despite important similarities in terms of units involved and their interactions, the mechanisms in gear in the twelfth century were further developed and advanced in the thirteenth century. Bisson's account is a thought-provoking overview of these developments as well as an essay "on the history of human power during the long century [ca. 1050-ca. 1225 – wk] when medieval lordship – the domination of people by one or a few, in extreme variable forms – came to maturity."[83] In his essay, Bisson strove to discuss the social and cultural origins of European government.[84] His book was widely acknowledged and received a great deal of enthusiastic reviews due to its comparative scope and the author's mastery of both narrative and documentary sources.[85]

Noteworthy, Bisson's extensive essay has been an outcome of his prolonged research interest in history of power in the twelfth century with special reference to power, lordship

---

[81] Thomas N. Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of European Government* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009).
[82] Ibid., 48.
[83] Ibid., IX.
[84] Ibid.
[85] For instance: Peter Fleming, *Labour / Le Travail* 67 (Spring 2011): 268-271; R. I. Moore, American Historical Review 115 (February 2010): 172-174; Theresa Earenfight, *Review of Politics* 72 (Winter 2010): 162-164; Anne E. Lester, *Journal of World History* 22 (March 2011): 136-139; Christopher Allmand, *History* 95 (April 2010): 226-227; Warren C. Brown, Central European History 43 (2010): 340-342.

and the problem of violence.[86] His article about "feudal revolution", critically engaging with earlier works of French historians (including George Duby's seminal study on the Mâconnais),[87] stirred a heated debate in scholarship.[88] Bisson's main argument was that

it seems beyond reasonable doubt is that over several decades around the year 1000 the implantation of new lordships typically fortified and violent broke through an old barrier of regalian control; that people were then aware of a crisis of power, and reacted to it … Disruptive, recurrent, this transformation was surely more than an "adjustment" in continuous experience. It forced, painfully, a new acceptance of noble lordship as the basis of social order. Its resemblance to a revolution, feudal or other, is not in the end what matters; the concept of "feudal revolution", however descriptive, remains problematic and may lose whatever evocative force it had in the discourse of its inventors when applied to the continuous history of lordship. Yet it is just that neglected history which compels us to reconsider the tumultuous millennium: to wonder what then happened to give violence a new and long lease on life … A terrible dynamic was sprung, an oppressive flaring of disdainful pretensions along the social seam torn open by mentors of the three orders. It was not a class struggle, for neither the unpoliticized many nor the violent few claimed a cause or found sympathy in the old elites – except, in a sense, the knights who could only gain from the enlarged respectability of lordship. Only by recognizing the characteristic violence of lay seigneurial power can we see that the typical struggle of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was not that between lords and peasants but that opposing two levels of the seigneurial elites. Here if anywhere was quasi-ideological conflict: knights, retainers and servants struggling for respectability with their fragile claims to coercive patrimonial domination, bewildered princes and kings seeking to square their own seigneurial instincts with revived and clerically inspired notions of lawful public order. … The crisis of the millennium was one of power, which (as always) survived; what collapsed was government.[89]

---

[86] Thomas N. Bisson, "The 'Feudal Revolution,'" *Past & Present* 142 (February 1994): 6–42.

[87] Georges Duby, *La Société aux XIe et XIIe Siècles dans la Région Mâconnaise*, Bibliothèque Générale de l'École Pratique Des Hautes Études (Paris: Armand Colin, 1953).

[88] Cf.: Dominique Barthélemy and Stephen D. White, "The 'Feudal Revolution,'" *Past & Present* 152 (August 1996): 196–223; Timothy Reuter and Chris Wickham, "The 'Feudal Revolution,'" *Past & Present* 155 (May 1997): 177–208; and Thomas N. Bisson, "The 'Feudal Revolution': Reply," *Past & Present* 155 (May 1997): 208–25.

[89] Bisson, "The 'Feudal Revolution,'" 40–42.

In other words, Bisson claimed the outburst of anarchy in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in the post-Carolingian world that transformed the social order and in a fairly rapid process gave birth to lordships, which emerged from the remnants of collapsed royal regimes. There is no need here to provide an overview of the debate triggered by Bisson's arguments. In general, it contested the very fact of "feudal change", pointing to numerous instances that would prove that violent and disorderly system of lordships was rather a mutation of the previous system than a new opening. Besides, it questioned the geographical and historiographical perspective of his study that was much concentrated on French territories. Finally, it put it doubt efficiency of the available methodological tools in assessing the degree of anarchy and disorder caused by predatory and violent lordships. Despite this criticism, the very existence of lordships, that multiplied and inhabited the political universe, was not questioned; an observation that gave me another impulse to use Bisson's latest work as the background for my inquiry and a vantage point for constructing the concept of lordship. What in his research was particularly beneficial for my own argument was the spread of analytical net, which Bisson cast, in order to set firmer grounding for what followed in the thirteenth century.

Constructing the Concept

On the whole, Bisson drew a picture of the twelfth century which seems complementary to the image created by already classical Charles Homer Haskins' "The renaissance of the twelfth century".[90] The latter powerfully focused on a great intellectual leap that the European society made by works of learned monks and other clergymen. The highly enlightened effigy of the twelfth century rendered by Haskins, focused on undoubtedly illustrious cultural and educational achievements,[91] was now repainted by Bisson from a different, external (or foreign) to scholarly inclined scriptoria, perspective, which was that of a burn-out peasant village rather than that of the highest intellectual or social strata. Bisson's twelfth century, viewed from a vantage point of the powerless, emerged as a violent and

---

[90] Charles Homer Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927).
[91] Haskins briefly characterized the century in the preface: *This century, the very century of St. Bernard and his mule, was in many respects an age of fresh and vigorous life. The epoch of the Crusades, of the rise of towns, and of the earliest bureaucratic states of the West, it saw the culmination of Romanesque art and the beginnings of Gothic; the emergence of the vernacular literatures; the revival of the Latin classics and of Latin poetry and Roman law; the recovery of Greek science, with its Arabic additions, and of much of Greek philosophy; and the origin of the first European universities. The twelfth century left its signature on higher education, on the scholastic philosophy, on European systems of law, on architecture and sculpture, on the liturgical drama, on Latin and vernacular poetry*: Ibid., vi.

abusive period filled with enormity, devastation and destruction. It was populated by aggressive lords who exercised their power through coercion and brutal domination. The general picture of socio-political circumstances, filled with crude force, terror and horror, makes a reader legitimately wonder how this destructive era could ever reach its cultural prowess[92] as justly elucidated by Haskins.[93]

Bisson's image of the twelfth-century politics can somehow distort the overall picture of this period, but this has been caused by his research agenda. Since he was chiefly interested in how power was practically experienced throughout Europe, his analytical essay offered a spotlight which revealed a piece of the past reality (the one preoccupied with the exercise of power) and by force it obscured the remainder. As Bisson put it, the fundamental question of his book was how the experience of power shifted from ritual, violence and lack of protection to the experience of government.[94] To emphasize historical change in perceiving modes of power, which he claimed had taken place between 1050 and 1225, he, therefore, poignantly contrasted the time of disorder – which prevailed in Europe in that given period – with the nascent of more institutionalized and public-order-oriented power relations.

This attempt has been neatly summarized by his reviewers:

If we stand well back from the myriad vivid accounts and close discussions of great and small events, a clear outline emerges in which the turbulent and chaotic conditions of the eleventh and early twelfth centuries give way slowly to a more ordered world in which central authority—that is, the greatest lords—imposes itself more effectively and begins to sense the possibility of broader, even common interests. It is a slow and painful business, much slower and more piecemeal than ordinary accounts, especially recent ones, have brought out. This is an important corrective to the many who, like the present reviewer, have been tempted to hail the distant shore the moment the clifftops are sighted, at the risk of overlooking the breakers between.[95]

---

[92] Cf. for example: Brett Edward Whalen, *Dominion of God: Christendom and Apocalypse in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 73, 98.

[93] Cf. a less enthusiastic review article: Hans Hummer, "Were the Lords Really All That Bad?," *Historical Methods* 43, no. 4 (2010): 165–70.

[94] Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century*, 2009, 17.

[95] R. I. Moore, American Historical Review 115 (February 2010): 173.

The period 1160-1225: It is in this period that territories were consolidated within their more familiar borders, kingship took shape, and laws and customs came to approximate their written contents of later centuries. Government was becoming routine rather than intrusive.[96]

According to Bisson, the long twelfth-century politics, or "international" politics (if one wishes to highlight inter-lordly relations), was a domain of competing lords who strove to attain lordships for themselves, or at least to secure a share in it.[97] Behind this claim, apart from prolific source material (although sometimes too easily trusted and overlooking their biased twist),[98] one can identify Bisson's anthropological contentions about human's political motivations. Thus, he came up with a sort of a "theory of lordship."[99]

In Bisson's view, humans are generally preoccupied with the matter of power. He stated that power is "the most interesting thing for people in all ages" and that it attracts most of them.[100] Having analyzed the sources, he came to a conclusion that in the post-Carolingian world, in which the royal authority and hold of imperial provinces had waned, power vacuum emerged which had to be somehow filled. Since quest for power is a supreme human motivation, man seeks control and domination, which in that particular moment could be attained through lordship.

Lordship, in Bisson's understanding, was "personal commands over dependent people who might be peasants in quasi-servile status or knights or vassals having or seeking elite standing."[101] Lordship was born by default or usurpation of royal prerogatives of protection and command, and derived from another natural human need of security. Interestingly, he observed that "the written sources show that people almost everywhere in Christian Europe,

---

[96] Anne E. Lester, *Journal of World History* 22 (March 2011): 138.
[97] Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century*, 2009, 7.
[98] Cf. Hummer, "Were the Lords Really All That Bad?," 166.
[99] Cf. opinions made by Bisson's opponents: *Discussions of the 'feudal revolution' originally stressed changes at fundamental levels of social and political organization, but T. N. Bisson's reconsideration underlines the accompanying changes in mentalities, especially in relation to the social role of violence. The contrast as he depicts it is not a simple one between peace before and violence after the millennium, but between an older violence whose primary role was the maintaining of public order and a newer 'private' violence practiced by the masters of castles and their followers. This was 'personal, affective, but inhumane; militant, aggressive, but unconstructive'. Unconstructive or not, Bisson depicts lords and their armed gangs as holding something like an ideology of violence, as seen both in the sparse narrative sources of the period and in the language used by charters. Lordship was not only in fact predatory, as no doubt it had always been and would long remain, but it also consciously saw itself as such. The 'feudal anarchy' of earlier discussions here finds its feudal anarchists*: Reuter and Wickham, "The 'Feudal Revolution,'" 177–178.
[100] Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century*, 2009, VIII.
[101] Ibid., 3.

from the later ninth century, were seeking or submitting to lords. How and by what rhythms this happened is an unresolved problem of history."[102] Since lordship was anti-institutional, that is, it was a private enterprise disinterested in an abstract notion of "public order", the basic means of exercising and attaining this mode of power was immediate violence,[103] which was thus experienced personally, physically, and palpably.[104] Bisson suggested that still in the ninth century both theoretically and practically protection and command were royal prerogatives; subsequently the notion of public order survived, yet the practice was significantly altered. From the tenth century onwards lordships successfully breached on these realities.[105] Consequently, violence prevailed and created its own mode of power, that of a lordship.[106]

In this sense, I would understand Bisson's lordship as a vessel of survival; its violence generated power,[107] which then provided protection and command;[108] hence, a certain type of order was restored.[109]

Coming back to Bisson's argument, wielding power defined nobility. The quest of lordship was, therefore, a quest for nobility and the honor of precedence.[110] It was a quest for status, because "only lords could be noble, only nobles could govern: could exercise powers of justice and command that created the presumption of nobility."[111] The social and political imperative required from aspiring nobility not to be taken as peasants, that is, as the powerless, who could be injured and tormented at will.

This strive for powerfulness concurs with what contemporary sociology of politics identified a number of the "commonly sought" values and principles in the human society. These are: power, social standing, and welfare (and education that has been recently added).[112] Also in IR scholarship there may be found:

---

[102] Ibid., 24.
[103] Ibid., 31.
[104] Ibid., 11–12.
[105] Ibid., 24.
[106] Ibid., 7.
[107] Ibid., 6.
[108] Ibid., 24.
[109] Ibid., 31.
[110] Ibid., 12, 201, 512.
[111] Ibid., 47.
[112] Jerzy Józef Wiatr, *Socjologia polityki* (Warsaw: Europejska Wyższa Szkoła Prawa i Administracji, 2009), 205.

at least five basic social values that states [in this case lordships – wk] *are usually expected to uphold: security, freedom, order, justice and welfare. These are social values that are so fundamental to human well-being that they must be protected or ensured in some way. … Most people usually take these basic values … for granted. They only become aware of them when something goes wrong.*[113]

Taking these sociological standards at their face value and applying them to Bisson's lordships, demonstrates that those political entities were in fact devised to sustain them, only in an adapted variation: the security standard stood for protection; freedom for the noble social standing (that is, not being considered as peasants devoid of power); order and justice meant the capability to exercise sheer coercive power; and welfare materialized from violent means of extortion. The important difference between lordships and states was in terms of whom they ultimately served: since states are nominally expected to secure the basic values of their citizens (by the implementation and workings of the concept of government), lordships were far more private enterprises, which had been less concerned with the well-being of subjugated people but rather committed to guarantee the proper standing of its elites precisely by means of forceful subjugation.

Bisson had not doubts that the proliferation of lordships throughout the tenth to thirteenth centuries, which had happened because of increasing population and wealth that caused "the multiplication of people with the means and will to coerce others,"[114] gave birth to an anarchical system of lordships,[115] populated by lords entrenched in castles (which popped up in geometrical speed).[116] In this system the concept of order became "illusory" and ceased to correspond to the real experience of power. However, it survived as a norm which "was never renounced as an aspiration, and would be one day substantially restored."[117]

This disorderly system of lordships was not, however, a total anarchy in the Hobbesian sense. Bisson well understood that despite the harsh realities, there were other currents which strove to mitigate the apparent enormities of the period.

---

[113] Robert H. Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 3–5.
[114] Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century*, 2009, 7.
[115] Ibid., 56.
[116] Ibid., 41.
[117] Ibid., 31.

For instance, he pointed that simultaneously to the proliferation of self-seeking lordships, the sustained reflection on power flourished. These considerations, on the one hand, were replicating the idea of lordship as a just mode of power and domination; on the other, however, they strove to "civilize" it by application of a moral discourse derived from the biblical-patristic inheritance.

Bisson identified six axioms of this discourse: 1) all power was from God; 2) power was justly wielded on earth to remedy sin and wickedness, and to protect the Church; 3) good and valiant deeds merited fidelity and honor; 4) kingship and prelacy were ministers or offices of God; 5) law was typically a classical restraint on the ruler, and was a "gift of God"; 6) a virtual equating of power with *dominatio*, or lordship, which was the only form of power God was conceived to possess.[118]

Gradually towards 1100, the concept of lordship, perceived as exercising unrestrained lord's will, was increasingly confronted with a religious universe of right and wrong, and the virtues of grace and mercy became inserted into the notion of good lordship.[119] Furthermore, doing justice was effectively played as the sole divine prerogative which God shared with lords; hence, claims to justice equaled claims to God's power.[120] To Bisson, the culture of violence induced a cultural reaction against exploitative lordship which could be noticed by the emergence and rapid development of charters. Their content, initially composed by educated clerics, promoted security, freedom, and justice.[121] Charters defined privilege and limited the more willful or arbitrary prerogatives,[122] and hence, they could be easily contextualized as an evidence of the widespread rejection of arbitrary lordship.[123]

According to Bisson, developments in the reflection on power were both effects and contributors to the multiplication of lordships. From 1050 to 1150 lordship, as the experience of power, became widespread[124] and customary.[125] As a result, the European "international" system was an aggregate of lordships with kingdoms of undefined borders, in which masses of subjects and dependents looked to princes as well as to kings as their rulers, and the

---

[118] Ibid., 10.
[119] Ibid., 80.
[120] Ibid., 72.
[121] Ibid., 351.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Ibid., 367.
[124] Ibid., 68.
[125] Ibid., 131, 182–183.

political imagination of the majority of lords was confined to checking and balancing their abutting neighbors.[126]

Invoking IR theoretical categories, I would point that the apparent anarchy of lordships was not the same as of states. Judging from Bisson's findings, the former were not defined solely as territorial units but functioned as clusters of human hierarchical networks combined with an unstable material base. They could be created by anyone capable of curving out a "piece" of domination over a territory and were held together by the concept of fidelity, which was a personal bond that stood for "solidarity" (Bisson's term for what I would call a "will to co-operate") in common causes fused with subordination.[127] Thus, lords, unlike modern states, could not be easily perceived as individual actors on the "international", that is, inter-lordly stage (as this is customarily claimed by the realist tradition in IR to be discussed later).

Bisson observed, for instance, that the German realm of the Salians was largely considered as a solidarity of king and princes;[128] a finding that later in the thirteenth century was to be confirmed by Emperor Frederick II's legislation.[129] Furthermore, it was also a common experience that in times of succession crisis "the security of youthful lord-princes depended on the good-will of their baronial allies and on their ability to reward them."[130] Thus, it can be argued that from a theoretical perspective lordships were themselves collections of smaller lordships,[131] subordinated - usually by the force of oath – to their larger counterparts, yet in turn, they also duplicated this type of structure to the very bottom of social strata (since – as Bisson's first anthropological assumption prescribed – everybody strives to dominate and control, and hence attempts to enforce some form of subjugation).

In the post-Carolingian world, lordships emerged through acts of usurpation or due to the absence of effective royal power, or by regular conquest. However, Bisson observed that in the long run it was not enough to seize power and wield it by sheer force. The carved-out lordships required justification for their existence that would subsequently promote and encourage the "solidarity" among its lesser units. Bisson pointed that lord-princes never

---

[126] Cf. Ibid., 84–85.
[127] Cf. Ibid., 93.
[128] Ibid., 112.
[129] Weiler, *Kingship*, 8–9.
[130] Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century*, 2009, 191.
[131] Cf. Gerd Althoff, *Ottonowie: władza królewska bez państwa* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2009), 118.

cultivated a self-sufficient ideology of power, and they had not gone much further than "echoing biblical precepts of royalist obligation" or "claiming descent from kings".[132] Moreover, he asserted, perhaps quite surprisingly to those who would try to view high-medieval lordships as state-like units, that the vassalage to lord-kings was not feared; quite the contrary, it was an honorable status for all who could achieve it (hence the concept of sovereignty was quite different to the one prevailing in the modern times).[133]

Since the justification for the existence of non-royal lordships was not elaborated independently from the reflection on royal authority, the custom could have done some good work there. Lordship's sustainability was promoted by its endurance in time which encouraged a sense of "ancient order" (or tradition) among both the lordship's dependents and the neighboring lords. This process of enrooting enhanced a sort of unwritten recognition which itself was linked to the status and standing of a given lordship. A telling example for this process of gradually won recognition could be the case of the Norman lordship of Sicily. [134] The Normans appeared in southern Italy in the middle of the eleventh century; the first invasion on the island of Sicily was launched in 1061, and was brought to completion within next thirty years. Later, Roger II succeeded in seizing control over lands governed by other Norman lords and in 1130 was crowned with a papal consent, and thus attained a royal standing.[135]

Noteworthy, the power of custom is, however, problematic, because it is susceptive to changes engineered by those who are in charge to interpret it.[136] A precedent or usurpation can inflict harm too. It is, therefore, a flexible and apt tool in hands of cunning actors. A customarily recognized existence backed with a royal coronation could effectively fulfill lord-princes ambitions of status and nobility (the Normans in Sicily). On the other hand, lordships, which justified their existence by the force of custom and longevity, ultimately formed a particular "international" system, ordered in a certain fashion, which could and was challenged, but at the same time it would relatively easy find its protectors and defenders.

Such guardians of the custom were first of all preoccupied with preventing significant changes in the distribution of power and prestige by not allowing major reshaping or

---

[132] Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century*, 2009, 297.
[133] Cf. Ibid., 299.
[134] Ibid., 279.
[135] Cf. Marjorie Chibnall, *The Normans* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2002), 75–93.
[136] Cf. Althoff, *Ottonowie*, 44–46.

reconfigurations on the customary map of European lordships. These changes did not have to always refer to territorial delineations but could equally legitimately pertain to alterations in social standing of given actors. For instance, Henry the Lion, who had managed to build a formidable lordship comprising Saxony, Bavaria and substantial territories in northern and eastern Germany, aspiring to kingly status against the will of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, was ultimately defeated by German princes and even exiled for some time. It was possible, as Bisson indicated, because of "the understanding between the emperor and a number of princes threatened more by Henry than by Frederick".[137] The formidable conflict between King Rudolf of Habsburg of the Romans and King Přemysl Ottakar II of Bohemia in the 1270s displayed analogical patterns and was strikingly similar in mobilizing lord-princes against their "overgrown" peer.

Hence, as Bisson claimed, from after 1150 the process of maximization of lordships could be noticed.[138] The omnipresence of lordships in Latin Christendom and their customarily established hierarchical order of subordination was by no means stable or well-defined. Lordships were no more simply extended by conquest; their maximization, that is, the increase in lordship's efficiency in terms of material power and human resources, embarked upon two fundamental strands: internal and external (alternatively, domestic and foreign). According to Bisson's findings, the maximization of lordships was mostly attained either by claiming to influence or profit from successions to great patrimonies (external strand), or by pretending that professions of fidelity implied the homage of vassals, and by urging that dependent tenures created customary obligations on which lords were entitled to insist.[139]

Therefore, lordships were "maximized" either by territorial expansion, that is, by securing control over a new land, or by intensifying means of establishing personal bonds and collecting taxes. Judging these practices from more theoretical perspective, it could be claimed about Bisson's argument that, in accordance with his general assumption about human's inclinations to control and domination, the lordships' proliferation stage was subsequently succeeded by a stage of their substantiation. In other words, once the multiplicity of lordships emerged and won its "conceptual battle of survival" by becoming a

---

[137] Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century*, 2009, 302.
[138] Ibid., 305.
[139] Ibid.

customary mode of experience of power, that is, the justification of lordship's existence made sense to its contemporaries, lordships set out to expand their revenues and their power basis. They began to strengthen and reproduce themselves.

In Bisson's opinion, the process of maximization transformed lordships, because it induced another process, that of government building. The increasing complexity of administration gradually replaced the logic of loyalty with the logic of competences, and thus forged intertwined concepts of accountability and office. Lordly power shifted from the passively affective character to progressively institutionalized.[140] That is, the exploitative power converted to the official service and a noble lordship mutated to its less aggressive variant of a royal retainer.[141] These changes received the label of "politicizing" which basically meant three advancements in lordly political mentalities: 1) linking one's inheritances with the collective advantage; 2) discovering common interests; 3) collectively influencing a changing state of the realm.[142]

As Peter Fleming rightly pointed out:

What prompted this transition [from affective power to that of government – wk] *was not, Bisson insists, any new-found concern of rulers for the wellbeing of their subjects, but a realization that thereby lay the best means by which power and profit could be realized. Far from subverting 'lordship,' 'government' emerged as its servant*.[143]

There is one more Bisson's observation to be mentioned here. He claimed that towards the first decades of the thirteenth century the customary experience of consecrated power favored lord-kingship (against other lordships) as seldom before.[144] This would suggest that in the thirteenth-century "international" system of lordships, which had originated in and somehow fossilized from the tenth to the early thirteenth century, non-royal lordships appeared incomplete, that is, the quest for elite standing and nobility could be better fulfilled, if at its end there was a royal diadem. Certainly, it was not a must, and kingdoms themselves greatly differed from each other; however, the idea of lordly power paid much attention to

---

[140] Ibid., 494.
[141] Ibid., 430.
[142] Ibid., 538–539.
[143] Peter Fleming, *Labour / Le Travail* 67 (Spring 2011): 270.
[144] Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century*, 2009, 541.

matters of prestige and considered kingship as its final model (the problem that will win much of my attention later on).[145]

By saying this I do not imply that the early thirteenth-century kingship was an embodiment of sovereignty, and therefore it had been particularly valued against lord-princes, whose position was traditionally viewed as less independent. This way of thinking will be rather nourished by political theorists over the fourteenth century, yet back in the thirteenth century the political practice did not prevent kings from submitting parts or even their entire kingdoms as fiefs to other lords; the cases of the kingdom of Sicily subjected to the pope and the English territories on the continent enfeoffed to kings of England by the French monarchs being the most well-known instances of such practices.

Having remembered that princely power did not manage to produce its independent ideology in contrast to kingship, as noted above, it makes easier to discern other sources of esteem that accompanied the royal standing. John Watts identified six of them which, although they were supposed to describe the status of kingship in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, they still, in my opinion, embrace the logic of prestige behind the thirteenth-century European system of lordships.

Watts pointed to the following advantages of kingdoms: 1) they were richly endowed with mythic and historical legitimations; 2) their rituals of installation were often especially elaborate that enabled them to claim a sacred status; 3) they usually had superior means of attracting service, storing records and generating publicity; 4) they always had a claim to regalia; 5) they generally enjoyed the support of the churchmen; 6) they were able to exploit new technologies of rule in advance to other lords.[146] Even if the thirteenth-century monarchies were not as sophisticated as Watts' enumeration implied (and they were not), the general tendency, which affirmed that their existence made most sense to their contemporaries, can be fairly easily noticed here.

---

[145] Susan Reynolds insisted: *The highest, most honorable, and most perfect of all secular communities was the kingdom. Although at every date there were some kingdoms which looked less united than some smaller units of government, kingdoms as such nevertheless seem to have been normally perceived as the ideal type of political unit, just as kings were perceived as the ideal type of ruler. A kingdom was never thought of merely as the territory which happened to be ruled by a king. It comprised and corresponded to a 'people' ... which was assumed to be a natural, inherited community of tradition, custom, law, and descent*: Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900-1300* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 250.

[146] John Watts, *The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300-1500* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 72.

To sum up, Bisson's study provided a number of useful material for conceptualizing lordships in the thirteenth century. First, it rendered its functional definition arguing that lordship was "personal commands over dependent people who might be peasants in quasi-servile status or knights or vassals having or seeking elite standing". Second, it suggested that lordship was born out of usurpation of royal prerogatives and originated in human interest in power. Third, lordships existed in predatory environment in which they competed with one another to maximize their power. Fourth, the disorderly practice on the "international" level was accompanied by a powerful cultural and moral discourse that identified what was "good" and "bad lordship" as well as determined kingship as the model for lordships. Fifth, over the tenth to early thirteenth centuries lordships multiplied, populated the entire "international" arena, and became customary; the process which allows to perceive them as standard "international" units of the time.

Definition and Characteristics

The following conceptualization of lordships is a combination of Bisson's findings, my own anthropological assumptions about human nature and some anticipations of discoveries made in this study.

The thirteenth-century "international" system was typically made of lordships which are considered as its basic building blocks. Lordships were generally monarchical units ruled by a lord (or a group of a few) who claimed domination over a given territory and people living there. Undoubtedly, there was a variety of political actors[147] but for this theoretical outline I would point to lordships as dominant and most important "international" units.

These units differed in size and power but shared the organizational principle of a monarchical or aristocratic rule. They were hardly sovereign in the modern sense but they were practically quite independent in coping with their internal and external problems. Lordships consisted of material power assigned to a lord and of immaterial claim of domination over a certain territory; the claim was exercised by the means of that power. Lordships were not centralized units as modern states would claim to be with extended bureaucracy and administration based on professionals paid by the state. Lordships functioned as collectives of lesser lords with their lord at the head. Since the

---

[147] Weiler, *Kingship*, 172.

institutionalization was still underdeveloped, lordships hardly distinguished between "internal" and "external" ("domestic" and "foreign") inter-lordly relations. Theoretically, for a lord there was a plain difference between a lord-subject and a lord-neighbor, but in practice such distinctions could be fairly easily blurred.

Lordships were more human-dependent projects than modern states are now (in which human factor is distilled through bureaucratic procedures and regulations, not to mention the sophisticated and multilayered system of domestic and international law). Lords were humans who were chiefly preoccupied with the interest of their own and their closest family. The practice showed that lords strove to secure the future of their wives and children, and their male issue in particular. Extending lordships and gaining authority and prestige was in a long run meant to provide a good starting base for young males to build lordships for themselves. This is why the matters of succession were so important. Lordships were, as noted earlier, vessels of survival for ruling families and means of maintaining noble status (a higher rank in the Christian society).[148] Therefore, the human impact on shaping political behavior of lordships was considerable, for it combined a naturally-induced self-regard with another powerful instinct of protecting one's offspring.

The internal organization of lordships reinforced human factor (against institutionally-governed factors). Lords were monarchs, that is, only rulers in their lands. This form of organization emulated God's rule over the world. Lord's will was crucial; hence, his personal skills and abilities, his individual capabilities were all particularly important in shaping lordship's behavior on the "international" stage. On the other hand, lordships could fairly efficiently function mostly in the form of living alliances between lord-ruler and lesser lord-subjects. This collective aspect of rule required from a lord hearing counsel and asking for help (known as *auxilium et consilium*).[149] In general, a lord had to accommodate interests of his

---

[148] Halina Manikowska indicated four purposes of a dynastic marriage: 1) acquiring an heir; 2) expanding the lordship; 3) attaining higher social standing and gaining more influence; 4) bringing peace between lords: cf. Halina Manikowska, "Andegaweni," in *Dynastie Europy*, ed. Antoni Mączak (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 2003), 46.

[149] Cf. opinion made by Susan Reynolds: *I hope that it may be agreed that between 900 and 1300 lay society and government depended in a mass of different ways on the collective activities of a wide range of people; that this activity was undertaken as a matter of course in support of government, as well as in opposition to it; and that in all its aspects it reveals a very homogenous set of values, which combined acceptance of inequality and subordination with a high degree of voluntary co-operation. These values, moreover, continued to dominate collective activity throughout the period. Although the twelfth and thirteenth centuries brought new forms of collective activity, clearer articulation of the duties owed to and by communities, and somewhat clearer expression*

lord-subjects, and thus secure their will to co-operate, while pursuing his own family-focused politics.

In the beginning of the thirteenth century, Europe was inhabited by various lordships that differed from each other in almost everything save the monarchical concept of lordly power. This system was still much more flexible than the contemporary one in Europe, because it allowed for significant changes: amalgamation of lordships, emergence of new ones, and disappearance of others. The system was elastic; however, it had its limits. Actually, if to consider the emergence of new states after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the recent decades, it could be argued that the adaptability of the thirteenth-century system was comparable to the contemporary one. With respect to all due differences, both of them allowed for including new members.

As it was already indicated, the thirteenth-century lordships differed in size, wealth, and power. Over decades some of them managed, by variety of means, to gain more resources than others. These aspects are corresponding to those relating to states. Nevertheless, lordships varied also in terms of formal status: there were lord-princes, lord-counts, lord-bishops, and lord-kings (and the list could continue if to include lesser mortals). Extending this categorization, one could speak about lord-emperor and lord-pope. Such diversification implied hierarchy in the "international" system; a situation incomparable to modern states perceived as equals (also before international law).[150]

Concluding, a few major points about lordships have to be made.

First, lordships were monarchical units ruled by a lord (or a group of a few) who claimed domination over a given territory and people living there. Second, they were the most standard power structures of the thirteenth-century "international" system. Third, lordships functioned as collectives of lesser lords with their lord at the head and thus combined the concept of monarchical rule with a notion of collective rule being somewhat similar to standing alliances dominated by a single hegemon. Fourth, lordships operated as vessels of survival for ruling families and means of maintaining noble status. Hence, the human impact

---

of the values they embodied, the evidence of any fundamental change of values is surprisingly small: Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900-1300*, 1997, 332.

[150] Michael Sheehan briefly concluded: *The feudal Middle Ages were not characterized by a state-system, but by one whose sovereignties looked to the authority represented by pope and emperor*: Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory* (London; New York: Routledge, 1996), 29.

on shaping political behavior of lordships was considerable, for it combined a naturally-induced self-regard of a lord with his another powerful instinct that prescribed protecting his offspring. Fifth, lordships differed from one another in size, wealth, power and rank (elite-standing). And last but not least, still in the thirteenth century lordships were susceptible to emergence, amalgamation and disappearance; the feature that made them relatively unstable as abstract "international" units and thus it even stronger linked their existence to persons of their lords.

International System and the Realist Tradition in IR Theories

Having accepted lords and their lordships as dominant actors of the "international" stage, the attention should be now shifted to the question how to characterize this "international" European system of lordships of the thirteenth century and what would be the essential elements of such description? Building this image requires, however, some reflection on the nature of international system as such. Kenneth Waltz's study,[151] its vehement criticism notwithstanding, would be a good point of departure. The purpose of this subsection is to provide theoretical groundings and become a reference point for the analysis carried out in Chapter 2 that is dedicated to the problem of the structure of the thirteenth-century "international" system and to what degree it determined the behavior of lordships.

Since this study has been done by a medieval historian by training and its prospective readership will most probably consist of other medievalists, and on the whole Kenneth Waltz does not fall into the scope of medieval political reflection, I consider as important to explain my interest in his study.

Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* is recognized as being "among the finest products to be based on rationalist assumptions" and the neorealist current in the field of IR theories has been mainly associated with Waltz's writings.[152] By some he has been acknowledged as the leading contemporary neorealist thinker.[153] Realism is a major tradition of thinking about international relations[154] which traces its philosophical assumptions to the works of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, yet itself was born in the inter-war

---

[151] Waltz, *Theory*.

[152] Knud Erik Jørgensen, *International Relations Theory: A New Introduction* (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 84.

[153] Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 73.

[154] Anna Wojciuk, *Dylemat potęgi: praktyczna teoria stosunków międzynarodowych* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2010), 23.

period, and reflected the nineteenth-century concept of *Realpolitik*. It grew up and came to maturity chiefly in the United States and over decades considerably contributed to the field of IR theories.[155]

The fundamental assumptions shared by all variants of the Realist tradition can be easily found in any textbook dealing with the IR theory. For this reason, I do not intend here to provide a more extensive characteristics of the realist strand. Nevertheless, before proceeding with a short presentation of Waltz's argument, I need to make some caveats.

First, the realist tradition (neorealism included) was created and elaborated primarily in the twentieth century, and was devised to grapple with the international system as observed in that period (this, for instance, explains its preoccupation with international state-actors). It was never purposefully designed to tackle with the politics of the past societies, although it claimed validity for the systems populated with centralized states (later nation-states), since among its fundamental principles were: 1) "a conviction that international relations are necessarily conflictual and that international conflicts are ultimately resolved by war"; 2) "a high regard for the values of national security and state survival."[156] As a result, realism adopted an approach to international politics that recognized states as the only meaningful agents on the international stage[157] (it was an arbitrary decision made for the sake of coherence of the theory)[158] and which essentially focused on the matters of war and conflict (theories of conflict).[159] All this would apparently exclude the realist approaches from profitable analyzing of the medieval "international" politics, which was evidently different from the contemporary international arena.

Second, however, the realist tradition is based on pessimistic assumptions about human nature and holds a conviction that humanity is generally doomed to live in the state of permanent conflict. It does not claim that war is perennial but rather underlines the impossibility to create an enduring peace on the international level. The field of international politics, unlike domestic politics which is hierarchically ordered, suffers from the lack of a global government which could control and eliminate conflicts between states, as a regular

---

[155] Jørgensen, *International Relations Theory*, 2010, 79.
[156] Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 59.
[157] Jacek Czaputowicz, *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych: krytyka i systematyzacja* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2007), 29.
[158] Waltz, *Theory*, 93.
[159] Jørgensen, *International Relations Theory*, 2010, 78.

government does at the level of domestic affairs. One of Waltz's most important arguments was an assertion that any international system was decentralized and anarchical by nature, for their parts are formally equal, none is entitled to command and none is required to obey.[160] Following these presumptions, it could be (and was) argued about universalistic capabilities of the realist theory, that is, that with its pessimism about humans (as preoccupied with their own well-being and competing with each other)[161] and states, their international "equivalents", realism is applicable throughout ages, and does not have to confine its explanatory powers solely to the contemporary politics.[162] Hence, as noted earlier, Markus Fischer applied realism to medieval Europe,[163] because he believed that "feudal actors" in essence behaved as modern states and this because, following Waltz's assertions, "the conflict and power politics are a structural condition of the international realm – present even among individuals in a stateless condition".[164]

Third, the realist tradition with its Waltzian denomination has been strongly contested and stirred up a grand debate.[165] This is by no means the only paradigm and there is no general agreement in the IR theory field about even basic assumptions, for all traditions (be it realism, liberalism, constructivism, the English School, Marxist, or critical approaches) begin their theoretical constructs on certain anthropologies, in most cases contradicting each other. Realism, as its critics say, "fails to explain most of international relations."[166] Waltz's answer to them went along the reductionist understanding of a theory in IR, when he asserted: "Structures [the pillar-concept of the neorealist understanding of international politics – wk] never tell us all that we want to know. Instead they tell us a small number of big and important things."[167] Paul Schroeder, a historian of modern period, made a deliberate attempt to test the principles of neorealism against the historical evidence, that he had been familiar with, and he eventually claimed that the Waltzian international theory's assumptions though make

---

[160] Cf. Waltz, *Theory*, 88–89.
[161] Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 59.
[162] Cf. Waltz, *Theory*, 117.
[163] Fischer, "Feudal Europe," Spring 1992.
[164] Ibid., 428.
[165] Cf. for example: Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
[166] Cf. a short summary: Scott Burchill, ed., *Theories of International Relations* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 52–54.
[167] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 329.

it simple, parsimonious, and elegant; yet simultaneously unhistorical, unusable, and wrong.[168] Nevertheless, his polemists, IR theorists, to Schroeder's dismay, declared about his examples, which he had believed devastating for the theory, that "no evidence could be more compatible with a neo-realist reading of international relations."[169]

Thus, there is virtually no possibility to conclusively decide about the degree of (in)validity of the realist tradition either in contemporary international politics or in its equivalents in the past. Also this is not my intention to delve into this issue here. Suffice to say that Fischer's study, which analyzed the medieval "international" politics from a vantage point grounded in fundamental and universal principle (and thus ahistorical),[170] nearly outraged the IR specialists of other paradigms,[171] and furthermore, it was still unsatisfactory to me as a medieval historian of politics. On the other hand, Bisson's study, which put forward the process of emergence, proliferation, and transformation of lordships, was unwittingly (at least as far as references are concerned) fashioned along the lines that could be with ease accommodated with the realist tradition. I will return to this issue in a while.

My argument is, therefore, that by making references to Waltz's structural theory of international politics, and by using his conceptual framework as a tool to make sense of the thirteenth-century medieval politics, I do not intend to subscribe completely to the realist tradition and automatically exclude other traditions or paradigms (in fact, Chapter 3 draws much of constructivist paradigm to be explained later in this chapter). Moreover, I am not trying to test Waltz's theory against the extant evidence and thus contribute to a discussion about (in)adequacy of such approach to the medieval "international" system. I would rather inform my own inquiry and theoretical thinking by adapting the concept which turned out to be a watershed in the IR theories.[172]

Jackson and Sorensen's textbook delivered a fancy summary of Waltz's model:

---

[168] Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 129.

[169] Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "History vs. Neo-Realism: A Second Look," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 184.

[170] *The feudal system was organized by the same fundamental principle as the modern system: the rational propensity to strive for exclusive control over manpower and thus territory in order to maximize the chances for survival in a condition where central protection was absent*: Fischer, "Feudal Europe," Spring 1992, 461.

[171] Cf. a vehement polemics with Fischer's claims: Hall and Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales," Summer 1993.

[172] Jørgensen, *International Relations Theory*, 2010, 85. Cf. Wojciuk, *Dylemat*, 27.

[It] seeks to provide a scientific explanation of the international relations system. His explanatory approach is heavily influenced by positivist models of economics. A scientific theory of IR leads us to expect states to behave in certain predictable ways. In Waltz's view the best IR theory is one that focuses centrally on the structure of the system, on its interacting units, and on the continuities and changes of the system. In classical realism, state leaders and their international decisions and actions are at the centre of attention. In neo-realism, by contrast, the structure of the system that is external to the actors, in particular the relative distribution of power, is the central analytical focus. Actors are relatively unimportant because structures compel them to act in certain ways. Structures more or less determine actions.[173]

Waltz's intuitions derived from his earlier book, *Man, the State and War*,[174] in which he set out to discuss reasons whether (and then how?) wars could be avoided. He, therefore, identified three "images of international relations". The first maintained that "the locus of the important causes of war is found in the nature and behavior of man. Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity. Other causes are secondary and have to be interpreted in the light of these factors."[175] The second image shifted the interest from human nature, which could be held responsible for everything in social life and thus explain nothing,[176] to the internal organization of states as essential for understanding war and peace.[177] Certain types of states (authoritarian, capitalist, Marxist – depending on the assumed perspective) are generally more aggressive than others and tend to initiate wars.[178] The third image referred to what goes beyond both human nature and the specific organization of a state. It focused on the structure of international systems which created a hostile environment that was permanently threatened with war.

In anarchy there is no automatic harmony. The three preceding statements reflect this fact. A state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it

---

[173] Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 73–74. Waltz explained: *The ruler's, and later the state's, interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve the state's interests; success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state – structural constraints explain why the methods are repeatedly used despite differences in the persons and states who use them*: Waltz, *Theory*, 117.

[174] Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Man, the State, and War; a Theoretical Analysis.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

[175] Ibid., 16.

[176] Ibid., 80–81.

[177] Ibid., 81.

[178] Wojciuk, *Dylemat*, 26–27.

values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies. Because any state may at any time use force, all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness. The requirements of state action are, in this view, imposed by the circumstances in which all states exist.[179]

The international system consists of interacting units and a structure.[180] The latter is a system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole. [181] The structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts and it is not merely a collection of political institutions. This arrangement has its principle. This principle of a system provides essential bit of information about how the parts of the system are related to each other. For instance, domestic politics is centralized and hierarchically ordered, whereas international systems are anarchically organized, that is, their parts interact with each other in the absence of agents with system-wide authority. International systems are "individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended." They "are formed and maintained on a principle of self-help that applies to the units."[182]

Concluding, neorealist theoretical framework that deals with structures of international systems has been never devised to specifically grapple with medieval realities. However, this is a deductively conceived paradigm that claims to be illustrative universally and applicable to all systems deprived of single supreme authority. Hence, I decided to utilize Waltz's notion of three "images of international relations", and the third image in particular, in order to determine the environment in which the thirteenth-century "international" politics took place and in which Charles I and Łokietek grew up to become and act like lords. In addition, Bisson's world of lordships had apparently much commonalities with the image of international politics painted by neorealists.

Anarchy – A Confusing Concept

While discussing this work on various occasions and with different audiences, it became evident that the way the term "anarchy" appears here causes sometimes a great deal of confusion. This lack of clarity seems to originate in the fact that in this study "anarchy"

---

[179] Waltz, *Man*, 160.
[180] Cf. Waltz, *Theory*, 79–93.
[181] Ibid., 79.
[182] Ibid., 91.

implies two different meanings. Given that medievalist are often unfamiliar with one of them, and unfortunately this is the one that remains central for the discussion in Chapter 2, I decided to dedicate this section to make necessary explanations.

The standard understanding of anarchy appears in this work for the first time while Fischer and Bisson's research on lordships have been discussed. The observations the latter made about the world of predatory lordships, which emerged and multiplied in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, suggested that it was the world of disorder, chaos, violence, extortion, and the lack of government; in other words, what surfaced in the post-Carolingian period was the universe of anarchical lordships that developed its own culture of violence deprived of the sense of accountability. This pessimistic and dim vision of "international" politics in medieval Europe after the year 1000 was in various respects the bone of contention with his critics and reviewers who expressed reservations about the scope and breadth of the presumed anarchy. Furthermore, many scholars – without participating in the debate triggered by Bisson – would hesitate to consider this historical period as the peak of mindless violence and disorder. After all, it is a real methodological problem to assess existing narrative accounts (be them annals, chronicles or charters) as qualifying measures about the degree of violence on the "international" stage.[183] Moreover, anecdotes about extreme lawlessness can be countered by other stories showing the actual existence of government and order. Hence, determining how anarchical medieval society was in a given period of time, seems genuinely inconclusive.

To be sure, talking about anarchy in the thirteenth-century Europe can cause even stronger resistance than in the case of preceding centuries, because such opinion goes against experience and intuition of the majority of scholars. Although wars and conflicts were not suppressed and continuously ravaged throughout the continent, by assuming the lack of order and governance in the thirteenth century one seems to deflect from the balanced judgment about the state of affairs. Presumably, it was one of the major concerns that my colleagues invoked to see my study arguing for anarchy in the thirteenth-century Latin Christendom.

Being aware of all those concerns and reservations, I would like to explicitly state that I do not claim that the thirteenth-century Europe was the realm of chaos, disorder and lack of government. Nor it was the field of the Hobbesian "war of all against all". In particular, in

---

[183] Cf. Reuter and Wickham, "The 'Feudal Revolution,'" 179.

Chapter 2 while discussing whether the "international" system was hierarchical or anarchical I am not implying the notions of disorder and failure of government. Quite the contrary, my argument indicates that serious efforts were exercised on the "international" level to sustain peace and prevent conflicts and violence; hence, to retain order.

Anarchy, which I elaborate on in Chapter 2, is usually addressed as "system-level", "structural" or "systemic". As a matter of fact this is a widespread and often used concept in IR theories and it has very little to do with common terminological understanding of "anarchy", identified with war, violence, death and destruction. While the standard concept of anarchy is descriptive, that is, it depicts the current state and condition of social organizations, the system-level anarchy is a theoretical notion that determines the environment, in which international units act. In other words, while the standard meaning of anarchy asserts a certain state of affairs in a given society, the systemic anarchy only declares something about how international units are arranged within the system and it does not automatically imply the permanent presence of war, conflict, death, violence, and destruction. What it implies, however, is the constant threat of their occurrence.

This point is well described by Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson who long before Waltz was the first to coin the term "international anarchy":[184]

In the great and tragic history of Europe there is a turning-point that marks the defeat of the ideal of a world-order and the definite acceptance of international anarchy. That turning-point is the emergence of the sovereign State at the end of the fifteenth century. … For it is as true of an aggregation of States as of an aggregation of individuals that, whatever moral sentiments may prevail, if there is no common law and no common force the best intentions will be defeated by lack of confidence and security. Mutual fear and mutual suspicion, aggression masquerading as defense and defense masquerading as aggression, will be the protagonists in the bloody drama; and there will be, what Hobbes truly asserted to be the essence of such a situation, a chronic state of war, open or veiled. For peace itself will be a latent war; and the more the States arm to prevent a conflict the more certainly will it be provoked, since to one or another it will always seem a better chance to have it now than to have it on worse conditions later. Some one State at any moment may be the immediate

---

[184] Jørgensen, *International Relations Theory*, 2010, 59.

offender; but the main and permanent offence is common to all States. It is the anarchy which they are all responsible for perpetuating.[185]

Returning to Waltz and his system-level "third image of international relations", what matters in international systems is their ordering principle, that is, how international units are positioned (arranged) towards each other within a given system. For instance, hierarchical ordering implies that units within a system are formally differentiated by means of super- and subordination and that they are assigned various functions that entail specialization. Anarchy, by contrast, presupposes sameness of all units (that is, they are identical in nature and none of them is predestined to rule over the rest) and suggests their essential differentiation only through variations in capabilities (size, resources, wealth, manpower etc.).[186]

Therefore, the system remains anarchical as long as there is no single and effective power center that could provide system-wide governance. Due to the lack of such supreme authority, which would be capable of policing violent interactions between units, the ultimate care for units' security and well-being remains in their own hands. Such "international" environment induces self-seeking practices and distrust, for each unit has to count on its own capabilities to defend itself. And precisely this environment of self-regard and suspicion generates "anarchical international system". Analogically, Waltz's argument pointed to the system-level anarchy, conceived also as a self-help system,[187] which is not generated by the nature of units that inhabit the system, but is an unintended result of entering the unsupervised system by more than two entities, which look at each other with suspicion.

Concluding this reflection about two types of "anarchy" that appear in the text and may cause confusion, I argue that while discussing the anarchical component of the thirteenth-century "international" system and searching for its dominant ordering principle, I am not presupposing disorder and chaos as prevalent features of the thirteenth-century Latin Christendom; instead, I am striving to determine and document the structure of the natural environment, in which medieval "international" politics took place. By assuming that this environment was anarchical in structure, I do not assert anything about the degree of ongoing conflict, bloodshed, violence and destruction within the system; all I declare is that

---

[185] G. Lowes Dickinson, *The European Anarchy* (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 13–14.
[186] Waltz, *Theory*, 93.
[187] Ibid., 104–105.

"international" units confronted (co-acted with) one another as equals by nature (that is, as the members of the same "species"), and that their confrontation (co-action or coexistence) was ultimately happening under the condition of the lack of system-wide authority. An immediate corollary of such anarchical ordering is the significant impact of fear and suspicion on behaviors and strategies of "international" units.

Lordly Identity – Constructivist Approach in IR Theories

In Chapter 3 the concept of "lordly identity" is substantiated on the basis of evidence accumulated throughout the thirteenth century mostly from the Polish lands; in Chapter 4 the content of this identity, as developed in the previous chapter, is tested against another "international" habitat (the kingdom of Hungary) and on specific cases of Charles I and Wenceslas III's lordship-building strategies. Finally, in Chapter 5 lordly identity is chiefly used as an explanatory instrument to identify Charles I and Łokietek's political interests and determine the "international" conditions that generated the need and opportunity to conclude the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320, which subsequently developed into a sustained dynastic alliance.

Given that the lordly identity is perhaps the most essential theoretical construct informing my argument, just like the other terms "lordship" and "anarchy", it requires adequate clarification. Furthermore, I am addressing this concept more extensively not only for its own sake but also for the sake of friendly criticism that I have received while developing it. I am aware that touching upon the issue of identities is a risky endeavor that may lead to swampy field of confusion. Fortunately, using the term "identity" in the context of international relations (for instance while speaking about state identity) is not an innovative move whatsoever, because it has already quite rich literature and has been related to constructivist strand in IR theorizing (to be explained below). What is, however, a pioneering venture in this study is an attempt to develop the content of "lordly identity", which has been initially modelled on how state identities are normally constructed, but it had to be crafted to the realities of the thirteenth-century "international" system in Latin Christendom.

Establishing identities

In 1992 Alexander Wendt published an article in which he attempted to introduce constructivist social theory into the realm of IR.[188] He advanced his argument against neorealist positions by claiming that self-help and power politics *do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy*.[189] In other words, he believed that competitive anarchy was not a product of immutable and ahistorical structure of any international system (as Waltz strongly suggested) but it was rather socially constructed by actors through their international practices. Hence he maintained:

If states find themselves in a self-help system, this is because their practices made it that way. Changing the practices will change the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes the system.[190] ... *Competitive security systems are sustained by practices that create insecurity and distrust. In this case, transformative practices should attempt to teach other states that one's own state can be trusted and should not be viewed as a threat to their security*.[191]

Looking at neorealism from this perspective made its convictions less transhistorical laws but rather a self-fulfilling prophecy that encourages certain behaviors and removes from sight their alternatives.[192] Wendt put forward two fundamental principles of constructivist social theory: 1) that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them and that it is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions;[193] 2) that the meanings in terms of which action is organized arise out of interaction.[194] Consequently, actors do not have a self prior to interaction with an other;[195] to put it differently, unlike in neorealist approach, international actors shape their interests and self-understandings by participation, that is, they do not come to politics with nature-given competitive interests but they rather learn and acquire them by observation and experience (imitation and social learning).

---

[188] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391–425.
[189] Ibid., 394.
[190] Ibid., 407.
[191] Ibid., 421.
[192] Cf. Ibid., 410.
[193] Ibid., 396–97.
[194] Ibid., 403.
[195] Ibid., 402.

In 1999, Wendt advanced his argument in a book on social theory of international politics.[196] This work did not make any direct references to the medieval "international" system and was primarily focused on contemporary state system. His objective was to propose alternative logics of anarchy which allow for a various types of cooperation at the international level. He, therefore, followed the neorealist assumption that system's structure was anarchy (the system-level anarchy), defined as the absence of centralized authority, but he sought to prove that this anarchy was compatible with more than one kind of structure and logic.[197] He claimed that the system's *political culture is the most fundamental fact about the structure of an international system, giving meaning to power and content to interests, and thus the thing we most need to know to explain*.[198]

In Wendt's opinion, (system-level) anarchy *per se* was somewhat a blank chart that would receive content on the basis what states put inside it.[199] Shortly speaking, he believed that self-help and competition in the international environment could be only one of possible forms of anarchical structure. The way the system operated depended on how states perceived each other in the first place: either as enemies or as rivals or as friends.[200] According to Wendt, the neorealist logic is the logic of enemy; the other logics would, however, evolve from systems, in which shared ideas exist.[201] He argued:

Rather than follow Neorealists in focusing first on material structure, therefore, I believe that if we want to say a small number of big and important things about world politics we would do better to focus first on states' ideas and the interests they constitute, and only then worry about who has how many guns.[202]

There is no room here to elucidate the entire argument that Wendt put forward. Suffice to say that his positions won recognition and popularity in the IR field (as an innovative approach to viewing international politics),[203] although they also ignited a hot debate and have

---

[196] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
[197] Ibid., 246–247.
[198] Ibid., 250.
[199] Ibid., 249.
[200] Ibid., 247.
[201] Ibid., 253.
[202] Ibid., 256.
[203] Cf. Jørgensen, *International Relations Theory*, 2010, 155–180.

been criticized from various standpoints.[204] What matters here, however, is that Wendt provided another toolkit for investigating and explaining international phenomena which, in different aspects, seem complementary to the Waltzian analysis (and to the realist tradition in general).[205] His insistence on the significant power of ideas, which create and reproduce social norms, regulations, and even types of social beings (states, lordships etc.), anticipated my observations about the hierarchical cultural script that mitigated and somehow governed the thirteenth-century "international" anarchy (as explained in Chapter 2).

Fundamental for establishing the concept of lordly identity is the assumption that the thirteenth-century "international" system in Latin Christendom developed its own logic and distributed knowledge among its members, defining a form of "international" society. This knowledge was shared by the "international" units and thus, according to Wendt's formulation of "society", those units were induced to *follow most of the rules of their society most of the time*.[206] This collective knowledge and understandings were <u>inter-subjective</u>, that is, they persisted *<u>beyond the lives of individual social actors, embedded in social routines and practices as they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their production and workings</u>*.[207] Simultaneously, this shared knowledge was not definite and fully established but rather constantly co-constituted and in move, for – simply put – *people and society construct, or constitute, each other*.[208]

At this stage viewing the thirteenth-century "international" system as a form of "international" society would be a mere assumption but this claim will be substantiated across Chapters 2 and 3. Here, for the sake of adequately explaining the concept of lordly identity I am anticipating the findings made in those chapters and accept the social dimension of the thirteenth-century "international" system. Consequently, this leads to the following assertion:

Łokietek and Charles I, who are the central figures in my analysis, were born into the thirteenth-century Christian society that on the "international" stage was dominated by lords

---

[204] For a brief overview see: Charlotte Epstein, "Constructivism or the Eternal Return of Universals in International Relations. Why Returning to Language Is Vital to Prolonging the Owl's Flight," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 499–519.

[205] See, for instance, Barkin's book which is precisely an attempt to establish common grounds for realist and constructivist approaches: J. Samuel Barkin, *Realist Constructivism* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[206] Wendt, *Social Theory*, 20, 209.

[207] Barkin, *Realist Constructivism*, 26.

[208] Ibid., 28.

seeking domination and control over people and territories (lordship- building activities). Therefore, both Charles I and Łokietek (as high-born and thus automatically predestined to maintain, reproduce and enhance their status within the society) had to acquire the lordly identity (mostly by observation, imitation and participation) in order to fulfill the role that the current political culture prescribed them. In brief, they had to determine who they were (self-understanding) and what they wanted (interests); both elements they could learn from the culture they were raised in.

Definition

Wendt defined identity as:

A property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions. This means that identity is at base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor's self-understandings. Identities are constituted by both internal and external structures (John thinks he is a professor; his students think the same).[209]

Paraphrasing Wendt's definition, "lordly identity" would be a property of lords (identified with their lordships) that forges their dispositions for certain motivations and behaviors and originates in how they understand their lordly roles in society. Moreover, "lordly identity" is not an individual trait specific to each lord but it is rather a collective understanding (inter-subjective)[210] of what it means to be lord (a member of social elite) that is produced collaboratively by intentional practice, and individually acquired by observation, imitation and participation.

For further clarification, one important caveat has to be made here. Following Wendt's definition an impression can be formed that establishing Charles I and Łokietek's identities requires reaching out for their self-understandings, which – with the extant source material – is futile and impossible.

To be sure, any attempts to scrutinize political ideas, thinking, and understandings outside the intellectual elite (which was the only familiar with accessible literary works) that governed behaviors of political actors in the thirteenth-century Latin Christendom seem shaky in terms of empirical groundings. For instance, Andrzej Marzec was right to point that the

---

[209] Wendt, *Social Theory*, 224.
[210] That is, exisiting beyond lives of individual actors.

impact of the idea of the unification of the kingdom of Poland in the turn of the fourteenth century (eventually carried out by Łokietek in 1320) – broadly and eagerly discussed in the Polish historiography for the last hundred years[211] – on the Polish society cannot be assessed and it is very hard to identify to what extent ducal and baronial motivations were shaped by this idea.[212] Needless to say that I admit that many individual aspects of Łokietek and Charles I's identities as lords are irretrievably gone and there is only room left for speculative arguments.[213]

Therefore, lordly identity is, I will repeat once again, not about individual and personal characteristics. Contrary to this perhaps intuitive preconception, lordly identity encompasses inter-subjective features that can be traced and identified as routinized practices, that is, standard behaviors pertaining to "what lords usually do when they interact with one another".

In this study actions, motivations and interests of Charles I and Łokietek are central, because they were responsible for concluding the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320. My assumption is that lordly identity, as a cultural and collective concept which they also shared, was drawn from one major source: inter-subjectively grounded norms, patterns, practices and routines observable in Charles I and Łokietek's "international" environments. Their individualities (personal traits), however, can be somewhat determined through examining their own actions and behaviors which either comply with the inter-subjective routinized practices or go against them.

One more possibly confusing element about lordly identity remains to be addressed. In this study I ventured to establish this identity as a collective cultural product but at the same time I repeatedly talk about Charles I and Łokietek's lordly identities which may give an impression that those identities are predominantly individual properties and not inter-subjective constructs. There are two arguments to overcome this impression.

First, establishing Charles I and Łokietek's lordly identities basically boils down to examining their "international" environment in search for patterns of behavior and routinized

[211] See Tomasz Jurek's preface to the reprint edition: Oswald Marian Balzer, *Królestwo Polskie: 1295-1370* (Cracow: Towarzystwo Naukowe "Societas Vistulana," 2005), IX–XIII.

[212] Cf. Andrzej Marzec, "Między Przemysłem II a Władysławem Łokietkiem, czyli kilka uwag o Królestwie Polskim na przełomie XIII i XIV wieku," *Roczniki Historyczne* 78 (2012): 98–99.

[213] About difficulties concerning exploration of people's hearts and minds see: Przemysław Wiszewski, *Henryk II Pobożny: biografia polityczna* (Legnica: Muzeum Miedzi, 2011), 7–8.

practices, which were not unique to those two lords but which can be noticed on a wider scale, and to which – by virtue of their behaviors recorded in sources – Charles I and Łokietek seem to ascribe. In other words, by speaking about Władysław Łokietek's lordly identity (which happens in Chapter 2) I am invoking a large degree of correspondence between Łokietek's own behaviors on the "international" stage and practices observed among other contemporary lords in his neighborhood; this correspondence implies Łokietek's ascription to the culturally and collectively constructed lordly identity by making it largely his own. To say it differently, Łokietek's lordly identity entails focus on his compliance to inter-subjective lordly identity rather than on his unique self-perception as a lord (principally unavailable for a historian due to the lack of relevant source material).

Second, in this study lordly identity was established on evidence confined mostly to patterns and routinized practices observable in Central Europe throughout the thirteenth century. Due to the character of this study, which imposes limits to the size and scope of the research, the investigation of the political culture beyond Central Europe in reference to "international" behaviors of the lords has been restricted to examining findings in selected scholarly literature. Therefore, lordly identity, as determined here, cannot claim validity for the entire Latin Christendom, not to mention the regions beyond. In this sense, due to geographical constraints of my analysis, lordly identity – although conceived as a collective and inter-subjective concept – appears to be more personal, because it was developed, substantiated and tested against "international" subsystem of Central Europe. In fact, Władysław Łokietek's lordly identity (that is, the investigation of the practices and routines of his immediate "international" environment) was most thoroughly defined and only then its degree of inter-subjectivity was tested against Charles I's actions and behaviors in the kingdom of Hungary in the early fourteenth century. The result, however, which showed high degree of correlation and conformity in behavioral routines between Łokietek and Charles I, allowed to cautiously argue that this form of lordly identity (despite their person-dependent method of construction) can pertain to "most times and most cases" in Latin Christendom.

The theoretical concept of lordly identity offers interpretative and explanatory benefits but its limitations need to be acknowledged. Determining lordly identity can be a useful tool for a historian to provide more imbedded and meaningful insights into how the thirteenth-century "international" system operated. Nevertheless, lordly identity does not explain

everything in lordly actions. But it brings some order and structuring into their historical interpretation. Namely, it could be expected that lordly identity functioned as a powerful and self-reproducing inter-subjective cultural script that strongly influenced individual lords in terms of their self-understandings, motivations and behaviors.

Since human societies are complex phenomena, I am away from suggesting that lordly identity was the only factor that motivated behavior of lords. While theorizing about how lords identified their political goals and interests, anthropological claims about human nature cannot be ignored. Considering international realm as the domain of international anarchy Wendt noticed, by virtue of empirical findings, that states *may indeed have a predisposition to be self-interested, since the members of human groups almost always show favoritism toward each other in dealing with the members of out-groups*.[214] Moreover, he recognized "fear of exploitation" as a genuine concern in (system-level) anarchy[215] and that *egoistic identities and interests are initially dominant* and constantly resist attempts of cooperation.[216] Remaining in agreement with this statement I would assume lords to take up lordly identity as a mode of behavior yet to remain predisposed to self-interest in crafting their political (or "international") objectives.

Lordly Identity and Lords' Political Interests

Despite lords' predispositions to self-regarding actions on the "international" stage, the constructivist approach that I am taking here presupposes that lordly identity is the essential forge of lords' political interests.[217] Wendt differentiated two types of interests: 1) objective, which are *needs or functional imperatives which must be fulfilled if an identity is to be reproduced*; 2) subjective which refer to *those beliefs that actors actually have about how to meet their identity needs, and it is these which are the proximate motivation for behavior*.[218] Since Wendt argued for existence of state identity, he also accepted anthropomorphizing them. Thus he understood states as real actors *to which we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs and intentionality*[219] and identified them as

---

[214] Wendt, *Social Theory*, 322.
[215] Ibid., 348.
[216] Ibid., 363–364. Earlier, Wendt asserted: "I argue in conclusion that states' interpretations of these needs [the national interests – wk] tend to be biased in a self-interested direction, which predisposes them to competitive, 'Realist' politics, but that this does not mean that states are inherently self-interested"; Ibid., 198.
[217] Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 398.
[218] Wendt, *Social Theory*, 232.
[219] Ibid., 197.

corporate agents that possessed capacities for institutionalized collective action,[220] and hence in practice they functioned as state-society complexes.[221] Building on the noted above discussion about the specific nature of lordship as an "international" unit, I consent to anthropomorphize it on the grounds that it was even more collective than institutionalized (unlike territorial states in the later period), because both overlords and lesser lords were humans, and the under-institutionalization did not yet allow lordship to transform into more abstract entity.

Nation states, which remained in center of Wendt's theorization, developed national interests. By analogy lordships worked out lordly interests. National interest – as Wendt put it – is a set of the objective interests of state-society complexes, consisting of four needs: 1) physical survival; 2) autonomy; 3) economic well-being; and 4) collective self-esteem.[222] The latter, in his understanding, *refers to a group's need to feel good about itself, for respect or status. Self-esteem is a basic human need of individuals, and one of the things that individuals seek in group membership.*[223] Bisson's studies on power in high middle ages could be an example of a more general trend that over centuries the practice of domination (wielding power over people and territory) defined nobility (which could be considered as powerfulness) and, all in all, satisfied the first three needs (from the list above) of individuals (as well as lordships or states alike). Nevertheless, the fourth one, related to honor and prestige, was more culture-specific and required certain channeling of sheer power, so that the power holder could be respected within the society for the way of using his domination.

As noted, lordly identity is considered here as what strongly contributed to constructing lordly interests, that is, their way of being in the "international" system. Wendt acknowledged that determining one state identity across international system cannot be sufficient, because it would be too simplistic, for states have more than single political interest (generated by state identity), which they pursue. Therefore, Wendt elaborated a system of identities that are all grounded in the fundamental "personal/corporate" identity.[224] In his understanding, those sub-identities spring from the principal identity and although they are

---

[220] Ibid., 43.
[221] Ibid., 234.
[222] Ibid., 198.
[223] Ibid., 236.
[224] Cf. Ibid., 224–230.

dependent on the latter, they still engender specific interests, and hence making such distinctions appears useful and worth risking additional confusion.

Wendt argued: *We have many identities. So have states. Each is a script or schema, constituted to varying degrees by cultural forms, about who we are and what we should do in a certain context.*[225] For the sake of states, he distinguished the following sub-identities: 1) "type" identity which is a social category or label applied to persons who share (or are thought to share) some characteristics; 2) "role" identity which reveals a mode of relations between Self and Others; 3) "collective" identity which brings the Self-Other distinction to certain form of identification; it is usually issue-specific and causes Self to be categorized as Other.

Wendt introduced this system of identities as appropriate to modern states. In order to illustrate his point about how various kinds of identities into the language of objective interests he took the U.S. as an example.[226] In his view, the U.S.'s principal identity ("corporate") is that of state which requires its monopoly on organized violence. Its "type" identity emphasizes that it is a capitalist state and thus it requires enforcing private property rights. Its "role" identity stresses its hegemonic role and demands from it to uphold this position. Finally, its "collective" identity points to solidarity with other Western states as a necessary requirement to remain a member of the West.

Wendt's proposition is open for debate. However, as long as this approach, to my best knowledge, has been never applied to medieval "international" realities, it seems inspiring to adopt analogical distinctions to the concept of lordly identity and thus expand its theoretical capacities. As already indicated, Chapter 3 is particularly dedicated to exploring lordly identity and its possible sub-identities (type, role, and collective). Anticipating the chapter's findings and categorizing them in accordance to Wendt's distinction, lordly identity and its sub-identities could be defined as in Figure 1.

---

[225] Ibid., 230.
[226] Cf. Ibid., 232.

Figure 1.

Name	Description	Objective Interest
Lord	**principal identity** as the personification of monarchical and hierarchical lordship	remain lord, that is, hold a lordship
Noble family leader	**type sub-identity**; a social category or label applied to persons who share, or are thought to share, some characteristics	promote family; build up position as an influential family leader; dynastic politics – secure the future of offspring
Title seeker	**role sub-identity** that exists only in relation to Others who may recognize it or not; there must be thrones and titles available and recognized as assets in the "international" arena in order to claim them	enlarge lordship; claim new titles; build power and prestige
Member of Christian society	**collective sub-identity** that takes the relationship between Self and Other to certain level of identification; fairly issue-specific	requires of a lord solidarity with other Christian rulers and adoption of rules and principles that make him a member of Christian society; respect the rules that create honor and prestige; respect the hierarchy of the "international" stage

Concluding Remarks

Lordly identity is a theoretical construct borrowed from the constructivist approach in IR theories. It is based on the assumptions that 1) people are attracted to things they value; 2) values and objects of interests are collectively constructed in a given society by constant interaction of its units through imitation and participation; 3) the thirteenth-century "international" system of lordships in Latin Christendom functioned as a form of international society; and 4) this society of lords developed collective and inter-subjective values and objectives sought by its members in most cases and for most of the time. The assumptions 3) and 4) are substantiated later in the text.

Lordly identity is a property of lords (identified with their lordships) that forges their interests to be pursued in the "international" realm and derives from how they understand their lordly roles in society. It is not, however, an individual trait specific to each lord but it is rather an inter-subjective understanding of what it means to be lord (a member of social elite) that is produced collaboratively by intentional practice within the "international" society of lords, yet individually acquired by observation, imitation and participation. Lordly identity is a compound comprising a number of sub-identities (principal, type, role and collective; see Fig.1). All of those identities are largely responsible for engendering particular political interests and thus, inspire lords to behave in a certain manner in interaction with one another.

In this work, lordly identity is chiefly determined by the examination of lordly interactions in Central Europe in the thirteenth century. Therefore, the content of this concept is not based on arguments put forward in the intellectual discourse of the period, but it is rooted in monitoring how lords behaved towards one another and why. In this sense, lordly identity remains a modern analytical tool, which is established through empirical inquiry, that serves a culturally imbedded framework for interpreting and elucidating lordly "international" actions. In this particular case, lordly identity helps to identify the context, in which the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320 took place.

CHAPTER 2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE "INTERNATIONAL" SYSTEM IN THE THIRTEENTH-CENTURY LATIN CHRISTENDOM

Introduction

This chapter has three essential goals.

First, it attempts to theoretically comprehend the environment in which the thirteenth-century "international" politics took place. In doing so, it follows up on an assumption that Charles I and Łokietek's rise to power happened in the context which in functional terms emerged from the practices observed in earlier decades throughout Europe. Before any investigation of the Angevin-Piast relations in the early fourteenth century can begin, it is essential to look around and examine the world of "international" politics, in which those relations emerged. Therefore, this chapter does not function as an agglomerate of facts and events of the "international" politics, nor it does not trace the origins of the Angevin-Piast alliance from the "time immemorial". Instead, with the help of the "three images of international relations" proposed by Waltz, it strives to identify the ordering principle of the thirteenth-century "international" system of Latin Christendom. Determining this principle, that is, the factor that enables to think about a system as a whole by deciding how units are arranged towards one another, is essential to adequately evaluate the interests and behaviors of Charles I and Władysław Łokietek. According to IR theorizing traditions there are two conventional forms of system ordering: 1) anarchical (in which "international" units are equal before each other in terms of their nature and functions); 2) hierarchical (in which the units are ranked according to certain logic). My fundamental task in this chapter is to offer some thoughts about whether the systemic anarchy prevailed in the thirteenth-century "international" politics or perhaps this "international" system would be better characterized as hierarchical in its structure.

This leads to the second aim of this chapter, which is polemics with standard IR accounts that regard medieval "international" politics impossible to theorize due to its hierarchical ordering. According to those accounts the medieval system more resembled imperial arrangement than a regular state-system and thus, it remained beyond the interest of traditionally conceived IR theory. I disagree with such understanding. My argument is that system-level anarchy and culturally induced hierarchy are two essential and indispensable components of the thirteenth-century "international" system and they cannot be easily tucked into too rigidly defined conventions. I am basically showing the paradox of co-existence of system-level anarchy and system-level hierarchy that derive: the first from the nature of how the units are arranged; the second from the political culture that attempts to bridle the consequences of naturally unsupervised "international" system.

Ultimately, the third goal of this chapter is addressed. Namely, by analyzing the hierarchical and anarchical components of the system, I put forward the concept of "hybrid" system that encompasses the interplay of both factors. Next, on the basis of my own analysis and experience and thought gathered from scholarly literature, this chapter presents an opening general characteristics of the thirteenth=century "international" system of Latin Christendom, attempting to agree anarchy with hierarchy by pointing to different forms of hierarchical ordering that the one proposed by Waltz. This type of hierarchy is not functional and bureaucratic but it reflects the imbedded convictions and perceptions about the world in general, and the world of "international" politics in particular, nourished by "international" units, that is, lords. Consequently, this early characterization emphasizes the cultural factor and its impact on behaviors of the "international" actors, and thus it opens the field for inquiring the cultural concept of "lordly identity" that occurs in Chapter 3.

The Thirteenth-Century "International" System – Anarchy or Hierarchy?

It is relevant to begin this section with bringing back some general assertions made by Bisson and described in more detail in Chapter 1. At the outset of his essay he assumed general human interest in power. Next, by examining political developments in the nine and tenth centuries in Europe, he discovered a gradual decline in the degree of protection and command provided by kings, which in consequence triggered the explosion of lordships. Bisson claimed that public order disappeared, while power-seeking lords routinely injured and intimidated

people. In his account anarchy prevailed. Lordships differed in size, wealth, power and forms of internal organization but lords were equally interested in maximizing their relative prestige and revenues against their neighbors. Later Bisson observed that towards the thirteenth century violent lordships, which had been existing in a competitive environment, realized that further maximization could occur through progressive institutionalization and more elaborate system of legitimization. This discovery led to the emergence of government, and thus, to continuous transformation of lordships into more state-like units.[227] This transition, however, pertained mostly to the form of lordships but did not eliminate competition. Bisson's argument indicated an improvement in public order, for due to institutionalization a formerly blurred distinction between domestic and foreign became more separate. Nevertheless, as can be extracted from Bisson's narrative, lordships – although more unified, coherent, and powerful – continued to seek the same goals: prestige and power.

This summary makes evident references to some aspects of the realist tradition in IR Theories. It is apparent that Bisson's anthropological assumptions were generally in agreement with the pessimistic vision of human nature upheld by the realists. Quest for power and prestige that characterized lords went together with their inclination to violence and rapacity. Self-seeking practices overpowered any dispositions to encourage peace and order. Obviously, this image, as any other generalization, cannot be taken as fully accurate but it has the merit of revealing a few yet important trends. Lords were humans, and thus their power- and standing-seeking nature was responsible for anarchical practices that exploded in Europe. Furthermore, from Bisson's perspective restraints to this disorder did not originate from changes in human nature (or from the power of reason that managed to subjugate affections) but were a result of 'rationalized' greed, which discovered that progressive institutionalization would prove more effective in maximizing their lordships than 'old ways' of extortion and bonding.

---

[227] Susan Reynolds attempted to modify the classical Weberian definition of the state in order to adapt it to less clear-cut medieval conditions and render a concept of a medieval state: *an organization of human society within a more or less fixed area in which the ruler or governing body more or less successfully controls the legitimate use of physical force. … The 'state' is a combination of both* [the ruler or governing body and the body of citizens – wk], *expressing the relation between them; it is an organization or structure*: Susan Reynolds, "The Historiography of the Medieval State," in *Companion to Historiography*, ed. Michael Bentley (London; New York: Routledge, 1997), 110.

In reference to the three "images of international relations" described by Waltz (see Chapter 1), it is clear that Bisson's study represented the application of the first image. This approach has its reasons. Given that lordships were not institutions but private vessels of survival, a sort of individual powers built by persons equipped with capabilities to secure from other men a will to cooperate and to raise revenues by subjugating the powerless; therefore, they were inherently human, for they depended on lord's will and the force he had been able to muster. Powerful men, preoccupied with imperative to maximize their power and attain noble standing, used lordships to these ends. Hence, figuratively speaking, lordships turned into lords' extensions in the "international" realm; they competed with each other and therefore, in the condition of permanent threat (posed by other "international" units themselves endangered) war was much more widespread international status than peace. From this perspective, the structure of the medieval "international" system was related to how individual actors interacted with one another.

Bisson did not investigate what Waltz called the "second image", that is, he did not pay attention to the question whether "lordships" as such – even if just more abstract extensions of their lords – by their nature contributed to the structure of international system, that is, if their existence made any meaningful change to the structure. Lordships seemed uniform in their concept, other differences notwithstanding, and thus, the appearance of "predatory lordships" or "peace-loving lordships" was not directly linked to various types of lordships, but most of all it derived from personalities of particular lords and their capabilities (broadly understood).[228] In other words, Bisson's observations allowed to claim that lordships as political entities were unable to make a difference in terms of sustaining peace and order on the "international" stage, for humans behind them had been both threatened and insecure, and thus, violent and aggressive. War emerged as a more natural condition than peace, although peace and order remained the general aspiration. Paradox discovered by Bisson was that lordships became more powerful (and hence able to better provide for protection and command internally) by self-restraining themselves in a slow process of institutionalization.

---

[228] In contrast, in the modern IR reflection there have been suggestions that states of certain characteristics (political system) are more predatory than others. Perhaps the best known example of such thinking was the idea of the end of history proposed by Francis Fukuyama who argued that liberal democracies were fundamentally peace-loving political systems and thus, spreading democracy in the world would profoundly contribute to attaining global peace: cf. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin Books, 1992).

The "third image" was also left unaddressed. In Bisson's terms people without supervision become anarchical and violent, and this entails antagonisms among lordships. However, Waltz's argument pointed to another factor, the systemic (system-level) anarchy, which is not generated by the nature of units that inhabit the system, but is an unintended result of entering the unsupervised system by more than two entities, which therefore look at each other with suspicion.

As noted above, in this chapter, the fundamental question of my inquiry is whether the systemic anarchy also prevailed in the thirteenth-century "international" politics or perhaps this "international" system would be better characterized as hierarchical in its structure (and thus fundamentally different to the modern international system)?

This question is relevant because it addresses the problem of how the environment, in which the thirteenth-century "international" units (lordships) functioned, was structured as well as it implies that this structure had its impact on how the units in the system behaved. The traditional narrative upheld in IR textbooks encounters problems with proper categorization of medieval politics. This issue also hints to why I keep writing "international" in quotation marks as long as it pertains to medieval realities.

Can we speak of 'international relations' in Western Europe during the medieval era? Only with difficulty because, as already indicated, medieval Christendom was more like an empire than a state system. States existed, but they were not independent or sovereign in the modern meaning of these words. There were no clearly defined territories with borders. The medieval world was not a geographical patchwork of sharply differentiated colors which represented different independent countries. Instead, it was a complicated and confusing intermingling of lines and colors of varying shades and hues. Power and authority was organized on both a religious and a political basis: in Latin Christendom, the Pope and the Emperor were the heads of two parallel and connected hierarchies, one religious and the other political. Kings and other rulers were subjects of those higher authorities and their laws. They were not fully independent. And much of the time, local rulers were not fully independent either. The fact is that territorial political independence as we know it today was not present in medieval Europe.[229]

---

[229] Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 11.

I disagree with this characteristics of the medieval "international" system. Leaving aside the fact that over ten centuries, which are traditionally included to the medieval era, the system evolved and transformed, the lack of the modern notion of sovereignty cannot stand for exclusion of the medieval "international" systems from the IR picture.[230] It is true that these systems varied but if a system is not like ours does not necessarily mean that it does not (or cannot) exist at all. Furthermore, in order to eschew stepping into a grand debate about the medieval origins of sovereignty[231] or about the fluctuating and confusing modern understandings of sovereignty,[232] Waltz's definition could be provided, which has its merit that it reinstates the sufficient degree of independence to lordships, so that they could be perceived as a "system of states":

What then is sovereignty? To say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments to them.[233]

The fundamental question about the medieval "international" systems, and the thirteenth-century system in particular, concerns the problem of its ordering principle – whether it was hierarchy (as in domestic politics characterized by relations of super- and subordination) or anarchy (specific to unsupervised political systems). Now, my argument in this Chapter suggests that the medieval systems could be categorized as "hybrid-systems", that is:

---

[230] Regarding these common notions in the field of IR and general approaches to medieval "international" politics, Peter Halden asserted: *Certain social sciences such as International Relations (IR) tend to simplify the Middle Ages to a binary opposition between emperor and pope. Conversely, within the historical disciplines the view that there was no "international politics" in this era has long prevailed. Both are results of identification of the state with the Weberian definition and of inter-state politics with institutions such as sovereignty and the "balance of power". With this background, two options have been left to synthetic approaches, focusing on feudal relations between minor lords or concluding that Europe was governed by unitary structure made up of the emperor and the pope until the system differentiated into fully autonomous units at the peace of Westphalia*: Peter Halden, "From Empire to Commonwealth(s): Orders in Europe 1300-1800," in *Universal Empire. A Comparative Approach to Imperial Culture and Representation in Eurasian History*, ed. Peter Fibiger Bang and Dariusz Kołodziejczyk (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 283.

[231] This concept was traditionally related to the problem of the emergence of the modern state in the Middle Ages, and was discussed in numerous books and articles.

[232] Interestingly, both authors of the quoted textbook were well aware of the conceptual challenges in regard to sovereignty. Cf. Robert Jackson, "Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape," *Political Studies* 47 (1999): 431–56.; Georg Sørensen, "Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution," *Political Studies* 47 (1999): 590–604. See also: Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner, eds., *Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[233] Waltz, *Theory*, 96.

Medieval (geo)politics was neither purely anarchical nor purely hierarchical, but contained both vertical and horizontal relations of subordination and coordination among highly differentiated bearers of political power.[234]

Teschke, who analyzed medieval political systems from the Marxist perspective, was right in observing in them both elements: hierarchy and anarchy. Jackson and Sorensen in their characteristics stressed the hierarchical aspects as vital; by contrast, Fischer – in his neorealist survey of feudal Europe – emphasized anarchy as the ordering principle of medieval "international" systems. Historically speaking, it would be most appropriate to concur with Teschke's point as the most adequate to the medieval political phenomena. However, given that for the sake of theoretical clarity it would be better to point to one principle as the essential one, the following overview of the thirteenth-century "international" politics intends to investigate whether the "international" realities could either indicate which of these ordering principles dominated, or – if not – how this "hybrid-system" functioned.

The IR scholarship developed throughout the twentieth century and it has made this twentieth-century international system its central issue. All IR theoretical traditions, even if they reach to theorists and philosophers of the past centuries for inspiration and solid grounding, they were in first place devised to elucidate the behavior of the twentieth-century states. Although the discipline did not confine itself to the contemporary matters, the focus on the recent developments remained principal. This was partially due to the IR's aspirations (not shared by historians) to offer meaningful predictions about the future transformations on the international stage. Having said this, it could be analogically argued that the examination of the thirteenth-century "international" politics Europe-wide (leaving out most of Central Europe as this is going to be more carefully investigated in the next chapters, Scandinavia, and the so-called "crusader states") should provide material sufficient to make claims about this "international" system. At least it should be enough to seek statements about its ordering principle.

The Thirteenth-Century "International" System in Operation

While investigating the ordering principle of the thirteenth-century "international" system of Latin Christendom, that is, whether it was an anarchical environment inhabited by

---

[234] Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, 48.

units uniform in political nature and differentiated only in material capabilities (wealth, manpower, resources) or it was a hierarchical structure, in which units were additionally categorized according to their functions; the most efficient way to determine the answer would be to focus special attention on "international" actors that claimed universal supremacy and thus implied a form of hierarchy in the system: the papacy and the empire. It seems particularly relevant to analyze the scope and breadth of the papal authority in the "international" affairs, because on many occasions it superseded the range of claims put forward by the emperors of the Romans.

For a historian, the easiest way to grapple with the issue of the ordering principle of thirteenth-century "international" system is to assume anarchical state-system-like structure, in which all actors were fundamentally preoccupied with securing their own individual interests. Since the conventional IR scholarship suggests the domination of hierarchy in the system, for the sake of the polemical argument the papacy – as the supposed generator of the "Papal Empire" – becomes the focal point of my inquiry. In other words, if hierarchical order among the lordships prevailed in the thirteenth-century medieval Europe, it was only the pope who could engender it (as the claimant of the most universal range of authority). Therefore, identifying the papal contribution to the "international" affairs, its interests and scope, limits and constraints will reveal most about the ordering principle that dominated in the thirteenth-century Europe.

In the thirteenth century the "Christian society"[235] developed a special way to view the problem of legitimacy. The pope emerged as the grand judge of Latin Christendom.[236] In the late twelfth century the number of appellations to the pope's court drastically increased. The pontiff became the only figure in Latin Christendom who purposefully attended to matters Europe-wide. Theoretically, he maintained contacts with all Christian rulers and also engaged in relations with Byzantium, the Crusader States, and beyond. By 1200 the annual output of papal letters could reach 50,000.[237] The papacy transformed into a vast "international

---

[235] This concept is conventionally used here. I will return to it in more details later in the chapter and elaborate it further in the next chapter.

[236] Walter Ullmann, *A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages* (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 228.

[237] William C. Jordan, *Europe in the High Middle Ages* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 189.

lawcourt"[238] which was believed to efficiently dispense justice, unlike lordly or episcopal courts, which were less productive and cherished minor prestige. In many respects the papal household transformed into a center of the Christian society, which provided guidance and binding resolutions to emerging conflicts and problems.

Walter Ullmann provided a brief but eloquent overview of the early thirteenth-century papacy's political qualifications:

As monarchic Ruler the pope claimed not only the ownership of all islands (on the basis of the Donation of Constantine), but he was also … the feudal lord of a great many countries. As the general 'overseer' … he was entitled to depose princes, release subjects from their oaths of allegiance, confer crowns by making kings (as evidenced in Croatia-Dalmatia, Sicily, Armenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and so on) and to dispose of territories.[239]

Ullmann's conception was very much juristic. He referred to the papal claims, entitlements and other legal capabilities. It could be argued, however, that the unique position of the papacy was not a direct product of the legal culture that exploded in Latin Christendom throughout the thirteenth century, and thus created a sort of a papal imperial jurisdiction, but its fundamental aspect was that it "made sense" to the thirteenth-century lords. This idea of "making sense" implies that the lords, drawing upon their concepts and understandings of the political, the moral, and the social, could comprehend the papal power as an example of legitimate authoritative order.[240] The context of the Christian society was of crucial importance there, since it created a special social space that favored the pope's qualifications to confer legitimacy, especially at the level of "international" system.

This overwhelming image of the papal omnipotence on the "international" stage has to be viewed in its context, however. The pope could play an essential role because it was generally accepted by other lords, who all "were born into" to the "international" politics when its rules had been already somewhat defined. This does not mean that these "rules of the game" were established once and for all. The famous conflict between Boniface VIII and Philip IV of France in the turn of the fourteenth century evidenced that there was still room

---

[238] Colin Morris, *The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250* (Oxford [England]: New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1989), 575.

[239] Ullmann, *A Short History*, 2003, 227.

[240] Cf. Matt Sleat, "Bernard Williams and the Possibility of a Realist," *European Journal of Political Theory* 9, no. 4 (2010): 488.

for negotiating and bending them. However, my opening assumption (based partially on Bisson's observations) about the lords' perceptions of the structure and functioning of the thirteenth-century "international" system in Latin Christendom is that for them it was God-given, inherited, and customary.

***

What now follows is an overview of "international" cases that – in my understanding – illustrate the workings of the thirteenth-century "international" system in Europe. It sheds light on what was the grand narrative of this system and subsequently, investigates how the actions of "international" actors (including the pope and the emperor) corresponded with more abstract theoretical claims that would govern and order the Christian society. Therefore, this overview of events does not demand completion but it basically works as empirical material that – as it is believed – could inform further theorization aimed at identifying whether and how anarchy and hierarchy co-existed in the "international" system and how they influenced each other. This analysis is purposefully confined chronologically to 1200-1300. In a way, my inquiry picks up the lordships at the point where Bisson dropped them.

In late November 1198, Empress Constance, widowed Queen of Sicily, at her deathbed, recognized Pope Innocent III as the guardian of her son Frederick (future Emperor Frederick II) and regent of the Kingdom of Sicily.[241] The papal claims to overlordship in Sicily reached back to the Norman conquest and, as it was already mentioned, they were acknowledged by Roger II, the first king of Sicily crowned in 1130.[242] The realm was considered the "special Patrimony of Peter."[243] Innocent III agreed to advance Frederick's case, because already in May 1198 Constance renounced her son's claims to the empire, and resolved to concentrate on securing his ascension to the Sicilian throne.[244] This resignation was related to the principle of the papal agenda, which had emerged after Frederick's father, Emperor Henry VI, had seized both imperial and Sicilian crowns, and it prescribed to keep these two lordships separated. Otherwise, the papal states were clenched between those two powerful entities

---

[241] Constance M. Rousseau, "A Papal Matchmaker: Principle and Pragmatism during Innocent III's Pontificate," *Journal of Medieval History* 24, no. 3 (1998): 266.
[242] David Abulafia, "The Kingdom of Sicily under the Hohenstaufen and Angevins," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, ed. David Abulafia, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 499.
[243] J. A. Watt, "The Papacy," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, ed. David Abulafia, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 134.
[244] Rousseau, "A Papal Matchmaker," 266.

and found their political maneuvers confined. According to Abulafia, the late 1190s could be the moment when the papacy recognized this threat and set out to act against it.[245]

The tension between the pope and the emperor defined one major pillar of the thirteenth-century papal politics. Growing Frederick's domination in Sicily, and his successful attempts to transform the realm into his powerbase, automatically diminished the pontiff's nominal supervision over the kingdom. The well-being of the papal states was at stake. In this sense, a sequence of popes acted on two levels: 1) as regular lords concerned about security of their lordship; 2) as all-Christian coordinators of larger projects which involved co-operation of many lords. By exercising this second role, the thirteenth-century popes gained unprecedented prestige, which strengthened them in pursuing their politics on the first level, yet in practice it caused to mingle these two dimensions by debasing the "coordination prestige" by engaging it into non-Christian-wide enterprises. This meant in practice, that the popes were far more eager to securing their control over Sicily (as their initial support for Frederick II showed, not to mention the later projects of enfeoffing the Plantagenets and Angevins with the realm, or – towards the end of the thirteenth-century – the firm backing of the Angevins against the Aragonese) rather than launching a crusade.

The political practice showed that for the papacy a friendly monarch in Sicily was a prerequisite for its more serious engagement into the matters of the Holy Land.[246] For special taxes imposed on the English Church in 1229, Gregory IX was reproached by the chroniclers Roger of Wendover and Matthew of Paris, who opposed an idea to finance the papal wars against Frederick II.[247] Also Boniface VIII was accused by the Franciscan friars of using the money collected for a crusade to wage his wars in Italy.[248] Such reactions provided evidence that the contemporaries easily discerned between the matters of the papal lordship (dominions and ownerships supervised by the lord-pope) and the issues of all-Christian interest (cared for by the pope-coordinator).[249]

[245] David Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1988), 83.

[246] Cf. Abulafia, "The Kingdom of Sicily," 507. See also: Sylvia Schein, *Fideles Crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land, 1274-1314* (Oxford [England]: New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1991), 156–157.

[247] Rebecca Rist, *The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198-1245* (London: Continuum, 2009), 173–174.

[248] Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, 148.

[249] Cf. Morris, *The Papal Monarchy*, 559.

The papacy had three major sources of its material power: 1) its own lordship, that is, the papal states; 2) the access to the Church-wide ecclesiastical revenues available due to the pontiff's authority as the head and ultimate protector of the Church; 3) fees and other incomes related to the functioning of the papal curia. There was also a non-material element of power which, however, translated into an effective political force: the pope's moral and legal authority enrooted in the prevailing concept of the Christian society and its common causes, that is, his mentioned-above unique position of the grand judge and shepherd of the faithful.

This non-material power is particularly difficult to comprehend and this task leads sometimes to perceiving the papacy as the thirteenth-century "superpower" which attained its peak during the pontificate of Innocent III and subsequently, suffered from gradual decline that ended in Boniface VIII's humiliation by the French king at the outset of the fourteenth century. The papal moral authority was elusive, for it could not stand – especially in the realist perspective – for armed forces, yet it was particularly productive in the moral discourse that prevailed in the thirteenth-century political realm. This politics did not know Machiavelli and was to more widely engage with the Aristotelian concepts only after ca. 1265.[250] This politics was expressed within the framework of moral principles, in which political efficiency had to, unlike in Machiavelli, succumb to what was right and just. The Decretals published by Gregory IX in 1234, and supplemented by an additional book by Boniface VIII in 1298, left no doubts about the inseparability of law from morality.[251] Jordan explained:

In the moral universe of the High Middle Ages, rulers, like everyone else, acknowledged God's rule in famine and plague and, also like everyone else, they confessed that the sins of the people were the root cause of God's infliction of punishment. Only virtuous acts would help appease God. But all these rulers believed or said that they believed that the wars they were waging (righteous from their point of view) and the economic policies that played such an important role in military strategy were virtuous acts in themselves. The enemy was always constructed as a swarm of evildoers. Defeating them was construed as an act that would help appease God and return health and prosperity to the Christian people. A ruler's failure to do

[250] Joseph Canning, *Ideas of Power in the Late Middle Ages, 1296-1417* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3.
[251] Watt, "The Papacy," 1999, 125.

his duty in waging a just war would be a damning personal sin and would, therefore, encourage the continuation of divine punishment.[252]

The Christian society was expected to live according to the moral principles as set out by God and interpreted by the Church. Politics was not an exception here. This assertion by no means entails a conclusion that the "international" stage functioned more morally than after Machiavelli who recommended to separate politics from ethics (Bisson's study is eloquent in this matter). Nevertheless, it claims that the thirteenth-century lords understood well the omnipresent imperative that their actions were, and had, to be viewed in universal terms of right or wrong, good or evil, legitimate or illegitimate.[253] The pope's position in the Christian society – and Innocent III saw his office as the fulfillment of a divine plan for the government of God's people,[254] and this approach did not much change over next many decades – was particularly convenient, because due to his spiritual power, uncontested even in the vicious ideological conflict with the French crown, he was especially qualified to render moral judgments, that is, to declare what was right or wrong, good or evil, legitimate or illegitimate. Consequently, the papal actions, if only did they find support in broader "international" constellation (like in the most famous and model conflict between Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV that resulted in the Walk to Canossa in 1077), could trigger significant changes in the highest ranks of the Christian society and allow the pope to interfere within the "international" system up to the role of a power distributor.

Furthermore, the Church was a universal institution and as such, in the period of institutionalizing lordships rather than of national monarchies (to emerge during the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries), represented a unique form of power as a unit of double allegiance that shaped the discourse of justice. On the one hand, the local Church had to co-exist with local lords, and bishops themselves were inclined to construct their own lordships, as it was particularly visible among the most powerful German bishops,[255] but could

---

[252] Jordan, *Europe in the High Middle Ages*, 302.
[253] About the prevailing concept of war perceived as a universal contest between Good and Evil, which dominated in the chronicles of the High Middle Ages, cf.: Paweł Żmudzki, *Władca i wojownicy: narracje o wodzach, drużynie i wojnach w najdawniejszej historiografii Polski i Rusi*, Monografie Fundacji Na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej (Wrocław: Wydawn. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2009), 17–18.
[254] Watt, "The Papacy," 1999, 115.
[255] Morris, *The Papal Monarchy*, 535. Cf. also Michael Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, ed. David Abulafia, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 401.

be observed elsewhere (like in the bishopric of Esztergom in the 1260s[256] or in the cases of bishops: Tomasz II of Wrocław in the years 1282-87,[257] and Muskata of Cracow in the turn of the fourteenth century[258] - to be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3). On the other hand, lord-bishops were expected to honor the papal leadership, which at times was a painful requirement and could cause tensions with lord-princes and lord-kings. Precisely for these reasons, the papacy set out to advance its unparalleled role in the Christian society in order to secure the freedom of the Church from illegitimate intrusions and encroachments.

Domination of Hierarchy as the Ordering Principle of the "International" System

In practical terms, in the thirteenth century the popes performed many actions which would nowadays appear as serious intrusions into states' sovereignty and thus, would indicate hierarchy as the ordering principle of this intra-Christian "international" system.

The popes subjected kingdoms[259] as well as excommunicated and deposed kings, or put them on trials. They usually did it on the grounds of rulers' breaches against the Church's liberties, unjust behavior, crimes against faith or immorality.[260]

---

[256] Cf. Gyula Kristó, "Die Macht der Territorialherren in Ungarn am Anfang des 14. Jahrhunderds," in *Etudes Historiques Hongroises 1985*, vol. 1 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1985), 599.

[257] Tomasz Jurek, Stanislaw Szczur, and Krzysztof Ożóg, *Piastowie: leksykon biograficzny* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1999), 428–429.

[258] Wojciech Kozłowski, "Developing the Concept of 'Succession Crisis': New Questions to Social and Political Circumstances of Łokietek's Rise to Power, 1304-1306," *Studia Mediaevalia Bohemica* 3 (2011): 247.

[259] E.g.: in 1213 England by securing an annual tribute of 1,000 marks paid by John and Henry III [cf.: Morris, *The Papal Monarchy*, 558.]; in 1274 Valdemar of Sweden submitted to the papal overlordship and promised to render an annual tribute [cf.: Jordan, *Europe in the High Middle Ages*, 248.]; in 1283 Martin IV deposed Peter III of Aragon on the grounds that it was a vassal kingdom since Innocent III had crowned Peter II of Aragon in 1204 [cf.: David Abulafia, "The Rise of Aragon-Catalonia," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, ed. David Abulafia, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 664.]

[260] Some representative instances: in 1210, Innocent III proclaimed the ban against Emperor Otto IV and in 1211 he freed the emperor's vassals from their oath of allegiance [cf.: Michael Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, ed. David Abulafia, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 381.] In 1215, during Lateran IV Count Raymond VI of Toulouse was deposed [cf.:Jordan, *Europe in the High Middle Ages*, 209.] Honorius III excommunicated Alfonso II of Portugal. Gregory IX proclaimed excommunication twice against Emperor Frederick II, in September 1227 [cf.: Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 386.] and in March 1239 [cf.: Ibid., 390.] The second instance was followed by a symptomatic action of stirring up a general opposition throughout Europe against the emperor. It was therefore meant as the Christian-society-wide issue and it attempted to shatter the emperor's legitimacy within the "international" system. The letters were sent to the French clergy to widely publicize the excommunication; there were others sent to the German Church instructing to resist Frederick II; a general letter was addressed to archbishops and bishops of Christendom; also, Louis IX of France and other European lord-kings were informed about this issue, and the French king was notified that his brother, Robert of Artois, had been selected by the pope in Frederick's place [cf.: Rist, *The Papacy*, 185.] Later, in 1245, during the I Council of Lyons, Frederick II was put on trial, declared guilty as charged, and was ordered to be replaced in both functions as the emperor and king of Sicily [cf.: Watt, "The Papacy," 1999, 129. See also: Rist, *The Papacy*, 188–189.] In February of the same year, Innocent IV ordered Sancho II of Portugal to separate from his wife, a Castilian lady, Mencia Lopes de Haro, for they were in the fourth degree in relation. A month later, the pope denounced Sancho for moral turpitude and failure to govern his kingdom [cf.: Peter Linehan, "Castile, Portugal and Navarre," in *The New Cambridge*

Furthermore, they claimed the central role in distributing royal power and adjudging the titles to competing lords. Throughout the thirteenth century, there can be a number of instances of such practices indicated (and by no means this is an exhaustive list):

- On July 3, 1201 Otto IV Welf was solemnly proclaimed the king of the Romans, once he agreed to: 1) renounce his rights over the German Church; 2) recognize papal claims in Italy; 3) follow the pope's guidance in his political dealings.[261]

- In 1204, Innocent III crowned Peter II of Aragon.[262]

- In October 1209 Otto IV Welf was made emperor.[263] At the Fourth Lateran Council Frederick II was officially recognized as the king of the Romans.[264]

- In 1218, Honorius III revised his predecessor's judgment and declared Ferdinand III the legitimate successor to the Leonese throne, what later allowed for the process of unification of Leon and Castile.[265]

- In November 1220, Frederick II was crowned emperor.[266]

- In 1245, Innocent IV authorized Count Alfonso of Boulogne to seize control over the kingdom of Portugal, vacating after stripping his brother, Sancho II, of his kingship.

- After Frederick II's death, the papacy set out to remove his offspring from power. The matter of primary importance was to reestablish papal overlordship in Sicily. In 1253, Innocent IV offered the emptied throne to Richard of Cornwall, Henry III of England's younger brother.[267] Three years later his candidature was replaced with Edmund, Henry III's second son.[268]

- In the meantime, in 1257 there was a double election to the Roman throne: Richard of Cornwall competed with Alfonso X of Castile. The former received the papal support and already in 1258 initiated attempts for imperial crown, yet political turmoil in England did not allow him to reach Rome. Alexander IV's calls remained unanswered, Richard never became emperor, but in April

Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300, ed. David Abulafia, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 684.] and soon after Count Alfonso of Boulogne, Sancho's brother, was authorized to take over the rule [cf.: Ibid., 685.] The papal decision was followed by Alfonso's solemn oath made in Paris before the representatives of the Portuguese episcopate to rule wisely and justly. In 1281, Martin IV excommunicated Emperor Michael Paleologos of Byzantium [cf.: Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, 60.] A year later, when Peter III of Aragon positively responded to the invitation, which had been put forward by the opponents of the Angevin rule in Sicily (itself favored by the pope), and landed at Trapani, the pope excommunicated him and on March 21, 1283 deposed him [cf.: Watt, "The Papacy," 1999, 154.] Furthermore, when in 1285 James of Aragon, son of Peter III, advanced the Aragon case in Sicily, and made himself crowned king of Sicily in Palermo, Honorius IV excommunicated him in February 1286 [cf.: Ibid., 155.]

[261] Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 379.
[262] Abulafia, "The Rise," 645.
[263] Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 380.
[264] Jordan, *Europe in the High Middle Ages*, 209.
[265] Linehan, "Castile, Portugal and Navarre," 671–672.
[266] Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 384.
[267] Björn Weiler, "Image and Reality in Richard of Cornwall's German Career," *The English Historical Review* 113, no. 454 (November 1998): 1115.
[268] Watt, "The Papacy," 1999, 144.

1262 Urban IV, a new pope, dropped his predecessor's politics and ceased to unilaterally back Richard's case. Instead he launched a meticulous investigation aimed at adjudicating who was to be the legitimate king of the Romans. This procedure had lasted long and ultimately remained undecided by the time Richard died on March 27, 1272.[269]

- In 1264, Urban IV saw Charles of Anjou, Louis IX of France's younger brother, as a credible and effective opponent to Manfred's, Frederick II's son, rule in Sicily.[270] This grant was, however, made conditionally: 1) Charles had to recognize the territories and boundaries of the papal states as the papacy defined them. He was totally excluded from holding any office or possessing any territory therein; 2) Charles had to recognize the pope as his suzerain; 3) Charles had to pay an annual tribute. In case of delay, he would be excommunicated; 4) the Sicilian Church would retain her liberties; 5) any union between the Empire and Sicily was forbidden; 6) the king of Sicily would act as the papal secular arm, providing an army for papal service at need.[271]

- In 1267, Clement IV refused to adjudicate Sardinia neither to James, James I of Aragon's second son, nor to Philip of Anjou, Charles's son.[272]

- In 1273, Přemysl Otakar II of Bohemia complained to the pope about Rudolf of Habsburg's election to the Roman throne. Bishop Bruno of Olomouc wrote to Gregory X and urged him to engage with the imperial affairs in order to bring Germany back to order.[273]

- In 1274, at the Second Council of Lyons, for the sake of the Holy Land, it was proclaimed among others that there should be no war in Christendom for six years.[274]

- During his short pontificate (1277-1280), Nicholas III put forward a grand plan of subdividing Frederick II's former empire into four hereditary kingdoms: 1) the kingdom of Germany for the Habsburgs; 2) the kingdom of Sicily for the Angevins; 3) the kingdom of Arles (Burgundy) for Charles Martel; 4) the kingdom of northwestern and central Italy for Orsini, the pope's family.[275]

- In 1278, a papal legate was dispatched to Hungary in order to help Ladislas IV to restore peace and order in his lordship.[276]

---

[269] Weiler, "Image," November 1998, 1115–1118.
[270] Watt, "The Papacy," 1999, 144.
[271] Ibid., 145.
[272] Abulafia, "The Rise," 655.
[273] Weiler, "Image," November 1998, 1132–33.
[274] Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, 39–42.
[275] Eugene Cox, "The Kingdom of Burgundy, the Lands of the House of Savoy and Adjacent Territories," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, ed. David Abulafia, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 360.
[276] Nora Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and "Pagans" in Medieval Hungary, C. 1000-C. 1300* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 173.

- In 1285, Martin IV, who sided with the Angevins in their war against the Aragonese over Sicily, persuaded Philip III of France to accept the crown of Aragon for his youngest son, Charles of Valois, and organize crusade to the Iberian peninsula.[277]

- In 1297, Boniface VIII ultimately granted to James II of Aragon the title to the kingdom of Sardinia and Corsica.[278]

- In 1302, the final accord of the extended conflict over Sicily between the Angevins and Aragonese was struck at the treaty of Caltabellotta. Frederick of Sicily agreed to withdraw from the Italian mainland but in turn his kingship in the island was recognized. The treaty prescribed that after Frederick's death, the realm would return to the Angevins, whereas his heirs would receive Cyprus, Sardinia or other suitable land in due course.[279]

The popes engaged in "pacification" of the Christian society, either by engineering marriages or by negotiating peace treaties. Nevertheless, the sake of moral good did not succumb to the political reasoning. As a study by Rousseau showed – since the Church solely controlled the validation of marital contracts – the papacy was ready to grant dispensations from too close consanguinity or affinity only within reasonable limits.[280] In Rousseau's cases (concerned with the marriages among Iberian lord-kings of Aragon, Castile, Leon, and Navarre) the third degree was already beyond these limits, and thus, as she concluded, in such situations canon law prevailed over political interests and even peace negotiations.[281] Here are some telling examples:

- In 1208, Innocent III devised a marriage between Frederick II and Constance of Aragon, Peter II's sister, hoping to distract Frederick's interest in the empire and drawing his attention more towards the Mediterranean.[282]

- Innocent III was active in suppressing the conflict over the Roman crown which erupted after a double election had taken place. He was involved in bringing to fruition a union between Otto IV Welf and Beatrix, Philip of Swabia's daughter, which was an attempt to soothe their fierce rivalry.[283]

---

[277] Watt, "The Papacy," 1999, 154–155.
[278] Abulafia, "The Rise," 666.
[279] Abulafia, "The Kingdom of Sicily," 518.
[280] The IV Lateran Council introduced important changes and revoked former legislation that proved ineffective among increasingly interrelated families of lords. Innocent III reduced the prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity to four: cf. Wilfried, 1942- Hartmann and Kenneth Pennington, *The History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140-1234: From Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 350.
[281] Rousseau, "A Papal Matchmaker," 265–266.
[282] Ibid., 267.
[283] Ibid., 264.

- In 1217, as a preliminary to the Fifth Crusade Honorius III worked out peace between Genoa and Pisa; two maritime republics indispensable in providing a crusading fleet.

- Similarly, he brought peace to Genoa and Venice in 1218.[284]

- In 1239, Gregory IX managed to secure reconciliation between Genoa and Venice, and made them swear to act jointly against all those who disobeyed the spiritual authority of the pope.[285]

- In 1267, Clement IV intervened deeply into the negotiations concluded by the treaty of Viterbo: Charles of Anjou was to become an "effective controller" of the restored Latin Empire in the East (by gaining most of the rights of the deposed Latin emperor Baldwin II; had the plan been successful), and Baldwin II – ignored by other European rulers in his pleads for help – would receive support in re-conquering Constantinople.[286]

- Furthermore, Gregory X was particularly interested in reconciling Italy in order to contain Charles of Anjou's increasing influence in the peninsula.[287]

- In 1274, the Second Council Lyons pronounced, as noted earlier, the general ban of wars for six consecutive years. The council's idea was to spare lords energy for their common foe in the Holy Land and to divert them from fighting each other.[288]

- In 1276, the pope engineered a treaty between Charles of Anjou and Genoa.[289]

- Since Clement IV's pontificate, elected in 1265, the Florentine banking families began to receive a privileged position as collectors of papal taxes and were urged to support Charles of Anjou with their resources,[290] the papacy grew more interested in securing peace in Florence itself. For instance, in 1280 the feuding factions were forced to conduct a ceremony of kiss of peace.[291]

- In 1295, under the aegis of Boniface VIII, who had been vitally interested in "pacifying" Europe and launching a crusade, the congress of Anagni was organized which strove to reconcile the Capetians (and the Angevins) with the House of Aragon.[292]

- In 1299, the same pope managed to work out a truce between Venice and Genoa, which – although shaky – preserved peace for five next decades.[293]

- Ultimately, Boniface VIII was among the parties that signed the Treaty of Caltabellotta in 1302.[294]

---

[284] John H. Pryor, "The Maritime Republics," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, ed. David Abulafia, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 424.

[285] Rist, *The Papacy*, 184–185.

[286] Cf. Watt, "The Papacy," 1999, 148. See also: Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, 58–59; and Jean Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou: Power, Kingship and State-Making in Thirteenth-Century Europe* (London; New York: Longman, 1998), 93.

[287] Louis Green, "Florence," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, ed. David Abulafia, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 487.

[288] Cf. Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, 39–42.

[289] Pryor, "The Maritime Republics," 438.

[290] Green, "Florence," 485–486.

[291] Ibid., 488.

[292] Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, 149.

[293] Pryor, "The Maritime Republics," 446.

[294] Abulafia, "The Kingdom of Sicily," 518. See also: Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, 160.

Another task that the thirteenth-century papacy was deeply concerned about was related to determining goals and coordinating "international" actions of Latin Christendom. The well-being of the Holy Land appears here as the focal point of the papal agenda. Its widespread recognition can be demonstrated on various levels of "international" activity.[295]

In other words, the recurrent motif of a crusade became a familiar feature of the political, social, economic, and religious fabric of Europe. The discourse that emerged particularly after the Fourth Lateran Council emphasized peace and harmony in the West as indispensable to a successful campaign in the East.[296] Operating within a moral framework, the "international" politics was – at the level of discourse – subjected to the benefit of the Holy Land as its guiding precept.[297] Weiler summarized:

As the crusade was embedded in the perennial struggle between good and evil, thwarting, delaying, or hindering the liberation of the Holy Land was no ordinary act of disobedience, but a crime against the principle which governed Christian society. As the wronged party was God himself, impeding the liberation of the Holy Land was an act of rebellion against the divine will.[298]

In Weiler's opinion the thirteenth-century "international" politics was profoundly permeated with the concept of crusade. It conditioned the conduct of diplomacy and provided language to "cement alliances, settle disputes, and state claims." It, therefore, worked as a grand narrative which was equally comprehensive to lord-kings and lord-princes, and which confused political pragmatism by intrusions of idealism.[299]

Apart from organizing military expeditions to the Holy Land (or against non-Christians at the frontiers of Christianity) that were supposed to unify Latin Christendom in a joint effort against common enemies, the papacy came about to use crusades as means of policing the Christian "international" community. In 1199, a precedent was set when Innocent III launched

---

[295] For instance, over the thirteenth century the crusading effort became customary for the emperors. Frederick II took the Cross in 1215 [cf.: Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 382.] Other candidates and elects declared strong desire to do so: Rudolf of Habsburg in 1275 [cf.: Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, 45.], and later Přemysl Ottakar II, Adolph of Nassau, Albrecht of Habsburg, and Henry of Luxemburg [cf.: Björn Weiler, "The 'Negotium Terrae Sanctae' in the Political Discourse of Latin Christendom, 1215-1311," *The International History Review* 25, no. 1 (2003): 27–29.]

[296] Weiler, "The 'Negotium,'" 2–3.

[297] Ibid., 11.

[298] Ibid., 9.

[299] Ibid., 18.

a crusade against Markward of Anweiler and his supporters in Sicily, who were resisting the papal policy.[300] This act is held responsible for triggering the later development of the crusading movement that included enterprises targeting defiant Christian lords. In scholarship these actions received a rather unfortunate name of "political crusades", and are considered as such because the popes pronounced them against their enemies, whom the pontiffs regarded as a threat to "the existence and security of the papal states and hence to the papacy itself."[301] Lloyd briefly summarized a standard scholarly opinion about the "political crusades":

The crusade, the most potent weapon in the papacy's formidable arsenal, increasingly emerged, then, as an instrument to be applied as and when popes saw fit, and against whomsoever and wherever its use was appropriate. By the middle of the thirteenth century, this was unquestionably the reality, but it should be stressed that by no means all contemporaries were content with each and every aspect of this broad development. Papal policy was one thing, public opinion another.[302]

In practice, after Innocent III whose letters suggested that any opposition to the Church had been itself a heresy,[303] canon lawyers advanced legal concepts of heresy and provided a solid theoretical grounding for what was happening in reality.[304] This has been viewed from the perspective of "politicizing" crusades (as Rist's argument went, unknowingly in accordance to the realist precepts).

There is, however, another possibility, which demands some mitigation of this strong power-centered reasoning put forward by Rist. Namely, the canonists' efforts and Innocent III's language could be seen as all coordinated by the prevailing principle of good and evil, right or wrong, legitimate and illegitimate in the "international" order. The Church perceived herself (with the pope at the head) as qualified to discern morality of the political realm. Given that nobody else in the Christian society could claim similar authority, fighting the pope, already customarily established as the grand judge and the distributor of legitimacy (as earlier examples showed), would suffice to declare a perpetrator an evildoer and proclaim him an enemy of faith. In this context, the "political crusades" could be defended as religiously- (or

---

[300] Simon Lloyd, "The Crusading Movement 1096-1274," in *The Oxford History of the Crusades*, ed. Jonathan Simon Christopher Riley-Smith (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 39–40.
[301] Rist, *The Papacy*, 171.
[302] Lloyd, "The Crusading," 41.
[303] Rist, *The Papacy*, 196.
[304] Ibid., 174.

morally-) driven enterprises, once the peculiarity of the thirteenth-century "international" system was acknowledged. This specificity was grounded in the conviction that "international" relations did not exist beyond the zone of Christian morality, and followed the presumption that if anyone was expected to interpret these moral principles, it was the pope himself. Thus, politics was deeply interwoven with ethics, which in turn had a strongly religious pattern.[305]

The popes organized a number of "political crusades" in the thirteenth century. Rist focused particularly on those against Markward and Frederick II (and the latter being the most well-known). Lloyd added the example of rebellious English lords, who had forced John of England to concede to Magna Carta, and faced the threat of crusade in 1216 and 1217.[306] A few more instances could be supplied.

- In the 1260s a crusade was preached against Manfred (he was crowned king of Sicily in 1259 and by 1261 he conquered nearly whole Italy),[307] Frederick II's son, while Charles of Anjou was mounting an army to invade Sicily.[308]
- Later, in January 1283, Martin IV the war to eject the Aragonese from the kingdom of Sicily elevated to a crusade.[309]
- In 1287, Honorius IV threatened to proclaim a crusade against Ladislas IV of Hungary.[310]
- A decade later, in 1297, a conflict in the Sacred College between Boniface VIII and the Colonna cardinals escalated so much that the pope resolved to preach crusade against them;[311] an act that met with "tremendous success in Italy".[312]

To sum up this short overview of the thirteenth-century papal agenda in the "international" politics in search for a "papal empire", a few observations can be made.

First, the papacy functioned within two dimensions: as a regular political agent who pursued its interests within the "international" realm; and as the highest moral authority that

---

[305] This way of perceiving „international" relations finds strong affirmation in the historical books of the Bible; success or disaster in relations with Israel's neighbors was fundamentally linked to upholding by the Israelites moral standards, commandments, and regulations prescribed by God, and explained to them by Moses, their leader. Analogous leading role in the midst of the Christians was ascribed to the pope.
[306] Lloyd, "The Crusading," 40.
[307] Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou*, 1998, 130.
[308] Abulafia, "The Kingdom of Sicily," 513.
[309] Watt, "The Papacy," 1999, 154.
[310] Berend, *At the Gate*, 2001, 175.
[311] Watt, "The Papacy," 1999, 160.
[312] Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, 161.

declared the boundaries of right and wrong on this "international" stage (an activity which made sense to other Christian lords).

Second, the breadth and scope of the papal moral and legal authority was astonishing. The pontiffs subjected kingdoms, pronounced and deposed lord-emperors and lord-kings, and excommunicated them. They put rulers on trials and decided about rights to thrones. They strove to pacify Europe by engineering marriage contracts, setting up truces and peace treaties, and convoking general councils which acted as "great assemblies" of the Christian society (apart from matters of faith, they decided about taxation of the Church, mandatory peace across Christendom, and issues concerning lords and lordships).

Third, the popes were profoundly distressed about the well-being of the Holy Land; consequently, through their actions they established the "international" discourse that utilized the notion of the "benefit of the Holy Land" for arranging many "international" enterprises. Beside attempts to distribute power in Latin Christendom and coordinate undertakings against Christian common foes (crusades), the papacy adapted the concept of crusading in order to police the community of Christian lords.

Finally, the popes built up their moral and legal authority by means of preaching and setting precedence in their relations with other lords. They also succeeded in producing and disseminating a legal practice that emphasized the validity of the claim that opposing the Church and the pope could result in charges of heresy.

According to the evidence provided above, the breadth and scope of papal "international" interventions makes a strong impression of existing hierarchical structures, on top of which emerges the pontiff as the ultimate guardian of the "international" realm. His role goes clearly beyond the field of theoretical speculations over universal nature of the papal power, because the material accumulated in this section has been intentionally limited to "international" practices and eschewed any reference to intellectual discourses. Namely, it has been less important here what the popes believed they could do, for the focus has been placed on what they really did in the area of "international" relations. Given that politics carried out by the pope was meaningful and chiefly making sense to other "international" actors, on the basis of the gathered evidence it could be argued that hierarchical arrangement of the thirteenth-century "international" system of Latin Christendom seems to be its

dominant structural feature. By the very fact that nobody else attempted to claim extensive papal prerogatives the "international" status of the papacy became unique and hierarchy-driven. In this particular context, the notion of Latin Christendom as the "Papal Empire" makes sense and thus, it can affect research perspectives acquired by IR scholars and theorists.[313]

Nevertheless, the "Papal Empire" cannot be too literally understood. It is fairly obvious that the papacy was not a real center of a bigger whole, which was controlled by a unitary administrative system and held in obedience by a military power commanded by this center.[314] The pure form of an empire is always a model. However, as my analysis proved, the Christian society was organized and practically functioned around a set of principles which were put forward by the Church with the pope at the head. The latter willingly intervened into matters that nowadays would be considered as internal business of states. It is always the question (addressed in detail in the following section), how effective the papal impact on "international" system was, but it goes without saying that the pope was not simply a loner in the woods and that ignoring his voice for good was for lords not only a costly enterprise but also a hardly thinkable act of resistance to the dominating political culture.[315] In a sense, the

---

[313] In his historical survey of empires, Herfried Münkler determined a number of features that would characterize imperial political logic. I am pointing to some of his descriptions, because they seem to fit the findings made in this section. By the way, Münkler himself did not pay attention to potential "imperial" aspects of medieval papal supremacy. However, my overview of papal interventions into the "international" sphere of Latin Christendom's world strikingly matches Münkler's depictions: *Empires are more than large states; they move in a world of their own. States are bound together in an order created together with other states, over which they do not have sole control. Empires in contrast see themselves as creators and guarantors of an order that ultimately depends on them and that they must defend against the outbreak of chaos, which they regard as a constant threat. … Fear of chaos, and the self-appointed role of defender of order against disorder, good against evil, through which the empire sees and legitimizes itself, are corollaries of the imperial mission, which also represents a fundamental justification for world empire – whether it be to spread civilization, establish a worldwide socialist order, defend human rights or promote democracy. While states stop at the borders of other states and permit them to regulate their own internal affairs, empires intervene in the affairs of others in order to fulfil their mission. … Empires, unlike states, are under an informal pressure to assume primacy in every sphere in which power, prestige and performance can be measured and compared*: Herfried Münkler, *Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), VIII, 31.

[314] Compare a useful definition of empire provided by Alexander Motyl and quoted by Yale Ferguson: *What distinguishes empires from centralized multinational political systems … is structure. The nonnative state's elite located in the core coordinates, supervises, and protects the peripheral native societies, which … interact with one another only via the core. Empires, then, are structurally centralized political systems within which core states and elites dominate peripheral societies, serve as intermediaries for their significant interactions, and channel resource flows from the periphery to the core and back to the periphery. As structured systems, empires need not have emperors, ideologies, and exploitative relationships to be empires; by the same token, nonempires may have these features without being empires*: Yale H. Ferguson, "Approaches to Defining 'Empire' and Characterizing United States Influence in the Contemporary World," *International Studies Perspectives* 9, no. 3 (August 2008): 275.

[315] For instance, Abulafia commented about Frederick II, generally pictured in historiography as the major foe of the papacy in the thirteenth century: *He was a man of some intellectual ability and of reasonable political skills who was called on by his dual inheritance to grapple indecisively with the claims to higher authority of the Roman Church; and when the gauntlet was thrown down he made little serious attempt to challenge the claim of the pope*

papacy was not a product of the international consent (like the United Nations nowadays) but it evolved from the previous centuries as a given but special element of the "international" system. It could be argued therefore, that the thirteenth-century "international" politics without the papacy was plainly impossible; and by contrast it was much more imaginable to conceive this system (and the rules of its operation) free of any other lordship (including France or England or perhaps even the empire[316]).

Domination of Anarchy as the Ordering Principle of the "International" System

The papal widespread claims to supremacy in Latin Christendom (and beyond), as analyzed above, were not only employed on the level of intellectual discourse (exemplified earlier by the investiture controversy and later by disputes over the scope of the papal "plena potestas") but also deeply permeated "international" practice of the popes. Their attempts to coordinate, judge and pacify Latin Christendom, and to distribute power and legitimacy within the Christian society invoked gradation in power and influence among lords; consequently, such practices implied the division of the thirteenth-century "international" system into political units possessing unequal rights, which would fit into imperial categories as put forward by Münkler.[317]

Leaving the argument at this stage would reassert claims made by IR theorists about the hierarchical, imperial-like nature of the medieval "international" system. However, determining the ordering principle of this system requires further investigation in order to establish the degree, to which the papal supremacy-driven actions were successful and efficient, and to identify the context, in which the pontiffs' system-wide power operated. In other words, this section aims to documenting that the "Papal Empire" was apparently an impressive cultural construct erected on an anarchically-natured base.

---

to moral leadership in the Christian world. He sought to clear himself of specific charges, not to strike a blow against the man he still saw as the vicar of Christ: Abulafia, *Frederick II*, 1988, 438.

[316] After the conversion of Emperor Constantine in the fourth century, Christianity progressively transformed into a state religion and thus, the Church's organization was likened to the imperial administration. In the late fifth century, the imperial authority in the West collapsed but the parallel ecclesiastical structures survived and developed, imitating the Roman secular model. Until Charlemagne's coronation in 800 and restoration of the Empire, the Church functioned as the practical bearer of the transnational imperial legacy. As a result, the original "Romanization" of the Church in Late Antiquity was in the West swapped with the "ecclesiasticalization" of the reborn empire of the High Middle Ages. In short, the existence of the empire appeared secondary to the durability of the Roman Church. About the "Romanization" of the Church and its practical consequences cf. Alister E McGrath, *Christian History: An Introduction* (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 48–49; 73–75.

[317] Münkler, *Empires*, 5.

First point that has to be made is that the papacy – despite all its universal aspirations – can be quite easily perceived as a standard element of the "international" system, which was equally preoccupied with matters of lordship and territorial control and domination. More specifically, the popes played roles analogous to other lords.

For instance, their sustained rivalry with emperors, well recognized in scholarly literature as a great stage on which the grand authorities of the ancient world collided, boiled down to the problem of domination over Italy and thus, it had the nature of a regular territorial struggle over lordship. However, its moral dimension transformed it into a bitter contest. As indicated earlier, the politics of "right or wrong" (in which the engaged parties believed the divine authority was behind them and that only their actions were just) was less susceptible to compromise and negotiations than the contemporary politics that, on the whole, believes to exist beyond regular moral constraints.

The popes disliked the idea to be taken in claws from north and south. Rather they acted as lords interested in controlling the whole peninsula by establishing friendly rulers on both sides of the papal states. The popes, adopting lordship-building logic, had to realize that being tucked between two imperial lordships (Empire in the north; Sicily in the south) could bring about another danger of becoming an extra imperial province (by means of annexation or through geographical determinants). It turned out to be a pressing matter, since Emperor Frederick II was preoccupied with building a lordship which he could hand over to his sons. At first it seemed he thought along the papal wishes and was ready to split his kingdoms between his offspring. Later, however, after his oldest son Henry had rebelled against him and been deprived of the Roman crown, Frederick conceived a new plan and towards the end of his reign he was thinking about creating a unitary lordship to be inherited by Conrad.[318]

Another observation reinforcing the argument about standard lordly status of the popes (in the "international" system) is the way they organized their relations with the kingdom of Sicily. As it turned out from meticulous negotiations with Charles of Anjou, the papacy considered this kingdom as an asset to gain considerable material power to back its claims to supremacy in Latin Christendom. Interestingly, the popes recognized Sicily as a separate lordship which could not be ever put under prolonged and immediate papal

---

[318] Abulafia, *Frederick II*, 1988, 437.

administration. It was a kingdom that deserved its own ruler but this ruler was strongly expected to submit his resources to Christendom-wide politics pursued by the pope. From this perspective, it was quite clear that the papacy had no illusions about practical unity of the Christian society which could lead to mount effective military expedition to the East. Instead, over decades it was increasingly imagined that the joint effort of the Italian lordships (the papacy, the Angevins, Florence, Venice and Genoa) could provide the core of such enterprise. This project was close to fulfillment in the early 1280s but was thwarted by the so-called "Sicilian Vespers", which put an end to the Angevin dreams about a Mediterranean empire.

For the popes acting as common lords (and not as individual rulers of their "empire"), Sicily was the focal point of their policy for the whole thirteenth century. Starting from the 1190s and Innocent III's attempts to make sure that young Frederick would not re-unify what his father, Henry VI, brought together: the empire and Sicily; to the peace of Caltabellotta in 1302, in which Boniface VIII and the Angevins had to, at least temporarily, recognize the Aragon domination in Sicily. In short, the papal superior authority notwithstanding, the hundred-years long dispute over Sicily was ultimately lost for the popes. Throughout the entire century there was a relatively short period, when a friendly ruler occupied the Sicilian throne.[319] It was only seventeen years and yet, the Angevin politics in the 1270s – although unable to restore the unity of Sicily and the empire – showed already how difficult it was for the papacy to control an agile king of Sicily, himself willing to extend his domination in Italy.[320]

It would be the third observation showing the *de facto* un-imperial papal authority in Latin Christendom to argue that the pontiff's decisions and adjudications hardly ever worked due to his direct involvement.[321] Namely, it was not papal forces that engaged in implementing

---

[319] From January 1266, when Charles of Anjou had been crowned and a month later he defeated Manfred at the battle of Benevento [cf.: Jean Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou: Power, Kingship and State-Making in Thirteenth-Century Europe* (London; New York: Longman, 1998), 4.] to the "Sicilian Vespers" (March-September 1283) that drove him away.

[320] Earlier, the conflict with Frederick II was rather unsuccessful either. In the regular war of 1229-30 and 1239-40, the pope's armies were defeated. In the second conflict the imperial troops were directly threatening Rome. In 1230 at San Germano a peace was concluded which, however, still guaranteed the liberty of the Church in Sicily [cf.: Morris, *The Papal Monarchy*, 564–565], and thus showed no imperial interest in destroying the papacy. In May 1241 Frederick II's fleet managed to intercept ships carrying papal supporters coming to a general council convoked by the pope [cf.: Rist, *The Papacy*, 186.] The council did not take place; instead, in August 1241, Gregory IX died [cf.: Morris, *The Papal Monarchy*, 566.] In 1250, Frederick II followed, but in this struggle there was no clear victor. Both sides did not manage to claim genuine success over its opponent. As Abulafia observed, however, Frederick's "greatest aim seemed within reach: that his sons would inherit his kingdoms and preserve or even restore the dynasty's good name." [cf.: Abulafia, *Frederick II*, 1988, 407.]

[321] For instance, denunciations, excommunications and wars did not succeed in stripping Frederick II of his power. When in 1238 papal legates strove to stir up Frederick Babenberg of Austria and Otto II Wittelsbach of Bavaria

his "international" policy but rather there were other lords who could pick up the "just cause" and strove to enforce it with the papal blessing. In other words, the pope's efficiency in shaping the "international" realm was powerfully linked to his abilities in mustering the support of other lords to put his rulings in force.[322]

Fourth, the papal claims to supremacy were parallel to similar aspirations nurtured by the kings (emperors) of the Romans (Germans). Although the character of the imperial rule was different from the spiritual authority of the bishop of Rome, for it was geographically limited and did not extend to Latin Christendom in its entirety, the kings (emperors) were dedicated to interfering with essential matters of other lords on the grounds of their superiority. Hence, the thirteenth-century "international" system accommodated another lordship that by its "international" practices gave an impression of large-scale hierarchical (imperial) rule. The kings (emperors), following the customary precepts of collective kingship in Germany, sought military engagement of German princes in order to act against other lords, who formally were imperial subjects. The imperial authoritative declarations had to be materially supported by the coalition of princes.[323] The practices of imperial interfering within

---

against the emperor and his newly elected heir, Conrad, they failed in their efforts [cf.: Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 390.] Simultaneously, there were other ineffective attempts to induce Robert of Artois, Louis IX's younger brother, to challenge Frederick's rule in Germany.

[322] A number of both successful and failed instances can illustrate this point. For example, the conflict with and ultimately the deposition of Sancho II of Portugal in the 1240s was effective, but only because his brother, Alfonso, was ready to fight for the throne and eventually was successful. Another example would be Charles of Anjou who managed to defeat Manfred, Frederick II's son and Sicilian regent, on the battlefield and conquered this lordship under the papal aegis. However, the Angevins were in fact second in line, because the Plantagenets – who had been earlier invited to seize Sicily – did not take up arms in the first place. A failed attempt of similar sort was the crusade proclaimed and paid by Martin IV, which brought the French invasion on the kingdom of Aragon in the Summer of 1285. Philip III of France was persuaded to accept the Aragonese crown for his youngest son, Charles of Valois [cf.: Watt, "The Papacy," 1999, 154–155.], but the military expedition was decimated by pestilence which also killed the king. As a result, the House of the Aragonese – at the same time fighting fiercely for the kingdom of Sicily (to which they laid claims through Constance, Manfred's daughter, who in 1262 married Peter of Aragon, James I's heir; cf.: Jordan, *Europe in the High Middle Ages*, 278) – survived intact. Another example is the Angevin-papal undertaking aimed at restoring the Latin empire in Byzantium by the means of the pope's authority and Charles I of Anjou's military might. In 1281 Martin IV excommunicated Michael Paleologos, the emperor of Byzantium, but due to the rebellion in Sicily, the long-planned expedition never set off. Meanwhile, Charles II of Anjou, following the scheme worked out by Nicholas III, began assembling an army at Tarascon with the intention of establishing the new kingdom of Arles by force [cf.: Cox, "The Kingdom of Burgundy," 360]; again, unsuccessfully. Last and yet victorious example of such political planning was the papal contribution to bringing the Angevins to the Hungarian throne in the early fourteenth century (to be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4). In that case, the popes made clear that Charles I was the lawful ruler-to-be of the kingdom, but the young candidate himself – like his great-grandfather in the 1260s – still had to raise armies and overpower resisting opponents.

[323] In the thirteenth century there are a few instances which illustrate well such practices. First, in 1220, when Frederick II was crowned emperor, his oldest son, Henry, became the king of the Germans. He was, however, expected to subject to his father's will. In 1232, the mutual relations between the father and the son deteriorated so much that Frederick ordered the princes to oversee his son's actions and allowed them to revoke their fealty should the king fail to keep the emperor's commands [cf.: Björn K. U. Weiler, "Kings and Sons: Princely

and outside the conventionally delineated borders of the empire can be adequately illustrated by individual cases of lords who either constructed or lost their lordships by recognizing the validity of imperial prerogatives and by incorporating them into their lordship-building

Rebellions and the Structures of Revolt in Western Europe, C. 1170–c.1280," *Historical Research* 82, no. 215 (February 2009): 24–25.] Two years later frustrated Henry rebelled and failed. Second, in June 1236, the Babenberger Duke Frederick II (the Bellicose) of Austria and Styria, brother-in-law of the emperor's son Henry (the one who had freshly lost the rebellion) was outlawed for his repeated refusal to appear at court [cf.: Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 389.] The confiscation of his fiefs did not happen, however, by administrative means. The emperor conceded to allow his lords to resolve to military means. Otto II of Bavaria, Wenceslas I of Bohemia, and lord-bishops of Bamberg and Passau organized a campaign and invaded the Babenberg lordship from north and west. Nevertheless, their action proved unsuccessful and Frederick II himself had to leave northern Italy and march to Austria with his army to ultimately defeat the Babenberg duke [cf.: Georg Scheibelreiter, *Die Babenberger: Reichsfürsten und Landesherren* (Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2010), 323–324.] Next, in the first months of 1237 the emperor liquidated the lordship of Austria and transformed it into an imperial province with the center in Vienna and governed by an imperial procurator, Bishop Ekbert of Bamberg [cf.: Stephan Vajda, *Die Babenberger: Aufstieg einer Dynastie* (Wien: Orac, 1986), 128–129.] Two years later, when the emperor was excommunicated and engaged in war with Gregory IX, Duke Frederick II managed to come to terms with the neighboring lords, and his former enemies, and set off to reconquer his lordship. By December 1239 his armies reached Vienna and put the city under siege. The reconciliation soon followed and by summer 1240 the conflict was settled. Gregory IX, once he learnt about the secret peace negotiations between two Fredericks, excommunicated the Babenberg duke, but Archbishop of Salzburg and Bishop of Passau declared the pope's decisions invalid [cf.: Ibid., 129–132.]

strategies: Přemysl Ottokar II (the 1260s and 1270s),[324] Albrecht Habsburg (the early 1290s),[325] and Wenceslas II (the 1290s).[326]

Summing up this particular point, in the imagined and hierarchically structured "Papal Empire", it was not only the pontiff who could effectively enforce his decisions by seeking assistance of other lords who would to certain degree obey him due to his special "international" status. Hence, in this aspect he was not really a unique "international" actor.

From this set of examples two conclusions could be drawn. First, that the papacy was neither the supreme lordship on the "international" stage (for it lacked its own resources to act effectively on the Christendom-wide scale and thus was forced to rely on other lords

---

[324] In the 1260s, Přemysl Ottakar II built up a very strong position within the empire. As the king of Bohemia he acquired the lands of the Babenbergs. In August 1262 his disputed possession of Austria was confirmed by Richard of Cornwall, the king of the Romans [cf.: Björn Weiler, "Image and Reality in Richard of Cornwall's German Career," *The English Historical Review* 113, no. 454 (November 1998): 1119.] In 1266, he received the title of vicar of imperial lands east of the Rhine [cf.: Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 394.] In 1269, he added Carinthia to his lordship and hence he became one of the richest and most influential princes of the empire, "ruling a territory about the size of England." [Weiler, "Image," November 1998, 1125.] After Richard's death in 1272, he wanted to become emperor himself and sought support from the pope. However, in October 1273 Rudolf Habsburg was elected, and from then until 1278, the new king put almost all his energies to destroy the power of Přemysl Ottokar II. In November 1274, decrees from Nuremberg announced the revindication of his lands and stripped him of his imperial fiefs [cf.: Ibid., 1134.] In June 1275 the king of Bohemia was, like Frederick II of Babenberg in 1236, outlawed [cf.: Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 397.] However, he did not find himself in such dramatic position as the Babenberg duke, because he quickly found support from the margrave of Brandenburg and the duke of Lower-Bavaria [cf.: Vajda, *Die Babenberger*, 158.] In Autumn 1276, Přemysl Ottokar II saw his lands invaded. Rudolf of Habsburg raised an army of Swabian and Bavarian knights, secured backing from Archbishop of Salzburg and invited Ladislas IV of Hungary to join. The king of Bohemia gave in and surrendered the Austrian lands to the emperor [cf.: Ibid., 159.] Two years later, after the lands in Austria had suffered from the high-handed imperial rule, he hoped to win them back. This time Rudolf of Habsburg did not receive any support from the powerful German lords and had to rely on his lesser allies: Count Meinhard of Tirol, Archbishop of Salzburg, Bishop of Basel; there were also some troops from the town of Nurnberg and from his own domains [cf.: Ibid., 160.] Nevertheless, the battle of Durnkrut in August 1278, in which the king of Bohemia died, was a genuine breakthrough for Rudolf. He could begin to reorder the structure of eastern German lordships according to his own projects [cf.: Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 397.]

[325] After the sudden death of Ladislas IV of Hungary [cf.: Pál Engel, *Realm of St Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895-1526* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 109,] on August 31, 1290 Rudolf of Habsburg pronounced the kingdom of Hungary escheated imperial fief. Subsequently, he enfeoffed his son, Albrecht, and commanded him to secure the throne [cf.: Edmund Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek na tle swoich czasów* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, 1951), 13.] The king of the Romans justified his act by referring to the precedence of 1245 when Béla IV of Hungary, facing the threat of another devastating Mongol invasion, subjected his kingdom to Frederick II [cf.: Karl Friedrich Krieger, *Die Habsburger im Mittelalter: von Rudolf I. bis Friedrich III.* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1994), 79.] In summer 1291, Andrew III, the newly made king of Hungary, fought against Albrecht and was victorious. Meanwhile, Rudolf died and Albrecht lost his immediate interest in Hungary, hoping for succeeding his father. As a result, he made peace with Andrew III and gave up his claim [cf.: Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 13–14 and Krieger, *Die Habsburger*, 1994, 79.]

[326] King Albrecht of Habsburg of the Romans officially permitted Wenceslas II of Bohemia to work against Władysław Łokietek. On August 23, 1299 Łokietek, acting as the duke of Great Poland, Poznań, Pomerania, Łęczyca, Cuiavia and Sieradz, promised to subject his lands to Wenceslas II and receive them in fief afterwards [cf.: Ignacy Zakrzewski, ed., *Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski*, vol. 2 (Poznań: Nakł. Bibl. Kórnickiej, 1878), n. 818.] He did not keep his promise. In response, in June 1300 King Wenceslas II received these lands as fief from Albrecht [cf.: Ibid., vol. 2, n. 832,] and in summer of that year he expelled Łokietek from his lordship and was crowned king of Poland.

capable of executing its projects) nor its ways of pursuing political interests were unique (the emperors operated on analogical grounds). Second, the emperors (or the kings of the Romans) wielded special power and maintained authority over the German lands, but they too were only partially able to enforce their decisions without acknowledging the collective system of rule in the empire. Nominally they upheld the higher status than the German lord-princes and lord-bishops but in fact their material resources derived only in part from imperial domains; their effective rule required skills in building alliances from among their subjects and accomplishments in playing out rivalries of other lords.[327]

---

[327] This argument can be well illustrated by a brief overview of the degree of succession instability throughout the thirteenth century, from which the Roman kingship suffered. As a starting point, however, I would point to Weiler's opinion that asserted the Frederick I to Henry VI succession of 1190 as the only smooth one in the twelfth century [cf.: Björn K. U. Weiler, "Suitability and Right: Imperial Succession and the Norms of Politics in Early Staufen Germany," in *Making and Breaking the Rules: Succession in Medieval Europe, c.1000-c.1600: Proceedings of the Colloquium Held on 6-7-8 April 2006, Institute of Historical Research, University of London = Établir et Abolir Les Normes: La Succession Dans l'Europe Médiévale, Vers 1000-Vers 1600: Actes de La Conférence Tenue Les 6, 7 et 8 Avril 2006* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 72.] The thirteenth-century rivalry did not prove considerably more peaceful. In 1198 the kingdom of the Romans had two kings elected. While Otto IV Welf received the papal backing, the majority of ecclesiastical and lay lord-princes stood behind Philip of Swabia [cf.: Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 379.] The conflict lasted unresolved until 1208, when Philip was murdered as a result of a private grudge [cf.: Ibid., 380.] Otto IV was crowned emperor but soon turned against the pope and Innocent III put forward Frederick II as the Welf's counter-candidate. The war ensued; Otto was vanquished at the battle of Bouvines in 1214, and a year later Frederick was properly crowned in Aachen [cf.: Ibid., 382.] In 1220 he was made emperor but this came at a cost: Honorius III demanded Frederick II's eldest son, Henry, be elevated to the German throne [cf.: Weiler, "Kings and Sons," 24.] This act limited the emperor's grip of the German lands. The co-habitation between father and son turned out to be unbearable, and in 1234 it brought frustrated Henry to the point of rising against the emperor [cf.: Ibid., 24–25.] However, he failed in his attempt, lost his crown, and was deported to southern Italy [cf.: Jürgen Kaiser, *Der Kampf um die Krone: Königsdynastien im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart: Theiss, 2011), 111.] In 1237 Conrad IV, another Frederick II's son, was elected king and imperial heir. Siegfried III of Eppenstein, archbishop of Mainz, was declared regent [cf.: Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 390.] In 1247, the archbishops of northern empire in concert with Duke Henry II of Brabant, elected as king the latter's young nephew Count William of Holland [cf.: Ibid., 391.] In that moment there were already two kings of the Romans and the emperor. The count received financial support from the papacy [cf.: Kaiser, *Der Kampf*, 114,] but was still unable to build up a sustained danger to the Hohenstaufen rule. By 1250, according to Abulafia, William's power was made to appear "paper-thin." [Abulafia, *Frederick II*, 1988, 405.] In 1250, Frederick II died. In 1251 his son, Conrad IV, departed to Sicily never to return, and he commissioned Otto II of Bavaria, his father-in-law, to govern the kingdom in his name [cf.: Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 392.] Conrad died in 1254 and King William of Holland was killed in 1256, while attempting to force Frisians into submission [cf.: Ibid.] The emptied Roman throne had to be filled. In 1257, like in 1198, a double-election took place: some lord-princes supported Alfonso X of Castile [cf.: Weiler, "Image," November 1998, 1115.] others invited Richard of Cornwall [cf.: J. A. Watt, "The Papacy," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, ed. David Abulafia, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 144.] Alfonso never appeared in Germany but managed to uphold his claims to the throne. Richard, however, as Weiler's study revealed, had won the recognition of those areas within the empire which constituted its economic, political and administrative core, and he was perceived to be the rightful and proper king [cf.: Weiler, "Image," November 1998, 1129.] His kingship did not remain unchallenged. Only in 1268 he could finally exercise full royal authority [cf.: Ibid., 1119.] Rudolf of Habsburg's power, who had been elected in 1273 after Richard's death, was firstly challenged by the king of Bohemia, who had risen among his peers under King Richard's protection. Subsequently, Rudolf strove to construct an extended lordship of his house from the pieces that had been left after the destruction of the Přemyslids' lordship. Adolf of Nassau, although unanimously elected after Rudolf's death in 1291 [cf.: Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 398,] within a few years met with strong opposition of his powerful lords, who disliked his acquisitions in Thuringia and margravate of Meissen. On June

Having already observed the un-imperial realities of the papal "international" presence, the overview of actions carried out by the kings of the Romans throughout the thirteenth century allows to argue that their position was hardly that of another medieval supreme power too.

The analysis of strengths and weaknesses of both so-called "universal" players (the popes and emperors) leads to conclusion that, despite the ongoing discussion about the extent and mutual relations between papal and imperial authorities in Latin Christendom, the incumbents of these universally-oriented offices were essentially not equipped with material resources necessary to impose and sustain hierarchical (imperial) structures Europe-wide. On the one hand, judging from the range of their claims to having authority over large parts of the Christian society, there would be little doubts about their dominating and hegemonic nature and that the papacy would still supersede the empire. On the other hand, taking into consideration the realities of the thirteenth-century "international" system, the opposite conclusion appears to better fit into the picture. The papacy and the empire remained unique actors on the "international" stage due to two elements: first, their special ability to produce justified claims to domination in various regions of Latin Christendom; second and yet linked to the first, their unparalleled prestige that made sense to other lords.[328] Their elite social

---

23, 1298 Archbishop Gerhard of Mainz and almost all other electors (the college of electors began to emerge since 1257) [cf.: Björn K. U. Weiler, *Kingship, Rebellion and Political Culture: England and Germany, c.1215-c.1250* (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 161,] deposed Adolf and promoted Albrecht of Habsburg. The latter confirmed this choice by defeating and killing the old king in battle [cf.: Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 398.] Without this success, Albrecht's kingship would suffer from a sustained challenge as it had been the fate of a number of his predecessors: Otto IV Welf, Frederick II, and Richard of Cornwall. Despite not having a parallel king of the Germans, Albrecht still had to struggle to come to terms with Boniface VIII; a difficult task which at certain point put him at the risk of deposition, especially when a few lord-electors resisted him [cf.: Heinz Thomas, *Deutsche Geschichte des Spätmittelalters 1250-1500* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1983), 115–120.]

[328] To be sure, in the thirteenth century the papacy and the empire cannot be taken as equals in respect to their potential supremacy within the "international" system. They shared some common features by claiming both highest hierarchical standing in the Christian society (although the emperors generally respected the pontiff's precedence in dignity) and the authority over other lords. There was, however, a considerable difference in scope of their claims. The emperors insisted on upholding supervision over the lands which had been recognized as parts of the empire, whereas the popes sought to oversee the regions which had belonged to Christendom. Obviously emperors tried to stretch their zones of authority by attempts to formally subjugate, for instance, the kingdoms of Hungary and Poland, but even then they could not raise similar demands towards the kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula, England or France as the popes did. Anticipating the argument put forward to the next Chapter, one more dissimilarity can be noticed. The emperors, like Frederick II, and the kings of the Germans, like William of Holland, Rudolf of Habsburg, Adolf of Nassau, and Albrecht of Habsburg, they all pursued dynastic politics; its logic was to extend and preserve one's lordship to provide well for one's offspring. The popes could not easily liberate themselves from such logic, since it actually was the only existing type of political behavior (in which the concept of lordship was grounded), but in the thirteenth century they were the only prominent "international" agents who did not conduct a dynastic politics. To be sure, they took care for their families and usually attempted to elevate them within the structures of the papal states; nevertheless, they perceived themselves as lords of

standing and reputation were essentially culturally constructed and did not translate into material power resources that would allow any of them to police Latin Christendom and thus, transform it into hierarchical, empire-like "international" system. The observations made so far in this section evidenced that even the papacy, despite its broad commitments and interventions throughout Christendom, in its "international" behaviors was not only unable to rely on its own resources but it was also pushed into regular lordship-building competition with other actors of the "international" system. Consequently, the "Papal Empire" was both challenged by the kings of the Romans in its universalistic aspirations as well as it was confronted with the lack of material power to pursue its policy independently. Therefore, I would argue that despite the extraordinary capabilities (or qualifications) found in the papal and imperial offices, they were similar in nature to other lords (that is, they did not represent another species among the actors of the "international" arena) and thus, they were unable to restructure the system according to the hierarchical principle but had to adapt to anarchical conditions and ultimately operate as lordships in a great sea of other lordships.[329]

It has been already shown that the "Papal Empire" (and its imperial equivalent) was more a cultural context of the political reality rather than the reality itself (which for theoretical purposes is an essential distinction). The inequality of "international" actors, imposed by hierarchical discourse and thinking of the time, had limited effect on the behavior of units in the system. Rather, this cultural component set up frameworks for political actions, created ways and arguments of justifying them (and thus, increased their effective power) but it remained a non-exclusive factor that motivated the actors' behavior.

Christendom, and they were genuinely preoccupied with the preservation and expansion of the Christian society. The nature of the papal office, which was not inherited but elective, and usually held no longer than approx. fifteen years (it was the case of the popes, save one, from 1198 to 1261; later, until John XXII who was elected in 1316, the pontiffs ruled no longer than nine years), and not to mention the religious and spiritual core of the papal service, did not encourage straightforward emulations of a secular political logic.

[329] As my analysis showed the papal and imperial claims to oversee lesser lords were effective and abiding not by law or sheer administrative power but by collective consent, which would give force to such declarations. In order to get things done both the pope and the emperor required capabilities to build alliances with and win recognition of other lords. which would give force to such declarations. In order to get things done both the pope and the emperor required capabilities to build alliances with and win recognition of other lords. These practices, however, were typical – as it was earlier said – to lordships as such. Every lord in order to uphold and advance his position had to secure the will-to-cooperate of his lesser lords and find allies in the neighborhood. What differentiated lords was how they defined, or could define, this neighborhood. For instance, the Piast lord-dukes of the first half of the thirteenth century gradually confined their "international" contacts to their immediate neighbors (and thus limited their "dynastic horizon") [cf.: Wojciech Kozłowski, *Prelude to the Angevins: Marriages of the Arpads and Piasts Reconsidered (986-Ca. 1250)* (Budapest: CEU, Budapest College, 2008),] whereas the Angevins, the Aragonese, and/or the papacy itself conducted their politics on a scale incomparable to the Piasts.

From what have been already said, it is difficult to maintain the idea of the thirteenth-century system-wide authority, personified either by the papacy or by the empire or even by both. Larger lordships, at the early stage of institutionalization (as described by Bisson), were still struggling to forge common identity and interests of smaller units that constituted them (and hence, encourage cohesion). Loyalties within the so-called "national monarchies" were still in the state of growth. Nevertheless, the outcome of the remarkable conflict between Boniface VIII and Philip IV of France in the turn of the fourteenth century showed that in this particular kingdom this loyalty reached its peak in relation to other lordships. In general, greater lordships, like France, England, Castile, Aragon and some others, strove to become even larger and to gain effective control over their smaller entities (the emerging distinction between something that will be later called the domestic and foreign policy caught red-handed), whereas less-complex lordships, like Flanders or those that comprised the German empire, sought to preserve their effectively-independent status and prestige, and whenever possible to expand.

Apart from cases listed in this section (in which the pope or emperor directly commissioned certain military expeditions against separate lordships), most of expansion of lordships took place either without or only with formal supervision or authorization from the "universal" powers. For instance, the great territorial expansion of Castile in the first half of the thirteenth century, the rapid increase of the royal domain in France, the Plantagenet wars in continental Europe and in the isles (subjecting the Welsh and the Scots), the emergence of the Přemyslids' lordship in Central Europe, the Teutonic Order's conquest of Prussia, and the Brandenburg expansion in Pomerania etc., were all conducted not by lord-kings or lord-princes acting as papal or imperial officers, but by lords themselves in their own name and for the sake of the maximization of their lordship.

Summing up the argument put forward in this section, it documented that the "Papal Empire" was just an impression gained from numerous "international" interventions carried out by the popes. Despite the important and meaningful Christendom-wide papal authority, the realities of the thirteenth-century "international" system did not allow the popes to become unique agents differently natured than the rest of "international" units. They were preoccupied with regional lordship-building and lordship-sustaining activities (Italy); they lacked resources to independently dominate the territory they claimed authority over; they

faced the kings (emperors) of the Romans as rivals in distributing power in the large areas of Latin Christendom; and in order to efficiently exercise their control they had to rely on individual material support provided by other lords (for instance, Sicily).

Returning to the concept of structural anarchy of international system, it defines a system, in which each international unit is equal of all the others; none is entitled to command and none is required to obey, for the international politics takes its shape in the absence of government, that is, in the absence of agents with system-wide authority. As a result, such system is populated with co-acting self-regarding units. All these conditions created a decentralized and anarchic international system that influenced (or even shaped) the behavior of its units.

Most of this description matches the conditions revealed in this section, showing that the thirteenth-century "international" system was generally anarchically structured, for there was no separate unit sufficiently empowered to police and coordinate the entire system. The papacy could only do it occasionally, locally, and if supported by other lords. Emperors, kings and dukes never even attempted to act as broadly as the popes, leaving the "international" system uncontrolled, and thus, anarchical in structure.

However, in the "international" discourse, and sometimes in practice, as the previous section has documented, the hierarchical component was very strong and cannot be easily refuted. Although it did not manage to change the very structure of the system, it still profoundly impacted the lordly behaviors. This is why the concluding section of this chapter attempts to give justice to culturally advocated hierarchies and thus, it paves the way for Chapter 3 that strives to determine the correlation between the dominant political culture and how political interests of lords were shaped.

Conclusion - the Hybrid "International" System

This is a good moment to start putting together the elements of the puzzle which I set out to make sense of in the beginning of this chapter. My intention was to offer some reflection about the characteristics of the thirteenth-century "international" system. I was particularly interested in revealing the structure and the ordering principle of this system. The assumption behind this enterprise was that thinking of how the system functioned over a hundred years would provide a useful framework to analyze the events of the early fourteenth

century in Central Europe in a broader and more complex manner (which will come particularly in the Chapters 4 and 5). Furthermore, if the characteristics of the system was created, it would shed light on how political interests were produced, and what was their fundamental grounding.

Certainly, exploration of the thirteenth-century "international" politics is not complete with this cursory study. However, on the basis of the collected material some trends and general patterns can be still visible and telling and this is precisely what I intended to accomplish here. It should be at least enough to give more advanced answer to the question whether the "international" system was, using the Waltzian terms, either hierarchical or anarchical. Once this issue is resolved, a more coherent analysis of the events in Central Europe could be rendered. What follows is an attempt to summarize what has been said so far.

On the whole, I am advancing the argument that the thirteenth-century "international" system in Latin Christendom was structurally neither anarchical nor hierarchical but more of a hybrid of these two. Essentially, the anarchical element was predominant, for hierarchy was culturally introduced (and thus was secondary to the "natural" state of anarchy) as a channeling factor that strove to organize, arrange and overcome fundamental fears and wants nurtured by the "international" units. The power of hierarchical arrangement was considerable and vital, because it stood in the core of the political culture of the time and thus, it had a profound impact on ways "international" interests were produced and how they were pursued in practice.

Hierarchical component

As explained earlier, hierarchical ordering in Waltz's model entails certain relations of super- and subordination and – as it happens in domestic structures – it introduces functional differentiation. This means that separate units are designed to tackle a set of issues while other agencies are assigned another tasks. All of them, however, respond to higher authority, which coordinates them, distributes work to be done, and provides necessary command.

This standard form of hierarchical ordering was not the one to which lordships submitted to. Moreover, the empire-like hierarchy, in which lesser administrative units (although independent in various degrees) are coordinated and ruled by a common and

organized center of power (the concept of imperial center and its peripheries), and thus these units function as members of a greater whole, and this greater whole is responsible for providing protection and command, seems to be more wrong than right.

The thirteenth-century "international" system was populated with lordships as its basic and dominant units. The system was essentially conceptualized as "Christian society". This concept implied hierarchy as an ordering principle and advocated the papacy as the system's most important leader and overseer. It also provided a sense of unity around a set of Christian principles and values, and put forward common interests, divinely inspired, which were promoted as these that should come forth before any particular interests. Lordships operated in the system that appraised political actions in moral terms and thus not in terms of their effectiveness (utility). Therefore, political behavior could be good or evil, just or sinful, right or wrong.

The idea of the common Christian society was particularly conceived and advanced from the middle of the eleventh century onwards. It implied a certain form of unity, which transgressed political divisions and promoted collective actions (such as crusades) for the sake of all believers (members of the society),[330] and was not confined to individual interests of separate lordships that decided to contribute to those actions.[331] As Brett Edward Whalen suggested, this new concept of Christendom (claiming the existence of a universal community under papal leadership and pastoral guidance), put forward by the papacy and "its network of supporters", revolutionized the way how the pope "viewed the properly ordered, right-believing assembly of peoples, churches and kingdoms that recognized the papacy as governing the norms and practices of their faith, if not their lives."[332] Pope Gregory VII fostered the idea that violent lords had duties towards the Church and they were supposed to willingly respond to and co-operate with God's plan for history and the destiny of Christendom,[333]

---

[330] For instance, in 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council, in canon 71, declared that attending to the affairs of the Holy Land to be a common duty of every Christian. Cf. Weiler, "The 'Negotium,'" 6.

[331] The same Canon 71 of the Lateran IV imposed the four-year-long peace on all Christian lords in order to establish convenient conditions for the crusade: *Quia vero ad hoc negotium exequendum, est permaxime necessarium ut principes populi christiani adinvicem pacem observant, sancta universali synodo suadente statuimus, ut saltem per quadriennium in toto orbe christiano servetur pax generaliter, ita quod per ecclesiarum praelatos discordantes reducantur ad plenam pacem aut firmam treugam inviolabiliter observandam*: Arkadiusz Baron and Henryk Pietras, eds., *Dokumenty soborów powszechnych: tekst grecki, łaciński, polski*, vol. 2 (Cracow: Wydawnictwo WAM - Księża Jezuici, 2007), 322.

[332] Whalen, *Dominion of God*, 12.

[333] Ibid., 33–34.

which had been to become a world-wide community supervised by the Roman Church, as a prelude to the end of history.[334] It is generally acknowledged that the case of the First Crusade, at the very end of the eleventh century, revealed some important things about the materialization of this particular concept which overshadowed the maturing system of lordships in Europe.[335] Pope Innocent III is normally recognized as the epitome of both discourse and workings of this concept of papal monarchy and of the pope acting as the shepherd of the world. For better elucidation, Whalen quoted Innocent III's statement from one of his letters:

For thus each magnate holds his own province, and every king his own kingdom, but Peter presides over all places in fullness as much as extent, for he is the vicar of the One to whom belongs the earth and its fullness, the entirety of the world and all those who live within it.[336]

The influential idea of "Christian society" combined with the prevailing reflection on lordly power, which had been outlined earlier, had their serious repercussions in the ordering of the "international" system. It installed and reinforced the hierarchical view on the lordly authority, pointing to God as the supreme source of power and distinguishing, albeit confused, prerogatives of the pope and the emperor. Furthermore, as Andreas Osiander noticed, the universal Christian community imposed on typical distinctions between lordships (as separate units of the system) an authoritative meta-distinction between "outside" and "inside" of Christendom,[337] and thus created two-dimensional "international" system: the intra- and extra-Christian.

It would be, however, misleading to take the dominant political discourse about the structure and aims of the Christian society for its everyday reality. The claims of unity under papal auspices were never fully realized.[338] They undoubtedly pervaded the discourse of the "international" system and thus shaped the language and terminology of how political interests were defined, but it could not be legitimately claimed that the papacy created a fully-fledged Christian empire (with Rome in its center). And the papal conflicts with the Roman

---

[334] Ibid., 3.
[335] Ibid., 43.
[336] Ibid., 126.
[337] Andreas Osiander, *Before the State: Systemic Political Change in the West from the Greeks to the French Revolution* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 247.
[338] Whalen, *Dominion of God*, 41.

(German) emperors, and kings, were not the only subversive factor there. The proclaimed and desired unity of all Christian lords did not automatically transformed their lordships into a peaceful "international" society. This ideational rather than political unity was aptly summarized by Halden:

The unity of the Latin medieval order consisted not in a unified system of hierarchical action from a single center but rather in the idea that Latin Christendom was a single society and in the lack of a separation between power and society.[339]

The hierarchy within Latin Christendom observed in the thirteenth-century "international" system was more noble-standing-focused and it also managed to develop its ideal: kingship. As Reynolds duly claimed: "Only kings were crowned: only kings could draw on the fund of prestige which came from the Church and from the kings of the Old Testament."[340] The title of king was prominent, but in consequence it disseminated the idea of a title as an equivalent (although lesser) of kingship. William Chester Jordan, while discussing the feudal society of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, concluded:

A vast juridical literature emerged to describe and categorize fiefs in the High Middle Ages, and the vernacular literature of adventure written for the upper class and which seems to have expressed its mentality is obsessively concerned with the extent of fiefs, the inheritance of fiefs, and the relations among people holding fiefs of one another … to this extent, many aristocracies conceived of themselves in a certain sense as a feudal order. And much of their power, prestige, and authority was believed to stem from their rightful inheritance of fiefs.[341]

Power and domination required justification.[342] Hierarchy had a solution for it: the higher in rank, the closer to God, the Ultimate Distributor of power; hence, the better reason to dominate. Hierarchy elevated prestige and reputation to significant assets of exercising lordly power. Although lordships competed for material resources, they highly valued the rivalry for elite standing, higher ranks and multiplicity of titles (that is, legal claims for domination).

---

[339] Halden, "From Empire," 284.
[340] Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900-1300*, 1997, 259.
[341] Jordan, *Europe in the High Middle Ages*, 15.
[342] Cf. Bernard Arthur Owen Williams, *In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2005), 5.

Ideally all Christendom was expected to follow the papal leadership. The imperial lands were analogically required to respect the emperor's commands. The hierarchical structure of the "international" system presupposed such behaviors. In practice, this structure was, however, distorted. Lords would eschew submitting to orders coming from the higher authority if they were not in their own (and dynastic) interest, unless they were forced to carry them out by the threat of losing more, if they remained defiant, than if they became submissive. Hence, lesser lords would attempt to act as equals to their more powerful peers, downgrading the meaning of hierarchy. On the other hand, lords would shape their political interests by accepting the rules of the game (the very nature of hierarchical structure) and constantly attempting to reach higher ranks, increase prestige and general recognition.

Unlike systemic anarchy, hierarchical structure of the "international" system was a civilizational or cultural imposition (more on this in Chapter 3), which crafted fundamental interests of the units (higher rank; more prestigious title and elite standing; larger domination in terms of manpower and land), and it was used (meaning: recognized as means) for moral justifications of one's claims (authorization from a higher rank creates a just cause which helps to attract allies; denunciation works to the contrary). The same hierarchy by its own force was, however, unable to compel the units to act as any system-wide authority (the pope or emperor) would expect them to behave.

Thinking and reasoning hierarchically (that is, referring to an inherited and customary image of the political realm and its structure) provided rules, limits, and framework of political game. Yet in practice, there were self-regarding "international" units that applied and interpreted them. Hierarchy spoke in the language of honor, which "entailed meanings of right, legal claims and office, as well as status, dignity and reputation."[343] Weiler explained:

The importance of honor highlights basic structural features in the way medieval politics was conducted: honor and the way it was expressed and claimed indicated publicly, to a ruler's or prince's peers and subjects, his status, standing and political clout. Other means of securing and exercising power – military might, financial resources etc. – were to some extent

---

[343] Weiler, "Kings and Sons," 20.

dependent on status for their effectiveness, or they reflected it, but they could not compensate for its lack.[344]

Weiler's study on political culture in England and Germany in the first half of the thirteenth century reinforced my argument about the ambivalent role of hierarchical structure of the "international" system. Lords, who had possessed a certain degree of prestige and honor, would engage in a "discourse of honor" (like Frederick II and his son Henry in their mutual conflict), because stressing the significance of their standing within the ranks of other lords rendered their power more effective and could help them win their cases by attracting compliance of lesser lords.

This practical usefulness of honor and prestige explains why lords would constantly strive to increase their elite standing and why they found the hierarchical structure indispensable. On the other hand, as subjects of greater lords they were strongly tempted to ignore the "discourse of honor", for in their particular position within the hierarchy it made them to submit rather than to rule and dominate. Therefore, they preferred to highlight different means of exercising power, and they stressed due process and legal mechanisms. They would point to other principles than honor, which would protect them from a tyranny of higher authority: 1) the importance of collective rule and stern justice; 2) the protection of those who could not protect themselves.[345]

In short, the political framework, produced by thinking of the "international" system in hierarchical terms, made lords both to compete for higher standings (in order to use the gained prestige for their purposes) and to defend themselves against the more powerful lords who had been already using their authority to subjugate or limit their lordships (in order to remain free from unwanted intrusions into their lordships and therefore be able to act as partners, or counselors, rather than servants of other lords).

Drawing on Bisson's observations (see Chapter 1) and findings made in this Chapter, all this leads to a conclusion that lordships were hierarchically ordered. Lord-kings were customarily perceived as models of genuine lordship. Lord-princes aspired to royal splendor and dignity, for this was considered as the fullness and perfection of human rule in the world.

---

[344] Ibid., 28.
[345] Cf. Weiler, *Kingship*, XIV, 172–173.

Thus, kingship in the thirteenth-century Christian society could not be self-proclaimed. It was either grounded in an "ancient tradition" (for example, England, France, and Germany) or – in case of a precedence or non-established custom – it required an approval of the higher authority, like the emperor (e.g., the confirmation of the Přemyslid royal title by Frederick II in the Golden Bull of Sicily in 1212)[346] or – most often – the pope (e.g., Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Ruthenia, Sicily).[347]

Hierarchy organized forms of interactions between lordships. Personal bonds between lords, established within the system "loyalty for protection", generated claims to overlordship and subjugation, and thus – by introducing ranks among the system's units – it undermined the concept of formal equality between "international" units, which a standard understanding of systemic anarchy would prescribe.

Nevertheless, this hierarchy of ranks and lord-vassal relations was different from a bureaucratic form of hierarchy,[348] conventionally (after Waltz) juxtaposed with anarchy. Lordships remained similar in the nature of their aspirations (claims for domination); they were, however, dissimilar in the scope of those aspirations: the papacy upheld the Christendom-wide pretenses; the emperor was confined to lands recognized as the parts of the empire; lord-kings and lord-princes analogically limited their claims to territories somehow subjected to their authority; down to lord-nobles who controlled not much more than their households. These sometimes overlapping claims for domination provoked tensions and generated conflicts (that derived from the competing legitimacies), but still they did not introduce categorizing lordships functionally. The matter and essence of each lordship was always the same – domination over land and people. Therefore, the theoretical precept about systemic anarchy, which prescribed unanimous nature of "international" agents, was never cancelled, despite the presence of hierarchical ordering.

In other words, the thirteenth-century "international" system in Latin Christendom was a hierarchy of units identical in regard to their nature. More specifically, they sameness in nature did not contradict their being: a) formally differentiated according to hierarchical

---

[346] Jaroslav Pánek and Oldřich Tůma, *A History of the Czech Lands* (Prague: Karolinum Press, 2009), 96.
[347] The pope's contribution to lordship-building processes is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.
[348] In which each element is functionally distinguished from the remainder, that is, its role within the system is clearly determined and varies from the roles of other units.

ranks; and b) materially distinguished in terms of size, wealth and manpower (that is, in regard to the distribution of their capabilities).

It could be therefore expected that lordships, in the way they behaved "internationally", were chiefly preoccupied with fashioning this, what could be molded: their rank and their material resources. In this sense, assuming the realist conviction, lords genuinely strove to maximize their power, that is, to build lordships that would provide for their needs to excel in the midst of Christian society.

Concluding, two claims need to be made.

First, it seems evident that in the "international" system of lordships, which had been existing under a strong pressure of a "unifying" principle, the matter of prestige and standing within one common society gained additional importance; the importance which did not have to be equally present (and valued) in the Waltzian anarchical and predatory system. In the thirteenth-century "international" environment, apart from overly present distrust and suspicion towards each other, as known from numerous conflicts throughout the century, the idea of the Christian society made sense to the contemporaries. Hence, it compelled lords to pursue politics which would particularly promote their elite-standing within the intra-Christian society.

Second, this assertion reveals more about the special significance of titles (and claims to the titles). They acquired extra importance in terms of value and prestige. Over decades of struggle, which took place in the "culture of war"[349] and was accompanied by the progressive nascent of the notion of Christian society and its conceptual dissemination (and thus at times practical application), the titles ordered and positioned separate lordships within the entire system. Some were perceived more favorably than other members of Latin Christendom. This should, however, become more clear by reference to concrete examples.

The matter of prestige and standing requires one more assertion. Lordships at the early stage of institutionalization were most of all controlled by individuals and their houses (dynasties). They did not function as abstract entities as far as modern states do. Although the reputation of a state plays a role in the contemporary international system, it cannot be as

---

[349] Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, 61.

easily ascribed to a state as it seems to permeate and influence a more private form of power: lordship. Lordships were customarily ruled by individuals, who had claimed descent from certain families. In the thirteenth century, more and more members of ruling elites equaled the good lordship with a collective effort (providing aid and counsel: *consilium et auxilium*) and became gradually deeper and deeper conscious of the need to constraint princely will; [350] therefore, the ruling families, in order to govern, had to greater extent than before secure the will to co-operate of their elite-subjects: the nobles.[351] Since lordships had been already operating within the conceptual and practical realization of the Christian society for a longer period, the ruling families could additionally profit from accommodating the society's principles and thus, build their prestige and more favorable position in it. Collecting titles was precisely means of enhancing such standing.

Ultimately, the hierarchical order of the "international" system, acknowledged by its units, was an important pillar of this system. It shaped some of vital interests of units by creating a non-alternative concept of organizing human affairs in the world. It identified principles, which were deemed valuable, and conceived a sense of its righteousness in the minds of the contemporaries. Hierarchy was accepted as a divine product that was worked out in the entire creation; it was therefore assumed that the best way to introduce peace and order into humankind was to "copy" this hierarchical model of creation and "paste" it to human society.

Anarchical component

It is never enough to repeat that arguing for anarchical "international" system in the thirteenth century does not immediately imply disorder, lawlessness, violence, and war all against all. To be sure, the hierarchical component of the system was constantly in gear and prevented the collapse of any order among lordships. However, the system remained anarchical as long as there was no single and effective power center that could provide Latin Christendom-wide governance. Due to the lack of such supreme authority, which would be

---

[350] Weiler, following Reynolds, observed: *the collectivization of royal lordship, in the sense that the governance of the realm was a joint undertaking of the monarch acting in co-operation and consultation with his leading nobles and prelates, was not a new concept, but one which, in the course of the thirteenth century, had become more formalized and was invoked with increasing frequency and in relation to an ever wider range of issues:* Weiler, "Kings and Sons," 27.

[351] Colin Morris succinctly commented that the thirteenth century was "a time of growing consultation": Morris, *The Papal Monarchy*, 552.

capable of policing violent interactions between lordships, the ultimate care for lordships' security and well-being remained in their own hands. Such "international" environment induced self-seeking practices and distrust, for each unit had to count on its own capabilities to defend itself. And this environment of self-regard and suspicion generated anarchical international system.

Existing hierarchy of titles and prestige did not imply that any lord-king, due to his higher standing, was entitled to command a lord-prince or lord-count. Neighboring lords (that is, those not engaged in any form of formal lord-vassal allegiance) practically interacted as equals, ritual expressions of honor and prestige notwithstanding. Lesser lords struggled to minimize real consequences of any form of overlordship and to maximize their own domination, whereas greater lords followed the same strategy yet at another hierarchical level.

Units equality and their parallel hierarchical interdependence mingled, because lordships – as organized as in the thirteenth century – were fairly inefficient (an ability which came with growing degree of institutional complexity) and the exercise of power remained practically limited. Imposing hierarchical structures aimed at promoting and securing co-operation of units, for other modes of winning loyalty and support were undersized. Lords were equals when they formed coalitions, struck marriage contracts, and acquired revenues from their lordships. They were equals on the battlefield and at the negotiations table, that is, the hierarchy of titles and ranks did not have to affect the course of peace talks or the outcome of a combat. Conflicting sides equally claimed just causes and named their opponents as treacherous and wicked, despite possible hierarchical distinctions. Lords could always ignore any claims for overlordship coming from other lords, if they believed they could resist the consequences. They were also ready to defend prerogatives and competences which they had previously acquired or had asserted as theirs since time immemorial. Consequently, lords – if only felt confident enough – would defy any authority, no matter how high hierarchically positioned, should their rights (that is, their morally weighted just cause) be menaced.

Lords-neighbors interacted as equals. In case of lord-vassal relations, the best fitting analogy, which stresses the concept and practice of collective rule, would view them as forms of sustained alliances. Swearing oaths and promising loyal service was a mode of declaring co-operation under certain conditions. In a sense, a lordship was always a type of an alliance

between a greater lord and leader, and individual lesser lords who agreed to join forces in order to maximize their own lordship. Lord-subjects were formally unequal with their overlord but only as long as their power could not match their overlord's. In changed conditions they would immediately act as equals again.

Lords accepted the hierarchical discourse of the thirteenth-century Christian society and assimilated its principles, because they interpreted their actions in moral terms of good and evil, and they recognized honor, prestige and social standing as of considerable and separate value (from immediate material gains). This could happen because the "international" system strongly linked the exercise of lordly material power with the degree of moral authority cherished by this lord.

Furthermore, lordships did not constitute a Europe-wide empire. Claims of universal authority, made by the popes, did not correspond with their real application. Although the formal differentiation of units according to degrees of authority existed (since units claimed various ranges of jurisdiction), the "international" practice proved its inefficiency and significant lack of resources to implement it. The system attempted to function as centralized but this centralization occurred chiefly at the level of subscribing to common political culture rather than at the level of political action. [352] Politically, economically and militarily the system

---

[352] As noted above, the papacy strongly aspired to play this role of supreme center of power in Latin Christendom but in practical terms it was too weak to act Europe-wide independently, that is, without recourse to the material support of lord-kings or lord-princes. Although in the late thirteenth century the annual Church income from tithes is estimated to reach approx. 800,000 pounds, which was three times as much as the annual revenues of the kingdom of France (approx. 264,000 pounds) [cf.: Heinz Thomas, *Deutsche Geschichte des Spätmittelalters 1250-1500* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1983), 118,] the wealthiest monarchy in Europe at the close of the thirteenth century, the former numbers do not stand for the papal budget as the latter indicate the assets of the French king. Moreover, raising an army of 15,000 to 25,000 men strong, of which 1,500 to 2,000 are fully armed knights, and equipping it for crusade purposes (as Louis IX did in the 1240s) was impossibly expensive; according to modern calculations the total cost of such enterprise nearly equaled the bi-annual Church income from tithes [cf.: William C. Jordan, "The Capetians from the Death of Philip II to Philip IV," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, ed. David Abulafia, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 290.] The papal world-government by no means could afford to deploy military power that would have capabilities to control European lordships by backing its resolutions with significant material power. Canning has mentioned an eloquent anecdote that neatly expressed this shortcomings of papal power. According to this anecdote, current in England at the time of the quarrel between the pope and the king of France in the turn of the fourteenth century, Philip's chancellor and ambassador to the pope, Pierre Flotte, said to Boniface: "Your power is verbal, ours however, is real" [cf.: Canning, *Ideas of Power*, 2011, 12.] The papal authority was grounded first and foremost in the compliance of the Christian society to the moral and religious principles as put forward by the pope. It also found backing in the special role of the papal office, which it gained from the middle of the eleventh century and manifested its mature form throughout the thirteenth century. Whalen, however, asserted that even then "Rome had never possessed an exclusive monopoly on dreams of a unified Christian world" [cf.: Whalen, *Dominion of God*, 230.] The unique and consolidating role of the papacy was still asserted in the early fifteenth century, and this time in very practical dimension, as one Turkish leader told his people that: *Since the Franks have two popes, I do not fear to make war against them; when there is one pope, however, it will behoove me to make peace with them* [Ibid., 226.]

was undoubtedly multi-polar,[353] and populated with lordships that formed, or were themselves, alliances of greater and lesser lords.

The Latin Christendom-wide government, therefore, was a semi-effective design. The papacy wielded influential (and nowadays rather incomparable to anything else) power of ideas, which was convincing and attractive to Christian society; moreover, it was generally recognized as right and just. This soft power,[354] however, as strong as it was, was not accompanied with a comparatively stout hard power, which was able to threaten and police defiant lordships. To be sure, this soft power, a sort of unparalleled moral authority, could encourage other lords to act in the pope's interest (and hence produce a real threat to a resisting party), but again – the pope did not retain the monopoly in the moral sphere, for other ecclesiastical lords did preserve and claim it for themselves. Consequently, the papal hold of Latin Christendom was too weak to be adequately called a common government. It could be possibly argued that the pope's Europe-wide lordship was relatively less effective than the lordships of other greater lords (like kings of Aragon, England, and France or Sicily).

Hierarchy and Anarchy in Interplay

On the whole, there is a strong evidence behind the claim that lordships existed in an anarchical environment: they never surrendered their arms and accepted the monopoly of coercive power and violence from a single overlord; they never "signed" a social contract to enable a supreme state-formation to exclusively settle their disputes and restore peace and order. In this sense, they did not become citizens of such a polity (like the "Papal Empire") as the modern understanding would imply. Lords remained armed and dedicated to their, and apparently their closest families', well-being.

Setting aside the theoretical concept of systemic anarchy that defines the natural conditions of lordly interactions, it has to be asserted that lords themselves did not perceive the nature created by God as an anarchical environment. Unlike contemporary theorists, lords saw rather a hierarchical order; hence, they did not comprehend human society as an endless

---

[353] Cf. the three dimensional chessboard proposed as power pattern in the world: Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), XV.

[354] Jeffrey Haynes used Joseph Nye's definition of soft power (*If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place – in short, if my behavior is determined by an observable but intangible attraction – soft power is at work. Soft power uses a different type of currency – not force, not money – to engender cooperation. It uses an attraction to shared values, and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values*) considered religion as a possible form of soft power: cf. Jeffrey Haynes, *Introduction to International Relations and Religion* (Harlow: Pearson, 2007), 42.

"war of all against all" as Hobbes put it. They would rather see conflict and war as a result of sin against God.

Order and justice prevailed as aspiration of lordly power because they reflected the divine order imbedded in nature. Hierarchy was divine, anarchy – as opposed to hierarchy – was ungodly. Therefore, the state of nature was order, not – as suggested in centuries to come – anarchy. Human society functioned not to overcome the state of nature but rather – assuming Augustine's terminology – to reassure its restoration in the city of God. This is why hierarchy could not be simply downgraded to a matter of discourse and abandoned as an insignificant element of lordly schizophrenia. In other words, lords were armed and susceptible to violent politics, but as a model of the social order they took hierarchy.

Neorealists, who advanced the concept of systemic anarchy (like Waltz), would probably answer that this hierarchical model was norm yet violence and aggression were practice. They would comply that the divinely inspired form of human society was widespread throughout Europe and made sense to minds of the contemporaries; however, they would also indicate that lords were never friends, because they could hardly trust each other.[355] This type of endemic anarchy excludes the existence of international society, because international units are irrevocably suspicious one to another, and thus facilitating any form of international cooperation is a very difficult challenge. This anarchy in its pure form presumes also that units will never disarm, as – according to modern concepts – humans did (by accepting social contract), and submit to a world government. As a result, they will always face each other in fear of aggression and seek to build up their power, balance threats, and form security- and profit-related alliances.

Nevertheless, despite prevailing anarchical structure of the thirteenth-century "international" system, lordships formed a sort of "international" society. They did not build a Latin Christendom-wide government; yet they worked out common political culture (including values and principles) and shared the concept of "international" order.

---

[355] Even lord-sons were inclined to rebel against their lord-fathers (for instance, Henry the Young King against Henry II of England in 1173; King Henry against Emperor Frederick II in 1234; Duke Steven against Béla IV of Hungary in the 1260s; Duke Sancho against Alfonso X of Castile in 1282). See: Weiler, "Kings and Sons" and Attila Zsoldos, "Az ifjabb király országa," *Századok* 139 (2005): 231–60.

By imposing hierarchical structures they came up with self-governing abilities (swearing oaths; issuing charters; performing rituals; establishing personal bonds of fealty and mutual help); they voluntarily submitted to these principles by process of inheriting and interpreting their political culture; they sought order and justice but did not fully give up a prerogative to define what was right and just; they all acknowledged the authority of God above them. This authority was elusive enough to prevent the construction of a super-state (like Biblical kingdoms of David and Salomon), but it was sufficiently palpable to stimulate self-government and somewhat bridle the consequences of anarchical environment they lived in.[356]

Lordships simply could not afford to trust nobody, as the model of systemic anarchy assumes, because lords were not as self-sufficient as modern states. They practically functioned as alliances tied up by the bonds of fealty. In order to survive and pursue their interests, they had no alternative but to cooperate. The self-governing Christian society they had formed provided concepts (hierarchy; divine order; moral principles; lordship) and means (oath; just war; *auxilium et consilium*) to secure and facilitate such cooperation. It also produced an environment in which political interests were forged.[357]

---

[356] Fischer listed the consequences of anarchical environment and claimed that the structure of anarchy: 1) constrains states to control natural and human resources in order to procure military forces sufficient to deter potential aggressors; 2) constraints states to arm and form alliances in accordance with the distribution of capabilities with the aim of balancing each other's war-making potential; 3) when balancing is not available, weaker states are forced to submit to stronger ones, thereby forming spheres of influence under the aegis of the latter; 4) when a threatened state refuses to submit to an aggressor and fails to deter it militarily, war breaks out; 5) unable to trust each other's present and future intentions, states generally fail to co-operate, since the exchange of goods and services entail a relative loss to their power. Cf.: Fischer, "Feudal Europe," Spring 1992, 429. Most of these behaviors could be noticed among lordships. Warfare and violent conflicts erupted nearly constantly throughout Europe. Military expeditions were often necessary to confirm otherwise peacefully negotiated solutions. Lordships could not afford raising standing armies but they were genuinely dedicated to increase their efficiency in collecting revenues and enlarging their manpower. Since the system was multi-polar, lords usually entered temporary alliances and were ready to reshuffle them at need.

[357] Conflicts over lands and subjects could be easily explained by the neorealist (Fischer's) pattern. Other types of conflicts, and political phenomena, make less sense without a recourse to the principles of the "international" society of lordships (for instance, crusades; papal prerogatives; dynastic marriages; emergence, disappearance and reconfiguration of lordships etc.) Moreover, the problem of survival, central to the neorealist logic of systemic anarchy, cannot be well-addressed in a standard manner, because it is undefined what would be the subject of the survival imperative: the lord? His family? His lordship? His eternal soul? Waltz's emphasis on material survival of international units derived from his conviction that states were the long-living actors on the international stage; nonetheless, lordships, in general, were more personal (and individually crafted) to endure unchanged for long and thus, the problem of their survival requires additional reflection. It can be stated here that only the process of institutionalization (as delineated by Bisson) detached lordships from power-holders and transformed them into more abstract entities which could claim eternal existence.

Concluding, it is virtually impossible to discern what ultimately shaped the behavior of lordships in the thirteenth-century "international" system in the first place.

On the level of political culture and discourse the ordering principle was hierarchy, and undoubtedly it was a powerful stimulant. It was responsible for creating political "imagination" of the actors, who were humans, and not abstract entities (like states are). It defined the meaning of power, wealth, honor and prestige, and affected the understanding of survival. On top of that it delivered concepts and means to procure cooperation and determined the nature of political goals. It failed, however, to provide a Latin Christendom-wide government which would efficiently sustain peace, order and stability. It managed to instill a sense of unity and community among the lords, and thus created an "international" society with remarkable abilities to self-government.

On the level of individual lordships, weaknesses of the fallen human nature strongly affected the behavior of monarchically-structured lordships. In a sense, the first and second "image of international relations" were intertwined more strongly than in case of modern states. The structure of the "international" system (the third image) remained anarchical, for lords never disarmed to submit their disputes and conflicts to one overlord. Systemic anarchy prevailed, with distrust, fear, violence, and self-regard, and surely antagonized and affected lords' behavior. But these fears were channeled and articulated through the political culture. The anarchical structure did impede the possibilities of cooperation between lords but never destroyed them completely.

In my opinion, the adequate elucidation arrives when anarchy is mediated by hierarchy.

CHAPTER 3. DETERMINING LORDLY IDENTITY – WŁADYSŁAW ŁOKIETEK'S CASE (1260-1300)

Introduction

This chapter takes upon the conclusions made in Chapter 2 that suggested hierarchical and culture-driven factors to be formative for the thirteenth-century "international" units. It attempts to acknowledge and determine the impact of political culture on how lords shaped their interests, motivations and behaviors while interacting with each other. More specifically, it asks how Władysław Łokietek became an informed player on the "international" stage and strive to demonstrate into what sort of international system Łokietek was born? The logic of this chapter presupposes that surveying the "international" sub-system of the Polish lands and their adjacent neighborhoods in search for lordly routinized practices and patterns of behavior will provide a framework for contextualizing Łokietek's "international" agenda in Chapter 5 that particularly deals with the origins of the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320.

In other words, in this chapter I assume that Łokietek learnt to act as lord chiefly by observation, emulation and participation; the process that can be called "socialization to politics". This socialization implied for Łokietek to acquire certain social roles and culturally-informed needs, principles and values in order to be socially recognized as a member of the ruling elite. Namely, Łokietek was strongly expected to internalize and interact with lordly identity as it inter-subjectively functioned in the society.

Making reference to the concept of lordly identity (as put forward in Chapter 1), the following chapter surveys "international" behaviors of the Piast dukes, their neighbors and their lord-subjects throughout the thirteenth century, in order to provide and document the essential content of what it stood for lordly identity. It is, therefore, not about Łokietek's personal characteristics and individual traits but about his inter-subjective role that he was most likely to play in the society, if he wanted to retain the elite standing he inherited after his father.

Ultimately, this chapter argues for essential "otherness" of the thirteenth-century "international" politics as compared to modern notions and standards. By bringing into the picture the culturally-driven hierarchical ordering principle of the "international" system and by seeking to establish the content of lordly identity, the chapter recognizes the significance of the unique "rules of the game" (as they made sense to the thirteenth-century lords) and tries to establish an interpretative framework for elucidating adequately – that is, more on the well-researched grounds and less on the basis of currently held convictions about how international politics operates – the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320.

Socialization to Politics

The Waltzian neorealism assumed that the structural anarchy, that is, the absence of a system-wide government, compels international units – independently from their leaders' characteristics and their internal political system – to pursue self-seeking politics predominantly concerned about relative gains and maximization of power. The lack of effective system-wide authority instills distrust between international agents and hence impedes possible cooperation. As a result, conflict at the international level erupts, in a sense, due to natural causes, that is, the international environment is *per force* hostile to all its members and does not leave much room for non-threat driven behaviors.

Nevertheless, the analysis carried out in Chapter 2 revealed that the anarchy-hierarchy dichotomy, proposed by Waltz's model and quite popular with IR scholars of various theoretical denominations, does not suffice to provide well-grounded explanation of the thirteenth-century "international" mechanisms. Leaving aside the medieval sophisticated reflection about power, and judging solely from the vantage point that embraced political practice throughout the century, it became clear that there was no Latin Christendom-wide government (and thus system-level anarchy prevailed) but – at the same time – this anarchical fabric of the "international" system was strongly mitigated by the dominating political culture, which promoted hierarchy; yet in a different form that was not taken by Waltz. This hierarchy was not similar to domestic structures of government that impose functional differentiation by introducing separate agencies to pursue specific goals within the system. This hierarchy was not, therefore, an effect of progressive sophistication of state's administration, rationally invented and developed by human factor.

Quite the opposite, the hierarchy that dominated the thirteenth-century "international" environment was perceived as God-given in the first place, then customary and inherited from the ancestors. This hierarchy was, therefore, far more than a bureaucratic invention; it functioned rather as a cultural context and framework for anarchical (self-seeking and power-building-centered) practices. Hence, the anarchy-hierarchy dichotomy was not enough to elucidate motivations and behaviors of "international" units (lordships); a third "hybrid" way is needed that will compromise and allow for a mode of coexistence between the anarchical structure that engendered distrust, self-regard, and conflict; and the hierarchical culture that provided building blocks for creating political interests, promoted ways of establishing peace and order, and nurtured ideas necessary to rekindle trust and will to cooperate.

My fundamental assumption for this analysis comes from Waltz's useful observations about the "three images of international relations".[358] He was right to claim that 1) in order to understand actors behavior on the international level, it is not sufficient to focus on personal characteristics of political leaders and trace their motivations down to the fallen human nature; 2) state's political system will not provide satisfactory answers and 3) examining the structure of the international environment could deliver interesting insights about why actors behave in a particular manner. On the virtue of my research done so far, however, I do not think that reducing the explanation of "international" mechanisms solely to the influence coming from the international anarchy will genuinely say a few but important things about the thirteenth-century "international" system in Latin Christendom.

Following stricktly this model would allow me to assert that Władysław Łokietek, once he entered into politics, engaged in conflictual and self-regarding power politics by striving to maximize his power and thus secure his and his family's survival and material welfare (for in anarchical conditions no real alternative of such behaviors exists). Nevertheless, this model significantly limits room for answers how "power", "security", "survival", and hence the political interest as such, could be defined in the thirteenth-century context. By emphasizing anarchical structure of international system, the model reduces non-structural elements and practices that could have impact on actors' behavior. My assumption is, therefore, that the threesome: 1) human nature; 2) an internal structure of lordship; and 3) the principally

---

[358] Cf. discussion on the realist tradition in Chapter 1.

anarchical structure of the "international" system did not fully determined Łokietek and Charles I's agency at the "international" level. There was an important aspect of socialization to politics that played a vital role in shaping their identities and interests as lords.

This chapter, therefore, builds on the constructivist concept of lordly identity[359] and enquires what can be identified as these interest-shaping forces. At its outset, I would also presuppose the answer: it was the "contextualized (or routinized) practice". Behind this vague term hides a conviction that Łokietek learnt arcana of politics by osmosis; in other words, by absorption of what he observed among his peers. I argue that political practices and examples he could witness: principles, means, methods, strategies, and goals, and the entire mindset how to think about "international" matters; they all constituted factors that provided a pool of political choices, suggested algorithms of behavior, and crafted interests and laid foundations for dynastic and political identities.

The scope of my inquiry is chronologically confined to the years before 1300. It was a moment when Łokietek went through a significant turning point in his lordly career. In that year Wenceslas II of Bohemia marched into the Polish lands, suppressed resistance here and there, expelled Łokietek and deprived him of his domains.[360] Łokietek's situation was so desperate that Tomasz Jurek described him as "politically bankrupt".[361] While the Polish duke was seeking refuge in Ruthenia,[362] Wenceslas II made himself crowned king of Poland.[363] All in all, in 1300 forty-year-old Łokietek[364] found himself for the first time in the most disconcerting position of a landless high-born threatened by the power of the Přemyslids and unsure about

---

[359] See relevant part in Chapter 1.

[360] Dąbrowski, "Z czasów Łokietka. Studia nad stosunkami polsko-węgierskimi w XIV w. Część I," 300.

[361] Tomasz Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa Polskiego książę głogowski Henryk (1274-1309)* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Avalon, 2006), 95.

[362] As can be argued on the ground that in 1302 Łokietek with the Ruthenians organized an incursion to Little Poland, and there is no reliable evidence about what he precisely did in the years 1300-1302: cf. August Bielowski, ed., "Rocznik Małopolski, 965-1415," in *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, vol. 3 (Lwów: w komisie Księg. Gubrynowicza i Schmidta, 1878), 186.

[363] Tomasz Pietras, *"Krwawy wilk z pastorałem": biskup krakowski Jan zwany Muskatą* (Warszawa: Semper, 2001), 54.

[364] Kazimierz Jasiński established Łokietek's date of birth on the year 1260. Cf. Kazimierz Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów małopolskich i kujawskich* (Poznań; Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Historyczne, 2001), 117–118. Thus, in 1300 Łokietek was already quite experienced in conducting "international" politics, for as a "young duke", he was mentioned for the first time in Bolesław the Pious's charter of August 7, 1273, as a party together with his mother Eufrozyna in a contention against the Teutonic Knights: Ignacy Zakrzewski, ed., *Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski*, vol. 1 (Poznań: Nakł. Bibl. Kórnickiej, 1877), n. 450. His first known charter was issued on May 1, 1275: cf. Alojzy Preissner, "Dokumenty Władysława Łokietka. Chronologiczny spis, regesty i bibliografia edycji," *Rocznik Biblioteki PAN w Krakowie* 11 (1965): 197.

the future. To balance this picture it is worth mentioning that at same time twelve-year-old[365] Charles I made a decisive step into the "international" politics.

Setting the Scene – the Origins of Ducal Lordships in the Polish Lands

In 1138 Duke Bolesław the Wrymouth of Poland divided his lordship into smaller entities and distributed them between his sons. As Uruszczak observed, this division was well justified due to the inefficiency of ducal power over extensive territories and was triggered by claims to rule raised by junior members of the Piast dynasty, and yet was also supported by local lesser lords who looked forward to benefiting from more direct access to a duke.[366] Uruszczak asserted that the juniors did not claim neither the state nor its territory (as if – like claims the common concept of the "patrimonial monarchy" that dominates the modern Polish historiography – they owned it according to the property law)[367] but merely their right to exercise power.[368] In Bisson's terms the division of 1138, as numerous others earlier and later, occurred due to the juniors' claims to lordship perceived as the embodiment of high-status and nobility (the powerfulness).

Fragmentation done by Duke Bolesław the Wrymouth was by no means unique in its idea; what was special about it was that it remained irreversible for next approx. hundred-eighty years. Moreover, it initiated a process of division which from one duke of Poland in 1138 led to eight dukes ruling in the Polish lands (only the current power-holders considered) when Władysław Łokietek was born. To him, therefore, the practice of division and existence of local principalities was a primary experience, whereas the concept of the unified Poland was no more than a distant memory.

There was another reason that made Bolesław the Wrymouth's divide of 1138 exceptional. After having defeated his brother, Bolesław was the only duke of Poland and it could be argued that the hierarchical principle of overlordship appeared natural to him. As a result, not only did he intend to provide each of his sons with a decent lordship but he thought

---

[365] He was born in 1288: Gyula Kristó and Ferenc Makk, *Károly Róbert emlékezete* (Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó, 1988), 7.

[366] Wacław Uruszczak, *Historia państwa i prawa polskiego (966-1795)* (Warsaw: Oficyna Wolters Kluwer Polska, 2010), 66.

[367] Cf. Jacek Matuszewski, "Polska monarchia patrymonialna - opis średniowiecznej rzeczywistości czy produkt dziewiętnastowiecznej historiografii?," in *Król w Polsce XIV i XV wieku*, ed. Andrzej Marzec and Maciej Wilamowski (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego "Societas Vistulana," 2006), 137–53. See also: Wacław Uruszczak, "Następstwo tronu w księstwie krakowsko-sandomierskim i Królestwie Polskim (1180-1370)," *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne* 62, no. 1 (2010): 15–36.

[368] Uruszczak, *Historia państwa*, 66.

of creating a system which would preserve the prerogatives of his own office. If all sons would only receive their parts, there was no place for a lord named "duke of Poland". To avoid this end, Bolesław the Wrymouth introduced what is now called the "principate", that is, he designated the oldest member of his descendants as the overseer of his younger brothers, and equipped him, apart from a hereditary territorial allowance, with the so-called "seniorial province" (presumably the central strip of land from Little Poland with Cracow in the south through Cuiavia to Gdańsk-Pomerania in the north) and additional privileges that were to guarantee the meta-unity of Bolesław the Wrymouth's duchy and to tie up separate lord-dukes to their ancestors' legacy.[369] This principate-system was challenged within a couple of years, when the senior brother was exiled and never again he resumed his office of overseer. Over next decades the system gradually withered and ultimately failed.[370]

Bronisław Nowacki, while setting out the social and political context which laid foundations for Przemysł II's (d. 1296) political actions, asserted:

In the period of provincial disintegration of Poland, and almost from its beginnings, one can observe two distinct yet contradictory tendencies of political development of Poland. The first aimed at deepening and sustaining the state's divisions by making attempts not to recognize the established rules of the political system of principate. The second tendency, which could be called 'legalistic', strove to maintain the political unity of the state by standing firmly at the principate system. This was the reason that in the twelfth and almost entire thirteenth centuries any actions towards unifying lands and provinces of disintegrated Poland were ephemeral. … Main factors were: the lack of interest in unification projects showed by

---

[369] For more details see: Ibid., 57, 66.

[370] Sławomir Gawlas, who followed Janusz Bieniak's research findings, claimed that in 1138 the duchy of Poland was not divided into a number of hereditary principalities and that Bolesław the Wrymouth's statute was principally aimed at securing better succession mechanisms. Power in the duchy of Poland was considered as the property of the Piast dynasty and the "senior", the oldest male representative of the ruling family, preserved the highest authority as the grand duke. Gawlas asserted that the "principate" functioned for several decades and pointed that some highest offices remained Poland-wide, for instance the rank of voivode survived until ca. 1180. Junior dukes ruled in separate provinces but generally consented to the grand duke's prerogatives. Gawlas's objections to the initial hereditary status of juniors' allowances do not affect my argument. The political practice, as Gawlas himself observed, revealed universal ducal agendas to consider their allowances as hereditary in order to provide their sons, that is the new generation of the Piasts, with adequate lordships. What is important in Gawlas's perspective is yet another evidence that the dynasty claimed its natural right to control and dominate the Polish lands. The matter of the form of this domination (monarchy or poliarchy) was secondary. See: Sławomir Gawlas, *O kształt zjednoczonego Królestwa: niemieckie władztwo terytorialne a geneza społecznoustrojowej odrębności Polski* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo DiG, 1996), 78–79.

the majority of the provincial Piast dukes and similar lack of support of the idea of unification expressed by social forces that had had influence on political matters of the country.[371]

The political system of principate did not survive long but the idea of overlordship carried out by a senior Piast continued almost to the mid-thirteenth century. Duke Konrad of Mazovia (d. 1247) has been considered by Polish historiography as the last protagonist of the system, for he deliberately crafted his "international" politics in accordance to the system's fundamental principle that linked the overlordship of a senior member of the Piast dynasty with his rule in the land (province) of Cracow.[372]

Principal Identity – the Lordship-Imperative

There was, however, another principle among the Piasts that upheld its validity throughout the entire thirteenth century. The principle drew from customary political practice and required that every grown-up and male member of the dynasty was to become a lord by receiving a lordship, that is, a piece of territory to rule. In order to identify this unwritten element of the Polish political system, I analyzed[373] the biographies of all Piasts whose dates of birth or death fell into the thirteenth century, and who lived – according to the extant sources – for twelve years or more (the earliest supposed moment of entering adulthood).[374] I searched them in order to confirm or discard my intuition that the overwhelming majority of male Piasts that were born or died in the given period managed to establish their lordships. My criterion for confirmation was quite weak, that is, I put into one box all Piasts who had been ever attested to rule or co-rule in a separate land or province.

The outcome of my analysis was rather telling. There were seventy-five male individuals of the Piast dynasty whose biographies happened to be linked with the thirteenth

---

[371] *W okresie rozbicia dzielnicowego w Polsce obserwujemy, niemal od jego początków, dwie wyraźnie przeciwstawne tendencje rozwoju politycznego kraju. Pierwsza zmierzała do pogłębiania i utrwalania podziału państwa, co wyrażało się dążeniami do nierespektowania ustanowionych zasad ustroju pryncypackiego. Druga tendencja, można powiedzieć – legalistyczna, poprzez trwanie na bazie zasad wynikających z ustanowionej zasady pryncypackiej, starała się zachować jedność polityczną państwa. W tym leży przyczyna, że w XII i niemal całym XIII w. działania na rzecz jednoczenia dzielnic rozdrobnionej Polski dawały zaledwie krótkotrwałe rezultaty. ... Głównymi czynnikami były: brak większego zainteresowania problemem jednoczenia Polski ze strony większości piastowskich książąt dzielnicowych oraz brak poparcia idei zjednoczeniowych przez siły społeczne mające wpływ na sprawy polityczne kraju* [translation mine]: Bronisław Nowacki, *Przemysł II: odnowiciel Korony Polskiej: (1257-1296)* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Avalon, 2007), 19.

[372] Ibid., 22.

[373] For my analysis I used the data collected here: Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*.

[374] Cf. Walerian Sobociński, "Historia rządów opiekuńczych w Polsce," *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne* 2 (1949): 248–263. See also: Wiszewski, *Henryk II Pobożny*, 94.

century and who lived twelve years at least. From their number there were only four known cases (3%) that a Piast did not receive any lordship. Such situation never occurred in Great Poland, Little Poland and among the Piasts of Cuiavia. There were three cases in Silesia (Bolesław, Duke Henry the Bearded's son, died in 1206/08; Bolko II, Duke Bolko I of Jawor and Świdnica's son, died in 1300; and Jerzy, Duke Casimir of Bytom and Kozielsk's son, died between 1327 and 1355) and one in Mazovia (Siemomysł, Duke Konrad of Mazovia's son, died in 1241). Of this group three Piasts, Bolesław, Bolko II and Siemomysł, had two things in common: 1) they did not live longer than 20 years, and 2) they died while their fathers were still alive. Only Jerzy's is an exceptional case, because he lived well into adulthood but the extant data about him has been so scarce that almost nothing could be said in regard to his life and deeds.[375] In short, three out of four Piasts passed away prematurely and it is possible that by the time of their death their fathers had not yet decided to share with them a part of their own lordship. Such practice that sons had to wait for their father's death to split his lordship into smaller entities was not unusual. Furthermore, Bolesław and Bolko were first-borns[376] and at least in their case it could be argued that should they have lived longer, they would have been granted a proper lordship.

Assuming this perspective would allow for a speculation that only one out of the seventy-five Piasts (0,75%) for some mysterious reason (that is, unrevealed by sources) was deprived of his share in power. There are three other instances, in which the Piasts did not become lord-princes but lord-bishops (Archbishop Władysław of Salzburg, Duke Henry the Pious's son, died in 1270; and brothers: Archbishop Bolesław of Esztergom, died in 1328, and Bishop Mieszko of Veszprem, died in 1344, who both were sons of Duke Casimir of Bytom). Although they did not have a share in their ancestral legacy, undoubtedly they exercised another form of lordship.

In the early twelfth century, in his chronicle, Gallus Anonymous used a term "domini naturales" in order to defend and strengthen the dynastic rights of the Piasts to rule over Poland. The term implied that they had overseen the Polish lands since the time immemorial

---

[375] Kazimierz Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich: Piastowie wrocławscy, legnicko-brzescy, świdniccy, ziębiccy, głogowscy, żagańscy, oleśniccy, opolscy, cieszyńscy i oświęcimscy*, ed. Tomasz Jurek (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Avalon, 2007), 532–533.

[376] Cf. about Bolko: Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 579. Regarding Bolesław see: Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, 99–101.

and hence their lordship was both customary and reassured by hereditary laws. Besides, Gallus indicated that the dynasty of the Polish lords originated from Piast who had been selected to govern by God.[377] In his view, any attempt to strip the natural lords of their power would lead to a disaster.[378] Interestingly, Wincenty Kadłubek who wrote his widely-read chronicle in the turn of the thirteenth century did not focus anymore on emphasizing the Piasts' rights to domination in Poland. Apparently, by his time they were unquestionable; instead, Wincenty concentrated on setting out principles and norms of good and just rule, and even insisted that moral qualifications came first before inborn privileges.[379] Nevertheless, the domination in Poland seemed well imbedded in the society of the Polish lands as the prerogative of the Piasts. As my brief study above showed, nearly all Piasts throughout the entire thirteenth century (and beyond) succeeded to put this general and customary principle into practice.

In the thirteenth century the Piasts were undeniably lords who maintained noble status by birth and custom. Therefore, Łokietek's fundamental lordly identity, into which he was born, was that of a lord. Judging from aspirations and practices of other members of the dynasty, he could think of himself as predestined to rule and dominate. This innate noble qualification, however, did not automatically guarantee complete satisfaction about the size and scope of his prospective lordship. This was only the matter of his actions and further developments at the "international" stage. An important limitation he could possibly encounter was that his best chances for carving out his own lordship were confined to the Polish lands; the Piasts did not practically have experience in exporting their lordships beyond territories inherited from their forefathers and establishing them in new locations (unlike, for instance, the Angevins, Árpáds, Normans, Plantagenets, and Přemyslids to name a few).

---

[377] Ewa A. Mądrowska, *Domini naturales: portrety polskich władców w "Chronicon Polonorum" Mistrza Wincentego* (Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, 2010), 19–20; 67–68. Przemysław Wiszewski explained: *It is generally accepted that the phrase "domini naturales" should be identified with the Piasts. It is more difficult to answer the question why the chronicler using the present conjunctive is addressing in this sentence to his readers, among whom would have been those who had "not kept the faith". … the reader should remember the close relationship between the presence at the head of the community of a member of the dynasty which by the grace of God was in rule, and the wellbeing of the country*: Przemysław Wiszewski, *Domus Bolezlai: Values and Social Identity in Dynastic Traditions of Medieval Poland (c. 966-1138)* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 220–221.

[378] Gallus Anonymus, *Kronika polska*, ed. Marian Plezia, trans. Roman Grodecki (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1965), XLIV–XLV.

[379] Mądrowska, *Domini naturales*, 68.

Assuming and sustaining the lordship-imperative, the thirteenth century in the Polish lands and their neighborhood was a period of intense lordship building. Lordship projects were ubiquitous and were carried out on various levels of medieval hierarchical society. Starting from the top, members of ruling dynasties attempted to expand and strengthen their power and domination by means of expansion, subjugation, intermarriage and by seizing royal titles. Ecclesiastical lords sought to free themselves from bondages that traditionally tied them to dukes by implementing the principles of the Gregorian reform that laid much emphasis on securing, confirming and defending the Church's liberties and privileges (which on the whole boiled down to curving out separate bishop-lordships). There were nobles who strove to find some room for themselves in the density of ducal lordships by collecting tax and legal exemptions, and receiving authorization for erecting castles. Finally, there were "newcomers" to the "international" stage, that is, non-established individuals and corporations that engaged in the lordship-building politics. Łokietek *per force* was from the beginning submerged into this "international" system of lordship-seeking and lordship-securing actors.[380]

Łokietek's lordship-building

Łokietek's earliest personal experience with lordship-building practices occurred in his closest family milieu and was related to the succession developments that took place in the central regions of Poland, which had been recognized as the lands controlled by Łokietek's father. Over decades the course of events turned out fairly favorable for Łokietek who managed to build a lordship, which elevated him to a higher "international" standing that he could have originally expected, by means of the peaceful accumulation of lands inherited after his heirless brothers.

---

[380] Gawlas's comparative study, which focused on developments of lordships in the eastern parts of the German empire as a platform for tracking social and economic transformation in the thirteenth-century Polish lands, showed widespread conflicting tendencies between rulers, wishing maximization of their power and elimination of prospective noble opponents, and noblemen, striving to maintain and expand their influence and elite status. Gawlas observed that from the second half of the twelfth century in Bohemia and Moravia, like in other places, began the process – by means of colonization and consolidation – of building material power and authority of a small group of most powerful families which then had to be targeted by ducal and royal "anti-lordly" policy that presupposed a more monopolized character of political power of a modern state. Cf. Gawlas, *O kształt zjednoczonego Królestwa*, 38–48 and 62–64. Gawlas's analysis, although preoccupied with what IR would call the transformation of "domestic" political system, revealed general Christendom-wide trends that were reconfirmed and described by Bisson and could be easily noticed both in the Polish lands and in the kingdom of Hungary (especially from the second half of the thirteenth century onwards).

In December 1267, while Łokietek was still a little boy, his father, Duke Casimir of Cuiavia and Łęczyca died.[381] From ca. 1261, after a successful rebellion, his oldest son, Leszek the Black, had already ruled in Sieradz.[382] After Casimir's death, Leszek inherited the land of Łęczyca, while his younger brother Siemomysł received the northern part of Cuiavia with the town of Inowrocław.[383] The southern section of Cuiavia (the so-called Brześć-Cuiavia) and the land of Dobrzyń was left for juniors, that is, step-brothers: Łokietek, Casimir and Siemowit who so far had remained under Eufrozyna, their mother's, supervision.[384] In 1275, Władysław Łokietek was recognized as capable of assuming lordship and began his rule in Brześć-Cuiavia (although still shared with younger Casimir). Ca. 1287 Siemowit, the youngest son of Duke Casimir, received a lordship in the land of Dobrzyń.[385]

Łokietek's senior step-brothers, Leszek the Black and Siemomysł, died in 1288 and 1287 respectively. The latter left three sons and thus his Inowrocław-Cuiavia remained in their hands under Salomea, their mother's, guardianship.[386] Leszek the Black, however, died heirless and his hereditary lordship was divided between Łokietek and Casimir (Siemowit, as the youngest and with the smallest lordship, was supposedly ignored). In consequence, in 1288 Łokietek controlled Brześć-Cuiavia and the land of Sieradz while Casimir governed in Łęczyca.[387] The former became also the senior member of the Cuiavian line of the Piast dynasty[388] and could claim certain authority (as political custom approved) over other members of the family.

In 1288, it was also the moment when Łokietek emerged in the broader "international" context.[389] Duke Leszek the Black of Cracow's heirless death initiated a serious succession

---

[381] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 202.

[382] Marek Kazimierz Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2006), 347.

[383] Ibid., 348. See also: Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 208.

[384] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 218.

[385] Ibid., 219.

[386] Ibid., 209.

[387] Cf. Edmund Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek na tle swoich czasów* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, 1951), 1. However, these divisions of power between brothers appear sometimes confusing. For instance, there is an extant charter of 1282 which reads: *nos Wladislaus et Kasimirus dei gracia duces Lancicie et Cuiauie*. This would suggest more sophisticated power-interdependencies among the sons of Duke Kazimierz. Cf. Leon Ryszczewski and Antoni Muczkowski, eds., *Codex Diplomaticus Poloniae*, vol. 2 p. 1 (Varsaviae: s.n., 1848), n. 107.

[388] Kazimierz Jasiński, "Polityka małżeńska Władysława Łokietka," in *Genealogia: rola związków rodzinnych i rodowych w życiu publicznym w Polsce średniowiecznej na tle porównawczym*, ed. Andrzej Radzimiński and Jan Wroniszewski (Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, 1996), 19.

[389] Jan Baszkiewicz, *Polska czasów Łokietka* (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1968), 39.

contest over the throne of Cracow. There was a few competing candidates: Henry IV of Wrocław, Konrad of Czersk, and Bolesław of Płock. Some barons of Little Poland considered also Łokietek.[390] Between February and August 1289 he even briefly held the castle of Cracow.[391] From that point onwards, almost forty-year-old Łokietek was deeply tied up in Poland-wide politics, of which, however, detailed description is not of my interest here. What matters is the continuous fluctuation of his lordship.

By 1290 Łokietek succeeded to make a firm grip of the land of Sandomierz (eastern Little Poland)[392] and held it firmly against Wenceslas II of Bohemia until the mid-1292, when he was defeated and forced to surrender to the king of Bohemia the land and all claims to Little Poland.[393] Nevertheless, when on June 10, 1294, another Łokietek's brother, Casimir, died heirless, the former's lordship expanded further to the land of Łęczyca.[394] Besides, after King Przemysł II of Poland had been assassinated in Rogoźno on February 8, 1296,[395] the barons of Great Poland decided to offer Przemysł's lordship to Łokietek.[396] Although in March 1296 he had to give up the western part of Great Poland to Henryk of Głogów,[397] and was compelled to drive out Leszek of Inowrocław, his nephew, from Gdańsk-Pomerania, he ultimately put under his control the following lands: Brześć-Cuiavia, eastern Great Poland, Gdańsk-Pomerania, Sieradz and Łęczyca.[398] The size of his lordship made him a considerable player among the Piast dukes (territorially, he gained more than his father ever). Nonetheless, Łokietek did not survive the continuous pressure coming from King Wenceslas II of Bohemia and eventually, by summer 1300, in a consequence of a rebellion in Great Poland and the subsequent Bohemian military expedition, Łokietek was expelled from all his domains, stripped of his lordship and ultimately, he left the Polish lands.[399]

---

[390] Roman Grodecki, Stanislaw Zachorowski, and Jan Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, ed. Jerzy Wyrozumski, vol. 1 (Cracow: Wyd. Prac Nauk. Universitas, 1995), 351.
[391] Baszkiewicz, *Polska czasów Łokietka*, 40.
[392] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:360.
[393] Stanisław Szczur, *Historia Polski: średniowiecze* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2002), 323. See also: Baszkiewicz, *Polska czasów Łokietka*, 41–42. Cf. Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 15–16.
[394] Bronisław Włodarski, *Polska i Ruś: 1194-1340* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1966), 224.
[395] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 161.
[396] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:367.
[397] Ignacy Zakrzewski, ed., *Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski*, vol. 2 (Poznań: Nakł. Bibl. Kórnickiej, 1878), n. 745.
[398] Cf. Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 442.
[399] Rocznik miechowski, *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, vol. 2 (Lwów: nakładem własnym, 1872), 883. Dąbrowski, "Z Czasów Łokietka. Studia Nad Stosunkami Polsko-Węgierskimi W XIV W. Częśc I," 300. See also: Tomasz Jurek, "Polska droga do korony królewskiej 1295-1300-1320," in *Proměna Středovýchodní Evropy*

Exiled dukes in the thirteenth-century Polish lands

Łokietek emerged virtually landless. Nevertheless, the objective interest of a lord, generated by his primary political identity, could not allow for existence of such a unit as a "landless lord". In the first place, a lord deprived of a lordship was basically an anomaly, because such a powerless status did not correspond with the expected elite-standing of a noble and thus, it required from him – by means of inter-subjective coercion – to restore his position within the social hierarchy. Therefore, in a sense, lordship for a noble individual was a non-alternative way of existence in the "international" system. Ignoring the lack of lordship put explicitly at risk the very existence of the lordly identity and hence doing it was hardly acceptable. According to those mechanisms, exiled Łokietek could only do one thing – seek opportunities to regain his domains or find a new lordship. A lord had to remain a lord.

This claim asserting the power of the lordship-imperative requires further evidence. The first argument can be sought from a comparative analysis of a few instances of analogically exiled dukes in the thirteenth-century Polish lands. Those are the cases of lords who had already ruled (even if briefly) and then were expelled from their domains; that is, another lord took over the control of their lordship yet they themselves escaped execution, mutilation or imprisonment. Their reactions could potentially illustrate the range of Łokietek's opportunities and – more broadly – the compelling power of the lordship-imperative.

It is fairly easy to argue that it was not an unusual thing to observe a duke having been expelled from his domains, who then sought help and support against his rival at the courts of other rulers. Such was the case of Daniel of Halich who in 1213 had requested Leszek the White's assistance against Włodzimierz, a newly appointed – by Andrew II of Hungary – ruler of Halich. A military expedition followed that, although it was successful on the battlefield, did not manage to get the castle, and thus ultimately failed.[400]

Two examples come directly from the Polish lands. In 1217, Duke Władysław Odonic[401] – who remained in a prolonged conflict with Duke Władysław Laskonogi, his fatherly uncle, over a decent piece of land to govern – was beaten by the latter and had to escape from his

---

Raného a Vrcholného Středověku: Mocenské Souvislosti a Paralely, ed. Martin Wihoda (Brno: Matice moravská pro Výzkumné středisko pro dějiny střední Evropy: prameny, země, kultura, 2010), 174–176.

[400] Włodarski, *Polska i Ruś*, 54. See also: Márta Font, *Árpád-fázi királyok és Rurikida fejedelmek* (Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 2005), 202–203.

[401] Cf. Odonic's recently published biography: Sławomir Pelczar, *Władysław Odonic - książę Wielkopolski, wygnaniec i protektor Kościoła (ok. 1193-1239)* (Cracow: Wydawn. Avalon, 2013).

lordship. His case, in a certain way, presupposes the fate of Łokietek. Odonic made his way to Hungary[402] hoping for support. It remains unclear what he was doing in the next few years (apparently he joined Andrew II of Hungary for a crusade and then spent some time in Bohemia and the Roman empire)[403] but ultimately he had come to terms with Świętopełk, an aspiring lord of Gdańsk-Pomerania, who in 1223 helped him to get strongholds of Ujście and Nakło in the northern borderlands of Great Poland; an act which, in turn, appeared to be enough to make peace with Laskonogi.[404]

A few years later the situation reversed. In 1229, Odonic emerged sufficiently powerful to expel Laskonogi and seize control over Great Poland, although the details of his actions remain unknown.[405] In response, the exiled duke took refuge in the duchy of Opole and Racibórz in Silesia, where he hoped to find assistance.[406] He was right in his calculations yet the Silesian auxiliary troops came at a price – Laskonogi had to give up his succession rights to his lordship in Great Poland and transfer them to Henry the Bearded. Such cession seems understandable, if to consider that sixty-five (or seventy) year-old Laskonogi did not have offspring (which would require territorial allowances in the future); besides he was not in a position to accept the sheer lack of lordship. From this perspective, Laskonogi was principally concerned about regaining his lost status as a lord of Great Poland, and to this end he was willing to allow his domain to be later overtaken by the Silesian branch of the Piast dynasty (and consequently, his hostile nephew – Laskonogi's closest family – would be deprived of the share of the ancestral lands). In 1231, another military expedition was organized that penetrated Great Poland up to the stronghold of Gniezno but failed to get over its walls. Odonic, backed by contingents from Duke Konrad of Mazovia, defended his lordship and forced Laskonogi to retreat to Silesia.[407] The old duke died soon after, allegedly killed by a German girl whom he attempted to brutalize.[408] Apparently, he was the only Piast duke in the thirteenth century who passed away in exile, deprived of his lordship.

---

[402] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:243.
[403] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 133.
[404] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:249.
[405] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 127.
[406] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:253.
[407] Ibid., 1:254. See also: Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 127.
[408] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 127–128.

It is, nevertheless, quite evident that in these cases, chronologically close to Łokietek, an exile was always a platform for bracing up and plotting a return-strategy. It could be argued that in the Polish lands it was still easier to nurture hopes about regaining the lost throne rather than putting forward claims for a completely new lordship in other geographical regions.

There is one more example of an exiled duke which needs to be mentioned here. It is virtually contemporary to Łokietek, for it affected his step-brother. Between 1268 and 1278 Siemomysł of Inowrocław-Cuiavia, Leszek the Black's junior brother, faced a serious challenge to his lordship. Some of the local nobles revolted against him and Bolesław the Pious of Great Poland was invited for mediation.[409] The controversy resulted in territorial concessions for Bolesław who began to control the Cuiavian castellany of Kruszwica.[410] In 1271, however, war rekindled anew and this time Bolesław the Pious conquered almost the entire Siemomysł's lordship. Hlebionek supposed that perhaps a small strip of land remained in Siemomysł's hands,[411] while Sroka maintained that the duke had to leave his domain.[412] Subsequently, Bolesław strove to rule in Inowrocław-Cuiavia but his attempts – as Polish historiography suspected – entailed growing resistance because there were other "closer" candidates to power, whom the local nobles could consider first (not to mention Siemomysł himself). By 1273 Bolesław returned his Cuiavian lordship to Leszek the Black but kept control over the towns of Bydgoszcz, Kruszwica and Radziejów.[413] In the meantime, however, he interfered with the matters in neighboring Brześć-Cuiavia and might have become the protector of duchess Eufrozyna, Casimir's third wife, and her three sons (including Łokietek). It is speculated that at that moment Bolesław could have become for Łokietek the first model ruler, the absence of any evidence notwithstanding.[414] Anyway, on August 24, 1278, in Ląd, Przemysł II mediated between Leszek the Black and Siemomysł and restored the latter to his lordship.[415] It is unclear what Siemomysł was doing between 1273 and 1278 but it could be

---

[409] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:304.
[410] Marcin Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny i Wielkopolska jego czasów* (Cracow: Avalon, 2010), 97.
[411] Ibid., 98.
[412] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 209.
[413] Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 102.
[414] Ibid.
[415] *In nomine Domini amen. Nos Premislius Dei gracia dux Maioris Polonie, omnibus presens scriptum inspecturis salutem. Noverint presentes et futuri, quod cum colloquium celebraretur inter dominum L. ducem Syradie et dominum ducem Zemo. Cuyaviensem, nos, predictum Pre. ducem Polonie, iam dicti principes L. et Zem. mediatorem ac assessorem elegerunt. Tunc predictus dux Syradie terram Cuyavie fratri suo domino duci Zem. per*

argued that he did not cease to search for ways to return to his lordship. Again, it is difficult to decide whether he finally emerged powerful enough to force Leszek the Black to give up Inowrocław-Cuiavia. This scenario is rather unlikely. Another perspective can be, however, taken. Given that the lordship-imperative was in gear and the inter-subjectively perceived obligation that a "dominus naturalis" should not remain powerless was too in operation, the restoration of Siemomysł would be not only a result of a regular power game but also an outcome of the culturally-driven logic of the "international" system that promoted maintaining and upholding the hierarchical order in a preferably unchanged manner. Siemomysł's lordly identity had to be somehow saved and reproduced.

These four instances, along with other examples (to be discussed below), have already showed that the fundamental dynamics of the "international" stage in the Polish lands (and beyond) were motivated by strong lordship-seeking interests that found their grounding in the inter-subjective lordly identity that dominated the mindsets of "international" actors and constituted the principal way of gaining, exercising, preserving and practicing political power. In short, Łokietek was born into the world, or – to speak more adequately – he entered the "international" system, in which virtually everybody sought some degree of lordship and domination. A lord not only had to remain a lord but was, therefore, supposed to act and behave accordingly.

Type Sub-Identity - Noble Family Leader

In search for further justification for this claim, getting deeper into aspects of lordly identity would be profitable. Following Wendt's categorization, the widespread lordly identity – that organized, encouraged and facilitated hierarchical structures of the "international" system yet concurrently provoked anarchical and self-regarding behaviors – could be split into subcategories. Being a lord had its consequences: his type sub-identity was to be a <u>noble family leader</u> (a dynast) who not only had to uphold his lordship but was expected to build up his own position among other members of family (dominate them as much as possible), take care of his offspring by providing them with opportunities to maintain and expand their noble

---

nostram ordinacionem et procuracionem karitative restauravit: Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1877, vol. 1, n. 482. Cf. Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 155.

status and protect other – perhaps more distantly related but still subjected to him – dynasty members.

A lord as a noble family leader had to emphasize his rights to independent leadership. Interestingly, it seems that he considered himself as a successor to his father in the first place. Loyalty towards father must have been the strongest bond among the intra-Piast relations in the thirteenth-century. A lord-son was inclined to inherit claims and overall political horizon after his lord-father. I would argue that the majority of inter-lordly conflicts in the Piast Poland were related to what a lord-father had left to his lord-son. In this sense, the "international" politics carried out by the father was an important point of reference, and sometimes perhaps a model, that shaped at least some of the son's crucial behaviors on the "international" stage. On the other hand, the loyalty towards father (in terms of preserving his lordship and spheres of control) was a spring board for the son to establish his own family and assume the role of a leader. A lord would, therefore, oppose and resist any intrusions into the spheres that he had already considered as under his domination. I will try to illustrate those points in the following analysis of the types of the intra-Piasts conflicts in the thirteenth century.

I set out to observe and categorize major conflicts that took place between lords in the Polish lands throughout the thirteenth century. By examining practical behaviors of the actors on the "international" scene, I thought I could identify some recurrent patterns which could – as being an essential part of the political culture of this region – shed light on how Łokietek's identity as a lord and a noble family leader developed. To this end, having compiled a database, I defined four types of family conflicts: 1) father-son; 2) fatherly uncle-nephew; 3) between brothers; 4) intra-Piast, that is, rivalries occurring between less directly related members of the dynasty. As for the numbers, I recorded only one type-1 conflict, five type-2 contests, at least another five type-3 antagonisms, and at least a dozen type-4 discords. This calculation, especially in terms of detailed accuracy and in regard to the type-4 cases, does not claim to be complete, although it encompasses, I think, most of violent conflicts that occurred among the Piasts in the thirteenth century. I allow this estimation since I am not going to use this data for hard statistical reasons. Instead, I intend to show dominating tendencies and phenomena.

Type 1 – fathers vs. sons

It is striking that in the Polish lands among numerous dynastic conflicts and rebellions throughout the thirteenth century, there was only one case when sons openly confronted their father. In 1260 (or 1261), Leszek the Black and Siemomysł, who – as *Kronika Wielkopolska* suggested – had considered themselves threatened by Eufrozyna, their father's third wife and mother of newborn Łokietek,[416] summoned assistance of local nobles (perhaps inspired by Bolesław the Pious of Great Poland who was in the midst of war with their father)[417] and challenged Duke Casimir of Cuiavia and Łęczyca.[418] Their action was successful and brought a lordship for Leszek the Black.[419] It is noteworthy that this conflict did not deprive Casimir of his power but basically provided approx. twenty-year-old lord-son[420] with a piece of land to govern. It could be argued that this rebellion played out lordly aspirations nurtured by a junior-duke and ceased once they were agreeably fulfilled. There is no way to decide how real was the danger from Eufrozyna who allegedly plotted to poison Leszek and Siemomysł. However, putting forward such accusation reveals a lordship-oriented mindset of the contemporaries for whom it was thinkable that eliminating senior lord-sons by an envy step-mother would create better perspectives for a newborn lord-son. From this point of view, not the lord-duke himself was a problem but the number of his heirs and the position in line to get a share in his heritage.

Type 2 – fatherly uncles vs. nephews

Although it was uncommon to start a conflict against father, junior lords were much more often in disagreement with their fatherly uncles. Such conflicts erupted between (I follow the chronological order; the fatherly uncle's name comes first): Mieszko Plątonogi and Henry the Bearded, Władysław Laskonogi and Odonic, Konrad of Mazovia and Bolesław the Chaste, Bolesław the Pious and Przemysł II, and Bolesław Rogatka and Henry IV Probus. Some of these discords were ephemeral in length but others lasted for years; the earliest occurred ca. 1202,[421] the latest in 1277.[422] All of them followed the same conflicting logic that brought

---

[416] Kazimierz Abgarowicz and Brygida Kürbis, eds., *Kronika Wielkopolska* (Cracow: Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych Universitas, 2010), chap. 136.

[417] Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 90.

[418] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 144.

[419] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 347. For more detailed analysis see: Paweł. Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego Królestwa: książę Leszek Czarny.* (Warsaw: Wydawn. Neriton, 2000), 130–135.

[420] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 203.

[421] Ibid., 713.

[422] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:287.

the rights of a brother and son of a deceased into collision. Sometimes they emerged from claims to guardianship put forward by the fatherly uncle who later – once the nephew came to age – became reluctant to share a part of his lordship with his dependent (the marginalized nephews were: Odonic, Bolesław the Chaste and Przemysł II). In general, the fundamental dispute concerned the issue who had the right or – more correctly – whose authority was recognized by local lord-nobles as more legitimate after a deceased duke. In material terms, the bone of contest was the fatherly lordship that vacated and had to be somehow assimilated and "consumed" by its heirs.

Uncle-nephew discords did not happen in political vacuum. On the basis of this analysis it cannot be claimed that in the thirteenth-century Polish lands succession to a ducal throne was merely a family matter between two competing lords. Informally, power was always elective, that is, it could not be gained without a local support, since the structure of lordship as basically a network of personal bonds would not allow other option. Furthermore, as Uruszczak's study showed, the idea of elective rights of local nobility was first planted in regard to the ducal seat of Cracow but by the end of the thirteenth century it spread across other lands and became a form of legal and political practice.[423] This means that any inter-lordly conflicts always occurred in social context which could shape their final outcome and, most of all, these results did not originate from a defined legal system.

However, there are some patterns to be demonstrated. First, despite the challenges all nephews managed to create and uphold lordships during the lifetime of their uncles. This may suggest that lords-juniors, although in different particular circumstances, succeeded in securing a satisfactory support for their case on the local "international" stage. The lordship-imperative was widely recognized and they could not be continuously deprived of a plot of land to rule. Second, the logic of the nephew-uncle conflicts (and the son-father antagonisms alike) did not produce life and death enemies and their binary outcomes. In other words, the survival of one actor did not entail destruction of another. There were victors and defeated but annihilation was not an encouraged option. It was, therefore, the logic of rivalry that prevailed. While analyzing types of military conflicts, Wendt put forward a distinction between constitutive wars, which put the type and existence of units at stake, and configurative wars, in which the units are accepted by the parties who are fighting over territory and strategic

---

[423] Cf. Uruszczak, "Następstwo tronu," 23–24.

advantage instead.[424] It can be argued that according to their final outcomes (individual motivations are much less accessible and more difficult to establish), the nephew-uncle hostilities took the form of configurative antagonisms that generally acknowledged the lordship-imperative but disputed the scope, shape and character of the lordships in question.

Type 3 – brothers vs. brothers

Very similar observations can be made about the third category of intra-Piast conflicts that occurred between brothers in the thirteenth century. There are quite a few instances to discuss here. In Great Poland it happened only once that there were two brothers aspiring to lordship – Przemysł I and Bolesław the Pious, and they had their episode of mutual fighting over the proper division of the province between themselves that caused Bolesław's three-year long imprisonment.[425]

In Little Poland, Mazovia and Cuiavia, after Casimir the Just (d. 1194), his lordship was divided between Leszek the White (d. 1227) and Konrad (d. 1247). Since Casimir's domain was large (in comparison to sizes of ducal lordships towards the end of the thirteenth century), it seems that the division made by Leszek and Konrad did not cause much tensions between them. They rather cooperated, for there is no sign of disagreement between them in the sources.

Nevertheless, in Mazovia and Cuiavia Konrad's sons did not distribute their father's lordship among themselves without discord. Casimir (d. 1267), the youngest among brothers, emerged as an energetic actor that apart from inheriting Cuiavia, which had been designated for him, successfully grabbed the lands of Sieradz and Łęczyca from Siemowit (d. 1262), the medium brother, and resisted the oldest Bolesław (d. 1248) who intervened on behalf of Siemowit.[426] However, a year later, in 1248, Bolesław died heirless and Siemowit smoothly established his lordship in Mazovia.[427] The controversy between the brothers erupted again in 1259 when a coalition of lord-dukes, including Siemowit of Mazovia, invaded Casimir's land of Łęczyca and temporarily controlled it.[428] However, although Casimir was painfully defeated, Siemowit did not attach Łęczyca to his lordship but instead he installed Leszek the Black (d.

---

[424] Wendt, *Social Theory*, 284.
[425] Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 32–46.
[426] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 268.
[427] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:299–300.
[428] Jan Szymczak, "Walki o kasztelanię lędzką w połowie XIII w.," *Rocznik Kaliski* 7 (1974): 32.

1288), Casimir's son, as a new ruler in this land. Again, it appears fairly plain that such wars reflected their configurative manner and subscribed to the lordship-imperative. The imperative itself was unable to prevent military conflicts but anyway it encouraged the logic of rival instead of the logic of enemy, for it recognized the right of existence of lords and did not strive to destroy them completely.

In short, Siemowit's interest would be – since he, inspired by Bolesław the Pious of Great Poland (d. 1279), joined the war against his brother[429] – to either gain something for himself or diminish Casimir's power (not much mutually exclusive goals). Despite tremendous advantage in force, the coalition did not attempt to strip Casimir of his lordship and distribute his lands among themselves but they chose to self-contain their appetites by taking away from him merely a single castellany of Ląd (of which attribution to Cuiavia was highly disputed over last twelve-thirteen years)[430] and enable Leszek the Black to establish a lordship in Łęczyca. Hence, Siemowit weakened his brother by encouraging a new lordship to be created out of Casimir's domains. In consequence, an important re-configuration happened on the local "international" stage but – at the same time – none of the lords involved found their principal lordly identity existentially threatened. The conflict could be, therefore, successfully resolved.

Duke Casimir of Cuiavia, Sieradz and Łęczyca's sons were less quarrelsome towards each other. Partially, it could be explained by natural causes: Leszek the Black and Casimir did not have offspring; Leszek and Siemomysł died while their step-brothers were between twenty and thirty of age and none of them had any children to think about their future; Casimir was unexpectedly killed during a Lithuanian raid.[431] Besides, the division of the fatherly lordship appeared satisfactory, especially when Leszek, the senior-brother, managed to inherit Cracow after Duke Bolesław the Chaste (d. 1279) and thus, he stepped beyond his father's political perspective by gaining a new and powerful lordship. In the meantime, his younger step-brothers learnt to live beside each other and preferred to choose cooperation. There must have been, however, some tensions between Leszek and Siemomysł regarding the latter's lordship that had to be restored after mediation carried out by Przemysł II of Great Poland (as detailed above). Again, their controversy was related to the problem of appropriate

---

[429] Cf. Gerard Kucharski, "Rywalizacja kujawsko-wielkopolska o kasztelanię lądzką w połowie XIII wieku," *Ziemia Kujawska* 18 (2005): 13.
[430] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:302–303.
[431] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 219.

and legitimate distribution of their father's lordship among his descendants and maintaining a proper hierarchical structure in mutual relations; they did not compete over, for instance, Cracow. Three sons of Siemomysł, who were still born in the last decades of the thirteenth century and had to share their father's domain, lived in relative harmony and sought ways of cooperation and mutual support.

In Mazovia, Duke Siemowit's sons, another pair of brothers, Konrad II (d. 1294) and Bolesław II (d. 1313), remained for most of the time competing rivals. In 1274 or 1275, Bolesław II received from his older brother western Mazovia to govern: the lands of Rawa, Sochaczew, Gostynin and Płock.[432] However, this division of the fatherly lordship was apparently dissatisfactory for Bolesław II. In 1282, his men attacked a stronghold of Jazdów and seized it with Konrad II's wife and daughter inside. They were robbed but saved their lives. A year later, Konrad invaded Bolesław's lands and ransacked them. Mutual hostilities lasted until 1289 when the succession conflict over Cracow attracted much of attention of the Mazovian dukes.[433] In that year Bolesław, with Łokietek's help, got the town of Cracow and won recognition in the land of Sandomierz. Meanwhile, Konrad II laid claims for Cracow and Bolesław offered him Sandomierz instead. This element of cooperation between the brothers, both interested in expanding their lordships, did not find understanding among local nobles, who could have been reluctant to prospective division of Little Poland, and thus, they transferred their support to Łokietek.[434] Nevertheless, Konrad II and Bolesław II, although unsuccessful in their expansion projects, overcame mutual antagonisms and restored good relations. When Konrad II died, in 1294, he only left a daughter, Anna. In consequence, Bolesław II took over his lordship and unified Mazovia under his rule.[435]

It is important to notice that the controversy between Konrad II and Bolesław II was in gear when their fundamental point of reference was their father's lordship and its satisfactory partition. Confined in their aspirations to Mazovia, they could only think of strengthening their lordship at the expanse of the brother. In 1279, after Bolesław the Chaste's death, Konrad II's perspective broadened and twice (in 1282 and 1285) he attempted to expel Leszek the Black, Bolesław the Chaste's successor, from Cracow. Since Konrad II tried to expand his lordship to

---

[432] Ibid., 276.
[433] Ibid., 275–277.
[434] Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 320.
[435] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 277.

Little Poland, Bolesław II's agenda was to enlarge his domain against his brother. Yet, all their hostilities, however devastating for their lands, did not lead to killing members of the family. The logic of rivalry dominated over the logic of enemy. Analogically to the conflict between Casimir of Cuiavia, Sieradz and Łęczyca and Siemowit of Mazovia in 1259 and 1260, Siemowit's sons, Konrad II and Bolesław II in the 1280s, did not seek to eliminate each other's rightfully held lordships but rather – as could be speculated – their essential goal was to readjust their share in their father's lands.

Bolesław II of Mazovia had three sons: Siemowit II (d. 1345), Trojden I (d. 1341) and Wenceslas (d. 1336). They were born in the 1280s and 1290s but began to rule only in the fourteenth century, that is, in the period beyond the scope of my analysis. It is fairly little known about their mutual relations, and relatively more about their "international" politics towards the kingdom of Poland, the Luxemburgs, and the Teutonic Order. As brothers they apparently did not compete much; however, in 1316 there was a short-lived conflict recorded between Siemowit and Trojden that supposedly was related to the distribution of lordships.[436]

Another instances of inter-brotherly antagonisms can be easily noticed in Silesia. Controversies erupted between the sons of Henry the Pious, who died on April 9, 1241 in the battle of Legnica, while attempting to face militarily the Mongolian onslaught.[437] He left five sons: Bolesław Rogatka (d. 1278), Mieszko (d. 1241/42), Henry III the White (d. 1266), Władysław (d. 1270) and Konrad I (d. 1273).[438]

In 1248, under the pressure coming from Bishop Thomas of Wrocław, Bolesław, the oldest son, divided the lordship he held after his father. He kept central Silesia with Wrocław for himself and equipped Henryk III with northern Silesia with Legnica and Głogów. In the same year, however, they swapped their shares and ultimately Bolesław got Legnica and Henry III seized Wrocław.[439] Moreover, each of them was supposed to provide for two remaining

---

[436] Ibid., 280.
[437] Włodarski, *Polska i Ruś*, 124.
[438] In 1241, when Henryk the Pious perished on the battlefield, only Bolesław Rogatka and Mieszko were old enough to hold a lordship by themselves. Since Bolesław, as the senior brother, took power after his father, Mieszko received the land of Lubusz. However, he died very soon afterwards and did not participate in inter-brotherly conflicts that ensued towards the end of the 1240s. Cf. Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, 118–119.
[439] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:285.

brothers, Władysław and Konrad, who were destined to ecclesiastical careers. Bolesław was expected to look after Konrad, and Henry after Władysław.[440]

The process of distributing lordships was, however, a failure and a war broke out. In 1249, Bolesław invaded Henry III's lands but his campaign was a fiasco. Meanwhile, Konrad revoked his clerical commitment (although he was granted the bishopric of Passau) and demanded his share in Silesia. Since Bolesław refused his claims, Konrad travelled to Great Poland hoping for support from Przemysł I (d. 1257).[441] The latter backed the former's claims and organized a military campaign that installed Konrad in the castle of Bytom. In the meantime, Henry III consented to assist Konrad in his struggle for lordship against Bolesław.[442] In 1251, Henryk III and Konrad (reinforced with contingents from Great Poland) organized a military expedition on Bolesław's lands. It triggered – or perhaps co-occurred with[443] – a rebellion of local nobles against Bolesław. In consequence, Duke Bolesław, overwhelmed by his opponents, allowed Konrad to cut out a lordship from his domain and surrendered to him the castles of Głogów, Bytom, Ścinawa and Żagań.[444]

In *Kronika polsko-śląska* there is a passage that suggests that around that time Bolesław Rogatka briefly lost his power and then was restored to Legnica by his brother, Henry III.[445] There is no consensus in Polish historiography, how to interpret this passage. It is debatable to decide whether Bolesław genuinely lost his lordship temporarily or the chronicle's account should be perceived as a mere anecdote. What occurred problematic for historians in particular was the unknown reason why Henry III, while waging war against his brother for the sake of another brother, surprisingly backed his enemy and virtually defended Bolesław's lordship. Osiński listed a number of possible answers. One option was to admit ignorance in this matter; the second variant was to suggest that Henry III did not want to allow for further partitions of Silesia or that the duke strove to uphold the balance of power in the

---

[440] Jacek Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka: książę legnicki, dziedzic monarchii Henryków śląskich (1220/1225 - 1278)* (Kraków: Wydawn. Avalon, 2012), 191.
[441] Ibid., 196–197.
[442] Ibid., 199–200.
[443] Ibid., 212.
[444] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 410. Cf. Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka*, 212.
[445] *Tendem Henrici tercii, fratris Boleslai, viribus castra predonum subversa sunt, et Boleslaus gubernaculo terre Legniczensis restitutus est licet indignus*: *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, vol. 3 (Lwów: w komisie Księg. Gubrynowicza i Schmidta, 1878), 652.

region. The third choice was to claim that the event itself, that is, depriving Boleslaw from power, did not ever take place and had been either made up or overheard by the chronicler.[446]

Osiński preferred the "internationally"-driven explanation. He asserted:

The reason why Henry [III] the White decided to intervene on his brother's behalf seems plain, if to consider the political situation in Silesia at that time. To wit, Henry [III] the White's intervention to his older brother's interest should be understood as an attempt to confine the size of land that would fall into Konrad's hands after the victorious war. The latter was allied with dukes of Great Poland and therefore, he was a significant threat to Henry [III] the White. In doing so, Henry [III] the White strove to neutralize increasingly powerful Konrad. This aim could be achieved by maintaining the balance of power between Konrad and Bolesław Rogatka in northern Silesia. Since Henry held the larger and economically more powerful duchy of Wrocław, this politics would grant him a considerable advantage over his brothers.[447]

Another meaningful explanation could be, however, proposed. I will reflect on it for a while as an eloquent illustration for the points made above that, in my view, appear useful in making sense of the mechanisms of the thirteenth-century "international" system in the Polish lands. Leaving aside the problem whether Silesia could be rightly considered as a fairly independent "international" sub-system constituted by the lordships of three brothers who had capabilities to shape their individual power politics with only limited influence coming from the "outside" world, there are still some patterns of inter-brotherly conflicts that may put forward alternative interpretations.

As examples of antagonisms: between Casimir of Cuiavia, Sieradz and Łęczyca and Siemowit of Mazovia as well as between Konrad II and Bolesław II in Mazovia or between Leszek the Black and Siemomysł in Cuiavia or Przemysł I and Bolesław the Pious in Great Poland showed, the inter-brotherly conflicts were fundamentally configurative, not

---

[446] Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka*, 213.

[447] *Powód, dla którego na rzecz brata postanowił interweniować Henryk Biały, wydaje się być jasny, jeśli weźmie się pod uwagę zaistniałą wówczas na Śląsku sytuację polityczną. Otóż interwencję Henryka Białego na rzecz starszego brata należy rozumieć jako chęć ograniczenia w ten sposób obszaru, który miał przypaść po zwycięskiej wojnie w udziale Konradowi. Ten bowiem, będąc w sojuszu z książętami wielkopolskimi, stanowił dla Henryka Białego istotne zagrożenie. Poprzez swoje działanie Henryk Biały chciał zneutralizować poczynania rosnącego w siłę Konrada. Osiągnięcie tego celu było możliwe poprzez utrzymanie w północnej części Śląska równowagi politycznej między Konradem a Bolesławem Rogatką, co w obliczu zajmowania przez Henryka Białego większego i silniejszego ekonomicznie księstwa wrocławskiego w rzeczywistości dawało mu znaczną przewagę nad braćmi*: Ibid., 214–215. See also: Andrzej Jureczko, *Henryk III Biały książę wrocławski (1247-1266)* (Cracow: Avalon, 2007), 61, 63–64, 71.

constitutive. The lordship-imperative considerably influenced individual political interests and in practice it allowed the logic of rivalry to prevail. As a result, Henry III's support for Bolesław against the rebels could be viewed as driven by exactly the same motivations that convinced him to back Konrad against Bolesław. Henry III's war waged against Bolesław was not intended to strip him from his lordship but to conveniently redistribute their father's lordship. Bolesław was lord and thus a sort of lordship had to be granted for him. Despite that the size and scope of his lordship was the matter of negotiation, his claim for domination was definitely not. According to customary and established standards of the time, it would be equally unfair to have Konrad deprived of a lordship as to see Bolesław expelled from the land inherited after his father. It could be argued that this inter-subjective cultural and political norm would need to be taken into consideration while interpreting the political behavior of Henry III.

In 1251, the inter-brotherly conflict was practically over. For next couple of years all brothers lived without major conflicts. Apparently, the distribution of Henry the Pious' Silesian legacy, that shaped each brother's lordship, won recognition and was not significantly challenged. Instead, they moved beyond internal animosities and attempted to reach for lands in Great Poland that used to belong to their father's lordship.[448] Therefore, in 1256 all three of them appealed to Pope Alexander IV who – on January 18, 1257[449] – confirmed their rights to the lands in Great Poland that had been earlier controlled by their grandfather and father yet were lost after 1241.[450] Surprisingly, a year later, in 1257, Konrad briefly imprisoned Bolesław but it is very little known about the context of this conflict.[451] The controversies between these two brothers erupted from time to time (like in 1271) but their intensity and scope were rather limited and were concerned about border regions of their lordships.[452]

Also, from the content of a single charter of 1266 it could be indirectly argued that there was another dispute between Henry III and Bolesław, because the former mentioned in the text that his subjects did not show up for a planned expedition against the latter.[453] In the

---

[448] Jureczko claimed that Henryk III had initiated the "recuperation" policy towards dukes of Great Poland in hope to restore the Silesian domination in parts of Great Poland – cf. Jureczko, *Henryk III Biały*, 69–70, 75–80, 87–88.
[449] Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1877, vol. 1, n. 345.
[450] Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 16.
[451] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 410.
[452] Ibid., 614. Jureczko speculated that Konrad's action was perhaps plotted together with Bishop Tomasz of Wrocław who earlier had been taken a prisoner by Bolesław and sought recompensation: cf. Jureczko, *Henryk III Biały*, 95–97.
[453] Jureczko, *Henryk III Biały*, 107.

second half of that year, the nobles rebelled against Henry III and forced him to cut out from his lordship a share for Władysław – at that time the archbishop-elect of Salzburg. Apparently, the nobility was not so much motivated to take care of Władysław's interests (his efficient cooperation with Henryk over years cannot be ignored as well as his quite successful ecclesiastical career) but they were rather willing to curb Henry III's policy that aimed at restoring lands and possessions given away by his grandfather and father and never returned.[454] Whatever reasons could be put forward here, it would be fairly unlikely to spot an inter-brotherly conflict.

All in all, Henry the Pious's sons clashed most vehemently at the early moment of establishing their lordships; a practice which was observed also in other examples. Later, when they sort of agreed on the fundamental distribution of their forefathers' legacy, they perhaps did not live always in peace and harmony but the moments of tensions intertwined with periods of cooperation and joint "international" politics.

Bolesław Rogatka died in the last week of 1278[455] and left three sons: Henry V the Fat, Bolko (d. 1301) and Bernard (d. 1286). Henry V divided Bolesław's lordship into two shares and let his brothers rule in the land of Jawor. In 1281, Bolko granted a smaller duchy around Lwówek to Bernard, and eventually all three brothers were equipped with a piece of lordship.[456] There was no conflict between them recorded, although – since Henry V seized Wrocław (formally not belonging to his family's branch) – Bolko required, for his support against Henry of Głogów (Henry V's rival to Wrocław) some extra territorial cessions from his senior brother and received them subsequently. Besides, Bolko inherited Bernard's lordship after his childless death in 1286.[457] Those changes and corrections were, however, carried out without waging wars and devastating each other's domains. It could be therefore argued that in terms of lordship management and distribution, Rogatka's sons operated quite similarly to Kazimierz of Cuiavia, Sieradz and Łęczyca's offspring, who did not fight each other but managed their father's legacy through negotiations.

---

[454] Ibid., 112–115.
[455] Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, 117.
[456] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 575.
[457] Ibid., 576. Cf. Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, 152.

Henry III the White had only one son. Konrad of Głogów (d. 1273 or 1274),[458] however, had three sons: Henry of Głogów (d. 1309), Konrad II the Hunchback (d. 1304) and Przemko (d. 1289). In 1278, they divided Konrad's lordship between each other.[459] In 1284, Konrad and Przemko exchanged their domains.[460] There are no records suggesting mutual conflicts between brothers. In 1289, Przemko died in the battle of Siewierz (or soon after in captivity),[461] when the Silesian contingents were defeated by Łokietek and Bolesław of Płock during the succession crisis over the throne in Cracow.[462] The remaining brothers claimed their rights to Przemko's land. It seems that Henry of Głogów managed to secure it for himself but soon he had to give it up for the sake of Duke Henry IV Probus of Wrocław, the most powerful Silesian duke at that time.[463] Only towards the end of the thirteenth century the relations between Henry of Głogów and Konrad II the Hunchback of Żagań deteriorated. Jurek pointed that Konrad could have joined the military expedition against his brother, organized by Bolko of Świdnica in 1296, because after a ducal assembly in Zwanowice (March 1297) – attended by all important Silesian dukes – Konrad received Lubin that earlier had been a part of Henry's lordship.[464] In Jurek's opinion, this assembly set up a new balance of power in Silesia that, however, was already challenged in 1299.[465] In March Konrad II the Hunchback of Żagań was elected the patriarch of Aquileia. While he departed to assume this prestigious office, Henry seized his brother's lordship in Żagań. Yet Konrad's enterprise failed, for Boniface VIII introduced another candidate,[466] and the duke returned to regain his lordship. This, however, met with Henry's reluctant attitude and caused some tensions between brothers. Ultimately, the land of Żagań was returned to Konrad and both brothers restored good relations that lasted until Konrad's death in 1304.[467]

The last region in the Polish lands that requires examination is the land of Opole which originally (after divides carried out by Bolesław the Wrymouth around 1138) belonged to Silesia. The first pair of brothers from the Opole branch of the Piast dynasty were Mieszko II

---

[458] Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, 128.
[459] Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 17, 20–21.
[460] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 624.
[461] Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 24–25.
[462] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:356.
[463] Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 26.
[464] Ibid., 66.
[465] Ibid., 78.
[466] Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, 355.
[467] Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 79–80.

the Fat (d. 1246) and Władysław (d. 1281 or 1282), sons of Casimir of Opole. Their father died when they were still minors and hence their guardians became Wiola, their mother, and later – Henry the Bearded of Silesia.[468] In 1238, Mieszko received the entire land of Opole (his father's lordship), while Władysław (still minor) and his mother got from Henry the Pious the land of Kalisz in Great Poland. Cutting out a new lordship in the territory controlled by the Silesian duke, after successful expeditions to Great Poland against Odonic, allowed the duchy of Opole to avoid divisions. Since all these changes and transformations happened under the aegis of powerful Silesian dukes and that both brothers received considerable lordships, and due to Władysław's minority (he was approx. twenty years-old when Mieszko, his brother, died)[469], it does not have to be a surprising observation that there are no recorded antagonisms between them. Although Władysław was gradually losing his grip on Kalisz (1244) and other lands (Ruda, 1249) that became the target of expansion of the dukes of Great Poland who had been dedicated to restore possessions which had once belonged to their father, Mieszko II the Fat died so early and unexpectedly (and with no offspring) that Władysław could easily inherit his brother's lordship without facing the fate of landless lord.[470] Thus, any prospective conflicts did not have a chance to occur.

Władysław had four sons who inherited the duchy of Opole and split it between themselves: Mieszko (d. ca. 1315) took the southern part of the duchy with Racibórz, Cieszyn and Oświęcim. Bolesław (d. 1313) received Opole; Casimir (d. 1312) – Bytom, Koźle, Gliwice and Toszek, and a few years later, in 1288, Przemko, the youngest brother, acquired Racibórz from Mieszko. Interestingly, these divisions were recognized by all brothers who did not go to war against each other and apparently accepted the scope and size of their shares. This allows to conclude that in the Opole region there were to instances in which consecutive generations of brothers could fight and compete but in the end they managed to find their *modus vivendi*.

This short survey of inter-brotherly relations and conflicts in the thirteenth-century Polish lands points to a few general principles that seem to be widely acknowledged throughout the century and have genuine impact on "international" behaviors of lord-brothers towards each other.

---

[468] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 719.
[469] Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, 510.
[470] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 722.

First of all, the lordship-imperative re-emerged as the fundamental motivation that inspired and shaped interactions between brothers. Starting a war was never a must for lord-brothers, that is, a military conflict was not an inherent feature of inter-brotherly relations and theoretically could be eschewed. Nevertheless, there was one condition that had to be fulfilled: every grown-up brother had to receive a decent (i.e., acceptable to him) share of the father's domain. If only brothers had been able to negotiate satisfactory divisions, there would have been good chances for peaceful cohabitation.

Secondly and remarkably, the inter-brotherly antagonisms were virtually always linked to the territorial distribution of lordships within the direct framework of the father's legacy. All examined conflicts showed immediate connection to the existing configuration of inherited lordships and aimed at its major or minor readjustment or redistribution. Hence, the thirteenth-century political practice in the Polish lands reveals a single non-alternative reason for controversies between lord-brothers: an appropriate division of the father's domain among all rightful male descendants.

Third, claiming a lordship was in practice strongly imbedded in the succession customs and in unwritten regulations. The inter-subjective and culturally enforced lordship-imperative rested on a considerable justifying element that required an adequate legitimization for seizing power on a given territory. What emerged from the analysis is the lordship succession system that granted to a son a share in his father's domain; this share, however, was not solely the matter of inter-brotherly negotiations but it involved all elites of the lordship in question. Local nobility and ecclesiastical hierarchy would rather sympathize with and support the general principle that each brother should receive a fair piece of the father's lordship. A landless heir with the right by birth to rule in a given territory would be perceived by a part of social elites as a personification of injustice that called for response and amendments. Therefore, it could be argued that legitimacy, although not grounded yet in a developed legal (or constitutional) system, played genuinely vital role in putting forward claims for power. In consequence, lord-brothers were caught between two colliding forces: their individual desire to secure a satisfactory lordship for themselves and the inter-subjective principle, which required from all those who were entitled to wield power to rule. It seems that lord-brothers widely acknowledged this principle even if initially this recognition did not come without some reluctance.

Fourth, the inter-brotherly conflicts did not produce mutual killings neither among them nor in their closest families. There were examples of imprisonment (Great Poland, Silesia) or taking captive wives and daughters (Mazovia) but none of them led to executions. Occasionally brothers fought each other fiercely but, if attempted at all, they never succeeded in killing each other. This observation could be used as an additional argument for the configurative character of those conflicts that, on the whole, applied the logic of rival and shunned the logic of enemy.

Fifth, brothers were simultaneously rivals as lords but cooperators as close-relatives. Their competition surfaced mostly at the moments of redistribution of their father's lordship. Yet at times when the matters of the father's domain were at stake it backed down and left room for alliance. The so-called "recuperation" policy (i.e., joint efforts to restore the father's lordship in its original shape and to continue territorial disputes "inherited" from the father) which unified the branches of the Piasts could be plainly observed among the sons of Odonic (Przemysł I and Bolesław the Pious) and the offspring of Henry the Pious (Bolesław Rogatka, Henry III the White, Władysław and Konrad of Głogów). Those policies, aiming at recreating the father's lordship and drawing their legitimacy from the customary succession rights, constituted a considerable part of intra-Piast conflicts, of which short overview will now follow.

Type 4 – intra-Piast controversies

A full investigation of intra-Piast conflicts, that is, those which occurred between less directly related Piasts, would need another research and a separate article. My goal here will be less ambitious because I will only search for general patterns that organized and fueled such controversies and wars. In other words, the main concern of this section is to reveal fundamental reasons why those conflicts erupted and what sort of logic of behavior was applied. Consequently, I will pay less attention to mutual agreements and alliances between the non-directly related Piasts, if they were not used against other members of the family (like treaties made in 1217 in Danków and Sądowlo between Leszek the White of Little Poland, Władysław Laskonogi of Great Poland, and Henry the Bearded of Silesia[471] or like the Piast-wide assembly on the occasion of the canonization of St. Stanisław).[472] What follows is not,

---

[471] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 304–305. See also: Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 16–17.
[472] Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 211, 235.

therefore, an attempt to analyze the entire "international" activity of the Polish dukes in the thirteenth century but an inquiry to demonstrate rationale for their mutual conflicts.

Traditionally, Polish historiography described the intra-Piasts relations of the thirteenth century in fairly depressing colors. Prominent authors knowledgeable in political developments of the period, tended to perceive them as drifting towards poli-archy,[473] which, in fact, since it had replaced the former "centralized" political system, it was viewed as primarily anarchical. In order to get a better picture of this historical tradition, the following quotations from books that surveyed the Piast politics in the thirteenth century will be eloquent enough.

First, there are three passages coming from a monumental "History of the Polish diplomacy" that hopes to provide its readers with a *resource of knowledge about the determinants which defined the history of the Polish state, its citizens, and the political elites responsible for Polish diplomacy during the past millennium*:[474]

After the death of Leszek the White [1227 – wk], *Poland assumed the geographic-political form of a chessboard on which particular dukes moved their dominions from one square to another, thus creating constantly variable figures*.[475]

The polyarchic form of the state, so characteristic for the period of feudal disintegration, assumed ultimate form in the course of the transformations of the Piast monarchy during the first half of the thirteenth century. The moment "the knot of the dependence of all upon a single man became definitely untied, and every duke seized sovereign rights in his territory, all the duchies became equal as regards their public-legal stand and from that time comprised a union of mutually independent duchies, formally not bound into a state whole (R. Grodecki, 1933). The number of states corresponded to the number of political conceptions, and the latter – to the number of diplomatic efforts intent on developing and rendering indelible the existence of particular duchies within and outside the Piast monarchy.[476]

---

[473] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 16.
[474] Gerard Labuda, Waldemar Michowicz, and Marian Biskup, *The History of Polish Diplomacy X-XX C.* (Warsaw: Sejm Publishing Office, 2005), 11.
[475] Ibid., 45.
[476] Ibid., 50.

The political activity of the Polish duchies in the second half of the thirteenth century was basically a prolongation of the development tendencies discernible already in the early part of that century, with a single difference, namely, that all the negative symptoms of inertia which were noticeable from time to time, now surfaced. In the major part of the duchies activity become supplanted by passivity, and they usually became an instrument for the policy of foreign states and supreme institutions such as the papacy. Several energetic dukes, well aware of the crisis to which the Piast monarchy had succumbed, tried to extract the country from the state of dependence and submission in relation to foreign powers by proposing a programme of a rebirth of the institutions of the Polish Kingdom.[477]

Also Barański, who recently authored a large synthesis of the political history of the Piasts (which he himself considered as the history of Poland under the Piasts),[478] demonstrated attitudes following the standard perceptions of the Piasts' "international" behaviors. While summarizing the political achievements of Duke Świętopełk of Pomerania, he put forward a few more general comments interpreting the Piasts, *de facto* anarchical as it sounds, politics:

Świętopełk also made many mistakes and almost throughout his entire life he came into ill-considered conflict. It has to be, however, admitted that the contemporary Piasts [Świętopełk died in 1266 – wk] employed similar politics. Ephemeral alliances were struck and endless wars erupted. Fighting for irrelevant goals consumed energy, potential possibilities were wasted, and towns and villages were destroyed. What else, however, could the rulers of tiny states have done? They did great politics tailored to their possibilities.[479]

Later Barański observed:

In the middle of the thirteenth century, in the period of the greatest political turmoil, the idea of unifying Poland re-emerged. It was not taken up by the dukes. Although the Piasts remembered about their common heritage, in practice they did not refer to this unity. They were interested in upholding their possessions, expanding them (if possible) and transferring them to their successors. Meanwhile, the re-unification of Poland would entail depriving many dukes of their ducal position.[480]

---

[477] Ibid., 54.
[478] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 7–8.
[479] Ibid., 363–364.
[480] Ibid., 427.

As a last example the observations by Stanisław Szczur will serve from his "History of medieval Poland"

Equal status of the Piast dukes was demonstrated in various ways, for instance, by making agreements between separate duchies. Those pacts had features characteristic to international treaties and dukes acted in them as sovereign rulers that did not recognize any supreme authority. In order to secure their long-lasting validity, the texts of the treaties were often sent to the pope for confirmation. The interest in foreign policy decreased, since the entire attention of the dukes was drawn to the relations with the closest neighboring dukes from the same dynasty. The foreign policy of the provincial dukes focused on interactions with their immediate neighbors. Each ruler, ignoring the interest of his neighbors or the whole dynasty, was preoccupied with his own political goals and he made such alliances and treaties that in the given circumstances were most profitable for his duchy.[481]

These images of the thirteenth-century "international" politics in the Polish lands seems to be distorted and highly influenced by the contemporary understandings of how the foreign policy of the modern states should be carried out in the international environment. According to the accounts above, intra-Piast relations were basically driven by unstable political will expressed by particular actors by means of ephemeral alliances or by waging (nonsense) wars. The dukes were, in general, short-sighted in their political ambitions playing their petty chess games and allowed greater powers to take advantage of their weakness (Labuda, Michowicz and Biskup); besides, they were self-regarding, independent and in mutual relations acted as the contemporary states (Szczur); ultimately, they were belligerent, self-centered and incapable of dropping the principles of family-centered politics (Barański). Nevertheless, the analysis done so far questions such modernized perceptions of the Piasts' "international" behaviors and the following investigation will reveal further arguments that boiling down the dukes' actions to anarchical and seemingly nonsense political "adventures" is too much an oversimplification, which – in consequence – does not explain much.

What then were the intra-Piast conflicts about in the thirteenth century? It has been already reasserted that antagonisms among the closest family members aroused from controversies concerning the distribution of lordships between the Piasts naturally authorized

---

[481] Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 210.

to rule and dominate. In this sense, they were fairly limited in scope, because they basically involved territories that had already belonged to the disputed lordship, and thus, they remained intra-provincial. Sometimes the non-related Piasts interfered but always by taking side with one of the contestants (like in case of Duke Władysław Laskonogi of Great Poland, who got support from Henry the Bearded of Silesia, or Konrad of Głogów assisted by Przemysł I of Great Poland).

The analysis I conducted allowed me to identify six clusters of the intra-Piast conflicts in the thirteenth century. I grouped them according to a set of categories which I introduced by pinpointing the conflicts' most evident features: 1) the Cracow group; 2) the Great Poland vs. Silesia group; 3) the Great Poland vs. Opole-Silesia group; 4) the Great Poland vs. Cuiavia group; 5) the "international" alliances group, and 6) the intra-Silesian group. These clusters are not equal in size and scope, because conflicts that constituted them were not identical in terms of intensity and chronological distribution. However, the very fact that such groupings could have been delineated shows that the intra-Piast antagonisms were not merely an expression of anarchical and belligerent behaviors of the "international" actors who strove to maximize their gains and power at the expense of their neighbors. As I shall present below, all those controversies derived from justified motives which made much sense in the age of lordships.

Conflicts over Cracow

It is not surprising that the presumably largest group of intra-Piasts disputes was directly related to the throne of Cracow. This is basically the case because over the twelfth century Little Poland became a region of contesting and overlapping succession procedures.

On the one hand, the statute of Bolesław the Wrymouth appointed Cracow the capital of the senior (grand) duke of Poland, that is, it was supposed to be consecutively controlled by the oldest member of the Piast dynasty. Theoretically it meant that the throne of Cracow would rotate between various branches of the dynasty which had already launched building their lordships in separate provinces of the Polish lands. Hence, this particular regulation introduced by The Wrymouth, the common ancestor of the thirteenth-century Piasts, *per force* equipped them with the right to lay claims to Cracow.

On the other hand, the system of seniorate (as it has been mentioned above) was fairly quickly challenged, since Bolesław the Wrymouth's succession concept collided with a strongly rooted custom that emphasized another form of succession to power – by inheritance after one's father. In 1180, at the assembly of Łęczyca, attended by all Polish episcopate and the most influential dukes (Casimir the Just, the host; Bolesław the Tall of Silesia; Leszek of Mazovia, and Odon of Great Poland), Bolesław the Wrymouth's statute was revoked and Casimir the Just's family was recognized as the rightful successor in Little Poland.[482] In consequence, by the common decision of the Piasts reinforced by the local Church and later corroborated by the authority of the pope and emperor, Cracow received another legitimate procedure of appointing a ruler.[483] Nevertheless, by introducing this change into the customary practice, Little Poland became even more a contested province for the future generations of the Piasts. Namely, apart from possible attempts to restore the seniorate, there were two new causes for stirring up an intra-Piast controversy. First, Casimir the Just's branch could expand and his descendants were quite likely to wage wars over the throne in Cracow. Second, and perhaps the most important, the local nobility of Little Poland began to claim, recognize and defend their freshly attained right to elect its rulers. From then on, there was an increasing tension between elective aspirations nurtured by the nobles and ducal ambitions to uphold a hereditary system of succession in Cracow.[484]

In sum, in the beginning of the thirteenth century Little Poland and Cracow functioned as the province highly vulnerable to legitimate claims coming from various branches of the Piast dynasty. Some rights could have been claimed by the supporters of the seniorate system but others would hope to rely on the election by the nobles or point to their blood ties with Casimir the Just.

There is no room and need to analyze in details the hundred-years long rivalry over Cracow that engaged the consecutive generations of the Piasts. The main point here is to present this group of the intra-Piasts conflicts as a set of antagonisms deriving less from anarchical, nonsense or belligerent characteristics of the Piast dukes but rather as a result of competing legitimacies which proved difficult to be settled. Moreover, as it will be more

---

[482] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 285, 289. For more details see also: Józef Dobosz, *Kazimierz II Sprawiedliwy* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 2011), 97–101.
[483] Uruszczak, "Następstwo tronu," 19–20.
[484] Cf. Ibid., 21.

evident from further examples, the Piasts waged wars against each other almost exclusively if the contesting parties could provide a legitimate – that is, making sense to its prospective audience – argument for putting forward their claims. The throne of Cracow was an exceptional case throughout the Polish lands for the most of the thirteenth century, because the intensity of competing legitimacies was relatively highest in comparison to the remaining provinces, and virtually anybody – as the last two decades of the thirteenth century showed – could lay meaningful claims to it. And so, if such possibilities existed, that is, Little Poland from time to time appeared as the most "no man's land" among other Piast provinces (and yet presumably the richest), various dukes took their chances on different occasions. It is, however, important to notice that the Piasts, although strongly motivated by the lordship-imperative (as it has been already seen), they still recognized the rules of "international" game which did not allow them to claim power and domination by sheer force. Again, the anarchical aspects of "international" behavior were mitigated by various socially constructed regulations and customs that made the Waltzian anarchical structure of the international system to be interceded by political culture in shaping real behaviors and motivations of "international" actors.

In 1202, after Duke Mieszko the Old's death (himself the ruler of Cracow by the consent of the local barons), the nobles of Little Poland offered the throne first to Władysław Laskonogi, Mieszko's successor in Great Poland, yet a few months later they reelected Leszek the White, the oldest son of Kazimierz the Just.[485]

In 1210, Innocent III issued a bull[486] that reinstated the seniorate in the Polish lands. It is generally presumed that the papal decision was made on Duke Henry the Bearded of Silesia's request, whose fatherly uncle, Mieszko Plątonogi of Opole, was at that time the oldest living Piast.[487] Mieszko took Cracow but on May 16, 1211 he died[488] and Leszek the White was again restored to power. These events were, however, the prelude for further actions carried out by the Silesian dukes towards seizing control over Cracow.

[485] Ibid., 20–21.
[486] Franciszek Piekosiński, ed., *Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vol. 1 (Cracow: Akademia Umiejętności, 1876), n. 6.
[487] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 714.
[488] Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, 68. See the overview and discussion with the scholarly literature in Mieszko's biography: Norbert Mika, *Mieszko książę raciborski i pan Krakowa - dzielnicowy władca Polski (ok. 1142-1211)* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Avalon T. Janowski, 2010), 204–212.

Anyway, since the chronologies are uncertain, it is difficult to decisively estimate who was the oldest Piast after Mieszko Plątonogi. Apparently it was Władysław Laskonogi (born between 1161 and 1166)[489] but it could have also been Henry the Bearded whose most probable date of birth fell between 1165 and 1170 (but it well might have been after 1160 or after 1163).[490] Interestingly, both of them remained deeply involved in the politics in Little Poland.

In 1224, Henry the Bearded was called by one of influential noble families to take control over Cracow. This attempt was unsuccessful.[491] After Leszek the White's sudden death in 1227, his two-year-old son Bolesław was designated his rightful successor. However, the future of this young boy attracted attention of three major dukes of the Polish lands.

Władysław Laskonogi of Great Poland, probably the oldest member of the Piast dynasty, apart from the claim by seniority had an extra card in hand: in 1217, he and Leszek the White (the then ruler of Cracow) made an agreement on mutual succession.[492] Besides, on March 28, 1228 Laskonogi issued a charter where he declared that he adopted Bolesław (and made him his successor in Great Poland), assumed guardianship, and promised his rule be just and respectful to the Church and nobility.[493] Hence, he was elected.

Meanwhile, Konrad of Mazovia raised his claims. He was Leszek the White's brother, a son of Casimir the Just, and thus he had legitimate reasons to seize the throne in Cracow and extend his tutelage over Bolesław and his mother. Finally, Henry the Bearded of Silesia, another likely senior of the Piast dynasty, entered the game, because Laskonogi asked him to do so. The latter was fighting his nephew in Great Poland and could hardly attend to the situation in Little Poland. A war between Konrad and Henry ensued. Apparently, the latter was more favorably perceived by the nobility of Little Poland than the former, and therefore, after Laskonogi's death in 1231, Henry was chosen the duke of Cracow and guardian of little Bolesław and Grzymisława, his mother. Although eventually unsuccessful, Konrad repeatedly struggled to seize Little Poland and in 1232 he managed to capture the lands of Sieradz and

---

[489] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 122.
[490] Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, 87–89.
[491] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 305.
[492] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 17.
[493] Franciszek Piekosiński, ed., *Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Katedry Krakowskiej Ś. Wacława*, vol. 1 (Cracow: Akademia Umiejętności, 1874), n. 19.

Łęczyca,[494] that is, a less significant part of his brother's lordship. This intra-Piast conflict of 1228-1232, that virtually engaged all Piast provinces, showed the competing legitimacies in operation. Remnants of the seniorate system, succession pacts and the power of election by the nobles clashed with the claims grounded in customary system of inheritance between the closest relatives.

After the Mongol onslaught in 1241 and Duke Henry the Pious' death on the battlefield of Legnica, when the Silesian hold on Cracow disappeared, Konrad of Mazovia reinvigorated his politics aiming at overtaking Little Poland from young Bolesław's hands. This uncle-nephew conflict got an additional intra-Piast feature for twice, in 1243 and 1246, Konrad was assisted by Duke Mieszko of Opole, a descendant of Mieszko Plątonogi. All those attempts brought nothing but ephemeral gains to Konrad who did not manage to reinforce his inheritance-based claims with the support coming from the local nobility. Also the fact that since 1238 (Henry the Bearded's death) he was the oldest surviving Piast did not help him much. The competition of legitimate claims was plainly won by Bolesław (later called the Chaste) who – save his inheritance rights after his father – was simply recognized by the barons of Little Poland.

In 1273, however, a rebellion against Bolesław erupted. Some of the powerful nobles searched for an alternative. Exercising their rights to election they invited Władysław of Opole to seize Cracow. A war broke out. Bolesław thwarted the rebellion and organized a retaliatory campaign against Władysław.[495] As a result, this micro intra-Piast conflict transformed for a while into something much bigger, for to Bolesław's help came: Bolesław the Pious and Przemysł II of Great Poland, Konrad of Czersk and Leszek the Black of Sieradz.[496]

It is worth noticing that two years earlier, in 1271, the same coalition of dukes (without Leszek the Black) had made another incursion into the lands of Opole; an act that demonstrated their support for King Steven V of Hungary's case in his dispute against Přemysl Ottokar II (Władysław sided with the king of Bohemia).[497] It was the only example of intra-Piast conflict grounded in the broader context of "international" politics.

---

[494] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 330–331.
[495] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:335.
[496] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 239–240.
[497] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:334–335.

Most probably in 1265, Leszek the Black was appointed the successor of Bolesław the Chaste to Cracow.[498] By doing so, Bolesław empowered Leszek with an important claim to Little Poland. There are no doubts, however, that in 1279 his ultimate elevation to the ducal throne in Cracow occurred by the election of the nobility.[499]

Anyway, Bolesław made his choice following the logic of family inheritance procedures. Himself childless, he designated Leszek as his successor, because the latter was the second oldest (after Bolesław himself) surviving descendant of Casimir the Just, Bolesław's grandfather. Moreover, Leszek still ruled in the lands that belonged to Leszek the White (Bolesław's father) lordship. From this dynastic perspective, making Leszek the Black a ruler in Cracow was a reasonable move that revealed what were the mechanisms behind the management of lordships.[500] Interestingly, according to the Galician-Volynian Chronicle, Duke Lev of Halich – who had no claims to Little Poland whatsoever – *wanted the [Polish] land for himself, but the [Polish] boyars were strong and would not give him the country*.[501] Lev's aspirations might have been materialized in a military expedition on Little Poland in 1280. As some historians presume, this particular incursion was not solely intended to bring booty but it could have been also an attempt to seize power in Little Poland.[502] Assuming that Lev indeed hoped for getting the emptied throne, efficient resistance put up by the local nobles[503] only strengthens the impression that Little Poland was increasingly less and less bound by non-elective forms of power transition. With one, however, important caveat: it was still possible to influence decisions and favors of the local nobility by providing legitimate (that is, again, making sense) reasons and justifications for one's claims.

In early 1280s, Duke Henry IV Probus of Wrocław emerged as a potential candidate to lay claims to Cracow. In March 1280, in Vienna, the duke, together with Władysław of Opole, part took in an assembly with King Rudolf Habsburg of the Romans. It is supposed that Henry

---

[498] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 189–191.

[499] Uruszczak, "Następstwo tronu," 22. Cf. Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 265–266.

[500] There is another example showing how much a common ancestor inspired "international" identities developed by his descendants. Żmudzki observed that the sons of Kazimierz of Cuiavia, Sieradz and Łęczyca – once their oldest brother, Leszek the Black, gained power in Little Poland – adopted the same coat of arms: half lion and half eagle (with a small variation that senior brothers used the coats of arms decorated with a crown and Łokietek did not): Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 295.

[501] George A. Perfecky, ed., *The Galician-Volynian Chronicle* (München: W. Fink, 1973), 92. See also: Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 265.

[502] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 204–205.

[503] Cf. the source analysis by Semkowicz: Aleksander Semkowicz, ed., *Krytyczny rozbiór dziejów polskich Jana Długosza, do roku 1384* (Cracow: Akademia Umiejętności, 1887), 298.

IV paid the tribute to the king and established a close alliance with Władysław, his then father-in-law, that aimed at gaining "regnum et coronam in Polonia".[504] Such aspirations with strong "international" support could entail hostilities against the current ruler of Cracow. There are accounts that suggest two military conflicts between Henry and Leszek in 1281[505] and between 1283 and 1285.[506] According to the extant sources neither of them was directly related to the matters of the throne in Cracow. Instead, they rather looked like single incursions into enemy's territory that concentrated on pillage and devastation. According to Długosz,[507] in 1281 Leszek the Black (with Mściwoj of Pomerania and the knights of Great Poland) invaded Silesia in order to bring rescue to Przemysł II, imprisoned lately by Henry IV. Allegedly, the campaign did not end with liberating Przemysł yet indeed caused much destruction. Nowacki recently observed that – although many historians have so far considered this intervention as obvious (including Żmudzki) – the thirteenth-century sources do not confirm Długosz's assertions[508] and the arguments put forward in historiography were rather shaky. As a result, Nowacki only presumed that Leszek the Black's incursion happened (or, more precisely, that Henry IV had to take into account a risk of such expedition).[509]

Leszek the Black's rule in Cracow – from what is known from the sources – was constantly questioned. Nearly from the very beginning he got into a conflict with Duchess Kinga, a widow after Leszek's predecessor, Bolesław the Chaste, and with Bishop Paweł of Cracow. Those controversies gradually deepened internal tensions, which ultimately could take shape of a rebellion,[510] and in 1283 forced Leszek to imprison Bishop Paweł.[511] My point here is to emphasize that Leszek's position in Cracow was then quite unstable. Now, there is a single letter by Archbishop Jakub Świnka of Gniezno to the bishop of Wrocław, from May 1285, where Henry IV's incursion to Little Poland was mentioned.[512] Żmudzki calculated that

---

[504] Nowacki, *Przemysł II*, 100–101. See also: Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 428.
[505] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 293–294.
[506] Ibid., 389.
[507] Zofia Kozłowska-Budkowa and Krystyna Pieradzka, eds., *Ioannis Dlugossi Annales Seu Cronicae Incliti Regni Poloniae*, vol. VII/VIII (Varsaviae: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1975), 213–214.
[508] Semkowicz, *Krytyczny rozbiór*, 299.
[509] Nowacki, *Przemysł II*, 102–103.
[510] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:347–348. Żmudzki discarded this idea of a nobility revolt but still it can hardly be argued that Leszek the Black's power in Cracow was stabilized and well secured: cf. Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 401–402.
[511] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 310–346.
[512] Gustav Adolf Harald, 1792-1854, ed Stenzel, ed., *Urkunden zur Geschichte des Bisthums Breslau im Mittelalter* (Breslau: Im Verlage bei Josef Max & Komp., 1845), n. CLXVI.

it could have only taken place between 1283 and 1285.[513] Judging from the description provided by the archbishop, the Silesian invasion on Little Poland mirrored the alleged one of 1281, that is, it caused widespread devastation. The archbishop did not suggest that by doing this atrocities Henry IV strove to retake Cracow from Leszek's hands. However, he complained that the Silesian duke impeded Leszek to fulfill his great task to embark on a crusade against the Mongols. Żmudzki followed Świnka's argument and explained that Henry IV organized his campaign to make sure that there would be no crusade which could enhance prestige and honor of Leszek the Black.[514] One could, however, come up with an alternative explanation. Given that in 1281 there had been ravaging of the Silesian land by the duke of Cracow, a few years later – not a surprising delay in medieval "international" politics – a retaliatory invasion was mounted.

It is hard to decide without deeper investigation of the matter, to what degree tensions between Henry IV of Silesia and Leszek the Black of Cracow were directly combined with their rivalry for Cracow. The extant source material does not support such suggestions. Nevertheless, there are no doubts that from the early 1280s Henry IV carried out actions aimed at building his lordship and domination in Silesia and by doing so, he assumed the political perspective once cherished by his forefathers: Henry the Bearded (great-grandfather) and Henry the Pious (grandfather). And both of them had ruled in Wrocław (like Henry IV did) as well as in Cracow, and they too were the guardians of Leszek the Black's predecessor, Bolesław the Chaste. And again, given that the final word in electing a duke in Cracow belonged to the nobility – supposedly much more than in the times of Henrys – attempts to destabilize the rival's position made sense, because they could set ground for possible reshuffling.

Leszek the Black's uncertain hold of Cracow resulted in another conflict. In 1285, the nobility rebelled against their duke and called Konrad of Czersk, one of the Mazovian dukes, to seize the throne.[515] Once more the right to elect their ruler was exercised by the nobles of Little Poland. Leszek the Black, however, supported by the Hungarian troops, was successful

---

[513] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 389.
[514] Ibid., 394–395.
[515] Ibid., 403, 416–417. Cf. Uruszczak, "Następstwo tronu," 22.

on the battlefield (Bogucice, May 3, 1285)[516] and restored his lordship. A year later, he undertook a retaliatory campaign and invaded Konrad of Czersk's lands.[517]

Further intra-Piast conflicts erupted after Leszek the Black's death in 1288. He died heirless and this opened up the field for tensions and rivalry regarding the succession procedure. Most probably the dying duke had some ideas about who should take the throne but it is tough to discern whether his will was recognized by the barons of Little Poland. Żmudzki assumed that since Bolesław of Płock, a brother of Konrad of Czersk, Leszek's former opponent, was smoothly elected and untroubled seized power in Cracow, it could be argued that the will of the duke and nobles converged in this matter.[518] Nonetheless, Henry IV Probus of Wrocław also arrived to Little Poland and was accepted by the townsmen of Cracow.[519] Soon after, he was given the Wawel castle and a war ensued.[520]

In order to better understand the essentials of the conflict for Cracow between 1288 and 1290, some general remarks can be useful. As Szczur rightly pointed, there were two large Piast coalitions competing with each other: the Silesian and the Cuiavian-Mazovian.[521] Both of them strove to establish good relations with the local elites knowing that indigenous support was indispensable for stable rule in Cracow. From the course of events it could be claimed that this elite was itself quite divided and indecisive about who should take the throne. This fluctuation of attitudes could derive from a short and stormy period of Leszek's rule and his rather unexpected death. Anyway, dynastically speaking (that is, not geographically), the rivalry emerged between the descendants of Henry the Pious (the Silesian alliance with Henry IV as its leader), a former duke of Cracow, and the descendants of Konrad of Mazovia, a short-lived duke of Cracow yet the incessant claimant to its throne both by birth and action (the Cuiavian-Mazovian party). In consequence, although the argument from seniority was no longer played, both sides still nourished "making-sense" reasons for their legitimate interest in Little Poland.

---

[516] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 419.
[517] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:348.
[518] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 468.
[519] Uruszczak, "Następstwo tronu," 23.
[520] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 469–470. See also: Tomasz Nowakowski, *Malopolska elita wladzy wobec rywalizacji o tron krakowski w latach, 1288-1306* (Bydgoszcz: Wydawn. Uczelniane WSP w Bydgoszczy, 1993), 15–17.
[521] Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 319.

In February 1289 at Siewierz, the Silesian expedition to Cracow was defeated by Władysław Łokietek's troops reinforced with contingents from Bolesław of Płock and Przemysł II of Great Poland (who had good reasons – to be examined later – not to favor the Silesian succession to Little Poland). Subsequently, Łokietek emerged as a possible candidate to the throne in Cracow (Bolesław of Płock simply disappears from the sources) and even managed to hold the town for a few months.[522] Then he was expelled and Henry IV took over.

The conflict remained unresolved because the duke of Wrocław controlled Cracow but the land of Sandomierz (the eastern part of Little Poland) recognized Łokietek's authority.[523] To get the picture even more complicated: Henry IV did not have much time to pursue a stabilizing politics, because he unexpectedly died heirless on June 23, 1290,[524] pointing to Przemysł II of Great Poland as his successor in Cracow.[525] Przemysł II was received in Cracow but again, he ruled only for a few months (Nowacki asserted that the duke was ignored by the local nobility which refused to cooperate with him)[526] and sometime in early 1291[527] he ceded his rights to Wenceslas II of Bohemia.[528] In the meantime, Łokietek maintained his hold on the land of Sandomierz. However, there are no records showing any military activities between Przemysł II and Łokietek.

From that moment the intra-Piasts conflicts and controversies over Cracow ceased. A new player emerged, for the first time from outside the dynasty (if not to include a dubious attempt carried out by Lev of Halich in 1280), who challenged the established political custom. This could have happened because Little Poland undergone an evolutionary process that disempowered the claims to rule grounded in the seniorate system or hereditary regulations, and developed a strong elective system, in which the attitudes of the local nobles played essential role in distributing power in the duchy. For the most of the thirteenth century the base for election was confined to the members of the Piast dynasty yet another step was made in the 1290s by introducing a "foreigner" to the throne.

---

[522] Nowakowski, *Małopolska elita*, 17, 24–26.
[523] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 429.
[524] Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, 160.
[525] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 431.
[526] Nowacki, *Przemysł II*, 165–167.
[527] Ibid., 173.
[528] Nowakowski, *Małopolska elita*, 26.

In sum, the intra-Piast wars over Cracow originated in the undefined (or, perhaps, ill-defined) succession procedure that allowed for conflicts caused by competing legitimacies. That is, various members of the Piast family could lay claims on Little Poland by referring to different sources of legitimization mechanisms. In practice, Cracow and Little Poland remained throughout the thirteenth century the only Polish duchy that could be reasonably claimed by other provinces without a threat of usurpation. This is also why it was so contested. In remaining cases, the intra-Piast antagonisms were less all-encompassing because the matter of competing legitimacies was limited to individual branches of the dynasty.

Antagonisms between Great Poland and Silesia

The controversies between the dukes of Great Poland and Silesia could be categorized into three groups: 1) territorial disputes; 2) allied interventions; 3) responses to rebellions. All of them, however, derive from the events of the early thirteenth century, when the relations between Henry the Bearded of Silesia and Władysław Laskonogi and Odonic of Great Poland opened up opportunities for the Silesian dukes to interfere with the shape and distribution of lordships in Great Poland.

Duke Władysław Laskonogi of Great Poland, who in 1202 had inherited the entire duchy after his father, Mieszko the Old, was preoccupied with the rivalry in Pomerania (north to Great Poland) with the king of Denmark. In order to get a stronger negotiating position in this dispute, Laskonogi decided to exchange a part of his lordship (the land of Kalisz – southern Great Poland) for the land of Lubusz (itself a region of Henry the Bearded's duchy to the north-west of Great Poland). The deal was struck in 1205.[529] A year later Odonic, Laskonogi's nephew, demanded a lordship from his uncle but was defeated and escaped to Henry the Bearded. The latter received the young duke and offered him the land of Kalisz as a starting point and base for mounting expedition aiming at restoring his father's lordship (by taking it away from Laskonogi). Odonic promised Henry to return Kalisz once he regained (carved out) a duchy for himself. Supported by Henry, Odonic recovered elements of the duchy he had sought yet he did not give back Kalisz; indeed, he declared himself the duke of Kalisz.[530] Theoretically speaking, however, Henry the Bearded found a legitimate (making sense) way of expanding his lordship towards Great Poland.

---

[529] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 310. See also: Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 290.
[530] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:237.

Sometime later, between 1216 and 1217 the conflict between Laskonogi and Odonic rekindled. First, the latter managed to seize control of Poznań (presumably his father's original domain)[531] and subsequently Henry the Bearded admonished him to return the land of Kalisz. Odonic refused. Soon Laskonogi fought back and – not surprisingly with Henry's help – defeated Odonic who lost all his lands (Poznań and Kalisz), and was subsequently exiled. He traveled to the kingdom of Hungary. Meanwhile, in 1218 Henry and Laskonogi entered an alliance and the former returned to the latter the land of Lubusz, which had been lately taken by Margrave Konrad of Meissen but successfully regained.[532]

In 1229, this time Laskonogi was defeated by Odonic and escaped to Henry the Bearded's domains hoping for his assistance. In 1231, the exiled duke – himself old and heirless – appointed Henry his successor.[533] Hence, the duke of Silesia received another argument to intervene in Great Poland. Nevertheless, it was quite plain that Odonic – a new lord of Great Poland after Laskonogi's death – would resist any interferences coming from Henry.

In 1233, the nobility of Great Poland rebelled against Odonic and invited Henry the Bearded.[534] Over next year the latter managed to make significant territorial gains there but did not succeed in establishing his rule throughout the entire province. A compromise was made in September 1234 which gave Henry the Bearded southern regions of Great Poland (with Kalisz and presumably the castellany of Ląd) but left two most important provincial strongholds (Poznań and Gniezno) with Odonic.[535] In late 1236, Henry the Bearded mounted another expedition against Odonic which could have brought him some further yet limited territorial gains.[536]

In sum, between 1205 and 1235 the duke of Silesia effectively attained the southern regions of Great Poland and found people among the local nobility who supported him. In consequence, he enjoined those territories into his lordship and distributed them according to his lordly will. Precisely this distribution, based on legitimate claims to control and

---

[531] See an overview of competeing theories in the scholarly literature: Bronisław Nowacki, *Przemysł I 1220/1221-1257: książę suwerennej Wielkopolski* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Avalon, 2013), 52–55.

[532] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:243–244. Cf. Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 311–313. See also: Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 290–291.

[533] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:254.

[534] Ibid., 1:270.

[535] Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 16–17.

[536] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 135.

domination, was in the coming decades the fundamental bone of content that triggered intra-Piast conflicts between Great Poland and other provinces: Silesia, Opole-Silesia and Cuiavia.

The lands of Great Poland that fell under Henry the Bearded's domination where divided as follows: Borzywoj, Henry's nephew, received the castellany of Śrem; Duchess Wiola and her minor son Władysław of Opole (who both stayed under Henry's guardianship) temporarily got the land of Kalisz and Ruda; in 1239 the castellany of Ląd would go to Duke Casimir of Cuiavia as the dowry of Konstancja (a daughter of Henry the Pious); the remaining lands were governed by Henry the Pious, the son and successor of Henry the Bearded.[537]

Odonic died in 1239, leaving two sons: Przemysł I and Bolesław the Pious. From what has been already observed about the principles and mechanisms of the "international" politics in the Polish lands, it was quite evident that Odonic's successors would concentrate on restoring their father's lordship and, on the other hand, Henry the Bearded's descendants would remember the territorial extension of his lordship and seek to secure and uphold (alternatively, regain) it as long as possible. Thus, the intra-Piast wars between Great Poland and Silesia emerged from these basic mechanisms of lordship-management.[538]

The Mongol invasion on southern Poland in 1241 shattered the Polish "international" subsystem. Henry the Pious died on the battlefield and – unexpectedly – the entire Silesian lordship governed by Henryk began to dissolve. Przemysł I of Great Poland understood that such instability in Silesia could provide favorable conditions for restoring bits and pieces of what his father had lost. According to Hlebionek, this politics of re-collecting the lordship started already in 1241.[539]

Carrying out his politics, Przemysł I confronted Bolesław Rogatka, the oldest son of Henry the Pious who governed his fahter's lordship on behalf of his minor brothers. It was, however, sure that sooner or later he would need to distribute smaller entities for them. The duke risked good relations with them by monopolizing power in his hands and usurping the superior, father-like, position. In 1244, Przemysł I and Bolesław agreed that the former would marry Elisabeth, the latter's sister. By doing so, the land of Kalisz and the western part of the

[537] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:271–272, 303. See also: Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 293–294; Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 346; Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 144.
[538] Cf. Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka*, 157–158.
[539] Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 19–21, 23. Cf. Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka*, 117, 149.

land of Ruda returned to Przemysł I's lordship. It is supposed by the scholarly literature that Kalisz was made Elisabeth's dowry.[540] From the lordship-management perspective, it was a reasonable move. It offered to Bolesław, suffering from hard times in his own duchy,[541] a way of securing "international" peace by fulfilling territorial demands put forward by Przemysł I and still equipping his sister with a considerable land grant. Similar strategy was used a couple years earlier, when in 1239 Casimir of Cuiavia married Konstancja, another Bolesław's sister, and she also received a piece of Great Poland's land (the castellany of Ląd) as a dowry. In short, the territories outside the traditional Silesian domain were used by Henryk the Pious and Bolesław Rogatka as primary "currency" in their "international" politics.

The marriage between Przemysł I and Elisabeth stopped the antagonisms between Great Poland and Silesia only for a short while. In 1246, Rogatka invaded Przemysł's lands and temporarily regained some strongholds.[542] Two years later, the latter – to much of a historian's surprise[543] – was invited by rebellious nobles in Great Poland to replace Przemysł I. The revolt failed and perpetrators were imprisoned.[544] It is, however, telling that such an attempt took place. For some of the Great Poland nobility (the Nałęcze kindred) it still made sense that the Silesian branch of the Piasts could rule in their province. Interestingly, they did not seek to empower Bolesław the Pious – who in 1247 had received his own lordship in the land of Kalisz[545] – but they chose to follow Rogatka. The matter of competing legitimacies resurfaced again. Furthermore, Nowacki pointed to the analysis of the annals of Gniezno, done by Brygida Kürbis, which showed that the selection of political events, which had been reported by the annals, was made deliberately to reinforce Odonic's sons claims to rule in Great Poland, and thus, they implicitly spoke against the Silesian legitimacies.[546]

As had happened earlier with Cracow and Little Poland, during the first decades of the thirteenth century the nobility of Great Poland acquired an alternative for their "domini naturales". The descendants of Mieszko the Old, who had been first granted the province from his father, Bolesław the Wrymouth, due to their mutual antagonisms opened up practical

---

[540] Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 25.
[541] Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka*, 130, 159. Cf. Nowacki, *Przemysł I*, 152–153.
[542] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:289. Cf. Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka*, 162–163.
[543] Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 37.
[544] Nowacki, *Przemysł I*, 170–171.
[545] Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 32–33.
[546] Nowacki, *Przemysł I*, 151.

opportunities for penetration of their lordships by the Silesian dukes. Over numerous conflicts between these two provinces, two general observations are particularly striking.

First, all territorial disputes and responses to rebellions were only one way, that is, the Silesian dukes claimed lands in Great Poland and were called to take power there, and never the other way around. There were no claims whatsoever and ruling opportunities in Silesia for the dukes of Great Poland throughout the thirteenth century.

In the middle of the 1250s, when the internal wars over the fair distribution of lordships between the duke-brothers (sons of Henry the Pious of Silesia) ceased and some sort of cooperation could be restored, they all remembered about the heritage of their father and – in order to enhance their legal standing against their opponents' arguments – they asked the pope to confirm their possessions in Great Poland. On January 18, 1257[547] Alexander IV validated the bull by Gregory IX of 1235[548] that corroborated peace conditions between Henry the Bearded and Władysław Odonic.

Needless to say, that this papal decision reinvigorated the inter-provincial dispute, for it supported the *status quo* most favorable for the Silesian dukes. Since it was a complicated issue, towards the end of this year, just before Christmas, Pope Alexander IV established a commission that was tasked to investigate the controversy in detail.[549] From the early 1280s, Henry IV Probus of Wrocław, a grandson of Henry the Pious, who adopted a policy aiming at dominating the entire Silesia, tried to forcefully compel young Przemysł II of Great Poland to surrender the land of Ruda by imprisoning him. He was successful.[550] Fifteen years later, in 1296, after King Przemysł II of Great Poland had been killed and Łokietek was elected his successor (there were no more heirs in the Great Poland branch of the Piasts) by the nobility, Henry of Głogów – whom in 1290 Przemysł II had made his successor[551] – claimed the throne too, and eventually was granted the western part of the province.[552]

---

[547] Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1877, vol. 1, n. 345. Cf. Jureczko, *Henryk III Biały*, 87.
[548] Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1877, vol. 1, n. 182.
[549] Marian Łodyński, *Uzależnienie Polski od papiestwa a kanonizacja św[iętego] Stanisława* (Cracow: [Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych] "Universitas," 1995), 15–16.
[550] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:353.
[551] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 158. For more details see: Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 34–40.
[552] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski Średniowiecznej*, 1:367. See also: Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 59–64.

Apart from military actions and diplomatic interventions aimed at grabbing some lands in Great Poland, the Silesian dukes to the very end of the thirteenth century were considered as main reservoir of prospective candidates to the throne in the province. As it was mentioned above, in 1248 Bolesław Rogatka was invited to expel Przemysł I and Bolesław the Pious. Another rebellion, in 1284, restored the land of Kalisz and Ruda (and so the very original territories once controlled by Henry the Bearded) to Henry IV Probus of Wrocław.[553] Still in 1298, Henry of Głogów plotted with Bishop Andrzej of Poznań against Łokietek; a project that would bring another Silesian duke to the throne in Great Poland.[554] Eventually, in late 1299 the rebellion against Łokietek did happen but its beneficiary was no more Henry of Głogów (and hence, the Silesian branch of the Piasts) but King Wenceslas II of Bohemia, who overpowered Henry and using the stick-and-carrot strategy he won recognition of the nobility in Great Poland.[555]

To sum up, the conflicts over territories and power between Great Poland and Silesia were hopelessly one way and clearly originated from the rightful claims obtained by Duke Henry the Bearded in the first four decades of the thirteenth century. His descendants, who plainly took their forefather's lordship as a standard model, continuously strove to exercise their legitimacies and – as a number of instance showed – their efforts met with relative support from groups of the local nobility.

Second striking observation that could be made here is that in mutual relations, while the dukes of Silesia monopolized aggressive politics aiming at overthrowing the rule of their rivals and territorially truncating the province, the dukes of Great Poland specialized in "allied interventions". This means that they basically focused on supporting one Silesian duke against another, occasionally entering alliances with them. Both Przemysł I and Przemysł II engaged in politics that would follow the well-known principle "divide and rule". The Silesian dukes, on the other hand, generally did not play out antagonisms between their counterparts in Great Poland. With one exception, when in the 1270s young dukes, Przemysł II and Henry IV Probus, joined forces in their struggle for lordship against their fatherly uncles: Bolesław the Pious and

---

[553] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 372. In 1285, Przemysł II of Great Poland regained Kalisz through negotiations with Henryk IV Probus of Wrocław. Ruda returned to Great Poland sometime between 1287 and 1288 but the background and circumstances of this event remain blurred; cf. Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 157.
[554] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 442. See also: Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 70–71.
[555] Cf. Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 83.

Bolesław Rogatka respectively.[556] Their cooperation resulted in a few military expeditions that, for instance, helped Przemysł II escape his uncle's supervision or was meant to support Henry IV, whose rule in Wrocław was challenged by Rogatka in 1277.[557]

In general, however, Przemysł I of Great Poland was the only duke of Great Poland who clearly engaged in conflicts in Silesia by putting much effort in intervening on behalf of Konrad of Głogów (himself fighting his senior brother Bolesław Rogatka to gain a lordship). Their alliance lasted for a few years, starting from 1249 when Konrad arrived to Great Poland seeking assistance[558] until 1254, when – since Konrad's lordship in Głogów had been secured and established and the Silesian dukes had launched politics aiming at regaining losses in Great Poland – their cooperation proved increasingly pointless.[559] Apparently, in 1253 and 1254 Przemysł I ceased to support Konrad's case and his incursions against Henry III the White of Wrocław could have been preemptive actions against a growing consolidation of the Silesian dukes.[560] According to the sources, however, Przemysł I's expedition of 1254 was basically caused by Henry III's failure to pay ransom for one of his followers, Mroczko of Pogorzel.[561]

All in all, regarding the intra-Piast conflicts between the dukes of Silesia and Great Poland, a few points can be made.

First, the inter-provincial antagonisms originated from overlapping legitimacies of both parties that had been established during the reign of Henry the Bearded in the first decades of the thirteenth century.

Second, those antagonisms proved to be very coherent with how competing parties imagined the territorial extent of their forefathers' domains. The Silesian dukes referred to the concessions formally granted to Henry the Bearded. The dukes of Great Poland, Przemysł I and Bolesław the Pious, strove to rebuild the lordship that used to belong to their great-

---

[556] According to the scholarly literature, this alliance emerged most probably in 1273. See: Nowacki, *Przemysł II*, 73–75; Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 186–187.

[557] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:287. See also: Nowacki, *Przemysł II*, 81–82.

[558] Nowacki, *Przemysł I*, 189–191.

[559] Ibid., 232–233.

[560] Jureczko, *Henryk III Biały*, 75. Cf. Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:290; Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka*, 231–233; Nowacki, *Przemysł I*, 232–233.

[561] Jureczko, *Henryk III Biały*, 77.

grandfather Mieszko the Old by practically refusing and challenging any grants and donations carried out either by Laskonogi or Odonic, their father.

Third, the overlapping and competing legitimacies were a tangible element of the quest for power. The Silesian dukes were virtually the only members of the Piast dynasty throughout the thirteenth century (with one exception of Łokietek in 1296) who had been repeatedly invited to take control of Great Poland. Although such invitations failed in most cases, that is, none of the dukes from Silesia ever exercised his power over the entire province, the very fact of their appearance is eloquent and proves a sort of predilection of the local nobility to the making-sense Silesian claims to authority in particular regions of Great Poland.

Fourth, the conflicts between both provinces were not a part of history of war and conquest. The dukes of Great Poland never attempted to overtake and annex to their lordships pieces of the Silesian territories. It can be hardly argued that their self-restraint derived solely from their weakness. If that was the only case, one could point to moments when such attempts were thinkable due to internal disputes in Silesia and relatively more powerful position of the duke of Great Poland (for instance, Przemysł I in the early 1250s). It seems that aggression towards Silesia was confined by a sheer lack of good reason that could justify any claims to power and authority; an element that the dukes of Silesia, thanks to Henry the Bearded's politics, already had.

Fifth, the lack of territorial ambitions on the side of the dukes of Great Poland does not indicate that they were peace-loving rulers as opposed to the Silesian predators. As the instances of Przemysł I and Przemysł II showed, they were absolutely capable of mounting incursions and military expeditions against the Silesian rulers and exert some lasting impact of the distribution of power in Silesia. The point is, however, that in their relations with Silesian cousins, the Piasts of Great Poland never thought of conquering their lands and establishing their authority there. There could be different ways to explain such "international" self-confinement. One of the possible answers, that seems validated by the gathered material, would link aggressive territorial expansion with the ability to provide making-sense justifications for such behaviors. Apparently, the lordships in the Polish lands were not so authoritarian as one could assume, and they had to comply with broader inter-subjective principles that governed behaviors of political actors on the "international" stage.

Sixth, the strongest making-sense claim for exercising authority, power and domination over a given territory was that related to immediate blood ties. What one's father had was the fundamental point of reference. Other elements, even elections by the local barons, seems considerably influenced by the power of claims inherited from one's ancestors. In the complicated intra-dynastic relations in the Polish lands, which had been gradually growing into more and more sophisticated system of interactions and genealogical compounds, disputes and controversies among the kindred virtually boiled down to undetermined and incessantly open to question conflicts of competing legitimacies. The antagonisms between Great Poland and Silesia in the thirteenth century powerfully illustrated this point.

Other intra-Piast conflicts

The largest conflict-groups have been already discussed above. Here I will turn to wars that erupted on a smaller scale, that is, they did not have a long-lasting life that stretched across the entire thirteenth century. Again, it is not my aim here to provide a detailed overview of these conflicts but rather search for patterns that may converge with the findings made so far or offer new insights into how the intra-Piast rivalries functioned.

Into the "other intra-Piast conflicts" section I incorporated three groups identified at the beginning of this survey: 1) the Great Poland vs. Opole-Silesia group; 2) the Great Poland vs. Cuiavia group; and 3) the "international" alliances group.

Great Poland vs. Opole-Silesia

The dukes of Great Poland and Opole-Silesia hardly ever fought each other, and only once due to their mutual rivalry. Their controversy erupted in 1249 and – as other Silesia-Great Poland disputes – was directly related to the legacy left by Henry the Bearded. During his wars with Odonic in the 1230s he secured the lands of Kalisz and Ruda (southern regions of Great Poland at the border of Silesia), and ca. 1238 gave them to Duchess Wiola and her son, Władysław of Opole.[562] After the Mongol invasion which killed Henry the Pious, who controlled the considerable lordship inherited from his father, Bolesław Rogatka – as the oldest son of deceased Henry – seized power. Yet, since his minor brothers were growing up and opposed his monarchical rule, Bolesław found himself in a state of increasing tensions

---

[562] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 138. Perhaps, the donation of Kalisz should be already ascribed to Henryk the Pious who in 1238 took over after Henryk the Bearded's death. Cf. Ibid., 719.

between himself and the remaining brothers. In consequence, for a time being he had to give up some lands in Great Poland. In 1244, Elisabeth, his sister, married Przemysł I of Great Poland and the land of Kalisz – presumably as her dowry – was transferred to Przemysł I's domain.[563] In consequence, Władysław of Opole's lordship shrinked to the unimpressive land of Ruda, because in the land of Opole proper ruled from ca. 1239 his older brother, Mieszko the Fat.[564]

Nevertheless, in 1246, Mieszko the Fat unexpectedly died. This opened the throne of Opole-Silesia to Władysław's succession. The latter, having established his rule in the central domain of his family branch, in 1249 decided to give the land of Ruda to Casimir of Cuiavia for five hundred silver marks. The transaction did not take place, however, because Przemysł I intervened and besieged the stronghold of Ruda and took it, claiming he was exercising his rights of inheritance.[565] There is no information about possible response coming neither from Władysław nor Casimir. Only a few decades later, in 1281, Henryk IV of Wrocław imprisoned Przemysł II, Przemysł I's successor, and forced him to return the land of Ruda.

The controversy over this land very much resembles other inter-provincial antagonisms that emerged between Silesia and Great Poland after the wars of Henry the Bearded. The legitimacies earned by successful war-making and passed on the latter's descendants and their "subordinates" clashed with claims that originated in the customary hereditary law that allowed the dukes of Great Poland to question authority of other dukes in what used to be consider an inherent part of their sphere of domination. Interestingly, the dukes of both provinces did not direct their lordship's expansion against each other. In a sense, in mutual relations they stayed within the inter-subjectively recognized "borders" of their lordships and did not allow themselves to make any further territorial claims than those which they could support with a relevant justification.

Having said that it is important to indicate that there were other occasions when the dukes of Great Poland and Opole-Silesia joined opposite "international" camps. In the early 1270s the lands of Opole suffered from two military expeditions carried out by a coalition of dukes including the rulers of Great Poland. Those clashes, however, if examined from a why-

---

[563] This matter has been already discussed in more detail in the section dedicated to the conflicts between the dukes of Silesia and Great Poland. Cf. Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 25.
[564] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 719.
[565] Nowacki, *Przemysł I*, 181–182.

perspective, did not belong to a territorial competition and were not a chapter of a conquest-and-expansion history. They were related to the rivalry over the throne in Cracow (as explained above in the relevant section) or resulted from "international" commitments of the Piast dukes (taking sides in the succession conflict in the kingdom of Hungary), and thus they had nothing to do with family matters.

Great Poland vs. Cuiavia

In the thirteenth century the relations between Great Poland and Cuiavia were marked by two conflicts. In both cases it was the former that behaved aggressively towards its eastern neighbor and forced territorial concessions. Having remembered how the dukes of Great Poland interacted with their counterparts in Silesia, it may be noticed that there is much discrepancy between the rather passive and defensive attitudes towards the Silesian dukes and a contrary behavior to the dukes of Cuiavia. Here, Great Poland acted more like an involved player who willed to overpower its neighbor. This picture of the belligerent dukes of Great Poland has to be, however, mitigated by one yet serious disclaimer.

There was, in fact, one duke, Bolesław the Pious, who intervened in Cuiavia several times. His interferences could be categorized under two separate conflicts: 1) the Ląd war (1247-48 and 1258-61) and 2) the Cuiavian war (1268-73). In the first case, and here comes the disclaimer I wanted to make, Bolesław's aggressive politics was grounded in well-justified claims; in the second case, he still could provide a reasonable justification for his actions, but a considerably weaker one. Perhaps this could be the reason why he would be well pronounced the victor of the first war but the unsuccessful party in the second one.

Before getting into more details, one more things requires short comment. While saying that Bolesław the Pious had "well-justified" claims to go to war with the dukes of Cuiavia, I am fully aware that providing justification for one's aggression is not by far a modern invention. It could go as a general rule that an attacking party searches for some sort of legitimization. I would argue, however, that in the international system it matters how such legitimization is being produced, that is, whether it derives from rules and principles inter-subjectively recognized within the international society (the general recognition of rules itself stands for a proof that such a society exists) or it is rather invented on the spot in order to cover other, non-legitimate motivations towards conflictual practices. As long as the rules are obeyed (at least by the majority and in most cases), behaviors of international actors can

attain a degree of predictability which allows for more stable and self-governing international system. However, if the rules are mostly ignored and do not apply beyond the dimension of rhetoric and propaganda, then the international system is to greater extent vulnerable to destabilization and anarchical behaviors. From this perspective it can be argued that it is essential for adequate understanding of the thirteenth-century "international" system in the Polish lands to identify whether Bolesław the Pious invented his justifications as he pleased, or his actions were informed by more foreseeable factors. My argument, which so far applies to the findings of the entire survey of family conflicts between the Piasts, is that the intra-dynastic hostilities operated within a quite clear framework. This framework was constituted by competing legitimacies that after all made sense to the contemporaries.

The war of Ląd had its origins – as many Great Poland's territorial disputes – in the first half of the thirteenth century and the reign of Henry the Bearded of Silesia. His successful campaigns in the 1230s against Duke Władysław Odonic of Great Poland that resulted in a series of land concessions to his favor and the Bearded's subsequent distribution of them, made this large province a unit of contested integrity. Odonic's successors rapidly attempted to regain what was lost and hence, the then-current possessors of those regions found themselves challenged in their rights to exercise authority there.

The castellany of Ląd emerged for the first time from the sources in 1236.[566] It was a region located on the eastern border of Great Poland, north to Kalisz and situated between Cuiavia from north and the land of Sieradz from south. Three years later, in 1239, Casimir of Cuiavia married Konstancja, a daughter of Henry the Pious, duke of Silesia,[567] who – as read in the charter issued by Casimir on May 25, 1252[568] – conferred the castellany on Casimir as Konstancja's dowry.

---

[566] Michał Wyszkowski, *Ustrój polityczny Wielkopolski w latach 1138-1296* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2009), 202–203. According to Stanisław Zajączkowski the Bull of Gniezno, issued in 1136, already mentioned the castellany of Ląd. In fact, it only registered the names of ecclesiastical properties, and I would argue that it is too much to assume that there were existing administrative districts, i.e,. castellanies, behind the list of names: cf. Stanisław Zajączkowski, *Studia nad terytorialnym formowaniem ziemi łęczyckiej i sieradzkiej* (Łódź: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1951), 15.

[567] *Dux Kazimirus Filius Conradi accepit filiam Henrici sibi in uxorem quinto gradu consanguineitatis a se distantem*: Brygida Kürbis, ed., "Rocznik Kapituły Gnieźnieńskiej," in *Monumenta Poloniae Historica, Series Nova*, vol. 6 (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1962), 5.

[568] *Nos igitur Kazimirus Dei gracia dux Lanchicie et Cuiavie notum facimus presentibus et futuris, quo cum racione dotis inclite ducisse Constancie, uxoris nostre et matris nobilium ducum Lestconis et Semomisli filiorum nostrorum, Lendensem castellaturam teneremus*: Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1877, vol. 1, n. 304.

In 1247, Bolesław the Pious – right after he had been granted by his older brother, Przemysł I, his own lordship in the land of Kalisz – invaded the castellany and captured the Ląd castle.[569] In response, a year later, Casimir organized an expedition and retook the castellany.[570] For a time being the *status quo* was maintained. However, in 1257 Bolesław inherited the entire province after his deceased brother, Przemysł I, and soon mounted another campaign aiming at restoring Ląd to his domain. A war broke out in 1258 with Bolesław conquering a part of the castellany; a year later, however, his success was diminished by powerful invasions carried out by Casimir who plundered the land of Kalisz and – helped by Duke Świętopełk of Pomerania – constructed a stronghold in Pakość in the land of Gniezno.[571]

In fall, 1259, Bolesław the Pious organized a retaliatory campaign which engaged substantial auxiliary forces. So far the conflict had only involved the two dukes and the only third parties concerned were Pomeranian dukes; in 1258, Warcisław was on Bolesław's side, and in 1259 Świętopełk of Pomerania appeared at Casimir's side, but merely to support his efforts in constructing the stronghold in Pakość. In contrast, Bolesław's campaign, launched in early October 1259, was already a political and military enterprise since he had managed to attract to his side Bolesław the Chaste of Little Poland and Siemowit of Mazovia, who also engaged his own Ruthenian allies. The ducal coalition invaded the land of Łęczyca, which belonged to Casimir's domain, laid it waste, built a stronghold and appointed Siemowit to administer it. As a result, Casimir requested a truce and proposed the coalition to meet on St. Andrew's feast day (November 30, 1259) to settle the conflict. He also promised to make amends for all his wrongdoings.[572]

There is no information available about tentative negotiations at the summit meeting of November 30, 1259. However, according to the charter issued on June 13, 1260 in Tuszyn, Casimir had by that time struck some sort of agreement with Bolesław the Pious. Unfortunately, no further details appear in the charter and remain enigmatic.[573] In the same year, anyway, Casimir made an incursion into Little Poland against Bolesław the Chaste and

---

[569] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:303. See also: Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 35–36.

[570] Szymczak, "Walki o kasztelanię," 19.

[571] Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 79–85.

[572] Szymczak, "Walki o kasztelanię," 30–31.

[573] *Noverint universi, ad quos presentes littere pervenerint, quod nos Kazimirus dei gracia Dux Landchicie et Cujavie, ordinacione facta cum nobili viro Boleslao Duce Polonie*: Leon Ryszczewski and Antoni Muczkowski, eds., *Codex Diplomaticus Poloniae*, vol. 1 (Varsaviae: s.n., 1847), n. 48.

built a stronghold in Lelów, but he lost it immediately afterwards.[574] In addition, in December 1260 he held a summit in Przedbórz with Bolesław the Chaste and Siemowit of Mazovia in an attempt to resolve their controversies.[575]

In 1261 the conflict over Ląd entered its final stage. The source accounts report that because Casimir had been reluctant to fulfill his promises and to give back the remaining half of the castellany to Bolesław the Pious, in August 1261 the latter had summoned his troops to wage war against the former. Casimir, however, felt too weak to face the challenge, thus he ultimately gave up the case of Ląd and through the intercession of Wolimir, bishop of Włocławek, he returned the castellany to Bolesław.[576] On December 10, 1261, the duke of Great Poland, as current holder of the castellany, issued a charter that confirmed the privileges of the Cistercians in Ląd.[577] This act was an epilogue to the decades-long ducal contest.

To sum up, the conflict over Ląd was basically another case of competing legitimacies. Bolesław the Pious claimed his hereditary rights to the castellany which had been taken away from his father's domain in the late 1230s. Casimir of Cuiavia could refer to the rights acquired by marriage with Konstancja who had received her dowry from her father, Henryk the Pious, the then recognized lord of this section of Great Poland.

According to legal historians, in the thirteenth-century Polish lands dowry was a piece of family property that a girl shall receive while entering marriage. In most cases, dowry was paid in money or alternatively was cut off from land estates that did not constitute the

---

[574] *Lelou castrum per Kazimirum ducem edificatur et statim per Bolezlaum ducem destruitur*: Zofia Kozłowska-Budkowa, "Rocznik Kapitulny Krakowski," in *Monumenta Poloniae Historica, Series Nova*, vol. 5 (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1978), 89. Długosz does not mention this military episode in 1260, but a year later, after the conflict over Ląd was already resolved cf. idem, 134. This chronology, however, seems less probable to me for two fundamental reasons: first, I tend to accept the dating by the *Rocznik kapitulny*, which was much closer to the events and was, in fact, consulted by Długosz. Second, the course of events (as explained in the main text) supports the *Rocznik kapitulny*'s account and renders Długosz's version less justified.

[575] Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 89. Labuda, Michowicz, and Biskup, *The History of Polish Diplomacy X-XX C.*, 54. For the extensive discussion of the summit see: Bronisław Włodarski, "Rywalizacja O Ziemie Pruskie W Połowie XIII Wieku," *Roczniki Towarzystwa Naukowego W Toruniu* 61, no. 1 (1956): 60–61.

[576] *Demum anno predicto Boleslaus Pius Wladislai, Polonie dux, circa festum sancti Bartholomei* [24 August 1261 – wk] *collegit exercitum fortem, ut terras Cuyauie Kazimiri ducis invaderet incendio et spoliis destinandas seu destruendas propter hoc, quod medietatem castellanie Landensis predictus Kazimirus contra promissa Boleslao reddere non curabat. Sed Kazimirus cernens se disparem potencie Boleslai, mediante Wolimiro, Wladislauiensi episcopo medietatem castellanie Landensi residuam Boleslao resignavit cum castello, quod construxerat in eadem* – (roz. 137, s 116).

[577] Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1877, vol. 1, n. 393. See also: Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 116; Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 131.

hereditary core of the family wealth. Such practice would explain why Henry the Pious ceded the castellany of Ląd (located outside of his central Silesian domain) instead of giving up a share of land in Silesia (besides, it made more sense from geographical point of view). In theory, dowry belonged to the bride, that is, it was either inherited by her sons or – in case of her heirless death – the dowry shall return to the family she had come from.[578]

Arguing along those lines, since Konstancja had died between 1253 and 1257[579] – that is, before the second phase of the war of Ląd broke out – yet she left two adolescent sons, Leszek and Siemiomysł, on the legal ground the castellany of Ląd should have been considered as their rightful heritage. However, this conflict was not a mere court case but an element of the "international" politics, thus the matter of competing legitimacies was solved in a number of military campaigns which ultimately turned out positive to Bolesław the Pious. Moreover, the war of Ląd was basically reported by sources deriving from Great Poland (and two centuries later by Długosz who employed them extensively).[580] Consequently, Bolesław's case was fashioned in terms of waging just war, while Casimir lacked an advocate who would speak for him.[581] Furthermore, Casimir never endeavored to advance his possessions in Great Poland and he focused solely on reaffirming his authority in Ląd. I would argue that in 1259 the construction of a stronghold in Pakość was an episodic and tactical move rather than preparation for the conquest of the land of Gniezno.[582]

Bolesław the Pious intervened in Cuiavia again in 1268. On December 14, 1267 died Casimir of Cuiavia, Bolesław's rival to the castellany of Ląd.[583] His death ensued a new distribution of lands within Casimir's lordship between his sons. This issue has been already discussed earlier in this chapter. According to observations made in this survey, the moment

---

[578] Juliusz Bardach, *Historia ustroju i prawa polskiego* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1993), 134–135.
[579] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 413–414.
[580] Semkowicz, *Krytyczny rozbiór*, 277–279.
[581] Paweł Żmudzki noted that the sources originating from Great Poland made Kazimierz of Cuiavia the subject of a "black legend", which was thereafter picked up by Długosz: Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 108.
[582] Kazimierz, as perceived by the narrative sources, was a bad guy with no agenda to pursue. In both cases, in 1247 and 1258, he was a victim of Bolesław's justified aggression. In general his motivations must have been wicked, because he did not comply with Bolesław's demands. This would actually mean that Kazimierz's defence of the *status quo* and his artful stratagems to secure his possessions – as pictured by Długosz – although characteristic and natural for an "international" actor, were all stamped with evil, and thus they were appraised in moral categories and not in terms of rational choice, individual interest or larger-scale strategy. In a nutshell, Bolesław's driving force for his predatory politics against the duke of Cuiavia was the desire to reclaim his patrimony and such an attitude was good and well-justified. On the other hand, Kazimierz did all he could to prevent this restoration from happening and this was unethical and unjust.
[583] Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów małopolskich i kujawskich*, 58–59.

of division of father's domain was quite often a fundamental source of antagonisms for lord-sons. It can be, however, suggested that in the moment of temporary absence of ducal/royal power, there was a general drive to try and lay claims for estates, even if those claims would be feeble and unconvincing. Such reaching for disputed areas, castles or properties was fueled by a hope that seizing them would increase chances for holding them later for good.

In the case of Cuiavia, the recently emptied throne was smoothly filled with Siemomysł who received this land as a lordship after his father. However, taking power by a new duke could not happen without recognition from the local nobility that was typically attained by some sort of negotiations. Perhaps the status of the barons in Cuiavia was not as firm as in Little Poland (electoral practices were known there from the late eleventh century) but still a new duke's obligation was to come to terms with the elite that was expected to subject to him.

Żmudzki analyzed the early moments of Siemomysł's rule in Cuiavia. He pointed to the duke's conciliatory attitude towards Bishop Wolimir of Włocławek who was the major ecclesiastical (and lordly) figure in the duchy. Żmudzki observed that Siemomysł granted privileges to the diocese which, in consequence, virtually turned into a separate lordship with a very limited number of services owed to the duke.[584] It is worth noting that Duke Casimir never made such long-reaching concessions and Siemomysł's actions could have been perceived as an attempt to set up good relationships in new inter-lordly circumstances. Apparently, for the most of the year 1268 the interactions between the duke and the bishop were good yet Żmudzki noticed that sometime in 1268 (presumably in late Fall) Bishop Wolimir requested another confirmation of privileges, so far granted to him by both Kazimierz and Siemomysł, from Bolesław the Pious of Great Poland. And his plea was not ignored which – in Żmudzki's reading – was an evidence for the bishop's distrust towards the young duke of Cuiavia.[585] Interestingly, in his confirmation charter Bolesław called Casimir his "patruus" (a fatherly uncle) and made Siemomysł his "frater" (a brother). Żmudzki put forward an

---

[584] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 206–207. For the privilege see: Piekosiński, *KDM*, 1876, vol. 1, n. 608.

[585] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 208.

assumption that such "abbreviation" of kinship[586] was Bolesław the Pious' attempt to highlight his rights to the lands of Cuiavia (which in fact he had none).[587]

Without a more detailed (and perhaps comparative) study it is hard to decide about motivations that impacted the bishop's attitudes towards the two dukes. Nevertheless, it can be asserted that in 1268 Wolimir to certain extent recognized the authority of Bolesław, that is, he acknowledged him as another lord who could protect the diocese's privileges from possible breaches committed by the dukes of Cuiavia. In consequence, Bolesław's confirmation – made on the bishop's request – created some room for his prospective "making-sense" intervention in Cuiavia.

Besides, the relations between Siemomysł and his local lords deteriorated towards the end of 1269 and resulted in a rebellion. Still in 1268, certain Teodoryk, the castellan of Bydgoszcz, surrendered his stronghold to Bolesław. Furthermore, some Cuiavian barons disapproved of Siemomysł's policy favoring German knights (by allowing them to serve at his court and promising them privileges)[588] and apparently sought support from Bolesław who then entered Cuiavia and controlled much of it (including Bydgoszcz and Kruszwica which both came under his direct rule).[589]

Two years later, in 1271, a war broke out again. This time – in Hlebionek's reading – Siemomysł was presumably the aggressor but according to Żmudzki[590] it was rather another rebellion of nobility, which had sought Bolesław's assistance, that caused the conflict. Siemomysł attempted to recapture Kruszwica which originally belonged to his duchy. His initial success was temporal. Bolesław mounted a coalition with Mściwój II of Pomerania and

---

[586] Their common ancestor was only Bolesław the Wrymouth (d. 1138), and so merely Bolesław's great-grandfather and Kazimierz's grandfather were brothers.

[587] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 208.

[588] About the reasons that triggered rebellion one can find more in a charter issued in 1278 by Przemysł II of Great Poland, who acted as an intermediary between Siemomysł and Leszek and worked out a compromise that allowed the former to return to his lordship and regain it: *Noverint presentes et futuri, quod cum colloquium celebraretur inter dominum L. ducem Syradie et dominum ducem Zemo. Cuyaviensem, nos, predictum Pre. ducem Polonie, iam dicti principes L. et Zem. mediatorem ac assessorem elegerunt. Tunc predictus dux Syradie terram Cuyavie fratri suo domino duci Zem. per nostram ordinacionem et procuracionem karitative restauravit, super talibus ordinacionibus compromissis, quod predictus Zem. dux Cuyavie frater noster, Teuthonicales milites et filios militum Teuthonicalium in terra et curia sua servare denegaret, item et quascunque promissiones privilegiorum olim promisit vel tradidit maturo sine consilio, frivola et vana perseverant*: Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1877, vol. 1, n. 482.

[589] Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 96–97. Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:304. Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 210–213.

[590] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 217–218.

together they managed to defeat the Cuiavian duke. Siemomysł virtually lost his lordship and was exiled. Cuiavia fell in Bolesław's hands, except for one castellany grabbed by Mściwój.[591]

The conflict between Bolesław the Pious and Siemomysł was to a certain degree unusual in comparison to many others analyzed in this survey. Bolesław did not organize customary devastation-incursions on his opponent's territories but clearly attempted to get a hold of Siemomysł's lands. His claims were, however, problematic because he could not reach back to his predecessors and demonstrate their rights to power in Cuiavia. Although he made use of such strategy in the case of Ląd, plainly it could not work in other parts of the lordship once held by Casimir of Cuiavia. Bolesław's sole legitimation to domination in that region was – as one can observe from the source material – the decision of the local nobles and (presumably) the bishop who, while being at odds with their newly arrived duke, sought protection, assistance and advice from the neighboring Piast.

It has to be, by the way, noted that in the late 1260s both Cuiavia and Mazovia were governed by young generation of dukes. The oldest among them, Leszek the Black, was no more than thirty-years-old. Over forty-years-old Bolesław the Pious of a relatively powerful province of Great Poland, could have been seen by the barons living in the border region of Bolesław's lordship as the only reasonable point of reference in the dispute with their own duke. By checking possible alternatives, it could be argued that Bolesław fitted best as a tentative mediator.

Bolesław the Pious, therefore, did invade Cuiavia on request from the local nobility. It was the only genuine claim he could use to back his interference. Perhaps initially his intercession was also encouraged by Siemomysł as a short account from the *Kronika wielkopolska* may suggest.[592] The conflict is poorly informed by the sources and hence, about individual motivations much can be speculated and little is certain. And yet, Żmudzki's analysis of Bolesław's practices of exercising authority in Cuiavia points to interesting findings. He observed:

Although the victory of the ruler of Great Poland was evident [that is, Bolesław's over Siemomysł in 1271 – wk], *he refrained from adopting the title of the duke of Cuiavia. Only on*

[591] Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 97–98. See also: Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 219–221, 225.
[592] Abgarowicz and Kürbis, *Kronika wielkopolska*, chap. 156.

August 8, 1271 Bolesław the Pious, while giving a grant to Wolimir, called himself, or perhaps was called by the episcopal chancellery (the issuer of the charter), the duke of Cuiavia. Three months later, in a peace treaty with the Teutonic Order, Bolesław appeared only as the ruler of Great Poland though he still governed the duchy of Inowrocław. Since then, while delivering justice in Cuiavia, he solely referred to his title of Great Poland.[593]

Żmudzki concluded that Bolesław's behavior was a clear evidence that he considered himself as a temporary ruler in Cuiavia who had no rights to exercise any permanent authority there. Whatever his thinking was, it is striking that Bolesław did not adopt the title of the duke of Cuiavia.[594]

According to the scholarly literature, in late 1273 Bolesław the Pious ceded his authority over Cuiavia to Leszek the Black. Bolesław's resignation was related to the re-confirmation of Bishop Wolimir's privileges and reconciliation between the duke and the bishop. Although Bolesław kept control over Bydgoszcz, Kruszwica and Radziejów, the remaining parts of Siemomysł's lordship returned to Casimir's legitimate successors.[595] Moreover, Bolesław's withdrawal was apparently peaceful and did not involve any military action. In short, he retired from his authority over Cuiavia because he respected the Leszek-Wolimir compromise.

As it has been already mentioned, in 1278 Leszek restored his brother to the duchy of Cuiavia under several conditions. This compromise was again struck with a help of a mediator, this time it was Przemysł II of Great Poland. This may suggest that the practice of the Cuiavian dukes of seeking advice in Great Poland in their internal discords managed to grow some roots.

Summing up the conflicts between Cuiavia and Great Poland, it is clear that the war of Ląd was distinct in its character from the later war of Cuiavia. The first originated in the

---

[593] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 225.

[594] For instance, in the middle of the 1230s, soon after officially acquiring significant parts of Great Poland, Henryk the Bearded added to the list of his formal titles the title: the duke of Great Poland. Such practices, therefore, could be considered as manifestations of lordly aspirations toward certain lands and territories. Cf. Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1877, vol. 1, n. 186. Analogically Bolesław Rogatka of Silesia, the immediate successor of the Henryks' of Silesia, also used this title, cf. Ibid., vol. 1, n. 227. Furthermore, for the last but telling example the case of Kazimierz of Cuiavia could be recalled. As he enjoyed the highly-disputed rights to control the castellany of Ląd, in 1241 he decided to emphasize his authority there by assuming an unusual title while exchanging estates with the monastery of Ląd: *ego Kasimirus Dei gracia dux Coavie et Landensis*; Ibid., vol. 1, n. 228.

[595] Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 102. Cf. Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 239.

outcomes of military campaigns of the 1230s between Henry the Bearded and Odonic, and derived its intensity from competing legitimate claims to the disputed castellany. The second conflict, however, does not match the standard conflict framework, to wit, the clash of claims (mostly of hereditary origin) to control and domination over a given land. Although Bolesław did conquer SIemomysł's lordship and exercised power there for a couple of years, his "international" behavior did not fully resembled actions carried out by other lords that yet had similar outcomes. He arrived on request from the local bishop and nobility with a task to reconcile the duke with his subjects. He was given two castellanies (Bydgoszcz and Kruszwica) but later – either provoked by Siemomysł's hostile action or again encouraged by rebellious local lords – he defeated the duke and extended his authority across his entire lordship. Nevertheless, Bolesław did not claim the lordship itself, for he refused to assume the proper title. Two years later he peacefully returned the duchy to its legal successors and still in 1273 he part took with Leszek the Black in an inter-ducal expedition against Opole-Silesia. He did not, however, gave up the castellanies he had been initially given.

Within the framework of this survey it is difficult to identify why Bolesław the Pious surrendered a part of his lordship and never raised any claims to it. Perhaps he was preoccupied with his politics towards Brandenburg or he had to watch out for Przemysł II, his nephew, who had just escaped from Gniezno and began his rule in Poznań. Or maybe Henry IV Probus' incursion distracted him from the matters of Cuiavia. Possibly he was also wondering about the intervention in Opole-Silesia with a coalition of dukes in support for Steven V, his ally, who had been fighting against Přemysl Ottakar II over the succession to the Hungarian throne.[596] All those reasons could temporarily divert Bolesław's attention from Cuiavia but – as the examples of the Great Poland-Silesian relations showed – they could not make him simply forget about his former possessions. If he had genuinely considered them as his, he would have gone to war with Leszek the Black later. But he did not. Furthermore, his successor, Przemysł II, never put the rule over Cuiavia on his agenda. This could be another indication that he did not recognize this land as a territory that needed to be restored to his family.

The war of Cuiavia was, therefore, not a regular conflict of competing legitimacies. Nor it was a standard conquest aiming at expansion and subjugation of an enemy territory.

---

[596] Pál Engel, *Realm of St Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895-1526* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 107.

Bolesław's legitimation for action derived from invitation by the locals to whom his presence and authority was – in that particular moment – acceptable and making-sense. However, there are no signs in the extant source material that they elected him their duke. He also did not assume this dignity himself. He retained lands he had been given. In consequence, his intervention was primarily a form of a military-based but requested intercession with elements of lordship-building strategies. In a nutshell, Bolesław was given a chance to expand his authority and he responded positively to this opportunity.

Intra-Piast conflicts caused by "international" commitments

In the classical work of the Polish inter-war scholarly literature there is a very negative appraisal of the "international" commitments made by the Piast dukes towards the second half of the thirteenth century.[597] Between 1239 and 1265 the dukes of Little Poland, Great Poland and Sieradz entered into dynastical ties with the Árpáds. These marriages linked them more closely to the kingdom of Hungary. Meanwhile, from ca. 1254, Přemysl Ottokar II, who had just inherited the throne of Bohemia after his father,[598] energetically and quite unexpectedly engaged in developing close relations with the dukes of Silesia.[599] From among the Silesian dukes, Přemysl was particularly interested in coming to terms with Władysław of Opole who a year earlier embarked on a joint campaign with Bolesław the Chaste and Daniel of Ruthenia, and invaded the kingdom of Bohemia in order to support King Béla IV of Hungary in the war with the Přemyslids over the emptied lordship of the Babenbergs.[600] Gradually, Přemysl Ottokar II emerged in the Polish lands as an influential actor who increasingly strengthened his position in Silesia and found ways to attract the dukes from beyond that province.

On the whole, in the middle of the thirteenth century in the Polish lands the scholarly literature identified two political "camps" or "coalitions" that comprised dukes supporting either the king of Bohemia or of Hungary in their mutual conflicts. The negative appraisal of such ducal "international" commitments derived from the observation that by sending

---

[597] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:330–337.

[598] Jaroslav Pánek and Oldřich Tůma, *A History of the Czech Lands* (Prague: Karolinum Press, 2009), 108–109.

[599] Antoni Barciak, *Czechy oraz ziemie południowej Polski w XIII oraz w początkach XIV wieku: polityczno-ideologiczne problemy ekspansji czeskiej na ziemie południowej Polski* (Katowice: Uniwersytet Śląski, 1992), 93–94.

[600] Font, *Árpád-házi királyok*, 257–258. See also: Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka*, 226–227; Włodarski, *Polska i Ruś*, 142–143; Bronisław Włodarski, *Polska i Czechy w drugiej połowie XIII i początkach XIV wieku (1250-1306)* (Lwów: Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1931), 14–18.

military contingents to the Bohemian-Hungarian battles "the Polish blood flowed and the Polish good was wrecked for the entirely foreign cause".[601] The older historiography that used to analyze medieval politics within the conceptual framework of national interest, could hardly recognize any immediate gains from such military engagements and hence viewed them as useless and unnecessary. Nevertheless, about the "camps" and "coalitions" that brought external discord to the Polish lands it can be also read in the most recent works. Żmudzki painted a vivid picture of a big "international" conflict in Central Europe, into which the Polish dukes were first drawn as the allies of Béla IV (in 1253), but subsequently Přemysl Ottokar II followed suit and decided to build another party for himself (in 1254).[602]

The allegiance of the Polish dukes to the two separate and apparently hostile coalitions in the second half of the thirteenth century requires, in my view, a refreshed analysis that would approach this important issue from the logic of lordship management and would put less emphasis on state-centered logic of contemporary international relations. Leaving this discussion aside, two points shall be made here.

First, the division of Central Europe into two military camps, the Bohemian and Hungarian, had a limited effect in terms of generating conflicts. Practically speaking, there was merely a single instance when the troops of the Piast dukes confronted each other outside the Polish lands. It happened in the war of 1259 and 1260, when Bolesław the Chaste and Leszek the Black backed Béla IV, whereas Henry III of Wrocław and Władysław of Opole supported Přemysl Ottokar II.[603] The conflict between these two parties only briefly resumed after Béla IV's death (1270). Then, the king of Bohemia attempted to get the Hungarian throne and challenged Steven V's rights to power. They came to terms, however, in 1271[604] and since then up until the beginning of the fourteenth century there was no major conflicts between them anymore. In consequence, the Piasts were no more put in the position to fight each other in the ranks of foreign armies.

Second, there was only one intra-Piast military conflict that could be directly linked to the existence of big coalitions in Central Europe. In 1271, Bolesław the Chaste of Little Poland,

---

[601] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:334–335.
[602] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 118. See also: Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 77. Analogically about Přemysl Ottokar II using the Piasts as building blocks of a wide-military alliances see: Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka*, 230–231.
[603] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:333.
[604] Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 107.

Bolesław the Pious of Great Poland and Konrad of Czersk organized military incursions to the duchy of Wrocław.[605] It was not, therefore, a regular war with pitched battles but rather a number of small-scale invasions that could have impeded prospective larger military commitments of Duke Henry IV of Wrocław for the sake of the Přemyslids during the succession war in the kingdom of Hungary. The limited scope of the presumably pro-Árpádian interventions was caused by parallel involvements of the major dukes of the Hungarian "coalition" in other locations. Still in 1271 Bolesław the Pious, for instance, attacked the castellany of Santok controlled by the Brandenburgs and – as it has been already discussed – he also intervened in Cuiavia. The source material about those events is fairly scarce. Besides, none of them points to the Árpád-Přemyslid conflict as a trigger for intra-Piast hostilities. This succession war has been simply acknowledged without drawing long-reaching conclusions.[606]

Nevertheless, on the basis of the *Galician-Volynian Chronicle*[607] and the letter of complaint issued by Bishop Thomas of Wrocław on June 28, 1271[608], where beside Bolesław the Chaste and Konrad of Czersk, the Ruthenians, Cumans and Lithuanians, he listed names and origins of a number of knights and nobles who allegedly had devastated Silesia, one could conceive the picture of joint expedition of non-Silesian nobility against this province. Interestingly, the bishop himself, although complaining about the destruction of his estates and afflicted casualties, did not link the dukes' incursion with the succession war. The letter reads only that Bolesław the Chaste carried out his plan "disregarding the fear of God and inspired by wrong advice" (*Dei timore postposito iniquo ductus consilio*); an indication that indeed leaves much room for speculation.

All in all, Bolesław and Konrad's action against Silesia, supported by knights and officials from various lands (Great Poland, Sieradz), was not a typical military conflict caused by competing legitimacies over a disputed territory. Such intervention appears chiefly as a hit-and-go campaign that fits quite well into the scheme of the clash of "international" coalitions, yet on the local level. The main argument is, however, based on ignorance of a contemporary historian. Namely, there are no equally good reasons for those incursions other than linking them to the system of alliances and inter-dependencies within the dynastic triangle of the

---

[605] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 215. See also: Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny*, 94.
[606] See: Rocznik kapitulny krakowski, *MPH*, 1872, 2:813.
[607] Perfecky, *The Galician-Volynian Chronicle*, 87.
[608] Piekosiński, *KDM*, 1876, vol. 1, n. 611.

Árpáds, Piasts and Přemyslids. Notably, Bolesław and Konrad's expedition, seemingly advertised in central and Great Poland and having consent from the lord-dukes of those provinces, was not aimed at conquering lands and expanding one's overlordship across new territories. There was no deeply-grounded agenda behind it save pillaging and ransacking. Hence, not much of internecine "brotherly" combat occurred as it happened every now and then during, for instance, the wars of Cracow (Mozgawa 1195; Suchodół 1243; Bogucin 1273; Siewierz 1289).

In sum, in the second half of the thirteenth century the existence of two hostile "camps" (recalling the logic of Cold War, which was the period when much of the political scholarly research was carried out) that triggered the intra-Piast discords and generated long-lasting divisions needs to be revisited as a notion that does not provide evidence for much more than one conflict throughout the period. On the contrary, the majority of them could be better explained by reference to family-related concerns and disagreements, rather than by exploring "international" commitments.

Nonetheless, there is one more observation to be made here. International alliances perhaps did not much provoke intra-Piast conflicts but establishing broad international ties could result in fostering military auxiliaries who could then be utilized in grappling with local-scale conflicts. In a word, "international" commitments of lords was a way to boost one's resources and potential, that is, they could result in affordable military contingents that would be drawn "globally" but employed in restricted areas of conflict and for short-lived purposes.

Intra-Silesian conflicts

This separate section has been curved out from the whole body of the Piasts conflicts in the thirteenth century in order to address the politics of Henry IV Probus of Wrocław that took shape ca. 1280. Prior to this date, Henry remained under protection of Přemysl Ottokar II and cooperated with him closely in the Habsburg-Přemyslid conflict.[609] Henry's position was challenged by Bolesław Rogatka of Legnica, his uncle, who in 1277 managed to take hold of a portion of Henry's lordship. Bolesław demanded one-third of the heritage after his brother

---

[609] Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka*, 332.

Władysław, another Henry's uncle and his guardian until death in 1270. This conflict still followed the scheme of a competing legitimacies rivalry.[610]

In 1278, however, there were serious changes in the political constellation of Silesia. Přemysl of Bohemia perished in a battle against the Habsburgs and a few months later died Bolesław of Legnica.[611] In consequence, Henry IV Probus of Wrocław found himself in a more favorable position for despite he lost his potent protector, he was also freed from the imminent menace from the duke of Legnica and in a new circumstances he could attempt to redistribute power in the region by interfering in the succession crisis in Bohemia and by building his position in Silesia.

After the death of Přemysl Ottokar II the kingdom of Bohemia, as Czech historiography emphasizes, entered a period of chaos.[612] In 1278, Přemysl's only son and heir, Wenceslas II, was only seven years old.[613] The powerful and influential monarchy lost its regional impact due to the lack of a strong figure who could muster resources and carry out efficient politics on the "international" stage. Instead, King Rudolf Habsburg of the Romans stepped into Přemysl's shoes. The king's agenda was to reshape the lordship organization in the region in order to make sure that the Habsburgs would get the Austrian lands from the Přemyslids. Besides, another pending matter was to decide upon the form of bonds that should tie the kingdom of Bohemia with the empire, for the barons of the former submitted to the victorious king and offered him their services. During the peace negotiations one of the conclusions was that the lands of Bohemia and Moravia would return to the empire as a fief.[614]

It could be, therefore, argued that in the years directly proceeding after the fall of Přemysl Ottokar II, favorable conditions for considerable lordship reconfiguration in the region up-then dominated by the king of Bohemia emerged. Henry IV of Wrocław belonged to this world and subsequently acted accordingly.

At that point, the position and authority of the king of the Romans was unquestioned. He was the major pillar than sustained the new order in Central Europe. Merging military

---

[610] Cf. Ibid., 324–331.
[611] Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, 117.
[612] Pánek and Tůma, *A History of the Czech Lands*, 2009, 111. Cf. Kateřina Charvátová, *Václav II: Král Český a Polský* (Praha: Vyšehrad, 2007), 48–49.
[613] He was born in 1271. For more details see: Charvátová, *Václav II*, 2007, 18.
[614] Karl Friedrich Krieger, *Rudolf von Habsburg* (Darmstadt: Primus, 2003), 153–161. See also: Weiler, "Image," November 1998, 1135.

success with the prestige of his office, Rudolf of Habsburg could not only formally subdue the kingdom of Bohemia to his overlordship but – by strongly interfering with the matters of the Bohemian lordship – he was capable of establishing new bonds with local dukes. According to Nowacki, in 1280 Henry IV of Wrocław met in Vienna with Rudolf Habsburg, paid homage to him, and subsequently received the royal approval for his crown-seeking policy in the Piast lands.[615]

In my understanding, the duke of Wrocław deliberately joined the "fiefs and vassals" game and recognized its rules as the legitimate form of exercising power and enhancing elite standing within the hierarchical framework of the Christian society of lords. Having seen the royal office of Bohemia subjected to the authority of the king of the Romans, he could easily think about becoming a central figure in Silesia by means of his direct submission to Rudolf and reproduction of vassal bonds down to the lower strata of local lords.

What followed was Henry IV's aggression towards his neighbors in Silesia and Opole-Silesia. In 1281, he imprisoned Henry of Głogów and Henry of Legnica[616] and forced them to pay homage to him. Soon followed other dukes.[617] All in all, there were five Piast lords that accepted Henry's overlordship: apart from the two mentioned earlier there were Bolesław of Opole, Konrad of Ścinawa and Przemko of Żagań.[618] Interestingly, those examples are the first in the thirteenth century that show some sort of self-imposed formal subordination among the Piasts. The reminiscences of the seniorate-system were weak and distant, and the instances of guardianship over minor lord-to-bes do not match the same category of hierarchic setup. Henry IV – himself widely trained and experienced in the workings and rules of the imperial political culture due to his education in the Přemyslid court[619] – by violent means introduced to Silesia and to his fellow Piasts a system of intra-dynastic dependencies.

It was an important innovation in the Piast lands. The logic behind it was plain. Assuming higher social standing, that is, excelling neighboring lord-dukes in honor and subsequently (presumably) reaching for a royal crown, required building a network of prestigious subjects. Besides, for Henry IV it must have been evident that for him there was

---

[615] Nowacki, *Przemysł II*, 100–101.
[616] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 371.
[617] Jurek, "Polska droga," 165.
[618] Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 21–22, 25.
[619] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 427.

no other option to unify Silesia but by the means of feudal bonds. As this conflict-survey demonstrated, the rules of "international" behaviors would not allow the duke of Wrocław to simply conquer the lands of other Piasts without a good justification that would, in turn, stimulate support for him from the local nobles. Henry IV was too weak (as any Piast duke at the time would be) to seize control over the Polish lands with an army. He also lacked legitimate causes to claim entire lordships at the expanse of his fellow dukes who were practically predestined to wield some sort of power over people and territory. In consequence, Henry IV could only adapt and seek new ways of gaining position and prestige without stripping other lords of their power; which anyway he could not afford.

Bringing explicit feudal practices to the intra-dynastic relations had one more significant corollary. Creating dependencies worked against the progressing fragmentation of the former duchy of Poland. Although the Piasts principally functioned and perceived themselves as equals in mutual relations, and probably resented the thought of being subjected to other members of their own dynasty, they must have also realized that acting on their own in the conditions of increasingly smaller lordships made them vulnerable to external threats and relatively poor in money and resources. Since the notion of subordination, technically speaking, was not a new issue to them,[620] therefore, a feudal ladder of dependencies could appear as a way of enhancing one's standing by joining (or forming) a larger and more prestigious entity. The idea of re-instating the kingdom of Poland as a possible instance of such honorable political entity could inspire the minds of some ambitious Piast dukes.[621] According to this concept, the king of Poland would have his own hereditary lands but, in addition, he would extend his authority over a number of lord-dukes and other lesser lords. In so doing, he would restore a kingdom without much injuring the lordships of the remainder. Generally speaking, such system was already functioning in the empire for at least half a century. Henry IV of Wrocław was most probably well aware of it.

Anyway, it appears that introducing subjugation through imprisonment was not the most efficient method in Silesia. Towards the late 1280s, as Jurek observed, some of the dukes

---

[620] This matter shall be elaborated later in the text while discussing the practicalities of the discourse of honor and prestige in the context of the Christian society.

[621] Polish scholarship dedicated a great deal of works to the so-called "unification matter". It is not my aim here to address this complicated issue, although I consider it worth revisiting in the light of the analysis provided in this work. For most recent summary of the scholarly problem see: Jurek, "Polska Droga."

– judging from their later actions – either totally broke any ties of dependency from Henry IV or they worked their way out to real independence.[622] The dynamics of this process is, however, more complicated than merely overcoming the reluctance of some Piasts to paying homage to their more powerful peers. There were other factors at play. Wenceslas II of Bohemia, himself perhaps a vassal of Rudolf Habsburg,[623] was slowly restoring the position of his lordship in the region and began attracting the Piast dukes. For instance, on January 10, 1289 Duke Casimir of Bytom recognized Wenceslas II as his overlord.[624] Furthermore, on June 23, 1290[625] Henry IV prematurely died and thus it is difficult to meaningfully speculate how would the new rise of the Přemyslids correspond with Henry's politics as the ruler of Cracow and the most influential lord in Silesia.

Before his death, Henry IV issued the last will that distributed his compound lordship, comprising a number of various lands and territories, among other lords.[626] Recently, Jurek questioned the act's authenticity but somewhat inconclusively, for he did not find clear reasons for carrying out a forgery. [627] Besides, Jurek accepted one of the last will's decisions that Henry IV's successor in Wrocław would be Henry of Głogów (as this element found its confirmation in other sources) but he was much more reluctant to acknowledge another of the last will's points that spoke of making Przemysł II of Great Poland Henry IV's successor in Cracow.[628]

Anyway, the throne of Wrocław became a matter of contest between Duke Henry of Głogów and Duke Henry of Legnica; both were cousins of Henry IV and grandsons of Duke Henry the Pious. However, what differentiated them was how they legitimized their claims to Wrocław. The lord of Głogów could easily point to Herny IV's appointment. His opponent, the

---

[622] Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 22.

[623] For the discussion about problems around the presumed subjection of Wenceslas II to the king of the Romans and how inconclusive its arguments may be, see: Robert Antonín, *Zahraniční Politika Krále Václava II. v Letech 1283-1300* (Brno: Matice moravská, 2009), 85–91.

[624] Barciak, *Czechy oraz ziemie*, 114.

[625] Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, 160.

[626] Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1878, vol. 2, n. 645.

[627] Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 27.

[628] *Primumque, in terra Slesie totoque Wratislaviensi dominio, quondam (sic) ad nos sive ex paterna sive ex patrueli successione devenerat, carissimum fratrem nostrum Henricum ducem Slesie ac dominum Glogovie ex asse et in totum instituimus heredem. In terris vero Cracovie et Sandomirie, quarum dominium ad nos racionabiliter et rite multis sumptibus et magno labore pervenit, dominum Primizlaum ducem Maioris Polonie facimus et deputamus heredem; commitentes nostris baronibus, militibus et vasallis, advocatis et civibus, et generaliter subditis omnium terrarum nostrarum, sub fide nobis prestiti iuramenti, quatenus predictis nostris heredibus in suis partibus obtemperent et subsint concorditer, tamquam nobis –* Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1878, vol. 2, n. 645.

lord of Legnica was recognized by the townsmen and some of the local nobility and thus, he seized power by election.[629] Henry of Głogów ruled in Wrocław only for a month. Subsequently, Henry of Legnica was invited and took over the control. The conflict between the dukes started. It took another four years to have it finally settled. Jurek observed that from the early stages of their controversy, Henry of Legnica attempted to come to terms with his opponent by granting him some territorial concessions in return for the revocation of his rights to Wrocław. These negotiations were, however, only partially successful, because Henry of Głogów remained active in his anti-Wrocław politics. It ended up with a kidnaping; Henry of Legnica was snatched by the Głogowian henchmen while taking a bath, imprisoned and tortured. In effect, he agreed for further territorial concessions and accepted a form of dependency from Henry of Głogów.[630]

On May 6, 1294 a peace treaty was signed and a proper charter issued. Its conditions were severe for the defeated but, interestingly, although his lordship was significantly diminished, Wrocław remained within his domain. Henry of Głogów, despite of his overall success did not manage to seize the town. Besides, there is no evidence that he ever tried to expel Henry from Wrocław nor he killed him, while keeping him imprisoned and defenseless. It appears that both solutions were somehow impossible to implement, for perhaps Wrocław would not accept Henry of Głogów anyhow and executing a fellow Piast would do no good to Henry of Głogów's case. Of course, it is difficult to speculate about human's motivations for not doing certain things, but taking all these risks into consideration, it is still worthwhile – in my opinion – to highlight that thinkable alternatives of "international" behavior did not take place. For Jurek Henry of Głogów was principally interested in expanding his own lordship (and therefore he sought territorial concessions from his rival) and in reconstructing a system of inter-dependencies that once Henry IV of Wrocław introduced.[631] Although there is less material evidence for feudal type of subordination imposed by Henry of Głogów on other Piasts, than it had been in case of Henry IV, there is enough data to argue that it was an attractive strategy of spreading one's influence without violating the very substance of the lordship-imperative.

---

[629] Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 28–32.
[630] For detailed analysis see: Ibid., 42–55.
[631] Ibid., 42, 51.

The defeated duke died on February 22, 1296. His brother, Bolko of Świdnica took care of his children and controlled Wrocław. There is no information about Henry of Głogów's reaction to his former's opponent death. Jurek rightly suggested that at that time he must have been preoccupied with the aftermath of King Przemysł II's successful assassination in Rogoźno (Febrary 8, 1296)[632] that opened up for him perspectives to rule in Great Poland. Instead, Bolko started war against him and regained some territories previously captured by Henry. The regional state of affairs were subsequently discussed in March 1297 at the Silesian ducal assembly in Zwanowice. During this meeting some alternations to the lordship distribution in the province were made and most probably Henry of Głogów was forced to give up his claims to a form of overlordship over Wrocław.[633] Stability returned to Silesia for next two years when in 1299, as a result of electing Duke Konrad of Żagań the patriarch of Aquileia new controversies briefly erupted. Nevertheless, they have been already discussed elsewhere, because they belonged to a different category of conflicts.

Concluding, the intra-Silesian conflicts of the last two decades of the thirteenth century were triggered by two different causes. First, it was an aggressive politics of Henry IV of Wrocław who explored new ways of expanding his lordship. Instead of fighting other lords and conquering their lands, which was already a challenging undertaking since it required considerable material resources and – perhaps most importantly – strong and legitimate authorization for laying hands on someone else's rightful property, Henry IV forced his less fortunate fellow Piasts to subject to him in a form of lord-vassal ties. In general, this type of aggression was a new thing among the Piasts and by 1300 was not practiced in other Polish provinces. It drew on material and power inequality that resulted from the growing fragmentation of lordship in the Polish lands and yet it functioned as a creative application of the political culture flourishing in other parts of Europe throughout the thirteenth century. This form of "international" aggression allowed for less legitimized patterns of expansion and prestige building. They did not require the state of competing legitimacies anymore in order to be carried out, because such strategies avoided any type of elimination of a local lord. He could stay in place as long as he recognized his duties towards the superior lord. As long as the overlord did not pull the strings too much and the vassal could operate within reasonable

---

[632] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 161.
[633] Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 66.

zone of independency, this system could serve as a platform for "international" cooperation and conflict mitigation. Henry IV did not introduce his system of dependencies through large military campaigns but by means of violent actions against the persons of his prospective subordinates. He basically needed their recognition. The system did not last long due to premature death of the duke of Wroclaw but it found favor in Duke Henry of Głogów, whose attempts on Wrocław were second cause of the intra-Piast conflicts in Silesia.

Henry of Głogów fought Henryk of Lenigca over the disputed last will of Henry IV of Wrocław. At first, their antagonism was strikingly similar to the nearly simultaneous controversies over the throne of Cracow and originated from the competing claims to rule: by designation or election. Like in the case of Cracow, as in many other places in the Polish lands, it seems the factor that was decisive was the consent of the local elites. Henry of Głogów lost his cause to Henry of Legnica in this matter. Nevertheless, the conflict continued yet the former was never closer to regain power in Wrocław. Despite his successes against Henry of Legnica, including his imprisonment (an act which nicely matched Henry IV's practices of the early 1280s), he achieved no more than territorial concessions and – and here comes the novelty – some sort of subordination. Thus, although he ultimately lost his cause in terms of the conflict of legitimate claims, by resorting to Henry IV's actions he still managed to benefit from his political successes. However, also in Henry of Głogów's case the system of dependencies did not survive long, because the new ruler to Wrocław, Bolko of Świdnica, challenged it fiercely and Henryk could not respond adequately. Anyway, Bolko's action was in itself quite typical and known from many other instances observed in this survey. It could be argued that the war started by Bolko was the lordship-distribution type of conflict that often erupted as an aftermath of a succession crisis and was linked to a new lord's aspiration and ambition to recover what was considered as the rightful part of the lordship that had been lost in unfortunate "international" circumstances.

Conclusions

Polish scholarly literature tended to depict the relations among the Piasts in the thirteenth century as an anarchical system that was filled with bloody conflicts over – quite often – petty and irrelevant pieces of land, estates, and strongholds. Together with increasing fragmentation of the formerly united duchy of Poland, the Piast dukes were becoming politically narrow-minded, self-regarding and primarily concerned about their own

possessions. Unlike powerful rulers in the neighborhood – as a standard historiographical account goes – who strove to build strong and centralized political entities, the Polish princes were inherently unable to overcome their particular interests for the sake of the common good (that is, implicitly for the good of the state). They preferred quarrels and mutual devastation of properties instead of seeking consent and cooperation in response to the imminent threat of emerging powers in the region: the kingdom of Bohemia, the Teutonic Order and the Mark of Brandenburg. Politically speaking, the thirteenth century in the Polish lands has been considered as the period of weakness, conflict, short-sightedness, and prevailing anarchy. In response, towards the end of the thirteenth century the Church and the lay elites, who continuously suffered from the political fragmentation and destruction that accompanied the petty wars of the Piasts, increasingly looked for a figure that would manage to curb the anarchy and restore peace, justice, and unity. They eventually found it in the person of Władysław Łokietek.

Nevertheless, the survey of the family conflicts among the Piasts in the thirteenth century revealed much more order and logic behind them that one could have expected at the first glance. By no means it was war of all against all and the members of the Polish dynasty did not slaughter themselves in incessant wars and fighting. The mechanisms of intra-dynastic interactions were quite often violent but they still subscribed to certain rules and followed specific patterns that demonstrated how powerful, constitutive and influential was political culture which distilled anarchically-driven behaviors, caused by the Waltzian system-level anarchy, and created more orderly (and thus more secure) "international" environment. This culture engendered the structure of the international system that did not follow the logic of enemy that would suggest a zero sum conflicts (i.e., there could be only one winner in a conflict). Instead it promoted the less conflictual (or, perhaps, less lethal) logic of rivalry that allowed for broader zones of cooperation, negotiation and compromise.

Lordly identity to be sustained required of a lord to hold a lordship. The fundamental fact about a lordship was that it was the principal attribute of a power-wielding figure, and thus, in this political culture one could not remain powerful without holding some form of a material lordship. This lordship acquired a collective meaning of being a representation of social status and elite standing. Domination and control over people was not, however, a

public good equally accessible to everyone but it was customarily restricted to those who could prove that their ancestors cherished the same privilege of prestige and authority.

Lordship required legitimacy. In the Piast context a lord was not a self-made man but he emerged in the contextualized practice and process of lord-reproduction. That is, he derived his legitimization from his lord-ancestors and, as a bearer of the lordly identity, transferred it to his lord-sons. In this sense lordship in the thirteenth-century Polish lands was a family matter, because it derived its validity from the fact of participation in the dynasty of lords. In a way, it was, therefore, an inherited duty or vocation that was inter-subjectively recognized by other members of the social elites, and thus, it was affirmed and strongly encouraged to be fulfilled.

A lord was, therefore, a nobleman responsible for maintaining and securing the highborn element of his family that made it stand out in the society. The lord as a family leader did not function as an independent ruler who identified his political interests solely according to his will and the advice of his barons. His dynastic context determined rules, principles and constraints for his "international" behaviors and considerably shaped the breadth and scope of his motivations.

The analysis of intra-Piast conflicts revealed a great number of such regulatory patterns and frameworks that allow to argue that the Piast lords, once they were made such by assuming power in a lordship, conceived themselves, as far as their lordship was concerned, as leaders of their nuclear families and, as far as their (grand)fathers' lordships were concerned, protectors and guardians of the properties and allegiances of their forefathers.

In the thirteenth century there were two essential reasons why the Piasts fought each other. The cause that governed conflicts between the closest family members, like between fathers and sons, sons and fatherly uncles or among brothers, was the lordship-imperative. The principle that every adult member of the dynasty should hold a lordship of satisfactory size was the fundament on which those conflicts were grounded. Lordship was indispensable and as it appears, it was actually a matter of social justice to equip a Piast with a lordship. Nevertheless, the conflicts triggered by the lordship-imperative did not emerge from controversies whether a Piast should receive one or not (this was beyond discussion). It was the size of lordship that mattered, for the lordship-imperative itself was widely recognized.

Therefore, there was no option to deprive a lord of his land for good. Sooner or later either other lord-dukes or the barons and lesser nobility would stand up for the powerless lord and demand the unjust state of affairs be amended.

The problem began with a question how lordships shall be distributed among those eligible to get them. Hence, brothers competed for shares in their father's domain, negotiating best possible allocation of estates. Also fatherly uncles challenged their nephews by laying hands on their fathers' lands, claiming protection and guardianship or demanding some territorial concessions as a heritage after their deceased brothers. Readjustment and redistribution of lordships within the father's domain was the standard and most common dispute that triggered violent behaviors of brothers towards each other. If the Piasts resolved their disputes regarding the distribution of land after their (grand)father, there was a high probability they would not fight each other anymore. It was one of the principles of the Piast "international" system that one could not (and practically did not) claim the lordships of others just like that. There had to be strong reasons to justify any attempt to seize authority in a given land (unlike a plundering incursion that was much easier to organize). The best and most efficient combination was close blood ties with the predecessor and consent of the local nobility manifested through election (invitation) to a ducal office.

This is why the overwhelming majority of violent conflicts among the Piasts were configurative wars which did not threaten the very existence of competing lordships. For instance, lords did not kill each other, unless they fell in battle. Imprisonment and tortures happened but not execution. Furthermore, exiled dukes could count on support (either from other Piast lords or local nobles) and had high chances to regain at least part of their lordships. The widespread recognition of the lordship-imperative was a strong cultural component that protected the lords from losing their elite standing completely and thus, they could feel secured by this customary norm. In practice, a standard conquest was out of question. What organized mutual Piast relations was rather a concept of just distribution of lands and territories that was to be achieved by respect to the ancestral order and through negotiation. In fact, there are examples showing cooperation between brothers in their efforts to restoring the distribution of lands as it were during the lifetime of their direct predecessors.

There were, however, other types of conflicts than those between brothers, fathers and fatherly uncles. Throughout the thirteenth century the Piasts competed beyond the

groups of close blood ties. There was the Poland-wide competition over Cracow (and Little Poland) and a few inter-regional conflicts between Great Poland and the Piasts of Silesia and Cuiavia. Still, most of them revealed a similar pattern, that is, wars broke out over disputed lands and territories, to which each conflicting side could provide a legitimate claim that made enough sense to the contemporary elites.

The throne of Cracow was a primary trouble in the thirteenth-century "international" system in the Polish lands because over decades various provincial branches established legitimacies that made their representatives eligible for seizing it. Besides, due to its unique status in the post-Bolesław the Wrymouth senioral system, Cracow was the first to introduce and develop an elective method of succession that additionally transformed Little Poland for many Piasts into a province of aspirations. The wars over Cracow were, all in all, a result of struggles between two making sense (and thus powerful) modes of succession: 1) by hereditary laws; 2) by invitation issued by the local elites.

The dukes of Great Poland were trapped into conflicts with the Piasts of Silesia and Cuiavia primarily due to the decisions of their predecessors who in the early thirteenth century transferred their rights to domination to Henry the Bearded of Silesia. He was powerful enough to execute, at least partially, those cessions and to make further ones on behalf of the duke of Cuiavia. For the next number of decades up to 1300, the consequences of such actions shaped the relations between Silesia and Great Poland. Also, they contributed to a prolonged conflict in the middle of the thirteenth century between Cuiavia and Great Poland. In all this, however, there was very little about individual aggressiveness, egoism or bloodthirsty-attitudes of particular dukes. What fueled those conflicts was the competing legitimacies that motivated one side to military actions and stimulated other side to defending its rights. The "international" horizon of those conflicts was defined by the limits of the predecessors' possessions; in short, what one's (grand)father controlled should the one equally rule, for this order of things is right and just. Such morally-charged thinking, which by the way did not collide with the lordship-imperative (both competing sides were retaining their original lordships), impeded opportunities to compromise and negotiation, and created space for sustained disputes that were hard to resolve even in the perimeter of successive generations. And again, the abovementioned principle banning conquests was in gear: no reaching beyond the ancestral lordships was practiced (the sole case of Bolesław the Pious's short-lived

occupation of northern Cuiavia reveals how awkward it was for the duke to go against the inter-subjectively accepted cultural norms). The common field for intra-dynastic struggle was basically Cracow.

It could be argued that the two ordering cultural principles of the thirteenth-century "international" intra-Piast system were: 1) the recognition and respect for the lordship-imperative that maintained the elite standing of lords and guaranteed a just redistribution of lordships among the growing number of lord-candidates; 2) the sustained effort of restoring the lordship's allegiance to their ancestral, or perhaps more accurately, (grand)fatherly *status quo*.

Towards the end of the thirteenth century, however, new developments in the "international" system could be noticed. Apart from the two well-grounded principles that governed the behaviors of the Piasts throughout the century, there was an innovative model of organizing the system introduced. To wit, Henry IV of Wrocław started forcing other Silesian dukes to subject to him into a form of lord-vassal bonds. Although it was by no means a novelty in the European "international" system, the coercive implementation of hierarchy of honor and prestige into the intra-Piast relations (so far based on formal equality) was – in my understanding – a breakthrough. Initially, it did not function well but the idea took roots and could transform the structure of the "international" system in the Piast lands. Namely, subordinating members of the same dynasty was an innovative form of expansion that was particularly attractive because it did not breach the two principles mentioned above. The subjected lords retained their lordships and pursued their politics aiming at preserving their just share in their father's domain but at the same time they joined a larger "international" entity that was represented by their overlord. In theory, the more prestigious overlord, the more honorable was the allegiance to his lordship. Henry IV's forceful introduction of stratification among the Silesian Piasts most probably followed the hierarchical structures observed in the empire (through the example of the kingdom of Bohemia) and could have been a turning point, since it established a precedent for the future. Therefore, on the practical ground it helped to think of a restoration of the royal dignity in Poland (and thus elevating one Piast over the others) without destroying the fundamental pillars of the "international" system.

The analysis of the family conflicts among the Piasts provided strong evidence for the lordship-imperative as a powerful interest-constructive motivator that was contextualized and practiced within the framework of family relations. In other words, a lord-Piast was predestined to hold a lordship but his entire legitimation to rule and dominate derived from the fundamental fact that his father was a lord too. Besides, the lord-Piast's political horizon was much defined by the scope of his father's achievements and a set of disputes that he left behind. The Piasts fought each other when the adequate share in the father's domain was at stake or if some territories fell off from their fathers' lordships and required bringing them back, so that the just redistribution of lands and lordships was restored. The competing legitimacies, that is, overlapping rights of individual Piasts to particular territories, that had emerged in the historical process, generated further conflicts because they made the attainment of the just order an impossible task. In this sense, also, the Waltzian anarchy prevailed because there was virtually no higher authority that could efficiently impose the just order that would be recognized and accepted by the Piasts. Hence conflict was inevitable.

On the other hand, the identified principles of the thirteenth-century "international" system in the Polish lands, installed and empowered by the dominant political culture, established practical limits and restrictions to ducal behaviors that were observed most of the time and by the majority. Seizing power in a land was impossible without the combination of hereditary rights and invitation by the local elites, and yet any action that breached those principles would stimulate reaction of other lords as a function of self-regulatory system. Thus, conquest was essentially impossible among the Piasts and so was deliberate executing each other.

In sum, the Waltzian systemic anarchy that promoted distrust, self-regard and practices of maximizing one's power against the prospective threat coming from other "international" units was considerably mitigated by the system of culturally validated norms and principles that made the intra-Piast relations principally non-anarchic (in the common meaning of the word) and suppressed the self-help motivations by providing protection to one's inherited elite status. This is to say, that in the thirteenth century the Piasts followed certain rules of "international" behavior that set the ground for cooperation and conflict management, and therefore, they allowed for forming a type of international society. However, the Polish dukes did not develop any form of a higher authority institution that was

entitled to handle and settle conflicts that were erupting between them. In this sense, the anarchical structure of the "international" system survived and its stability was primarily based on the Piasts' capabilities to self-regulate their coexistence according to the cultural norms and principles that they were brought to.

Role Sub-Identity – Title-Seeker

As it has been stated elsewhere, a lord was a nobleman whose role was, under the lordship-imperative, to retain his high social standing by securing a lordship for himself and for the sake of his closest family. This general rule applied not only to the increasingly extended dynasty of the Piasts but also pertained to other members of social elites who sought accumulation of power, wealth, and honors (for example, titles or offices) as a form of attaining prestige and authority, which in turn reconfirmed and affirmed their high social standing.

This section aims at demonstrating briefly the breadth and scope of those mechanisms that motivated lords-to-be (outside the Piasts yet related to them either by spatial proximity or by various forms of dependencies) to construct and find recognition for their own lordships. It can be argued that those lordship-seeking projects, which were launched by a great number of individuals throughout the thirteenth century in the Polish lands and their vicinities, reveal another pattern of the "international" system of that time. Control and domination over people could only come with a lordship and therefore, lordship-building projects were not confined to those who were fortunate enough to claim their predestination to rule by birth and noble standing, but they remained attractive to lesser aristocrats and knights. As aspiring lords they strove to gradually build their power and social position and they did it not necessarily by challenging or confronting the "big" actors at the "international" stage.

It could be argued that the fundamental idea for such projects was that the "international" system was flexible and adaptable enough to accommodate new smaller lordships and insert them on the political map. This specific feature of the thirteenth-century system that has been now proposed as a working assumption would allow lords to acquire an additional role-identity (a sub-category to their lordly identity that may exist only in relation to Others who may recognize it or not). This role of a "title-seeker" engendered specific

interests on the "international" arena, suggesting power-seeking motivations like expanding one's lordship, claiming new titles or offices, and investing in prestige- and authority-building.

The best way of investigating the flexibility of the thirteenth-century "international" system in the region will be to make a survey of lordship-dynamics, that is, to analyze circumstances of emergence and disappearance of lordships in the vicinity of the Polish lands. Since a detailed analysis of such processes would require another serious study, the following set of observations stand for a pilot inquiry that aims at identifying some general patterns that would shed more light on the flexibility of the "international" system and elaborate on the matter of the "title-seeker" identity.

Logic of Lordship-seeking Conflicts in the Kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary after the Mongol Invasion

Undoubtedly the Mongol invasion devastated the Kingdom of Hungary. There is, however, some dispute about the degree of destruction. In the older scholarship it was claimed that almost 50% the country was depopulated by the killings and later by disease and starvation, which occurred because large parts of land was not being tilled due to the marauding Mongols. More recent studies suggest a lower proportion of 20% for the percentage of the population that was killed.[634] To reinforce their arguments these scholars point to later events that show that after the Mongols retreated to the steppes, the Kingdom resumed its military activities fairly quickly.[635] It is beyond any question, however, that the Mongolian onslaught left Hungary changed in many respects. Apparently, the fear of the soon-to-come next invasion instilled in people's hearts[636] – apart from all the other damages and losses they had already suffered – significantly influenced and shaped the polices adopted by King Béla IV, who has sometimes been called the second "state-founder".[637]

One of his responses to this pending Mongolian threat was to authorize nobles who could afford it to construct stone-castles. A big building campaign was primarily designed to strengthen the defense potential of the Kingdom, because – as the last example of the

---

[634] Recently about the supposed decimation of the population cf. Attila Zsoldos, *Nagy uralkodók és kiskirályok a 13. században* [Great Rulers and Small Kings in the Thirteenth Century] (Budapest: Kossuth/Metropol, 2009), 54.
[635] László Szende, "Magyarország külpolitikája 1242-1246 között," [The Foreign Politics of Hungary between 1242 and 1246] *Első század* 2 (2000): 307–311; Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 101–102.
[636] Zsoldos, *Nagy uralkodók*, 54.
[637] Cf. Iván Bertényi and Gábor Gyapay, *Magyarország rövid története* [Short History of Hungary] (Budapest: Maecenas, 1992), 90–91.

Mongolian attack revealed – there were significantly higher chances of survival if the invaders encountered a walled location. This construction boom was very efficient and by Béla's IV death in 1270, it produced a hundred new castles owned by the royal family, wealthy nobles, and bishops.[638] The rapid rise of fortified places in the kingdom certainly expanded its defense potential, yet – by diversification of their ownership – it deprived the king of an important advantage in times of confrontation with rebellious nobility (the number of stone-castles reached three-hundred by the end of the thirteenth century,[639] and at least two-thirds of them were in private hands).[640] Giving away property and lands to the elite in order to financially enable them to erect their own castles reinforced the Kingdom in absolute terms but, at the same time, created a favorable foundation to reduce its political coherence as in practice, it undermined the will for cooperation on the part of the elite. A result, more powerful subjects could dictate higher 'prices' for their compliance.

The kingdom of Bohemia – in contrast to Hungary – was not much affected by the Mongol invasion. Although the Mongol troops devastated Little Poland and massacred the Christian army at Legnica (Silesia), subsequently marched through Moravia, putting it to fire, their final destination was Hungary. Wenceslas I, King of Bohemia, gathered his army and awaited confrontation with Mongols but ultimately he did not have to engage in battle.[641] The kingdom of Bohemia was spared from the external threat but was not free from internal turbulences. In 1248, King Wenceslas I faced a rebellion initiated by a group of influential barons. They wanted Přemysl Otakar, the king's son, who had recently come of age, to be their king. This struggle within the Bohemian royal family, although ultimately won by Wenceslas I, had a similar effect on the distribution of power as the aftermath of the Mongol invasion in Hungary.

In Bohemia the conflict between Wenceslas I and Přemysl Otakar was settled at the cost of strengthening the position of the local noble families, who meanwhile managed to increase their wealth (through royal grants or by illegal acquisitions of either ecclesiastical or royal properties) and, thus, gathered enough means to initiate building stone castles

---

[638] Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 104.
[639] Zsoldos, *Nagy uralkodók*, 55.
[640] Kristó, "Die Macht," 1985, 605.
[641] Pánek and Tůma, *A History of the Czech Lands*, 2009, 107.

themselves.[642] In its own fashion, but for other reasons, Bohemia had stepped onto the same path as Hungary.

There are further analogies between the situations in the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary. Přemysl Otakar reconciled with his father but the matter of lordship remained essential and unresolved. However, a new option emerged. The lords of Austria, the Babenbergs, died out in the male line, and the empty throne naturally drew the attention of the neighboring lords: Béla IV and Wenceslas I. Acquiring these new lands for themselves would boost their wealth, prestige and, all in all, their power. The Babenbergs' lands were attractively located on the Alpine routes between northern parts of the German Empire and Italy.[643] Moreover, such acquisitions could act as a way to temporarily suspend internal tensions by finding means to satisfy ambitions nourished by royal sons. In the early 1250s, Wenceslas I attempted to make Přemysl Otakar the lord of Austria. Béla IV fought back.

In the meantime, in 1250, Emperor Frederic II died; his immediate successor, Conrad IV, followed four years later. The empty German throne was subsequently claimed by two candidates, Richard of Cornwall, a brother of King Henry III of England, and King Alfonso X of Castile. As a result, the former lands of Babenbergs, which had lain under imperial jurisdiction, were momentarily no longer backed by the authority of the German king because the German lords were preoccupied with resolving their own disputes. The absence of a third influential player in the 1250s and 1260s left more room for arrangements made by kings of Bohemia and Hungary.

In 1253, when Wenceslas I died, the conflict over Austria entered a new phase. On the Bohemian side there was no longer a young royal son needing to be satisfied with separate lordship because Přemysl Otakar II inherited the throne after his father died. From then on his agenda changed since at the outset of his personal reign he had to secure the cooperative good will among his subjects. Béla IV, however, still had to secure Steven's needs. Again, from the perspective of Hungarian political practice, bestowing a lordship on a royal son was nothing extraordinary. Since the late twelfth century the custom prevailed that the Árpádian princes governed Slavonia and Croatia as *duces totius Sclavonie*.[644] There are other instances

---

[642] Ibid., 107–108.

[643] Ibid., 107.

[644] Attila Zsoldos, "Az ifjabb király országa," [The Realm of the 'Junior' King] *Századok* 139 (2005): 235.

of similar practices: in 1226, Béla IV, at the age of twenty, was named by his father, Andrew II, duke of Transylvania.[645] Four years later, after Přemysl Otakar II and Béla IV had agreed to divide the Babenbergs' lands between themselves in 1254, Steven was conferred the title of duke of Styria.[646] A year earlier, he received Transylvania, whereas in 1260, his younger brother Béla was authorized to oversee Slavonia.[647]

This state of affairs did not last long. Přemysl Otakar II took advantage of the prolonged disputes in the German empire and sought to maintain good relations with both concurrent German kings. As a result, King Richard of Cornwall entrusted him with the task of defending "the property of the [imperial] Crown to the right of the Rhine" and did not interfere with Přemysl Otakar's II actions in Austria and its surroundings.[648] In the 1260s, the lordship of the Bohemian king extended through Austria, Styria, and Carinthia, and reached the Adriatic Sea. Meanwhile, Béla IV, had not been able to reconquer the former lands of the Babenbergs which he had lost to the King of Bohemia, came into conflict with Steven over the scope of Steven's authority in Transylvania and beyond (and, as the extant sources reveal, over the succession rights too).[649] This conflict subsequently transformed into a regular internal war.

Béla IV died in 1270. After domestic wars of the 1260s, the kingdom was not fully pacified. The divisions that had arisen in past years fuelled the flame of ambition and conflict in the minds of elite power brokers and at any time could trigger further conflict. In a sense, the former supporters of Béla IV found themselves in an awkward position in serving Steven V, whom they had fiercely fought while standing in the ranks of his father's army. This is presumably why a double election took place, because some of Steven's opponents invited Přemysl Otakar II to sit on the Hungarian throne. Přemysl's claim was reinforced by the fact that from 1261 he had been married to Kunigunda, a granddaughter of Béla IV. Kunigunda was a daughter of Anna, a sister of Steven V. Přemysl Otakar II, however, was not strongly motivated to initiate a prolonged conflict with Steven V and after he had been allowed to grab Béla's IV treasury, he retreated from the competition.[650] Nevertheless, these events proved a precedent to the events of 1301, and the Hungarian elite must have taken note that,

---

[645] Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 95.
[646] Zsoldos, "Az ifjabb király országa," 235.
[647] Ibid., 260.
[648] Pánek and Tůma, *A History of the Czech Lands*, 2009, 110.
[649] Zsoldos, "Az ifjabb király országa," 233–234.
[650] Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 107.

practically speaking, in choosing their new king they were no longer confined to the direct male descendants of St. Steven's kindred.

During the 1270s, the vast lordship built-up by Přemysl Otakar II was vehemently challenged. A heretofore non-existing player, the German king, reemerged on the scene after Rudolf I Habsburg was elected to the office in 1273. Five years later, Přemysl Otakar II died on the battlefield and the Kingdom of Bohemia shrank to its former, original size, whereas the successful Rudolf I Habsburg, exercising the legal authority and prestige of the king of the Romans, could more firmly establish his family's domain in Austria.

The ultimate decline of the kingdom of Bohemia in the late 1270s corresponded with a rising number of quarrels in the kingdom of Hungary. Steven V ruled only two turbulent years. First, he had to struggle for the throne with the Bohemian king. Second, he grappled with the rebellion of Joachim Gutkeled, the ban of Slavonia, who captured Ladislas, an infant royal son. The king did not manage to liberate him, and Engel suspected that frustration deriving from a sense of powerlessness may have resulted in Steven's premature death.[651] Whatever the reasons for his death, what happened was a clear sign that in the early 1270s the effective power of the king could be successfully challenged by other lords in the kingdom.[652]

Ladislas IV was ten years-old when he inherited the kingdom of Hungary after his father. His clear inability to efficiently assume the office encouraged the Hungarian barons to take advantage of the lack of royal authority. Apparently, there was no systemic solution available to efficiently replace the person of a monarch as the source of order and justice in the kingdom.

On the other hand, it would be legitimate to ask to what degree the royal presence was really longed for and required by other powerful lords, whose chief strategy was to establish their standing and wealth at the expense of royal resources (fighting each other was seemingly less productive although still practiced)? There is no plausible answer to this question because between 1270 and 1310, the nature of relations between the royal office and the Hungarian barons remains opaque. Namely, it seems they never imaged not having a

---

[651] Ibid.

[652] János M. Bak, *Königtum und Stände in Ungarn im 14.-16. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1973), 12.

king at all, since the barons understood clearly that all their acquisitions, both in terms of properties and jurisdiction, required – sooner or later – clear confirmation from a king. Otherwise, depending how powerful they were at any given point, their prosperity might prove, more or less, temporary and short-term. Practical usurpations would simply be short-lived because only confirmation by a higher (royal) authority diminished social and political tensions, and thus, relieved the usurper from the higher costs (of all sorts) of upholding his illegal gains.

It could be argued, however, that similar mechanisms can be also observed on the "international" stage. Before he initiated any military campaign in the lands of Bohemia, Rudolf I Habsburg, elected the king of the Romans (Germans) in 1273, refused to confirm Přemysl Otakar's II possessions in the Empire.[653] Thus, he made a public statement which declared Přemysl's lordship in Austria illegitimate and – by exercising his royal authority – he also had means to effectively threaten Přemysl Otakar's II domination outside Bohemia. In short, Rudolf I was in a position to claim back the lands that customarily belonged to the sphere of jurisdiction of a German king and, if he was industrious enough, he could hope to find other lords who would support any re-taking actions against the Bohemian ruler.

Přemysl Otakar II, was probably well aware of how these mechanisms functioned. Precisely for this reason he previously strove to maintain favorable relations with Richard of Cornwall, who earlier – as the king of the Romans – had given him license to build up his lordship within the imperial lands, a license which was later retracted by Rudolf I, another king of the Romans. By analogy, the Hungarian lords must have been experienced enough to recognize that all they needed in the Kingdom of Hungary was either a friendly king or a king, whose will, if necessary, they had the means to resist.

Moreover, growing tensions, disputes, skirmishes and quarrels at the level of a single kingdom very much resembled conflicts in Germany during the so-called Great Interregnum, and were similar in their logic (although not in their scope) to the Béla IV-Wenceslas I conflict over the Babenbergs' inheritance. There was no difference in quality, because in both cases the actors aimed at expanding their lordships, that is, their control over people, land and resources, and thus, improve their prestige, wealth and social standing. There was, however,

---

[653] Pánek and Tůma, *A History of the Czech Lands*, 2009, 110.

a quantitative dissimilarity since the goals of the Hungarian lords, confined to the boundaries of the Kingdom of Hungary, could not be compared with the range of activities performed at the royal level.[654]

In the 1270s, the kingdom of Hungary had to grapple with an infant king directly resulting in the rise of baronial lordships. The king was expected to dominate his lords but where he was not able to fulfill this task (because of his age, absence, illness etc.), his lords easily turned into usurpers, who recognizing opportune conditions took advantage of them.

At the end of the decade, Přemysl Otakar's II death in a battle brought the kingdom of Bohemia into a comparable situation. Wenceslas II, an heir to the Bohemian throne, was only seven and was placed under guardianship of Otto V of Brandenburg, his maternal uncle. Wenceslas II returned to Bohemia in 1283, nevertheless only after long negotiations resulting in the payment of 20,000 silver marks to Otto V.[655] In the meantime, however, the kingdom of Bohemia was virtually transformed into a "cake" which many lords would gladly take a piece of. The barons attempted to put a hold on royal or ecclesiastical properties.[656] Rudolf I Habsburg, as the king of the Romans and formal overseer of the kingdom of Bohemia, successfully took control of Moravia. Otto V acquired the appointment as the guardian of Wenceslas II. Henry IV Probus of Wrocław, engaged in militarily action to take his chances at winning the Bohemian throne for himself or, at least, to become a regent.[657] Rudolf I managed to arranged a marriage contract between Wenceslas II and his daughter, Jutta of Habsburg;[658] an act which gave him a new argument to justify his interference in the future of Bohemian matters.

Consequently, in the 1280s, Wenceslas' II role in the domestic politics of the kingdom of Bohemia was largely diminished by prolonged conflict between powerful lords: Zavis of Falkenstejn and Tobias, Bishop of Prague. Zavis displayed a perfect lord-to-be logic: he attempted to acquire the duchy of Opava; he married Kunigunda of the Árpád dynasty, who had been left a widow after Přemysl Otakar's II death making him the stepfather of Wenceslas

---

[654] Cf. the description of political activities carried out by the Hungarian lords: Kristó, "Die Macht," 1985, 603–604.

[655] Jörg K. Hoensch, *Geschichte Böhmens: von der slavischen Landnahme bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*, 2., aktualisierte u. ergänzte Auflage (München: C.H. Beck, 1992), 279.

[656] Ibid., 280.

[657] Tomasz Jurek, Stanisław Szczur, and Krzysztof Ożóg, *Piastowie,*428.

[658] Kateřina Charvátová, *Václav II: Král Český a Polský* (Praha: Vyšehrad, 2007), 48–51.

II; in the late 1280s, he married Elisabeth of the Árpád dynasty, a sister of Ladislas IV, King of Hungary. Thus, Zavis efficiently expanded his properties (which gave him wealth and manpower) and entered into the strata of the highest elite by marrying into the Árpád House. Anyway, he was decapitated in 1290 with the tacit consent of Wenceslas II who was only able to fully assume his royal office afterwards.

Interestingly, Zavis – still as a minor lord compared to royal families – accomplished more than his Hungarian counterparts, who were never offered (or accepted, since I cannot exclude that they made applications for marriage) a marriage into either the House of Árpád or the Přemyslids. The Hungarian lords were, nonetheless, successful in entering into marriage contracts with other prominent ruling houses of Austria, Bavaria, or Serbia.[659]

After assuming the throne, Wenceslas II decided not to go to war with the lords of Bohemia to recover properties which they had seized during the previous turbulent period.[660] According to Kateřina Charvátová,[661] who herself followed the *Chronicon Aule Regie* (which, by the way, depicted the king in very favorable terms),[662] Wenceslas II did undertake diligent actions to "revoke what was split up, gather what was dispersed" and "ruled that what an unfriendly hand had taken away should be reintegrated".[663] However, this short and rather general account was actually followed by a more detailed description of how, in fact, Wenceslas II distributed castles, towns and offices, and that through his generosity, the kingdom was stabilized.[664]

On the other hand, he did not give up the lordship-seeking logic and, by other means managed to gather resources to pursue his goals in his dealings with dukes of the south-eastern Polish principalities; it was a highly successful endeavour, which in 1300 eventually allowed him to become the king of Poland. It is particularly revealing that – judging from the course of events – it was easier for Wenceslas II to step outside his kingdom and seek to expand his sphere of control and domination by overpowering or, less violently, by coming to terms with the neighboring lords, than to launch a retributive campaign aimed at restoring

---

[659] Kristó, "Die Macht," 1985, 604.
[660] Hoensch, *Geschichte Böhmens*, 1992, 280.
[661] Charvátová, *Václav II*, 2007, 116.
[662] Cf. Robert Antonín, *Zahraniční Politika*, 20–63.
[663] František Palacký, ed., "Chronicon Aulae Regiae," in *Fontes Rerum Bohemicarum*, vol. 4 (Prague: Nákl. N. F. Palackého, 1884), 38.: *Wenceslaus rex* […] *sicque dispersa revocat, dissipata congregat, ea quoque, que aliena manus distraxerat, cum summa diligencia reintegrando gubernat.*
[664] Ibid., 38.

order and justice (and thus, his authority and lordship, since a king was a legitimate source of peace and tranquility) within the borders of the kingdom of Bohemia.

At that particular moment, Wenceslas II was in a far more convenient position than the kings of Hungary, because he had just begun to exploit the silver mines of Kutna Hora. The mines turned out to be exceptionally rich in silver and their output soon outdistanced older sites at Jihlava among others.[665] Abundance of silver, which poured into royal coffers, provided Wenceslas II with money, a resource that made him a wealthy stand-out in the region. However, he apparently linked the satisfaction of his lords with opulent gifts and new opportunities, which would emerge from expanding his domination over new lands, and he preferred to invest his significant incomes in projects of expansion, rather than to use his assets against his lords. It could be argued therefore for Wenceslas II, like other contemporary lords, lordship primarily had to be expanded in a mutual cooperative effort (according to an unwritten rule: 'the more powerful overlord, the more powerful his faithful lords'). Lordship, therefore, did not have to expand using an alternative model, more characteristic of modern states, which seek to disarm their citizens and monopolize access to coercive power and its resources, following the precept that 'the overlord builds up his power at the expanse of his lords-subjects'.

In the 1290s, the kingdom of Bohemia was back on an ascending track, that is, the cooperation between the king and his barons was resumed and thus, Wenceslas II could effectively engage in spreading his influence and authority in the region. In Hungary, however, this lack of will to cooperate, which had powerfully emerged ca. 1290, continued until Andrew's III death in 1301 (and beyond, up to ca. 1330).[666] His predecessor, Ladislas IV, did not come up with a solution that permanently tied the Hungarian barons to him; a failure which, in practice, left him powerless. He did not own silver mines with an output comparable to Kutna Hora, and thus, he could not cherish hope of a privileged position, which seems to have greatly contributed to Wenceslas' II success in restoring the will to cooperate among his barons.

According to Gyula Kristó, from the 1290s, the kingdom of Hungary witnessed an explosion in lordship-building which emerged from Ladislas' IV legacy of disorder. The

---

[665] Charvátová, *Václav II*, 2007, 180–181.
[666] Kristó, "Die Macht," 1985, 598.

Hungarian lords seized royal and ecclesiastical properties and established their overlordship over considerable pieces of land. They fiercely fought each other and by both request and threat they attracted the lesser nobility to their ranks. By regionally seizing royal authority and jurisdiction they shattered the integrity of the kingdom, and actually created the "state-in-state" system.[667] Kristó calculated that by the turn of the fourteenth century there were eleven[668] "oligarchs", who controlled the better part of the realm with the most powerful of these overlords having resources comparable to regional dukes.[669]

Within the Polish lands

While discussing Polish scholarly literature, Gawlas commented on the organization and political influence of barons in the Polish lands in the twelfth century. He pointed out that throughout the century there were numerous examples of powerful nobles (Sieciech, Piotr Włostowic, Jaksa etc.) whose role within the system of the Piast's duchies should be perceived as more significant than merely of the ducal officials (voivodes). He indicated instances that would strongly suggest that the ambitions of those lords were directed towards regular lordships: duchies. They married into neighboring ducal families, acted as commissioners and sponsors of ecclesiastical foundations (the so-called private churches), and minted coins. Jaksa traveled to Jerusalem; an endevour that Gawlas read as an evidence for his conscious participation in the religious and political culture of the European aristocracy.

It seems that from the twelfth century onwards, the noble families in the Polish lands, by the intercession of their German counterparts, started adopting the Western models of the aristocratic family organization. This could explain a significant eruption of church-foundation projects, that themselves imitated the pious deeds of kings and dukes,[670] and thus can provide

---

[667] Ibid., 600.

[668] According to Gyula Kristó there were eleven oligarchs in medieval Hungary. His assertion is generally accepted by Hungarian scholarship, nevertheless Pál Engel has a slightly different opinion, for he regards Ugrin Csák as an oligarch, while Kristó refuses this statement. See: Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 126. I thank Istvan Petrovics (Univ. of Szeged) for pointing this issue out.

[669] Kristó, "Die Macht," 1985, 601–602.

[670] Roman Michałowski observed: *Royal foundations will interest us as the elements of political toolkit; acts that had (or could have had) two different functions: putting pressure on people and on sacrum. Apart from those two, one could add the third one. To wit, it has to be taken into consideration that by establishing an ecclesiastical institution or by granting to it some estates, a ruler was more or less consciously willing to conceive himself as a king or duke worth his name. This function shall not be underestimated. The confidence that a monarch could build by such acts was presumably not indifferent to the way he exercised his power*: Roman Michalowski, *Princeps Fundator: studium z dziejów kultury politycznej w Polsce X-XIII wieku* (Warsaw: Zamek Krolewski, 1993), 7–8. See also Skwierczyński's comments and his case study analysis of Palatine Sieciech's duke-imitating politics in the late eleventh and early twelfth century: Krzysztof Skwierczyński, "Fundacje możnowładcze w Polsce XI i XII wieku. Możni i ich fundacje jako problem badawczy," in *Animarum Cultura: studia nad kulturą*

yet another evidence for the scope and ultimate aim of such actions carried out by the nobles.[671] Furthermore, according to recent scholarship throughout the twelfth century the most powerful nobles were by no means only small estate-holders. Quite the opposite, individual possessions could comprise a few dozens of villages, and much more, if the wealth of the entire family was to be calculated. In addition, the nobility owned their properties (that is, did not hold them as fiefs) and were entitlied to exchange them freely.[672]

While analyzing the sections of Wincenty Kadłubek's account about Mieszko the Old's rule in Cracow in the 1170s, Gawlas summarized his observations by pointing out to mechanisms that – in my opinion – illustrate well the inherent aspect of the lordly identity that pushed a lord to adopt lordship-seeking practices.

In the society based on personal bonds, where the fundaments of ruler's power were underinstitutionalized, the scope of real ruling possibilities were subject to the permanent power game. Domination over their closest retinue, typical of the nobility, easily transformed, in favorable circumstances, into the control over land.[673]

Klemens of Ruszcza is a good example of a baron whose actions could be perceived as following the precepts of the role-identity. He was the voivode of Cracow between 1243 and 1253 (perhaps 1255),[674] and died in 1256.[675] After the Mongol onslaught in 1241 and the death of Duke Henryk the Pious of Silesia, Konrad of Mazovia used this opportunity that the still minor heir to Little Poland, Bolesław the Chaste, had lost his guardian and protector at the battlefield of Legnica, and seized the throne in Cracow. Konrad's arrival was not welcomed by some of the local elites, including Klemens of Ruszcza, and the duke decided to curb opposition by arresting the dissidents.[676] In summer 1242 a rebellion broke out with Klemens at its head.[677] Eventually, Bolesław the Chaste recuperated power in Little Poland, but this came at

---

religijną na ziemiach polskich w średniowieczu, ed. Halina Manikowska and Wojciech Brojer (Warsaw: Instytut Historii PAN, 2008), 63–64, 72–77, 81–83.

[671] Gawlas, *O kształt zjednoczonego królestwa*, 76–78.

[672] Ibid., 78.

[673] Ibid., 80: *W społeczeństwie opartym o więzi o charakterze osobistym, przy słabej instytucjonalizacji podstaw władzy, realne możliwości decydowania przez panującego były przedmiotem stałej gry sił. Właściwa pozycji możnych władza nad ich najbliższym otoczeniem w sprzyjających okolicznościach łatwo przekształcała się we władzę nad ziemią.*

[674] Antoni Gąsiorowski, ed., *Urzędnicy małopolscy XII-XV wieku: spisy* (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinskich, 1990), 123.

[675] Rocznik krakowski, *MPH*, 1872, 2:838.

[676] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 338–339.

[677] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:280.

a price. Klemens's services had to be acknowledged. As the charter of great privileges reads, Klemens managed to liberate the duke from captivity, subsequently, he defeated Konrad of Mazovia's troops at Suchodół, and reinstated Bolesław into the throne of Cracow.[678] In recognition to his services, Bolesław issued two acts (1250[679] and 1252) that granted Klemens such broad liberties and exemptions from the ducal authority that for Gawlas it was clear that the voivode attained an individual lordship.[680]

Those grants, quite exceptional in scope for the thirteenth-century relations between the Piasts and their barons, can be used as an interesting evidence for what appeared meaningful when it came to rewarding one's subject. In 1250, Klemens "pro fideli seruicio" received merely the right to hunt beavers in his hereditary estates. In 1252, however, Bolesław's grants were far more generous. Klemens was given exemption from any form of taxes in all his possessions; besides, he was entitled to deliver justice and judge people in his estates; furthermore, he received a permission to erect castles, strongholds, and cities at will; finally, he could decide whomever duke he wanted to serve, either proximate or distant. In fact, Bolesław the Chaste explained that for eternity he gave and conferred to Klemens and his successors of both sexes all liberties that he had "in dominio nostro".[681]

It can be, therefore, argued that the highest reward for the most valuable baron was to elevate his elite standing almost to the level of being equal to the Piast dukes. Certainly, Klemens – even equipped with all privileges – was still considerably less powerful than Bolesław, both in terms of material power and authority over people. He was, for instance, expected to serve a duke (princeps); a fate that indicated his inferior position in comparison with regular dukes, yet this lower status was significantly alleviated by the right to make his own choices.

Klemens' example shows, however, the conceptual direction towards which the ducal strategy of rewarding drifted. It was a transition from a subject to ducal fiscal, juridical, and personal authority to a more independent "international" unit that could exercise control and domination in his lands and engage in building bonds of loyalty with any other lord

---

[678] Franciszek Piekosiński, ed., *Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vol. 2 (Cracow: Akad. Umiejętności, 1886), n. 436.
[679] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 431.
[680] Gawlas, *O kształt zjednoczonego królestwa*, 84–85.
[681] *Cuius nos fidelitatem de more representantes, damus et perpetuo ei tradimus et omnibus posteris eius utriusque sexus omnes libertates, quas nos in dominio nostro habemus*: Piekosiński, *KDM*, 1886, vol. 2, n. 436.

whatsoever. No matter how exceptional were the grants for Klemens, their logic is easily traceable. Even if to assume that the baron actually forced Bolesaw the Chaste to make such unprecedented concessions, this presumption does not invalidate the fundamental fact that a lordship-seeking project was at play.

Less spectacular examples could be provided here. Gawlas argued that the reception of the Western models of lordship organization led to two conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, the Piast dukes strove to transform their methods of government and administration into more efficient systems, which required introduction and sustenance of some forms of monopoly of authority and control over the subjects, including, for instance, exclusive rights to arrange the colonization process and implementation of the system of the so-called "regalia". On the other hand, lesser lords were attracted to imitate this form of government and create enclaves, in which the ducal domination would be replaced by their own.[682]

Throughout the thirteenth century even the most influential noblemen did not succeed in developing separate lordships that would emerge on the "international" level as individual actors. However, the lack of spectacular successes does not immediately exclude ambitions and aspirations of this kind. Klemens of Ruszcza died in 1256 and there is not enough material to speculate what would have happened to his lordship, should he had lived longer. As Kurtyka asserted the barons derived their social standing from the size and quality of the estates they possessed.[683] This explained their drive to accumulate land; a process that entered a new phase in the early fourteenth century.[684] Yet already in the middle of the thirteenth century and later, there were examples of wealthy barons who successfully strove to develop coherent land units and win privileges and exemptions for them. It was, for instance, the case of a Silesian noble Henryk of Oleśnica.[685]

Another powerful example of a noble who gradually constructed the basis for his lordship was Mikołaj Przedpełkowic Łodzia from Great Poland. He secured for himself grants from Mściwoj II of Pomerania, Przemysł II of Great Poland and Łokietek. They empowered him to found towns and villages, erect strongholds at will, and deliver justice within the borders of

---

[682] Gawlas, *O kształt zjednoczonego królestwa*, 85.

[683] Janusz Kurtyka, "Posiadłość, dziedziczność i prestiż," *Roczniki Historyczne* 65 (1999): 162. Cf. observations made by Cetwiński: Marek Cetwiński, *Rycerstwo śląskie do końca XIII w.: Pochodzenie - Gospodarka - Polityka* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1980), 185–186.

[684] Kurtyka, "Posiadłość," 163.

[685] Cetwiński, *Rycerstwo śląskie do końca XIII w.*, 180.

his estates. Gawlas was convinced that Mikołaj's aspirations were much higher but he did not have time to attain them, for he died in 1305.[686] Kurtyka emphasized that land properties were not merely the source of substantial income but served as the basis for prestige- and authority-building. Owning a castle streghtened the military status of a nobleman but also facilitated the administration of his lands; controlling a town boosted local economy and founding a church or a convent conveyed a symbolic and moral message that would liken him to a duke.[687]

Separate set of examples that illustrate the power-seeking strategies outside the Piast family can be found in the actions of some Polish bishops. Throughout the second half of the thirteenth century the bishops of Cracow, Włocławek and Wrocław strove, in various ways, to develop separate lordships that would operate beyond ducal jurisdiction. Gawlas asserted that presumably such lordship-seeking enterprises were the primary causes of conflicts that erupted between the bishops and the Piast dukes.[688]

The most famous were controversies between the Silesian dukes and the bishops of Wrocław. Bishop Tomasz confronted Bolesław Rogatka of Legnica (1256-61) and his successor, Bishop Thomas II, entered a dispute with Konrad of Głogów (1268-1273).[689] Another controversy erupted between Bishop Thomas II of Wrocław and Henry IV Probus (1282-87).[690]

It is rather difficult to clearly identify reasons why on October 2, 1256, Bolesław of Legnica captured and imprisoned Bishop Thomas. The extant sources pointed Bolesław's desire to either forcefully extract money from the bishop or to compel him to agree to modify the system of collecting the tithes.[691] These source accounts, however, have been challenged by recent investigations that showed that hardly any changes in the forms of tithe collection could be noticed due to the duke-bishop conflict. Therefore, Tomasz Jurek, for example, suggested that the conflict was primarily motivated by personal vengeance.[692] The course of the entire controversy, its chronology and involvement of other actors remains the matter of constant discussion, for the remnants of sources that survived until today are often

[686] Gawlas, *O kształt zjednoczonego królestwa*, 86.
[687] Kurtyka, "Posiadłość," 187.
[688] Gawlas, *O kształt zjednoczonego królestwa*, 85.
[689] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:294.
[690] Jurek, Szczur, and Ozóg, *Piastowie*, 428–429.
[691] Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka*, 252.
[692] Jurek, Szczur, and Ozóg, *Piastowie*, 411.

inconclusive and leave room for speculation and making assumptions.[693] It is not my intention to analyze anew the entire conflict; it would be illustrative enough to jump to its conclusion. In March 1260, Henry III the White of Wrocław, Bolesław's brother, at the episcopal castle of Nysa, issued a charter in Bolesław's name. In the text, he guaranteed that Bolesław would pay 2,000 marks of silver as a compensation for all inflicted damages and restoration of some unjustly sequestered incomes. Besides, he confirmed the Church of Wrocław be free from all ducal duties and services, and granted independent jurisdiction except for death penalties. This charter contained a remark that obliged Konrad of Głogów to issue a similar document.[694] On the whole, it seems that all three brothers-dukes and brother-clergyman Władysław (successfully pursuing his ecclesiastical career),[695] got involved in resolving this mysterious controversy and the way to have it done was to accept the even greater autonomy of the bishop of Wrocław.

Bishop Thomas died in 1268. Between that year and 1270, Władysław, that is a brother of the ruling Silesian dukes, was appointed with the papal consent an administrator of the diocese.[696] Konrad of Głogów gradually started to breach the privileges that he had granted to the Church of Wrocław. In 1270, a new bishop, Thomas II, was elected and for the next three years an intenstive dispute over the Church's liberties followed. Eventually, shortly before his death, Konrad reasserted all taxation and jurisdiction grants he had made earlier.[697] The bishop's position was reinforced and the ducal claims were dropped.

However, later during his pontificate, Thomas II still had to face challenges of his lordly status. Previous controversies with Bolesław of Legnica and Konrad of Głogów resulted in reconfirmation of elite standing that belonged to the bishops of Wrocław. The power of episcopal moral authority, though always shaky and questionable, in those instances was strong enough to get the ducal intrusions overcome. However, an apparently quite similar conflict with Henry IV Probus of Wrocław, which erupted in 1282 and lasted until 1287, was less victorious. Henry demanded former ducal lands be returned to his domain and violated fiscal and juridical privileges that had been earlier granted to the bishopric. Thomas II was

---

[693] Cf. Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka*, 251–268.
[694] Ibid., 264. See also: Jureczko, *Henryk III Biały*, 99.
[695] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 418–419.
[696] Osiński, *Bolesław Rogatka*, 304.
[697] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 614.

particularly reluctant to give back the lands because there had been a lot of investments done in them and approx. seventy villages were founded. The mutual tensions escalated and the bishop had to take refuge in the castle of Otmuchów. In 1285, Henry IV took the castle by force and Thomas II escaped to Racibórz. In 1287, the duke sieged that castle and ultimately the bishop surrendered. In response, Henry IV acted mercifully and did not hurt the bishop; instead, he extended his protection over the Church of Wrocław and later acted as her great benefactor.[698]

All three conflicts between the bishops of Wrocław and the Silesian dukes demonstrate a common pattern, that is, a tension between ducal attempts to subordinate the bishop and the latter's struggle to sustain his elite lordly standing by the virtue of the office he was wielding. The successful campaigns of Henry IV, which made him the first who genuinely overwhelmed the bishop of Wrocław, were limited in scope and did not target the very idea of the episcopal lordship. Noteworthy, Henry IV of Wrocław was too the initiator of the process of subjecting lesser Piast dukes to his overlordship and he forcefully strove to dominate Silesia. This attitude towards his fellow dukes clearly corresponded with his politics towards the Church of Wrocław. Given the assumption that both Silesian dukes and the bishop were significant lords, that controlled lands and people on given territories, there would be no difference between forced subordination of Henry of Głogów and Henry of Legnica in 1281 and 1282, and the castle-winning campaign against the bishop in 1285 to 1287. Furthermore, the outcome of the duke-bishop conflict is also quite telling in this respect. Once Thomas II was defeated and surrendered to Henry IV, their mutual relations transformed. Asserting domination sufficed the duke who afterwards acted as a benign and generous overlord. It could be therefore stressed that it was not a problem of episcopal lordship as such that triggered the conflict, but rather its scope and aspirations of independence from ducal control and domination. Paradoxically, the bishops of Wrocław were the first among the Polish episcopate to establish a separate duchy of Nysa and Otmuchów. Only later, towards the second half of the fifteenth century, the bishops of Cracow assumed the ducal title too.[699]

There were other bishops who clearly followed the same pattern of developing their lordships by receiving grants and liberties from local dukes, and by gradual affirmation of their

---

[698] Ibid., 428–429.
[699] Cf. Gawlas, *O kształt zjednoczonego królestwa*, 85.

legitimate domination over a given territory. Chronologically speaking, those phenomena emerged virtually at the same time.

Bishop Wolimir of Włocławek in Cuiavia assumed his office in 1252.[700] According to Żmudzki, for the first couple of years Wolimir was preoccupied with expanding and reassuring the privileges and liberties of his bishopric. By doing this, he was securing a growing independence of the estates that belonged to his office from ducal authority. In 1258, however, Wolimir concluded a form of a feudal contract with Bogusza, a powerful nobleman, who issued the last will, in which he declared the bishop be the guardian of Bogusza's wife. In practice, Bogusza subjected his wife and his land properties under the protection of Bishop Wolimir. In the same year another noble, Zdzisław, received *in feudum* a few villages from the bishop.[701] Such practices revealed Wolimir's aspirations to act as a lord who could exercise domination also over lesser members of the elite.

The bishop's lordship-building project antagonized him with some nobles and ecclesiastical figures who claimed rights to Bogusza's estates and control over his ecclesiastical foundations. For instance, the Cistercians demanded authority over their monastery in Szpetal, which had been originally erected by Bogusza, and – after it collapsed – its properties were taken by Wolimir. Abbot Henryk of Sulejów, who had been commissioned to revitalize Szpetal, argued to Duke Casimir of Cuivia and Łęczyca that it was his responsibility to protect the monastery by the virtue of his status as the *dominus terrae*. It is unsure whether Casimir was convinced by Abbot Henry's reasoning, yet it is clear that in Spring 1259 he entered into the conflict with the bishop.[702]

Duke Casimir questioned the regulations of Bogusza's last will, refused to accept Zdzisław's feudal contract with the bishop, and challenged Wolimir's claims to the castle of Raciążek. Supposedly he also banned the bishop from Cuiavia.[703] At the same time the conflict between Casimir and Bolesław the Pious over the castellany of Ląd reignited. The duke of Cuiavia was losing his ground and in addition was excommunicated by Wolimir. To make matters worse, his son Leszek the Black revolted against his father's authority and won a lordship for himself. Wolimir was involved in all those events and acted as intercessor between

[700] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 94.
[701] Ibid., 90–91.
[702] Ibid., 98.
[703] Ibid., 99–102.

the vanquished Casimir and triumphant Bolesław.[704] In consequence, in 1261 Casimir sought peace with the bishop. Negotiations lasted for some time but eventually Wolimir of Włocławek received, on June 13, 1262,[705] full authority over twelve villages located between the rivers Vistula and Drwęca. This act equipped the bishop with a solid territorial basis for further development of his lordship. Żmudzki observed that in the charter there was nothing said about the castle of Raciążek and thus, he concluded that this aspiration Wolimir had to ultimately sacrifice.[706]

The end of the conflict between the bishop and Duke Casimir did not decrease Wolimir's will to expand his lordship. By close cooperation with Leszek the Black, he firmly pursued his policy of gathering rights and control over other pieces of lands, and of dominating lesser nobility.[707] By 1265, when the Casimir-Wolimir conflict re-erupted, the castle of Raciążek had already become the center of administration of the bishop's lordship. This war ended next year and the bishop regained all lost estates, was entitled to 200 silver marks of remuneration, and the duke promised to finance a stockade for Włocławek, the bishop's main residence.[708] Again, Wolimir remerged from this power competition strengthened. Until his death in 1275, the bishop continued successful cooperation with Duke Leszek the Black. He profited from sustaining good relations with the duke by extending his lordship-building activities to the castellany of Wolbórz.

The bishopric of Poznań was an interesting case. The Polish Church received her initial general liberties from the Piasts at the assemblies in Borzykowa in 1210 (cancellation of fiscal duties and services towards dukes)[709] and Wolbórz in 1215 (separate jurisdiction over subjects in the ecclesiastical estates).[710] Those decisions, however, were just primary steps towards more independent status of the Church, and had to be frequently repeated and confirmed by next generations of dukes on the local level.[711] In 1252, Bishop Boguchwał of Poznań received such assertion, while Przemysł I was organizing the official foundation of the town of

---

[704] Ibid., 129–133.
[705] Ibid., 138.
[706] Ibid., 139.
[707] Cf. Ibid., 141, 148, 150–151.
[708] Ibid., 151–152.
[709] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:239.
[710] Ibid., 1:240. See also: Uruszczak, *Historia państwa*, 75.
[711] Cf. Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 232–233.

Poznań.[712] A couple of decades later in Kościan, in 1298, Henry of Głogów as *dux Regni Polonie, Pomoranie, Slesie et dominus Glogouie*,[713] confirmed the privileges of the bishoprics of Gniezno, Poznań and those of Włocławek that pertained to the land of Pomerania. This charter, however, was issued in the time of heated tensions in Great Poland and was a result of an anti-Łokietek alliance that aimed at stripping him of his lordship in the provinces of Great Poland and Pomerania.[714] It was, therefore, understandable that Bishop Andrzej Zaremba of Poznań, who had been strongly invovlved in paving the way to power for Henry of Głogów against Łokietek, and other bishoprics, whose estates were located in Henry's prospective lordship, gained reconfirmation of their privileges and liberties from an aspiring candidate.

Yet, there is one more aspect that makes Henry's concessions stand out. Namely, Bishop Andrzej was promised that should Henry assume the royal crown (which was rather possible since Przemysł II's coronation in Great Poland in 1295), the royal chancellery – to be organized – would be operated by the bishop of Poznań.[715] It could be argued that for the bishop it was an attractive and prestigious task to be appointed the royal chancellor. In this case, sustaining lordly prerogatives were combined with a title-seeking interest that did not have to confine the scope of the bishop's lordly independence from the future king. Quite the opposite, being the highest official at the royal court would boost his elite standing and allow him a frequent contact with the monarch. Pursuing this career would be yet another way of securing his secular overlod's favor that in time would supposedly translate into further concessions and liberties. There is an interesting analogy with Bishop Wolimir's case who prior to assuming the see of Włoclawek was Duke Kazimierz's chancellor of Łęczyca.[716] Apparently, the splendor of the most noble royal office was still attractive for a bishop (as the cases of Władysław in the Kingdom of Bohemia and of Peter Aspelt in the Holy Roman Empire confirm), since it was far more prestigious than a local ducal chancellery (as that of Łęczyca, cherished by early Wolimir, for example).

---

[712] Nowacki, *Przemysł I*, 198.
[713] Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1878, vol. 2, n. 787.
[714] Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 70–78. See also: Jurek, "Polska droga," 174–175.
[715] *Si autem per adiutorium venerabilium patrum superius nominatorum et ecclesiarum eorundem regias fuerimus infulas assequuti, cancellaria regni penes Poznaniensem episcopatum perpetuo remanebit*: Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1878, vol. 2, n. 787.
[716] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 522.

Jan Muskata is the final example for episcopal endavors of building lordships. This particular one took a strategy of loyal service and cooperation with the ruler rather than challenging his prerogatives in order to expand one's own. Jan Muskata was elected bishop of Cracow on July 11, 1294 with considerable backing from Wenceslas II of Bohemia who at the same time was the ruler of Cracow.[717] Bishop Jan has been widely considered in scholarly literature as a protagonist of the Bohemian government in the Polish lands and the primary enemy of Władysław Łokietek after 1300.[718] There is a well-justified possibility that during the later period of the Přemyslids' rule in the Polish lands, between 1304 and 1306 (not continuously, however), Bishop Jan wielded the office of *capitaneus*[719] and thus, he acted as the royal representative and highest-official in Little Poland, chiefly exercising authority in the name and place of King Wenceslas II.[720]

According to Gawlas, Muskata's loyalty was recognized by Wenceslas II who granted him concessions that clearly supported the bishop's lordship-building project. In June 1295, Muskata received permission to raise walls around the settlements of Iłża, Kielce, Sławków and Tarczek. In 1301, he was given the castle of Pławiec, situated in northern Scepusia, together with the right to carry out colonization in its neighborhood. For Gawlas, such royal actions could be understood as the recognition of a princely status of the bishop.[721] Długopolski listed a number of castles and fortified churches controlled by Muskata: Biecz, Kielce, Lipowiec, Skalbimierz, Sławków, Tyniec, and Wawrzeńczyce. It is also known about mercenary troops that were hired by the bishop and were said to carry out killings and plundering throughout Little Poland.[722] Although most information about the alleged atrocities of Muskata derive from the witnesses' accounts collected during the bishop's trial between 1306 and 1308, and those testimonies are undoubtedly biased towards then victorious Duke Władysław Łokietek (and thus promoting his case and rights to the throne in

---

[717] Antonín, *Zahraniční*, 2009, 252–253. Cf. Nowakowski, *Małopolska elita*, 58.

[718] Sławomir Gawlas, "Człowiek uwikłany w wielkie procesy - przykład Muskaty," in *Człowiek w społeczeństwie średniowiecznym*, ed. Roman Michałowski (Warsaw: DiG, 1997), 391. Cf. Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 82.

[719] Antonín, *Zahraniční*, 2009, 264. See also: Tomasz Jurek, "Pod władzą obcego króla. Rządy czeskie w latach 1291-1306," in *Król w Polsce XIV i XV wieku*, ed. Andrzej Marzec and Maciej Wilamowski (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego "Societas Vistulana," 2006), 208. For more details see: Nowakowski, *Małopolska elita*, 62–65.

[720] Jurek, "Pod władzą," 199.

[721] Gawlas, "Człowiek uwikłany," 398.

[722] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 81.

Cracow against the claims of the Přemyslids which were backed and protected by Muskata),[723] it can be still argued that the bishops position in Little Poland considerably strengthened during the Přemyslids' rule in Little Poland. In time, he emerged as a third political party in Little Poland, obstructing the more customary system of bilateral relations between the ruler and the local elites (including the bishop). Muskata's successful consolidation of power by combining the assets and estates of the bishopric of Cracow with the most influential (and presumably rewarding) royal office and with the cordial bonds to the Přemyslids, transformed him into a local lord of unparalleled power, subject to the king himself and influential enough to outdistance the remainder of the nobility.[724]

All those developments and Muskata's actions, if observed from some broader perspective, of which some instances have been highlighted here, are well encapsulated and expressed by Gawlas's opinion:

Dramatic events of the beginning of the fourteenth century [that is, the war between Muskata and Łokietek in Little Poland and the former's subsequent trial – wk] *were the culmination of the longlasting efforts of the bishops of Cracow aimed at building their independent lordships. By no means they were unique in their aspirations. Throughout the thirteenth century in all Polish dioceses more or less clear evidence for such endavors can be noticed.*[725]

The ultimate example of title-seeking practices that belonged to characteristic features of the lordly identity and expressed sustained longing for making one's lordship not only more extensive in material terms, but also for attaining even greater prestige and more ducal (kingly)-like status, would be the controversy which erupted between Duke Leszek the Black and Duchess Kinga in 1280.[726]

---

[723] Sławomir Gawlas, "'Verus Heres'. Z badań nad świadomością polityczną obozu Władysława Łokietka w początku XIV w.," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 95, no. 1 (1988): 81–83. See also: Pietras, *Krwawy wilk z pastorałem*, 71–73.

[724] Cf. Kozłowski, "Developing," 246–248.

[725] *Dramatyczne wydarzenia z początku XIV w. były kulminacją długotrwałych dążeń biskupów krakowskich do budowy samodzielnego władztwa terytorialnego. Nie byli oni w żadnym wypadku wyjątkiem. We wszystkich polskich diecezjach można dostrzec w XIII w. mniej lub bardziej wyraźne świadectwa podejmowanych w tym kierunku wysiłków* (translation mine): Gawlas, "Człowiek uwikłany," 393. For instance, Żmudzki presumed that Bishop Paweł of Cracow (1266-1292), who supported Kinga, the widow of Duke Bolesław the Chaste of Cracow, in her dispute with Duke Leszek the Black over her lordship in the lands of Sącz, Biecz, and Korczyn, offered his services in hope to receive at least part of her lands after her heirless death: Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 319.

[726] For a detailed analysis see: Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 310–346.

At the beginning of this dispute there was an unprecedented donation of the land of Sącz made in Korczyn, on March 2, 1257, by Duke Bolesław the Chaste of Little Poland to his wife Kinga, a daughter of King Béla IV of Hungary.[727] This grant, carried out as a compensation for the money she had given to her husband in the recent turbulent times in order to pay his debts to his troops, transferred to her all ducal authority over the territory with only two restrictions: the duke confirmed his duty to protect and defend the land of Sącz and expressed his will that after Kinga's death the territory would not be broken off from the Polish nation (*natio Polonica*), that is, it would remain within the boundaries of the Polish lands. Otherwise, Kinga received a fully-fledged lordship.[728]

Bolesław the Chaste died in 1279. Leszek the Black inherited the throne, while Kinga – according to the grant she had received earlier from her husband – exercised lordly power in the land of Sącz. On July 6, 1280, as *domina et princeps de Sandech* she founded the monastery of Poor Clares and generously equipped it with properties and estates.[729] This act, which underlined her lordly prerogatives and will to perform pious deeds as expected from a regular lord, emerged as a controversial action that was disliked by the new duke (although after negotiations he approved the foundation itself). The charter was fashioned in a way that plainly stated Kinga's authority to perform such legal acts and Leszek appeared in the text as the illustrious duke of Cracow, Sandomierz and Sieradz who – by attaching his seal to the charter – publicly announced his consent for Kinga's donation. Żmudzki observed that the controversy over the monastic foundation was only a backlash of a more serious issue, that is, Kinga's status in the land of Sącz. In short, it was hardly acceptable for Leszek to tolerate an independent lord within the boundaries of what was traditionally considered as the ducal lordship.[730]

---

[727] Piekosiński, *KDM*, 1886, vol. 2, n. 452. The outcomes of this donation towards the end of the thirteenth century have been analyzed, see: Marek Kazimierz Barański, *Dominium sądeckie: od książęcego okręgu grodowego do majątku klasztoru klarysek sądeckich* (Warsaw: UW, 1992).

[728] The charter reads: *terram Zandecensem pure et integre et sine omni diminutione, cum pleno dominio, sicut ipsi tenuimus, sibi damus et conferimus irreuocabiliterque tradimus in perpetuum possidendam, cum pleno dominio thelonei et omnibus attinenciis pertinendibus ad eandem, siluis usque ad metas Ungarie se extendentibus, fluuis, piscaturis, piscinis, tabernis, molendinis, pratis, pascuis et omnibus aliis attinentiis et pertinentiis, quibuscunque nominibus censeantur, ita, quod dictam terram liceat sibi vendere, commutare, donare, locare et quolibet modo a se alienare*; Piekosiński, *KDM*, 1886, vol. 2, n. 452.

[729] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 487.

[730] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 312.

The conflict gradually increased. Supposedly Bolesław the Chaste, shortly before his death, donated to Kinga the land of Biecz.[731] She also laid claims to Korczyn.[732] While she was founding the monastery and getting prepared to join its ranks, Duke Leszek – as Żmudzki assumed – could have expected that taking the Franciscan vows of poverty would make her drop her interest in holding a lordship. Whatever were his expectations, the dispute continued throughout the year 1280. On October 31, 1280 Duke Leszek issued a charter where he promised to hold further peace negotiations with Kinga in Cracow and to abstain from inflicting any harm to her and her people. He also indicated the matter of their controversy: *dominium terrarum de Sandec et de Bech, quas terras predicta domina dicit ad se pertinere*.[733] In January 1281, before the scheduled negotiations with Leszek the Black started, Bishop Paweł of Cracow promised Kinga to support her case before the duke and either convince him to let her build the monastery and rule in her lordship peacefully or make him pay 20,000 silver marks of compensation[734] (which – according to Żmudzki – was far too much for the duke to even consider this as an alternative).[735]

This close cooperation between Kinga and Bishop Paweł was unexpectedly broken. In 1283, Duke Leszek imprisoned the bishop and subsequently invaded the lands of Biecz and Korczyn. Kinga did not put up the fight.[736] For the next couple of years the conflict continued, though Leszek had an upper hand. The bishop was realeased within a month but he was no longer Kinga's protagonist. By 1286 the entire controversy was settled: Paweł was granted a compensation in the amout of 6,000 silver marks[737] and Kinga upheld her lordship in Sącz.[738] It seems, however, that her prerogatives were diminished. Żmudzki observed that she ceased to issue charters, dropped the title of the lord of Sącz, and – supposedly – returned to the duke the customs office in Rytro.[739]

This conflict between Kinga and Bishop Paweł on one side, and Duke Leszek the Black on the other side, was a competition over the breadth and scope of effective lordly

---

[731] Ibid., 313.
[732] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 377.
[733] Piekosiński, *KDM*, 1886, vol. 2, n. 490.
[734] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 491.
[735] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 317.
[736] Ibid., 329.
[737] Ibid., 342.
[738] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 377.
[739] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 331.

prerogatives. For Żmudzki, Leszek's brutal action against the bishop was the last resort that allowed him to remind the elites in Little Poland who the ruler in Cracow was.[740] Attacking Kinga and claiming disputed territories was an attempt to restore his overlordship as much as it was possible in the area that was customarily controlled by the duke of Cracow. Kinga's lordship, however, was never fully destroyed and, in turn, she avoided raising armies to resist what she considered as infringing her legal rights. Some constraints notwithstanding, her authority in the land of Sącz remained undisputed. Hence, the original donation that she had received in 1257, and which after 25 years rooted more deeply in the political custom of Little Poland, was recognized and maintained.

Duke Leszek as a new ruler of Cracow faced the practicalities of the distribution of power in Little Poland that undermined the status of a duke as it was known to him in the duchy of Sieradz, where he had ruled prior to his succession to Cracow. Himself willing to dominate over lands and people according to the models he was acquainted with, still he had to grapple with similar aspirations coming from lesser lords, in this case the bishop and Duchess Kinga of Sącz. By no means he was the most powerful and – since negotiations appear to have been futile – he could resort to military power as his ultimate and most efficient argument. On the other hand, the intra-Piast conflicts alike, this controversy was also a configurative-type, because it chiefly introduced alternations and modifications in the power distribution in the "international" micro-system of Little Poland. The duke reasserted his dominating role but acknowledged the elite standing of lesser lords, even if slightly diminished. On the whole, there is no doubt that the fact that Kinga was calling herself the duchess of Sącz, and thus aspired to the ducal status in her lands, was intolerable for Leszek the Black who – as a potential overlord – could not accept any of Little Poland's lords to claim equal status to his own. Nevertheless, as long as the hierarchy of titles (elite standings and prestige) secured his prevailing position, other lordships within his lordship did not do him harm.

Lordship-appearances in the vicinity of the Polish lands

Throughout the thirteenth century the former kingdom of Poland was fragmented and its lands were ruled by the members of the Piast dynasty. As it has been indicated earlier, scholarly literature in Poland tended to contrast the "international" system in the Polish lands,

---

[740] Ibid.

characteristic for its divisions and anarchical behaviors, with the developments towards the end of the century that were said to be governed and inspired by an emerging idea of unity. This concept of re-unification has already large literature and on the virtue of my argument it needs to be revisited and deserves a separate study.[741] Among various reasons that apparently led to the real unification completed by Łokietek in 1320,[742] there are a few that argue that this process was a practical answer to the changes in the "international" system in the second half of the thirteenth century.

In his biography of Przemysł II of Great Poland, the first Polish king (crowned in 1295) after more than two hundred years, Nowacki interpreted the modifications of power distribution in Central Europe as detrimental for the position of the Polish dukes. He pointed that petty Polish principalities gradually ceased to play independent role in the "international" politics and their significance in the "international game of interest" declined in the face of the rise in power of the neighboring states. While summarizing results of the Polish scholarship, Nowacki identified four major directions that had been considered as considerable threats to the integrity of Poland: 1) the so-called "Eastern invasions" carried out by the Mongols, the Ruthenian dukes, and the Lithuanian or Prussian tribes; 2) the "Brandenburg aggression" related with a broader phenomenon of German expansion; 3) the threat generated by the Teutonic Order in the north; 4) the rise of the Přemyslids of Bohemia.[743]

This state-centered narrative perhaps does not do justice to the logic of "international" politics carried out by lords and tends to perceive the behaviors of lordship and modern nation state as undistinguishable, and hence it may be wrong while applying the modern concept of "territorial integrity of Poland", but apparently it makes another important point. Namely, during the thirteenth century the Piasts witnessed in adjacent lands a powerful and transformative process of lordship-building and its legitimization by winning recognition from the highest existing authorities in Christendom: the papacy and the empire.

---

[741] For comprehensive summaries see recent texts by Tomasz Jurek: Oswald Marian Balzer, *Królestwo Polskie: 1295-1370* (Cracow: Towarzystwo Naukowe "Societas Vistulana," 2005), IX–XIII and Jurek, "Polska Droga," 140–146. Cf. Janusz Kurtyka, *Odrodzone Królestwo: monarchia Władysława Łokietka i Kazimierza Wielkiego w świetle nowszych badań* (Cracow: Towarzystwo Naukowe "Societas Vistulana," 2001), 11–36.

[742] For a brief summary of the so far identified factors that facilitated the process of the unification of Poland see: Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 317–319.

[743] Nowacki, *Przemysł II*, 35–36.

As it was stated in the beginning of this section, lordship-seeking projects were, in a certain sense, aristocratic, because they were open to pioneers who had been ready to use their local elite position in order to boost it further towards becoming equal with the "domini naturales", that is, to join their ranks. By doing this, those pioneers, if they were successful, could distance themselves from their immediate peers, among whom that had been raised, and reach for higher strata in the social hierarchy. Such projects were even more feasible if there were lands with undetermined allegiance (i.e. existing beyond the Christian sphere of "international" order and hence not subjected to the customary system of overlordship) or which suffered from the lack of efficient control and domination. Disintegration of the Polish monarchy made the Polish dukes less capable of taking advantage of functioning in the borderland of Western Christendom. They had been already weaker in terms of material power and less prestigious in terms of attracting foreign aid than if there was a unified political entity, elevated by its royal title over the neighboring lordships (the prospective kingdom of Poland). However, in the thirteenth century Central Europe was a region of particularly unestablished legitimacies, and thus it was a fertile soil for growing new lordships and accommodate various title-seekers.

It is not my intention now to begin a detailed analysis of the lordship-building processes that occurred in Central Europe during the thirteenth century. The argument I will make is that lordship-construction and expansion, claiming titles, and prestige-boosting were political phenomena so widespread and ubiquitous, and thus so overwhelming and influential, that had great impact on shaping "international" interests, targets, and policies of individual actors. It can be argued, therefore, that this culture of hierarchy, control, domination, and subordination was a furnace that generally produced lords and inspired their motivations and actions. Consequently, wherever a lack of strong and well-legitimized domination was noticed, title-seeking lords and ambitious lesser nobles would compete to fill this default with their presence.

I will start with pointing to two successful lordship-establishing projects that occurred in the thirteenth century and could be viewed as a good illustration of the title-seeking mechanisms: the emergence of lordships in Gdańsk-Pomerania and of Teutonic Order in Prussia. These cases would acquire some additional significance, if one considered that they were created in geographical proximity to the future lands of Łokietek (and so his thinking

about the "international" system could have been impacted by them). Subsequently, there should be some reflection over prestige-building projects that occurred around the Polish lands and could have created – precisely in terms of securing the elite standing – an extra urge for the Polish dukes to reach for the royal crown and start to introduce hierarchical relations within the dynasty, as Henry IV of Wrocław did in the 1280s.

The Teutonic Order initially emerged in the Holy Land in the second half of the twelfth century and acquired its military function in the 1190s.[744] Over first few decades of its existence, the Order received number of grants and estates in the Holy Land, Sicily and Italy, Thuringia and Saxony. Almost simultaneously to their arrival to the land of Chełmno in 1228,[745] they acquired lands in Spain and France.[746] The Order benefited the most under Master Herman von Salza (1209-1239) who closely cooperated with Emperor Frederick II and thanks to his faithful services the emperor lavished the Order with grants that were envied by the Hospitallers and Templars.[747]

As Labuda observed normally the donations for the Teutonic Order were standard, in terms of size, grants oferred to ecclesiastical institutions. They did not exceed a few-village properties, smaller pieces of land, and houses. However, in 1211 King Andrew II of Hungary donated them the Barcaság land (German: Burzenland; Romanian: Ţara Bârsei)[748] that amounted to 12,000 sq kilometers.[749] According to the royal plan, the installation of the Teutonic Knights in Transylvania, at the south-eastern border of Andrew II's realm, was meant to provide military protection in the area prone to the Cuman incursions.[750] As the king explained in the donation charter, he settled the Order in the borderlands and expected them to act as a firm stronghold against the Cumans, who had been constantly invading the realm, and that they would day by day not fear to expose themselves to death.[751]

---

[744] Marian Biskup and Gerard Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach: Gospodarka, Społeczeństwo, Państwo, Ideologia* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1986), 98–102. See also: Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 325.

[745] Labuda, Michowicz, and Biskup, *The History of Polish Diplomacy X-XX C.*, 45.

[746] Biskup and Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, 102–109.

[747] David Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1988), 166, 172, 181. Cf. Biskup and Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, 136–137.

[748] The region located in the neighborhood of Braşov (German: Kronstadt, Hungarian: Brassó).

[749] Biskup and Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, 112.

[750] Nora Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and "Pagans" in Medieval Hungary, C. 1000-C. 1300* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 33.

[751] *Eo quod ipsi in confinio illo, tanquam nouella plantation sunt positi, et assiduous Cumanorum patients insultus, se pro regno tamquam firmum propugnaculum de die in diem morti opponere non formident*: György Fejér, *Codex*

The Order quickly started erecting castles in the region. They built at least five: Marienburg, Schwarzburg, Heldenburg, Kreuzburg, and Ruczarburg.[752] Besides, they attempted to escape the jurisdiction of the bishop of Transylvania by attaining a papal bull that confirmed their immediate subjection to the papacy (April 30, 1224).[753] Meanwhile, Honorius III consented to their request and took their lands in Transylvania under special protection and acknowledged them as the property of St. Peter. As a recognition of the papal overlordship, the Order was expected to pay annually two marks of gold.[754]

King Andrew II resisted such developments that legally confirmed a practical autonomy of the Order in the Barcaság and filed an official complaint against them to the pope. He pointed to continuous abuses and their sustained will to diminish the royal supervision over the territory they had been given, and questioned the papal decision about placing the land under the pope's direct control. Honorius III appointed Cistercian judges to investigate the controversy and back down from claiming rights to the Barcaság, but it did not prevent the king from expelling the Order from the kingdom of Hungary in 1225. Later the popes insisted on restoring the Order to its properties but to no avail.[755]

Hungarian scholarly literature clearly stated that the expulsion of the Teutonic Order from Transylvania was caused by its growing ambitions and aspirations to independence.[756] Romanian historiography, which as a matter of fact is often at odds with the Hungarian interpretation of the history of Transylvania, this time perceived the problem of the Teutonic Knights in the Barcaság similarly.[757] Although the Order was given generous privileges and broad liberties, and could easily operate as the vassal of Andrew II, instead it strove to break

---

Diplomaticus Hungariae Ecclesiasticus Ac Civilis, vol. 3.1 (Budae: typis typogr. Regiae Vniversitatis Vngaricae, 1829), 117. Istvan Petrovics (Univ. of Szeged) explained to me that in fact this quotation is not from the original charter issued by King Andrew II in 1211 (where the king granted the territory of the Barcaság / Burzenland / Ţara Bârsei to the Teutonic Knights) but it comes from the royal privilege (issued in 1212 for certain brother Theodoricus), in which – however – Andrew II confirmed and enlarged the already existing grants and privileges of the Teutonic Knights.

[752] Biskup and Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, 114. It is, however, very difficult to identify their exact locations. For more details see: Ioan Marian Tiplic, *Die Grenzverteidigung Siebenbürgens im Mittelalter (10.-14. Jahrhundert)* (Heidelberg: Arbeitskreis für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde, 2007).

[753] August Potthast, ed., *Regesta pontificum Romanorum inde ab a. post Christum natum MCXCVIII ad a. MCCCIV* (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1957), n. 7231, 7232.

[754] Biskup and Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, 115–116.

[755] Ibid., 117.

[756] Cf. Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 90. See also: Béla Köpeczi and Katalin Péter, eds., *History of Transylvania* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1994), 424–425.

[757] Ioan-Aurel Pop and Thomas Nägler, eds., *The History of Transylvania*, vol. 1 (Cluj-Napoca: Romanian Cultural Institute, Center for Transylvanian Studies, 2005), 224–225.

any bondages with the king of Hungary and establish distant (and thus much weaker) ties with the Apostolic See. Despite the Order's efficiency in defeating the Cumans and enlarging the territory that it controlled (which was a plain evidence that it well carried out the job it had been commissioned), it was unacceptable for Andrew II – as Nora Berend put it – *to cede territories for the sake of defense.*[758]

From this brief overview it is clear that the Teutonic Order attempted to build its separate lordship in the Hungarian borderland, that is, in the region that offered many opportunities in expanding control and domination, and in producing wealth. They did not have much time to prove their qualifications in waging successful wars against the pagans, but from what is known about their fourteen-year-long presence in Transylvania it could be argued that they had capacities to construct a powerful defense system. Andrew II would undoubtedly profit from their military presence. He also realized, however, that the political entity, which the Order was building, aspired to a higher elite standing in the "international" system that a subjugation to the Árpáds. Besides, according to papal decisions of 1216 and 1221, military orders were banned to enter vassal relations with secular rulers.[759] As a result, the Order could pursue policy of removing all dependencies except the subordination to the papacy. In practice, such development in the hierarchical order of the "international" system stripped the king of Hungary of the land he had considered as belonging to his domain, deprived him of prospective territorial gains in south-eastern Transylvania and – perhaps the most irritatingly – cut him off from carrying out his own expansionist policy in that area. The emergence of another political entity there, that was militarily and materially capable of effective conquest, required from Andrew II a firm response which would contain the Order's lordship organization before it was more advanced in structure and resources. The kingdom of Hungary was strong enough to resist the emergence of an unwanted and presumably antagonistic lordship. The Teutonic Knights had to surrender to the royal military force and the papal authority was too distant and frail in order to provide meaningful support for them.

Similar scenario but in different "international" circumstances was played out in the land of Chełmno, granted to the Knights by Duke Konrad of Mazovia as a springboard for their activities in Prussia. In March 1226, Grand Master Herman von Salza received from Emperor

---

[758] Berend, *At the Gate*, 2001, 33.
[759] Biskup and Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, 115.

Frederick II a confirmation charter that asserted the conditions of mutual agreement which had been made between the Order and Duke Konrad of Mazovia.[760] The emperor, however, apart from authorizing the Order to settle in the land of Chełmno, granted to Herman a separate lordship in Prussia (which was still to be conquered in the first place). Although the imperial decision could have been challenged in legal terms as invalid in regard to the military orders, its most fundamental conclusion was plain: the Order was aiming at building a lordship and intended to secure its highest possible standing in the "international" system. In Hungary, the Teutonic Order was initially dependent on the king of Hungary; in the Polish lands it was Duke Konrad of Mazovia who acted as their founder and protector. It was clear that an ecclesiastical institution (and the Order functioned in Christendom as a regular "international" corporation) derives its prestige not only from wealth but also from the close relations with the most prestigious lords in the "international" system. An imperial grant – even legally doubtful – was still a powerful source of legitimization for a new lordship that a donation issued by a Polish duke somewhere at the edges of Christendom.

Between 1228 and 1230 the Teutonic Order received the village of Orłowo near Inowrocław and the stronghold of Nieszawa and four villages nearby Toruń. Moreover, Konrad of Mazovia repeated his donation of the land of Chełmno, and on January 18, 1230 Pope Gregory IX confirmed all those agreements and urged the Knights to begin the reconquest of the land of Chełmno, which apparently was partially taken by the Prussians.[761] In 1234, the pope once more acknowledged Konrad's donation of the land of Chełmno and declared the Prussian lands, which still were to be conquered by the Order, the propriety of St. Peter (identically with the earlier claim concerning the land of Borsa) and donated it to the Knights with all rights and privileges.[762]

---

[760] This charter, the so-called „golden bull", has been declared by historians a fraud that was in fact generated in the 1230s; presumably in 1235, see: Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 307. Cf. Labuda, Michowicz, and Biskup, *The History of Polish Diplomacy X-XX C.*, 45.

[761] Biskup and Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, 120.

[762] *Quod a vobis suffragante exercitu christiano iam de ipsa terra [the land of Prussia – wk] auctore Deo noscitur acquisitum in ius et proprietatem beati Petri suscipimus et eam sub speciali apostolice sedis protection ac defensione perpetuis temporibus permanere facimus, ipsamque vobis et domui vestre cum omni iure et prouentibus suis concedimus in perpetuum libere possidendam. Ita ut per vos aut alios dicta terra nullius umquam subiciatur dominio potestatis*: Johannes Voigt, ed., *Codex Diplomaticus Prussicus: Urkunden-Sammlung zur Ältern Geschichte Preussens aus dem Königl. Geheimen Archiv zu Königsberg nebst Regesten*, vol. 1 (Königsberg: Gebrüdern Vornträger, 1836), n. 35. See also: Biskup and Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, 127–128.

In Polish scholarly literature the emergence of the Teutonic Order's lordship in the land of Chełmno and Prussia is considered as a fatal event. Labuda observed:

Neither Konrad [the duke of Mazovia – wk] *nor Chrystian* [the missionary bishop of Prussia – wk] *were aware of what the Teutonic Knights' intentions were. So far, experiences with the Knights Hospitallers and the Templars, who in the late twelfth century had already established their first colonies in the Polish lands and in Western Pomerania, as well as fresh experiences with the Order of Dobrzyń and of Calatrava in Tymawa in Gdańsk-Pomerania, have not engendered any reasons to worry that newcomers would carry out their task with more energy than their predecessors. It seemed to both noble figures* [Konrad and Chrystian – wk] *that the Teutonic Knights would be puppets in their hands and that with the Order's help they would not only vaniquish the pagans but – if they acted approprietly – they would conquer the entire Prussia.*[763]

Similar opinion was repeated by Szczur.[764] Also Barański put forward an analogous interpretation, claiming that Konrad of Mazovia – who himself had risked little by bringing the Teutonic Order to the land of Chełmno because it was already controlled by the Prussians – could hope to secure his northern border with the Order's help and, by the virtue of his status of founder and sponsor of the Order's settlement in that region, he looked forward to gaining control over Prussia. Nevertheless, the Order outmanoeuvred him by asserting independent status from the emperor and the pope and thus they succeeded in establishing their lordship there.[765]

It is a historiographical cliché that traces its origins from the fourteenth-century anti-Order trials. It depicts the Teutonic Knights as cunning, wicked and deceitful "international" actors[766] who continuously strove to expand their lordship by military conquest of the neighboring lands (including those claimed to belong to the sphere of authority and

---

[763] *Ani Konrad, ani Chrystian nie byli świadomi, z jakimi zamiarami przybywali Krzyżacy. Dotychczasowe doświadczenia z joannitami i templariuszami, którzy już u schyłku XII w. założyli na ziemiach polskich i na Pomorzu zachodnim swe pierwsze kolonie, a także świeże doświadczenia z zakonem rycerzy Chrystusowych w Dobrzyniu i kalatrawensami w Tymawie na Pomorzu Gdańskim nie dawały powodu do obaw, iż nowi przybysze bardziej gorliwie zabiorą się do dzieła niż ich poprzednicy. Obu dostojnikom wydawało się, że Krzyżacy będą powolnym narzędziem w ich ręku i że z ich pomocą nie tylko poskromią pogan, lecz przy umiejętnym postępowaniu opanują całe Prusy*: Biskup and Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, 136.
[764] Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 307–308.
[765] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 326–327.
[766] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:258–259.

domination of the Piast dukes). In this view, Konrad of Mazovia appeared as a naïve duke who completely miscalculated power and resources of the Teutonic Order and facilitated the emergence of a hostile and dangerous political entity right at the Polish border. As a result, he exchanged the Prussian poorly coordinated incursions into his lands for a highly-efficient and institutionalized political entity that eventually turned its military power against Poland.

This common opinion that has been reinforced throughout the ages and found its important place in Polish scholarly literature contains two significant flaws. First, it offers the appraisal of the Order-Polish relations from the post-factum perspective, which is known to contemporary historian but was inaccessible to Duke Konrad, no matter how smart he might have been. Second, and this one has to be particularly emphasized, it ignores the omnipresent in the political culture lordship-imperative and the identities which it had been constantly producing. On the basis of the so far accumulated data and evidence, it can be argued that the Teutonic Order had no other alternative but to pursue its politics towards establishing a lordship and seeking the highest elite standing that was possible for it. The very fact that from the outset, prior to their arrival to the land of Chełmno, they required decent number of estates, privileges and liberties, and that Duke Konrad had no problems with granting them what they requested, reveals that both parties understood mechanisms of inter-lordly relations. They did not act as hired mercenaries, enlisted temporarily for individual military campaigns. Their mission was extended for years and required a stable system of self-financing that the duke-patron had to provide in advance. The Order's expansion to Prussia was even more promising because it opened perspectives that its material base would increase and free the duke's treasury from possible burdens.

In short, it was rather obvious that the Teutonic Order would attempt to build a lordship and would search for ways of linking it directly to the so-called universal powers of Latin Christendom. This strategy provided to the Order an additional sense of security and protection from possible claims emerging from whatever direction against it. Moreoever, appealing to the emperor or pope for confirmation of one's legitimacies in a given land was a well-known practice for the Piasts themselves. This issue will be elaborated in the later section. Anyway, the Teutonic Order acted in full correspondence to contemporary political customs and modes of operation. Following my intuition, which would yet require a separate investigation, there is much chance that the future conflicts between the kingdom of Poland

and the Order's lordship could be efficiently explained within the framework of competing legitimacies and it would not require resorting to standard (and more dramatic) narratives of brutal conquest, in which a predatory-state strove to consume a prey-state by virtue of the former's domination in terms of military resources.

One more influential factor has to be noticed here. Namely, King Andrew II of Hungary was a relatively powerful king. It can be asserted that his lordship was extensive, more populated and richer that any of fragmented Polish duchies. Assuming for a moment an IR perspective, which pays much attention to international security threats, it could be claimed that when he invited a military order to his borderlands, that is, by bringing into his realm alien, well-organized and trained troops,[767] he put himself at risk. On the other hand, his action wasunderstandable because he had resources that could support his demands to oversee the Order's actions.

This model of firmer control over a military order was employed in Spain during the *Reconquista*, where local kings were concerned about their leading role in fighting the Muslims and thus they did not allow for too much freedom of action on the side of the military orders. The models of interactions and co-existence between rulers and orders were, however, context-specific and subject to diverse forms of cooperation. In the East and in the Holy Land the orders carried out more autonomous politics towards neighboring political entities; they waged wars and negotiated peace treaties that were also recognized by Latin rulers. In Central Europe, however, the military orders found the most fertile conditions for independent growth and flourishing.[768] In Hungary it turned out that escaping the royal control was ultimately impossible and such defiance resulted in expulsion, but in the Baltic region the "international" sub-system was more diverse and fragmented. Therefore, it was harder to dominate such a military lordship and, on the other hand, it was much easier for the Teutonic Knights to build up an "international" unit that would be immune to any wiping-out attempts due to its relatively significant power in the region.

The Teutonic Order was a newcomer to the "international" system in Central Europe. It received its operational base in the land of Chełmno but over next couple of decades it

---

[767] Cf. Jonathan Simon Christopher Riley-Smith, ed., *The Oxford History of the Crusades* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 188–190.
[768] Ibid., 182–183.

expanded territorially and by 1283 the entire land of Prussia fell under the Order's control.[769] While the Piast duchies were generally prone to further fragmentation, the Order marched in the opposite direction and thus its "international" position in the region increased.

Meanwhile, in Gdańsk-Pomerania another lordship-building project was ongoing. Nonetheless, it was not carried out by immigrants who claimed control and domination over Gdańsk-Pomerania. Edward Rymar asserted:

From the second half of the twelfth century dukes of Vistulan Pomerania, with centres in Świecie, Gdańsk, Białogard and Lubiszewo, are known. [...] *Initially they were tribute-payers to the Polish dukes and acted as dukes (even governors) of lower rank; they emancipated around 1227, when Świętopełk the Great, by cancelling his subordination to the Polish dukes, became equal to the dukes of Western Pomerania and Poland.*[770]

The origins of the house of Gdańsk-Pomerania lords are disputed. It is presumed that it was a side-line of the kindred of the Pomeranian dukes and that it originated from Świętopełk, the governor of a number of strongholds at the Noteć riverbank between 1109 and 1113, who has been considered a cousin of Duke Bolesław the Wrymouth of Poland.[771] Sobiesław of Gdańsk (d. 1187) was the first attested representative of this ruling house. He supposedly married a sister of Żyro, the voivode of Mazovia.[772]

Gdańsk-Pomerania was, therefore, not ruled by the Piasts; however, it was for a long time controlled by the duke of Cracow. Around Leszek the White's death in 1227, it was the moment that the local governor, Świętopełk (b. ca. 1190, ruled 1217-1266),[773] seized power and *de facto* elevated himself to the status of lord-duke.[774] However, in that time the status of Gdańsk-Pomerania was complicated. Apart from claims to overlordship made by the rulers of Cracow, kings of Denmark were also seriously interested in spreading their domination by submitting the lords of Pomerania.[775] For instance, in 1205 Władysław Laskonogi of Great

---

[769] Biskup and Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, 182–185.
[770] *Od drugiej połowy XII w. znamy książąt na Pomorzu Nadwiślańskim z ośrodkiem w Świeciu i Gdańsku, Białogardzie i Lubiszewie.* [...] *Początkowo trybutariusze książąt polskich i książęta (wręcz namiestnicy) o niższej randze, wymencypowali się ok. 1227 r., kiedy Świętopełk Wielki, zrzucając podległość trybutarną, zrównał się rangą z książętami Pomorza Zachodniego i dzielnicowymi książętami polskimi* [translation mine – wk]: Edward Rymar, *Rodowód książąt pomorskich* (Szczecin: Książnica Pomorska im. Stanisława Staszica, 2005), 219.
[771] Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 280.
[772] Rymar, *Rodowód*, 225.
[773] Cf. Ibid., 239–245.
[774] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 361.
[775] Rymar, *Rodowód*, 224.

Poland intervened in Pomerania to prevent an attack from Denmark.[776] In 1210, Mściwoj I (ca. 1207 – ca. 1213/15)[777] as a lord of Gdańsk-Pomerania was forced to pay homage to King Waldemar II of Denmark[778] but supposedly he did not recognize this submission for long and remained in close relations with the Piasts of Cracow.[779]

It is possible that in 1217 Duke Leszek the White of Cracow visited Gdańsk-Pomerania and confirmed Świętopełk's rule there. In time, the latter became involved in the intra-Piast politics. In 1223, alongside the Polish dukes he participated in a crusade to Prussia[780] and supported Odonic in his struggle for lordship in Great Poland against his fatherly uncle, Władysław Laskonogi. Świętopełk's commitment on Odonic's side brought him into conflict with his formal overlord, Leszek the White. The duke of Cracow challenged Świętopełk's politics and demanded from him to drop Odonic's case and, by doing so, to recognize his authority. In 1227, in response to those developments on the "international" stage, Świętopełk made two further steps towards creating his lordship: first, he filed a complaint against the Polish dukes to the pope; second, he dispatched a military unit that attacked a summit of the Piast dukes in Gąsawa and got Leszek the White killed.[781] In consequence, even his formal dependency from the dukes of Cracow ceased to exist. In 1231, Gregory IX issued a protection bull that recognized Świętopełk as the lord of Gdańsk-Pomerania.[782]

This strategy that sought help and protection from the pope was already a well-known and widely used practice in the "international" system.[783] It was an efficient way to minimize subordination-generating aspirations of more powerful lords. Submitting one's lordship to the pope was a productive tool to improve its security, because any external aggression had to consider some form of accountability before the authority of the pope. Of course, it did not guarantee peace and harmony with lord-neighbors but still the papal protection was a desired

---

[776] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:235. Cf. Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 282.

[777] Rymar, *Rodowód*, 232–233.

[778] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:248.

[779] Rymar, *Rodowód*, 232–233.

[780] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:257.

[781] Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 282–283.

[782] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 361. Cf. Rymar, *Rodowód*, 267.

[783] I will come back to this issue while discussing the final element of a lordly identity: the membership in the Christian society.

status among less powerful lords (perhaps among those who felt threatened by their neighbors and lacked means for effective defense).

As it has been mentioned above, in the same way the Teutonic Order sought to elevate its elite standing while creating lordships in the Barcaság and subsequently in Prussia. More importantly, however, before Świętopełk requested the papal recognition of his lordship – which would thus make him more immune to a coercive submission to other rulers, like the dukes of Cracow, kings of Denmark etc. – his former overlord, Leszek the White, had already done it twice.

On January 4, 1207 Innocent III issued a special bull for him.[784] The pope took Leszek and his duchy of Cracow, and all his possessions that justly belonged to him, under the protection of the Roman Church, so that nobody would try to unfairly disturb him in regard to them.[785] Sometime in 1216, Leszek sent a letter to Honorius III, in which he first recognized that in the Roman Church dwelled the plenitude of power to bind and unbind, and then he rejoiced that God made the pope "patrem et rectorem totius orbis", promised to remain faithful to the Church and finally he supplicated the pope to act as Leszek's protector in all his necessities.[786] Another Polish duke in the thirteenth century who turned to Rome for protection was Odonic. He received the relevant bull on February 9, 1217, but had to accept a regular tribute in the amount of ten marks of gold for this grace.[787] Some time later, on June 22, 1235, Henry the Pious of Silesia, a young successor to Henry the Bearded's considerable lordship, was also taken under the papal protection.[788] Combining those petitions with others, issued in the 1230s by the Teutonic Order, would reveal the "international" context, in which

---

[784] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:234. See also: Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 303.

[785] *Eapropter dilecte in Domino fili, sinceritatem deuotionis ac fidei, quam erga nos et Romanam Ecclesiam habere dignosceris attendentes, personam tuam cum ducatu Cracouiensi et omnibus bonis tuis, que iuste possides et quiete, sub beati Petri et nostra protectione suscipimus et presentis scripti [pagina communimus], auctoritate presentium districtius inhibentes, ne quis te super eis presumat indebite molestare*: Piekosiński, *KDM*, 1876, vol. 1, n. 5.

[786] Jan Ptaśnik, *Analecta Vaticana 1202-1366* (Sumpt. Academiae Litterarum Cracoviensis, 1914), n. 4.

[787] Eapropter dilecte in Domino fili, tuis iustis postulationibus inclinati, personam tuam, terram et homines, possessiones et alia bona que impresentiarum rationabiliter possides aut in futurum iustis modis prestante Domino poteris adipisci, sub beati Petri et nostra protectione suscipimus et presentis scripti patrocinio communimus districtius inhibentes, ne venerabilis frater noster Gneznensis archiepiscopus in te vel terram tuam, absque manifesta et rationabili causa et monitione premissa, sententiam excommunicationis promulget. Ad indicium autem huiusmodi a nobis percepte protectionis, censum decem marcarum auri, que de tertio in tertium annum te promisisti liberaliter soluturum, nobis et successoribus nostris persolves: Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1877, vol. 1, n. 91.

[788] Potthast, *Regesta*, n. 9944.

Świętopełk carried out his appeal to the pope. In short, he behaved like those who he intended to imitate in the form, scope, and prestige of their lordships.

Concluding, while building his lordship, Świętopełk – although initially a lesser lord without much "international" recognition – followed standard procedures that secured him a legitimate title of a duke and pushed him into the more prestigious ranks of lords. By submitting to the pope he joined the group of dukes who had done the same prior to him or shortly after him. Similar protection bulls were issued for the dukes of Cracow (Little Poland), Kalisz (Great Poland), Gdańsk-Pomerania, and Silesia. The Teutonic Order used an analogous way to keep safe from an unwilling subjugation. Therefore, his lordly identity was reinforced and co-constructed by the papal act. He attained an external recognition of his status of a lord and safeguarded from potential threats of degrading him back to the rank of a ducal governor.

During his reign Świętopełk waged many wars. He dominated his brothers Sambor and Racibor by allotting them petty lordships in Gdańsk-Pomerania. Most of the lands and leading role he retained for himself. Initially such distribution of power followed Świętopełk's father command, which he had made on his deathbed, that the first-born son would take care of his younger brothers and their lordships.[789] Later conflicts with his brothers originated in the uneven (or at least unacceptable to them) distribution of domination and control in Gdańsk-Pomerania. Their mutual tensions were quite similar to controversies that emerged in the 1240s among the sons of Henry II the Pious of Silesia. In this latter case, Bolesław Rogatka also attempted to diminish the position of his brothers by retaining hegemonic role. However, the important difference between these two cases was that Świętopełk vanquished his brothers and did not have to make many concessions to them. He managed to defend his status of an overlord.

Świętopełk identified his political goals and set up agenda to achieve them in a way strikingly similar to what has been already revealed from the mechanisms and practices of the intra-Piast conflicts. First, he fought his brothers (particularly in the 1230s)[790] but was not willing to eliminate them from the "international" stage. He was satisfied with securing their subordination. Second, in order to extend his lordship to new territories, he took advantage of rebellions of the local nobility against the formal Danish rule and reached for the lands of

---

[789] Rymar, *Rodowód*, 240, 244.
[790] Ibid., 234.

Słupsk and Sławno (sometime between 1218 and 1223).[791] Third, he managed to marry with a representative of a local ducal family. His father, Mściwoj I, married certain Swinisława of unknown but noble origin.[792] The origins of Świętopełk's first wife, Eufrozyna, are highly disputed. There are competing hypotheses that suggest that she was: 1) Władysław Odonic's sister, that is, she was a Piast from Great Poland; 2) a daughter of Duke Świętopełk of Olomouc, that is, she was from the Přemyslids.[793] His second wife, Irmingarda, must have been a German native of a supposedly noble status.[794] Putting aside genealogical discussions, it appears plain that Świętopełk of Gdańsk-Pomerania was successful in elevating his elite standing by various prestige-building strategies. Fourth, he survived as a lord despite numerous military conflicts with his neighbors. He challenged the Piasts of Great Poland and Cuiavia by making claims to the stronghold of Nakło and the land of Wyszogród respectively. In the land of Chełmno he sought to gain some possessions taken from the Teutonic Order. In his own lordship, he attempted to seize properties and breach liberties that belonged to the bishop of Włocławek.[795] His continuous wars were ultimately futile but they never undermined his lordly status. His overlordship in Gdańsk-Pomerania was generally recognized. Fifth, Świętopełk's son, Mściwoj II (ca. 1222-1294),[796] demanded from his father a separate lordship which was yet another common practice. In 1259, he received the land of Świecie.[797] Nevertheless, after Świętopełk's death in 1266, Mściwoj's aspirations to become – like his father – the dominating duke in Gdańsk-Pomerania collided with the firm resistance of his brother Warcisław of Gdańsk and war ensued (1269/70-71). Subsequently, having defeated and expelled his younger brother (who took refuge in Cuiavia),[798] in the 1270s Mściwoj II assumed the titles: *dux modernus tocius Pomeranie* and *dux tocius Pomeranie*.[799]

Świętopełk's lordship in Gdańsk-Pomerania was initially built on local hierarchical structures that empowered a single noble family to exercise power and control over the given territory. The "international" allegiances of this region were complicated for Gdańsk-Pomerania was subject to subordinating attempts coming from the neighboring rulers of

---

[791] Ibid., 240.
[792] Ibid., 234.
[793] Ibid., 240–244.
[794] Ibid., 244.
[795] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 361–363.
[796] Rymar, *Rodowód*, 268.
[797] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 364.
[798] Ibid., 364–365.
[799] Rymar, *Rodowód*, 268.

Denmark and Poland. Throughout the thirteenth century, however, this lordship, or a group of lordships dominated by one, managed to elevate its status and to carry out "international" politics in a way characteristic to lord-dukes. They emerged from a sort of domination default that created circumstances favorable to carving out a separate lordship. Its politics was standard, that is, it aimed at dominating lesser lords, expanding towards new territories, enhancing prestige and status in the region, and providing male family members (preferably confined to one's offspring) with means to control and govern. At the same time, Świętopełk's lordship operated within the anarchical structure of the "international" system and yet it accepted and recognized the input of the political culture that promoted hierarchies and certain code of conduct. In this sense it was together with the Piast duchies a part of the larger whole that followed similar rules and interest-building patterns. And seeking lordship with a respectful title, that is, with one which would speak and make sense to other lords, was one of such patterns.

Finally, I will say a few words about prestige-building projects that occurred around the Polish lands throughout the thirteenth century and as such they could be indicated as the context and direct incentive for the Polish dukes to think about the royal crown themselves. A working assumption would be that the amount of duchy-into-kingdom transformations and the number of royal titles distributed in Central Europe in the thirteenth century was so intense, that it would be genuinely surprising, if for this single reason the Piasts did not try to get one for themselves. It could be argued that towards the end of the thirteenth century attaining the royal crown became a matter of high status and reputation for the Piasts.

The kingdom of Poland transformed back into a duchy in the late eleventh century. After King Bolesław the Brave (exiled in 1079), there were only dukes in the Polish lands until Przemysł II's coronation in Great Poland in 1295. While the Piasts continued to operate on the "international" stage without a royal emblem, Central Europe was gradually filled with royal titles. Depending which side one would take in the controversy around the possible coronation of Bolesław Chrobry in the year 1000 during the summit with Emperor Otto III in Gniezno,[800]

---

[800] See the recent historiographical survey and source analysis by: Wojciech Drelicharz, *Idea Zjednoczenia Królestwa W Średniowiecznym Dziejopisarstwie Polskim* (Cracow: Towarzystwo Naukowe Societas Vistulana, 2012), 47–70.

the Piast's lordship was either the first (before Steven the Great of Hungary) or the second (after the Hungarians) to achieve the royal diadem in Central Europe.

Bohemia joined later. Except for two cases: in 1085 Vratislav II and in 1158 Vladislav II were crowned by Emperor Henry IV and by Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa respectively;[801] a real breakthrough happened in 1198. In that year Přemysl Otakar I, who sided with Duke Philip of Swabia in his struggle for the Roman crown against Otto of Brunswick, was made by Philip the king of Bohemia and granted a privilege that transformed the Přemyslids' lordship into hereditary monarchy.[802] The so-called Golden Bull of Sicily, issued by the emperor-to-be Frederick II on September 26, 1212, confirmed the royal title for the Bohemian rulers, empowered them with the right to approve their local bishops, cancelled any tributes paid to the imperial treasury, and required them to assist the Roman kings with 300 men (or with the lump sum of 300 silver talents instead) on imperial coronal journeys to Rome.[803] In the meantime, on August 24, 1203 Guido, the papal legate, consecrated Přemysl Otakar I as a king of Bohemia. It was an act that was closely related to Innocent III's aspirations to clamp down the ongoing succession crisis in Germany, which could have been easier, if Přemysl Otakar I had supported a candidate acceptable for the pope.

In all those political turmoil, for the Přemyslids the final outcome was the most important. Namely, in the turn of the thirteenth century the dukes of Bohemia were elevated to royal dignity by both the emperor and the pope.[804] This double recognition could only reassure their enhanced elite standing. All those developments on the "international" stage appeared as a prelude to the unprecedented surge in power and prestige that the Přemyslids experienced towards the second half of the thirteenth century. There were obviously various factors in play that enabled such growth and seizing a hereditary crown was perhaps not the most transformative one. Nevertheless, it could not be underestimated that the royal title was something that the Přemyslids desired and that the conversion of the Bohemian duchy into a regular kingdom significantly altered its influence and impact on the region. For the Piasts the Bohemian case could have been fairly demonstrative.

[801] Pánek and Tůma, *A History of the Czech Lands*, 2009, 96.

[802] *Velké Dějiny Zemí Koruny České 1197-1250*, vol. 2 (Praha ; Litomyšl: Paseka, 2000), 85–86.

[803] Pánek and Tůma, *A History of the Czech Lands*, 2009, 96. See also: Antoni Barciak, *Ideologia polityczna monarchii Przemysła Otokara II: studium z dziejów czeskiej polityki zagranicznej w drugiej połowie XIII wieku* (Katowice: UŚ, 1982), 27–28. Cf. *Velké Dějiny Zemí Koruny České 1197-1250*, 2:86–87, 108–109.

[804] Cf. *Velké Dějiny Zemí Koruny České 1197-1250*, 2:95–96.

Almost simultaneously to the acquisition of the royal title by the Přemyslids, a kingdom-building project was carried out in the Halich-Ruthenia. At that time south-western Ruthenia was deeply confused by numerous wars around succession to particular lands and strongholds.[805] Due to its shaky status and fragmentation, it became attractive to the Árpáds and the Piasts. Both dynasties attempted to get some form of hold of it. It is not, however, my aim to provide even a brief overview of facts and events that comprise this complex "international" subsystem. It is the establishment of kingdom (although only a temporary one) that matters here the most.

In the late twelfth century, King Béla III of Hungary (1172-1196) assumed the title of "rex Galiciae" and strove to have his younger son, Andrew, recognized as the ruler of Halich.[806] Later, Andrew, as King Andrew II (1205-1235), not only followed his father's practice and took the title "king of Galicia and Lodomeria", but profoundly engaged in expanding his lordship to Halich-Ruthenia and sought ways to dominate the region. As Engel calculated *between 1205 and 1233, 14 campaigns were launched against Russian territories, on four occasions (1205, 1212, 1226, 1231) under the personal leadership of the king*.[807] Since Leszek the White of Cracow was also interested in spreading his control in this region,[808] ca. 1214 both rulers ultimately devised a plan that delineated their "spheres of influence" (in Dąbrowski's terms) in south-western Ruthenia, and which was sealed by the marriage agreement. Salomea, Leszek the White's daughter was married off to Coloman, the second son of Andrew II. The couple was then to be crowned and rule in Halich.[809] The coronation happened sometime in 1215 or 1216 with Innocent III's approval who had sent the royal insignia.[810] Since Andrew II was departing for a crusade, on February 11, 1217 Honorius III issued a protection bull for the king and his sons, in which he confirmed Andrew II's disposition that the *regnum Galliciae* should belong to Coloman.[811]

---

[805] For a classical work that discusses political history of Ruthenia and its relations with the Piast dukes in this period see: Włodarski, *Polska I Ruś*. Recently about the entangled relations between the Árpáds, Piasts and the Romanowiczs in Halich-Volynia, have written: Font, *Árpád-házi királyok* and Dariusz Dąbrowski, *Daniel Romanowicz król Rusi: (ok. 1201-1264): biografia polityczna* (Cracow: Avalon, 2012). For a brief description of the degree of fragmentation in western Ruthenia ca. 1217, see: Ibid., 91–92.

[806] Font, *Árpád-házi királyok*, 180–182.

[807] Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 89.

[808] Włodarski, *Polska I Ruś*, 9.

[809] Dąbrowski, *Daniel Romanowicz*, 83. Cf. Font, *Árpád-házi királyok*, 188–214. See also: Perfecky, *The Galician-Volynian Chronicle*, 24.

[810] Font, *Árpád-házi királyok*, 207–210. Cf. Dąbrowski, *Daniel Romanowicz*, 102.

[811] Potthast, *Regesta*, n. 5456.

However, the kingdom was very short-lived. In 1221, the young royal couple had to leave Halich which was taken by Mścisław Mścisławowicz. The duke made an agreement with Andrew II. It read that Coloman waived his royal title and Mścisław was supposed to rule in Halich until his death. Subsequently, the throne would be given to Andrew, Andrew II's third son.[812] As a result, for a brief moment between 1227 and 1234 the royal son governed in Halich.[813] Then Daniel Romanowicz took the throne and was challenged by the dukes of Kiev.[814] Meanwhile, the nobles invited Duke Michał of Czernigov to Halich and another succession crisis followed.[815] King Béla IV of Hungary remained passive.[816] Anyway, a few years later Ruthenia fell prey to the ravaging Mongol armies.

This short royal episode in Halich-Ruthenia had its continuation in the 1250s. The kings of Hungary retained their title of *rex Galiciae et Lodomeriae* and Coloman, long after having lost control over Halich, called himself *rex Ruthenorum*.[817] This very practice can be considered an additional evidence for the significance of title-possession, even in cases when such titles were void in practice.

Daniel Romanowicz, who appeared as a sustained claimant to the throne in Halich, gradually gained the upper hand. He resisted Rościsław of Czernigov's attempts, militarily supported by the Hungarians and Poles, to take Halich and – by doing this – made Béla IV drop his engagement on behalf of Rościsław.[818] Ultimately, Daniel's rule in Halich was accepted by the neighboring lords, though he had to carefully find ways between the West and the East. He sought protection and support against the Mongols in Latin Christendom but at the same time he was well aware of the efficiency of the Mongol troops. Therefore, when in 1253 Innocent IV, by his legate, offered him royal insignia, Daniel was reluctant to accept the gift and received it only after having been encouraged and persuaded by his mother, Polish dukes and the nobles.[819] His coronation, which occurred in Drohiczyn in late 1253 or 1254,[820] was a formal subjugation to the Roman Church and a manifestation of the ecclesiastical unity.[821] This

---

[812] Włodarski, *Polska I Ruś*, 81.
[813] Ibid., 87.
[814] Font, *Árpád-házi királyok*, 234–235.
[815] Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 28.
[816] Font, *Árpád-házi királyok*, 241.
[817] Dąbrowski, *Daniel Romanowicz*, 361.
[818] Szende, "Magyarország külpolitikája," 325–329. Cf. Żmudzki, *Studium podzielonego królestwa*, 35–36.
[819] Perfecky, *The Galician-Volynian Chronicle*, 67–68.
[820] See discussion with various chronological propositions: Dąbrowski, *Daniel Romanowicz*, 348–354.
[821] Ibid., 363.

did not work as the religious matters are concerned. From the Western perspective, however, Daniel's coronation re-introduced him into the "international" system as a fully-fledged member of the "international" society.

Daniel's royal elevation coincided with analogous event in Lithuania. From the early thirteenth century the Lithuanians constructed a lordship that carried out an aggressive politics towards its neighbors. Apparently between 1200 and 1263 they organized at least seventy five raids. Those figures, their possible inaccuracy notwithstanding, show that in that time the Lithuanian tribes found their way to engender a more efficient and complex political entity. Still in a treaty concluded in 1219 between the Volynian and Lithuanian lords, a list of twenty Lithuanian dukes can be found with no indication about their internal hierarchies. However, in time the office of Grand Dukes emerged. The supreme Lithuanian duke of the thirteenth century, who is best known from the sources, is Mindaugas (Mindowe, Mendog). His role was powerful enough that older scholarly literature would consider him as the founder of the Lithuanian state.[822]

It is not the matter of this study to rule out whether the unification carried out by Mindaugas deserves the be called the foundation act of Lithuania or he only continued and advanced workings of his predecessors. Undoubtedly, under Mindaugas a serious lordship-building project was in gear. Paszkiewicz observed:

The sources have preserved many details, indicating by what means and under what circumstances Mindaugas attained the Grand-Ducal throne. The winning and maintaining of supreme authority was in the first place a problem of force. And this depended on the extent of the territory united under one ruler. In order to carry out his ambitious plans, Mindaugas ruthlessly lays hands on the lands of many princes, of whom he murders some, and forces others into exile. The sources, when speaking of the Grand Duke, stress his wealth and his great power.[823]

---

[822] Henryk Paszkiewicz, *The Origin of Russia* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954), 195–197. See also: Jadwiga Krzyżaniak and Jerzy Ochmański, *Władysław II Jagiełło* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1990), 22. Mariusz Bartnicki commented somewhat in favor for Mindaugas' contribution to the Lithuanian process of state-formation by saying that in the 1240s – which is a period very well documented by the Halych-Volhynian Chronicle – "the foundations of the Lithuanian statehood were laid": Mariusz Bartnicki, "The Halych-Volhynian Chronicle as a Source for the History of Central Eastern Europe in the 13th Century," *Quaestiones Medii Aevi Novae* 13 (2008): 366.
[823] Paszkiewicz, *The Origin of Russia*, 198.

Those power-maximizing strategies were, however, accompanied by less violent means of building one's position among the local elites. While struggling for domination in Lithuania, Mindaugas chiefly fought his kinsmen, and the outcome of such kindred quarrels was the establishment of the Grand-Ducal power in this country. Apart from exercising sheer force, he made family alliances, bought friendship from the Yatvingians and diplomatically played out the Samogitians' difficult "international" position. Despite the fact that he failed to bestow his lordship to his descendants and was killed in conspiracy (1263), his three-decades long rule transformed lordly aspirations in Lithuania, for it created plain patterns of subordination among the Lithuanian elites and engendered the Grand-Ducal title that was the point of aspirations of the later generations of lords.[824] Moreover, Mindaugas, as none of the Lithuanian rulers before and after him, was crowned as a recognition for his elite standing and reception of Christianity.[825] He was also associated with launching the "true expansion of Lithuania" towards the Ruthenian territories.[826]

While building his lordship, Mindaugas entered closer relations with the Teutonic Order. In 1250, he made an agreement with it. The Order promised its support against Mindaugas' opponents, lord-dukes, and in return he ceded them Samogitia and Yatvingia. This treaty helped Mindaugas join the ranks of the Christian rulers: he was baptized and Pope Innocent IV sent him the royal insignia. In the early 1252 in Nowogródek, Bishop Heindenryk of Chełmno, commissioned by the pope and backed by the authority of the Teutonic Order, crowned Mindaugas as the king of Lithuania.[827] The latter's politics of power-consolidation and territorial expansion would remain on his successors' agenda but their royal title was forsaken. Apparently, the Teutonic Order was not particularly interested in real proliferation of Christianity in Lithuania, because as a Christian kingdom Lithuania would become much more problematic "international" player in the region. In other words, the Teutonic Knights would lose a well-justified reason to wage war against the Lithuanians and the pagan Lithuania was a perfect goal for expanding the Order's lordship (after having defeated the Prussians). In

---

[824] Cf. Ibid., 199. See also:Andres Kasekamp, *A History of the Baltic States* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2010), 17–18.

[825] Krzyżaniak and Ochmański, *Władysław II Jagiełło*, 112.

[826] John Lister Illingworth Fennell, *The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200-1304* (London: Longman, 1993), 101–102.

[827] Drelicharz, *Idea zjednoczenia*, 192–193.

consequence, Mindaugas' baptism and coronation were practically considered short-lived and not valid anymore.[828]

Concluding, in the thirteenth century the Piast ducal lordships have been confronted with a number of kingdom-building and royal-title-seizing projects occurring at their borders. In 1200, there was only the kingdom of Hungary as a well-established and customary monarchy. The kingdom of Bohemia was just entering its way to prestige and glory related to the splendor of its royal status. Later more ephemeral projects occurred in Halich-Ruthenia and Lithuania. Statistically speaking, during the thirteenth century in the direct vicinity of the Polish lands there were altogether four kingdom-creating projects – one in Bohemia (administered by the emperor but not without the papal intrusions), two in Ruthenia (the Arpad-Piast co-operation project and a separate action for Duke Daniel; both undertakings oversaw by the papacy), and one in Lithuania (for Mindaugas; again with the pope's consent).

Drelicharz, who recently analyzed the notion of re-unification of the kingdom of Poland in the Polish medieval historiography, noticed a correlation between the Lithuanian and Ruthenian kingdom-building projects of the early 1250s, and the intellectual aftermath of St. Stanisław's canonization that was celebrated in Cracow in May 1254.[829] It is worthwhile to quote his observations at more length. They explicitly reveal how "international" practices and procedures of distribution of royal titles, which both contributed to the shape of the political culture and somewhat framed the lordly identities, could inspire the Piasts and motivate them to put the royal dignity and title in front of them as an aspiration to attain.

The moment of the emergence of the re-unification idea was not accidental. The idea of restoring the kingdom of Poland appeared a couple of decades after Leszek the White had been murdered in Gąsawa, and several years after Henryk the Pious had died on the battlefield of Legnica. Therefore, it was the moment, when the existing idea of supreme authority, which had been associated with the principles of the principate, ultimately failed. The re-unification idea was born together with the generation that did not even remember the institution of the principate. The historical literature was the only transmitter of the tradition that was known only to the very restricted group of the ecclesiastical elites. This idea also emerged from a very particular international constellation: on the one hand some rulers of the states adjacent to

---

[828] Cf. Krzyżaniak and Ochmański, *Władysław II Jagiełło*, 112.
[829] Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 235.

Poland had just received from the pope crowns and a royal status, which the contemporary Piasts did not possess; on the other hand dukes and higher clergy of various Polish lands were put under strong and sustained political pressure by Přemysl Otakar II, the powerful and ambitious king of Bohemia. […] The canonization of St. Stanisław in 1253 and the rapid political "advancement" of the ecclesiastical, and thus intellectual as well, elites of Cracow, resulted in the fact that in this town the idea of restoration and unification of the kingdom of Poland occurred and was linked with the cult of newly canonized martyr, St. Stanisław.[830]

Conclusions

This section aimed to illustrate the omnipresence of the lordship-imperative at the various levels of social hierarchy and the particular significance of the title-seeking practices within the arsenal of aspirations and motivations nurtured by a lord. Its fundamental puzzle was to demonstrate the breadth and scope of mechanisms that motivated lords-to-be (beyond the Piast dynasty but related to them in various forms) to construct and find recognition for their own lordships.

This analysis sought to investigate the initially assumed flexibility and adaptability of the "international" system in Central Europe that would allow for constant reconfigurations of the map of lordships without falling apart or transforming into chaos by inducing war all against all. The revealed lordship dynamics was competitive but hierarchical. This particular structure engendered rivalry for both material (land, castles, towns, privileges, and people) and non-material assets (prestige-charged titles and offices) but also – through hierarchical component – it deployed methods and mechanisms that multiplied forms of control and domination, and thus enabled elite-standing rotations that were possible to accommodate for the "international" system. In other words, the "international" stage was not filled with equally dominating (sovereign) entities that could only modify their individual domination by diminishing the spheres of control of other actors. Instead, the system was populated with lordships of various size, wealth, power and dignity. This last aspect, unequally distributed among the "international" actors, was particularly responsible for the systems adaptability, because the actors fundamentally agreed on the fact that hierarchy made sense as an organizing principle of the "international" system.[831] Although the practice was different,

---

[830] Drelicharz, *Idea zjednoczenia*, 197.
[831] Cf. my remarks made at the end of Chapter 2.

formally speaking the "international" actors accepted they rather formed ranks than functioned as an egalitarian society. That is to say that apart from being dissimilar in material power (which would be the distinctive category for Waltz), they recognized and internalized the reality of hierarchy of dignities.

In consequence, the lordship-dynamics was this extraordinary, because lords could submit to other lords and recognize their authority without surrendering their rights to exercise power and control within their own lordships. Such flexibility allowed for lordship-building projects carried out by consent of an overlord and not necessarily by challenging domination-prerogatives of other lords. Hence, lordships could emerge peacefully and by negotiation, as a form of elevating a lord to higher ranks by condescending to him some of overlordly prerogatives. Those were, for instance, the cases of noblemen or some bishops who received grants and privileges from dukes or kings that helped them to generate separate lordships. Analogically the popes distributed royal titles among the aspiring lords.

Lordships provided material power and elite standing. The latter could be considered as an immaterial reflection of the scope and amount of the former. However, this correlation was more sophisticated, for the prestige relied on the recognition of the rest of the "international" community and thus it could not be merely calculated from any algorithm that would put together the size of land, its wealth, population and military capabilities. Already existing titles and offices acquired their rank and position within the society. Therefore, they could operate as a dynamic asset for its holder and they were not just a decoration. They implied concrete meaning by claiming some form of authority and qualification for domination. The title of a duke or a bishop mattered on its own and suggested plain prerogatives for a certain type of control. Royal titles were special and in the thirteenth century they could not be assumed by a lord himself without the papal or imperial intervention who appeared as the only members of Latin Christendom authorized to distribute and confirm new kings.

In general, a lord was a title-seeker because a title not only could boost his prestige and elevate his standing within the hierarchical "international" society, but it also provided him with claims and legitimacies for carrying out lordship-building and lordship-expanding policies. By acquiring a title, or aspiring to it, the lord could justify his actions, put pressure on

other lords, and identify his political goals and aspirations. The title implied recognition and enabled the lord to interact on the "international" stage as a fully-fledged actor.

Collective Sub-Identity – Member of Christian society

So far the survey of the thirteenth century "international" politics in Central Europe revealed range and complexity of a lordly identity. As a result, I have sought to introduce a system of sub-categories – borrowed from Wendt – which would facilitate the process of identification what the motivations of lords were and how the contemporary political culture influenced the ordering principles of the "international" system and how this culture forged political interests and aspirations.

The final sub-category that seems relevant for my argument refers to a collective identity. This identity generates a sense of belonging of individual units (lords) to a wider group and creates an experience of identification between the self and the others. Wendt illustrated his point about the collective identity, as I quoted in the beginning of this chapter, by using the example of the U.S. He argued that its "collective" identity points to solidarity with other Western states as a necessary requirement to remain a member of the West. Analogically, the working assumption would be that thirteenth-century lords considered themselves also as participants in some form of the "international" society that distinguished them from the outsiders, and kept them together by participation in the same political culture. This participation, however difficult it is to define its degree in regard to individual lords, would basically imply that the lords most of the time and in most cases followed certain patterns of political interest-building processes and accepted certain rules of "international" conduct.

The problem of the Christian society and its presumed impact on the structure of the "international" system has been already addressed in Chapter 2. There is no need here to repeat my considerations in this matter. A brief recap shall suffice.

The idea of the common Christian society was particularly conceived and advanced from the middle of the eleventh century onwards. It implied a certain form of unity, which transgressed political divisions and promoted collective actions (such as crusades) for the sake of all believers (members of the society), and could not be boiled down to individual interests of separate lordships that decided to contribute to those actions. This concept of Christendom claimed the existence of a universal community under papal leadership and pastoral guidance,

and thus it instilled into the political culture a sense of divinely inspired hierarchical order, devised and sustained by God. It was the principle for the ecclesiastical leaders as well as for secular rulers to protect, maintain and implement (wherever necessary) this order. By doing so, the Christian elites willingly responded to and co-operated with God's plan for history and the future of Christendom. This order, guarded by the moral and religious authority of the pope and the secular authority of the emperor, aimed at creating Christianity a world-wide community as a prelude to the end of history.

Certainly, this highly idealistic concepts were never realized. To the contrary, the redefinition of the role of the papacy in Christendom antagonized the most prestigious players on the "international" stage: the emperor and the pope. Their controversy over the supreme authority in the Christian society reflected, among others, the deeply imbedded cultural conviction about hierarchical ordering of the worldly affairs. Both parties sought to emphasize their final say in the mundane matters and referred to the Scriptures for pro and contra arguments about who had been chosen by God to supervise all mankind. This long-lasting battle for prominence is a plain evidence how much elite standing and prestige mattered in the "international" system ordered according to the hierarchically-driven mindset.

Later developments in legal and political thought, emerging towards the end of the thirteenth century and flourishing in the fourteenth century, responded to and mused over the so-called "national monarchies",[832] and – by observing the political practice – sought to elevate the king to the status equal with the emperor. By doing so, the early notions of sovereignty surfaced that advanced in time and generated new international order, where the culturally dominant perspective of hierarchy was gradually replaced by egalitarian system of sovereign states. Lords either attained the status of a sovereign and remained on the international arena or they had to submit to other sovereigns and consequently, they were reduced to the role of players in the domestic politics.

In order to state my point clearly, one distinction has to be made. Although I discussed this issue previously, it may still require further clarifications. By emphasizing the hierarchical

---

[832] John Watts concluded: *In the world of secular politics, meanwhile, kings like Edward I of England (1272–1307), Philip IV of France (1285–1314), James II of Aragon (1291–1327) and Alfonso X of Castile (1252–84) appeared to preside over embryonic nation states, bound together by overarching royal jurisdiction, networks of officers, notions of community and ethnicity, and experimental media of consultation and taxation*: Watts, *The Making of Polities*, 2009, 43.

ordering of the "international" system in the thirteenth century, I do not argue that the pope and the emperor ruled over the entire known Christian world. Nor they were capable of exercising such authority. Chapter 1 illustrated how unstable were any of their universal inclinations. Besides, due to the proliferation of the Roman law over the twelfth century, kings were rapidly supplied with conceptual frameworks and terminologies that allowed them to claim the ultimate authority in their lordships (*rex est imperator in regno suo*).[833] Therefore, my argument will be valid not for the hierarchy of power and authority, but for the hierarchy of prestige and titles. The thirteenth-century "international" system was hierarchical not because the pope and the emperor dominated all other lords but because all lords agreed upon the highest prestige of the papal and imperial offices, and furthermore, they accepted diversity in ranks and honors among themselves. The fundamental expression of such thinking was (limited and conditional) readiness to both formally and practically recognize superiors and overlords, the more prestigious and distant the better. By definition, a sovereign could not carry out such actions anymore and thus, the hierarchy of honor and prestige disappeared from the "international" system as an important element of its ordering principle.

Membership in the Christian society implied common characteristics of lords that derived from their participation in the cultural project of Christendom as opposed to the Muslim world, pagan societies, and heretics. In the intellectual discourse of the late thirteenth century, Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum* became the most influential example of the mirror-for-princes type of literature[834] and therefore, it can be used as a brief illustration of a Christian ideal of a lord.

The book was produced for the future Philip IV of France and was meant to inspire him to live up to high standards set up for Christian rulers. Giles of Rome was among the best intellectuals of his time, with a high standing at the University of Paris as the first Augustinian professor of theology. He was familiar with both recent theological advances and the Aristotelian thought.[835] In his view, the king must: rule for the good of his people; be the guardian of justice; have control of coercive jurisdiction; dictate the norms of society (that is, to direct it to its appropriate end); establish good laws; take counsel; keep peace at home and

---

[833] Ibid., 68.

[834] Joseph Canning, *Ideas of Power in the Late Middle Ages, 1296-1417* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 31.

[835] Ibid., 30.

defend against foreign enemies; encourage learning; prevent seditions among his magnates; make himself loved by his people; and fulfill his religious obligations.[836]

Now, it is not important here whether lords ever lived up to such standards. It is also irrelevant that those ideals were principally preoccupied with the question of government, and therefore, their interest in "foreign" policy was confined to emphasizing the duty of defending the realm; for what mattered the most was maintaining righteous relations with the subjects by offering them protection and guidance.[837] The special power of Giles of Rome's textbook, and others of the same type, was that it was a standard "know-how" education provided to lords across Latin Christendom. In other words, minor differences and conceptual variations notwithstanding, the Mirrors for Princes became widespread from c. 1150 (the Carolingian period excluding)[838] and disseminated culturally homogenous model of exercising power and domination. This ideal could have been ignored in practice but for a time being remained unchallenged[839] and by this very fact its influence and impact continued. Bagge's comparative analysis of the King's Mirror (produced in Norway in the 1250s),[840] provided evidence how the understanding of ruler's duties was deeply rooted in the concept of divinely ordered and supervised nature, where the ruler emerged as God's elect, his servant, and imitator. Bagge observed:

It is his [the king's – wk] *duty to maintain the fixed hierarchy of society ordained by God. The social hierarchy with the king at its summit is a reflection of the hierarchic order of nature with God at its summit, and the community governed by the king has a political and a religious identity: they are the people of God for whom the king is responsible on the Last Day.*[841]

Apart from subscribing to certain moral and religious values and principles (not to mention almost technical aspects like being baptized and recognizing the duty to defend the Church), the membership in the Christian society in the thirteenth century required from a lord to internalize hierarchy as the cultural ordering principle of the "international" system,

---

[836] J. H. Burns, ed., *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought C. 350-C. 1450* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 484–485.
[837] For an illustrative comparative analysis of the conventional literature called „mirrors for princes" consult: Sverre Bagge, *The Political Thought of The King's Mirror* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1987).
[838] Ibid., 19.
[839] Conventionally speaking, the great breakthrough happened with Machiavelli's "Prince", published in 1532.
[840] Bagge, *The Political Thought of The King's Mirror*, 210.
[841] Ibid., 211.

position himself within it, and subsequently identify what was expected from him at that level. Normally, such requirements would include: respect and recognition of the special status and authority of the pope and the emperor in Latin Christendom as the supreme protectors and overseers of peace and order; recognition and application of legal structures as methods for resolving conflicts and resuming cooperation; formal or real submission to an overlord; participation in common Christian enterprises like sending out missionaries or embarking on crusades; constructing bonds with lesser lords that employed the loyalty-for-protection principle of *auxilium et consilium*.

All those observations above have to be considered as preliminary reflection upon the character of the Christian society perceived as an "international" society.[842] Throughout this work I have made a number of allusions that would suggest that claiming the existence of such society is a valid argument that reveals something about the nature of the thirteenth-century "international" system. However, any proper investigation of this phenomenon would require another empirical research combined with critical re-thinking of the concept of international society as it has been forged by the so-called English School in International Relations. As Kalevi Jaakko Holsti asserted:

The English School refers to the characterization of international politics that emphasizes the role of norms, rules, and laws in tempering the relations between states. ... The main works that developed the concept of international society appeared in the 1950s and 1960s, culminating in the publication of Hedley Bull's classic, The Anarchical Society, in 1977.[843]

In this work, Hedley Bull was not interested in Latin Christendom. To him, medieval monarchies were not states, and in his understanding the starting point of international relations was "the existence of states, ir independent political communities each of which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth's surface and a particular segment of the human population".[844] Bull expressed his conviction about the lack of sovereignty among the medieval "international" actors (ultimately, he argued, they all had been subjected to the papal or imperial authority), which

---

[842] Which would anyway require a separate study.

[843] Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, "Theorizing the Causes of Order: Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society," in *Theorising International Society: English School Methods*, ed. Cornelia Navari (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 125.

[844] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 8.

made them unable to construct an international society as he intended to define it.[845] This attitude. which for long has been a standard understanding among the IR scholars, has been challenged in Chapter 1 by showing that the late medieval universal powers (the papacy and the empire) – as mentioned above – were not superiors and governors of the Christian world. They had precedence in honor and prestige, and particularly the thirteenth-century papacy aspired to act as the judge and pastor of the entire Christian flock, but the "international" practice kept those claims at bay. Lords would pursue their interests and behave in a self-regard manner just as modern states do. Nevertheless, their actions were not anarchical (that is, disorderly) but – as this study of the lordly identity argues – they disclosed certain patterns and rules of conduct that they followed. From this perspective, and bearing in mind all that has been revealed about mechanisms of the thirteenth-century "international" politics, it seems particularly useful to briefly examine Bull's concept of international society. It could be argued – perhaps to his surprise – that the Christian society would match the characteristics he put forward.

A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions. If states today form an international society (to what extent they do is the subject of the next chapter), this is because, recognising certain common interests and perhaps some common values, they regard themselves as bound by certain rules in their dealings with one another, such as that they should respect one another's claims to independence, that they should honour agreements into which they enter, and that they should be subject to certain limitations in exercising force against one another. At the same time they cooperate in the working of institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of diplomacy and general international organisation, and the customs and conventions of war.[846]

While elucidating the fundamental precepts of the English School, Jorgensen asserted that introducing the notion of international society was a way to avoid hierarchy as an order-making factor. That is to say that "international society is regarded as anarchical, yet this does

---

[845] Ibid., 9.
[846] Ibid., 13.

not exclude order".[847] And this order is achieved by the states through voluntary submission to a system of laws and regulations. However, one of the Christian society's fundamental features was that it was hinged on hierarchy as the essential element of political culture. This omnipresence of hierarchical orderings may cause confusion and at first sight it supports the way of thinking proposed by Bull. Nonetheless, this hierarchy was not that of bureaucratic administrations (functional and task-oriented system of dependencies), as it has been explained in Chapter 1. It was rather a result of dominant understanding about how the world and nature as such operated. In short, it was expected to follow certain rules of conduct and respectfully recognize the ranks of dignities, but material power retained its significance in dealings between the lords. Therefore – returning to Jorgensen's opinion – the Christian society could be regarded as anarchical, yet this did not exclude order which relied on divinely inspired hierarchy of the humankind. This hierarchy in the "international" realm was advanced, sustained, and developed by sharing common cultural, legal and religious traits; the process that was remarkably coordinated by the existence of the papacy and by general recognition of its unique regulative and justice-preserving role.

The collective identity of a lord instilled a sense of belonging to and participation in a society that went beyond local or even regional loyalties. Most probably it generated lordly sensibilities of what was right and just by common moral and ethical teaching of the Roman Church. On the "international" arena one of the supposedly most predominant elements that the majority of the lords shared was their link to the papacy. On the one hand, neither the popes nor the emperors were powerful or influential enough to coordinate and carry out an effective Christian-wide campaign against the Muslims in Asia Minor. Or they were incapable of raising troops that would march and defeat the Mongols in the East. Judging from its efficiency, the Christian society failed to showcase genuine solidarity. On the other hand, there is a great deal of instances where the Christian lords throughout Europe learnt to cooperate on more regional scales. And perhaps the most importantly, the patterns of "international" behavior spread across the continent. In other words, all lords did same things.

I will illustrate this point with one telling example. While analyzing the lordship-building practices in the "Title-Seeker" section, I have repeatedly referred to the papal-protection seeking strategy. Between 1207 and 1235 a number of bulls that took under

---

[847] Jørgensen, *International Relations Theory*, 2010, 106.

protection particular lords was issued for the dukes of Cracow, Gdańsk-Pomerania, Kalisz, and Silesia. Also the Teutonic Order submitted to the papal overlordship.

In order to establish a wider context of such "international" practices, in which lords requested a formal statement of protection from the Christian-wide institution, I have carried out a small research. Using the *Regesta pontificum Romanorum* edited by Potthast, I set out to find out about possible other protection bulls, so that to get a firmer grip of how widespread and popular such practice was. In the time period of 1198 to 1240, which was roughly the chronological scope for the applications discussed above, there were over thirty similar cases registered in Potthast's edition. There were obviously various reasons for issuing a protection bull: going for a crusade; protection of noble widows and orphans; coronation and peace confirmations; kingdom's protection; and granting freedom from episcopal penalty of excommunication.

From geopolitical perspective, the bulls were issued for the kingdoms of: Aragon,[848] Castile,[849] Cyprus,[850] Denmark,[851] England,[852] France,[853] Hungary,[854] the Isles,[855] Jerusalem,[856] Navarre,[857] Norway,[858] Portugal,[859] the Romans,[860] and Sweden;[861] and for Emperor Frederick II.[862] There was a number of high-born wives, widows, and offspring receiving the papal

---

[848] James I of Aragon, 8 May 1219: Potthast, *Regesta*, n. 6057.

[849] Ferdinand III of Castile and his kingdom, 19 Jul 1218: Ibid., n. 5876.

[850] Hugon, king of Cyprus, his sons and daughters, and possessions 27 Jul 1217: Ibid., n. 5589. Also, Henry I of Cyprus, 31 Jan 1226: Ibid., n. 7526.

[851] Waldemar II of Denmark, going for a crusade, 7 May 1210; and Waldemar III of Denmark, the junior king, 1215/1216: Potthast, *Regesta*, n. 3993, 5288.

[852] John of England, 21 Apr 1214: Ibid., n. 4912.

[853] Philip II Augustus of France, crusade, 17 Nov 1207, and due to his intervention in Toulouse, 5 Sep 1218: Ibid., n. 3223, 5900. Also, Louis IX of France, his mother Blanche and his brothers, 10 May 1227: Ibid., n. 7897.

[854] Andrew II's sons and the kingdom before the king departed for a crusade, 11 Feb 1217 (5456): Potthast, *Regesta*, n. 5456. Yolanda de Courtenay, Queen consort of Hungary, mentions that she was under the papal protection, 11 Aug 1220: Ibid., n. 6328. Béla IV of Hungary, while fighting against heretics and schismatics, 9 Aug 1238: Ibid., n. 10635.

[855] Reginald, king of the Isles, 23 May 1223: Potthast, *Regesta*, 7027.

[856] King Amalric of Lusignan, and his wife, Kingdom of Jerusalem, 2 Dec 1198: Ibid., n. 443. (443)

[857] Sancho VII of Navarre, before the crusade, 18 May 1219: Ibid., n. 6068.

[858] Inge II of Norway, crusade and peace confirmation, 6 Mar 1217: Ibid., n. 5489.

[859] Alfons of Portugal, 11 Jan 1218: Ibid., n. 5663.

[860] Frederic II, king of the Romans, 11 Feb 1219: Ibid., n. 5983.

[861] Eric X of Sweden, his coronation confirmed, 1215/1216: Ibid., n. 5252.

[862] Emperor Frederick II, his sons, and his empire, 13 Jan 1227: Ibid., n. 7649.

tutelage from: Austria,[863] Bohemia,[864] Castile,[865] Cracow,[866] Cyprus,[867] Hungary,[868] Opole,[869] and Slavonia.[870] Furthermore, the popes were equally willing to defend and oversee duchies and principalities: Bavaria,[871] Brunswick,[872] Flanders,[873] Saxony,[874] and Thuringia;[875] as well as the city of Venice,[876] the Teutonic Order[877] and the dukes and people of the Cumans who had just converted to Christianity.[878]

This list does not claim to be complete. Nevertheless, even with this data it is evident that there was nothing extraordinary in the behaviors of the Piasts and their neighbors in regard to the pope's special authority. If to assume the papacy as the first "international" institution (the imperial office seems to have a narrower impact on "international" reality than that of the pope), which was commissioned (or it self-imposed on itself) with the task to bring leadership, order, peace, justice, and stability to Christendom, than the broad recognition of such formal prerogatives by Christian lords shows how the Christian society, as the "international" society, could function.

Conclusions

Lords by practice and education learnt how the world was designed by Divine Providence and what forms of hierarchies were wanted by the Maker. Moreover, they could not do anything else but to recognize the existence of the Church as an overarching cultural and religious trait that was powerful enough to promote certain system of values and principles that would govern and impact the lord's life. What seems particularly important to comprehend the significance of the membership in the Christian society is that for it there was no meaningful alternative. The lords could be either an element of this society or fall out of it

---

[863] Theodora of Austria and her sons, while her husband Leopold on crusade: 1 Sep 1217: Ibid., n. 5600.
[864] Constance of Hungary, the widow of Přemysl Otakar I and mother of Wenceslas I, and her dowry, 10 Apr 1231: Ibid., n. 8705.
[865] Sancha of Castile, widow of Alfonso II of Aragon, Apr/May 1200: Ibid., n. 1035.
[866] Grzymisława, widow of Leszek the White, 23 Dec 1233: Ibid., n. 9351.
[867] Alice of Champagne of Jerusalem, queen of Cyprus, widow of King Hugh I of Cyprus who just died, 12 Jul 1218: Ibid., n. 5870.
[868] Yolanda, daughter of Andrew II of Hungary, 11 Aug 1235: Ibid., n. 9987.
[869] Viola of Opole and her sons, 3 Dec 1233: Ibid., n. 9337.
[870] The son and the widow of Ban Steven of Slavonia, 8 Aug 1236: Ibid., n. 10224, 10225.
[871] Duke Otto II Wittelsbach of Bavaria, no episcopal excommunication, 9 Feb 1239: Ibid., n. 10699.
[872] Duke Otto I of Brunswick-Lüneburg, before the crusade, 11 Feb 1234 and 25 Mar 1238: Ibid., n. 9399, 10552.
[873] Baldwin IX Count of Flanders, 28 Apr 1199: Ibid., n. 680. (680)
[874] Duke Bernhard III of Saxony, 3 March 1207: Ibid., n. 3028.
[875] Louis of Thuringia, no episcopal excommunication, 11 Apr 1203: Ibid., n. 1883.
[876] Doge of Venice, for fidelity to the Roman Church, 5 Dec 1238: Ibid., n. 10677.
[877] On 15 Dec 1220: Ibid., n. 6444.
[878] On 1 Oct 1229: Ibid., n. 8457.

which – in a long run – was an unacceptable fate. In other words, the "international" system deprived of the Christian principles and hierarchies did not make much sense for the thirteenth-century lords. Pagan, heretical or Muslim alternatives were much less attractive and perhaps less homogenous that they would be capable of competing with Latin Christendom in generating the sense of belonging and participation in a greater whole.

In short, in politico-theoretical terms, the Christian society was an "international" society of lords who were born into it, and who learnt their craft of control and domination under a strong pressure of the default of a genuine alternative for the world and social order as put forward and promoted by the Christian culture. As a result, being a lord required forms of compliance with rules of conduct that were stimulated as model for lordly behavior. By saying this, I am not implicitly claiming the omnipotence of the pope, because it was still possible to remain within the Christian society while being at odds with the Roman Pontiff. However, it was much harder a task to do so, for – as the examples above showed – it was rather a common attitude to see the pope as a guardian and protector of lords and lordships. The collective identity, that is, the sense of belonging to a global community of Christians, had multiple consequences for lords. It could be argued, however, that the most important corollary was – unusual to modern mind – distribution of the significance of material and non-material aspects of power. The value of title, honor and prestige, which was linked to the divinely constructed and thus immutable natural and social hierarchies,[879] was relatively high in regard to military and economic power. The neorealist paradigm emphasizing the imperative of maximizing power by accumulating troops and wealth would face even greater difficulties in gaining recognition in the thirteenth century than it suffers nowadays.

Conclusion – Władysław Łokietek's Lordly Identity

This chapter put forward two essential arguments. First, that standard political history, which approaches the thirteenth-century Polish political history as if centralized statehood (and its international implications) was an ahistorical phenomenon existing in all ages, painfully ignores the otherness of medieval political culture. And that is does it up to the point

---

[879] About hierarchies and the Divine inspiration in human societies, as perceived by medieval intellectuals, seeCf. Andrzej Feliks Grabski, *Dzieje historiografii* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2003), 60–61, 71–72. About the special cultural significance of continuity and immutability as values to be sustained and promoted in writing medieval histories, cf.: Krzysztof Pomian, *Przeszłość jako przedmiot wiary; historia i filozofia w myśli średniowiecza.* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawn. Naukowe, 1968), 140–147.

that causes confusion, misinterpretation, and occasionally misjudgment about actions and behaviors of "international" actors. Therefore, the application of modern understanding of global affairs and their mechanisms to medieval cultural context impoverishes the historian's explanatory power. Second, that making sense of the thirteenth-century "international" politics requires something more than a structural analysis (Chapter 2). Following Alexander Wendt's theorization of inter-subjective identities that international actors acquire through their interaction with other actors, the problem of determining Łokietek's identity was a springboard for a broader search for a lordly identity that Łokietek could then assume during his lifetime.

The underlying assumption for this chapter was a common-sense idea that behaviors, interests and motivations of Łokietek would have been primarily shaped in the "international" context that he personally experienced or was told about. Therefore, Wendt's categories and sub-categories of state identities were interpreted as to fit into the realities of Łokietek's broadly-conceptualized "international" environment. The fundamental puzzle for this chapter was to demonstrate into what sort of international system Łokietek was born, and whether in this system any patterns and rules could be identified. This reflection over the question: what must have been the most important for Łokietek as an "international" actor?, was believed to stimulate research that would provide empirical evidence for his "foreign" interests and motivations, and – with no lesser significance – for how those interests were possibly shaped by the political culture of the period. Another assumption for the analysis that was carried out in this chapter was that Łokietek's actions would be carried out within the limits of the "international" system, that is, they would be confined by the system's structure, ordering principles, and the political culture which greatly contributed to the previous two elements.

It is important to understand that Łokietek's identity, as it has been pursued in this chapter, had very little (if anything) to do with his personality and psychological predispositions. The picture that the chapter created does not pin down Łokietek's individuality but reveals the broad context for interpreting his "international" behaviors. Without getting into Łokietek's mind (which is virtually impossible due to the type of available sources), the chapter follows the claim in social psychology that people are prone to construct their behaviors by imitating observed actions of other people, and argues that by looking at lordly interactions between 1200 and 1300 in the Polish lands and somewhat beyond, and by

identifying existing patterns and mechanisms of those interactions, there could be much learnt about Łokietek's ways of perceiving himself as a lord.

This chapter, due to its size and diversity of topics, has been divided into sections that are supplied with separate conclusions, summarizing each section's findings. For this reason, here I will focus on the fundamental problem that walked through the entire chapter as its leitmotif: what was the lordly identity that was determined here using the example of Władysław Łokietek?

Łokietek's essential lordly identity was that of lord which required from him to retain his elite standing by remaining lord, that is, by exercising domination over a lordship. Since he was born as a lord-to-be and by the virtue of his ducal status he had no other alternative but to dominate as all other Piasts did. It was the lordship-imperative that prevailed in crafting fundamental motivations of "international" actors of the period. The size and scope of Łokietek's lordship were of lesser importance. Surely, however, his role as *dominus naturalis* of the Poles could not be downgraded to anything smaller than a ducal throne.

Łokietek shared some characteristics with other lords that could be labeled as a type sub-identity. He was a noble family leader. This meant that his desire for building a lordship (induced by the lordship-imperative, itself triggered by the high social status he was born into) was additionally augmented by the need to have a decent share in his father's lordship and, in turn, by the want to provide acceptable lordships for his offspring. His leadership implied responsibility for securing elite standing for himself and extending it as much as possible to his heirs. Interestingly, he would fight other members of the dynasty if their actions threatened his lordship. The uncovered mechanism showed that once a lord-to-be became a lord, his loyalty towards his father, uncle, and brothers would be affected; he would protect his individual right to dominate and to protect lands and people he had dominated.

Inherently Łokietek was also a title-seeker. In the "international" system anarchical by its nature yet hierarchical by its culture, honor, prestige, and power display played significant role. All those non-material elements of power influenced self-esteem and translated into the rank in a hierarchical order of all creatures. The higher the rank, the closer to heavens and to the Maker. Royal titles were of particular importance because they were charged with symbolical and religious meanings derived from Biblical models. Moreover, kingship was a

fulfillment and completion of lordship, for it represented the eternal monarchical reign of God over the world. Anyway, seeking titles motivated to undertaking lordship-building projects. As the lordship-imperative presumed that a lordship shall be attained, the title-seeking implied behaviors aimed at: enlarging one's lordship; searching for ways to build its both material power and non-material prestige; and accumulating titles and claims to them as another form of asserting one's position within the "international" system.

Finally, Łokietek was a member of the Christian society. To certain level he identified himself with other lords by participation in the cultural project of Latin Christendom. He, therefore, acknowledged certain values and principles that would govern his "international" behaviors and recognized the hierarchical order imposed by this culture.

The next chapter will seek to determine how the lordly identity – as worked out here – would operate in the context of the succession crisis in the kingdom of Hungary in the beginning of the fourteenth century.

CHAPTER 4. DETERMINING LORDLY IDENTITY – CHARLES I OF ANJOU IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1300-1310)

Introduction

This chapter is based on the research article I have written at the end of my fellowship program at the New Europe College in Bucharest, Romania. The original text was dedicated to analyzing power-winning strategies that Charles I of Anjou and Wenceslas III of Bohemia employed in order to win the Hungarian throne during the time of succession crisis that vehemently broke out after King Andrew III's death in 1301. The puzzle that brought me to carry out this research was about why Charles I was ultimately successful and his rivals failed? My intention was to search and identify factors that possibly contributed the most to Charles I's effective quest for power. It was the patterns and strategies, which would govern the behaviors of "international" actors, that I was particularly interested in.

This chapter will use the same source material as did the original article, but a different problem shall be addressed here. Namely, what does the competition between the Angevins and Přemyslids over the emptied throne of Hungary showcase in regard to practical workings of lordly identities as developed and elaborated in the previous chapter? In other words, how the particular "international" competition of the early fourteenth century corresponds with a set of theoretical conceptualizations produced by the investigation of the thirteenth-century "international" system in Latin Christendom? The working assumption is that the structures and identities established in the previous chapters will match the methods employed by Charles I and Wenceslas III to secure their success.

The course of events in the kingdom of Hungary after Andrew III's death has been demonstrated fairly exhaustively on various occasions and in a number of publications.[880] The

---

[880] Gyula Kristó and Ferenc Makk, *Károly Róbert emlékezete* [The Legacy of Charles Robert] (Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó, 1988), 7–21. Blanka Brezovakova, "Politicky zapas Anjouovcov o uhorsku korunu," *Historicky Casopis* 39, no. 6 (1991): 569–587. Stanisław A. Sroka, "Methods of Constructing Angevin Rule in Hungary in

intention here, therefore, is not to describe them since it would be hard to add anything in terms of new yet meaningful events. However, a brief overview of the course of events will still be helpful by providing context for the analysis of the lordly identities at work.

The Succession Crisis in the Kingdom of Hungary

On July 10, 1290, King Ladislas IV of Hungary was assassinated. However, already on July 23, 1290, Lodomer, Archbishop of Esztergom, crowned Andrew III as the successor of Ladislas IV. A year later, the Kőszegi family,[881] whose members were bans of Slavonia and who virtually owned Vas County in southwestern Hungary,[882] invited Charles Martel, the first-born son of Charles II, King of Naples, to seize the Hungarian crown. Charles Martel was a grandson of Steven V of Hungary and through his mother, Mary, could easily claim share in the Árpádian House, since the deceased Ladislas IV was his uncle (a third degree of kinship). From the perspective of blood relations, the status of Andrew III was less prominent, because as an alleged descendant of King Andrew II, he was related to Steven V merely in the fourth degree and to Ladislas IV in the fifth degree.

Before April 12, 1294, Charles Martel was crowned by Pope Celestine V as king of Hungary.[883] However, he never managed to reach his new kingdom and died in 1295. His son, Charles I, was instantly named his successor and in 1298 a papal legate crowned him while he was still in the Kingdom of Naples.[884] In February 1300, he left for Hungary and by October 1300 was already in Zagreb.[885] His presence there showed that he was positive about challenging the authority of the ruling monarch. Quite unexpectedly, however, Andrew III died on January 14, 1301. The kingdom was torn between lords who either supported the deceased king or looked forward to the advances of the Angevins or sought to find other solutions.

In Hungarian scholarship Andrew III's death has been traditionally considered as a turning point in the history of Hungary. The standard understanding has been that it signified

---

the Light of Most Recent Research," *Quaestiones Medii Aevi Novae* 1 (1996): 77–90. Enikő Csukovits, *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I.: I. Károly és uralkodása* (Budapest: MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2012), 41–69. Iván Bertényi, *Magyarország az Anjouk korában* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1987), 27–47.

[881] This family was associated with the Héder, a noble kindred in medieval Hungary: cf. *Korai magyar történeti lexikon, 9-14. Század* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1994), 260, 375.

[882] Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 125.

[883] Brezovakova, "Politicky zapas," 572.

[884] Bak, *Königtum*, 13.

[885] Brezovakova, "Politicky zapas," 575.

a period of abrupt dynastic change, when the indigenous House of the Árpáds died out and a period of dynastic diversity followed.[886] It is generally accepted, however, that this period of transition generated a lot of distress and conclusively shattered the foundations of the Hungarian realm.

Nevertheless, such a political blow could not have happened overnight. Pál Engel observed that since 1270 political events had led to a rapid decline in central power in the kingdom of Hungary and brought about an anarchic situation that culminated in 1301,[887] pushing Hungary into a "critical situation",[888] which then continued for another decade. Engel's opinion is best summarized in two statements: "central power practically ceased to exist", and "that the kingdom might fragment into several independent provinces became a real possibility".[889] Also, the idea prevailed in recent Hungarian scholarship that central power was significantly weakened at the turn of the fourteenth century[890] and/or for a time could not be organized.[891]

The practical destruction of the political unity of the kingdom of Hungary was not, however, solely related to the extinction of the Árpáds (or, to be more precise, to the dying out of its male branch). The fact that Andrew III was the last representative of the glorious male line of descendants of Saint King Steven was indeed noted by contemporaries. However, from the extant source material it is difficult to judge how much it really mattered. There is only a one short passage available touching upon this issue. In a charter issued by palatine Steven *de genere* Ákos, a former supporter of the deceased king, dated to February 26, 1303, the issuer speaks about Andrew III as the "last golden branch that broke off"[892] from the paternal line of St. Steven, and about a great mourning after the king's death among all the prelates and barons. However, the desolation they felt – as the charter reads – because of the

---

[886] Pál Engel, Gyula Kristó, and András Kubinyi, *Magyarország története, 1301-1526* (Budapest: Osiris, 2002), 11. Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 124. Iván Bertényi and László Szende, *Anjou-királyaink és Zsigmond kora* (Budapest: Officina, 2011), 51.

[887] Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 101.

[888] Ibid., 111.

[889] Ibid., 124.

[890] Enikő Csukovits, *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I.: I. Károly és uralkodása* (Budapest: MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2012), 41.

[891] Bertényi Iván and Szende László, *Anjou-királyaink és Zsigmond kora*, 2011, 51.

[892] Translation after: Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 124.

lack of their *dominus naturalis*, did not leave them without hope of finding a new monarch marked by the blood of St. Steven, that is, with a claim of belonging to Steven's kindred.[893]

In my view, it may be questioned whether there was anything special – in terms of political consequences – to Palatine Steven's contemporaries about the sudden death of Andrew III, although he was perceived as the last of the male Árpád line. Judging from what happened after the assassination of Ladislas IV in July 1290, when Andrew III took the throne and yet was immediately confronted with rebellious nobles; and judging from what followed his death in 1301, when two powerful candidates to the Hungarian throne appeared, I would hesitate to overestimate the meaning of the extinction of male line for Hungarian elites.

In May 1301, Pope Boniface VIII appointed Bishop Nicholas Boccasini of Ostia his legate and commissioned him to make the necessary arrangements to restore order in the kingdom of Hungary.[894] In the same month, Charles I was crowned king of Hungary by Gregory, Archbishop-elect of Esztergom. Nevertheless, shortly after, in the summer 1301, some of the Hungarian lords invited Wenceslas, a son of Wenceslas II, to be their king. Like Charles I, young Wenceslas could claim blood-membership in the Árpádian kindred: his great-grandmother was a sister of Steven V; thus, Wenceslas was related to Steven V in the fourth degree. On August 27, 1301, he was crowned a king of Hungary by Archbishop John of Kalocsa, in Szekesfehervar. The double-election was now a fact.

The following year Boniface VIII called both involved parties, that is, Wenceslas II and his son, and Charles I with Mary, his grandmother and the Queen of Naples, to appear before him and hear his judgment about who should legitimately receive the kingdom of Hungary.[895] Meanwhile, the war erupted. In the autumn of 1302, Charles I and his followers attacked, with no effect, the town of Buda which was held by the supporters of Wenceslas III.[896] In May 1303,

---

[893] Imre Nagy and Gyula Nagy, *Codex Diplomaticus Hungaricus Andegavensis. Anjoukori okmánytár*, vol. 1 (Budapest: A Magyar tudományos akadémia, 1878), 51–53: *Demum eciam domino Andree Illustri Regi Hungarie diuina vocante clemencia rebus humanis exempto vltimo aureo ramusculo a progenie stirpe ac sanguine sancti Regis Stephani primi Regis Hungarorum per paternam lineam descendenti extinco, cum vniuersi ecclesiarum prelati amministracionem habentes et Barones proceres ac vniuersi nobiles et cuiusuis status homines Regni Hungarie cum se vero ac naturali domino desolato sentirent scirent et intelligerent de morte eiusdem more Rachelis deplorantes et immensum conturbati et admodum soliciti qualiter et quemadmodum sibi diuina desuper disponente clemencia futurum dominum de sanguine sancti Regis polulatum possent et valerent inuenire.*

[894] Irena Sułkowska-Kurasiowa and Stanisław Kuraś, *Bullarium Poloniae*, vol. 1 (Romae: Ecole française de Rome, 1982), n. 951.

[895] Josef Emler, ed., *Regesta Diplomatica Nec Non Epistolaria Bohemiae et Moraviae*, vol. 2 (Pragae: Haase, 1855) [herefater: RDEBM], 827–829.

[896] Brezovakova, "Politicky zapas," 580.

Boniface VIII ruled that Charles I and his mother held the legitimate rights to the Kingdom of Hungary. In June 1303, the pope sent out letters, informing Albrecht of Habsburg, the king of the Romans, about his decision regarding the Hungarian throne[897] and instructed the Hungarian prelates – under threat of excommunication – to abandon the Přemyslids.[898] Over the summer, both Hungarian archbishops, Gregory of Esztergom and Steven of Kalocsa, engaged to spread the news about the papal edict across Hungary, including Transylvania. Everybody was to obey the papal decision or suffer ecclesiastical penalties.[899] In September 1303, Albrecht of Habsburg joined the conflict on the Angevin side, and officially wrote to Wenceslas II, demanding, among other things, that he leave the kingdom of Hungary.

Since the Přemyslids did not recognize the papal ruling concerning the Hungarian throne, Albrecht of Habsburg began preparations for a military campaign. He did not undertake them out of special love towards the Angevins; he was rather preoccupied with the growing power of the Přemyslids in Central Europe (Wenceslas II was crowned king of Bohemia in 1297[900] and king of Poland in 1300,[901] and his son became the king of Hungary in 1301). The Přemyslid domination in the region somewhat resembled the circumstances of the sustained conflict between King Rudolf of Habsburg of the Romans and Přemysl Otakar II of Bohemia in the 1270s. Anyway, Albrecht urged the Hungarian bishops and barons to join efforts in driving the Bohemian king away.[902] In August 1304, Charles I concluded an alliance with Rudolf Habsburg of Austria, a son of Albrecht, and gave an oath before Archbishops Michael of Esztergom and Steven of Kalocsa, promising support for Rudolf.[903] Earlier that year, however, it was Wenceslas II who marched with his troops into Hungary, hoping to secure by sheer force the throne for Wenceslas III, and devastated regions around Esztergom, and – having achieved little politically – returned with his son back to Bohemia.[904] In response, Albrecht Habsburg and Rudolf and Charles I invaded Bohemia and Moravia,[905] yet also with

---

[897] Emler, *RDEBM*, 1855, 2:843–846.
[898] Ibid., 2:847–849.
[899] *Anjou-kori oklevéltár: Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia*, vol. 1 (Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1990), n. 417.
[900] Toch, "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs," 1999, 398.
[901] Janusz Bieniak, *Wielkopolska, Kujawy, ziemie łęczycka i sieradzka wobec problemu zjednoczenia państwowego w latach 1300 - 1306* (Wodzisław Śląski: Wydawnictwo Templum, 2011), 107–109.
[902] Emler, *RDEBM*, 1855, 2:870.
[903] *AOkl.*, 1990, vol. 1, n. 643.
[904] Csukovits, *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I.*, 2012, 65.
[905] Emler, *RDEBM*, 1855, 2:871.

limited effect.[906] However, Wenceslas III never returned to Hungary. In June 1305, Wenceslas II died and in August Wenceslas III, already king of Bohemia, concluded a peace treaty with Albrecht Habsburg.[907] The lordship of the Přemyslids seemed to return to a reasonable size (the kingdom of Poland was yet to be recovered).

For a time, Charles I was the only standing pretender to the throne of Hungary. Nevertheless, in October of 1305 Wenceslas III revoked all his claims to the kingdom of Hungary and voluntarily transferred them to Otto III of Wittelsbach.[908] Otto, the duke of Bavaria, had very close blood ties with the Árpáds because his mother, Elisabeth, was the sister of Steven V. He could, therefore, stake equally powerful dynastic claims as the Angevins since Queen Mary of Naples was the sister of Ladislas IV. Thus, both Elisabeth and Mary were Árpád royal daughters and sisters, only separated by a single generation. Starting in November 1305, Wenceslas III ceased to use the title of Hungarian king.[909] On December 6, 1305, Otto III was crowned in Szekesfehervar by Bishops Benedict of Veszprem and Anthony of Csanád.[910]

As a result, beside Charles I a new candidate for the Hungarian throne emerged. Otto III – as indicated in the *Kronika Pulkavova* – was elected by the Hungarians to be their king[911] although he must have been most popular in Northern and Eastern Hungary, chiefly in Transylvania.[912]

In the spring of 1306, Charles I organized a military expedition to the northern regions of the Hungarian kingdom and captured several strongholds there. In May 1307, Archbishop Thomas of Esztergom summoned a council in Udvard [Dvory nad Žitavou]. The council participants declared that – respecting fully the papal ruling – should anyone reject Charles I

---

[906] As the comment favorable to Wenceslas II goes in the *Chronica Oliviensis*: *Item istius regis nobilis tempore* [Wenceslas II] *Albertus monoculus rex Romanorum cum valido exercitu Bohemiam intravit et ad tempus in ea stetit, sed nichil proficiens, protegente Deo pium regem, confusus recessit non sine multo exercitus sui detriment*o. *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, vol. 6 (Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1893), 317.

[907] Emler, *RDEBM*, 1855, 2:886–887.

[908] *Chronicon Aulae Regie* explained that Wenceslas III "voluntarie resignabat" his royal rights: František Palacký, *Fontes Rerum Bohemicarum*, vol. 4 (Prague: Nákl. N. F. Palackého, 1884), 107. See also: Kristó and Makk, *Károly Róbert emlékezete*, 16.

[909] He still used it in a charter of October 10, 1305 although the title had vanished from charters starting from November 3, 1305: cf. Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1878, vol. 2, n. 894., and Emler, *RDEBM*, 1855, 2:888.

[910] Brezovakova, "Politicky Zapas," 585.

[911] Kronika Pulkavova: *Sed et Otto, Bavarie dux,* [tamquam heres vicinior - version B] *in regem Ungarie per Ungaros est electus*: František Palacký, *Fontes Rerum Bohemicarum*, vol. 5 (Prague: Nákl. N. F. Palackého, 1884), 187.

[912] Cf. *Anjou-kori oklevéltár: Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia*, vol. 2 (Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1992), n. 656 and 683. Cf. Kristó and Makk, *Károly Róbert emlékezete*, 17.

as the rightful king of Hungary, he would be excommunicated and his possessions placed under interdict.[913] On June 1, 1307, the town of Buda eventually fell into hands of Charles I's followers.

Since Pope Clement V still considered the kingdom of Hungary to be in critical condition, he dispatched Cardinal Gentilis de Monteflorum as his legate to administer all necessary reforms and ensure peace and tranquility in the kingdom.[914] Two days later, on August 10, 1307, the pope issued letters in which he confirmed the ruling of Boniface VIII regarding the fate of the Hungarian throne (that it should belong to Charles I of Anjou through his grandmother Mary of the House of Árpád), and urged both Hungarian archbishops, Thomas of Esztergom and Vincent of Kalocsa, to proclaim his decision across the Hungarian lands. He also demanded that Bishop Anthony of Csanád be disciplined and impelled Otto III to give up his title and royal dignity.[915] Subsequently, Ladislas, Voivode of Transylvania, captured Otto III and took the coronation regalia from him, ultimately expelling him from the kingdom.[916] Charles I for the second time remained the only candidate for the royal office. It was not, however, the end of his prolonged quest for power.

On October 10, 1307, an assembly of Hungarian prelates and nobles, held on the plains of Rákos near Pest, declared Charles I king of Hungary.[917] A year later, in November 1308, another assembly in Pest, gathered to restore peace and order in the kingdom of Hungary, once again accepted Charles I as king,[918] and on June 15, 1309, he was crowned in the presence of the majority of the Hungarian prelates and powerful barons.[919] On April 8, 1310, Ladislas, Voivode of Transylvania, submitted to Charles I and recognized him as his *dominus naturalis*; on August 27, 1310, Charles I was again crowned,[920] yet this time according to the rules which had been put forward by Legate Gentilis and accepted by the Hungarian episcopate.[921] Apparently, from this moment onwards, Charles I became the one and only king of Hungary and finally gained widespread recognition among his subjects; a cautious claim that can be

---

[913] Brezovakova, "Politicky zapas," 585. Cf. *AOkl.*, 1992, vol. 2, n. 172.
[914] *AOkl.*, 1992, vol. 2, n. 201.
[915] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 221–222.
[916] Csukovits, *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I.*, 2012, 65–66.
[917] *AOkl.*, 1992, vol. 2, n. 243.
[918] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 494.
[919] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 668.
[920] Chronici Hungarici, Imre Szentpétery, ed., *Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum Tempore Ducum Regumque Stirpis Arpadinae Gestarum*, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1937), 486.
[921] *AOkl.*, 1992, vol. 2, n. 674. Cf. Csukovits, *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I.*, 2012, 68.

supported by the fact that no more coronations were needed.[922] However, having defeated other candidates and ceremonially received the crown, he had to confront the political reality which had prevailed in the kingdom of Hungary since the death of Steven V in 1272. Namely, he was compelled to face the same challenges his predecessors Ladislas IV and Andrew III had had to grapple with, that is, with the extensive lordships of some Hungarian noble families.

Identifying Political Interests

There are a few questions that emerge while walking through the course of the events between 1301 and 1310 in Central Europe. Why did the succession crisis in the kingdom of Hungary happen in the first place? Was it really necessary to have three lords competing for the Árpádian legacy? What was so special about this kingdom that attracted their interest? Apparently all of the competitors believed in their causes, although from a historical perspective there is a prevailing tendency to perceive Charles I as the only rightful successor to the throne and thus, the one who was predestined to win.

One way of identifying motivations that made Charles I, Otto III and Wenceslas III engage in the quest for the Árpádian legacy would point to the material splendor of the kingdom of Hungary itself as a sufficient factor for gaining "international" attention. I will focus on this element here for a short while.

The power and wealth of the kingdom of Hungary was acknowledged by foreign witnesses. As noted by Pal Engel, an Angevin envoy travelling there in 1269 reported that

The king of Hungary has incredibly great power and such a military force that there is no one in the east and in the north who would dare to move if the glorious king mobilized his enormous army.[923]

Three decades later, similar arguments were used by the Bohemian royal councilors who sought to convince Wenceslas II to enter the competition for the Hungarian throne. They spoke about how vast were the lands of this kingdom and its power hard to measure. The advisors also believed that in the past the Hungarian kings had efficiently overpowered and

---

[922] As Kristó asserted, by 1310, the Church, the lesser nobility, towns, merchants, and peasants realized that "for their own interest" they had to staunchly support the new king in order to overpower the "oligarchs", cf. Kristó, "Die Macht," 609.

[923] Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 108.

dominated almost all the German lands.[924] According to an anonymous French Dominican, who in 1308 produced a description of Eastern Europe (*Descriptio Europae Orientalis*), the kingdom of Hungary was in size one of the largest kingdoms in the world, because it stretched for forty days of travel in longitude and latitude.[925]

These accounts represent a common recognition at the turn of the fourteenth century that the kingdom of Hungary was an attractive entity worth fighting for. It is notable that none of these reports referred to anything but material power, measured in terms of the size of lands or military might. Maintaining solely this perspective would actually suggest that the throne should have been claimed by much larger group of lords, including some of the lesser Hungarian lords. A kingdom of this size and wealth and without an obvious successor must have been very seducing for any aspiring lordship-builder.

This is, however, only part of the picture. The Bohemian royal councilors, who assisted Wenceslas II in making the best out of the proposal proffered by a number of the Hungarian lords, pointed out – in order to convince the king to accept the offer – that assuming another crown (his third, since Wenceslas II was already king of Bohemia and Poland) or even giving it to his son, Wenceslas III, would exalt and expand the royal dignity, secure better order in Bohemia, and bring about hope for peaceful tranquility. Thus accepting the offer of the throne would be worth doing for the sake of the common good.[926]

This part of the argumentation focused on non-material interest-building principles which included boosting *honor regalis*, reassuring the *dignitas inviolabilis securitatis*, and guaranteeing peace in the region. From this perspective, the kingdom of Hungary was attractive as a special acquisition for the king of Bohemia, which would add extra splendor to his name and, since it would be ruled either by the king himself, or by his only son and heir, there would be decreased threat of regional conflicts. Thus, the king would be equipped with additional resources to effectively control the region and spread his authority there.

---

[924] *Chronicon Aulae Regie*: *Non te latet domine rex, inquiunt, et nos ipsi cognoscimus et patres nostri narraverunt nobis, quia lata est Ungarie terra ac ipsius potencia minime mensurata. Reges enim Ungarie, qui ante nos fuerunt, per totam fere Germaniam tyrranidem exercentes longe dominati sunt*; Palacký, *FRB*, 1884, 4:83.

[925] Csukovits, *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I.*, 2012, 11. *Regnum vngarie est de maioribus regnis mundi, quantum ad terre spacium; dicitur enim comuniter, quod in longitudine habebat XL diebus et totidem in latitudine*: Olgierd Górka, ed., *Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis "Imperium Constantinopolitanum, Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Ruthenia,Ungaria, Polonia, Bohemia" Anno MCCCVIII Exarata* (Cracow: Gebethner: sumptibus Academiae Litterarum, 1916), 46.

[926] *Chronicon Aulae Regie*, Palacký, *FRB*, 1884, 4:83–84.

Some more about non-material aspects of unique prestige of the kingdom of Hungary can be added from the statement made by Cardinal Gentilis before the Hungarian lords in 1309. I follow the English translation delivered by Gabor Klaniczay:

By the grace of Divine Providence, the kingdom of Hungary had had Catholic rulers for some time now. The first one, the saint king, Steven, has merited inclusion in the catalogue of saints, and so have several others. They left legitimate successors, under whose propitious reigns this kingdom was fertile and prospered, secure in the sweets of peace, and in the unity of spirit that bound its inhabitants to one another. Since foreign kings have usurped this kingdom, however, fertility has given way to sterility, the sweets of peace to the rumble of storms, and unity of spirit to detestable discord. We, who have been charged by the Holy See to reform the state of this kingdom, and aspire to find a salubrious remedy to all this, hereby summon the prelates, the barons, and the nobles to a general council, where the prelates and the barons might, as a body, recognize the magnificent prince, the Lord Charles – a true descendant of the first saints – as the rightful and legitimate King of Hungary, and their natural sovereign [dominus naturalis – wk].[927]

Klaniczay used the cardinal's assertion as an illustration for a later discussion about the religious legitimation of secular power in terms of royal and dynastic sanctity. He observed, therefore, that the kingdom of Hungary was special for its holy kings. Due to them and to their legitimate successors, the kingdom gained certain profits: fertility, prosperity, peace and security, and spiritual unity that kept the realm together. Gentilis implied the causes for its decline were linked to the usurpations done by foreign rulers who – by illegitimately claiming the throne – lost the divine privileges and brought sterility, war and discord to the kingdom. It was plain for Gentilis that only the installation of the legitimate king and successor of the holy rulers would secure peace and concord for the distorted kingdom. Hence, following the cardinal's argument, the kingdom of Hungary had an immense non-material and divinely-instilled potential, which could make it even more powerful, wealthy, and peaceful, but this potential was only to be triggered by a true heir of the Árpádian saintly kindred. With the backing of the papal authority, Charles I was declared such a triggering-agent. This happened

---

[927] Gábor Klaniczay, *Holy Rulers and Blessed Princesses: Dynastic Cults in Medieval Central Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1–2.

in 1309 (and did not solve all problems anyway), but – more importantly – in 1301 the ruling about a legitimate successor of Andrew III had been far less clear and defined.

At the outset of the fourteenth century the kingdom of Hungary was generally perceived as powerful in terms of land and military might, and prestigious and honorable as far as the non-material features of the kingdom's dignity were concerned. The title of *rex Hungariae* was thus attractive to lordship-minded "international" players and particularly eye-catching for non-royal-title holders. It is noteworthy that all three competitors to the throne of Hungary: Charles I, Wenceslas III, and Otto III; at the moment of the succession crisis were not kings themselves. In fact, only the latter was a fully-fledged lord who had been ruling in Lower Bavaria since 1290. Charles I was born in 1288 and Wenceslas III in 1289, so in 1301 they were thirteen and twelve years old respectively. They were basically aspiring lords at the early stage of constructing their own lordships who were driven by the powerful lordship-imperative. The empty throne in Central Europe that belonged to the well-known and respected dynasty of holy kings of the Árpáds was an extremely convenient occasion that could not be ignored.

It will be, however, not enough to assert that the kingdom of Hungary excelled in material power and prestige, and therefore, a group of candidates showed up wanting to seize its throne. Although the lordship-imperative functioned as a common feature of all actors on the "international" stage, the very desire to gain control and domination over a given region could not suffice to transform want into being. From this perspective lords of practically all hierarchies and ranks could join the race and compete for the Árpádian legacy. The "international" system was not, however, that type of anarchy which stipulated war of all against all. It regulated itself by bringing into the heart of the matter the issue of legitimacy. A lord-to-be had to have a strong claim in order to win recognition from his prospective subjects. Cardinal Gentilis asserted this inherited legitimacy of Charles I by virtue of the moral authority of the papacy. It was not the only source of legitimate rule but – as the forthcoming analysis shall prove – it still had its considerable impact.

Let me briefly return to the questions put forward at the beginning of this section. They will facilitate the answer to its chief problem, that is, how political interests of the actors involved in the succession crisis in the kingdom of Hungary could be identified?

Why did the succession crisis in the kingdom of Hungary happen? There may be a few answers to this problem but here I will emphasize one. The crisis surfaced vehemently (because it was there in gear since the 1290s) as an "international" phenomenon for a reason similar to the causes of the majority of the intra-Piast conflicts (over Cracow, for instance). Namely, the reason was the competing legitimacies. They all made sense to other, bigger and lesser, lords who were involved in the process, and implied to each competing party a sense of righteousness in insisting on pursuing its claim.

Cardinal Gentilis declared Charles I a true heir of the Árpáds. By doing so, he proclaimed the other candidates as usurpers and "foreign" rulers. Genealogically speaking, however, such assertion was problematic. Charles I interpreted his rights to the kingdom of Hungary by his descent from his grandmother, Mary, a daughter of Steven V of Hungary and a sister of Ladislas IV of Hungary.

There were other lords who could trace their origin to female members of the Árpádian royal family. Wenceslas III's grandmother, Kunigunda, was herself a granddaughter of Béla IV of Hungary. Otto III's mother, Elisabeth, was yet another daughter of Béla IV. In 1301, there was also Steven Vladislav II (the future king of Syrmia between 1316 and 1325), a man in his early twenties and son of Catherine, a daughter of Steven V of Hungary and sister of Mary, Charles I's grandmother. Also Záviš of Falkenštejn, a powerful Bohemian lord, had single sons[928] with: Kunigunda, the widow of Přemysl Otakar II and a granddaughter of Béla IV; and with Elisabeth, a sister of Steven V, who ca. 1300 sought refuge at Mary, her sister's, court.[929] Besides, in 1301 Władysław Łokietek – according to Jasiński – could have had two sons, Stefan (1296/1300-1306) and Władysław (1296/1311-1312), who were grandsons of Jolenta, Béla IV's daughter.[930] Furthermore, there was Duke Jerzy I of Halich who was Béla IV's grandson through his mother, Constance. And perhaps his sons, though minors, could have been available. This search could continue but the argument is quite plain right now: there was a great deal of lords who genealogically were equipped comparably with Gentilis' only legitimate heir: Charles I. The lack of clear succession procedure, which was absolutely normal for unsophisticated legal systems founded on customary regulations (they did not foresee

---

[928] *Velké Dějiny Zemí Koruny České 1250-1310*, vol. 3 (Praha ; Litomyšl: Paseka, 2002), 653.
[929] Ibid., 3:414.
[930] Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów małopolskich i kujawskich*, 262–263.

procedures for untypical situations), engendered an "international" puzzle that had to be resolved. It could be done, however, only by means of negotiation between lord-candidates and lords-nobles due to lordships' nature of collective rule.

Was it really necessary to have three lords competing for the Árpádian legacy? Judging from the list above, the kingdom of Hungary was still blessed by not having more pretenders to the throne. Certainly, this argument can be dismissed by a suggestion that all other possible candidates did not have sufficient power, prestige, and support to lay their claims. This may be the case (a separate analysis would be necessary here) but it does not change the fact that Gentilis' rhetoric about usurpers and the only genuine heir was rather misleading. Theoretically, the problem of competing legitimacies was far broader in scope than a group of three competitors. Therefore, another source of legitimate rule shall be sought. From what was said so far, the lordship-imperative, which could produce hundreds or thousands of throne-seekers, was significantly controlled by the principle of dynastic proximity, which allegedly would supply with claims to lordship all those, who could prove their origins from the House of the Árpáds.

It was not enough though. There were only three candidates and not a dozen. Another criterion must have been employed. Namely, Charles I, Wenceslas III, and Otto III were the only descendants of the Árpáds that engaged in throne-seeking policy, because all three of them were invited by various groups of Hungarian lords to assume power. Therefore, it was not necessary to have three candidates, but only this amount that was justified by the support they could muster from among the indigenous lords. Apparently, Gentilis' proclamation was a powerful and authoritative statement yet it could only urge and admonish the lords to re-elect Charles I; it did not possess power to create political reality. Charles I of Anjou could get lordship by proving that supporting him made most sense for his prospective lord-subjects.

What was so special about this kingdom that attracted their interest? It has been already indicated that the extant source material strongly suggests how powerful and splendid the kingdom of Hungary was. Nevertheless, a closer analysis revealed that those material and non-material aspects of the realm's greatness by themselves did not seduce anyone. I will repeat again: the "international" system did not allow for war of all against all. Its regulations went even beyond the logic of blood ties. Only those fought for the kingdom who were invited to do this by various groups of prospective lords-subjects. The power of blood ties could have

mattered (all three rivals had strong links to the Árpáds) but it is hard to decide to what degree real dynastic proximity mattered.

It could be argued that the primary reason that drew Charles I, Otto III, and Wenceslas III to engage in the throne-fight was, paradoxically, not the splendor of the realm but the sheer fact that there was a true lordship-gaining opportunity. From all three competitors, only Charles I was pushed to the wall. He arrived to Hungary as a landless lord-to-be who at that point did not have an alternative for building his lordship. Wenceslas III could always count on taking the Bohemian throne after his father (which he actually did in 1305), and Otto III had his lordship in Bavaria. In other words, thanks to existing legitimate claims to the Árpádian legacy (blood ties and election), all three lords advanced their cases.

Such political agenda was in concordance with the lordly identity that required lordship-building actions which would secure elite standing for the lord and his offspring (by enlarging the lordly assets in terms of land, wealth, resources and people to dominate over) and that would enhance the status of the lord's family by supplying it with prestigious title, preferably a royal one. From this perspective, Wenceslas III was in the most convenient position. There was a prospective royal dignity awaiting him in Bohemia. The young Angevin, a descendant of highly ambitious and politically-creative lords of Sicily and Naples, desperately needed a lordship, and the vacant Hungarian throne was his golden opportunity.

Risking exaggeration, it could be argued that what was, therefore, genuinely special about the kingdom of Hungary at that point for all three competitors were two things: first, that there was a vacant throne that needed to be filled; second (and perhaps foremost), that according to the political culture and in concordance with the principles that governed the "international" Christian society, they were eligible to seek their chances to fill this particular vacancy. Undoubtedly, power, prestige, and wealth of the kingdom of Hungary were significant incentives, but the most relevant unique feature of this realm that drew them into competition was the very fact that – at that particular time – it was a lordship merely at arm reach away from them.

Concluding, the concept of the lordly identity, explored in the Chapter 2, highlights interesting points in how the political interests of Charles I, Otto III, and Wenceslas III – in regard to the succession crisis in the kingdom of Hungary – were constructed. It helps to move

away from making objective calculations about the extent of material and non-material power of the realm that, theoretically speaking, would drag attention of any lordship-seeking actor. Instead, it practically illustrates how self-regarding tendencies in "international" politics, aiming at maximizing material power, were controlled and channeled by the dominant political culture. The lordly identity, itself a cultural construct, provided rules and regulations for establishing eligibility for filling the vacant Hungarian throne. These were: blood ties with the Árpádian kings, which reasserted the noble status of a prospective candidate; and election of a candidate carried out by lesser Hungarian lords; an act which emphasized the principle of collective rule in any lordship. Viewed from this angle, all three competitors had firm legitimation to pursue their goals in the kingdom of Hungary and their interest in doing so derived from their complex lordly identity which encouraged them to face the conflict-generating problem of competing legitimacies by advancing their own cases. The lordly identity was also responsible for this particular sensitivity to one's own claims, which one considered as righteous. That is, a lord was additionally motivated to act if he saw his just claims be violated.

In the turn of the fourteenth century a succession crisis was a standard conflict of legitimacies in Latin Christendom. Theoretically speaking, an anarchical environment of the Waltzian international system could drag various lords of all possible denominations to compete for a vacant throne, if only the balance of gains and losses would be relatively favorable. However, the existing political culture imposed restrictions on the anarchical variant by distilling it through its two powerful constructs: the Christian society at the level of the "international" system and the lordly identity at the level of an individual actor. Compliance to these two influential cultural constructs, which configured the otherwise anarchical system (deprived of the world government), enticed political interests and provoked "international" players to act accordingly.

The following sections will investigate in detail how Charles I and Wenceslas III attempted to transform their eligibility to hold the kingdom of Hungary into practice.

The Power-Winning Strategies of Charles I

Charles I's quest for power is best accessible in the extant source material. There is less available data for Wenceslas III and Otto III. The primary reason is that he was the ultimate

winner, and thus, there were greater chances that his charters – as generally the only valid ones and, consequently, the most precious – would survive. Moreover, his case was the most widely backed by multiple authorities (the pope, the king of the Romans, the king of Naples, the highest officials of the Hungarian Church), and so supposedly the amount of evidence produced was also exceptional. Furthermore, Charles I's quest for power lasted for a decade, Wenceslas III attempts to gain the throne lasted for four years and Otto III's only for a little more than two years. The disparity in the lengths of the main actors' respective struggles likely also resulted in disproportions in the amounts of available data.

There are three charters issued by Charles I with royal grants for his faithful followers, in which he explained in more detail the reasons why each recipient deserved his special grace. The motivations in each charter represent Charles I's self-reflection on his path to the Hungarian throne. Therefore, they will be analyzed in greater detail here.

On May 22, 1304 Charles I granted a property for services rendered to a certain Benedict. In this charter, Charles I first pointed out the serious perils and difficulties he had found himself in where Benedict had never abandoned him. Next, he explained that Benedict three times came to the kingdom of Naples as an envoy and brought him news that as soon as possible he should travel to the kingdom of Hungary (which was his, due to the election of the prelates and the barons and because of his right of birth), and assisted him along the dangerous way to Hungary. Subsequently, Charles I explained that the kingdom of Hungary was in great distress, and while attempting to administer and govern the realm, he had diligently searched for an advantageous remedy. Thus, having consulted with the prelates and the barons, he dispatched Benedict to the pope and the cardinals to ask them to help the king reform and restore the kingdom of Hungary, then suffering from internal devastation. Benedict was successful in his mission and, with the help of God, he returned to Charles I with the papal license to rule over the kingdom of Hungary. Next, however, some unfaithful and rebellious people attempted to disrupt the rule of Charles I and worked hard to overthrow him; therefore, he – with the consent of the prelates and the barons – turned to Albrecht of Habsburg, the king of the Romans, for support against them.[931]

---

[931] Nagy and Nagy, *AO*, 1:80–81.

On March 20, 1310, Charles I rewarded Steven for his faithful services reaching back to the very beginnings of Charles I's presence in the kingdom of Hungary. Charles I pointed out that when he had arrived in the realm, Steven acknowledged him as king and presented a royal castle to him. Later, he successfully fought battles and accompanied Charles I in his expedition against Wenceslas II. Finally, he assisted the king in establishing friendly relations with Steven Dragutin who ruled in northern Serbia.[932]

On September 4, 1310, Charles I issued a grant to Alexander *de genere* Aba for his faithful services in the period from Charles I's arrival in the kingdom of Hungary until his coronation. As the king explained, Alexander was always at his side, against all and particularly against Wenceslas III, who was crowned a king by certain Hungarian barons who had rejected Charles I's authority. Subsequently, Wenceslas II personally arrived in Pest with his powerful army – as it was widely known – and took his son back to his own domains. Next, Charles I, together with his faithful barons and noblemen, invaded the kingdom of Bohemia, and devastated it, burning down strongholds and castles. Alexander served bravely during this expedition and also remained faithful to Charles I against Otto III Wittelsbach.[933]

Apart from these three grants, there are many more which were more specific in enumerating the deeds worth rewarding. For instance, there were grants for injuries in battle,[934] for travelling overseas to persuade Queen Mary, Charles I's grandmother,[935] for lords in Scepusia for abandoning Wenceslas III's cause,[936] grants for help in capturing castles in northern Hungary,[937] for seizing the town of Buda,[938] for participation in the expedition against Wenceslas II and for capturing Buda,[939] for recapturing Esztergom,[940] for assistance in achieving power etc.[941] Putting all these stories together, and particularly the first three presented above sheds light on what Charles I considered the turning point in his quest for power in the kingdom of Hungary. I will summarize them now.

---

[932] *AOkl.*, 1992, vol. 2, n. 855.
[933] Nagy and Nagy, *AO*, 1:210.
[934] *AOkl.*, 1990, vol. 1, n. 451.
[935] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 675.
[936] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 668.
[937] *AOkl.*, 1992, vol. 2, n. 44.
[938] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 173.
[939] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 232.
[940] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 436.
[941] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 684.

Charles I, who could claim blood ties with the House of Árpád, had been elected king by the prelates and the barons of the realm who, afterwards, repeatedly dispatched envoys to bring him to his new kingdom. It was important to have him on Hungarian soil as soon as possible, because probably his prolonged absence was detrimental to his case. He found the realm in serious distress because some of the barons had elected Wenceslas III to be their king and had had him crowned. Since Charles I's attempts to govern the kingdom seemed futile, he turned for assistance to the pope and the cardinals who ultimately ruled that he should be the one to wield power in the realm. This judgment was supposed to bring relief to the kingdom and guarantee its restoration. However, the papal decision did not prevent some barons from conspiring and plotting against Charles I. They sought to overthrow him, forcing him to apply for help from Albrecht Habsburg, the king of the Romans and his uncle. Meanwhile, Wenceslas II invaded the kingdom of Hungary getting as far as Pest and taking his son, Wenceslas III, back to his realm. In response, Charles I organized an expedition to Bohemia and led his faithful barons and noblemen against Wenceslas II where he inflicted serious casualties. Later, he had to face Otto III of Wittelsbach. Notably, Charles I made many of his significant decisions with the counsel or assistance of the prelates and the barons.

From this perspective, the power-winning strategy which Charles I adopted was to cooperate closely with the Hungarian elite, which offered him its support, and exploit his good connections with the supreme moral and legal authority in the Christian West (the pope). He also took advantage of his affinity with the king of the Romans, who could efficiently act as a powerful ally in terms of material (military) power and who was still able to claim his royal jurisdiction over the lands of Charles I's opponent, the king of Bohemia.

The primary goal, however, for Charles I was to secure favor among the Hungarian lords who were in the convenient position of being able to choose between two candidates. It seems Charles I clearly understood his situation since I managed to identify more than twenty-five grants given for faithful service between 1302 and the end of 1310. The secondary goal (because it chiefly resulted from accomplishing the first goal) was to defeat the enemy. The defeat, however, had to happen not solely on a military level. In fact, there was no pitched battle between the rival armies. Instead, there were some fights between the protagonists of each candidate, basically aimed at capturing strongholds, and thus, at gaining control over certain regions and people.

Charles I's power-winning strategy was multifaceted. Before he arrived in the kingdom of Hungary, he assumed before the pope individual religious obligations to recite daily some prayers until he was crowned. These obligations were strengthened by oaths which, after the coronation had taken place, had to be officially alleviated.[942] Furthermore, Charles I turned to the pope for legal and moral support. He allied with Albrecht Habsburg to defeat the Přemyslids by force. He gave numerous grants to his faithful followers (the earliest of them dating back to sometime in 1302).[943] He intended to marry his sister Clemencia to someone in the kingdom of Hungary to stabilize his foothold there.[944] He was crowned three times in the realm. He led military expeditions to the kingdom of Bohemia and to northern Hungary; he fought back possession of towns and castles. Eventually he was victorious.

It remains an open question, however, how much of this success was the result of Charles I's outstanding ability to convince the Hungarian lords to accept him as a king. He was, more likely, an able player in a game of cooperation. Only the joint effort by various powerful lords favoring Charles I resulted in him being successfully crowned king of Hungary. The course of events showed that inasmuch as the problem was that there were other candidates for the throne, their final disappearance from the political scene by the end of 1307 did not automatically mean the common reception of Charles I. It was the Hungarian lords that needed to be ultimately convinced or compelled to submission. However, with disappearance of rival candidates to the throne, the Hungarian lords lost a good excuse to work against the Angevin candidate.

The power-winning strategies of Wenceslas III

To gain the upper hand in the dispute, Wenceslas III applied similar power-winning strategies to defeat his opponent. The number of instruments each could command was limited but they were at least accessible to both candidates. He therefore, like Charles I, awarded grants to his supporters. Moreover, he had already initiated this practice in 1301, within a month after his coronation and earlier than his rival.[945]

---

[942] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 825–826.
[943] *AOkl.*, 1990, vol. 1, n. 278, 316–317.
[944] *AOkl.*, 1992, vol. 2, n. 821–823.
[945] *AOkl.*, 1990, vol. 1, n. 76.

Although he left no charters containing elaborate interpretations of his quest for power, as in the case of Charles I, perhaps because his battle for the Hungarian throne did not last long, he still managed to reward some Hungarian lords for their help in defending the town of Buda[946] or for assistance in getting him crowned.[947] He also made large concessions to one of the most powerful Hungarian lords, Máté Csák, lavishing him with authority over the whole of counties Nitra[948] and Trencsén[949] (thus, much more than control over a group of villages or a castle which would have been a more customary way of rewarding faithful lords) for supporting his bid to become king of Hungary. There was a grant for a Saxon leader in Scepusia for Saxon support[950]. Wenceslas III continued to distribute wealth and properties from 1303[951] until July 1304,[952] when he most probably joined his father, Wenceslas II, on his way back to the kingdom of Bohemia.

As mentioned earlier, in the period between 1302 and 1310, comparatively speaking, Charles I awarded not many more than twenty-five grants for faithful service, whereas Wenceslas awarded approximately ten grants between 1301 and 1304. By the summer of 1304, however, Charles I had issued only seven such charters in comparison to ten grants presented by Wenceslas III. This would suggest, according to the extant source material, that both candidates were more-or-less equally busy rewarding their followers and that both clearly understood the effectiveness of and need for such practices.

Charles I, as he himself emphasized, sought external help from the pope and the king of the Romans. The former provided him with the legal and moral justification of his claims and the latter mainly with military support. Wenceslas III relied chiefly on his father's assistance, which would have been considerable since Wenceslas II was – as king of Bohemia and Poland – the closest and most powerful neighbor to the north of the kingdom of Hungary. Judging from the military expeditions of Charles I military expeditions, generally directed to the northern regions, the lords of these lands were particularly interested in benefiting from Přemyslids' domination in Central Europe. In spring of 1304, Wenceslas II was capable of

---

[946] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 315.
[947] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 212, 315.
[948] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 184.
[949] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 186.
[950] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 268.
[951] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 505, 507, 508.
[952] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 634.

bringing a considerable army up to the town of Buda and, meanwhile, reinforce his son's followers in their hold of strategic castles in the north, which fell to Charles I only two years later.

Like Charles I, Wenceslas III also sought to mobilize widespread support from many lords, since only an extensive network of allies could secure political change favorable to his cause. Therefore, in 1303, both Přemyslids concluded an alliance with Philip IV of France which was supposed to outweigh Albrecht Habsburg and Boniface VIII's commitment to Charles I's case. Both parties agreed that in the case of war, each of the allies would rise a mercenary army for 100,000 silver marks and provide help.[953] It was a formidable promise which was never realized.

In *Regesta Slovaciae* there is a summary of the letter which in July 1304 Wenceslas III apparently sent to his father discussing the state of affairs in the kingdom of Hungary.[954] It is an interesting piece of critical self-reflection and self-evaluation. Wenceslas III explained there that his protagonists had become dull and idle; that prominent barons were leaving his side because Charles I was closer to the inheritance following Andrew III (closer either in terms of the family relationship, which is doubtful, or in time, which would fit to what is otherwise known from the sources); that, in particular, Charles I's innate talents and charm attracted the Hungarians to him, whereas Wenceslas' idleness, pride and other manifestations of bad manners had caused people to hate him and thus, provoked his alienation from key players. For this reason, he argued, the lords of towns and castles were gradually abandoning him and submitting to Charles I by making secret agreements. In his opinion, this might cut the domestic fights short and interrupt the internal dispute. The Hungarian barons, however – Wenceslas III continued – who were not faithful to either side, seemed more interested in nourishing these divisions than willing to extinguish them in order to get hold of royal castles and incomes and escape punishment.[955]

---

[953] Emler, *RDEBM*, 1855, 2:856–857.

[954]Brezovakova, "Politicky zapas," 583.

[955] *Ladislaus, rex Hungariae, Wenceslao, regi Bohemiae et Poloniae, patri suo, litteras de statu regni mittit, in quibus continebatur, quod pars sua sensim languidior hebetiorque esse coepit. Desciscentibus praecipuis baronibus ab eo et in partem Caroli regis facientibus secessionem, quod et Carolus ad succedendum regi Andreae erat propinquior, singularique ingenio et indole atque venustate morum praeclarus Hungarorum mentes in sui venerationem et culturam instexerat, et Venceslaus desidia et superbia ceterisque corruptis moribus et flagitiis odium in se et alienationem animorum provocabat. Quo effectum est, ut castra municipiaque, obedientiam Venceslai regis professa, regi Carolo dederentur et in personae suae clamdestini celebrarentur tractatus, quo*

I will not concentrate on the accuracy of Wenceslas' ruling capabilities in comparison to Charles'. In 1304, Charles I was sixteen and Wenceslas III was fifteen. They were both young and comparably inexperienced, although they had already spent a couple of years in the kingdom of Hungary and must have learnt a great deal about political mechanisms at work there. Moreover, the *Chronicon Aulae Regie* has left us with quite the opposite description of Wenceslas III's skills and abilities, depicting him as an agile, attractive and talented ruler,[956] although with inclinations to promiscuous behavior because of his age.[957]

Leaving this issue aside, it is worth observing two things here. First, Wenceslas III noted how much the personal features of a candidate could enhance his chances for success. Inborn talents combined with outer attractiveness and exemplary manners did matter, since skills in 'making friends' were particularly desirable in enterprises which depended upon smooth cooperation from the lords that was built chiefly on loyalty and reciprocity.

Second, the weakest lords (individual noblemen, towns or particular castles) sought to side with the most plausibly victorious candidate, hoping to benefit from so-called band-wagoning (they could either submit to a more powerful lord and seek his protection or side with the king whose protection did not have to be immediate but, on the other hand, represented greater authority in legal and moral terms, and eventually could be more profitable).

More powerful players tended to take advantage of the candidates' rivalry to boost their lordships. Since political change required that groups of lords engage in cooperative efforts, their status guaranteed them profitable participation in the rivalry. On the other hand, the rivalry itself was necessary and on the basis of Wenceslas III's observations, I would again argue that sustaining the royal office was indispensable for the internal logic of the political system. This was because for the lords, only appropriating royal properties or privileges and subsequently, acquiring legal and moral confirmation for these acquisitions (from a legitimate

---

facilius civile bellum intercipi posset, expulsionem vel discrimen. Barones insuper Hungariae, nulli partium fidi, nutrire magis divisionem, quam extinquere visi sunt, ut castrorum et introituum regalium impunis illis esset detentio: Vincent Sedlák, *Regesta Diplomatica Nec Non Epistolaria Slovaciae*, vol. 1 (Bratislavae: Sumptibus Academiae Scientiarum Slovacae, 1980), 156.

[956] Chronicon Aulae Regie, *FRB*, 1884, 4:106.

[957] *Chronicon Aulae Regie*, ibid., 4:107.

ruler) was the ultimate (that is, there was no alternative) way of establishing and enlarging their lordships.

Money Matters

Another essential element in the quest for power was money. As pointed out earlier, Charles I and Wenceslas III resorted extensively to their royal right to reward actors deemed loyal to them. In a sense, it was the most customary way of showing magnanimity and assure a profit for the supporters who in majority of cases had to first invest their own wealth in the service of their lord, hoping subsequently for remuneration which would exceed their expenses. Apart from grants, both rivals could rely on external financial support.

Charles I's sponsors, known from the source material, were his grandparents Charles II of Naples and his wife, Queen Mary. In 1301, Charles II agreed to transport thirty-three horses (including three war-horses) to Dalmatia (a region tied to the kingdom of Hungary);[958] in 1301 and 1302, he assigned altogether 200 ounces of gold to Paul Subic, Ban of Slavonia and a powerful supporter of Charles I.[959] In 1303, he agreed that instead of 100 ounces of gold, Paul Subic would receive 1000 packloads (*salme*)[960] of wheat.[961] In December 1301, Charles II ordered his seneschals in two districts to collect taxes to build up an army for Charles I.[962] In 1305, Queen Mary pledged her jewelry and crown to the Florentine merchants in exchange for 300 ounces of gold.[963] Two years later, Charles II agreed that Mary could pledge her incomes from 1307 for the sake of Hungarian affairs.[964] Ultimately, in his last will dated March 1308, , Charles II donated 2000 ounces of gold to Charles I.[965]

Although it is difficult to estimate the overall of financial aid provided to Charles I by his grandparents to achieve victory, it seems quite clear that almost every year money poured to his pocket constantly. Moreover, the extant source material indicates that until 1303

---

[958] *AOkl.*, 1990, vol. 1, n. 46.
[959] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 55, 249.
[960] Philip B. Baldwin recently explained: "A *salma*, derived from *sagma*, a pack-saddle, is the load that can be carried on the back of pack-horse or other beast of burden. … One hundred pack-loads of wheat on the English example might therefore be equated, in general terms, with the bread provision for 55 people for one year; but there are many variables.": cf. Philip B. Baldwin, "Charles of Anjou, Pope Gregory X and the Crown of Jerusalem," *Journal of Medieval History* 38, no. 4 (2012): 428. Following his calculations, Paul Subic was granted the annual bread provision for approx. 550 people.
[961] *AOkl.*, 1990, vol. 1, n. 429.
[962] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 128.
[963] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 744.
[964] *AOkl.*, 1992, vol. 2, n. 262.
[965] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 323.

Charles II extensively supported his grandson. Nevertheless, from 1305, when the Přemyslids eventually left the kingdom of Hungary and ceased to threaten Charles I, Queen Mary contributed to further efforts, whereas Charles II limited himself to approving his wife's actions. His final donation on his deathbed was only partially connected to Charles I's enterprise in Hungary, and was primarily related to sorting out the question of succession in the kingdom of Naples.

Wenceslas III was sponsored by his father. There is, however, less data available about direct financial support. One hint may be the formidable sum of 100,000 marks of silver that the Přemyslids agreed to spend to recruit an army against Albrecht Habsburg, a promise which was a part of an alliance with Philip IV of France. There is no evidence that this huge amount of money was ever used although it reveals the degree of contribution approved at least officially by the Přemyslids. Another, and far more modest, indication would be a charter issued on May 31, 1305 by Wenceslas II in which he promised to a canon of Aquileia that Wenceslas III would return by December 25, the tithes of 580 marks of silver which had been collected for the sake of the Holy Land in the Olomouc region but requisitioned by Wenceslas III for "times of need".[966]

Non-material Dimensions of Power

So far, the comparative analysis of the power-winning strategies employed by Charles I and Wenceslas III generally match each other. They started their quest for the Hungarian throne under almost identical conditions, having been elected by different groups of the Hungarian lords and were nearly the same age. They employed similar methods to gain the hearts and minds of their prospective subjects, sought widespread support from external powers and relied on generous sponsors who could provide considerable financial aid. Both were in the fourth degree of affinity with the deceased Andrew III, with a slight advantage towards Wenceslas, who in the late 1290s was formally engaged to Andrew III's daughter and might have become his son-in-law. Therefore, if the legal terminology used in 1304 by Wenceslas II in his dispute with Albrecht Habsburg is followed, it appears each party could

---

[966] Emler, *RDEBM*, 1855, 2:880–881.

equally claim rights to the Hungarian throne *iure legitime successionis* (by the legitimate law of succession) and *vocacionis titulo* (by election).[967]

However, despite all these similarities, only Charles I was eventually successful. It is worth asking what made the difference? Was it sheer disparity in material power or Wenceslas III's questionable charm that caused the same power-winning strategies to work better for Charles I? The extant source material suggests that between 1301 and 1306 there was a gradual shift in the ranks of the Hungarian lords who shifted from the Bohemian prince's side to that of Charles I changing an anticipated triumph into a defeat. What did Wenceslas III lack that mattered so much in the quest for power in the early fourteenth century?

The answer to this question lies in the non-material dimensions of power, and to moral authority in particular. It can be argued that what made a considerable difference between the positions of Charles I and Wenceslas III was precisely the support of the pope and the king of the Romans.[968] Yet, this assistance was not important in its material aspects but rather in its persuasive, soft-power type of capabilities. The firm moral and legal protection from the pope, when effectively used, triggered the Hungarian Church to place its moral and religious authority on Charles I's side.

In 1301, after the death of Andrew III, the prelates were not unanimous in their decision who should replace him. They split into two groups. According to the papal legate's report, most of them adhered to John, Archbishop of Kalocsa, and refused to acknowledge the authority of Gregory, a new Archbishop of Esztergom (and the formal head of the Church in the Kingdom of Hungary).[969] John crowned Wenceslas III, whereas Gregory crowned Charles I.

Boniface VIII followed the politics of his predecessors and favored the Angevin claims. A few months after Andrew III's death, he appointed his legate, Nicholas, Bishop of Ostia.[970] Already in October 1301, the legate summoned the Hungarian prelates in search of a way to settle the conflict between Wenceslas III and Charles I, and – as I presume – to end the

[967] Chronicon Aulae Regie, *FRB*, 1884, 4:88.
[968] For this analysis it is less important to elucidate the reasons which made the pope and the German king work against the Přemyslids.
[969] Emler, *RDEBM*, 1855, 2:188.
[970] Sułkowska-Kurasiowa and Kuraś, *Bullarium Poloniae*, 1982, vol. 1, n. 951.

divisions in the Hungarian Church.[971] On November 6, 1301, Boniface VIII issued a number of letters which requested Wenceslas II to cooperate with the legate,[972] urged the bishops of Hungary, Dalmatia, Slavonia and Poland to assist the legate in restoring peace in the kingdom of Hungary,[973] and empowered the legate to punish these prelates who obstructed his efforts to reform the realm.[974] On November 17, 1301, Boniface VIII sent out further letters. The first was addressed to Archbishop of Kalocsa and reprimanded him for siding with Wenceslas III, declaring that the coronation of Wenceslas III was illegitimate, reminding him that ultimately St. Steven himself had received the royal crown from the pope (hence, the pope's will should be obeyed), and demanding that the archbishop correct his behavior and show loyalty to the pope in the spirit of obedience.[975] The second letter was for the legate mandating him to discipline the archbishop of Kalocsa and informing him that only the archbishop of Esztergom could legitimately crown a king of Hungary.[976]

In May 1302, the papal legate levied an interdict on the town of Buda which had sided with Wenceslas III and whose clergy had refused to submit to the papal decrees.[977] Meanwhile, Boniface VIII continued his policy to act as the ultimate overseer of Central European "international" relations. On June 10, 1302, he deprived Wenceslas II of his self-appointed title of the king of Poland[978] and summoned the Přemyslids and the Angevins before himself to adjudicate their dispute for the Hungarian throne.[979] The pope made his ruling in favor of the Angevins on May 31, 1303. He recognized Charles I's hereditary rights deriving from his grandmother, Queen Mary, and granted validity to his election. Furthermore, the pope stated that Wenceslas II did not send well-prepared advocates to represent the Přemyslids at his court (he rather expected them to come personally). Moreover, Boniface VIII demanded that everyone – under threat of excommunication – support Mary and Charles in their efforts to repossess the Hungarian realm. All laity and clergymen were absolved from allegiance to the Přemyslids, and the latter were to provide within four months evidence for their rights to Hungary; otherwise, the pope decided to

---

[971] *AOkl.*, 1990, vol. 1, n. 96.
[972] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 107.
[973] Emler, *RDEBM*, 1855, 2:820.
[974] Ibid., 2:819–820.
[975] *AOkl.*, 1990, vol. 1, n. 88.
[976] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 89.
[977] Brezovakova, "Politicky zapas," 579.
[978] Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1878, vol. 2, n. 853.
[979] Sedlák, *Regesta Slovaciae*, 1:827–829.

introduce the rule of *perpetuum silentium*, that is, to impose on the Přemyslids "eternal silence", meaning they did not have the right to resume the trial in the future.[980] In addition, the pope informed King Albrecht Habsburg of the Romans, his son Rudolf, Duke of Austria, and all *praelatis, principibus et nobilibus* in Hungary and beyond, about his ruling, and urged them to support Charles I with *consilium et auxilium et favor*.[981] Subsequently, the prelates of the Hungarian Church received a clear command to abandon the Přemyslids and side with the Angevins.[982]

In the following months, the Hungarian bishops engaged in spreading the news about the papal decision across the whole kingdom.[983] They were fairly determined to uphold it. For instance, on July 31, 1305 a certain John and Henry were excommunicated and their lands put under an interdict as punishment for their support of Wenceslas III (*consilium et auxilium*), for ignoring the papal orders, for helping the Přemyslids to carry away the Hungarian Holy Crown, and for inflicting damage on the town and castle of Esztergom.[984] However, complete unity within the Hungarian Church had still not been attained. On December 6, 1305, Otto III of Wittelsbach was crowned by Benedict, Bishop of Veszprem, and Antonius, Bishop of Csanád.[985] A half a year later, the former was rewarded for this act by Otto.[986]

The emergence of Otto III of Wittelsbach as a new candidate for the Hungarian throne mobilized the Church anew. In May 1307, Thomas, Archbishop of Esztergom presided over a local council, which reiterated that anyone opposing Charles I would be excommunicated based on a papal ruling.[987] In August 1307, Clement V dispatched Gentilis de Monteflorum OFM as a legate to a "distressed" Hungary,[988] reconfirmed Boniface VIII's ruling concerning Angevin rights to the Árpádian legacy,[989] and required Thomas, Archbishop of Esztergom and Vincent, Archbishop of Kalocsa, to promulgate his decision in the Hungarian realm and to discipline Bishop Antonius for his support of Otto.[990]

---

[980] Ibid., 1:843–846.
[981] Ibid., 1:846.
[982] Ibid., 1:848–849.
[983] *AOkl.*, 1990, vol. 1, n. 417, 426, 432–434.
[984] Ibid., vol. 1, n. 756.
[985] Brezovakova, "Politicky zapas," 585.
[986] *AOkl.*, 1992, vol. 2, n. 55.
[987] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 172; cf. Brezovakova, "Politicky zapas," 585.
[988] *AOkl.*, 1992, vol. 2, n. 201.
[989] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 221.
[990] Ibid., vol. 2, n. 222.

When, at the end of 1307, Charles I was the last standing candidate for the Hungarian throne, the legate and the archbishops continued in their efforts to facilitate his final recognition in the kingdom.[991] Their contribution was, first and foremost, non-material and rooted in the moral authority they wielded that equipped them with "pacifying powers". Although their success was not complete (since Charles I needed another two decades to eliminate lordships that contested his authority), they managed to generate conditions favorable for the new king. He was widely recognized across the kingdom and the will to cooperate with him among the lords was restored to a level that allowed them to think positively about returning the realm to peace, order, and tranquility. Therefore, the papal judgment in favor of Charles I did not fully settle the dispute over the empty throne in Hungary but it definitely created a new context for its continuation. The Hungarian Church, which in the last decades had been active in restoring peace and tranquility in the kingdom, gained additional validation and justification for her efforts. However, it was not merely papal moral authority that made the difference, for at nearly the same time Boniface VIII was losing his conflict with Philip IV of France, precisely because his stance did not resonate with the majority of the French bishops.

While comparing the power-winning strategies that drove Charles I and Wenceslas III in their quest to win the Árpádian legacy, it appears evident that the Angevins were able to exploit an additional power resource (to wit, moral authority), which was – at least from August 1303 – significantly less available to the Přemyslids. Making this claim does not mean that Wenceslas III was defeated solely because of a 'shortage' of this type of power resource. The Angevin-Přemyslid struggle was waged on many fronts, using military, financial, and even hereditary assets. The very fact that in late 1305 Otto III Wittelsbach replaced Wenceslas III in this succession conflict reveals that, despite the papal ruling and the sustained offensive of the Hungarian Church, options were still open and things could go in a variety of directions.

My point is, therefore, to show that this more detailed analysis of the way Charles I and Wenceslas III acted in order to gain control of the Hungarian throne, permits a firmer grip on the non-material aspects, which played important roles in medieval "international" politics. The Přemyslids did not lose Hungary in a battle and their protagonists survived in northern Hungary for next two years. Rather, the Přemyslids withdrew from the dispute, as previously

---

[991] Csukovits, *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I.*, 2012, 66–69.

Přemysl Otakar II had done in 1271, concentrating on reaffirming their hold of the kingdoms of Bohemia and Poland. One could therefore claim that the military campaigns of late 1304, and Władysław Łokietek's emergence in Little Poland, forced the Přemyslids to give up their ambitions in Hungary and to shift their attention to domains they already possessed.

However, it was very telling that in the summer of 1304, Wenceslas II led a strong military force to the kingdom of Hungary, although the final outcome of this enterprise was to extricate his son from Buda back to Bohemia, since Wenceslas III was no longer a welcome candidate for the throne there either. This circumstance had much to do, it seems, with the efficiency of papal moral authority, which clearly took the side of Charles I. Moreover, there is always the question of how much the emergence of the anti-Přemyslid coalition was prompted by admonitions coming from the pope, and to what extent his attitude promoted cooperation between members of this alliance (it included Rudolf of Habsburg, Charles I, both Hungarian archbishops, four other Hungarian bishops, a number of powerful Hungarian lords,[992] and – presumably – Władysław Łokietek[993]).

In 1997, Rodney Bruce Hall developed the concept of moral authority as a power resource. Since his approach was constructivist (like Wendt's that was discussed in the Chapter 2), he assumed a methodological suggestion that in order to identify what, in any given context, the power resource actually is, one first needs to understand "a situationally specific or historically contingent structure of co-constituted identities and interests".[994] In short, his idea was that moral authority could function as a power resource if, in a given context, the political actors were impelled by their socially constructed identities and political interests to recognize it as a power resource, i.e. as a resource that has utility and value.[995] This point resembled my category of "making sense" that I used extensively while elaborating on certain culturally-driven actions carried out by lords in the "international" context. Furthermore, Hall believed that "institutionalizing social practices into conventions lends utility to the subject of the convention as a power resource".[996] He argued that such a

---

[992] *AOkl.*, 1990, vol. 1, n. 643–644.

[993] Edmund Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 55; cf. Adam Kłodziński, "Łokietek a Habsburgowie (1300-1332)," *RAU. Wydział Hist.-filoz.* 59 (1916): 259.

[994] Rodney Bruce Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 594.

[995] Ibid.

[996] Ibid., 596.

convention regarding moral authority existed in the Middle Ages, and hence, he claimed that "feudal ecclesial and politico-military actors competed for the moral authority".[997]

The quarrel between Charles I and Wenceslas III over the empty throne in the kingdom of Hungary reflects Hall's intuitions about special "conventions" which governed medieval "international" politics by influencing the concepts of kingship and crafting particular types of political interests. This analysis showed that in the multi-polar political environment, which had emerged in Central Europe since the 1240s (see the Chapter 2), and in which efficient rulership could only be attained by promoting the will to cooperate between the lords (because there was no hegemonic actor towering over the remainder), the lord's ability to attract, persuade and convince both other lords and his dependents appeared as an important factor in successful politics in the "international" realm. In a political system comprised of comparably powerful units (be it on the level of dukes, kings, emperors or on the more modest level of counts and individual lord-nobles), the prevailing multi-polarity combined with the limited effectiveness of military force together with the fragility of the financial system and its confined assets (as it was the case in the thirteenth century) lead to an increase in the prominence of non-material power resources, themselves deeply imbedded in the traditional political culture of the time.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to investigate whether (and if so, to what degree) the lordly identity, with all its subcategories introduced and elaborated in Chapter 3, retains explanatory power for the succession crisis in the kingdom of Hungary in the early fourteenth century. It also assumed that the characteristics of this identity, built principally on the analysis of conflicts in the Polish lands and their immediate vicinities, would correspond with how Charles I and Wenceslas III would project their own roles in the "international" system.

The context for the throne competition in the kingdom of Hungary was a multi-polar "international" system that was anarchical by its nature but hierarchical by its prevailing normative culture. Multi-polarity suggested that the region was populated with lords and lordships of various degrees of material power and prestige, who all sought to maximize power and elite standing, and that there was no hegemon, or system-wide authority, which

---

[997] Ibid., 591.

could play around with the conflict and coerce lesser powers to submit to its decisions. In consequence, the successful power-winning strategy required effective negotiations and cooptation of lords to the certain candidate's camp, so that his power could be recognized and internal hierarchies reconfigured. The culture of authority hinged on hierarchy and prestige created room for non-material power resources that proved effective in securing lordship for Charles I.

The nature of the conflict was constituted by the competing legitimacies. This implied that each party had a strong claim to seize the throne and that there were no procedures available, which would resolve this puzzle peacefully. They were only to be born in time in order to demonstrate why from all three equally eligible candidates Charles I must have been the true heir of the Árpáds.

The comparative analysis of the power-winning strategies employed by Charles I and Wenceslas III showed that they generally match each other. Both competitors started their quest for the Hungarian throne under almost identical conditions, having been elected by different groups of the Hungarian lords and were nearly the same age. They employed similar methods to gain the hearts and minds of their prospective subjects, sought widespread support from external powers and relied on generous sponsors who could provide considerable financial aid.

Their points of departure were similar and at the outset of the competition their chances of success were fairly even. Over time, however, it turned out that Charles I managed to nearly monopolize access to a single power resource of moral authority, which consequently, projected him in a favorable light and boosted his abilities to convince and manipulate. This striking disparity, which arose after Boniface VIII's ruling concerning Angevin succession rights and continued until Charles I's third coronation in 1310, presumably knocked his rivals (Wenceslas III, Otto III and the rebellious Hungarian lords) off balance and deprived them of the power of arguments they could use to draw the others' will to cooperate to their side.

The course of events between 1307 and 1310 revealed how consistently the pope, the legate and the Hungarian Church worked on advancing their power of argument within the "convention" (as Hall called it) of their moral authority on behalf of Charles I. The repeated

general assemblies which officially acknowledged Charles I's authority, agreements with the powerful lords, and the elaboration of the coronation rite under the legate's *aegis* were all reflections of the same procedure, namely, to monopolize the discourse of legitimacy and authority in favor of one candidate. Wenceslas III, himself well equipped with strong legal and dynastic arguments, still could not manage to balance this pressure, which willy-nilly made him lose the battle on the front of moral discourse.

In short, the succession crisis in the kingdom of Hungary manifested the hybrid "international" system (see Chapter 2) in operation. Lords pursued their own interests fixed on the maximization of power, but the content of this power and the strategies of attaining it were rooted in and governed by the political culture. This culture promoted the lordship-imperative as a tool for upholding elite standing. It implied that, among others, this standing derived from titles one could accumulate, and the royal ones were particularly favored (and thus not available to ordinary lords). It also introduced hierarchy as the "international" system's ordering principle, overlapping with and distilling the anarchical fabric of the system, which narrowed down the number of eligible candidates (blood ties and election functioned as prerequisites) and – at the same time – it equipped lesser lord-nobles with negotiating powers (the principle of collective rule in lordship). Moreover, this culture both emanated from and co-constructed the "international" Christian society that required from lords - in order to maintain their sense of belonging and participation in a bigger whole – to honor (take into consideration) the moral authority of the Church and recognize the special papal authority to decide what was right and just.

Therefore, Charles I of Anjou was born as a descendant of a prestigious noble family and as such his culturally prescribed role was to dominate over lands and people as a lord. As a young boy he was given an opportunity to fulfill this want. He came to the kingdom of Hungary backed by a few very prestigious lords of the period, seeking royal title and a base for launching his own Angevin branch as a noble family leader (although this aspect could be better seen in his future actions). In order to achieve success, he complied with norms and principles that recognized lordships as collectives of lords bounded by ties of personal loyalty as well as he rested his legitimation to rule in the kingdom of Hungary on fundaments that made particular sense to the members of the Christian society.

CHAPTER 5. THE ORIGINS OF ANGEVIN-PIAST DYNASTIC MARRIAGE OF 1320

Introduction

In the Polish historical perspective the year 1320 acquired special meaning. That year Władysław Łokietek was crowned King of Poland. Thanks to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century generations of scholars, this event was considered as a historical watershed that brought back to the international world, after nearly two hundred years of fragmentation, a newly reunited kingdom governed by the local dynasty of the Piasts.

In 1926, in one of scholarly classics Stanisław Zachorowski noted:

On January 20, 1320 in the cathedral of Cracow, Archbishop Janisław of Gniezno accompanied by other bishops placed the royal crown on Władysław Łokietek and his wife Jadwiga's temples, who for decades had been courageously sharing in her husband's good and bad fate. Undoubtedly it was the most magnificent moment in the life of this unfaltering duke, who – hardened by life and difficult relations – had excelled so much from among the multitude of dukes of his kindred that he accomplished an extraordinary task, which apparently was beyond human powers. For him it was a reward for all his hardships and humiliation.[998]

The restoration of the kingdom, its "rise from death"[999] and its universal character, that is, encompassing all Polish lands throughout separate provinces (and thus referring to the splendor and might of the first Polish kingdom ruled by Bolesław the Brave in the early eleventh century),[1000] was assumed by older historiography as an obvious progress in

---

[998] *Dnia 20 stycznia 1320 r. w kościele katedralnym krakowskim arcybiskup gnieźnieński Janisław w otoczeniu biskupów włożył koronę królewską na skronie Władysława Łokietka i jego małżonki Jadwigi, która mężnie od kilkudziesięciu lat dzieliła dobrą i złą dolę męża. Była to niewątpliwie najwspanialsza chwila w życiu tego niezłomnego księcia, który zahartowany przez życie i ciężkie stosunki tak niezwykle wyróżnił się wśród licznej rzeszy książąt swego rodu i dokonał dzieła niezwykłego, na pozór przerastającego siły ludzkie; była to dla niego nagroda za wszelkie trudy i upokorzenia* [translation – wk]: Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*, 1:397–398.

[999] Baszkiewicz, *Polska czasów Łokietka*, 128–129.

[1000] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 198.

comparison to the period of weak and anarchical principalities that had earlier prevailed for almost two centuries.

Oswald Balzer, a great protagonist of this universal concept of Łokietek's kingdom, claiming that this kingdom could not be perceived as a particular monarchy of Great Poland or that of Cracow, in his monumental work "Kingdom of Poland" (originally published in three volumes in 1919-1920),[1001] argued among others, for an important difference in status between ephemeral kingdoms of Przemysł II (1295-1296) and Wenceslas II (1300-1305), and Łokietek's new creation that subsequently survived for centuries.[1002] Although more recent scholarship acknowledged the significance of the unification carried out by the Přemyslids,[1003] it did not drop the idea that Łokietek's coronation in 1320 was a new opening and the foundation of a new state, which from then on had to be further strengthened and developed.[1004]

Somewhere in the background of this scholarly-established "turning point", almost half a year later,[1005] another significant event occurred – the dynastic marriage between Charles I of Anjou, King of Hungary, and Elisabeth, a daughter of Władysław Łokietek and Jadwiga. This marriage emerged as a springboard for future dynastic cooperation between the Angevin and Piasts and laid foundations for a succession project,[1006] which took shape most probably in the 1330s[1007] and in 1370 brought the Hungarian branch of the Angevins to the Polish throne. In Stanisław Szczur's opinion, both Łokietek's coronation and subsequent dynastic marriage were pivotal for the future of those two royal houses.[1008] He claimed so after Balzer who pointed that according to the Piast dynastic tradition it had been impossible for a woman to

[1001] Balzer, *Królestwo Polskie*.
[1002] Ibid., 401. See also: Magdalena Pyter, *Oswald Balzer i lwowska szkoła historycznoprawna* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2010), 264.
[1003] Kurtyka, *Odrodzone Królestwo*, 14.
[1004] Jurek, "Polska Droga," 189–190. See also: Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 454.
[1005] Kálmán Benda, ed., *Magyarország történeti kronológiája: A 1970-ig*, vol. 1 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1981), 196.
[1006] For the most recent reconsideration of the matter see: Stanisław Szczur, "W sprawie sukcesji andegaweńskiej w Polsce," *Roczniki Historyczne* 75 (2009): 1–53.
[1007] Ibid., 51. There is an opinion in scholarship that points to 1327, which was the moment of serious illness of Casimir, Łokietek's prospective heir, and of John of Luxemburg's powerful invasion on Łokietek's lordship (stopped by the diplomatic intervention of Charles I), as a convenient time for holding the first succession-related negotiations: cf. Kurtyka, *Odrodzone Królestwo*, 43–44.
[1008] Szczur, "W sprawie," 2.

inherit the throne; however, one could claim it by the virtue of marriage with a Piast duchess. Hence, given favorable conditions Charles I could effectively toy with such an idea.[1009]

Without attempting to revisit the matter of the Angevin-Piast succession project (which was, after all, a one-way dynastic agreement), this chapter will focus on unravelling the context and circumstances that caused the Elisabeth-Charles marriage to occur. The intention is not, however, to provide a chronological overview of events, which resulted in the marital contract, and to offer a common-sense appraisal about entanglements and complexities of the "international" scene in the region that pushed both kings to strike a deal. The extensive analysis of the thirteenth-century "international" system and of the lordly identity that prevailed in the political culture of this period, which has carried out in the previous chapters, will all serve as conceptual tools (or theoretical lenses) to examine and elucidate "international" agendas of Charles I and Łokietek.

The fundamental idea for this chapter is to investigate the well-explored facts in the perspective informed by more profound conceptualizations of the "international" system of the early fourteenth century and of political interests that presumably guided behaviors of lords. The leading research question for my inquiry is what sort of political agendas brought the kings of Hungary and Poland to agree upon a formation of close dynastic bonds? Answering this question will require to combine the lordly routinized practices (as revealed in the previous chapters), which functioned as essential political-interest makers, with the analysis of then current "international" situation in the region, which constituted the environment for Łokietek and Charles I's actions.

Arriving at conclusions require a proper order of steps to be taken. First, a survey of available source material will provide data how this marriage was perceived and interpreted by the contemporaries and their immediate successors. Second, a survey of international scholarship will follow aiming at bringing together Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish, and Slovak interpretations of the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320. This section will also shed some light on the "international" context of this event, suggest probable answers to my primary research question, and reveal how national historiographies identified Charles I and Łokietek's political agendas. Third, I will take and analyze those agendas as they can be investigated

---

[1009] Ibid., 5, 51.

through existing primary materials and scholarly literature, particularly between 1310-1320. This will serve as a "searching-for-alliance" tool. This part will chiefly focus on the question whether at any given moment Charles I and Łokietek's politics converged and whether some common objectives could be demonstrated. Finally, on the basis of collected material and with reference to the structure and workings of the thirteenth-century "international" system (as put forward above), I will offer my own assumptions and interpretation about the dynastic and political motivations behind Charles I and Łokietek's decisions.

The Angevin-Piast Marriage in the Source Material

No matter how a historian approaches a certain event in the past and what are his or her own concepts and presumptions about motivations and interests that provoked the event to take place, it seems particularly useful in this case to explore meanings that contemporary sources ascribed to the Angevin-Piast marriage.

There are basically two sources of information about it: the Hungarian tradition preserved in various chronicles and the Polish tradition represented by notes made in annals and chronicles. There is also a brief account in the Bohemian chronicle, the so-called Chronicle of Pulkava.

Starting with the Hungarian accounts, two observations can be made.

First, all of them are very similar in structure and – even more importantly – they ultimately convey the same message: that in 1320 King Charles I took Elisabeth, a daughter of King Władysław of Poland (or of the Poles), as his wife and that within a year she bore a son, Charles, who died in 1321.[1010]

Second, all these accounts do not indicate any direct explanation or justification for this particular dynastic contract. If to examine the note about Charles I's previous marriage,

---

[1010] *Anno Domini M-o CCC-o XX-o accepit rex Karolus filiam Ladizlai regis Polonorum, Elyzabeth nomine, de qua anno Domini M-o CCC-o XXI-o habuit rex filium nomine Karolum, qui puer mortuus est eodem anno, quo natus est et in Alba sepultus:* Chronici Hungarici Compositio Saeculi XIV, Imre Szentpétery, ed., *Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum Tempore Ducum Regumque Stirpis Arpadinae Gestarum*, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1937), 490.. *Anno Domini M-o CCCXX. accepit rex filiam Ladizlai Polonorum, Elizabeth nomine, de qua anno Domini M-o CCCXXI. filium habuit, qui eodem anno mortuus est et Albe sepultus:* Chronicon Posoniense, Imre Szentpétery, ed., *Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum Tempore Ducum Regumque Stirpis Arpadinae Gestarum*, vol. 2 (Budapest, 1938), 50. *Anno M.CCC.XX. accepit rex Karolus Elizabeth filiam regis Polonie, de qua habuit filium Karolum, qui eodem anno mortuus in Alba sepelitur:* Chronicon Monacense, ibid., 2:86. *Nach Cristi gepurt taussent jar, drewhundert jar und in dem czweinczigsten jar do nam der vorgenant kunig Karl des kunges tochter von Polan, die hiesz Elizabeth:* Chronicon Henrici de Mugeln, ibid., 2:217–218.

concluded in 1318 with Beatrix of Luxemburg,[1011] there was no difference in a way both records were structured. There was a dissimilarity in content, for Beatrix died within a year and Elisabeth gave birth to a baby-boy, but in either cases the chronicler did not find relevant to shed light on political or dynastic motivations that generated those marriage contracts. Alternatively, interpretation was left for a reader.

Nevertheless, such dry accounts could be annotated and instances of this practice can be found in one of the Polish chronicles. Interestingly, it appeared right after the report about the marriage of 1320. Namely, in the Cathedral Chronicle of Cracow[1012] there is an account that relates, in the consecutive sentences, about the marriage of Elisabeth and Charles I as well as about another union between Casimir, Elisabeth's brother, and Anna, a daughter of Giedymin, a Lithuanian duke.[1013] It is striking that as the former marriage did not receive any commentary, the latter was explained in length. The chronicler indicated that Łokietek's, that is, the real contractor of the marriage's aim was to free his people, living in Little Poland, from incursions and atrocities inflicted by the neighboring Lithuanians.

One explanation of the chronicler's disparity in approach could be the following. Supposedly, he felt uncomfortable with evident dynastic relations between Christian and pagan ruling families, and therefore, he saw himself compelled to provide a coherent justification for such a contract. Alternatively, this particular dynastic marriage was an outcome of a more tangible political agenda than in the case of its Angevin-Piast equivalent. For in the subsequent sentence the chronicler pointed that the durability of the marriage of Anna and Casimir directly corresponded with the maintenance of peace between the parties.

[1011] See for instance: *Anno Domini M-o CCO-o XVIII-o accepit rex dominam Beatricem filiam regis Romanorum, sororem regia Bohemorum de terra Luchumburgensiba, que in revolutione eiusdem anni obdormivit in Domino et Waradini in cathedrali ecclesia tumulatur*: Chronici Hungarici Compositio Saeculi XIV, Szentpétery, *SRH*, 1937, 1:490.

[1012] Initially published in the vol. 3 of the Monumenta Poloniae Historica as the Annals of Cuiavia (Rocznik kujawski, 204-212) and subsequently re-edited by Wojciech Kętrzyński: cf. Wojciech Kętrzyński, *O rocznikach polskich* (Cracow: Akademia Umiejętności, 1896), 185–190. For more details see: Wojciech Drelicharz, *Annalistyka małopolska XIII-XV wieku: kierunki rozwoju wielkich roczników kompilowanych* (Cracow: PAU, 2003), 207–211.

[1013] *Eodem quoque anno filiam suam nomine Elizabeth die dominica infra octavas apostolorum Petri et Pauli Karolo regi Ungarie matrimonialiter copulavit in uxorem. Volensque populum suum ab insultibus Litwanorum infidelium liberare in Lublinensi* [et] *Sandomiriensi terris degentem, Gedimini ducis Litwanorum filiam nomine Annam, sanctissimo sacri fontis baptismate renovatam, filio suo domino Kazimiro matrimonio copulavit*: Kętrzyński, *O rocznikach polskich*, 186–187.

In his understanding, Anna's death unblocked the mutual enmity.[1014] Thus, from the chronicler's perspective there were immediate positive results from the inter-dynastic marriage, of which he could comment in a note. Without deciding about what his reasons could have been, the lack of any form of justification of the Angevin-Piast marriage contrasts with what immediately follows it in the text of the chronicle.

Apart from the Cathedral Chronicle of Cracow, the information about the royal marriage appeared in a number of annals that the recent scholarship related to the family of the so-called Małopolska Annals that trace their origins to the currently lost archetype: the *Annales Polonorum deperditi*[1015] that were apparently produced between 1306 and 1325.[1016] However dispersed and scattered among various copies and manuscripts, regarding the Angevin-Piast marriage the Polish source tradition, in general, remained equally dry and down-to-earth as its Hungarian counterpart.

The richest in details is the account recorded in the Kuropatnicki's Małopolska Annals.[1017] Right after noting Łokietek's coronation, it points to the Hungarian barons who – after Charles I had expressed his consent – on June 29, 1320, arrived at Nowy Sącz and took Elisabeth, Łokietek's daughter.[1018] Other annals simply mention the fact of the marriage in a stylistic way very similar to the Hungarian accounts.[1019] With one distinctive variation – there is no mention about the offspring that Elisabeth gave birth to in the subsequent years.

The longest account of the Polish medieval historiography that comments on the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320 is a note by Jan Długosz. In his *Annales seu Cronicae incliti*

[1014] *Quo facto eiusdem terre* [gentes*] nemoribus extirpatis, dulcedine pacis fruentes peroptime locate fuerunt, predicta domina eciam mortua, donec omnium seminator malorum inimicicias iterum inter Polonos et Litwanos suscitavit, sicut plene inferius dicetur*: Ibid., 187.

[1015] Cf. the *stemma annalium* in: Drelicharz, *Annalistyka małopolska*, 469. See also the English summary of the book: Ibid., 493–498.

[1016] Drelicharz, *Annalistyka małopolska*, 453.

[1017] I decided to follow the English names of the annals after Drelicharz.

[1018] *Rex Wladislaus coronatur in Cracovia auctoritate domini pape per venerabilem in Christo patrem Ianislaum archiepiscopum Gneznensem. Item in eodem anno in octava Iohannis baptiste, die Iovis, in Sandecz Elizabeth filia Wladislai regis Polonie post Karulum regem Ungarorum per suos barones est reverenter accepta*: Rocznik małopolski (kodeks Kuropatnickiego), *MPH*, 1878, 3:190.

[1019] For instance: R*ex Wladyslaus cognominatus Loctek coronatur in Cracovia auctoritate domini pape per venerabilem in Christo patrem Ianisslaum archiepiscopum Gneznensem. Eodem anno filia ipsius Elizabeth regi Ungarie copulatur Karolo*: Traska's Annals, *MPH*, 1872, 2:854. Or: *Dux Wladislaus dictus Lokethk coronatur in Cracovia auctoritate domini pape in regnum Polonie per Yanislaum archiepiscopum Gnezdnensem. Eodem anno Elizabeth filia regis Wladislai regi Ungarie copulatur*: Sędziwój's Annals, ibid., 2:880. Or: *Rex Wladislaus dictus Loktek coronam in Cracovia auctoritate domini pape per venerabilem in Christo patrem Ianislaum archiepiscopum Gneznensem accepit. Eodem anno filia eius Elizabeth regi Ungarie Carolo copulatur*: Piotr of Szamotuly's Heilsberg Codex, *MPH*, 1878, 3:191.

Regni Poloniae, composed altogether between 1455 and 1480,[1020] among the notes of the year 1320 he dedicated a section about Charles I and his interest in marrying Elisabeth.[1021] If to take away all his borrowings from the above-mentioned both Hungarian and Polish sources,[1022] what is basically left – apart from Długosz's literary charm and plot-improving additions – is his attempt to make sense of why this marriage was concluded. Since this is the earliest known account that sincerely grappled with this issue, it is especially worth closer examination.

Długosz began with asserting that Charles I had been successful in his internal wars against powerful barons and that he had managed to curb their usurpations of royal power and authority. As he said, some of them died, some were executed, others killed on a battlefield or thrown into prisons; all in all, Charles I could eventually see his kingdom peaceful and watch himself reaffirmed on its throne.[1023] However, as Długosz continued,[1024] the king could not be fully satisfied, for he suffered from childlessness despite his two marriages to noble and respectful ladies. He did not father an heir neither from the first one (due to her barrenness) nor from the other one (because of her miscarriage). Therefore, Długosz noted, Charles I – willing to shake off the disgrace of barrenness and the shame of childlessness (*sterilitatis opprobrium et orbitatis sue dedecus volens excutere*) – set out to arrange a marriage contract with Łokietek and requested Elisabeth to be his wife. Hence, he sent his envoys and, after Łokietek's consultations with his barons, they were granted the royal

---

[1020] Teresa Michałowska, *Literatura polskiego średniowiecza: leksykon* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2011), 451.

[1021] Zofia Kozłowska-Budkowa, Danuta Turkowska, and Krystyna Pieradzka, eds., *Ioannis Dlugossi Annales Seu Cronicae Incliti Regni Poloniae*, vol. IX (Varsaviae: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1978), 113–114.

[1022] See: Semkowicz, *Krytyczny rozbiór*, 341.

[1023] This Długosz's assertion seems to follow "sensum de senso" one of the codices of the Chronici Hungarici Compositio Saeculi XIV. that for the year 1320 noted: *Rex igitur Karolus in regno Vngarie potestate accepta plenarie et bene roboratus, mortuis primis duabus uxoribus suis, videlicet Maria filia Kasmerii ducis Polonie et domina Beatrice filia regis Romanorum ac sorore regis Bohemorum*: Szentpétery, *SRH*, 1937, 1:490.

[1024] [Charles I – wk] *orbitatis tamen sue reminiscencia secretis cruciabatur suspiriis. Nam etsi duas illustres matronas, videlicet Mariam Kazimiri <ducis Bithomiensis et> <Theschiiensis> filiam et ea obeunte Beatricem Henrici de Luczemburg comitis Romanorum regis filiam et Iohannis Bohemie regis sororem sibi matrimonialiter iunxisset, fructu tamen filiorum in spem Hungarie Regni generandorum ex unius sterilitate, ex alterius vero in partu periclitacione orbatus est. Huius tamen sterilitatis opprobrium et orbitatis sue dedecus volens excutere, ad Wladislaum Polonie regem procis notabilibus missis, filiam eius virginem Elizabeth forma et moribus prestantem et decoram sibi in consortem dari exposcit. Cuius preces de prelatorum et baronum Polonie consilio Wladislaus Polonie rex dum ad graciam exaudicionis admisisset, firmantur literis et promissis sponsalia et virgo predicta Elizabeth a baronibus et proceribus Polonie cum sufficienti dote et regali apparatu Budam deducta, Karolo Hungarie regi die Dominico in octava sanctorum Petri et Pauli copulatur, quam celebratis ex more nupciis procurat coronari in Alba Regali in Hungarie reginam*: Kozłowska-Budkowa, Turkowska, and Pieradzka, *Annales*, IX:113.

approval. On July 6, 1320 the marriage was concluded and Elisabeth was crowned Queen of Hungary. As the story unfolds, by the grace of God she was so much fertile that she gave birth to five sons and this – beside a number of pious deeds and personal humility – won her respect and love of all her subjects.

It has been already observed by the scholarship that Długosz was often inclined to supplement the lack of source material with logic and thinking that was characteristic to his own age.[1025] According to Stanisław Kutrzeba (1876-1946), a Polish historian of law, who was quoted by Roman Sobotka, the work of Długosz was completely useless for the period before 1386, because it was already based on known source material and merely augmented with his assumptions and individual projections and suppositions.[1026] Taking this critical stance in its full extension, one could easily refute the making-sense attempt of the marriage carried out by the chronicler. Since the extant source material, as it has been showed above, has given no direct clue about the rationale behind the Angevin-Piast marriage, it is highly probable that Długosz either utilized an unknown to modern scholarship source (perhaps an oral historical tradition about those events) or he simply made it up by following the reasoning that was most appealing to his senses.

The content of the Hungarian chronicles that practically emphasized Elisabeth's fertility by enumerating the line of sons, to whom she had given birth,[1027] can serve as some evidence that the issue of arrival of royal sons and heirs did indeed matter. And thus, Długosz's observations can be taken into consideration. The point here is that since the sources closest to the events do not shed light on the motivations behind the marriage, it is a historian who is left with a problem to provide a coherent explanation and it could be argued that Długosz's stance – still reflecting mentality and political culture much closer to the realities of the early fourteenth century than the sensibilities and logics of a contemporarily educated historian – may offer meaningful insight and shall not be omitted with a wave of a hand. The political culture of the thirteenth century, as revealed for instance in the previous chapters, firmly suggests that Długosz's calculations concerned about the welfare of a single family (that of Charles I) could (and in various Polish cases happened to be) a strong motivator for political

---

[1025] Cf.: Roman Sobotka, *Powoływanie władcy w Rocznikach Jana Długosza* (Warsaw: Liber, 2005), 13, 194. See also: Michałowska, *Literatura polskiego średniowiecza*, 451–452.

[1026] Sobotka, *Powoływanie władcy*, 27.

[1027] See: Szentpétery, *SRH*, 1937, 1:490–492.

actions. The longing for male legitimate heirs (for Charles I had already had Coloman, an illegitimate son from a mistress)[1028] could have been a meaningful reason for entering another lawful marriage. This matter will receive more attention as this chapter unfolds.

A little more data about the Angevin-Piast marriage can be drawn from extant charters. Since between Elisabeth and Charles I there was a close degree of kinship,[1029] it was necessary for Charles to request a formal dispensation from the pope. Two of such papal letters have been preserved (from July 2, 1320[1030] and August 2, 1320)[1031]. Interestingly, none of them mentions explicitly Elisabeth's name; instead they talk about a Christian woman the king was willing to marry and who was related to him in the fourth degree of kinship. Nevertheless, from the context it seems rather clear that both papal letters were concerned with the freshly established Angevin-Piast union. Moreover, according to Kristó other extant charters confirm that between July 8 and 20 Charles I was indeed in Buda (this reasserts the date of July 6 as the date of marriage as provided by Długosz) and that on July 20 Bishop Steven of Veszprem appeared for the first time as the chancellor of the new queen.[1032]

In sum, there is an abundance of evidence that in the summer of 1320 Elisabeth, a daughter of King Łokietek of Poland, and King Charles I of Hungary got married. The sources also indicate that this event took place in relatively short time after Łokietek's coronation and the death of Beatrix, Charles I's wife. Moreover, they emphasize that this union generated a number of royal sons and prospective heirs to the throne of the kingdom of Hungary. At the same time the earliest sources, that is, those which were produced within the decades following the marriage, were concise in form and style, and hence, they did not provide any explanation for why this marriage was concluded in the first place, and who was its instigator. It is only Długosz who in the late fifteenth century interpreted these events by pointing to Charles I as the man suffering from the disgrace of childlessness who strove to amend his situation and chose Łokietek's daughter as his next wife. Judging from Długosz's account, what brought the Angevins and Piasts together was not long-distance political calculations and

---

[1028] Gyula Kristó, "Károly Róbert családja," *Aetas* 20, no. 4 (2005): 16.
[1029] Both Elisabeth and Charles I had King Béla IV of Hungary as their common ancestor. Elisabeth was his great-granddaughter and Charles I was his great-great-grandson.
[1030] *Anjou-kori oklevéltár: Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia*, vol. 5 (Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1998), n. 827.
[1031] Ibid., vol. 5, n. 872.
[1032] Kristó, "Károly Róbert családja," 22–23.

strategic thinking but a crucial family pressure felt by Charles I. On the other hand, it would be too much to confine Długosz's perspective to solely dynastic perspective because his remark about Łokietek holding consultations prior to giving his consent reveals the political aspect of this enterprise. Therefore, it was rather sure for Długosz that this union had entailed major "international" implications, yet – and again it is worth emphasizing – he was totally satisfied with his dynastic elaboration about the origins of the union.

At the end of this section, a few remarks about the Bohemian sources need to be made. The *Chronicon Aulae Regiae*, started by Otto of Thuringia yet continued and enlarged by Peter of Zittau, the abbot of the Cistercian monastery in Zbraslav from 1316,[1033] mentioned Łokietek's coronation of 1320,[1034] yet the subsequent Angevin-Piast marriage was ignored. This complete lack of interest contrasted with a longer and richer in details account about Charles I's earlier marriage with Beatrix of Luxemburg, King John of Bohemia's sister, concluded in 1318 (I talk more about it below).[1035] Given that Peter of Zittau was an eyewitness of this event, it could explain his colorful report. However, completely omitting Charles I's marriage with Elisabeth Piast would imply its minor importance for John's affairs (in the chronicler's eyes). And yet, Pribík Pulkava from Radenín (d. 1380), an author (or perhaps co-author with Emperor Charles IV) of his chronicle, written around 1374,[1036] drew up an account that in one paragraph mentioned both marriages of Charles I.[1037] This remark, by the way with confused chronology (it puts Charles I's marriage with Elisabeth before Łokietek's coronation), did not elucidate why those marriages had been arranged. Yet by linking them it restored the significance of the Angevin-Piast dynastic bond in the Bohemian perspective. Further reading of the chronicle provides some implicit arguments about consequences that that union entailed. Namely, for Pulkava Łokietek's coronation, granted by John XXII, was the outcome of Charles I and Robert of Naples's (in general the Angevin)

[1033] Grabski, *Dzieje*, 103.

[1034] *Chronicon Aulae Regiae*, František Palacký, *Fontes Rerum Bohemicarum*, vol. 4 (Prague: Nákl. N. F. Palackého, 1884), 256.

[1035] *Chronicon Aulae Regiae*, ibid., 4:249.

[1036] Grabski, *Dzieje*, 105. See also: Deborah Mauskopf Deliyannis, ed., *Historiography in the Middle Ages* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003), 208.

[1037] *Hic Johannes, rex Boemie, duas sorores habuit, (filias 6) septimi Henrici imperatoris, quarum una Karolum, regem Ungarie, maritum habuit, que in partu prime prolis sue una cum fetu occubuit. Post cuius obitum idem Karolus, Ungarie rex, filiam Wladislai, Siradie et Cracovie et Sandomirie ducis, qui Gneznam Surdamque Poloniam habuit, duxit uxorem*: František Palacký, *Fontes Rerum Bohemicarum*, vol. 5 (Prague: Nákl. N. F. Palackého, 1893), 202.

support.[1038] In Pulkava's eyes it could make sense that first Łokietek had given Elisabeth to Charles I and in turn the latter contacted his fatherly uncle, King Robert of Naples, in order to promote Łokietek's case at the papal court in Avignon. This would show that Łokietek's strategy to seize royal crown was to win the Angevin assistance through marrying his daughter to Charles I. However, this is a mere speculation because Pulkava did not make a plain connection between those two events and – more importantly – he was wrong about the chronology (this issue is elaborated more towards the end of this chapter).[1039]

The Context and Origins of the Angevin-Piast Alliance in Scholarly Literature

The marriage of Charles I and Elisabeth is a well-known fact in national historiographies. Due to its later repercussions that led to the Angevin succession to the throne of Poland, the moment of its conclusion attracted scholarly attention. As a result, a number of historians commented and interpreted the motivations that induced Łokietek and Charles I to strike an agreement and make an alliance that – as events unfolded – proved to establish a steadfast bond between the two royal families. The aim of this subsection is to get some orientation how national historiographies grappled with this marriage and its context. I decided to utilize selected but major historical works of the five "most interested" nations.

German perspective

I will start with a brief observation made in two places by Jörg Konrad Hoensch.[1040] Although he did not dedicate more than a pair of sentences to the Angevin-Piast marriage, he used the Habsburg-Wittelsbach competition for the Roman throne as the interpretative framework (which will soon turn out to be a standard approach to viewing it).

As for this "international" rivalry, the conflict erupted in October 1314 when Duke Frederick Habsburg of Austria was elected and crowned king of the Romans by Archbishop Henry of Cologne, an act virtually parallel to election and coronation of Louis Wittelsbach of

---

[1038] *Qui eciam Wladislaus postea, videlicet anno Dom. M°CCCXX° ex dicti Karoli Ungarie et Roberti Sicilie regum promocione per XXI^um papam Johannem in dictis terris suis Polonie rex effectus est et eius mandato eciam coronatus et unctus in regem*: Ibid.

[1039] The letter from Pope John XXII giving assent to Łokietek's coronation (with reservations) was issued on August 20, 1319 (see: Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1878, vol. 2, n. 1013.). At that time, Beatrix of Luxemburg, Charles I's wife, was pregnant and alive (she died before November 11, 1319): cf. Kristó, "Károly Róbert családja," 15.

[1040] Jörg K. Hoensch, *Geschichte Böhmens: von der slavischen Landnahme bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*, 2., aktualisierte u. ergänzte Auflage (München: C.H. Beck, 1992), 117; Jörg K. Hoensch, *Die Luxemburger: eine spätmittelalterliche Dynastie gesamteuropäischer Bedeutung 1308-1437* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2000), 62.

Bavaria by Archbishop Baldwin of Trier.[1041] Over time, this competition engaged the increasing number of lords and thus created a division into two parties; one supporting Frederick, and the other promoting Louis's case.[1042] Later – according to Szczur – it developed into a pan-European conflict.[1043] John of Luxemburg sided with Louis and on June 19, 1317 concluded an alliance with him that prescribed mutual help.[1044] It is widely accepted in scholarship that between 1314 and 1322 the Luxemburgs and Wittelsbachs closely cooperated against their common foe, the Habsburgs, who threatened Louis in the kingdom of the Romans and raised their claims to the kingdom of Bohemia against John.[1045] Michael Menzel plainly asserted that John's primary motivation was to secure his lordship in Bohemia and therefore, he so unconditionally supported the Wittelsbachs and was in turn favored by Louis.[1046]

Meanwhile, the Habsburg party allegedly drew closer to the papacy and the Angevins of Naples. On June 23, 1316 Frederick Habsburg married his sister Catharine to Charles, a son of King Robert of Naples. This brought the houses of Neapolitan Angevins and Habsburgs together.[1047] Moreover, in October 1317 a military cooperation between Charles I of Hungary and Frederick Habsburg occurred against Máté Csák, a powerful lord in the north-western parts of the kingdom of Hungary.[1048]

Coming back to Hoensch's arguments, he asserted that initially Charles I had been rather inclined to the Habsburg party and, therefore, it was John of Luxemburg's political

[1041] Henry S. Lucas, "The Low Countries and the Disputed Imperial Election of 1314," *Speculum* 21, no. 1 (January 1946): 97, 108. See also: Karl Friedrich Krieger, *Die Habsburger im Mittelalter: von Rudolf I. bis Friedrich III.* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1994), 114–117. See also a useful account: Ernst Schubert, "Die Deutschen Königswahlen zur Zeit Johanns des Blinden," in *Johann der Blinde, Graf von Luxemburg, König von Böhmen, 1296-1346: Tagungsband der 9es Journées Lotharingiennes, 22-26 Oktober 1996, Centre Universitaire de Luxembourg*, ed. Michel Pauly (Luxembourg: Section historique de l'institut grand-ducalde Luxembourg, 1997), 140–146.
[1042] Cf.: Lucas, "The Low Countries," 97–106. See also: Thomas, *Deutsche Geschichte*, 1983, 153–159.
[1043] Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 345.
[1044] Josef Emler, ed., *Regesta Diplomatica Nec Non Epistolaria Bohemiae et Moraviae*, vol. 3 (Pragae: Haase, 1890), n. 379. See also: Bronisław Włodarski, *Polityka Jana Luksemburczyka wobec Polski za czasów Władysława Łokietka* (Lwów: nakł. Towarzystwa Naukowego, 1933), 20. For larger context see: Pánek and Tůma, *A History of the Czech Lands*, 2009, 122–123.
[1045] Michael Menzel, "König Johann von Böhmen und die Wittelsbacher," in *Johann der Blinde, Graf von Luxemburg, König von Böhmen, 1296-1346: Tagungsband der 9es Journées Lotharingiennes, 22-26 Oktober 1996, Centre Universitaire de Luxembourg*, ed. Michel Pauly (Luxembourg: Section historique de l'institut grand-ducalde Luxembourg, 1997), 308–315.
[1046] Ibid., 311.
[1047] Samantha Kelly, *The New Solomon: Robert of Naples (1309-1343) and Fourteenth-Century Kingship* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 203–204. See also: Władysław Abraham, *Stanowisko kuryi papieskiej wobec koronacji Łokietka* (Lwów: s.n., 1900), 25.
[1048] Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 133.

success to arrange Beatrix, his sister, to marry the king of Hungary (November 18, 1318).[1049]
In this context, her death during the childbirth (ca. November 11, 1319)[1050] was a politically
unfortunate event because it made Charles I drift away from the Wittelsbach's party back to
the Habsburgs' camp by marrying Elisabeth, a daughter of Łokietek, who himself had been
strongly tied with Pope John XXII, who – in turn – ultimately made up his mind and openly
opposed the Wittelsbachs.[1051]

Broader examination of the Angevin-Piast marriage context was developed by Karl
Bosl.[1052] First of all, he acknowledged the rivalry between the Habsburgs and Luxemburgs over
the rights to the Bohemian throne. In his opinion, this was their essential bone of
contention.[1053] Thus, marrying Beatrix to Charles I was a strategy that aimed at encircling the
Habsburgs domains by building an allied block of the Wittelsbachs, Luxemburgs and Angevins.
Alternatively, Bosl pointed also to Máté Csák as the common foe of John and Charles, whose
significant power could encourage his neighbors to cooperate.[1054] Successful in building this
coalition, John of Luxemburg was unable to foresee the unexpected death of his sister which
– Bosl argued – changed the "power field" in which John grounded his political plans, for
Beatrix functioned as the pledge of cooperation between the Angevins and Luxemburgs. Once
she was gone, behind John's back the Central European lordships united into an at least
defensive camp. As symptoms of those transformations Bosl took Łokietek's royal coronation
and the Angevin-Piast marriage.[1055] Moreover, he observed that the death of Máté Csák in the
following year (March 18, 1321)[1056] released Charles I from internal constraints and granted
him more time for "international" commitment. For Bosl, therefore, it was quite clear that the
Angevin-Piast marriage was an act of containment against the Luxemburg expansionist politics
in Central Europe.

[1049] Benda, *Magyarország történeti kronológiája*, 1:195. The date was recently disputed by Kristó, see footnote: 1257.

[1050] Ibid., 1:196. See also: Kristó, "Károly Róbert családja," 15.

[1051] Cf. Peter Herde, "The Empire. From Adolf of Nassau to Lewis of Bavaria, 1292-1347," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1300-c.1415*, ed. Michael Jones, vol. 6 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 538–539. For a short overview of papal individual plans for administering the lordships of Italy that brought him into conflict with Louis of Bavaria see: Krieger, *Die Habsburger*, 1994, 123–124.

[1052] Karl Bosl, ed., *Handbuch der Geschichte der Böhmischen Länder*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1967).

[1053] Ibid., 1:363.

[1054] Ibid., 1:366.

[1055] Ibid., 1:367.

[1056] Enikő Csukovits, *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I.*, 84.

Franz Meltzer's view somewhat differed from Bosl's.[1057] He began with showing Charles I's marriage with Beatrix as an element of John of Luxemburg's foreign policy that aimed at overwhelming Máté Csák, and at securing himself from the steadfast threat from the Habsburgs. However, by making his alliance with Charles I, John – first and foremost – wanted to isolate Władysław Łokietek. It was necessary in order to allow John to win the Polish throne as he claimed his rights to it after the Přemyslids. In Meltzer's perspective, Łokietek's position between the kingdom of Bohemia, the Teutonic Order and the kingdom of Hungary was tremendously unfavorable.[1058] The death of Beatrix changed everything and put an end to John's very promising politics of expansion in the East. For both Bosl and Meltzer Beatrix was the only element that kept the Luxemburgs and Angevins together. After her departure, Charles I drastically changed his foreign politics and drew closer to Łokietek. With Máté Csák's death, as Meltzer picturesquely described, the John-Charles friendship also "died".[1059] It is worth mentioning that Meltzer work, published in 1940, disclosed then current political agenda and particularly praised John of Luxemburg for laying grounds for the germanization of Silesia and considered him as the early "carrier" of the German Ostpolitik.[1060] Within this socio-political framework, Meltzer's insistence on the Polish direction as the leading thread of John's foreign policy may be better contextualized and understood.

Nevertheless, in his recent study on John's marriage politics, performed for the sake of the state affairs, Dieter Veldtrup followed Meltzer's assumptions.[1061] First, he observed that John, having fairly pacified noble opposition in the kingdom of Bohemia, set out to continue the foreign politics of his ancestors by wife, the Přemyslids, and began his efforts to reconstruct a Central European Reich under the leadership of Bohemia. Since meanwhile Łokietek was in the process of re-establishing the kingdom of Poland, in 1318 John approached Charles I proposing him to marry off one of his sisters. This proposal – as Veldtrup repeated

---

[1057] Franz Meltzer, "Die Ostraumpolitik König Johanns von Böhmen, ein Beitrag zur Ostraumfrage im 14. Jahrhundert." (G. Fischer, 1940).

[1058] Ibid., 19–20.

[1059] Ibid., 22–23.

[1060] Ferdinand Seibt, "Johann der Blinde in der Historiographie des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts," in *Johann der Blinde, Graf von Luxemburg, König von Böhmen, 1296-1346: Tagungsband der 9es Journées Lotharingiennes, 22-26 Oktober 1996, Centre Universitaire de Luxembourg*, ed. Michel Pauly (Luxembourg: Section historique de l'institut grand-ducalde Luxembourg, 1997), 14.

[1061] Dieter Veldtrup, "Ehen aus Staatsräson. Die Familien- und Heiratspolitik Johanns von Böhmen," in *Johann der Blinde, Graf von Luxemburg, König von Böhmen, 1296-1346: Tagungsband der 9es Journées Lotharingiennes, 22-26 Oktober 1996, Centre Universitaire de Luxembourg*, ed. Michel Pauly (Luxembourg: Section historique de l'institut grand-ducalde Luxembourg, 1997), 483–543.

after Meltzer – was aimed at isolating Łokietek. This cunning political maneuver failed because Beatrix prematurely died and Charles I took Elisabeth as his next wife. By doing this, he threatened John with an anti-Bohemian coalition and thus, compelled him to seek even closer relations with Louis Wittelsbach.[1062]

Czech perspective

Strikingly enough, recent Czech historiography tends to overlook the meaning and significance of the Angevin-Piast marriage. Jiří Spěváček, a scholar considered as an important specialist in the life of John of Luxemburg,[1063] while interpreting the marriage of Charles I and Beatrix, he did not confront it with Charles I's next union with Elisabeth. In his opinion, proposing Beatrix to Charles I was an attempt to find external support for John's internal tensions with the Bohemian nobility as well as to weaken close ties between the Habsburgs and the Angevins. He also acknowledged the childlessness of Charles I as a possible reason for his readiness to re-marry. The entire plan did not work out due to Beatrix's untimely death.[1064] In consequence, Charles I soon returned to Frederick's camp and it was a success of the Habsburg diplomacy.[1065] Although Spěváček was well aware of sustained tensions between John and Łokietek due to their rivalry over the title of the king of Poland,[1066] he neither perceived the Angevin-Luxemburg marriage as concluded against Łokietek, nor – by not mentioning it at all – he apparently did not consider the Angevin-Piast union as a major threat to John's lordship.[1067]

In a quite recent *History of Czech Lands to 1526*, Miloslav Polivka, while discussing the European dimension of Czech politics, [1068] omitted both marriages in his narrative. This omission, fully understandable from the sake of text brevity, implies that both dynastic unions

[1062] Ibid., 508–509.
[1063] Michel Pauly, ed., *Johann der Blinde, Graf von Luxemburg, König von Böhmen, 1296-1346: Tagungsband der 9es Journées Lotharingiennes,22-26 Oktober 1996, Centre Universitaire de Luxembourg* (Luxembourg: Section historique de l'institut grand-ducalde Luxembourg, 1997), 167.
[1064] Jiří Spěváček, *Jan Lucemburský a jeho doba, 1296-1346: k prvnímu vstupu českých zemí do svazku se Západní Evropou* (Praha: Svoboda, 1994), 266–267.
[1065] Ibid., 318.
[1066] Ibid., 168.
[1067] On another place, while summarizing John's political and historical role, Spěváček focused entirely on the king's relations with the lords from outside Central Europe. The matters related to Charles I or Łokietek were completely omitted: Jiří Spěváček, "Neue Gesichtspunkte Zur Beurteilung Der Politik Sowie Der Historischen Rolle Königs Johann von Böhmen," in *King John of Luxembourg (1296-1346) and the Art of His Era: Proceedings of the International Conference, Prague, September 16-20, 1996*, ed. Klára Benešovská (Prague: Ústav dějin umění AV ČR, 1998), 11–18.
[1068] Pánek and Tůma, *A History of the Czech Lands*, 2009, 123–124.

did not play – in author's opinion – a major role. Also Jaroslav Čechura did not include them into the body of his text.[1069] By doing so, he disclosed similar perception of those events as minor in significance and implications. Jaroslav Mezník briefly mentioned the Angevin-Luxemburg union of 1318. He observed that from 1315 the Bohemian-Hungarian border was already quiet, because the power of Máté Csák was in decline and John maintained good relations with Charles I that were ultimately confirmed by the marriage. The author argued that those relations somewhat deteriorated in 1323 (due to an Angevin-Habsburg agreement) but still until 1331 there was no sign of mutual fights between the Bohemian and Hungarian troops.[1070] Once more, Charles I's marriage with Elisabeth was overlooked.

Lenka Bobková briefly commented on the Angevin-Luxemburg marriage. She asserted that it was an element of John's deliberate marriage policy that was supposed to serve the king's interests. Since John was still considering raising his claims to the Polish throne and because there was a succession contract between the Angevins and Piasts,[1071] the Luxemburgs could not ignore this fact. Besides, John needed to strengthen his position against the Habsburgs. Unfortunately, Bobková noted only that Charles I was widowed and thus available for a new marriage, but she failed to provide any explanation for why the king of Hungary decided to use this particular marital opportunity.[1072] She has also overlooked the Angevin-Piast marriage itself, however, for Charles I's intermediary role in the 1330s in the struggles between Casimir the Great of Poland and John she explained that the king of Hungary was married to Casimir's sister as well as he was tied to the Polish royal family with succession pacts.[1073]

On another place,[1074] Bobková commented that John of Luxemburg built alliances with his neighbors by means of dynastic marriages (towards the Angevins, the Habsburgs, the lords of Carinthia, and the Wittelsbachs).[1075] However, also here she did not mention the Angevin-Piast marriage. Furthermore, she dedicated very little space to John's "Polish politics". Instead, she pointed that from 1320 – after having established *modus vivendi* with the Bohemian

---

[1069] Jaroslav Čechura, *Lucemburkové na Českém Trůně*, vol. 1 (Praha: Libri, 1999).
[1070] Jaroslav Mezník, *Lucemburská Morava: 1310-1423* (Praha: Lidové noviny, 1999), 30–31.
[1071] This statement is certainly wrong if related to the year 1318 when Beatrix married Charles I.
[1072] *Velké Dějiny Zemí Koruny České 1310-1402*, vol. 4a (Praha ; Litomyšl: Paseka, 2003), 75–76.
[1073] Ibid., 4a:157, 162.
[1074] Lenka Bobková, "Český Král a Hrabě Lucemburský Jan," in *Lucemburkové: Česká Koruna uprostřed Evropy*, ed. František Šmahel and Lenka Bobková (Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2012), 54–70.
[1075] Ibid., 64.

nobles – John shifted his attention to matters of his inherited lordship in the county of Luxemburg.[1076] Judging from Bobková's account, in the big picture the kingdom of Poland, its throne, and Łokietek as the current incumbent of this throne, remained marginal and irrelevant.

Slovak perspective

Before moving to the examination of Hungarian and Polish scholarly literature in search for arguments and interpretations of the Angevin-Piast marriage and its occurrence right after the Angevin-Luxemburg union, it seems worthwhile to make a concise overview of the Slovak perspective.

The main focus of Slovak historiography does not rest on the deeds of Charles I or John of Luxemburg. Quite the opposite, it is Máté Csák in the center – the lord of north-western lands of Hungary (which is modern Slovakia) – who has been sometimes discussed as a genuine candidate for a national hero.[1077] Stanislav J. Kirschbaum noted:

Was Matthew Cak a Slovak potentate, a national hero as older Slovak historiography describes him? Many historians consider him to have been merely a Magyar oligarch. Marxist historiography suggests that "it is just a coincidence that his domains were in Slovakia and that this enabled him to become a personality who played an important role in the life of Slovakia and the Slovaks." On the other hand, it is quite likely that most of his troops were composed of Slovaks and that many of his officials were Slovak; he also had the support of important Slovak groups such as the Diviacky and Ludanicky families. Given the nature of his rule – feudal and centralized – and the area over which it extended – most of Slovakia – his reign could not have been without some direct impact on the life of the Slovaks. Kucera and Kosticky suggest that his reign resulted in "the strengthening of Slovakia in the consciousness of the people as a territorial-political entity in its own right which contemporaries called Terra Mathei – Land of Matthew.[1078]

[1076] Ibid.

[1077] By the way, this "nationalization" of Máté Csák characteristic to an older nation-bound historiography, has been refuted by the Hungarian literature that maintained that both Máté Csák and Amade Aba – the so-called "Slovak" oligarchs – were the descendants of the ancient Hungarian families who in the end of the thirteenth century just happened to receive lands in modern Slovakia: cf. Géza Herczegh, *Magyarország külpolitikája, 896-1919* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1987), 48. See also: Iván Bertényi and Gábor Gyapay, *Magyarország rövid története* (Budapest: Maecenas, 1992), 104.

[1078] Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, *A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival* (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 46.

Matúš Kučera expressed an opinion that in the turn of the fourteenth century Slovakia was a nearly independent country and Máté Csák was a powerful figure who not only managed to maintain lordship until his death but – having had a little bit more luck at the battle of Rozgony in 1312 – he could have influenced the course of history towards ends more favorable to the Slovaks.[1079] Kučera did not comment on any of dynastic marriages that were concluded when Máté Csák was an "uncrowned king of Slovakia"[1080] but still he recognized Máté's attempts to conduct autonomous foreign policy[1081] that was aimed against John of Luxemburg and Charles I, that is, against the lords strongly committed to subduing Máté's lordship. Kučera described the latter as an old feudal type, who had been forged by the times he was living in and who could rise to unrestricted oligarchical power due to anarchy that emerged in the kingdom of Hungary in the beginning of the fourteenth century.[1082]

In this grand narratives about medieval Slovakia, the problems of dynastic marriages between the Angevins, Luxemburgs and Piasts did not occur as significant elements. However, Slovak scholarly literature projects Máté Csák as an essential player in Central European politics of that time, hostile to two young rulers struggling for securing the crowns and titles for themselves, and thus, it recalibrates the "international" context by highlighting the influence and impact of non-royal and non-princely actors in the region.

In the 1990s, however, Blanka Brezováková[1083] and Jaroslav Perniš[1084] published a few studies that grappled with the early period of Charles I's reign in the kingdom of Hungary. Brezováková's article about Charles I's struggles with the Hungarian barons, unfortunately, although the period it discussed chronologically fitted into the field of the Angevin dynastic marriages, completely omitted those issues. Hence, it became impossible to identify the author's interpretation of those unions.

[1079] Matúš Kučera, *Cesta Dejinami: Stredoveké Slovensko* (Bratislava: Perfekt, 2002), 136.

[1080] Matúš. Kučera, *Slovenské Dejiny* (Bratislava: Literárne informačné centrum, 2008), 239.

[1081] For instance, he planned to marry his daughter to the duke of Austria, see: Gyula Kristó, "Die Macht der Territorialherren in Ungarn am Anfang des 14. Jahrhunderds," in *Etudes Historiques Hongroises 1985*, vol. 1 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1985), 607.

[1082] Kučera, *Slovenské Dejiny*, 242. In a very similar manner Blanka Brezováková characterized Máté Csák*: It is necessary to perceive and assess the personality of Matthew Csak in the context of the period, and to evaluate his activity in the territory of present-day Slovakia in the same spirit. It is very improbable that he endeavored for anything more than the creation of his domain, or aspired to its definitive separation from the Kingdom of Hungary*: Elena Mannová, ed., *A Concise History of Slovakia* (Bratislava: Historický ústav SAV, 2000), 64.

[1083] See: Blanka Brezováková, "Politický Zápas"; Blanka Brezováková, "Konsolidačné Snahy Karola I. v Uhorsku Po Zvolení Za Kráľa (1310-1317)," *Historický Časopis* 41, no. 4 (1993): 361–78.

[1084] Jaroslav Perniš, "Karol Róbert z Anjou a jeho manželky," *Historický Časopis* 45, no. 2 (1997): 177–93.

Unlike Brezováková, Perniš briefly interpreted the political motivations behind the Angevin-Luxemburg and Angevin-Piast unions. Furthermore, he was one among the few who attempted to view those marriages from both sides and to search for benefits both parties could hope for. And so, John of Luxemburg sought to foster friendly relations with a neighboring ruler and deepen mutual cooperation. Charles I was primarily interested in securing a legitimate heir to his lordship.[1085] Elisabeth's marriage to Charles I was essential for Łokietek who, having been just crowned King of Poland, needed to reassert and reconfirm his "international" standing, particularly threatened by John of Luxemburg. On the other hand, untimely widowed Charles I still did not have a male heir and thus it was only a matter of short time that he would re-start a search for next wife. This coincidence brought the Angevin-Piast marriage project to fruition.[1086]

In the early 2000s Perniš published a book that discussed princesses in the dynastic politics of the Angevins.[1087] There he returned to the political interests that – in his opinion – had governed the actions of Charles I, John, and Łokietek. Regarding the Angevin-Luxemburg union, Perniš generally repeated his points put forward earlier in the article (John: fostering friendship and cooperation; Charles I: awaiting a legitimate heir) but he augmented it with a quotation from Spěváček that indicated the anti-Habsburg element in John's calculations.[1088] In reference to the Angevin-Piast marriage, Perniš expanded a little bit his original interpretation. He openly used Długosz to justify Charles I's decisions and considered the lack of a legitimate heir as an essential reason for re-marrying. However, he also pointed to dynastic issues: through her mother, Elisabeth also had Árpádian blood flowing in her veins and Łokietek's turn to the Angevins fitted well into the tradition of continued co-operation between the Árpáds and Piasts in the thirteenth century. Other than that, Perniš repeated his claims that from the Polish perspective it was an anti-Luxemburg marriage that was meant to secure Łokietek's hold of the Polish crown against John's pretensions.[1089]

[1085] Ibid., 187.
[1086] Ibid., 188–189.
[1087] Jaroslav Perniš, *Vznešená Žena stredoveku: princezné v dynastickej politike Anjouovcov* (Budmerice: Rak, 2003).
[1088] Ibid., 49–51.
[1089] Ibid., 55–58.

Hungarian perspective

From Hungarian scholarly literature that touched upon the context and matter of the Angevin-Piast marriage, a few representative instances need to be examined here. The most appropriate starting point will be works of Pal Engel and Gyula Kristó, that is, two prominent scholars who dedicated some of their research interest to the tumultuous early stage of the Angevin rule in the kingdom of Hungary. However, there are two works of older Hungarian scholarship that shall be mentioned first.

In 1903, Antal Pór published a study that analyzed the Hungarian-Polish relations in the fourteenth century.[1090] According to his observations, Łokietek had maintained cordial relations with Hungary and its king since 1304 and 1305, when he received powerful help to reconquer his lordship. This friendship extended for next decade; to justify his claim Pór pointed to an alliance that in 1315 Łokietek had made with King Erik of Denmark. The treaty asserted that Łokietek would make, among others, Charles I of Hungary join the coalition, which must have been a clear sign of close relations between Poland and Hungary.[1091] Furthermore, Pór followed Pribík Pulkava of Radenín, the Bohemian chronicler of the second half of the fourteenth century, and fully accepted his information that Charles I and King Robert of Naples were active in winning the crown for Łokietek. It seemed obvious to him that the Poles, having been striving for long to get Łokietek crowned against manipulations and machinations carried out by the Teutonic Order and John of Luxemburg, would seek Charles I's intercession to convince Robert of Naples, Charles I's fatherly uncle, to support the Polish case at the papal court. The fact that John XXII was Robert's former teacher and guardian was essential there. Hence, the Angevin-Piast marriage was a natural outcome of the already existing strong bonds between both houses and this – luckily to Łokietek – could only happen due to Betarix's premature death.[1092]

In 1936, Bálint Hóman, considered as one of the greatest Hungarian medievalists,[1093] published a short article that sought to discuss the historical foundations of the Hungarian-

---

[1090] Antal Pór, "Magyar-lengyel érintkezés a XIV-ik században," *Századok* 37 (1903): 201–18, 308–26.

[1091] Cf. Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 176.

[1092] Pór, "Magyar-Lengyel," 312–315.

[1093] Daniel Bagi, "Średniowieczna historia Polski w myśleniu historycznym Węgier i stosunki polsko-węgierskie w średniowieczu w historiografii węgierskiej XIX–XX w. Przeszłość i przyszłość," in *Widziane z zewnątrz*, ed. Michał Baczkowski (Warsaw: DiG, 2011), 125.

Polish friendship.[1094] He was convinced about the close resemblance of the historical paths that Hungary and Poland had followed in the early centuries of building own state and society. Moreover, to Hóman both Charles I and Łokietek were the figures that recreated the unity of their states by overcoming divisions and suppressing centrifugal forces which had been tearing Hungary and Poland for quite a time. From this perspective, which pictured both countries as partakers in the same historical fate, the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320 could be perceived as a necessary, and perhaps obvious, element of a bigger whole. Hóman argued that during the Angevin period the sustained goal of the Hungarian foreign policy was to upkeep the Croat-Hungarian-Neapolitan-Polish coalition, of which the firmest core was the Hungarian-Polish alliance.[1095] Besides, Łokietek and Charles I's mutual agreements corresponded well with centuries of cooperation that actually forged good relations and made both sides inclined toward each other.

Modern Hungarian historiography came up with further interpretations of the Angevin-Piast marriage. However, it did not drop the intuitions inherited from earlier works. In the probably best known English edition of the medieval history of Hungary (published in 2001),[1096] Engel summarized the relations between Charles I and his neighbors in the first decades of the fourteenth century. In his account, Engel observed that Charles I's relations with the Habsburgs had been friendly and stable until the late 20s of the fourteenth century; however, the most reliable allies the king of Hungary found in the Luxemburgs and the Piasts. Engel believed that Charles I had regularly supported Łokietek from 1306 onwards, sending him auxiliary troops in the times of need, and in 1320 this political alliance – "one of the strongest pillars of the Angevin foreign policy" – was only reasserted by the dynastic marriage. The capstone of this friendship was Casimir the Great's decision, in 1339, that in the case of dying without a legitimate heir, the throne of the kingdom of Poland should be transferred to the Hungarian Angevins. Also, Charles I's relations with John of Luxemburg were, in Engel's opinion, cordial yet less enthusiastic than with the Piasts. They were correlated with the status of the Angevin-Habsburg relations and once the latter deteriorated, the former flourished. In consequence, following Engel, Charles I's greatest success on the international stage – attained throughout the 1330s – was to intermediate between Casimir and John in their

---

[1094] Reprinted: Bálint Hóman, *Magyar középkor* (Budapest: M. Tört. Társ., 1938), 511–518.
[1095] Ibid., 515–516.
[1096] Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001.

315

dispute over the Polish throne which ultimately resolved a prolonged and exhausting conflict.[1097]

In his earlier seminal study that was concerned with the re-unification of the kingdom of Hungary carried out by Charles I between 1310 and 1323,[1098] Engel had some more space to elaborate on his view about the Angevin-Piast marriage. However, this occasion for broader elucidation of the context and significance of Charles I's last two dynastic marriages was not fully explored. For Engel, Beatrix was simply chosen as the next wife for Charles I after his previous spouse had passed away. Engel did not attempt to provide any rationale for this choice and he did not discuss possible motivations that had driven both John and Charles I to arrange this union. Engel rather reported than commented on this event.[1099] Regarding the next marriage, Engel was convinced about Charles I's favorable attitude towards Łokietek (who had been equally fiercely fighting for his lordship as Charles I) that in 1320 was transformed into an alliance that subsequently forged the northern foreign policy of Hungary. Engel merely noticed that by the Angevin-Piast marriage Charles I's current relations with his neighbors had somewhat changed.[1100] From this perspective it could be argued that the origins of the union were located in the steadfast mutual cordiality between two lords and seemed to naturally stem from their personal friendship.

Kristó has been a prolific author of scholarly works of various sizes and some of them explored the politics and actions of Charles I. Among them, he occasionally pondered about the king's marriages and – more broadly – about his family. In one of his last papers, since he has been a powerful proponent of the idea that Charles I had been married four times (and not three as it was previously widely acknowledged), he thoroughly discussed the existing source material concerning Charles's successive wives.[1101] Unfortunately, in this study he showed much more a genealogist face than revealed his interests in political history. As a result, "international" aspects of those marriages as well as their consequences and plausible calculations that motivated them be concluded were neglected and omitted. Kristó's only suggestion why the Angevin-Luxemburg and Angevin-Piast marital unions were arranged

---

[1097] Ibid., 136–137.
[1098] Pál Engel, "Az ország újraegyesítése. I. Károly kűzdelmei az oligarchák ellen (1310-1323)," *Századok* 122, no. 1–2 (1988): 89–146.
[1099] Ibid., 125–126.
[1100] Ibid., 131–132.
[1101] Kristó, "Károly Róbert családja."

came between the lines and pointed to the lack of legitimate heirs and Charles I's simultaneous gradual advance in age. Due to his childlessness he had no other option but to hurry from one marriage to another in order to procure legitimate male offspring.[1102]

In other Kristó's works this matter of securing an appropriate heir to the Hungarian throne also seemed to propel Charles I's marital endeavors.[1103] Thus, he did not draw additional implications from them. In another account, Kristó asserted that the first signs of establishing closer ties between Charles I and John of Luxemburg were traceable only towards the end of 1323, after John had reconciled with the Habsburgs, with whom the king of Hungary had been faithfully cooperating for roughly a decade.[1104] This claim implicitly indicated that the marriage contract of 1318 with Beatrix did not play a configurative role in "international" politics. On the other hand, Charles I's intervention on Łokietek's behalf in 1327 and in 1330 against John of Luxemburg's invasion was to Kristó a result of dynastic ties between the Angevins and Piasts as well as an act of pre-defense against the threat of the Luxemburgs domination in the region.[1105] Unfortunately, Kristó did not explain why he considered the dynastic marriage of 1318 as different in consequences than another dynastic marriage of 1320. Kristó's perception of Charles I's consecutive marital contracts as "internationally" marginal can be additionally drawn from his studies about Charles I's over-a-decade-long wars with the so-called oligarchs, resisting his royal authority. Although those fights required "international" support and at various points they really engaged both the Habsburgs and Luxemburgs on Charles I's side, Kristó did not find it relevant enough to examine neither of the dynastic marriages.[1106]

In his comprehensive study about the foreign politics of Hungary, Géza Herczegh briefly described the mechanisms that governed the "international" politics in Central Europe in the beginning of the fourteenth century. He pointed to new houses that had taken over power in the region (the Angevins, Habsburgs, and Luxemburgs) and understood their mutual relations as a complex system of support and rivalry that was fueled by envy and greed, and

---

[1102] Ibid., 21.

[1103] Kristó and Makk, *Károly Róbert emlékezete*, 1988, 26. See also: Gyula Kristó, *Az Anjou-kor háborúi* (Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1988), 52–53, 57.

[1104] Pál Engel, Gyula Kristó, and András Kubinyi, *Magyarország története, 1301-1526* (Budapest: Osiris, 2002), 61.

[1105] Ibid., 62.

[1106] Cf. Kristó, "Die Macht," 1985 and Gyula Kristó, "I. Károly király harcai a tartományurak ellen (1310-1323)," *Századok* 137, no. 2 (2003): 297–347.

aimed at not allowing another party to gain the upper hand. Thus, Herczegh saw the dynasties practicing a peculiar-to-modern-senses strategy of building alliances, for in a given year they used to ally two against one, but a year later they could easily swap their allegiances and reconfigure the coalitions. Dynastic marriages served as such alliance-builders, and thus, Charles I once backed John of Luxemburg and some other time he supported Łokietek against the same John, because his current wife was from another dynasty. Besides, Herczegh observed that the Hungarian help for Łokietek against the Luxemburgs was also motivated by the threat of regional domination that John would secure should he vanquished the king of Poland.[1107]

For Ivan Bertényi, the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320 marked the moment when a stable and close alliance was established as opposed to shaky and changeable coalitions with the Habsburgs and Luxemburgs that had been made meanwhile. This friendship was maintained despite the fact that it had occasionally deteriorated Charles I's relations with John of Luxemburg.[1108] On other place, Bertényi more broadly commented on Charles I's last two marriages. While discussing his nuptials with Beatrix of Luxemburg, Bertényi noted that it was a clear move against the Habsburgs and explained this change of allies by pointing to the Kőszeg family, which belonged to the group of powerful barons (oligarchs) who had been resisting Charles I's lordly domination in the kingdom of Hungary, that received support from the Habsburgs.[1109] Since Beatrix died in 1319, Charles I married again in 1320 and this time "the choice fell" on Elisabeth Piast. Bertényi emphasized that Elisabeth was of the Árpádian origin through her mother and then he observed that this marriage swapped Charles I's allegiances from the alliance with John of Luxemburg to the friendship with Władysław Łokietek. Also this move made possible reestablishing cordial relations with the Habsburgs.[1110] In Bertényi's most recent work on the discussed period, it was nothing said about inter-dynastic marriages and their significance for the "international" politics in the region.[1111]

In 2007, László Szende submitted his doctoral dissertation about Elisabeth Piast and her court.[1112] In his study, he dedicated some space to analyzing the origins of the Angevin-

---

[1107] Herczegh, *Magyarország*, 49–50.
[1108] Bertényi and Gyapay, *Magyarország rövid története*, 1992, 111.
[1109] Iván Bertényi, *Magyarország az Anjouk korában* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1987), 57.
[1110] Ibid., 58.
[1111] Bertényi Iván and Szende László, *Anjou-királyaink és Zsigmond kora* (Budapest: Officina, 2011).
[1112] László Szende, "Piast Erzsébet és udvara (1320-1380)" (ELTE BTK, 2007).

Luxemburg and Angevin-Piast marriages. First, he asserted that dynastic unions were chiefly arranged for political and not emotional reasons.[1113] Having accepted Kristó's arguments about Charles I's four (not three) marriages, Szende found himself confused with the first two of them – the alleged one with a Ruthenian princess of Halich and another one with Maria (1290/92-1317),[1114] a daughter of Casimir of Bytom (d. 1312),[1115] a relatively weak lord in Opole-Silesia. Politically speaking, they seemed to be questionable in terms of profits and looked to Szende like mésalliance.[1116] The marriage with Beatrix, however, served – in his opinion – to strengthen the Bohemian-Hungarian relations. They had been already established due to the challenge posed by Máté Csák and there was hope for further cooperation. Elucidating John of Luxemburg's perspective, Szende followed Veldtrup (see above) and assumed that the king of Bohemia planned to utilize it against the Poles.[1117] Returning to Charles I's motivations, Szende adopted Kristó's stance and pointed to childlessness as a particular problem for a ruler who aspired to build an Angevin power in the kingdom of Hungary. Since Charles I's previous marriages did not deliver a legitimate heir to the throne, Szende thus accepted Kristó's suggestion that Charles I became anxious about the future of his house and hence, he hastily decided to take another wife.[1118]

According to Szende, the Angevin-Piast marriage was particularly important for Poland. Following Hoensch, he proposed that John of Luxemburg – willing to seize the Polish crown – chose to marginalize Łokietek in the region and thus in 1318 he arranged Beatrix's marriage with Charles I. It was, therefore, an extraordinary change in foreign politics, when in 1320 the king of Hungary decided to marry Elizabeth. It definitely ruined John's plans and transformed the power relations in Central Europe favorably to Łokietek.[1119] He repeated his opinion nearly word to word on another place.[1120] In his most recent study on Elisabeth,[1121] Szende did not pay much attention to the "international" context of the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320; yet

---

[1113] Ibid., 54.
[1114] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 736.
[1115] Ibid., 725–726.
[1116] Szende, "Piast Erzsébet és udvara (1320-1380)," 55.
[1117] Ibid., 55–56.
[1118] Ibid., 56.
[1119] Ibid., 58.
[1120] László Szende, "Le Rôle d'Elisabeth Piast Dans la Diplomatie de Hongrie," in *La Diplomatie des États Angevins aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles*, ed. Zoltán Kordé and István Petrovics (Szeged: Roma: JATEPress ; Accad. d'Ungheria in Roma, 2010), 225–226.
[1121] László Szende, "Piast Erzsébet a hitves, az édesanya, a mecénás," in *Károly Róbert és Székesfehérvár*, ed. Iván Bertényi (Székesfehérvár: Székesfehérvári Egyházmegyei Múzeum, 2011), 78–100.

he just asserted that since no children were born to Charles I from previous marriages, the king could justifiably hope that Elisabeth would finally provide him with a long awaited heir.[1122]

In her recent book on the rule of Charles I in Hungary Enikő Csukovits expressed her opinions about both dynastic marriages.[1123] Her analysis was strongly Charles I-centered and did not set out to broadly investigate the context and possible motivations of all involved parties. In her view, Charles I married Beatrix and subsequently Elisabeth because he was in great need of a legitimate heir. Csukovits's stance was therefore similar to Kristó and Szende's, and it explicitly followed chronicler Peter of Zittau who reported that widowed and childless Charles I asked John of Luxemburg to marry one of his sisters.[1124] When Beatrix died prematurely, the king of Hungary consequently requested his next wife from Łokietek and it turned out that it was Elisabeth who became the mother of the Hungarian Angevins.[1125] Besides, Csukovits asserted that dynastic marriages were in Central Europe the most successful tools (unlike military conflicts, for instance) for expansionist politics.[1126]

Polish perspective

The survey of opinions held by Polish scholarship about the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320 and Charles I and Łokietek's motivations that led to its conclusion needs to begin with works of Jan Dąbrowski who for last over hundred years has been considered as the main reference point in the field of the early fourteenth-century Hungarian-Polish relations.

In 1914, Dąbrowski published a study on Elisabeth, Łokietek's daughter.[1127] On this occasion he offered some opinions about why her marriage to Charles I was actually concluded. In his view, it was common interests that brought Charles I and Łokietek together. Dąbrowski noted that both rulers attained their thrones through the conflict with Bohemia and thanks to the papal support. Moreover, the Angevin-Piast alliance was chiefly built to assure common politics against the Luxemburgs. Dąbrowski accepted Pulkava's account

---

[1122] Ibid., 79.
[1123] Csukovits, *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I.*, 2012.
[1124] Ibid., 126–129. For the chronicler's account see*: Eodem anno Karulus, filius Karuli, regis Sicilie, factus rex Vngarie, prima sua absque liberis viduatus uxore Thomam ac Symonem comites Vngarie cum Stephano interprete et cum decencia familie misit ad Johannem, regem Boemie, petens, ut unam de suis sororibus velit pro coniuge sibi dare*: Chronicon Aulae Regiae, Palacký, *FRB*, 1884, 4:249.
[1125] Csukovits, *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I.*, 2012, 128.
[1126] Ibid., 126.
[1127] Here I refer to its recent re-edtion: Dąbrowski, *Elżbieta Łokietkówna 1305-1380*.

(asserting the Angevin intercession at the papal curia in Łokietek's coronation plans) and explained that for Łokietek it was an essential matter to safeguard himself from John of Luxemburg's expansionist politics towards the kingdom of Poland. Probable cooperation between the Teutonic Order and John, both conflicted with Łokietek, could entail disastrous consequences for the latter, and thus:

the marriage of Elisabeth and Charles I aimed to be a warning for John of Bohemia to mitigate his pro-Teutonic Order politics. Otherwise, if he pulled the string too far,[1128] *Hungary would intervene diplomatically or even militarily on the Polish side.*[1129]

Dąbrowski also observed that through his wife, Łokietek was related to the Árpáds and that there had already been a tradition of good Hungarian-Polish relations that could foster prospective marital contracts be fulfilled.[1130]

In 1916, Dąbrowski published another study that in more detail discussed the Hungarian-Polish relations in the early fourteenth century.[1131] This time he could follow up interpretations he had made in the previous study and elaborate on the context that caused the Angevin-Piast marriage to be concluded.

First and foremost, Dąbrowski was convinced that Łokietek sought Charles I's friendship as means of protecting himself from the aspirations of John of Luxemburg. As many other historians, he linked the Angevin-Piast relations to broader "international" constellations that in Central Europe were configured by the Habsburg-Wittelsbach antagonism over the Roman throne. Charles I sided with the Habsburgs against the Wittelsbachs and Luxemburgs, and it was natural for Łokietek to draw closer to the former. Nevertheless, the blurred signs of possible cooperation flashed briefly in 1315, when Łokietek entered an alliance with the king of Denmark and promised to bring Charles I to the coalition, but afterwards the king of Hungary drifted towards John. It was because the Habsburgs did not fulfill their obligations that had been stated in the Angevin-Habsburg treaty of 1314; instead, they managed to induce Máté Csák – Charles I's greatest enemy – to invade Moravia.

[1128] That is, he would pursue his politics beyond the limits of tolerance.

[1129] *Małżeństwo Elżbiety z Karolem Robertem miało być przestrogą dla Jana Czeskiego, by hamował się w swej krzyżackiej polityce, gdyż Węgry dyplomatycznie, a nawet orężnie znajdą się u boku Polski, gdyby zbyt przeciągnął strunę*: Reprint: Dąbrowski, *Elżbieta Łokietkówna 1305-1380*, 12.

[1130] Cf. Ibid., 11–12.

[1131] Dąbrowski, "Z czasów Łokietka. Studia nad stosunkami polsko-węgierskimi w XIV w. Część I."

This shift of alliances almost automatically pushed Hungary towards Bohemia. Dąbrowski argued that Łokietek could count on establishing political alliance with Charles I only as long as the latter was remaining in the Habsburg camp. However, in 1316 and 1317 apparently there was no bright future for such transformation of the "international" stage because Łokietek housed the sons of Amade Aba, exiled from the kingdom of Hungary, and Charles I married Beatrix; an act which coincided with John's revitalization of his claims to the Polish crown.

Soon another shift in political coalitions followed. Dąbrowski argued that the Habsburgs were finally successful in building a broad support for their case, including Robert of Naples, the pope, and – subsequently – Charles I; getting the latter was even easier to achieve after Beatrix's death that loosened the Angevin-Luxemburg ties. In Dąbrowski's view, the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320 was directly tied to the papal politics that strove to draw Łokietek to the Habsburg's camp. He supported his claim by referring to Pulkava's account that suggested the links between Łokietek's coronation and the Angevin lobbying in the papal curia. In consequence, in Central Europe a new system of alliances emerged.[1132]

Also in 1916, Antoni Kłodziński published the results of his research about the relations between the Habsburgs and Łokietek in the fourteenth century.[1133] This work did not discuss the Angevin-Piast alliance in detail but expressed Kłodziński's understanding of the developments of the "international" stage in Central Europe. His views were strongly analogical to Dąbrowski's and focused on Łokietek and Charles I's community of interests (fighting the Přemyslids in order to secure their respective thrones and their close ties to the papacy) that had been traditionally presumed and subsequently reinforced by the marriage of 1320. The cooperation started already in 1304 and aimed at provoking an insurgence in the Polish lands that would sabotage the Přemyslids actions in the kingdom of Hungary.[1134] Towards 1320, Kłodziński interpreted the changing face of the "international" politics within a standard framework of two competing blocks: the Habsburgs vs. the Wittelsbachs. He therefore stated that the former were interested in having Łokietek on their side which was

---

[1132] Ibid., 315–317.
[1133] Adam Kłodziński, "Łokietek a Habsburgowie (1300-1332)," *RAU. Wydział Hist.-Filoz.* 59 (1916): 255–77.
[1134] Ibid., 259.

easy to achieve, for the papacy and Charles I already supported them, and – last but not least – John of Luxemburg, Łokietek's arch-enemy, was with the Wittelsbachs.[1135]

In 1926, a two-volume history of medieval Poland was issued by three prominent scholars: Jan Dąbrowski, Roman Grodecki and Stanisław Zachorowski.[1136] The latter was the author of the parts that discussed Władysław Łokietek's period. Analogically to historians of his age, Zachorowski was thinking about international politics in terms of state coalitions and alliances. In his view, until 1320 Łokietek was politically isolated and his relations with Charles I were rather tense. Zachorowski rejected an idea that there had been cordial ties between the two rulers since 1304, for – in his opinion – it was Amade Aba who originally supported Łokietek. Distrust between the latter and Charles I continued and was not overcome by the anti-Brandenburg treaty of 1315, into which Łokietek hoped to drag Charles. Łokietek's action was inspired by the emergence of the Habsburg-Wittelsbach competition that left Charles I and John of Luxemburg in two camps. However, two years later Łokietek's relations with Charles deteriorated even further due to the Angevin-Luxemburg marriage. Hence, the last resort for surrounded Łokietek was to seek assistance from the papacy.[1137] John XXII deigned to grant Łokietek the Polish crown in order to stop him from joining the Wittelsbachs.[1138] The subsequent events were designed to maximize the power of the Habsburg party. Since in 1319 Beatrix died, the Habsburgs re-approached Charles I and the papal diplomacy intervened to bring kingdoms of Hungary and Poland to friendship. The Angevin-Piast marriage was the capstone of the entire diplomatic project and significantly increased Łokietek's position on the "international" stage.[1139]

Edmund Długopolski attempted to produce the first biography of Władysław Łokietek.[1140] Although his work depicted more than a history of a single duke but tried to provide a panoramic picture of Łokietek's times, the duke remained the central figure of the narrative. Długopolski argued that in the first decades of the fourteenth century the relations between Charles I and Łokietek were fairly good due to their common foe: the Přemyslids. He interpreted the treaty of 1315 as an evidence for positive relations. Furthermore, it was Peter

---

[1135] Ibid., 267.
[1136] Grodecki, Zachorowski, and Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej.*
[1137] Ibid., 1:394–395.
[1138] Ibid., 1:396–397.
[1139] Ibid., 1:399.
[1140] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek.*

of Aspelt, the archbishop of Mainz and the architect of the Luxemburgs' foreign policy, who maneuvered Charles I into the marriage with Beatrix of Luxemburg, and this act temporarily damaged the Hungarian-Polish relations. However, soon after the papal letter had been issued (supposedly in February 1319) in Łokietek's defense that urged Charles I to curb intrusions carried out by his subjects into Łokietek's lands,[1141] an immediate improvement occurred. As a result, the Angevin-Piast marriage was concluded. Długopolski followed Dąbrowski and asserted that motivations behind this dynastic union were: on Charles I's side to draw Łokietek closer to the Habsburgs camp; on Łokietek's side to keep Charles I away from the Luxemburgs.[1142]

Jan Baszkiewicz authored another study about Łokietek and his times.[1143] In his research, published in 1968, he briefly commented on the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320. He was not innovative in his approach to this event. He observed that Łokietek needed allies for his prospective war with the Teutonic Order and it was a tradition to seek them in the kingdom of Hungary. Charles I's tightening ties with John of Luxemburg was only a transient phenomenon and caused little troubles. Soon the king of Hungary married Elisabeth and the alliance was firmly set.[1144]

In the early 1980s Zbigniew Kaczmarczyk contributed to a multivolume history of Polish diplomacy.[1145] In his part that covered Łokietek's period, he made a few remarks about the Hungarian-Polish relations in the early fourteenth century. First, he identified the Teutonic Order, margraves of Brandenburg, and John of Luxemburg as the enemies of Poland.[1146] The kingdom of Hungary appeared in this selection as a prospective ally. However, in 1318 and 1319 Charles I drew closer to the Luxemburgs (which caused some skirmishes and conflicts on the border) but then Łokietek asked John XXII for intervention, and the papal letter made Charles I reconsider his politics and brought him to restore friendly relations with Poland.

[1141] Cf.: Abraham, *Stanowisko kuryi papieskiej*, 32. See also: Irena Sułkowska-Kurasiowa and Stanisław Kuraś, *Bullarium Poloniae*, vol. 1 (Romae: Ecole française de Rome, 1982), n. 1095; *AOkl.*, 1998, vol. 5, n. 393.

[1142] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 192–193, 221–222.

[1143] Baszkiewicz, *Polska czasów Łokietka*.

[1144] Ibid., 143.

[1145] Gerard Labuda and Marian Biskup, eds., *Historia dyplomacji polskiej. Połowa X w. - 1572*, vol. 1 (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1982).

[1146] Ibid., 1:225.

Next, the papal support and Łokietek's coronation galvanized closer relations with the kingdom of Hungary that ultimately materialized in the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320.[1147]

In 1986, another Polish scholar, Jerzy Wyrozumski published the second edition of his biography of Casimir the Great, Łokietek's son.[1148] In this book he shortly commented on the Angevin-Piast marriage. However, he omitted the general political context of this marriage and focused on the splendor of the Angevin court, arguing that it was the greatest political dream for Łokietek to win such a powerful and wealthy ally as Charles I. Besides, Wyrozumski asserted that the Hungarian-Polish relations used to be friendly and he assumed that Łokietek viewed Charles I favorably. His conclusion was, therefore, that this marriage strengthened Łokietek on an *ad hoc* basis and opened up perspectives for sustained and profitable cooperation.[1149]

In 1996, Kazimierz Jasiński analyzed Łokietek's marital politics.[1150] In the beginning of his study, he called Łokietek be the first Polish ruler to carry out "marital politics" on a large scale. He also observed that dynastic marriages were essentially political in character. Furthermore, Jasiński's fundamental premise about marital politics stated that it was obvious that a medieval ruler was involved in arranging his marriage or in concluding those of his children and siblings.[1151] About the Angevin-Piast marriage, he noted:

The marriage of Elisabeth and Charles I belongs to the group of the most important marriages of the Piasts. It had begun and was subsequently strengthening the long-lasting Hungarian-Polish alliance that functioned as the fundamental asset of foreign policy pursued by the last two Piast kings. Even if to consider an egoistic attitude of the Hungarian ally every now and then, it has to be underlined that this alliance prevented Poland from being isolated on the current international arena. During the times of Łokietek and Casimir the Great, the alliance entailed the strengthening of Poland's position in its conflict with the Teutonic Order and the Luxemburgs of Bohemia.[1152]

[1147] Ibid., 1:234–235.
[1148] Jerzy Wyrozumski, *Kazimierz Wielki* (Wrocław [etc.]: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1986).
[1149] Ibid., 18.
[1150] Jasiński, "Polityka małżeńska."
[1151] Ibid., 9–10.
[1152] *Małżeństwo Elżbiety z Karolem Robertem należy do najważniejszych mariaży piastowskich. Małżeństwo to zapoczątkowało a następnie umacniało długotrwały sojusz polsko-węgierski, stanowiący podstawowy atut w polityce zagranicznej ostatnich dwóch Piastów królewskich. Nawet uwzględniając egoistyczne niekiedy stanowisko węgierskiego sprzymierzeńca, należy zaznaczyć, że sojusz ten zapobiegł izolacji politycznej ówczesnej*

Janusz Kurtyka summarized the state of the art about the fourteenth-century kingdom of Poland.[1153] In this survey-book on the recent scholarly developments, he succinctly presented international factors that influenced functioning of the newly re-united kingdom. He firmly stated that the fundament of the Polish "international" relations between 1320 and 1370 was the alliance with Hungary. He pointed to traditional political cooperation that Łokietek had carried out with various rulers and powerful magnates since 1290-91. In 1320 this practical alliance was only confirmed by the Angevin-Piast marriage. Kurtyka was also convinced that this partnership was uneven in power, for the kingdom of Hungary was far more powerful in terms of material resources as well as of the scope of its European networks and contacts.[1154]

According to Stanisław Szczur[1155] Polish scholarship generally agreed that in the beginning of the fourteenth century the foreign policy was particularly important during the process of rebuilding the kingdom of Poland and its re-positioning on the "international" arena. Łokietek's rule was especially focused on finding the proper place for Poland in the permanently vibrating and transforming field of power relations in Central Europe. Łokietek's success was fundamentally linked to the papacy that, while battling the Wittelsbachs, discovered the Polish duke as a useful means of pursuing its own politics in the region. Szczur was critical about Łokietek's capabilities to remain independent from the pope's influence.[1156] He acknowledged, however, Łokietek's dynastic marriage arrangement that laid down the cornerstone of the Polish future foreign politics.[1157]

Marek Barański explained that the alliance with the kingdom of Hungary was initially difficult to attain because Charles I was distrustful towards Łokietek as a former friend of the Hungarian oligarchs. It was therefore Łokietek who sought to regain Charles I's trust but his efforts remained inconclusive. To make matters worse, Charles married Beatrix of Luxemburg but eventually the Hungarian-Polish alliance was concluded. It was possible due to the

---

Polski na arenie międzynarodowej. Oznaczał on wzmocnienie pozycji Polski czasów Łokietka i Kazimierza Wielkiego w konflikcie z zakonem krzyżackim i czeskimi Luksemburgami (translation – wk): Ibid., 13.

[1153] Kurtyka, *Odrodzone Królestwo*.

[1154] Ibid., 42–44.

[1155] Stanisław Szczur, "Król w dyplomacji polskiej (1320-1370)," in *Król w Polsce XIV i XV wieku*, ed. Andrzej Marzec and Maciej Wilamowski (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego "Societas Vistulana," 2006), 239–70.

[1156] Ibid., 239.

[1157] Ibid., 241. Cf. Szczur, *Historia Polski*, 345.

developments in the "international" politics and Beatrix's untimely death. Barański indicated that the Habsburg-Wittelsbach rivalry divided Central Europe into two camps. In one of them there were all Łokietek's enemies: John of Luxemburg, Margrave Waldemar of Brandenburg, and the Teutonic Order. In the other one, there were the Habsburgs and the pope. Such "international" constellation pushed Łokietek decisively into one direction and gained him the papal assistance in his strive for the Polish crown and for Charles I's friendship.[1158] In time, Charles I became the only and priceless ally who shared with Łokietek the community of interests.[1159]

Krzysztof Ożóg pointed to the Luxemburgs as the crucial factor that made Łokietek arrange Elisabeth's marriage with Charles I. From the Angevin perspective, the fact that Elisabeth's grandmother was an Árpádian princess mattered as an additional element to reinforce Charles I's legitimacy to seize the Hungarian crown.[1160] Stanisław Sroka argued that the Angevin-Piast marriage was one of the most important marriages in medieval Poland; the one that significantly augmented Łokietek's position on the "international" stage.[1161]

Summary

At first sight, this fairly long survey of opinions and interpretations concerning the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320 leaves a reader with an impression that the variety of available stances and perspectives is stunning and overwhelming. Furthermore, the quality and amount of extant source material apparently does not reveal enough about Charles I and Łokietek's motivations, if historians have been so creative in providing explanations and justifications.

And yet, this impression of inconclusiveness generated by swarms of answers can be somewhat amended by grouping them according to the issues that they considered as the most relevant. I will start with a few general observations about national historiographies.

German-speaking historians usually presented the political developments in Central Europe as a reflection of the "international" rivalry between the Habsburgs and Wittelsbachs in the German kingdom. They also suggested that in the Angevin-Piast marriage an anti-Luxemburg spike materialized as a response to expansionist and domination-driven foreign

---

[1158] Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce*, 452.
[1159] Ibid., 483.
[1160] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 164.
[1161] Ibid., 215, 227–228.

politics of King John of Bohemia. In contrast, the Czech scholarship tended to marginalize the significance of the Angevin-Piast alliance and generally did not consider it as an anti-John act. The Slovak historiography seemed to be disinterested in commenting the marriage and Perniš's works have been exceptional in grappling with these matters. Besides, his interpretations are close to the opinions expressed by Hungarian and Polish historians. The Hungarian historiography underlined two issues that made the marriage possible: the traditional Hungarian-Polish friendship and share in common interests, and Charles I's desire to secure a legitimate heir to his lordship. Polish scholarship willingly pointed to sustained and good Hungarian-Polish relations, underlined the long-lasting competition between John of Luxemburg and Łokietek over the rights to the Polish throne (and thus suggested clear anti-John rationale behind the marriage), and contextualized all these events within the framework of the "pan-European" rivalry between the Habsburgs and Wittelsbachs.

It is clear that for all national historiographies a dynastic marriage was a two-side political project that had to generate benefits for both contracting parties. However, it remained problematic to identify proper interests that could foster the Angevin-Piast alliance. It was often the case that scholarship concentrated its explanatory efforts only on one of the involved parties and overlooked or superficially commented on the plausible motivations of the other. For instance, Polish scholars would investigate Łokietek's agenda, whereas their Hungarian colleagues tend to view the marriage solely from Charles I's perspective.

Interpreting a dynastic marriage reveals historians' approaches to the mechanisms of medieval "international" politics and to the ways in which they believe those mechanisms functioned.

It is particularly a German and Polish perspective (Bosl, Barański, Dąbrowski, Długopolski, Hoensch, Kaczmarczyk, Kłodziński, Szczur, Zachorowski) to perceive the "international" system in the fourteenth century as an environment populated with blocks of alliances that in their concept and logic are strikingly similar to blocks known from the twentieth century: the Triple Entente vs. the Central Powers (World War I), the Allies vs. the Axis (World War II), and the NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact (Cold War). In this perspective the Habsburg-Wittelsbachs rivalry works as a general framework that not only influenced regional interactions between local actors but it actually provided content and meaning for individual actions. That is, the Angevin-Piast marriage would be – first and foremost – a result of an

"international" game that aimed at reconfiguration of existing alliances and at sustaining balance of power between great antagonistic blocks. Of course, rivalries on the local level (e.g. Łokietek vs. John of Luxemburg over the kingdom of Poland or the Habsburgs vs. the Luxemburgs over the kingdom of Bohemia) were the basic stimulants for individual lords to act, but the belonging to a proper block was the real guarantee of security in divided Europe. This way of thinking presumed solidarity between the members of the block in case of military conflict. On one side there were friends, on the other – enemies.

Similar modernized perception of the mechanisms of international politics is represented by German and Hungarian scholarship (Bosl, Herczegh, Meltzer, Szende, Veldtrup). They quite reasonably point to a common foe as a good motivator for cooperation between international actors. In the case of the Angevin-Piast marriage, it was John of Luxemburg who was pursuing his expansionist and aggressive politics in Central Europe that was recognized as a threat for the kingdoms of Hungary and Poland. In response, Charles I and Łokietek had to apply politics of containment that required formalizing and strengthening their alliance by marriage.

A variation of this approach can be traced chiefly among Polish scholars (Barański, Dąbrowski, Jasiński, Kaczmarczyk, Ożóg, Perniš, Szende, Zachorowski). It emphasizes the rivalry between John of Luxemburg and Łokietek over the kingdom of Poland as the fundamental motivation that drew the king of Poland to Charles I. This stance picks up the weaker and more-threatened international actor and transforms him into an agent of striking an international bargain. In this sense, Łokietek was in danger and he desperately sought help and protection. Thus, it was not a real containment policy but rather a one-way declaration of protection, made by the king of Hungary for isolated Łokietek. The marriage was either a price for Charles I's defensive umbrella or a plain manifestation of the Hungarian involvement. But the Angevins are not a part of this competition and do not feel menaced by John's politics towards the Piasts.

There is a powerful strand among Hungarian and Polish historians (with a single exception of a Slovak historian) that underlines the tradition of good relations and cooperation between the Árpáds (later, the Angevins) and the Piasts (Baszkiewicz, Bertényi, Dąbrowski, Długopolski, Engel, Hóman, Kłodziński, Kurtyka, Perniš, Pór, Wyrozumski). This tradition grew out of the community of interests that fostered mutual friendship and created favorable

conditions for concluding a dynastic marriage. In this case, actors in the international system are motivated in their actions by trust that has been established on a historically evidenced routine. In other words, actors tend to make further deals with those partners which in the past they had already successfully cooperated with.

It is almost exclusively a Hungarian perspective (Csukovits, Engel, Kristó, Perniš, Szende) to view the Angevin-Piast marriage as means for Charles I of attaining a legitimate heir of his lordship. This approach is also in agreement with explanations found in the extant source material and it clearly follows Długosz's presumptions. This understanding of medieval "international" politics recalibrates the focus from big inter-lordly rivalries and antagonisms, and sets it on the logic of dynastic thinking that requires of a lord not only to secure a lordship for his offspring but also – the other way around – to provide heirs for his lordship. Hence, Charles I kept picking up new wives until he could finally rejoice with the birth of his sons.

Another way of viewing the Angevin-Piast marriage concentrates again on the dynastic matters (Bertényi, Dąbrowski, Ożóg, Perniš). This is Charles I's concern about legitimizing his authority in the kingdom of Hungary that brought him to seek Elisabeth's hand. Since she was a granddaughter of an Árpádian princess, she was an attractive candidate for wife. By marrying her and thus linking himself with yet another tie to the natural rulers of his lordship, Charles I could collect additional claim to put hold on the legacy of the Árpáds: the kingdom of Hungary. In this sense, international politics was interestingly combined with the matters of what would be nowadays called "domestic" politics. That is, by taking "international" actions actor could expect to configure his status in front of his lord-subjects. Furthermore, following this logic, an international system is no more inhabited by "strangers" (that is, units similar in nature yet not related to each other) but it assumes the shape of an extended family, in which many actors can claim various types and degrees of mutual kinship and affinity. As long as "strangers" cooperate with one another by making contracts and agreements, cooperation within a family may be galvanized by the common sense of affinity and blood ties. Consequently, Charles I's attempts to enhance the degree of legitimate rule in the kingdom of Hungary – by marrying Elisabeth, an Árpádian descendant – could be thinkable only by utilizing the "logic of kindred" as a meaningful (making-sense) principle in the "international" politics. In other words, due to his marriage Hungarian lords-subjects would perceive Charles I even more as "theirs" rather than an outsider or stranger.

In the older historiography there are two authors (Dąbrowski and Pór) who accepted Pulkava's account and sought to bind the coronation of Łokietek in January 1320 and Elisabeth's marriage with Charles I in July 1320 together. From their proposed interpretation an interesting political exchange could be extracted. Namely, that the Angevin-Piast union was a consequence of the Angevin lobbying at the papal court against the Luxemburg claims for granting Łokietek the royal title. This "crown for daughter" deal represents the concept of medieval "international" politics that underlines essential principles of dynastic politics, that is, the significance of hierarchy and prestige as well as the alluring power of establishing blood ties with other lords and generating high-born legitimate heirs to one's lordship.

It is easy to recognize that in this categorization of scholarly interpretations of the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320 there is hardly one factor that would satisfy historians. This is why many names are recurrent in the listings, for scholars have been inclined, for instance, to follow the logic of Łokietek-Luxemburg rivalry in case of Łokietek, and simultaneously apply the logic of dynastic politics in case of Charles I. Since international system is complex and does not surrender to one leading factor that causes a given action, another way of elucidating the Angevin-Piast marriage utilized by historians has been to provide a collection of possible factors, that would combine international blocks of alliances with regional rivalries and dynastic motivations. On the one hand, such approach seems to exhaust all variants and claims, and hence, to deliver quite powerful set of arguments, but on the other hand it confuses the image of the fourteenth-century "international" system by merging mechanisms and practices known from the contemporary logics of international behavior with other forms of behavior (like dynastic politics), characteristic to lordships functioning in the political culture concerned about hierarchy and prestige.

Searching for the Angevin-Piast Alliance

As it has been already demonstrated the source material does not provide much explanation for the Angevin-Piast marriage, except for brief indication that it was Charles I's growing anxiety about his childlessness that compelled him to send envoys to Łokietek requesting Elisabeth's hand. Nevertheless, over numerous decades international scholarship produced a plethora of interpretations and justifications that aimed at pinning down reasons for this particular dynastic match. Although bringing them all in one place could provide the most comprehensive treat of the Angevin-Piast marriage, it would be still a promising venture

to reconsider Charles I and Łokietek's politics prior to the marriage in order to re-establish its adequate "international" context and to seek out agendas that made it possible to happen.

Nevertheless, before entering a discussion about interests and priorities that governed Charles I and Łokietek's political behaviors, it is a good place to succinctly summarize the essential findings made throughout this entire study that aimed at elucidating mechanisms of medieval "international" politics and helping a historian to assess this politics through adequate theoretical lenses.

A Brief Recapitulation

In general, all three preceding chapters were meant to present a set of documented analyses that would provide a framework for the main inquiry of this study, that is, what can be legitimately said about the origins of the Angevin-Piast marriage, which subsequently transformed into a sustained and consequential dynastic alliance. The structure of this dissertation was designed to address a number of critical issues which – in my opinion – have to be discussed in order to supply a fully-fledged analysis of an international situation. Those issues are: the structure of international system, political culture that dominates in the midst of the system's actors, and current political interests as they are shaped by the interplay between the system and its prevailing culture. My assumption has been that recognizing the influence of the above-mentioned elements on individual decisions and behaviors of international actors fosters a broad and deep approach to an international phenomenon under inspection.

Chapter 2 sought to analyze the structure of the thirteenth-century "international" system by identifying its units and the way that they are positioned towards each other. It was, therefore, an attempt to define who, in the thirteenth century, was the subject of international politics and in what way their mutual relations could be most adequately described. It was concluded that the thirteenth-century "international" system was chiefly made of lordships that could be considered as its basic building blocks. Lordships were generally monarchical units ruled by a lord (or a group of a few) who claimed domination over a given territory.

Conceptually, or culturally speaking, lordships were hierarchically ordered, that is, they differed from each other not only in terms of material power and capabilities. They were also

unequal in terms of elite standing and prestige. This hierarchy distinguished the "international" actors in regard to their dignity. Apart from the special status of the papacy (and, to lesser degree of the empire), the fullness of lordly power was associated with wielding royal title.

Theoretically speaking, lordships – although hierarchically ordered by the political culture – existed and functioned in the "international" system deprived of any single unit that possessed capabilities to effectively police interactions between all actors. In other words, there was no system-wide power that could maintain peace by forcing lordships to behave in a prescribed manner. This state of the system triggered the existence of structural anarchy, that is, the type of conditions that required of the "international" actors to find their own ways to live among each other. The political culture, by promoting certain values, principles and rules of behavior, encouraged cooperation between the actors, devised the field and provided the conceptual arsenal that both governed the flow and content of "international" conflict. In other words, it was the political culture that forged political interests but it was the structural anarchy of the "international" system that created space for distrust, self-regard, competition and conflict.

Chapter 3 followed up the reflections about the structure of the system and its standard units, by asking: what sort of political interests can be identified as predominant within the thirteenth-century "international" system? The analysis and categorization of conflicts among the Piast lord-dukes throughout the thirteenth century, augmented with examples of lordship-building (that is, domination-building) practices in the region, aimed at revealing what was a collective understanding of being a lord. To put it differently, it was the question whether there were any practices and interactions between the lords that could be somehow grouped and labeled for more theoretical inquiry that would go beyond individual characters of particular lords and attempt to pin down more generic features that, in turn, would culturally define a lord. The fundamental assumption behind Chapter 3 was that discovering patterns and regularities in "international" behaviors of many Piast lords would validate making analogous claims about Łokietek's motivations. This set of routinized practices, that is, standard ways of lordly behavior, was dubbed "lordly identity".

Lordly identity was, therefore, a forge of political interests, because it represented a group of features and behavioral mechanisms characteristic for those who strove to claim

domination over land and people. Specifically, lordly identity was something that catalyzed various components of "international" situation (human natural dispositions, conditions of structural anarchy of the "international" system, and hierarchical ordering encouraged by the political culture) in order to render its final product: political interests that, in turn, would motivate behavior of lords.

Chapter 3 identified four features recognizable as core constituents of lordly "international" calculations. First, it was the "lordship-imperative", that is, the conviction that the high social status of lord was inherently tied to holding a lordship. Thus, any lordship-building initiatives were either related to enhancing one's elite standing (by becoming a lord or by expanding the basis for grow in material resources and prestige) or to defending (retaining) it. Second, lords had a significant social function as family leaders. It was, therefore, not enough to secure an elite standing for himself; lord was expected to provide honorable lordships to his legitimate male descendants. The heirs were to receive lordship opportunities and subsequently hand their dominions over to their sons. Those sons would usually look up to their father's lordship (its size, richness in resources, degree of honor attached to its title, and unpursued claims) as the model and natural environment for carrying out their "international" politics. Third, lord was always inclined to be "title-seeker". It was the element focused on upgrading lord's standing among other lords by means of boosting the lord's prominence by acquisition of new titles, most-preferably royal ones. Title-seeking was the outcome of the hierarchical framework imposed by the political culture on the otherwise anarchical "international" system. Fourth, lords, whose behaviors have been investigated in this study, composed a somehow integrated group of social elite throughout the European continent and shared membership in the Christian society. However vague this concept may be, it basically implied that to certain degree lords identified themselves with each other as participants in the same cultural script of Latin Christendom. On practical level it gave rise to their (limited) acquiescence with hierarchies, principles and values upheld by this culture.

Putting it briefly, lordly identity was a practical expression of responses that "international" actors gave to the conditions of systemic anarchy, being inspired by the process of socialization to politics that had taken place in the specific political culture. Strictly speaking, this is how lords perceived their roles within the "international" system and to what

principles they generally succumbed in order to foster cooperation and an acceptable level of predictability on the "international" stage.

Chapter 4 was less theoretical in its concept and content. It rather looked at Charles I's political behaviors during his period of constructing lordship in the kingdom of Hungary in order to demonstrate practical manifestations of regularities and patterns observed and interpreted in Chapter 3. The chapter's fundamental finding was that lordly behavioral features identified in the Polish lands throughout the thirteenth century corresponded with those displayed by Charles I, a young representative of the Angevin dynasty.

Keeping all those findings and theoretical conceptualizations in mind, it is a good moment to apply them to the "international" circumstances that generated the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320. Assuming that international actors engage in specific actions on the international area in order to attain goals which they find, in one way or another, profitable and beneficial, the starting point for the direct analysis of the origins of the marriage should be concerned about prospective gains that it could bring to both parties. It is, therefore, essential to investigate Charles I and Łokietek's current "international" positions. However, instead of assuming things about the early fourteenth-century "international" system and its acting units (as it was the case in number of instances in the reviewed scholarly literature), this inquiry will utilize the concepts developed earlier in this study.

Władysław Łokietek's agenda

Why would Łokietek give his daughter to Charles I for wife? Why would he care to accept his proposal? Once he did so, was this decision stimulated by his political instincts or it was merely a family calculation at play?

While interpreting a dynastic marriage, one of the problems that emerges points to the "international" breadth and scope of such a project. To wit, is this union an act of goodwill and mutual support in the long-distance future or is it a manifestation of a political alliance that has to be clearly directed against a defined enemy? Is it, therefore, necessary for two lords to have a common enemy to establish a marital contract? Or perhaps it is thinkable that such dynastic arrangement is more directed to enhancing prospects of the future development of the contracting families (and helps, for instance, to settle disputes over competing legitimacies), and thus, it can live without pointing to particular enemies or

coalitions? Furthermore, there are good number of examples, when alliances against common foes are established without reaching for marriage projects.[1162]

To the validity of the question, whether a historian – grappling with a dynastic marriage – should always search for an enemy to be defeated by this project, an assertion by Kazimierz Jasiński, an accomplished Polish genealogist of the Piast family, delivers an additional argument:

I will invoke here my previous remark proving that a stroke of luck was necessary in marital politics. The results of marital politics were difficult to foresee. Genealogical accidents (premature death of one of fiancés or spouses, childlessness of the marriage) play immense role here. Even greater role has to be admitted to changes in political constellations that are difficult to anticipate at the moment of concluding the marriage. This is from where unfulfilled hopes about certain marriages as well as unexpectedly fruitful consequences of marriages of marginal (at the moment of their taking place) importance originate.[1163]

If Jasiński was right, and it is difficult to argue against his opinion, than perhaps dynastic marriages should not be automatically viewed as elements of current short-sighted "international" politics, because it is hard to believe that contracting lords were unaware of their susceptibility to resist changes on the "international" arena. From this perspective, a dynastic marriage could be perceived as a more than an asset to utilize right away but a form of prolonged investment that may promise some profitable returns in the forthcoming future. However, without assessing each case individually, it is impossible to draw more general conclusions in these matters. Yet, it is still a gain to think about a dynastic marriage more broadly.

[1162] Two such alliances, close both in time and space with the Angevin-Piast marriage of 1320, can easily serve as examples. First, an alliance between Charles I and Rudolf of Habsburg (24 August 1304: *Anjou-kori oklevéltár: Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia*, vol. 1 (Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1990), n. 643.), in which Charles I made an oath to support Rudolf. The immediate outcome of this alliance was, later that year, an invasion on the lands of the Přemyslids. Second, a coalition established between Łokietek and the Scandinavian rulers (27 June 1315: Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1878, vol. 2, n. 976.) against the March of Brandenburg. Łokietek invaded Brandenburg in the second half of 1316.

[1163] *Przytoczę w tym miejscu moją wcześniejszą wypowiedź, świadczącą o tym, że w polityce małżeńskiej był potrzebny łut szczęścia. Efekty polityki małżeńskiej były trudne do przewidzenia. Odgrywają tu dużą rolę przypadkowe fakty genealogiczne (przedwczesny zgon jednego z narzeczonych lub małżonków; bezdzietność w małżeństwie). Jeszcze większe znaczenie należy przypisać zmianom w układach politycznych, trudnych do przewidzenia w momencie zawierania małżeństwa. Stąd się biorą niespełnione nadzieje związane z pewnymi małżeństwami, jak i niespodziewanie owocne następstwa małżeństw o niewielkim znaczeniu w chwili ich zawierania* (translation- wk): Jasiński, "Polityka małżeńska," 27.

As it has been earlier stated, in 1300 Władysław Łokietek had been exiled by King Wenceslas II of Bohemia who was subsequently recognized and crowned king of Poland. Supposedly with the help of Hungarian mercenary troops,[1164] in the end of 1304 Łokietek returned to Little Poland and gradually retook the land of Sandomierz.[1165] He found support from local nobility and throughout 1305 and 1306 he succeeded in regaining his initial domains in the land of Sieradz, Łęczyca and Cuiavia.[1166] The land of Cracow resisted, however, since Bishop Jan Muskata of Cracow remained loyal to the Přemyslids and thus, he used his mercenaries against Łokietek's supporters. The latter's campaign went perhaps so smoothly to the north, because in June 1305 Wenceslas II died and – formally speaking – the kingdom of Poland lost its king.

Muskata effectively held off Łokietek's attempts to get the throne in Cracow until the beginning of September 1306, when the duke finally overcame resistance. Apparently, Muskata's capitulation was linked with the fact that Wenceslas III's military campaign against Łokietek was called off, after the young king had been assassinated.[1167] Towards the end of 1306 Łokietek controlled Gdańsk-Pomerania and some pieces of north-western Great Poland.[1168] Quite unexpectedly he managed to rebuild from scratch his lordship of the 1290s: although he did not take over Great Poland, still he was accepted as the ruler of Cracow.

It is not necessary here to re-tell a detailed chronology of Łokietek's "international" actions until 1320. It has been extensively done on number of occasions in easily available scholarly literature. More important is to identify key elements that governed the duke's actions and influenced his "international" behaviors.

As an exiled and landless lord he had been nurturing the idea of regaining his lordship and elite status. Source accounts shed some light on his activities between 1302 and 1304 that plainly suggest Łokietek's deep interest in restoring what he had lost.[1169] In that period the

---

[1164] There is evidence from the years 1304 to 1306 that Łokietek rewarded the Hungarian lesser lords with certain land donations, explicitly for their fighting on his side. See: *Dokumenty polskie z archiwów dawnego Królestwa Węgier*, vol. 1 (Cracow: Towarzystwo naukowe "Societas Vistulana," 1998), n. 6–8.

[1165] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 57–59. See also: Andrzej Marzec, *Urzędnicy małopolscy w otoczeniu Władysława Łokietka i Kazimierza Wielkiego (1305-1370)* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego "Societas Vistulana," 2006), 21.

[1166] Marzec, *Urzędnicy małopolscy*, 22.

[1167] Kozłowski, "Developing," 244. See also: Jurek, "Polska droga," 178–179. For the description of the event see: Chronicon Aulae Regiae, Palacký, *FRB*, 1884, 4:109.

[1168] Baszkiewicz, *Polska czasów Łokietka*, 91. Marzec, *Urzędnicy małopolscy*, 26–27.

[1169] Kozłowski, "Developing," 243–244.

lordship-imperative was definitely in gear. Once Łokietek was successful, this imperative required of him to retain his lordship against possible opponents and to expand it towards the regions of competing (disputed) legitimacies.

In the beginning of 1307, Łokietek cherished a brief time of success, for finally the lands he had aspired to return to his lordship recognized his authority. Nevertheless, this happened within six months from the death of Wenceslas III, the legitimate successor to the royal crown in the kingdom of Poland. Since the Přemyslids were gone, a succession crisis erupted in the kingdom of Bohemia that was put in place by the rivalry between Henry of Carinthia and the Habsburgs. As a result, temporarily Łokietek could feel liberated from any claims coming from Bohemia against his authority in the Polish lands. This matter, however, until resolved remained a serious issue for Łokietek's "international" reputation and position, because his claims to the lands of his lordship could be – sooner or later – meaningfully questioned and undermined by the rights put forward by a new king of Bohemia.

Łokietek's principal goal was, therefore, to re-establish firm authority throughout his lands. It was the main task of lord to exercise domination. Fulfilling this task did not come easy. Already in 1307, the family of Święca, a leading noble kindred of Gdańsk-Pomerania[1170] took advantage of the loosened grip of overlordly power and attempted to build their own lordship with the help of the margraves of Brandenburg. They rejected Łokietek's authority, submitted to the margraves and received from them some lands in Pomerania as fief.[1171] Simultaneously, Bishop Muskata of Cracow, who during the Přemyslid rule in Poland had managed to create his episcopal lordship, also confronted Łokietek. Meanwhile, Duke Henry of Głogów, who after the fall of the Přemyslids controlled the majority of Great Poland, laid claims to the royal title by calling himself in charters the "heir of the kingdom of Poland".[1172] Łokietek fought Święca and Muskata, and during 1308 eventually imprisoned the bishop and Peter, Święca's son and current family leader.

Despite these achievements, throughout 1308 Gdańsk-Pomerania was lost to Łokietek. It was a province into which the margraves of Brandenburg and the Teutonic Order had been

---

[1170] Biskup and Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, 252.
[1171] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 112–114. Cf. Marzec, *Urzędnicy małopolscy*, 31. See also: Biskup and Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, 254.
[1172] *Nos Heinricus Dei gracia heres regni Polonie, dux Slezie, dominus Glogovie et Poznanie*: Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1878, vol. 2, n. 914.

recently expanding their domination zones. During the reign of Wenceslas II the margraves were discussing with him – as with the king of Poland – possible exchange bargain: Meissen for Gdańsk-Pomerania.[1173] Meanwhile, during the conflicts with the Pomeranian dukes of Rugia, Wenceslas II summoned the Teutonic Order for assistance, and as a gratification he offered to the Order some villages and territories within the province.[1174] When Łokietek attempted to take over the Přemyslids's lordship in the Polish lands, Gdańsk-Pomerania was already a province of possibly contested legitimacies. Łokietek's claims to authority could be easily questioned. The fact that Peter, Święca's son, was appointed by Wenceslas III as the last royal governor of the province was not helpful, for his actions could assert some legitimacy and provoke other "international" actors to act.

In 1308, the margraves invaded Gdańsk-Pomerania on the basis of Święca's homage. Łokietek was unable to respond militarily, so – not unlike Wenceslas II – he requested the Teutonic Knights to defend the province in his name. The Knights defeated the margraves but reconsidered giving the province back to Łokietek. When in spring 1309 at an assembly the duke proposed to compensate for their military effort, they put forward conditions impossible to fulfill.[1175] At that moment, Łokietek's "international" standing must have been rather weak, because he could not rely on fierce resistance of the Pomeranian nobles against the Order as well as he was not able to summon his own troops to drive it away. Meanwhile, the Order launched a military conquest of the province[1176] and negotiated with the margraves – who had formally come into the possession of Gdańsk-Pomerania by Święca's homage – an agreement that for 10,000 silver marks was supposed to clarify all disputed legitimacies in regard to the province. The contract was officially confirmed and validated by King Henry VII of the Romans in 1311.[1177]

Łokietek's lordship in Little Poland remained contested too. The duke's conflict with Bishop Muskata was in 1310 investigated by Gentilis, the papal legate, and in consequence, Łokietek was obliged – under threat of excommunication – to restore Muskata to his office

---

[1173] Biskup and Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, 253.

[1174] Ibid., 252.

[1175] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 119. Cf. Bieniak, *Wielkopolska, Kujawy, ziemie łęczycka i sieradzka*, 53.

[1176] Marzec, *Urzędnicy małopolscy*, 32–33.

[1177] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 121–122, 124.

and power.[1178] However, it took another eight years to conclude peace between both lords and the bishop resume the administration of the diocese.[1179] Besides, Jurek speculated that Henry of Głogów, who at that time had been ruling in Great Poland, in 1308 and 1309 was plotting a full-scale confrontation with Łokietek.[1180]

Another challenge to the duke's power in Little Poland came from the town of Cracow that in May 1311 revolted and soon the rebellion spread among other minor towns of the province and reached to the land of Sandomierz.[1181] Duke Bolesław of Opole, in the past closely related to Wenceslas II and his former governor of Little Poland,[1182] joined the war on Cracow's side and attempted to seize the Wawel Castle.[1183] This anti-Łokietek action coincided with the political changes in the kingdom of Bohemia. In September 1309 the Habsburgs promised Henry VII of Luxemburg, newly elected king of the Romans, help in acquiring the kingdom of Bohemia for 30,000 marks of Prague's silver; however, for all services they demanded 50,000 marks and they claimed to hold Moravia until they would have been fully paid.[1184] On August 30, 1310 King Henry VII enfeoffed his son, John, with the kingdom of Bohemia[1185] and on February 7, 1311 he was crowned King of Bohemia.[1186] Subsequently, in late March 1311, Frederick of Austria, after negotiations with powerful lords on the side of John of Luxemburg and his father, agreed Moravia to return from the Habsburgs to Bohemia and resigned his rights to the Bohemian throne.[1187] A few months later, on June 18, 1311 John of Luxemburg issued a privilege charter that was meant to secure good cooperation with the Bohemian and Moravian nobles. He promised to limit taxation and not to force the nobles to

---

[1178] Ibid., 101–103, 105. Cf. Gawlas, "Człowiek uwikłany." Muskata was first judged by Archbishop Jakub Świnka of Gniezno. On June 14, 1308 Świnka pronounced him guilty of murder, simony, oath-breaking, lease maiestatis, and some other crimes. Bishop Muskata was hence suspended, excommunicated and put under interdict, and lost the rights to administer his diocese: Władysław Karasiewicz, *Jakób II Świnka, Arcybiskup Gnieźnieński 1283-1314* (Poznań: nakł. Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 1948), 58.

[1179] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 183. There is no source information about Muskata between July 25, 1312 and August 10, 1317. Most probably he returned from exile in the first half of 1317 and from October 1318 his relations with Łokietek seemed to be back to normal: Pietras, *Krwawy wilk z pastorałem*, 109, 113–114.

[1180] Jurek, *Dziedzic Królestwa*, 122–124.

[1181] Marzec, *Urzędnicy małopolscy*, 33, 35. Cf. Jurek, "Polska droga," 182.

[1182] Jurek, "Pod władzą," 206.

[1183] Jurek, Szczur, and Ożóg, *Piastowie*, 728.

[1184] Emler, *RDEBM*, 1855, vol. 2, 954–955.

[1185] Jacek Elminowski, *Stosunki polityczne między Piastami a Luksemburgami i Wittelsbachami w pierwszej połowie XIV wieku* (Toruń: Wydaw. Adam Marszałek, 2002), 40.

[1186] Hoensch, *Die Luxemburger*, 52.

[1187] Ibid., 53–54.

go to war beyond Bohemia, and regulated hereditary issues.[1188] In other words, while the towns of Little Poland and Duke Bolesław of Opole were attempting to take over control in the province, John of Luxemburg, a new and young king of Bohemia, was on his way to settle his relations with the Habsburgs over their legitimacy issues in Bohemia as well as to attain recognition from the Bohemian nobles.

By spring 1312 the rebellion in Little Poland was thwarted.[1189] Once again Łokietek had to hire troops from the kingdom of Hungary in order to overcome resistance.[1190] However, John of Luxemburg concluded further agreements with the Habsburgs (July 25, 1312; 200 men promised against Cracow)[1191] and Louis Wittelsbach (December 4, 1314; assistance in John's attempts to retrieve the lands of his kingdom and help to make the Habsburgs genuinely drop their claims to the kingdom of Bohemia as promised during the reign of Emperor Henry VII).[1192] Although all these agreements did not materialize in an immediate invasion against Łokietek, an understandable fact given that John had been working hard to actually get a firmer grip on his Bohemian lordship and his struggles lasted well into 1318,[1193] the issue of competing legitimacies remained unresolved and thus, it posed a constant threat for Duke Władysław Łokietek.

To sum up, between 1304 and 1312 Łokietek was preoccupied with re-building and, subsequently, upholding his lordship, facing challenges originating chiefly from his problematic succession after the Přemyslids and the lack of royal title. The only parts of his lordship that did not create serious disturbances throughout this period were the domains in Central Poland, that is, Cuiavia, Sieradz and Łęczyca. Interestingly, these were territories that he inherited after his father and brothers as their *dominus naturalis*. Other lands, which he earlier used to rule, caused problems: Great Poland was snatched by Henry of Głogów;

[1188] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 133. See also: *Velké Dějiny Zemí Koruny České 1310-1402*, 4a:27–29.
[1189] Marzec, *Urzędnicy małopolscy*, 34.
[1190] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 155.
[1191] Emler, *RDEBM*, 1890, vol. 3, n. 86.
[1192] Ibid., vol. 3, n. 232. See also: Marzec, "Między Przemysłem II a Władysławem Łokietkiem," 100. Cf. Lucas, "The Low Countries," 111.
[1193] See, for instance: Pánek and Tůma, *A History of the Czech Lands*, 2009, 122–123. Hoensch, *Die Luxemburger*, 59; Dušan Třeštík, Jaroslav Čechura, and Vladimír Pechar, *Králové a knížata zemí Koruny České* (Praha: Rybka Publishers, 2001), 339; Włodarski, *Polityka Jana Luksemburczyka*, 21–22. Recently Robert Antonín argued that not only in 1311 and 1312 John of Luxemburg was unable to threaten Łokietek but he could only start thinking about it towards 1318 and beyond: Robert Antonín, "Działalność polityczna Jana Luksemburskiego w okresie buntu krakowskiego wójta Alberta i jego ocena w czeskiej historiografii," *Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Historica* 13 (2013): 8–18.

Gdańsk-Pomerania was lost to the Teutonic Order; Little Poland was shattered by internal conflicts that were basically overcome by the staunch and sustained support from the local nobility and by presence of mercenaries hired from the kingdom of Hungary. Moreover, due to prolonged succession crisis in the kingdom of Bohemia, Łokietek's lordship was for a time being liberated from serious threat of invasion carried out by the only ruler in Europe who had strong and widely recognized titles to call himself the king of Poland.[1194] Notably, both Łokietek and Henry of Głogów described themselves as "heirs to the kingdom of Poland"[1195] which implies that from their perspective the Polish throne was vacant and they were entitled to perform coronation that would put an end to this default.[1196]

Łokietek's material power was limited. It was not tested against a strong enemy like John of Luxemburg. However, it was examined on a lesser scale in Gdańsk-Pomerania and proved inefficient there. The duke was incapable of defending the province neither from the margraves nor from the Teutonic Order. On the other hand, he was still strong enough to muster assistance and contain the internal rebellion in Little Poland. Besides, not waging a war against Henry of Głogów for Great Poland cannot be easily assessed and did not have to reflect deficiencies in Łokietek's material power.

In late 1313, he was invited to take over the part of Great Poland he used to rule in.[1197] He officially assumed lordly authority there some time in the summer of 1314.[1198] The confrontation with John of Luxemburg was still pending but except for singular diplomatic maneuvers the king of Bohemia was seriously distracted from pursing any aggressive politics against Łokietek's lordship.

After the coronations of Przemysł II (1295) and Wenceslas II (1300), Łokietek's current duchy was incomplete in his own eyes and the eyes of his contemporaries. The title of the "king of Poland" was regularly in use and it was clear that the competing legitimacies (John's

---

[1194] Cf. Antonín, "Działalność polityczna," 18.
[1195] Cf. Jurek, "Polska droga," 181–182.
[1196] Antoni Barciak described a similar practice of calling oneself an "heir of the kingdom" observed among the kings of Bohemia. Přemysl Ottokar II used this title for eight years and also Wenceslas II, prior to his coronation, applied this term in his charters. However, according to Barciak this practices did not affect their power and authority, for "internationally" they were considered as kings. See: Antoni Barciak, "Czeskie echa koronacji Przemysła II," in *Przemysł II: odnowienie Królestwa Polskiego*, ed. Jadwiga Krzyżaniak (Poznań: IH. UAM, 1997), 227.
[1197] Baszkiewicz, *Polska czasów Łokietka*, 119. Marzec, *Urzędnicy małopolscy*, 36. Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 173.
[1198] Jurek, "Polska droga," 185.

de iure and Władysław's *de facto*) would sooner or later require of both sides some "international" action. There were a few options to consider here. One possibility was a Luxemburg-Piast agreement that would make the former drop their claims on behalf of the latter. Second possibility was to wage a war. Another option, however, was to arrange a dynastic marriage that would transform the state of tension into more cooperative attitudes. Whatever solution was going to be applied, from 1314 it was obvious for Łokietek that he could no longer operate on the "international" arena as an "heir of the kingdom of Poland".[1199] More specifically, retaining his lordship (that is, complying to the lordship-imperative) was particularly strongly related to securing a royal title (title-seeker), especially against the rights of the Luxemburgs.

There is no available source material that would indicate Łokietek's plans to either fight John of Bohemia or pay him off for his resignation from the Polish royal title. However, sometime in summer 1315 Casimir, a five-year-old Łokietek's son and Jutta, John's freshly newborn daughter, were betrothed. According to Bieniak and Jasiński, this dynastic project aimed at mitigating the dynastic tension over the competing legitimacies by putting the Luxemburg-Piast couple on the Polish throne and making sure their children would continue to rule there. This undertaking eventually failed when in 1316 and 1318 sons were born to John.[1200] Although short-lasting, it was a genuine attempt to deliver an "international" compromise into the region.

Since the dynastic marriage with the Luxemburgs did not work out, Łokietek's "international" priority became to acquire royal crown, John's complaints and resistance notwithstanding. This would also enhance Łokietek's position in claiming Gdańsk-Pomerania back from the Teutonic Order. However, it was still hardly thinkable without a military confrontation which – given Łokietek's limited resources – was rather a challenge.

The future of Łokietek's lordship somehow depended on seizing the crown. From 1314, that is, after the take-over of power in Great Poland and thus, having held the effective authority over a number of important Polish provinces, the "true heir of the kingdom of

---

[1199] A symbol of this growing conviction about the necessity to himself claim the royal title could be a single charter, issued on January 11, 1314 (that is, while arranging his power take-over in Great Poland), in which he openly assumed royal dignity; *Vladislaus, Dei gratia rex Polonie, dux Cracovie, Cuiavie, Lencicie, Sandomirie et Syradie*: Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1878, vol. 2, n. 964.

[1200] Jasiński, "Polityka małżeńska," 14.

Poland"[1201] could officially begin his efforts to gain the royal title as the successor of previous rulers. Apparently, it was impossible for him to automatically crown himself, because the royal title was legally ascribed to John of Luxemburg. Łokietek's only way to go around this legal burden was to receive a papal authorization that practically could overrule the existing *status quo*. There was, however, an unresolved dilemma whether he would be capable enough of convincing the pope to grant him the royal crown (presumably against the rights of the Luxemburgs). The matter became even more pressing after the failure of the Luxemburg-Piast marriage project of 1315. Was Charles I a prospective ally here?

It is difficult to prove Charles I's any direct involvement into Łokietek's lordship-rebuilding project between 1304 and 1312 (more on this in the following section about Charles I's political agenda). Although the sources mentioned military support coming from the kingdom of Hungary, it was rather Amade Aba, a Hungarian lord wielding power in the north and north-eastern parts of the kingdom, who stood behind those actions.[1202] Since by Spring 1312 the rebellion in Little Poland was eventually suppressed and in that year some Hungarian forces allegedly marched through the province,[1203] and yet in September 1311 Amade Aba had been killed in Kosice,[1204] it could be therefore argued that this late assistance must have been dispatched by someone else. Still, it is difficult to point to Charles I, for at least until the battle of Rozgony (June 15, 1312) this region was controlled by Amade's sons and their supporters.[1205] It seems more plausible that the lands governed by the Abas were for Łokietek chiefly a source of paid troops, and thus, there was little involvement on Charles I's side (in terms of implementing an outright alliance resolutions). Even if to follow Kristó's assertion that Amade was for years one of Charles I's most faithful protagonists, the realities of "international" politics in the kingdom of Hungary left to Amade much independence in his actions. Hence, the king's will had very limited power there, in case he tried to control Amade's actions.[1206] It could be argued, therefore, that Łokietek's first stage of reaffirming his authority in the Polish lands was attained without much contact with the Angevins, except perhaps for

---

[1201] Ryszczewski and Muczkowski, *KDP*, 1848, vol. 2 p. 1, n. 195, 196, 201.

[1202] See the Annal of Traska: *MPH*, 1872, 2:858–859.

[1203] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 155.

[1204] Gyula Kristó, *A rozgonyi csata* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1978), 38.

[1205] See: Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 131. For more details, cf.: Kristó, *A rozgonyi csata*. Also, Engel pointed that Charles I succeeded in taking firmer control in the former Amade Aba's region only by winter of 1314 and 1315: cf. Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 132.

[1206] Kristó, *A Rozgonyi csata*, 38–39.

a brief encounter in 1304, while forming an anti-Přemyslid coalition with the Habsburgs.[1207] Anyway, between 1314 to 1320 there was no major conflict within Łokietek's lordship and no Hungarian mercenaries were needed.

Noteworthy, that for the entire 1304-1320 period there is no source that would plainly prove the existence of any form of the Angevin-Piast alliance. Particularly, there is no such document extant. Meanwhile, it was a time of quite vibrant "international" politics that produced number of analogous treaties that strove to ratify inter-lordly cooperation. One of them was the already mentioned anti-Brandenburg alliance of 1315 between Łokietek and the kings of Scandinavia. Charles I was mentioned in this document as Łokietek's *affinis noster charissimus*[1208] (our most dear neighbor, accomplice or relative),[1209] about whom the duke could declare with good faith that he would observe the treaty's dispositions. Nevertheless, this seems not enough to prove anything but positive relations between the two lords. Strictly speaking, the lack of any formal Angevin-Piast alliance or declaration of friendship until 1320 suggests that most probably there was none.

According to Marzec, between 1317 and 1320 Łokietek hardly ever travelled outside Little Poland. It was a time of intensive preparations for the royal coronation.[1210] Despite problems caused by diplomacies of the Teutonic Order and John of Luxemburg (see below), there were some natural impediments that prolonged this undertaking. For a time being there was no pope, who could give his consent for coronation, and no the archbishop of Gniezno, who would perform the coronation. Clement V died on April 20, 1314[1211] and his successor, John XXII, assumed his office only on August 7, 1316.[1212] Jakub Świnka of Gniezno died on March 4, 1314, his immediate successor died after six months of holding the office (June 30, 1317), and only on November 7, 1317 the next archbishop, Janisław, was confirmed and consecrated by the pope.[1213] The lasting conflict with Bishop Muskata of Cracow excluded him

---

[1207] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 55. See also: Kłodziński, "Łokietek a Habsburgowie," 1916, 259.

[1208] *Promittimus* [Łokietek – wk] *etiam bona fide pro excellentissimo rege Ungarie, affine nostro charissimo, et pro omnibus nostris filiolis, Dei gratia principibus Cuiavie, Masovie, Osvantime, Bythonie et Raziborie, pro nostrisque nepotibus Russie principibus, quod prehabitam ordinationem initam nobiscum, tenebunt et inviolabiliter observabunt*: Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1878, vol. 2, n. 976.

[1209] All three terms are possible for Łokietek through his half-Árpádian wife was distantly related to Charles I.

[1210] Marzec, *Urzędnicy małopolscy*, 40–41.

[1211] Ignacy Bokwa, ed., *Breviarium Fidei: wybór doktrynalnych wypowiedzi Kościoła* (Poznań: Księgarnia Świętego Wojciecha, 2007), 711.

[1212] Ibid.

[1213] Cf. Krzysztof Rafał Prokop, *Arcybiskupi gnieźnieńscy w tysiącleciu* (Cracow: nakł. Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności, 2000).

from possible candidates for performing coronation (which would be, anyway, a very new practice), not to mention the fact that the exiled bishop was not the best prediction for the papal approval of Łokietek's royal elevation.[1214]

Długosz noted that the Teutonic Order vehemently engaged in lobbying against this coronation.[1215] Allegedly they directly approached John XXII and convinced John of Luxemburg to take action.[1216] This opposition can be explained. John's motivations were obvious but the Order's resistance was most probably based on the presumption that Łokietek as King of Poland would hardly ever recognize the Order's rights to Gdańsk-Pomerania. Although the Order collected a good number of claims to hold this province, the lack of royal grant was painfully missing. Gdańsk-Pomerania was evidently a part of the Kingdom of Poland and without the Polish king's recognition their rights to the province were feeble. Now, judging from the Order's experiences with Wenceslas II, the Knights could justifiably foresee that John of Luxemburg as King of Poland would not resist to confirm what his father, Emperor Henry VII, had already declared as belonging to the Order. Besides, from their perspective Łokietek was not a legitimate ruler in the Polish lands and thus it preferred to oppose creating a new king of Poland, when – in their view – there had been already one. Speaking in theoretical terms, the Teutonic Order's resistance and diplomatic action was an outcome of the lordship-imperative that compelled it to uphold and strengthen its lordship in its current state. Furthermore, there was no guarantee that, in case John XXII approved Łokietek's coronation, the pope would not announce John of Luxemburg's deposition from the Polish throne, as Boniface VIII had once done with Wenceslas II (June 10, 1302).[1217] In other words, it was beneficial for the Order to maintain Łokietek's status as a claimant to the Polish throne as long as until John of Luxemburg would find himself able to divert his attention to his so-far forsaken kingdom.

As a result, towards 1320 Łokietek's "international" agenda narrowed down to two major issues: winning the papal consent for his coronation and putting the Teutonic Order to trial for their conquest of Gdańsk-Pomerania (a military conflict appeared impossible for a

[1214] Cf. Jurek, "Polska droga," 185–186.
[1215] Kozłowska-Budkowa, Turkowska, and Pieradzka, *Annales*, IX:96–97. Długosz's sources in this matter are not determined completely: cf. Semkowicz, *Krytyczny rozbiór*, 339.
[1216] Abraham, *Stanowisko kuryi papieskiej*, 17.
[1217] Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1878, vol. 2, n. 853.

time being). In June 1318, at the Łokietek's lordship-wide assembly of Sulejów, two acts were produced: a formal petition to the pope of all the lords and subjects asking for restoration of the kingdom of Poland and approval for Władysław Łokietek's coronation; and another document requesting an investigation against the Order be launched.[1218]

John XXII replied on August 20, 1319 and ultimately gave his consent to Łokietek's coronation.[1219] Meanwhile, between November 1318 and November 1319 Charles I was married to Beatrix of Luxemburg.[1220] From February 1319 there is a papal letter to Charles I, stating that Łokietek's lordship had been under the pope's protection and urging the king of Hungary not to allow his subjects to bother it.[1221] Władysław Łokietek's coronation took place approx. two months after Beatrix's untimely death.

To sum up, the years between 1304 and 1320 Łokietek spent on restoring his lordship, upholding it, and striving to legitimize his renewed status by performing coronation. Throughout the first decade of his rule, his position was repeatedly contested both from within his lordship and from outside. All this resistance could be explained by the framework of the competing legitimacies that delivered alternatives to Łokietek's domination. Only in the lands inherited after his father and brothers, Władysław's rule was never genuinely threatened.

Until 1320 and beyond, the most important "international" issue remained unresolved. In consequence, from January 1320 there were two monarchs who claimed to be kings of Poland. Apparently, Charles I committed little to alleviate Łokietek's struggles and their relations could be best described as positive but neutral. However, it must be noted here that by 1320 there was no armed conflict between Łokietek and John of Luxemburg. Instead, there was an unsuccessful dynastic marriage project. Łokietek, however, could expect that any serious menace to his lordship would arrive in connection with his rival incumbent of the Polish throne – John of Luxemburg. The kingdom of Hungary, on the other hand, was not a part of this conflict and, in fact, it possessed a significant asset: between Charles I and Łokietek

---

[1218] Janusz Bieniak, "Wiec ogólnopolski w Żarnowie 3-7 czerwca 1319 r. a geneza koronacji Władysława Łokietka," *Przegląd Historyczny* 64 (1973): 469. See also: Marzec, *Urzędnicy małopolscy*, 41.
[1219] Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek*, 1951, 189, 195–196. See also: Abraham, *Stanowisko kuryi papieskiej*, 28, 33–34. For the papal formal reply, see: Zakrzewski, *KDW*, 1878, vol. 2, n. 1013.
[1220] Benda, *Magyarország történeti kronológiája*, 1:195–196. About the disputed chronology of this marriage, see footnote 1257.
[1221] Sułkowska-Kurasiowa and Kuraś, *Bullarium Poloniae*, 1982, vol. 1, n. 1095.

there was no competing legitimacies that might cause conflict. Specifically, in the early fourteenth century they were neighbors without any overlapping claims.

Taking all above into consideration, why then Łokietek would accept the Angevin-Piast marriage? The complete answer to this question needs to be postponed until Charles I's "international" agenda is elucidated.

Charles I of Anjou's agenda

Charles I's struggles for power in the kingdom of Hungary have been the background of the previous chapter. On August 27, 1310 his third coronation on Hungarian soil took place.[1222] As Engel observed:

With the kingdom now having a legitimate ruler, recognized by everybody, the period of the 'interregnum' was over. The only question was whether or not the formal restoration of the monarchy would be followed by the effective restoration of royal authority.[1223]

In Hungarian historiography it is generally accepted that the period immediately following the coronation of 1310 to 1323 was the king's sustained struggle to re-unify the kingdom by striking down oligarchs who over recent decades had built powerful lordships throughout Hungary.[1224] There is no doubt that this strife was the principal and predominant challenge that preoccupied Charles I for a long time. Although he was the king of Hungary, practically speaking his power was significantly diminished by the depth and scope of authority claims made and exercised by nearly a dozen of lords and their followers.

Charles I's position was, therefore, a sort of mirror reflection of Łokietek's. Both aspiring rulers had to dedicate over a decade to organize and sustain their lordships. In Łokietek's case the coronation was presumed to function as the ultimate act of the lordship-

---

[1222] *Quapropter cum prefati nobiles extra cimiteria corpora iacentia conspicerent defunctorum* [due to the interdict by Gentilis – wk], *amaro spiritu perturbati, anno Domini M-o CCC-o X-o congregati in campum Ratus circa Pesth Carulum sepedictum in regem concorditer susceperunt et Albam properatnes feria quinta in octavis sancti regis Stephani sollempniter cum letitia coronarunt cum sancta corona a Ladizlao voyuoda restituta*: Szentpétery, *SRH*, 1937, 1:486. See also: Engel, "Az ország újraegyesítése," 133 and Kristó, "I. Károly király harcai," 345.

[1223] Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 130.

[1224] There have been a number of studies recently carried out that attempted to provide a detailed and chronological account about this decade of fighting: Kristó, "Die Macht"; Engel, "Az ország újraegyesítése"; Brezováková, "Konsolidačné snahy Karola I"; Stanisław A. Sroka, "Methods of Constructing Angevin Rule in Hungary in the Light of Most Recent Research," *Quaestiones Medii Aevi Novae* 1 (1996): 77–90; Kristó, "I. károly király harcai." Also in the late 1980s appeared more descriptive accounts targeting a wider-audience that had sections dedicated to those issues: Kristó and Makk, *Károly Róbert emlékezete*, 21–27 and Kristó, *Az Anjou-kor háborúi*, 28–65. For an English account, see: Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 2001, 130–134.

building process, whereas in Charles I's case his coronation merely delivered legitimacy to extend authority and overlordship over a group of resisting lords, and thus, it appeared as the condition *sine qua non* for re-establishing royal domination in the kingdom of Hungary. To wit, Łokietek could crown himself once he managed to relatively pacify his lordship and gain wide support of local lesser lords, while Charles I had to put the crown on his head in order to equip himself with various attributes that would only allow him to battle the so-called oligarchs. As the third chapter showed, Charles I understood well that seizing power could be successful only with winning support of lesser lords, both lay and ecclesiastical, for their faithfulness was the genuine fundament of his exercise of lordly power. Great lords were much more difficult to be bought off and material resources, indispensable for continuous fighting against them, could chiefly be gathered from Charles I's supporters.

There is no need here to re-tell the detailed chronology of numerous wars that afflicted the kingdom of Hungary in the 1310s. Instead, a few observations about their "international" context can be made. Basically, it is essential to investigate how Charles I attempted to win the conflicts with the local lords, that is, who he cooperated with, who could be counted as his enemies, and whether the was any role for Łokietek in this business.

One specific feature about this period was that between 1311 to 1320, every year, Charles I (or his officers) was involved in a military conflict somewhere in the kingdom of Hungary. Although there are sometimes disagreements between Engel and Kristó in regard to particular chronologies,[1225] it is quite clear from the extant evidence that in the 1310s Charles I had little time to do anything else but provoking and responding to war against Hungarian lords. It was a continuous and serious financial and military effort. Charles I's greatest challenge to subjugating the oligarchs was Máté Csák, whom he fought almost incessantly each year until 1318, and still with a limited success.

Moreover, Csák's lordship in nowadays Slovakia was the target of interventions coming from the neighboring rulers. In 1315, John of Luxemburg unsuccessfully invaded Csák's lands.[1226] Apparently, it was the result of agreements, made in 1314 by Charles I with the

---

[1225] Cf. Kristó's article that was very much in response to Engel's research. The differences can be seen in the summarizing sections of their articles, where proposed chronologies have been displayed: Engel, "Az ország újraegyesítése," 133–136 and Kristó, "I. Károly király harcai," 345.

[1226] Benda, *Magyarország történeti kronológiája*, 1:193. Cf. Stanisław A. Sroka, "Methods of Constructing Angevin Rule in Hungary in the Light of Most Recent Research," *Quaestiones Medii Aevi Novae* 1 (1996): 81.

Habsburgs and – supposedly – with John, against Csák. As Kristó observed, 1315 turned out to be a difficult year for Charles I, when number of resisting oligarchs amassed, and thus he could not join the king of Bohemia in the action against Csák.[1227] Another campaign, this time with the Habsburgs, was organized in 1317, and yet it was still not enough to overpower the Hungarian lord. Furthermore, according to Charles I's itinerary, assembled by Engel,[1228] between 1311 and 1320 the king of Hungary never traveled beyond the borders of his kingdom, except for two visits to Vienna (1314 and 1318). This is a very telling practice in terms of searching for Charles I's allies.

Charles I was related to the Habsburgs through his mother Clemence who was a sister of King Albrecht I of the Romans. In consequence, all Austrian Habsburgs, including Frederick, the king-elect, were his cousins. This close dynastic ties must have played their role, as above noted, during the period of overpowering the Hungarian lords.

Besides, there is some evidence about Charles I's contacts with John of Luxemburg. On July 19, 1312 King James II of Aragon was informed about an agreement – contents unknown – recently concluded between Charles I and John of Bohemia.[1229] Almost a week later, in Vienna, on July 25, 1312 there was an four-year alliance made between the Habsburgs and John of Bohemia, in which the latter promised his assistance against everybody except for a few rulers, including Charles I.[1230] In 1315, John marched against Máté Csák which – as Hungarian scholarship assumes – could be an action coordinated with Charles I. Ultimately, as noted before, in 1318 the king of Hungary married Beatrix, John's sister. It is difficult to draw conclusions from such a scarce source material. However, while looking at the available data, it would be significantly more challenging to prove throughout the 1310s bad relations between Charles I and John than to claim the opposite.

Another issue in Charles I's "international" agenda was his relations with the Angevins of Naples. In 1309, King Charles II of Naples died. In his last will he declared Robert, his third son, his only legitimate successor, announcing him the first-born son. In early August 1309,

[1227] Kristó, "I. Károly király harcai," 320–321.
[1228] Engel, "Az ország újraegyesítése," 136–139.
[1229] *Anjou-kori oklevéltár: Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia*, vol. 3 (Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1994), n. 338.
[1230] Ibid., vol. 3, n. 342.

Robert was crowned by Clement V.[1231] However, strictly speaking, his rights to the Neapolitan throne were questionable. Samantha Kelly neatly explained:

In fact, as the third son of King Charles II, he had not been expected to inherit at all. Charles Martel, his eldest brother, was the heir apparent to Naples; thanks to that marriage alliance with the Árpád house he was, by 1292, king as well of Hungary, inherited through his mother. … In 1295, however, Robert's fortunes dramatically changed. Charles Martel died, probably of malaria, in the fall of 1295. By a strict interpretation of primogeniture his son Carobert should have become heir apparent in his place. But as a young child and heir already to Hungary, Carobert was, in the eyes of both King Charles II and Pope Boniface VIII, an unacceptable successor. Thus attention turned to Charles II's second son, Louis—but Louis, having undergone a religious conversion, emerged from captivity in late 1295 to announce his surrender of all earthly power and his intention to become a Franciscan friar, a decision from which neither his father nor the pope could dissuade him. Through these unusual circumstances Robert became heir apparent and eventually king of Naples. But those circumstances, and the existence of the rival claimant Carobert, cast doubt on Robert's legitimate right to the kingdom for the rest of his life.[1232]

Apparently, in the early 1310s Charles I posed threat to his uncle, Robert of Naples. On April 20, 1312 in a letter to James II of Aragon, Robert expressed his concerns about disunity between him and his kingdom on one side, and Charles I on the other.[1233] In another report from July 19, 1312, sent to James II, it was mentioned about Robert who had been reluctant to depart from Apulia, lest his lands would be invaded by Charles I.[1234] Taking those accounts into consideration, it could be argued that the intra-Angevin relations in the early 1310s were tense.

There are no signs of mutual contacts between both dynastic branches until 1316. Apparently this situation changed due to negotiations carried out between Frederic Habsburg and Robert of Naples. It was the time of continuous rivalry between Louis Wittelsbach and Frederic, both king-elects of the Romans, and Robert was willing to secure his lordship and

---

[1231] Cf. Giuseppe Galasso, *Il Regno di Napoli. Il mezzogiorno Angioino e Aragonese (1266-1494)*, vol. 1 (Torino: UTET, 1992), 116.
[1232] Kelly, *The New Solomon*, 7–8.
[1233] *AOkl.*, 1994, vol. 3, n. 271.
[1234] Ibid., vol. 3, n. 338.

position in Italy by striking a deal with a future emperor. His idea was to sustain the validity of Clement V's bull (March 1314) that declared the imperial claims to authority over the kingdom of Sicily futile; a legal announcement plainly opposing traditional interpretations favored by the emperors.[1235] Robert sought to avoid possible conflict with a new emperor by making an agreement confirmed by a dynastic marriage. On June 23, 1316 Robert's son, eighteen-year-old Charles and Frederick's sister, twenty-one year-old Catherine were married, and – as a result of this compromise – Charles was appointed imperial vicar over all Guelf cities in Italy.[1236]

Interestingly, from 1316 there are a few documents that record some contacts between Robert and Charles I. This could be an indirect evidence for a link between the negotiations with the Habsburgs and the improvement of mutual relations between the Angevins. Namely, in January 1316 Robert sent envoys to Charles I together with a pair of chests with weaponry.[1237] In turn, at the end of this year, on December 27, at Robert's court the envoys from Charles I are attested.[1238] Subsequently, another longer break in recorded relations occurred. It is already on February 23, 1320, in Naples, when Robert issued a charter in which he commanded the port masters of Apulia to prepare ships: one for Charles I to sail to the shores of Slavonia, and other three for him and Charles I to be available when needed.[1239] Again, it is difficult to evaluate the temperature of mutual relations among the Angevins between 1316 and 1320 on the basis of the abovementioned data; however, if to follow the saying that "no news is good news", and taking into consideration the overall content of the sources, it could be expected that the relations must have relatively improved. As a result, the account of Pulkava about the Angevins lobbying at the papal curia for Łokietek's coronation appears plausible. I will return to this soon.

Despite apparent advancement in mutual contacts, Charles I did not forget about his legitimate rights to the throne of Naples. The issue was reignited after Charles, Robert's only son, had unexpectedly died in 1328. In consequence, Robert devised a succession project that

---

[1235] Kelly, *The New Solomon*, 200.
[1236] Ibid., 203–204. See also: Galasso, *Il Regno di Napoli*, 1:129.
[1237] *Anjou-kori oklevéltár: Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia*, vol. 4 (Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1996), n. 224–226.
[1238] Ibid., vol. 4, n. 374.
[1239] *AOkl.*, 1998, vol. 5, n. 706.

he carried out by arranging dynastic unions with Charles I's children; a later story which – however – is not the main interest of this study.[1240]

As noted, throughout the 1310s Charles I waged numerous wars and undertook military expeditions across the kingdom of Hungary. In his struggles he was supported by the Habsburgs and John of Luxemburg. Against him, there were Hungarian lords, including the most mighty of them, Máté Csák. Moreover, Charles I was not really bothered by other lords except for two military campaigns (between 1317 and 1319) against King Stefan Uros II Milutin of Serbia (1282-1321), which had been caused by the latter's aggression on the land of Macva in the southern frontiers of the kingdom of Hungary.

The conflict over Macva was yet another example of "international" rivalry over competing legitimacies. In 1284, this territory (stretching between the Drina, Sava, and Morava rivers and the Serbian border) had been handed over to Dragutin, a former king of Serbia deposed in 1282,[1241] as a fief by King Ladislas IV of Hungary, his father-in-law.[1242] Dragutin held this land until his death in 1316, when it was transferred to his son Vladislav. However, already in 1316 or 1317 Milutin, Vladislav's uncle, imprisoned him and attempted to take Macva under his authority.[1243] His military interventions were followed by successful retaliatory campaigns carried out by Charles I.[1244] During the expedition of 1319, the king also occupied Belgrade.

Regarding Charles I's relations with other neighboring lords between 1310 to 1320, there is very scarce data available. What is certain is that those contacts were generally shaped through the contexts of the king's competition with the Hungarian lords. Ca. 1314 there could have been some single involvement of one of Bulgarian lords operating as an ally of John, a son of Tódor Vejtehi, a lord resisting royal authority.[1245] Also in 1316 a group of lords in the north-eastern part of the kingdom of Hungary established a coalition that aimed at deposing

---

[1240] Cf. Galasso, *Il Regno di Napoli*, 1:151–153. See also: Csukovits, *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I.*, 2012, 131–133.

[1241] For a brief description see: Anna Adashinskaya, "The Joint Cult of St. Simeon and St. Sava under Milutin: The Monastic Aspect" (CEU, Budapest College, 2009) MA Thesis, 12–13.

[1242] John V. A. Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 218–219.

[1243] Ibid., 261.

[1244] See: Engel, *Realm of St Stephen*, 134; Csukovits, *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I.*, 141; Benda, *Magyarország történeti kronológiája*, 1:195–196.

[1245] Engel, "Az ország újraegyesítése," 104–105.

(or assassinating) Charles I and bringing a new king from Halich-Ruthenia: one of the duke-brothers Andrew or Lev.[1246] Since due to the lack of source material there is a significant gap in historian's knowledge, stretching from 1289 to 1340, about what happened in the Halich-Ruthenia,[1247] it is, therefore, hard to discern what might have been Lev and Andrew's reactions to such proposals. All in all, it is rather little known about their rule (1308-1323) until they died, presumably fighting the Mongols.[1248] Apparently, their main focus was not placed on the relations with the kingdom of Hungary, for they were chiefly concerned about the threats coming from the Lithuanians and Mongols, the latter being their official overlords, and thus they sought support from the Teutonic Order.[1249]

In this entire context, there are a few things to be said about Charles I's presumed contacts with Władysław Łokietek. As noted earlier, the amount of existing material is almost negligible. Apart from information about military support coming to Little Poland from the kingdom of Hungary, Łokietek's treaty of 1315 with the Scandinavian rulers, and alleged disturbances on the Hungarian-Polish frontiers (all discussed above), there is a charter (February 6, 1315)[1250] that mentioned certain Ladislas be an envoy to Poland. Judging from its chronology, it could be argued that it was a visit that subsequently allowed Łokietek to make some declarations about Charles I's allegiance to the treaty against the margraves of Brandenburg. Otherwise, nothing can be taken for granted.

There are, however, some observations that could be drawn from this silence. First, there was neither conflict between Łokietek and Charles I nor a token of it. Both parties did not have any overlapping legitimacies to fight over. The border disturbances notified by John XXII in his letter to Charles I seemed – judging from the logic of the text – not to accuse the king of Hungary with instigating them, but rather to curb them as inflicted by royal subjects. In the context of the limited control of the royal officers over northern and north-eastern regions of the kingdom, it could be well argued that the frontier turmoil was caused by marauding troops of non-royal provenance. Besides, despite the fact that there were records

---

[1246] Ibid., 114.

[1247] Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1994), 64.

[1248] Nicholas L. Chirovsky, *An Introduction to Ukrainian History*, vol. 1 (New York: Philosophical Library, 1981), 177.

[1249] See: Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 64; Władysław A. Serczyk, *Historia Ukrainy* (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinskich, 1990), 53.

[1250] *AOkl.*, 1996, vol. 4, n. 24.

of the Hungarians coming to Łokietek's assistance, there is nothing to be found about possible Polish contingents crossing the border in help of either Charles I or particular Hungarian lords.

Second, the lack of "international" controversies was a promising platform for good mutual relations.

Third, in his battling the lords, Charles I did not seek any assistance from Łokietek. Although he made contacts with the Habsburgs and John of Luxemburg, there is no evidence of approaching the Polish duke (unless the envoy mentioned in early 1315 is considered as little related with Łokietek's northern politics but preoccupied with other – unknown – aspects of the Hungarian-Polish relations, for instance, a pro-Charles I's intervention in northern Hungary). This lack of more frequent contacts can be explained with another lack: of common interests. Łokietek's unstable authority in his lordship was chiefly caused by his questionable legitimacy and in order to amend this inconveniency he had to seek a "making-sense" resolution with the current king of Bohemia, John. Furthermore, for a most time of the discussed period Łokietek appeared on the "international" stage as a relatively weak player. His military effort was incomparable to Charles I's, for his fighting was basically limited to thwarting local opposition on a few occasions (often with the Hungarian assistance). He was unable to retake Gdańsk-Pomerania from the margraves and, later, from the Teutonic Order. A short and inconclusive campaign against the margraves of Brandenburg in 1316 was still an exception here.[1251] Perhaps this military weakness and the lack of resources was another reason for Charles I not to view the Polish duke as a potential ally. Besides, the king of Hungary did not have controversies with John of Luxemburg that could bring him closer to Łokietek's position. Expressly, from lordship-upholding perspective Łokietek was to Charles I rather powerless ally. Practically speaking, while being neighbors, Charles I and Łokietek's political agendas made them look in other directions, so as their looks could hardly cross.

In this sense, and this would be the fourth observation, Charles I's cooperation with John of Luxemburg does not have to be perceived as a symptom of anti-Łokietek's politics. At that time John and Władysław were not open foes. Certainly, they had mutually exclusive claims to the title of the king of Poland but this did not immediately entail hostilities. Similar competing legitimacies could be noticed between the Habsburgs and Luxemburgs (over the

---

[1251] Marzec, *Urzędnicy małopolscy*, 39.

rights to the throne of Bohemia) as well as between the Angevins (over the succession procedures to the throne of Naples). Such disputes, although pending, did not necessarily pushed the interested parties into a permanent war. Moreover, they did not exclude temporal or intermittent cooperation. Accepting the dynastic marital project between Jutta, a daughter of John and Casimir, a son of Łokietek, concluded in the summer of 1315, which was only cancelled sometime in 1318 or 1319,[1252] shows that the Luxemburg-Piast enmity was not unsurpassable and – consequently – Charles I's marriage with Beatrix of Luxemburg in November 1318 does not prove the king of Hungary's unexpected hostile attitude towards Łokietek.

There is one more element in the Angevin-Piast relations prior to 1320 that deserves some attention. This is Pulkava's account suggesting that the Angevins, Charles I of Hungary and Robert of Naples, profoundly contributed to winning the papal consent to Łokietek's coronation.

On the whole, it is not a big surprise that the contemporary *Chronicon Aulae Regiae* was negative towards Łokietek's claims to the throne in Poland and was disappointed with John's resignation from his claims in the 1330s.[1253] Barciak explained that the chroniclers' unenthusiastic attitude towards Łokietek was linked to the fact that in Poland he had posed the greatest threat to the Bohemian rule. According to *Chronicon*'s account, Łokietek's coronation was to the detriment of the kingdom of Bohemia and it was attained by the duke's financial commitment and thanks to the support from the Polish bishops, John's protests notwithstanding.[1254] However, Pulkava's account, produced a couple of decades later, did not complain about the very fact of the coronation and pointed to its different causes, apparently unknown to the previous eye-witness chronicle. Furthermore, Pulkava's assertion cannot be easily refuted, for his chronicle was compiled under supervision of Charles IV, who could know some details from his father (if not from other sources). It is, therefore, important to address this issue.

[1252] Jasiński, "Polityka małżeńska," 14.

[1253] Antoni Barciak, "Postrzeganie Polski i polskiej polityki władców czeskich przez autorów 'Kroniki Zbrasławskiej,'" in *In tempore belli et pacis: ludzie, miejsca, przedmioty: księga pamiątkowa dedykowana prof. dr. hab. Janowi Szymczakowi w 65-lecie urodzin i 40-lecie pracy naukowo-dydaktycznej*, ed. Tadeusz Grabarczyk, Anna Kowalska-Pietrzak, and Tadeusz Nowak (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo DiG, 2011), 49.

[1254] Ibid., 52–53.

Theoretically speaking, it was possible for the Angevins to promote Łokietek's case in Avignon. Robert of Naples lived in the city between 1319 to 1324 and frequently met with the pope.[1255] Moreover, their relations were particularly intimate, because in the past John XXII was Robert's tutor and Charles II's chancellor at the Neapolitan court.[1256] As noted above, towards 1320 the relations between Charles I and Robert seemed normal and allowing cooperation. It can be speculated that an additional stimulant for upholding them was elderly Queen Mary of Naples (d. 1323), Robert's mother, Charles I's grandmother, and a daughter of King Steven V of Hungary. For her it could have been important to foster intra-dynastic harmony. In sum, there were conditions for carrying out such lobbying, if only wanted. Now, viewing from a more distant perspective, it could be argued that "international" situation in Central Europe justified an anti-Luxemburg action carried out by the Angevins, for in the competition over the title of the king of the Romans John was associated with Louis Wittelsbach, while the Angevins and Habsburgs had closer ties with the papacy, and thus, two opposing camps emerged willing to impede each other's "international" maneuvers.

Nonetheless, there is much to say against the Angevin lobbying for Łokietek. Except for Pulkava's account, there is no contemporary evidence that would support his statement. The extant intra-Angevin correspondence is so dramatically scarce and unrelated to Łokietek's issues that nothing can be concluded from it. Contemporary Bohemian, Hungarian and Polish sources do not lend any support either. Furthermore, the known communication between John XXII and Charles I between 1318 to 1320 does not reveal any data or even hint in this matter.

Given the regional and European "international" context, speculating about the Angevin assistance for Łokietek at the papal curia is also risky for a few reasons. First, assuming a more general perspective, it has been already showed that despite non-aggressive relations between Charles I and Łokietek, there was virtually no common interest that would foster their closer ties, that is, they were preoccupied with different problems and did not share a common enemy. In the 1310s they rather lived peacefully next to each other.

Second, looking closer into the period of 1318 to 1320 (or, more precisely between the Polish petition to the pope of June 1318 to the papal replies of August 1319), Charles I was

---

[1255] Kelly, *The New Solomon*, 78.
[1256] Abraham, *Stanowisko kuryi papieskiej*, 21. See also: Kelly, *The New Solomon*, 77.

busy with number of tasks and none of them attracted him to work with Łokietek. In June 1318, almost simultaneously with the Polish assembly in Sulejów, which produced the coronation letters to John XXII, Charles I's plenipotentiaries betrothed him to Beatrix of Luxemburg.[1257] In July, there was an expedition to northern Transylvania against Mojs, one of the Hungarian lords.[1258] Towards the end of this year the king of Hungary fought his enemies on the western borders of his kingdom and traveled to Vienna. Next year, his officers were striking down the Koszeg family; meanwhile, Charles I organized an expedition against King Milutin of Serbia and carried it out through August and September. There was also some fighting in the area of Debrecen, and in the early November 1319 Beatrix died during the labor.[1259]

Third, it is impossible to prove Charles I's anti-Luxemburg attitude during the given period. His marriage to Beatrix was his initiative and fit well into the context of friendly relations with John. Attempting to say anything about Mary's, previous wife of Charles I, influence on her husband's attitude to Łokietek would be a mere speculation.

Fourth, the aspect of "international" rivalry between Frederick Habsburg and Louis Wittelsbach can be also misleading, because apparently it had limited influence on Charles I's attitude towards John of Luxemburg. Noteworthy, that for some time John XXII was cautious about giving precedence to any of the imperial competitors.[1260] Also, the pope remained strongly bounded with the French kings and supported them in their conflict in Flanders against local lords, ended by the Treaty of Paris in 1320.[1261] At that time John of Luxemburg

---

[1257] Engel, "Az ország újraegyesítése," 135. This is a traditionally accepted chronology that builds on the information provided by the *Chronici Hungarici Compositio* (Szentpétery, *SRH*, 1937, 1:489) about Mary, Charles I's wife, who died on December 15, 1317. However, in his recent study Kristó pointed to a single charter (*AOkl.*, 1998, vol. 5, n. 208) that implied that by the summer 1318 Mary had been still alive. Kristó refuted opinions of previous scholarship, which had presumed errors in the charter, and instead he asserted the chronicle's account wrong (Kristó, "Károly Róbert családja," 20–22). In consequence, Kristó revised the chronology of the marital events as follows: Mary died in summer 1318; Beatrix became the queen in February 1319 the latest, and the time of betrothal cannot be determined well. I am not fully convinced with Kristó's calculations, especially because with questionable justification he rejected two unrelated chronicle's accounts from *Chronici Hungarici Compositio* and *Chronicon Aulae Regiae*. Anyway, Kristó's manipulations in the events' chronology does not affect much my argument about Charles I's disinterest in Łokietek's matters.
[1258] Kristó, "I. Károly király harcai," 345.
[1259] Engel, "Az ország újraegyesítése," 135.
[1260] Bernard Guillemain, *Les Papes d'Avignon, 1309-1376*, Histoire (Editions Du Cerf) (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1998), 61–62.
[1261] Cf. Sophia Menache, "The Failure of John XXII's Policy toward France and England: Reasons and Outcomes, 1316-1334," *Church History* 55, no. 4 (1986): 424–427.

had cordial relations with France too.[1262] The situation in Germany was undecided and John XXII, by appointing Robert of Naples the imperial vicar in northern Italy (July 16, 1317), and deposing Louis's vicar,[1263] manifested to both candidates his will to secure his authority in the peninsula and over their prospective confirmation.[1264] It was only after Louis's triumph over Frederick in 1322, when he considered himself as the only claimant to the Roman throne, that the serious conflict with the papacy erupted.[1265] On the one hand, it is true that in the end of 1317 the Habsburgs, that is, close allies of the king of Hungary, acted against John of Luxemburg. On December 27, 1317 they decided to support Henry of Leipa, one of the barons resisting John's authority.[1266] Next year, in February, Frederick Habsburg promised to assist Henry of Carinthia in his struggle to regain the Bohemian throne after he had lost it to John in 1310.[1267] This action was possible due to John's grave troubles with the Bohemian nobles, yet already in April 1318 Louis Wittelsbach interceded in their dispute and eventually the strife was over.[1268] On the other hand, all these developments did not prevent Charles I from seeking his next wife at the Luxemburg court (later that year) as well as to visit his cousins in Vienna (in early October 1318).[1269] And again, the Habsburg's "international" offensive against John of Luxemburg does not have to be seen as an element of their struggle with the Wittelsbachs but it can be explained with their interest in regaining control over the kingdom of Bohemia that initially, after dying out of the Přemyslids, fell into their hands.

Fifth, in his official response to the Polish coronation petition, John XXII recognized the state of competing legitimacies between John of Luxemburg and Władysław Łokietek and refrained from adjudging the crown to neither of them. From his letter it can be learnt that the Polish case was promoted by Bishop Gerward of Włocławek (and by the content of the petition itself) and John's complaints were brought up by his protagonists. The pope gave no, even the smallest, hint about any third parties that could have interfered with his decision-

---

[1262] See: Božena Kopičková, *Eliška Přemyslovna: královna Česká 1292-1330* (Praha: Vyšehrad, 2003), 38. Furthermore, in 1323 in complete accordance with the family tradition, John's son and heir, Charles IV was sent to the French court for education: Pánek and Tůma, *A History of the Czech Lands*, 2009, 123. Cf.: Charles IV, *Autobiography of Emperor Charles IV and His Legend of St. Wenceslas*, ed. Balázs Nagy and Frank Schaer (Budapest: CEU Press, 2001), XIV.
[1263] Ullmann, *A Short History*, 185–186.
[1264] Kelly, *The New Solomon*, 204.
[1265] Ullmann, *A Short History*, 186.
[1266] Hoensch, *Die Luxemburger*, 59.
[1267] Spěváček, *Jan Lucemburský a jeho doba, 1296-1346*, 260.
[1268] Włodarski, *Polityka Jana Luksemburczyka*, 21–22.
[1269] Engel, "Az ország újraegyesítése," 138.

making process. Moreover, the papal inconclusive response shows much less determination against John of Luxemburg than, for instance, nearly twenty years earlier Boniface VIII expressed towards Wenceslas II. In other words, if an "international" coalition against the Wittelsbachs party had been in gear, it would have been highly probable that John XXII would have had less reservations in making up his mind and determining who had the valid rights to rule in the kingdom of Poland. I do not think that the pope had to be afraid of John's reaction. Now, if this had been a case and the pope had been anxious about the Luxemburgs backlash, he would have more readily dismissed Łokietek's plea, for there is no evidence that the Habsburgs or Angevins pressured him in this matter (and there is a plain proof that John did).

In the light of these arguments, Pulkava's account asserting the Angevin commitment to winning the papal consent for Łokietek's coronation seems, to say the least, problematic. However, since it appears to be a well-informed source, this information cannot be easily ignored. In order to amend this perplexity, some speculations can be raised. The fact that the account confused the chronology and put the Angevin-Piast marriage before Łokietek's coronation, this can possibly suggest that there was some Angevin involvement into Łokietek's case later, towards the 1320s, when John of Luxemburg shifted his focus to the kingdom of Poland and sought to establish his domination there. Particularly, the Angevins could have played a role in Łokietek retaining the crown (perhaps, at some point at the papal curia there were controversies regarding the need to resolve the Luxemburg-Piast dispute) but this could only happen after the Angevin-Piast marriage had been concluded. Otherwise, I would be inclined to reject Pulkava's assertions.

Summing up the main points of Charles I's "international" agenda, between 1310 and 1320 it was profoundly dominated by conflict with the Hungarian lords whose rejection of royal authority was a direct threat to Charles I's upholding his lordship. Reinstating peace and order across the kingdom was the pressing matter of his status and reputation as a lord-king. Charles I's principal goals were, therefore, closely connected to overpowering the resistance of his lord-subjects. In the 1310s there were numerous, and often successful, military campaigns throughout the kingdom. The king's ability to muster troops and efficiently keep them for a decade implies three features: a limited character of separate expeditions (lesser costs), a sustained support from a part of the Hungarian elites, and – last but not least – considerable material resources available to the king. Charles I's greatest allies were his

cousins, the Habsburgs, but in fact he rather effortlessly managed to retain good relations with John of Luxemburg and came to terms with his fatherly uncle, King Robert of Naples. Interestingly enough, throughout the decade of fighting, his lordship was virtually free from aggressive acts coming from the neighboring rulers. An occasional conflict with King Milutin of Serbia was a regional dispute, and yet again Charles I proved effective in defending his claims to the contended land. This relevant peace at its borders evidences that at that time, as an "international" entity, the kingdom of Hungary barely suffered from issues of the competing legitimacies. In this sense, the realm was safe from "international" aggression. Charles I's relations with Łokietek were vague; however, the extant material proves no hostilities between the rulers and suggests their neutral co-existence. They did not have common interests and shared no common enemies. Both sides were preoccupied with their own matters and hardly ever sought cooperation on the "international" arena.

Concluding Remarks – the Origins of the Angevin-Piast Marriage

Dynastic marriage was not the only means of conducting "international" politics. Alliances, agreements and treaties could work well without reaching for inter-dynastic unions. Current "international" politics could be based on oaths and written words, and thus, it did not require larger commitments that included marriage contracts.

The analysis of Charles and Łokietek's "international" agendas revealed that those agendas can explain little about why the Angevin-Piast marriage was concluded. For Łokietek, a war with John of Luxemburg over the Polish crown was not imminent and, again, Charles I could be hardly lured into such prospective conflict. Besides, Łokietek's struggle for coronation can be actually considered as an attempt to avoid conflict with the Luxemburgs by transforming the duke's *de facto* authority in the kingdom into the kingship *de iure*. By doing this, he could hope to come to terms with John and overcome the problem of competing legitimacies in a non-violent way. On the other hand, in the 1310s Charles I had no reasons to fear John, for the latter had been rather help than impediment in Charles I's efforts to secure his own lordship. Hence, the analysis done above has not delivered a plainly political motif that would bring both rulers together. For upholding their respective lordships or for solving mutual controversies (there was none, actually), this marriage was unnecessary.

Nevertheless, the lordly identity comprised more aspects than just fulfillment of the lordship-imperative. This element urged lords to create and sustain a lordship and by title-

seeking they struggled to underline their legitimate claims as well as to position themselves as high as possible in existing social hierarchies. Charles I was already the king of Hungary and his task was basically to obtain the recognition of his authority from possibly all his lord-subjects. Łokietek managed to pacify his lordship and won support of his lesser lords but he needed the title in order to acquire firmer "international" standing that, in turn, could help him to relieve tensions with the king of Bohemia over the disputed Polish throne.

As lords, both Charles I and Łokietek were leaders of their families, that is, it was expected of them to generate male offspring and determine their success by providing them with powerful and prestigious lordships. This was precisely the area where Charles I and Łokietek's interests met.

In 1320, Władysław Łokietek had four living children: ten-year-old Casimir (the prospective successor), and three daughters: Kunegunda (ca. 1310 married to Duke Bernard of Świdnica),[1270] approx. fourteen-year-old Elisabeth and max. nine-year-old Jadwiga.[1271] While he was securing his lordship for Casimir, it was his pending duty to marry off his daughters well. Jadwiga was still a minor, and thus, his only daughter available for marriage was Elisabeth. Since it was a practice among lords to marry their daughters in early age,[1272] the moment when Charles I requested her hand was basically a great coincidence.

Apart from sheer biological considerations, Łokietek could put much hopes in giving Elisabeth to Charles I. As noted above, their relations were practically without tensions and only could be enhanced through this marriage. Moreover, it was an unusual situation for the Piasts who throughout the thirteenth century used to maintain dynastic relations with the Árpáds but most often in the opposite form, that is, they married Hungarian princesses yet hardly ever gave their daughters to the kings of Hungary (with the exception of 1290 when the marriage of Andrew III and Fennena, a daughter of Duke Siemomysł of Inowrocław was concluded).[1273] It was a prominent future for Łokietek's daughter and at the same time a gate for Łokietek into the elite milieu of the early fourteenth-century ruling houses. Besides, the Angevin-Piast marriage functioned as a form of recognition of Łokietek's newly acquired royal

---

[1270] Jasiński, "Polityka małżeńska," 12.

[1271] Cf. Kazimierz Jasiński, "Genealogia Władysława Łokietka i jego najbliższej rodziny," *Zapiski Kujawsko-Dobrzyńskie. Historia* 6 (1987): 13–32. For problematic chronology about Jadwiga, cf.: Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów małopolskich i kujawskich*, 160–163.

[1272] Jasiński, "Genealogia Władysława," 29.

[1273] Jasiński, "Polityka małżeńska," 20.

dignity and established an additional and meaningful reason to seek Charles I's *auxilium et consilium* when necessary. The sources do not unravel anything about plausible terms of "international" cooperation that could have been agreed due to the union, and thus, any details about it should be so far forsaken. However, it can be argued that the marriage created a bond between the families of Łokietek and Charles I that devised the platform for working together. It is important to emphasize that the marriage itself did not have to be designed against an enemy or a group of enemies (as argued earlier); it was rather a tool for making mutual support and assistance easier and more accessible. Długosz, who reported about Łokietek taking advice from his lord-subjects regarding this marital project, did not reveal arguments and reservations that could emerge during discussions. Needless to say that it was a serious decision in terms of strategy, which way of expanding Łokietek's kindred should be taken. In the light of the entire "international" context, accepting Charles I's proposal was an optimistic step forward that came in a genuinely right moment.

Since dynastic politics was prone to natural disasters, one more aspect in Łokietek's reasoning has to be taken into consideration. Namely, in 1320 Władysław Łokietek was entering his sixties and had already outlived all his brothers, his father, and all his family members up to his great-grand father Casimir the Just (d. 1194), and yet he just equaled his grand-father Konrad of Mazovia (d. 1247). There is not data about the state of Łokietek's health but, on the whole, at the time of coronation it could have been expected that his death was near. Since Władysław's successor, Casimir, was only ten years old, there was a threat of a succession crisis to erupt in relation to the disputed throne rights and due to the minority of the prospective successor. It was, therefore, essential for Łokietek to secure some sort of co-responsibility for Casimir's future with the king of Hungary. It could be hoped that disturbances in the kingdom of Poland would not be ignored due to Charles I's allegiance to his brother-in-law.

Charles I had his reasons too. No matter if Kristó was correct about the king's four marriages (Halich-Ruthenia, Opole-Silesia, Bohemia, and Poland) or there were only three of them (without the Ruthenian spouse), Charles I's marital policy seems quite clear: at all times he sought to marry within the region and thus, his initial idea for starting his own family branch was concentrated on rooting into the local ruling houses. Originally he wanted his sister, Clemence, to join this project, for around the beginning of 1310 he urged Robert of Naples

not to marry her to anyone, because he was planning to give her to someone in the kingdom of Hungary and thus gain some extra support.[1274] This scheme did not work out, but the direction in his thinking remained unchanged. It can be further explained by the fact that all his marriages were concluded during the stormy period of the lordship-building process and, therefore, engendering regional affinities and allegiances was a reasonable tactics for enhancing the chances of success.

In the late 1319, Charles I's conflict with the Hungarian lords was far from over. Máté Csák remained unbeaten as were a few other lords scattered around the realm. Although things seemed to develop into the right direction and after the successes of 1317 he could look forward to brighter future, Charles I's fundamental problem was related to the lack of legitimate successor. According to the source material, it is the very reason why he kept re-marrying. On the one hand, he did not have to fear natural death as perhaps Łokietek had to. On the other hand, his continuous strife with numerous enemies could at any time result in sudden death, either on a battlefield or by assassination. Any outbreak of disease or plague could have fatal consequences both for him and his lordship, being constructed with so much effort. Apparently, in 1320 he had no children except for an illegitimate son, born in 1317 or 1318.[1275] For Charles I having an heir meant three added values: it stood for the prospect of stability in the kingdom, implied God's grace resting upon him, and improved his status of a lord in the eyes of other lords.

It can be only speculated why Charles I asked for Elisabeth's hand. The fact that he sought to have legitimate offspring explains his want to re-marry but does not explain the particular choice of Władysław Łokietek's family. It may be rightly suggested that for Charles I it was merely the second choice, for the "plan A" was plainly linked to the Luxemburgs. Beatrix's untimely death in childbirth, although foreseeable as a possible scenario of pregnancy at this level of medical standards,[1276] was unexpected and must have brought some confusion. Theoretically speaking, in late 1319 Charles I could turn to John of Luxemburg for Mary, Beatrix's sister, who at the time was still unmarried; or search for a wife among his

---

[1274] *Anjou-kori oklevéltár: Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia*, vol. 2 (Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1992), n. 821, 822.

[1275] Kristó, "Károly Róbert családja," 28.

[1276] For instance, in 1399 Queen Jadwiga of Poland in her correspondence with King Władysław Jagiełło allegedly noted about her pregnancy as the state at the point of death, for childbirth often used to cause it: Jan Długosz, *Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2009), 301.

cousins, the Habsburgs. In comparison to these families, Łokietek's was rather peripheral. Also, further alternatives could be sought out.

To avoid too much speculation, I will point to a few elements that could play a role in Charles I's decision-making process.

First, he did not need to marry back into the Habsburgs or Luxemburgs to maintain good relations with them. He already had strong bonds with them and if a new royal marriage was intended to expand Charles I's dynastic network and entrench him even more into the regional dynastic kindred, it was justified to go for Elisabeth. Second, most probably it was not a surprise to Charles I that Władysław Łokietek was arranging for his coronation. In consequence, a new king was about to emerge in Central Europe, to whom Charles I had been tied very little. Hence, this marriage could serve as a start for establishing another allegiance in the region. Third, there was a long tradition of Árpád-Piast dynastic ties, and especially with the rulers of Cracow, that was worth perpetuating. Fourth, there was Árpádian blood flowing in Elisabeth's veins.

There is one more thing that has to be mentioned here. Namely, on the basis of the analysis above I argue that the foremost reason for concluding the Angevin-Piast marriage was the premature death of Beatrix Luxemburg. There was no teleological necessity that could be identified from the development of "international" affairs. Quite the contrary, from a historical perspective it was a sheer coincidence that at the time when Charles I was searching for a new wife, Elisabeth was available. Also, the king of Hungary was not compelled by external circumstances to make Łokietek's daughter his choice but there is a great deal of reasons that justify his decision. Moreover, it did not entail an immediate change in his politics.

In sum, the Angevin-Piast marriage was fundamentally caused by Charles I's determination, augmented by workings of the inter-subjective lordly identity, to produce an heir to his lordship. He hopelessly awaited one from Mary, failed to receive one from Beatrix, and looked forward to conceiving one with Elisabeth. The alliance was, therefore, an outcome of unpredictable developments of family-centered politics.

Conclusions

This chapter investigated the "international" context of the Angevin-Piast marriage between King Charles I of Hungary and Elisabeth, a daughter of King Władysław Łokietek of

Poland. Its essential research question was to determine political agendas that brought the two kings to agree upon a formation of close dynastic bonds. Since this marriage emerged to be consequential in its outcomes and laid foundations for close relations between the Hungarian and Polish monarchs, which resulted in a twelve-year period of dual kingdom of Hungary and Poland ruled by King Louis the Great of Hungary (1370-1382), over decades it have attracted scholarly attention and required some reconsiderations.

Various historiographies sought ways to explain the origins of the marriage that, in fact, was interpreted as a manifestation of political alliance. The overview of scholarly literatures revealed a multiplicity of approaches and explanations, and made an impression of inconclusiveness.

German-speaking historians usually presented the political developments in Central Europe as a reflection of the "international" rivalry between the Habsburgs and Wittelsbachs in the German kingdom. They also suggested that in the Angevin-Piast marriage an anti-Luxemburg spike materialized as a response to expansionist and domination-driven foreign politics of King John of Bohemia. Czech scholarship tended to marginalize the significance of the Angevin-Piast marriage and generally did not consider it as an anti-John act. Slovak historiography seemed to be disinterested in commenting the marriage. Hungarian historiography underlined two issues that made the marriage possible: the traditional Hungarian-Polish friendship and share in common interests, and Charles I's desire to secure a legitimate heir to his lordship. Polish scholarship willingly pointed to sustained and good Hungarian-Polish relations, underlined the long-lasting competition between John of Luxemburg and Łokietek over the rights to the Polish throne (and thus suggested clear anti-John rationale behind the marriage), and contextualized all these events within the framework of the "pan-European" rivalry between the Habsburgs and Wittelsbachs.

In order to meaningfully overcome the cacophony of competing historiographical interpretations, Łokietek and Charles I's political agendas were analyzed. This investigation was not, however, another attempt to deliver a chronological list of events that led to the conclusion of the Angevin-Piast marriage. Instead, it applied the findings about structures, mechanisms, routinized practices and features of lordly behavior acquired from the previous chapters. The research questionnaire was based on the three core dimensions of the lordly identity: the lordship-imperative, the noble family leader and title-seeker.

As for Łokietek's "international" agenda, it was concluded that the years between 1304 to 1320 Łokietek spent on restoring his lordship, upholding it, and striving to legitimize his renewed status by performing coronation. Throughout the first decade of his rule, his position was repeatedly contested both from within his lordship and from outside. All this resistance could be explained by utilizing the framework of the competing legitimacies that delivered alternatives to Łokietek's domination; especially, John of Luxemburg's claims to the succession in the kingdom of Poland. Only in the lands inherited after his father and brothers, Władysław's rule was never genuinely threatened.

However, the most important "international" issue, that is, the crown dispute, remained unresolved. In consequence, from January 1320 there were two monarchs who claimed to be kings of Poland: Władysław Łokietek and John of Luxemburg. Charles I contributed little to alleviate Łokietek's struggles and their mutual relations could be best described as positive but neutral. By 1320 there was also no armed conflict between Łokietek and John of Luxemburg. Instead, there was an unsuccessful dynastic marriage project. Still, Łokietek could expect that any serious menace to his lordship would arrive in connection with his rival incumbent of the Polish throne – John of Luxemburg. The kingdom of Hungary was not a part of this conflict and it possessed a significant asset: between Charles I and Łokietek there was no competing legitimacies that might cause conflict. Specifically, in the early fourteenth century they were neighbors without any overlapping claims.

On the whole, Charles I's "international" agenda between 1310 to 1320 was profoundly dominated by conflict with the Hungarian lords whose rejection of royal authority was a direct threat to Charles I's upholding his lordship. Reinstating peace and order across the kingdom was the pressing matter of his status and reputation as a lord-king. Charles I's principal goals were, therefore, closely connected to overpowering the resistance of his lord-subjects. In the 1310s there were numerous, and often successful, military campaigns throughout the kingdom. Charles I's greatest allies were his cousins, the Habsburgs, but in fact he rather effortlessly managed to retain good relations with John of Luxemburg and came to terms with his fatherly uncle, King Robert of Naples. Throughout the decade of fighting, his lordship was virtually free from aggressive acts coming from the neighboring rulers. An occasional conflict with King Milutin of Serbia was a regional controversy, and yet again Charles I proved effective in defending his claims to the disputed land. This relevant peace at

the realm's borders evidences that at that time, as an "international" entity, the kingdom of Hungary barely suffered from issues of the competing legitimacies. In this sense, the realm was safe from "international" aggression. Charles I's relations with Łokietek were vague; however, the extant material proves no hostilities between the rulers and suggests their neutral co-existence. They did not have common interests and shared no common enemies. Both sides were preoccupied with their own matters and hardly ever sought cooperation on the "international" arena.

Charles I and Łokietek's political agendas proved to be separated and rather unrelated. Thus, for upholding their respective lordships or for solving mutual controversies (of which there were none), the Angevin-Piast marriage was unnecessary. However, as lords, both Charles I and Łokietek were leaders of their families, that is, it was expected of them to generate male offspring and determine their future by providing them with powerful and prestigious lordships. And this was the area where Charles I and Łokietek's interests converged.

It was profitable for Łokietek to give consent to the marriage. It provided a prominent future for Łokietek's daughter and, at the same time, it offered Łokietek a gate to the elite milieu of the early fourteenth-century ruling houses. Besides, the Angevin-Piast marriage functioned as a form of recognition of Łokietek's newly acquired royal dignity and established an additional and meaningful reason to seek Charles I's *auxilium et consilium* when necessary. Furthermore, the marriage created a bond between the families of Łokietek and Charles I that devised the platform for working together. In the light of the entire "international" context, accepting Charles I's proposal was an optimistic step forward that occurred in a genuinely right moment. Łokietek could, for instance, count on sharing with the king of Hungary some sort of responsibility for Casimir, Łokietek heir's, future. Particularly, it could be hoped that any disturbances in the kingdom of Poland caused by a possible succession crisis (after Łokietek's imminent death) would not be ignored by Charles I due to his allegiance to his brother-in-law.

In all his marriages, Charles I pursued the strategy to establish family relations with the regional ruling families, because engendering regional affinities and allegiances was a reasonable tactics for enhancing his chances for successful lordship-building. As a noble family leader, Charles I genuinely suffered – as the source material indicated – from the lack of a legitimate heir. Within the context of the political culture, having an heir for Charles I meant

three added values: it stood for the prospect of stability in the kingdom, implied God's grace resting upon him, and improved his lordly status in the eyes of other lords.

These circumstances explain why Charles I was strongly willing to re-marry. It remained open to speculation why he chose Elisabeth. A few points can be made here. First, it may be rightly suggested that for Charles I it was merely the second choice, for the "plan A" was plainly linked to the Luxemburgs and Beatrix, John's sister. Second, Charles I did not need to marry back into the Habsburgs or Luxemburgs to maintain good relations with them. He already had strong bonds with them and if a new royal marriage was intended to expand Charles I's dynastic network and entrench him even more into the regional dynastic kindred, it was justified to go for Elisabeth. Third, most probably it was not a surprise to Charles I that Władysław Łokietek was arranging for his coronation. In consequence, a new king was about to emerge in Central Europe, to whom Charles I had been tied only very little. Hence, this marriage could serve as a start for establishing another allegiance in the region. Fourth, there was a long tradition of Árpád-Piast dynastic ties, and especially with the rulers of Cracow, that was worth perpetuating. Fifth, there was Árpádian blood flowing in Elisabeth's veins.

In sum, the Angevin-Piast marriage was fundamentally caused by Charles I's determination, augmented by workings of the inter-subjective lordly identity, to produce an heir to his lordship. He hopelessly awaited one from Mary, failed to receive one from Beatrix, and looked forward to conceiving one through Elisabeth. The alliance was, therefore, an outcome of unpredictable developments of family-centered politics. Otherwise, in 1320 Charles I and Łokietek did not have much in common.

CONCLUSIONS

At the outset of this study two central question have been posed: 1) what was the context and what motivations pushed Charles I and Władysław Łokietek to establish a dynastic marriage in 1320?; and 2) whether and how the "international" environment, in which both figures formed and strove to achieve their goals and objectives, can be theoretically characterized? The essential thread of argument that has been visible throughout the entire dissertation reflected my initial conviction that the meaningful elucidation of international phenomenon comes together with deepened reflection about the environment, where the phenomenon occurred, and the cultural context, which can considerably inform and impact behaviors and interests of international units. This work has been, therefore, an attempt to recognize the significance and influence of the thirteenth-century "international" world (that is, its natural structures and cultural meanings built on them) on how "international" actors defined and pursued their politics. This recognition has been attained by entering theoretical discussion about international system as a conceived entity and by supporting these considerations with empirical material accumulated from primary sources and scholarly literature. As a result, this study has emerged as an interdisciplinary project that strove to make meaningful use of a few current strands in IR theories and combine their stimulating intellectual merit with a set of various inquiries about the thirteenth-century political culture and its practical manifestations on the "international" level. On the whole, the central problem of the origins of the Angevin-Piast alliance of 1320 appeared in this study as a sort of capstone project that has been preceded by considerable reflection and research that was commisioned to provide solid grounding for interpreting Charles I and Władysław Łokietek's political agendas.

There is a number of findings that have been made in the course of this study. In this concluding part I will address five of them, which seem to me the most relevant.

First, the context of the Angevin-Piast marriage, which was concluded in 1320, and presumed motivations, which inspired Charles I and Władysław Łokietek to arrange it, have been determined. The analysis of their "international" agendas showed that between 1300 and 1320 both rulers had in fact little in common and thus, the marriage (that laid foundations

for the subsequent alliance) was an outcome of unpredictable developments of family-centered politics, that is, its arrangement derived from Charles I's determination to produce legitimate male offspring that could inherit the lordship, which he had been constantly establishing for two decades already. Otherwise, Charles I and Łokietek's political agendas proved to be separated and rather unrelated. For upholding their respective lordships or for solving mutual controversies (of which there were none), the Angevin-Piast marriage was unnecessary. It was chiefly their lordly identities as leaders of their families (preoccupied among others with securing prestigious positions for their children) that made Charles I and Łokietek's interests cross their paths. In conseqence, commonly held opinions – particualry popular with German and Polish scholarship – about anti-Luxemburg spike of this marriage and its direct link to the European-wide rivalry between the Habsburgs and Wittelsbachs were refuted.

Second, the theorized characteristic of the thirteenth-century "international" environment, into which Charles I and Łokietek were born, has been provided. Noteworthy, this description – although it has been researched and substantiated with historical evidence – still needs to be perceived as a tentative, because with this contribution a vast field for debate has been opened. Here I have demonstrated that the thirteenth-century "international" system was principally built of lordships. These lordships varied in size, wealth, and power (as kingdoms, duchies, free cities, bishoprics, counties, marks and noble domains did in relation to one another) yet they were identical in nature, that is, they all can be defined as units seeking domination of one or a few over a piece of land and people living there. These lordships were basically arranged into the two-dimensional hybrid structure of the "international" system that emphasized the lack of system-wide government (and thus induced the conditions of constant fear of aggression and encouraged mutual suspicion) co-exisiting with powerful cultural component that engendered hierarchical ordering of "international" units (lordships), underlining prestige, elite-standing and legitimate domination as central principles that governed behaviors of lordships.

Third, the reflection over the specificity of the thirteenth-century "international" system and the way how units in this system were positioned towards one another, allowed to conclude that political culture was a considerable factor capable of shaping lords' interests and objectives on the "international" stage. Furthermore, it revealed that lords of Latin

Christendom acted with noticeable conformity to the standards, values and principles determined by this political culture and expressed as patterns of behavior and routinized practices. In other words, this study has proposed lordly identity as a useful analytical tool that encompasses what it meant in practice (as opposed to normative prescriptions found in various literary works) to be a lord in the thirteenth-century Latin Christendom; or more specifically: what lords usually do when they interact with one another. Building on constructivist approach, borrowed from IR theories, it has been concluded that the inter-subjective lordly identity (that is, the collective understanding of being a lord without focusing on individual peculiarities) induced a few objective political interests: 1) to hold and sustain a lordship; 2) to produce male offspring and provide it with lordship that guarantees adequate social elite-standing; 3) to enlarge one's lordship, claim new titles, build power and prestige; 4) to retain a successful degree of conformity with rules and principles that make one a member of Christian society and allow for climbing the ladder of social hierarchy by creating honor and prestige. The concept of lordly identity and its content has formed the vital tool for elucidating the central problem of this study by sheding light on what sort of social role Charles I and Łokietek presumably subscribed to.

Fourth, the overview of national scholarly literatures concerning the Angevin-Luxemburg and Angevin-Piast marriages showcased how researcher-specific and context-contingent an analysis of medieval "international" politics can be. This study attempted to prove that such arbitrariness, which derives from the influence of the scholar's currently held assumptions about how international politics operates in general, can be mitigated, and that by reaching out for more theoretically-informed approaches one can interrogate medieval politics in its complexity and otherness in an inspiring, meaningful, and thought-provoking manner.

Fifth, this study has been a risky experiment, for it strove to bridge medieval studies with IR theories, which had been hardly ever done before, and if so – to my best knowledge – then solely by few IR scholars. Thus, this project had to swim against the current, because the standard IR account claims unlikely to theorize medieval politics and the medievalists could say that if such inter-disciplinary bridge has not been established yet, this is perhaps because the gap in-between is an abyss. However, despite all flaws and incoherences observable in this study, I argue that engaging in theoretical reflection about the nature of the thirteenth-

century "international" system, its structure and dominating political culture, is a promising endeavor and worth continuing. A few arguments supporting this opinion can be put forward here: 1) theory brings order to a mass of data by underlining the most meaningful elements and thus refining research questionnaire. Therefore, it helps to carry out a more structured and deepened inquiry; 2) theorizing requires of a researcher to put his/her underlying assumptions on the table and thus makes them open to criticism and debate by allowing others to interact with concepts (and their content) as they were initially brought to the research itself; 3) ultimately, theorizing offers alternative to three most common (and less successful in my opinion) approaches to medieval "international" politics: a) the undertheorized, common-sensical approach; b) the teleological, nation-state-centered and centralization-presuming approach; and c) the anticipatory approach that judges the past actions of "international" units by virtue of knowning their later outcomes and consequences.

I began and carried out this study with a strong conviction that it can be mutually profitable and informative for both disciplines to be intergrated into one body of research. This assertion, however, cannot be defended without confronting it with opinions and criticism of my fellow medievalists and IR scholars. I would therefore conclude by saying that I hope I have managed to tell something meaningful and convincing about the thirteenth-century "international" system, the inter-subjective lordly identity that was collectively constructed and shared by lords, and the origins of the Angevin-Piast alliance, which was preceded by a dynastic marriage contract concluded between two Central-European lords in 1320. It is, however, certain – due to this dissertation's experimental and innovative approach – that many issues discussed here will need further refinement. Last but not least, my final take-away from this work is the want that alternative approach proposed here will contribute to the debate how to effectively research medieval "international" politics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Abgarowicz, Kazimierz, and Brygida Kürbis, eds. *Kronika Wielkopolska*. Cracow: Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych Universitas, 2010.

Anjou-kori oklevéltár: Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia. Vol. 1. Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1990.

Anjou-kori oklevéltár: Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia. Vol. 2. Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1992.

Anjou-kori oklevéltár: Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia. Vol. 3. Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1994.

Anjou-kori oklevéltár: Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia. Vol. 4. Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1996.

Anjou-kori oklevéltár: Documenta Res Hungaricas Tempore Regum Andegavensium Illustrantia. Vol. 5. Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1998.

Baron, Arkadiusz, and Henryk Pietras, eds. *Dokumenty Soborów Powszechnych: Tekst Grecki, Łaciński, Polski*. Vol. 2. Cracow: Wydawnictwo WAM - Księża Jezuici, 2007.

Bielowski, August, ed. "Rocznik Małopolski, 965-1415." In *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, 3:135–202. Lwów: w komisie Księg. Gubrynowicza i Schmidta, 1878.

Charles IV. *Autobiography of Emperor Charles IV and His Legend of St. Wenceslas*. Edited by Balázs Nagy and Frank Schaer. Budapest: CEU Press, 2001.

Dokumenty Polskie Z Archiwów Dawnego Królestwa Węgier. Vol. 1. Ed. Stanisław Sroka. Cracow: Towarzystwo naukowe "Societas Vistulana," 1998.

Emler, Josef, ed. *Regesta Diplomatica Nec Non Epistolaria Bohemiae et Moraviae*. Vol. 2. Pragae: Haase, 1855.

———. , ed. *Regesta Diplomatica Nec Non Epistolaria Bohemiae et Moraviae*. Vol. 3. Pragae: Haase, 1890.

Fejér, György. *Codex Diplomaticus Hungariae Ecclesiasticus Ac Civilis*. Vol. 3.1. Budae: typis typogr. Regiae Vniversitatis Vngaricae, 1829.

Gallus Anonymus. *Kronika Polska*. Edited by Marian Plezia. Translated by Roman Grodecki. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1965.

Górka, Olgierd, ed. *Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis "Imperium Constantinopolitanum, Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Ruthenia,Ungaria, Polonia, Bohemia" Anno MCCCVIII Exarata*. Cracow: Gebethner: sumptibus Academiae Litterarum, 1916.

Ioannis Dlugossi Annales Seu Cronicae Incliti Regni Poloniae. Vol. VII/VIII. Ed. Kozłowska-Budkowa, Zofia, and Krystyna Pieradzka. Varsaviae: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1975.

Ioannis Dlugossi Annales Seu Cronicae Incliti Regni Poloniae. Vol. IX. Ed. Kozłowska-Budkowa, Zofia, Danuta Turkowska, and Krystyna Pieradzka. Varsaviae: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1978.

Kozłowska-Budkowa, Zofia. "Rocznik Kapitulny Krakowski." In *Monumenta Poloniae Historica, Series Nova*, Vol. 5. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1978.

Kürbis, Brygida, ed. "Rocznik Kapituły Gnieźnieńskiej." In *Monumenta Poloniae Historica, Series Nova*, 6:1–20. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1962.

Monumenta Poloniae Historica. Vol. 2. Lwów: nakładem własnym, 1872.

Monumenta Poloniae Historica. Vol. 3. Lwów: w komisie Księg. Gubrynowicza i Schmidta, 1878.

Monumenta Poloniae Historica. Vol. 6. Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1893.

Nagy, Imre, and Gyula Nagy. *Codex Diplomaticus Hungaricus Andegavensis. Anjoukori okmánytár*. Vol. 1. 7 vols. Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1878.

Palacký, František, ed. "Chronicon Aulae Regiae." In *Fontes Rerum Bohemicarum*, 4:1–337. Prague: Nákl. N. F. Palackého, 1884.

———. *Fontes Rerum Bohemicarum*. Vol. 4. Prague: Nákl. N. F. Palackého, 1884.

———. *Fontes Rerum Bohemicarum*. Vol. 5. Prague: Nákl. N. F. Palackého, 1884.

Perfecky, George A., ed. *The Galician-Volynian Chronicle*. München: W. Fink, 1973.

Piekosiński, Franciszek, ed. *Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Katedry Krakowskiej Ś. Wacława*. Vol. 1. Cracow: Akademia Umiejętności, 1874.

———. , ed. *Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Małopolski*. Vol. 2. Cracow: Akad. Umiejętności, 1886.

Potthast, August, ed. *Regesta pontificum Romanorum inde ab a. post Christum natum MCXCVIII ad a. MCCCIV*. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1957.

Preissner, Alojzy. "Dokumenty Władysława Łokietka. Chronologiczny Spis, Regesty I Bibliografia Edycji." *Rocznik Biblioteki PAN W Krakowie* 11 (1965): 197–296.

Ptaśnik, Jan. *Analecta Vaticana 1202-1366*. Sumpt. Academiae Litterarum Cracoviensis, 1914.

Ryszczewski, Leon, and Antoni Muczkowski, eds. *Codex Diplomaticus Poloniae*. Vol. 1. Varsaviae: s.n., 1847.

———. , eds. *Codex Diplomaticus Poloniae*. Vol. 2 p. 1. Varsaviae: s.n., 1848.

Sedlák, Vincent. *Regesta Diplomatica Nec Non Epistolaria Slovaciae*. Vol. 1. Bratislavae: Sumptibus Academiae Scientiarum Slovacae, 1980.

Stenzel, Gustav Adolf Harald, 1792-1854, ed, ed. *Urkunden Zur Geschichte Des Bisthums Breslau Im Mittelalter*. Breslau: Im Verlage bei Josef Max & Komp., 1845.

Sułkowska-Kurasiowa, Irena, and Stanisław Kuraś. *Bullarium Poloniae*. Vol. 1. Romae: Ecole française de Rome, 1982.

Szentpétery, Imre, ed. *Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum Tempore Ducum Regumque Stirpis Arpadinae Gestarum*. Vol. 1. Budapest, 1937.

———. , ed. *Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum Tempore Ducum Regumque Stirpis Arpadinae Gestarum*. Vol. 2. Budapest, 1938.

Voigt, Johannes, ed. *Codex Diplomaticus Prussicus: Urkunden-Sammlung Zur Ältern Geschichte Preussens Aus Dem Königl. Geheimen Archiv Zu Königsberg Nebst Regesten*. Vol. 1. Königsberg: Gebrüdern Vornträger, 1836.

Zakrzewski, Ignacy, ed. *Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski*. Vol. 1. Poznań: Nakł. Bibl. Kórnickiej, 1877.

———. , ed. *Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski*. Vol. 2. Poznań: Nakł. Bibl. Kórnickiej, 1878.

Secondary Literature

Abraham, Władysław. *Stanowisko kuryi papieskiej wobec koronacji Łokietka*. Lwów: s.n., 1900.

Abulafia, David. *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor*. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1988.

———. *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor*. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1988.

———. "The Kingdom of Sicily under the Hohenstaufen and Angevins." In *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, edited by David Abulafia, 5:497–524. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

———. "The Rise of Aragon-Catalonia." In *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, edited by David Abulafia, 5:644–67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Adashinskaya, Anna. "The Joint Cult of St. Simeon and St. Sava under Milutin: The Monastic Aspect." CEU, MA Thesis, Budapest College, 2009.

Althoff, Gerd. *Family, Friends and Followers: Political and Social Bonds in Medieval Europe*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

———. *Ottonowie: Władza królewska bez państwa*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2009.

———. *"Selig sind, die Verfolgung ausüben": Päpste und Gewalt im Hochmittelalter*. Stuttgart: Theiss, 2013.

Antonín, Robert. "Działalność polityczna Jana Luksemburskiego w okresie buntu krakowskiego wójta Alberta I jego ocena w czeskiej historiografii." *Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Historica* 13 (2013): 8–18.

———. *Zahraniční Politika Krále Václava II. v Letech 1283-1300*. Brno: Matice moravská, 2009.

———. *Zahraniční Politika Krále Václava II. v Letech 1283-1300*. Brno: Matice moravská, 2009.

Bagge, Sverre. *The Political Thought of The King's Mirror*. Odense: Odense University Press, 1987.

Bagi, Daniel. "Średniowieczna historia Polski w myśleniu historycznym Węgier i stosunki polsko-węgierskie w średniowieczu w historiografii węgierskiej XIX–XX W. Przeszłość i przyszłość." In *Widziane Z Zewnątrz*, edited by Michał Baczkowski, 117–30. Warsaw: DiG, 2011.

Bak, János M. *Königtum und Stände in Ungarn im 14.-16. Jahrhundert*. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1973.

Baldwin, Philip B. "Charles of Anjou, Pope Gregory X and the Crown of Jerusalem." *Journal of Medieval History* 38, no. 4 (2012): 424–42.

Balzer, Oswald Marian. *Królestwo Polskie: 1295-1370*. Cracow: Towarzystwo Naukowe "Societas Vistulana," 2005.

Barański, Marek Kazimierz. *Dominium Sądeckie: od książęcego okręgu grodowego do majątku klasztoru klarysek sądeckich*. Warsaw: UW, 1992.

———. *Dynastia Piastów W Polsce*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2006.

Barciak, Antoni. *Czechy oraz ziemie południowej Polski w XIII oraz w początkach XIV wieku: polityczno-ideologiczne problemy ekspansji czeskiej na ziemie południowej Polski*. Katowice: Uniwersytet Śląski, 1992.

———. "Czeskie echa koronacji Przemysła II." In *Przemysł II: Odnowienie Królestwa Polskiego*, edited by Jadwiga Krzyżaniak, 225–32. Poznań: IH. UAM, 1997.

———. *Ideologia polityczna monarchii Przemysła Otokara II: studium z dziejów czeskiej polityki zagranicznej w drugiej połowie XIII wieku*. Katowice: UŚ, 1982.

———. "Postrzeganie Polski i polskiej polityki władców czeskich przez autorów 'Kroniki Zbrasławskiej.'" In *In Tempore Belli et Pacis: ludzie, miejsca, przedmioty: Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana Prof. Dr. Hab. Janowi Szymczakowi w 65-lecie urodzin i 40-lecie pracy naukowo-dydaktycznej*, edited by Tadeusz Grabarczyk, Anna Kowalska-Pietrzak, and Tadeusz Nowak, 47–56. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo DiG, 2011.

Bardach, Juliusz. *Historia Ustroju i Prawa Polskiego*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1993.

Barkin, J. Samuel. *Realist Constructivism*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Baron, Arkadiusz, and Henryk Pietras, eds. *Dokumenty Soborów Powszechnych: Tekst Grecki, Łaciński, Polski*. Vol. 2. Cracow: Wydawnictwo WAM - Księża Jezuici, 2007.

Barthélemy, Dominique, and Stephen D. White. "The 'Feudal Revolution.'" *Past & Present* 152 (August 1996): 196–223.

Bartnicki, Mariusz. "The Halych-Volhynian Chronicle as a Source for the History of Central Eastern Europe in the 13th Century." *Quaestiones Medii Aevi Novae* 13 (2008): 349–68.

Baszkiewicz, Jan. *Polska czasów Łokietka*. Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1968.

Benda, Kálmán, ed. *Magyarország történeti kronológiája 1970-ig*. Vol. 1. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1981.

Berend, Nora. *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and "Pagans" in Medieval Hungary, C. 1000-C. 1300*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Bertényi, Iván. *Magyarország az Anjouk korában*. Budapest: Gondolat, 1987.

Bertényi, Iván, and Gábor Gyapay. *Magyarország rövid története*. Budapest: Maecenas, 1992.

Bertényi Iván, and Szende László. *Anjou-királyaink és Zsigmond kora*. Budapest: Officina, 2011.

Bieniak, Janusz. "Wiec ogólnopolski w Żarnowie 3-7 czerwca 1319 R. a geneza koronacji Władysława Łokietka." *Przegląd Historyczny* 64 (1973): 469–83.

———. *Wielkopolska, Kujawy, ziemie łęczycka i sieradzka: wobecproblemu zjednoczenia państwowego w latach 1300 - 1306*. Wodzisław Sląski: Wydawnictwo Templum, 2011.

Biskup, Marian, and Gerard Labuda. *Dzieje Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Prusach: Gospodarka, Społeczeństwo, Państwo, Ideologia*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1986.

Bisson, Thomas N. *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of European Government*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009.

———. "The 'Feudal Revolution.'" *Past & Present* 142 (February 1994): 6–42.

———. "The 'Feudal Revolution': Reply." *Past & Present* 155 (May 1997): 208–25.

Bobková, Lenka. "Český Král a Hrabě Lucemburský Jan." In *Lucemburkové: Česká Koruna Uprostřed Evropy*, edited by František Šmahel and Lenka Bobková, 54–70. Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2012.

Bokwa, Ignacy, ed. *Breviarium Fidei: Wybór doktrynalnych wypowiedzi Kościoła*. Poznań: Księgarnia Świętego Wojciecha, 2007.

Bosl, Karl, ed. *Handbuch der Geschichte der Böhmischen Länder*. Vol. 1. Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1967.

Brezováková, Blanka. "Konsolidačné snahy Karola I. v Uhorsku po zvolení za kráľa (1310-1317)." *Historický Časopis* 41, no. 4 (1993): 361–78.

———. "Politicky zapas Anjouovcov o Uhorsku korunu." *Historicky Casopis* 39, no. 6 (1991): 569–87.

Brown, Warren, and Piotr Górecki, eds. *Conflict in Medieval Europe: Changing Perspectives on Society and Culture*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.

Bull, Hedley. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

Burchill, Scott, ed. *Theories of International Relations*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001.

Burns, J. H., ed. *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought C. 350-C. 1450*. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Canning, Joseph. *Ideas of Power in the Late Middle Ages, 1296-1417*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Čechura, Jaroslav. *Lucemburkové na Českém trůně*. Vol. 1. Praha: Libri, 1999.

Cetwiński, Marek. *Rycerstwo śląskie do końca XIII w.: Pochodzenie - Gospodarka - Polityka*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1980.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton Studies in Culture/power/history. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Charvátová, Kateřina. *Václav II: Král Český a Polský*. Praha: Vyšehrad, 2007.

Chibnall, Marjorie. *The Normans*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2002.

Chirovsky, Nicholas L. *An Introduction to Ukrainian History*. Vol. 1. New York: Philosophical Library, 1981.

Cox, Eugene. "The Kingdom of Burgundy, the Lands of the House of Savoy and Adjacent Territories." In *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, edited by David Abulafia, 5:358–74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Csukovits, Enikő. *Az Anjouk Magyarországon I.: I. Károly és uralkodása*. Budapest: MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2012.

Czaputowicz, Jacek. *Teorie Stosunków Międzynarodowych: krytyka i systematyzacja*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2007.

Dąbrowski, Dariusz. *Daniel Romanowicz król Rusi: (ok. 1201-1264): biografia polityczna*. Cracow: Avalon, 2012.

Dąbrowski, Jan. *Elżbieta Łokietkówna 1305-1380*. Cracow: Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych Universitas, 2007.

———. "Z Czasów Łokietka. Studia nad stosunkami polsko-węgierskimi w XIV w. Część I." *RAU. Wydział Hist.-Filoz.* 34 (1916): 278–326.

Dalewski, Zbigniew. *Ritual and Politics: Writing the History of a Dynastic Conflict in Medieval Poland*. Leiden: Brill, 2008.

Davies, Rees. "The Medieval State: The Tyranny of a Concept?" *Journal of Historical Sociology* 16, no. 2 (June 2003): 280–300.

Deliyannis, Deborah Mauskopf, ed. *Historiography in the Middle Ages*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003.

Dickinson, G. Lowes. *The European Anarchy*. New York: Macmillan, 1916.

Długopolski, Edmund. *Władysław Łokietek na tle swoich czasów*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, 1951.

Dobosz, Józef. *Kazimierz II Sprawiedliwy*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 2011.

Drelicharz, Wojciech. *Annalistyka małopolska XIII-XV Wieku: kierunki rozwoju wielkich roczników kompilowanych*. Cracow: PAU, 2003.

———. *Idea zjednoczenia Królestwa w średniowiecznym dziejopisarstwie polskim*. Cracow: Towarzystwo Naukowe Societas Vistulana, 2012.

Duby, Georges. *La société aux XIe et XIIe siècles dans la région Mâconnaise*. Bibliothèque Générale de l'École Pratique Des Hautes Études. Paris: Armand Colin, 1953.

Dunbabin, Jean. *Charles I of Anjou: Power, Kingship and State-Making in Thirteenth-Century Europe*. London; New York: Longman, 1998.

Dunne, Tim, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight. "The End of International Relations Theory?" *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 405–25.

Elman, Colin, and Miriam Fendius Elman. "History vs. Neo-Realism: A Second Look." *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 182–95.

Elminowski, Jacek. *Stosunki polityczne między Piastami a Luksemburgami i Wittelsbachami w pierwszej połowie XIV wieku*. Toruń: Wydaw. Adam Marszałek, 2002.

Engel, Pál. "Az Ország újraegyesítése. I. Károly küzdelmei az oligarchák ellen (1310-1323)." *Századok* 122, no. 1–2 (1988): 89–146.

———. *Realm of St Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895-1526*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2001.

Engel, Pál, Gyula Kristó, and András Kubinyi. *Magyarország története, 1301-1526*. Budapest: Osiris, 2002.

Epstein, Charlotte. "Constructivism or the Eternal Return of Universals in International Relations. Why Returning to Language Is Vital to Prolonging the Owl's Flight." *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 499–519.

Fennell, John Lister Illingworth. *The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200-1304*. London: Longman, 1993.

Ferguson, Yale H. "Approaches to Defining 'Empire' and Characterizing United States Influence in the Contemporary World." *International Studies Perspectives* 9, no. 3 (August 2008): 272–80.

Fine, John V. A. *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.

Fischer, Markus. "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices." *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 427–66.

Font, Márta. *Árpád-házi királyok és Rurikida fejedelmek*. Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 2005.

Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Penguin Books, 1992.

Galasso, Giuseppe. *Il Regno di Napoli. Il Mezzogiorno Angioino e Aragonese (1266-1494)*. Vol. 1. Torino: UTET, 1992.

Gąsiorowski, Antoni, ed. *Urzędnicy małopolscy XII-XV Wieku: Spisy*. Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinskich, 1990.

Gawlas, Sławomir. "Człowiek uwikłany w wielkie procesy - przykład Muskaty." In *Człowiek w społeczeństwie sredniowiecznym*, edited by Roman Michałowski, 391–401. Warsaw: DiG, 1997.

———. *O kształt zjednoczonego Królestwa: niemieckie władztwo terytorialne a geneza społecznoustrojowej odrębności Polski*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo DiG, 1996.

———. "'Verus Heres'. Z badań nad świadomością polityczną obozu Władysława Łokietka w początku XIV w." *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 95, no. 1 (1988): 77–104.

Goldberg, Eric Joseph. *Struggle for Empire: Kingship and Conflict under Louis the German, 817-876*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.

Górecki, Piotr. *Economy, Society, and Lordship in Medieval Poland, 1100-1250*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992.

———. "The Early Piasts Imagined: New Work in the Political History of Early Medieval Poland." *The Mediaeval Journal* 1 (2011): 81–102.

Górecki, Piotr, Nancy Van Deusen, and János M. Bak, eds. *Central and Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages: A Cultural History*. International Library of Historical Studies 51. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2009.

Grabski, Andrzej Feliks. *Dzieje historiografii*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2003.

Green, Louis. "Florence." In *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, edited by David Abulafia, 5:479–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Grodecki, Roman, Stanislaw Zachorowski, and Jan Dąbrowski. *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej*. Edited by Jerzy Wyrozumski. Vol. 1. Cracow: Wyd. Prac Nauk. Universitas, 1995.

Guillemain, Bernard. *Les Papes d'Avignon, 1309-1376*. Histoire (Editions Du Cerf). Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1998.

Györffy, György. *Az Árpád-kori Magyarország történeti földrajza. vol. 1.* Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1966.

Halden, Peter. "From Empire to Commonwealth(s): Orders in Europe 1300-1800." In *Universal Empire. A Comparative Approach to Imperial Culture and Representation in Eurasian History*, edited by Peter

Fibiger Bang and Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, 280–303. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Hall, Rodney Bruce. "Moral Authority as a Power Resource." *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 591–622.

Hall, Rodney Bruce, and Friedrich V. Kratochwil. "Medieval Tales: Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse of History." *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 479–91.

Hartmann, Wilfried, and Kenneth Pennington. *The History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140-1234: From Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008.

Haskins, Charles Homer. *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927.

Haynes, Jeffrey. *Introduction to International Relations and Religion*. Harlow: Pearson, 2007.

Herczegh, Géza. *Magyarország külpolitikája, 896-1919*. Budapest: Kossuth, 1987.

Herde, Peter. "The Empire. From Adolf of Nassau to Lewis of Bavaria, 1292-1347." In *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1300-c.1415*, edited by Michael Jones, 6:515–50. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Hlebionek, Marcin. *Bolesław Pobożny i Wielkopolska jego czasów*. Cracow: Avalon, 2010.

Hoensch, Jörg K. *Die Luxemburger: eine Spätmittelalterliche Dynastie Gesamteuropäischer Bedeutung 1308-1437*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2000.

———. *Geschichte Böhmens: Von der Slavischen Landnahme bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*. 2., aktualisierte u. ergänzte Auflage. München: C.H. Beck, 1992.

Holsti, Kalevi Jaakko. "Theorizing the Causes of Order: Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society." In *Theorising International Society: English School Methods*, edited by Cornelia Navari, 125–47. Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Hóman, Bálint. *Magyar középkor*. Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1938.

Hummer, Hans. "Were the Lords Really All That Bad?" *Historical Methods* 43, no. 4 (2010): 165–70.

Iggers, Georg G. *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*. Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1997.

Iwańczak, Wojciech. *Jan Luksemburski: dzieje burzliwego żywota i bohaterskiej śmierci króla Czech i hrabiego Luksemburga w 21 odsłonach*. Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 2012.

Jackson, Robert. "Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape." *Political Studies* 47 (1999): 431–56.

Jackson, Robert H., and Georg Sørensen. *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Jasiński, Kazimierz. "Genealogia Władysława Łokietka i jego najbliższej rodziny." *Zapiski Kujawsko-Dobrzyńskie. Historia* 6 (1987): 13–32.

———. "Polityka małżeńska Władysława Łokietka." In *Genealogia: rola związków rodzinnych i rodowych w życiu publicznym w Polsce średniowiecznej na tle porównawczym*, edited by Andrzej Radzimiński and Jan Wroniszewski, 9–28. Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, 1996.

———. *Rodowód Piastów małopolskich i kujawskich*. Poznań; Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Historyczne, 2001.

———. *Rodowód Piastów śląskich: Piastowie wrocławscy, legnicko-brzescy, świdniccy, ziębiccy, głogowscy, żagańscy, oleśniccy, opolscy, cieszyńscy i oświęcimscy*. Edited by Tomasz Jurek. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Avalon, 2007.

Jones, Rhys. "Mann and Men in a Medieval State: The Geographies of Power in the Middle Ages." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series* 24, no. 1 (1999): 65–78.

Jordan, William C. *Europe in the High Middle Ages*. London: Penguin Books, 2001.

———. "The Capetians from the Death of Philip II to Philip IV." In *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, edited by David Abulafia, 5:279–313. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Jørgensen, Knud Erik. *International Relations Theory: A New Introduction*. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Jureczko, Andrzej. *Henryk III Biały książę wrocławski (1247-1266)*. Cracow: Avalon, 2007.

Jurek, Tomasz. *Dziedzic Królestwa Polskiego książę głogowski Henryk (1274-1309)*. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Avalon, 2006.

———. "Pod władzą obcego króla. Rządy czeskie w latach 1291-1306." In *Król w Polsce XIV I XV wieku*, edited by Andrzej Marzec and Maciej Wilamowski, 187–220. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego "Societas Vistulana," 2006.

———. "Polska droga do korony królewskiej 1295-1300-1320." In *Proměna Středovýchodní Evropy Raného a Vrcholného Středověku: Mocenské Souvislosti a Paralely*, edited by Martin Wihoda, 139–91. Brno: Matice moravská pro Výzkumné středisko pro dějiny střední Evropy: prameny, země, kultura, 2010.

Jurek, Tomasz, Stanislaw Szczur, and Krzysztof Ożóg. *Piastowie: Leksykon Biograficzny*. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1999.

Kaiser, Jürgen. *Der Kampf um die Krone: Königsdynastien im Mittelalter*. Stuttgart: Theiss, 2011.

Kalmo, Hent, and Quentin Skinner, eds. *Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Karasiewicz, Władysław. *Jakób II Świnka, Arcybiskup Gnieźnieński 1283-1314*. Poznań: nakł. Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 1948.

Kasekamp, Andres. *A History of the Baltic States*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2010.

Kelly, Samantha. *The New Solomon: Robert of Naples (1309-1343) and Fourteenth-Century Kingship*. Leiden: Brill, 2003.

Keohane, Robert O., ed. *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

Kętrzyński, Wojciech. *O rocznikach polskich*. Cracow: Akademia Umiejętności, 1896.

Kirschbaum, Stanislav J. *A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival*. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Klaniczay, Gábor. *Holy Rulers and Blessed Princesses: Dynastic Cults in Medieval Central Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Kłodziński, Adam. "Łokietek a Habsburgowie (1300-1332)." *RAU. Wydział Hist.-Filoz.* 59 (1916): 255–77.

Köpeczi, Béla, and Katalin Péter, eds. *History of Transylvania*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1994.

Kopičková, Božena. *Eliška Přemyslovna: Královna Česká 1292-1330*. Praha: Vyšehrad, 2003.

Korai magyar történeti lexikon, 9-14. század. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1994.

Kozłowski, Wojciech. "Developing the Concept of 'Succession Crisis': New Questions to Social and Political Circumstances of Łokietek's Rise to Power." *Studia Mediaevalia Bohemica* 3 (2011): 231–48.

———. *Prelude to the Angevins: Marriages of the Arpads and Piasts Reconsidered (986-Ca. 1250)*. Budapest: CEU, Budapest College, MA Thesis, 2008.

Krieger, Karl Friedrich. *Die Habsburger im Mittelalter: Von Rudolf I. bis Friedrich III.* Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1994.

———. *Rudolf von Habsburg*. Darmstadt: Primus, 2003.

Kristó, Gyula. *A rozgonyi csata*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1978.

———. *Csák Máté tartományúri hatalma*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1973.

———. *Csák Máté. Magyar História. Életrajzok*. Budapest: Gondolat, 1986.

———. *Az Anjou-kor háborúi*. Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1988.

———. "Die Macht der Territorialherren in Ungarn am Anfang des 14. Jahrhunderds." In *Etudes Historiques Hongroises 1985*, 1:597–614. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1985.

———. "I. Károly király harcai a tartományurak ellen (1310-1323)." *Századok* 137, no. 2 (2003): 297–347.

———.Károly Róbert családja." *Aetas* 20, no. 4 (2005): 14–28.

Kristó, Gyula, and Ferenc Makk. *Károly Róbert emlékezete*. Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó, 1988.

Krzyżaniak, Jadwiga, and Jerzy Ochmański. *Władysław II Jagiełło*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1990.

Kučera, Matúš. *Cesta Dejinami: Stredoveké Slovensko*. Bratislava: Perfekt, 2002.

———. *Slovenské Dejiny*. Bratislava: Literárne informačné centrum, 2008.

Kucharski, Gerard. "Rywalizacja Kujawsko-Wielkopolska o kasztelanię lądzką w połowie XIII wieku." *Ziemia Kujawska* 18 (2005): 5–28.

Kurtyka, Janusz. *Odrodzone Królestwo: monarchia Władysława Łokietka i Kazimierza Wielkiego w świetle nowszych badań*. Cracow: Towarzystwo Naukowe "Societas Vistulana," 2001.

———. "Posiadłość, dziedziczność i prestiż." *Roczniki Historyczne* 65 (1999): 161–94.

Labuda, Gerard, and Marian Biskup, eds. *Historia dyplomacji polskiej. Połowa X w. - 1572*. Vol. 1. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1982.

Labuda, Gerard, Waldemar Michowicz, and Marian Biskup. *The History of Polish Diplomacy X-XX C.* Warsaw: Sejm Publishing Office, 2005.

Latham, Andrew. *Theorizing Medieval Geopolitics: War and World Order in the Age of the Crusades*. New York: Routledge, 2012.

———. "Theorizing the Crusades: Identity, Institutions, and Religious War in Medieval Latin Christendom." *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 223–43.

Linehan, Peter. "Castile, Portugal and Navarre." In *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, edited by David Abulafia, 5:668–99. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Lloyd, Simon. "The Crusading Movement 1096-1274." In *The Oxford History of the Crusades*, edited by Jonathan Simon Christopher Riley-Smith, 35–67. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Łodyński, Marian. *Uzależnienie polski od papiestwa a kanonizacja Św[iętego] Stanisława*. Cracow: [Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych] "Universitas," 1995.

Lucas, Henry S. "The Low Countries and the Disputed Imperial Election of 1314." *Speculum* 21, no. 1 (January 1946): 72–114.

Mądrowska, Ewa A. *Domini Naturales: Portrety polskich władców w "Chronicon Polonorum" Mistrza Wincentego*. Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, 2010.

Manikowska, Halina. "Andegaweni." In *Dynastie Europy*, edited by Antoni Mączak, 42–74. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 2003.

Mannová, Elena, ed. *A Concise History of Slovakia*. Bratislava: Historický ústav SAV, 2000.

Marzec, Andrzej. "Między Przemysłem II a Władysławem Łokietkiem, czyli kilka uwag o Królestwie Polskim na przełomie XIII I XIV wieku." *Roczniki Historyczne* 78 (2012): 83–106.

———. *Urzędnicy małopolscy w otoczeniu Władysława Łokietka i Kazimierza Wielkiego (1305-1370)*. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego "Societas Vistulana," 2006.

Matuszewski, Jacek. "Polska Monarchia Patrymonialna - opis średniowiecznej rzeczywistości czy produkt dziewiętnastowiecznej historiografii?" In *Król w Polsce XIV i XV wieku*, edited by Andrzej Marzec and Maciej Wilamowski, 137–53. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego "Societas Vistulana," 2006.

McGrath, Alister E. *Christian History: An Introduction*. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

Meltzer, Franz. "Die Ostraumpolitik König Johanns von Böhmen, ein Beitrag zur Ostraumfrage im 14. Jahrhundert." G. Fischer, 1940.

Menache, Sophia. "The Failure of John XXII's Policy toward France and England: Reasons and Outcomes, 1316-1334." *Church History* 55, no. 4 (1986): 423–37.

Menzel, Michael. "König Johann von Böhmen und die Wittelsbacher." In *Johann Der Blinde, Graf von Luxemburg, König von Böhmen, 1296-1346: Tagungsband der 9es Journées Lotharingiennes, 22-26 Oktober 1996, Centre Universitaire de Luxembourg*, edited by Michel Pauly, 307–42. Luxembourg: Section historique de l'institut grand-ducalde Luxembourg, 1997.

Mezník, Jaroslav. *Lucemburská Morava: 1310-1423*. Praha: Lidové noviny, 1999.

Michałowska, Teresa. *Literatura polskiego średniowiecza: leksykon*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2011.

Michalowski, Roman. *Princeps Fundator: studium z dziejów kultury politycznej w Polsce X-XIII wieku*. Warsaw: Zamek Królewski, 1993.

Mika, Norbert. *Mieszko książę raciborski i pan Krakowa - dzielnicowy władca Polski (ok. 1142-1211)*. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Avalon T. Janowski, 2010.

Morris, Colin. *The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250*. Oxford [England]: New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1989.

Münkler, Herfried. *Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States*. Cambridge: Polity, 2007.

Nowacki, Bronisław. *Przemysł I   1220/1221-1257: Książę suwerennej Wielkopolski*. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Avalon, 2013.

———. *Przemysł II: Odnowiciel Korony Polskiej: (1257-1296)*. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Avalon, 2007.

Nowakowski, Tomasz. *Malopolska elita władzy wobec rywalizacji o tron krakowski w latach, 1288-1306*. Bydgoszcz: Wydawn. Uczelniane WSP w Bydgoszczy, 1993.

Nye, Joseph S. *The Future of Power*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011.

Osiander, Andreas. *Before the State: Systemic Political Change in the West from the Greeks to the French Revolution*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Osiński, Jacek. *Bolesław Rogatka: Książę legnicki, dziedzic monarchii Henryków śląskich (1220/1225 - 1278)*. Kraków: Wydawn. Avalon, 2012.

Paner, Anna. *Luksemburgowie w Czechach: historia polityczna ziem czeskich w latach 1310-1437*. Gdańsk: Wydaw. Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2004.

———. *Przemyślidzi. Od Borzywoja I do Przemysła II Otokara. Ludzie i wydarzenia w latach 874-1278*. Gdańsk: Wydaw. Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2008.

Pánek, Jaroslav, and Oldřich Tůma. *A History of the Czech Lands*. Prague: Karolinum Press, 2009.

Paszkiewicz, Henryk. *The Origin of Russia*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1954.

Pauly, Michel, ed. *Johann der Blinde, Graf von Luxemburg, König von Böhmen, 1296-1346: Tagungsband Der 9es Journées Lotharingiennes,22-26 Oktober 1996, Centre Universitaire de Luxembourg*. Luxembourg: Section historique de l'institut grand-ducalde Luxembourg, 1997.

Pelczar, Sławomir. *Władysław Odonic - książę Wielkopolski, wygnaniec i protektor Kościoła (ok. 1193-1239)*. Cracow: Wydawn. Avalon, 2013.

Perniš, Jaroslav. "Karol Róbert z Anjou a jeho manželky." *Historický Časopis* 45, no. 2 (1997): 177–93.

———. *Vznešená Žena stredoveku: princezné v dynastickej politike Anjouovcov*. Budmerice: Rak, 2003.

Pietras, Tomasz. *"Krwawy wilk z pastorałem": Biskup krakowski Jan zwany Muskatą*. Warszawa: Semper, 2001.

Pomian, Krzysztof. *Przeszłość jako przedmiot wiary; historia i filozofia w myśli średniowiecza.* Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawn. Naukowe, 1968.

Pop, Ioan-Aurel, and Thomas Nägler, eds. *The History of Transylvania*. Vol. 1. Cluj-Napoca: Romanian Cultural Institute, Center for Transylvanian Studies, 2005.

Pór, Antal. "Magyar-lengyel érintkezés a XIV-ik században." *Századok* 37 (1903): 201–18, 308–26.

Prokop, Krzysztof Rafał. *Arcybiskupi Gnieźnieńscy w Tysiącleciu*. Cracow: nakł. Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności, 2000.

Pryor, John H. "The Maritime Republics." In *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, edited by David Abulafia, 5:419–46. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Pyter, Magdalena. *Oswald Balzer i lwowska szkoła historycznoprawna*. Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2010.

Reuter, Timothy, and Janet Laughland Nelson. *Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities*. Cambridge, UK ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Reuter, Timothy, and Chris Wickham. "The 'Feudal Revolution.'" *Past & Present* 155 (May 1997): 177–208.

Reynolds, Susan. *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

———. *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900-1300*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.

———. "The Historiography of the Medieval State." In *Companion to Historiography*, edited by Michael Bentley, 109–29. London; New York: Routledge, 1997.

Riley-Smith, Jonathan Simon Christopher, ed. *The Oxford History of the Crusades*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Rist, Rebecca. *The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198-1245*. London: Continuum, 2009.

Rousseau, Constance M. "A Papal Matchmaker: Principle and Pragmatism during Innocent III's Pontificate." *Journal of Medieval History* 24, no. 3 (1998): 259–71.

Rymar, Edward. *Rodowód Książąt pomorskich*. Szczecin: Książnica Pomorska im. Stanisława Staszica, 2005.

Scheibelreiter, Georg. *Die Babenberger: Reichsfürsten und Landesherren*. Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2010.

Schein, Sylvia. *Fideles Crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land, 1274-1314*. Oxford [England]: New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1991.

Schroeder, Paul. "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory." *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 108–48.

Schubert, Ernst. "Die Deutschen Königswahlen zur Zeit Johanns Des Blinden." In *Johann Der Blinde, Graf von Luxemburg, König von Böhmen, 1296-1346: Tagungsband Der 9es Journées Lotharingiennes, 22-26 Oktober 1996, Centre Universitaire de Luxembourg*, edited by Michel Pauly, 135–66. Luxembourg: Section historique de l'institut grand-ducalde Luxembourg, 1997.

Seibt, Ferdinand. "Johann der Blinde in der Historiographie des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts." In *Johann der Blinde, Graf von Luxemburg, König von Böhmen, 1296-1346: Tagungsband der 9es Journées Lotharingiennes, 22-26 Oktober 1996, Centre Universitaire de Luxembourg*, edited by Michel Pauly, 9–20. Luxembourg: Section historique de l'institut grand-ducalde Luxembourg, 1997.

Semkowicz, Aleksander, ed. *Krytyczny rozbiór Dziejów Polskich Jana Długosza, do roku 1384*. Cracow: Akademia Umiejętności, 1887.

Serczyk, Władysław A. *Historia Ukrainy*. Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinskich, 1990.

Sheehan, Michael. *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*. London; New York: Routledge, 1996.

Skwierczyński, Krzysztof. "Fundacje możnowładcze w Polsce XI I XII wieku. Możni i ich fundacje jako problem badawczy." In *Animarum Cultura: studia nad kulturą religijną na ziemiach polskich w średniowieczu*, edited by Halina Manikowska and Wojciech Brojer, 63–93. Warsaw: Instytut Historii PAN, 2008.

Sleat, Matt. "Bernard Williams and the Possibility of a Realist." *European Journal of Political Theory* 9, no. 4 (2010): 485–503.

Sobociński, Walerian. "Historia rządów opiekuńczych w Polsce." *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne* 2 (1949): 227–354.

Sobotka, Roman. *Powoływanie władcy w Rocznikach Jana Długosza*. Warsaw: Liber, 2005.

Sørensen, Georg. "Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution." *Political Studies* 47 (1999): 590–604.

Spěváček, Jiří. *Jan Lucemburský a jeho doba, 1296-1346: k prvnímu vstupu českých zemí do svazku se Západní Evropou*. Praha: Svoboda, 1994.

———. *Král diplomat: Jan Lucemburský, 1296-1346*. Praha: Panorama, 1982.

———. "Neue Gesichtspunkte zur Beurteilung der Politik Sowie der Historischen Rolle Königs Johann von Böhmen." In *King John of Luxembourg (1296-1346) and the Art of His Era: Proceedings of the International Conference, Prague, September 16-20, 1996*, edited by Klára Benešovská, 11–18. Prague: Ústav dějin umění AV ČR, 1998.

Sroka, Stanisław A. "Methods of Constructing Angevin Rule in Hungary in the Light of Most Recent Research." *Quaestiones Medii Aevi Novae* 1 (1996): 77–90.

Subtelny, Orest. *Ukraine: A History*. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1994.

Szczur, Stanisław. *Historia Polski: Średniowiecze*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2002.

———. "Król w Dyplomacji Polskiej (1320-1370)." In *Król w Polsce XIV I XV wieku*, edited by Andrzej Marzec and Maciej Wilamowski, 239–70. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego "Societas Vistulana," 2006.

———. "W sprawie sukcesji andegaweńskiej W Polsce." *Roczniki Historyczne* 75 (2009): 1–53.

Szende, László. "Le Rôle d'Elisabeth Piast Dans La Diplomatie de Hongrie." In *La Diplomatie Des États Angevins Aux XIIIe et XIVe Siècles*, edited by Zoltán Kordé and István Petrovics, 225–33. Szeged: Roma: JATEPress ; Accad. d'Ungheria in Roma, 2010.

———. "Magyarország külpolitikája 1242-1246 Között." *Első század* 2 (2000): 299–349.

———. "Piast Erzsébet a hitves, az édesanya, a mecénás." In *Károly Róbert és Székesfehérvár*, edited by Iván Bertényi, 78–100. Székesfehérvár: Székesfehérvári Egyházmegyei Múzeum, 2011.

———. "Piast Erzsébet és udvara (1320-1380)." ELTE BTK, Doctoral dissertation, 2007.

Szymczak, Jan. "Walki o kasztelanię lędzką w połowie XIII w." *Rocznik Kaliski* 7 (1974): 9–46.

Teschke, Benno. "Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages: History and Theory." *International Organization* 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 325–58.

———. *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations*. London ;New York: Verso, 2003.

Thomas, Heinz. *Deutsche Geschichte Des Spätmittelalters 1250-1500*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1983.

Tiplic, Ioan Marian. *Die Grenzverteidigung Siebenbürgens im Mittelalter (10.-14. Jahrhundert)*. Heidelberg: Arbeitskreis für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde, 2007.

Toch, Michael. "Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs." In *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, edited by David Abulafia, 5:375–404. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Třeštík, Dušan, Jaroslav Čechura, and Vladimír Pechar. *Králové a knížata zemí Koruny České*. Praha: Rybka Publishers, 2001.

Ullmann, Walter. *A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages*. London; New York: Routledge, 2003.

Uruszczak, Wacław. *Historia państwa i prawa polskiego (966-1795)*. Warsaw: Oficyna Wolters Kluwer Polska, 2010.

———. "Następstwo tronu w Księstwie Krakowsko-Sandomierskim i Królestwie Polskim (1180-1370)." *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne* 62, no. 1 (2010): 15–36.

Vajda, Stephan. *Die Babenberger: Aufstieg einer Dynastie*. Wien: Orac, 1986.

Veldtrup, Dieter. "Ehen Aus Staatsräson. Die Familien- und Heiratspolitik Johanns von Böhmen." In *Johann Der Blinde, Graf von Luxemburg, König von Böhmen, 1296-1346: Tagungsband Der 9es Journées Lotharingiennes, 22-26 Oktober 1996, Centre Universitaire de Luxembourg*, edited by Michel Pauly, 483–543. Luxembourg: Section historique de l'institut grand-ducalde Luxembourg, 1997.

Velké Dějiny Zemí Koruny České 1197-1250. Vol. 2. Praha ; Litomyšl: Paseka, 2000.

Velké Dějiny Zemí Koruny České 1250-1310. Vol. 3. Praha ; Litomyšl: Paseka, 2002.

Velké Dějiny Zemí Koruny České 1310-1402. Vol. 4a. Praha ; Litomyšl: Paseka, 2003.

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics." In *Neorealism and Its Critics*, edited by Robert O. Keohane, 322–45. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

———. *Man, the State, and War; a Theoretical Analysis.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

———. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.

Watt, J. A. "The Papacy." In *The New Cambridge Medieval History, c.1198-c.1300*, edited by David Abulafia, 5:107–63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Watts, John. *The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300-1500*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Weiler, Björn. "Image and Reality in Richard of Cornwall's German Career." *The English Historical Review* 113, no. 454 (November 1998): 1111–42.

———. "The 'Negotium Terrae Sanctae' in the Political Discourse of Latin Christendom, 1215-1311." *The International History Review* 25, no. 1 (2003): 1–36.

———. "Kings and Sons: Princely Rebellions and the Structures of Revolt in Western Europe, C. 1170–c.1280." *Historical Research* 82, no. 215 (February 2009): 17–40.

———. *Kingship, Rebellion and Political Culture: England and Germany, c.1215-c.1250*. Basingstoke [England] ;New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

———. "Suitability and Right: Imperial Succession and the Norms of Politics in Early Staufen Germany." In *Making and Breaking the Rules: Succession in Medieval Europe, c.1000-c.1600: Proceedings of the Colloquium Held on 6-7-8 April 2006, Institute of Historical Research, University of London = Établir et Abolir Les Normes: La Succession Dans l'Europe Médiévale, Vers 1000-Vers 1600: Actes de La Conférence Tenue Les 6, 7 et 8 Avril 2006*, 71–86. Turnhout: Brepols, 2008.

Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391–425.

———. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Whalen, Brett Edward. *Dominion of God: Christendom and Apocalypse in the Middle Ages*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009.

Wiatr, Jerzy Józef. *Socjologia Polityki*. Warsaw: Europejska Wyższa Szkoła Prawa i Administracji, 2009.

Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen. *In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Wiszewski, Przemysław. *Domus Bolezlai: Values and Social Identity in Dynastic Traditions of Medieval Poland (c. 966-1138)*. Leiden: Brill, 2010.

———. *Henryk II Pobożny: biografia polityczna*. Legnica: Muzeum Miedzi, 2011.

Włodarski, Bronisław. *Polityka Jana Luksemburczyka wobec Polski za czasów Władysława Łokietka*. Lwów: nakł. Towarzystwa Naukowego, 1933.

———. *Polska i Czechy w drugiej połowie XIII i początkach XIV wieku (1250-1306)*. Lwów: Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1931.

———. *Polska i Ruś: 1194-1340*. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1966.

———. "Rywalizacja o ziemie pruskie w połowie XIII wieku." *Roczniki Towarzystwa Naukowego W Toruniu* 61, no. 1 (1956): 5–69.

Wojciuk, Anna. *Dylemat potęgi: praktyczna teoria stosunków międzynarodowych*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2010.

Wyrozumski, Jerzy. *Kazimierz Wielki*. Wrocław [etc.]: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1986.

Wyszkowski, Michał. *Ustrój polityczny Wielkopolski w latach 1138-1296*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2009.

Zajączkowski, Stanisław. *Studia nad terytorialnym formowaniem ziemi łęczyckiej i sieradzkiej*. Łódź: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1951.

Zientara, Benedykt. *Heinrich der Bärtige und seine Zeit: Politik und Gesellschaft im mittelalterlichen Schlesien*. München: R. Oldenbourg, 2002.

Żmudzki, Paweł. *Studium podzielonego Królestwa: książę Leszek Czarny.* Warsaw: Wydawn. Neriton, 2000.

———. *Władca i wojownicy: narracje o wodzach, drużynie i wojnach w najdawniejszej historiografii Polski i Rusi*. Monografie Fundacji Na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej. Wrocław: Wydawn. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2009.

Zsoldos, Attila. "Az ifjabb király országa." *Századok* 139 (2005): 231–60.

———. *Nagy uralkodók és kiskirályok a 13. században*. Budapest: Kossuth/Metropol, 2009.