

THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN BOUNDARY MAINTENANCE OF EUROPARTIES

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Submitted to
Central European University
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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Budapest, Hungary
2013

ABSTRACT

The paper examines the role of party ideology in boundary maintenance of thirteen Europarties. The focus of the analysis is on the relationship between the Europarties and their national member parties, especially on the conditions that national parties have to fulfill in order to be accepted to the Europarty and what they have to do once they are accepted and function within the Europarty. Based on the qualitative content analysis of the party statutes, internal rules and regulations, the paper argues that ideology influences organizational structure of the Europarties (size of the party, party staff, party finance, decision-making within the party) and thus also how Europarty treats its applicants and members and whether and to what extent Europarty applies control mechanism such as disciplinary measures. First part of the analytical chapter describes party organizations at the European level and identifies factors that influence how selective or inclusive Europarties are. Second part focuses on the two cases studies: one when disciplinary measures were applied (suspension of Slovak party SMER-SD in 2006 from the Party of European Socialists) and one where disciplinary measures were not applied (Hungarian party Fidesz, 2012 and the European People's Party).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project would not be possible without the guidance of my supervisor, Professor Zsolt Enyedi. I am grateful for his valuable comments, time and contagious passion about party politics.

My gratitude goes to those political elites who in spite of the amount of work and lack of time, expressed their interest in this project. From the European People's Party, I want to thank Mr. Christian Kremer and Nikolas Briec for their availability and willingness to share their experience and opinions. From the Party of European Socialists, my thanks go to Ms. Katarina Nevedalova and Boguslaw Liberadzki.

Furthermore, my gratitude goes to Daniel I. for his insider stories from the European Commission and numerous discussions about Hungarian politics. I also want to thank the International Visegrad Fund for the support in 2012/2013.

Finally, I want to thank all my friends and colleagues from the CEU community for an enjoyable intellectual journey and experience. Special thanks go to my family, Mina, Veronika, Samuel and Brian.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AECR	Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists
AENM	Alliance of European National Movements
ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
DSS	Democratic Party of Serbia
EAF	European Alliance for Freedom
EC	European Commission
ECPM	European Christian Political Movement
ECR	European Conservatives and Reformists
EDP	European Democratic Party
EDU	European Democratic Union
EFA	European Free Alliance
EFD	Europe of Freedom and Democracy
EGP	European Green Party
EL	Party of European Left
ELDR	Federation of Liberal, Democratic and Reform Parties of the European Communities
EP	European Parliament
EPP	European People's Party
EU	European Union
EUCD	European Union of Christian Democrats
EUD	EUDemocrats
Fidesz	Hungarian Civic Union
Greens/EFA	European Greens–European Free Alliance
GUE/NGL	European United Left–Nordic Green Left
HZDS	People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
LSDSP	Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party

MDF	Hungarian Democratic Forum
MELD	Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy
PES	Party of European Socialists
PNTCD	Christian-Democratic National Peasants' Party
S&D	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
SMER-SD	Direction – Social Democracy
SNP	Slovak National Party
SOC	Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community
UDF	Union of the Democratic Forces

1. INTRODUCTION

People like me, and our political community, must accept that unfortunately the ideals we represent do not enjoy majority support in this House either. Our ideals are undoubtedly Christian and based on personal responsibility; we find national sentiment to be an important and positive thing, and we believe that families are the foundations of the future. It may be that a great many people believe otherwise, but that makes our position no less a European one. It may be that with this we are in a minority in Europe, but this position is no less a European position, and we are free to represent this conviction. You may disagree with what I will quote now, but I personally profess Schumann's view that there will either be a Christian democracy in Europe or there will be no democracy at all. This, ladies and gentlemen, is a European position (Viktor Orban in EP 2012).

Since 2011 Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has visited the European Parliament (EP) multiple times with the same purpose: to explain the current political developments in Hungary. Most of the time, he was attacked by the representatives of party groups in parliament that are opponents to the European People's Party (EPP) where Orban's party Fidesz belongs. On the other hand, the EPP party group and its respective Europarty keep silence. Why do they not respond to the criticism of their opponents? Do they have any mechanism to address potential problems with member parties? And what is the relationship between the national member parties and their respective Europarties?

The majority of political parties in the EU member states are also members of the transnational European parties (from now on "Europarties") and party groups within the European Parliament with a similar ideological profile, forming so-called "party families". Both forms of parties (at national and European level) are political organizations, however, the functioning of a national political party is regulated by the legislature at the national level, whereas functioning of the European party is (to some extent) defined by the regulations of the EP and Council (No 2004/2003). It might be clear why political parties want to join and

remain within the transnational political structure¹, but little attention has been paid to the analysis of the relationship between transnational party federations and their member parties, especially what they have to fulfill in order to be accepted to the European party and what parties have to do once they are accepted and function within the broader European structure.

Although belonging to the same “Europarty” and party family, national member parties are still independent units at the national level and thus, “discipline” within the organization at the EU level may be hard to maintain, especially when a national member party does not adhere to the proclaimed values, goals or “ideology” of the party at the European/EU level. Party discipline of the individual members of the European Parliament is widely studied by scholars (Kreppel 2002; Bardi 2005) e.g. by party cohesiveness measured by roll-call votes, however, there is a lack of literature on the discipline of the national member party as a party belonging to the transnational Europarty. Thus, the aim of this project is to shed both theoretical and the empirical light on the problem of “boundary maintenance” of Europarties. The main research question guiding this project is: What determines how selective or inclusive Europarties are? Based on the study of thirteen Europarties (EPP, PES, ALDE, EGP, AECP, EL, EDP, EFA, EAF, EUD, ECPM, AENM and MELD) and two case studies (PES and SMER in 2006; EPP and Fidesz in 2012), I argue that ideology influences the organizational structure of Europarties (size of the party, party staff, party finance, decision-making within the party) and thus also how a Europarty treats its applicants and members, and whether and to what extent a Europarty applies any kind of “disciplinary measures”.

¹For example Edoardo Bressanelli in “National Parties and Group Membership in the European Parliament: Ideology or Pragmatism?” identifies two main reasons why a national party join the group in the European Parliament. Traditional argument is that ideological and policy compatibility of the member party matters and that a national party joins the political group that best matches its programmatic position. Another explanation is more pragmatic: it is argued that offices and pragmatic goals are better advanced by joining the largest and most influential group in the EP. By applying the multinational logit model on the 2009 euro barometer data, Bressanelli finds that “ideology or policy compatibility is the most important factor behind a party transnational affiliation” (Bressanelli; 2012). However, the exception is Central and Eastern Europe, where the ideological fit “appears to be more problematic” compared to the west European parties (for the “new” parties he reports 58.7% success of predicting the transnational affiliation of the parties compared to 71.4% in Western Europe). For more explanation, see for example Enyedi, 2006.

The topic is puzzling for several reasons. First, there have been numerous examples when a national party and a Europarty were in an ideological conflict. Although such a situation is not unique, it has never been properly studied and analyzed. The second reason why this topic is relevant to study is that a threat of suspension and exclusion may be in some cases used as a tool to influence (and potentially change) politics on the national level² and thus, may have a “blackmail” potential. Hence, it is important to understand the mechanism behind it. Third, the topic has broader implications for party politics in Eastern Europe, where membership in the European party groups and Europarties still does matter for its democratic image, international credential, local affiliates etc. (Enyedi 2006). Fourth, I believe that there is a real gap in the literature about the relationship between political parties on the EU level and on the national level from the point of view of disciplinary measures, as described above.

In order to analyze how selective or inclusive the Europarties are, how Europarty responds to the violation of its internal rules and what are the factors that influence membership status of the national party, it is important to identify 1) the formal rules of Europarties concerning membership status of the national member parties 2) the cases when change of membership status/disciplinary measures were applied. Hence, the data on internal organization and structure of thirteen Europarties are analyzed with the focus on party size, party finance, party staff and internal party structure. The data were obtained through the content analysis of statutes and internal regulations of Europarties, qualitative analysis of documents and articles and in addition, semi-structured elite interviews with representatives of the EPP and the PES were conducted.

The structure of this paper is the following: First, I provide the theoretical background to the debate about Europarties with the focus on the factors that may influence organizational

² For example, suspension of SMER-SD was used to give the signal that party should reconsider formation of the government with xenophobic party SNP.

structure of the parties. Then I describe the methodology used in the analysis, followed by the analytical part of the paper that presents the data and the analysis of the party organizations at the European level and identifies factors that influence how selective or inclusive the Europarties are. The last part of the research focuses on the two cases: one when disciplinary measures were applied (PES and SMER-SD in 2006) and one where disciplinary measures were not applied (EPP and Fidesz in 2013).

2. EUROPARTIES: ORGANIZATIONS WITH DIFFERENT STRUCTURES

The main research question outlined in the introduction touches upon several topics that need to be addressed before proceeding to the analytical chapter. Analyzing the phenomenon of Europarties' boundary maintenance, this research combines the literature on a) transnational parties and party families, b) on party organization (sociology), c) on party ideology, d) on formal rules in organizations, and in addition, the literature on other broad topics such as the impact of Europeanization on national party systems. This shall not frustrate the reader, since most of the social phenomena are complex in their nature. Given the limited scope of the thesis, this chapter presents the theoretical framework inevitable for further analysis. Thus, the chapter starts with the definition of Europarties and moves to the concept of boundary maintenance and its connectedness to the party's internal structure. Next, the literature on party ideology and its possible impact on party organization is presented. Finally, formal rules within the organizations are briefly discussed. In the second part of the chapter, concepts that are used in this study are presented and operationalized.

2.1. Theoretical Framework

European political parties and especially party groups within the European parliament are extensively discussed in the literature (Kreppel 2002; Bardi 2005; Hix & Lord 1997; Hix 2007, 2011; Hix & Hoyland 2011; etc.). Much of the research has naturally been set in the broader context of the debate on the European Parliament and supranational party system. Concerning the relationship between national parties and transnational structures, most scholars focus only on the European party groups within the EP, arguing that outside the EP, there is little evidence that the party system on the European level exists (e.g. Kreppel 2002). Luciano Bardi, for instance, argues that there are several reasons why scholars focus on EP party groups. He claims that the European transnational organizations appear to be “very

weak institutions” from the point of media access, staffing, finance and internal organization when compared to the EP party groups that have better material resources and are also better developed (Bardi 2002).

For a similar reason, little is known about the internal rules and regulations of the Europarties outside the EP, which surprisingly applies also to European party groups. Amie Kreppel argues that the informal nature of the internal rules and procedures “makes a large-scale, rigorous analytical study [...] of the party groups impossible” but the practical reason behind it is that internal rules are sometimes not easily accessible (Kreppel 2002, 51). Nevertheless, we still do have some data about the formal structures and rules of Europarties. Important information is provided by Katz & Mair (1992) in their Data Handbook on party organizations, where they describe in detail three transnational European parties: the European’s People Party (EPP), Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community (SOC) and Federation of Liberal, Democratic and Reform Parties of the European Communities (ELDR). However, their focus is not on how Europarties treat their members but rather on the organizational structure of emerging Europarties per se.

Before proceeding further, it is important to emphasize the difference between Europarties and party groups in the European Parliament. The “Europarties” that this paper is referring to were firstly formed as transnational party federations before the first elections of the EP (mid-1970s) and they operate outside the European Parliament. The first legal definition of political parties at the European level can be found in Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and Council from November 2003, created primarily for the purpose of their funding. According to the Regulation, a political party at European level is defined as political party or an alliance of political parties which satisfies certain conditions. Those are according to Article 3:

- (a) it must have legal personality in the Member State in which its seat is located;
- (b) it must be represented, in at least one quarter of Member States, by Members of the European Parliament or in the national Parliaments or regional Parliaments or in the regional assemblies, or it must have received, in at least one quarter of the Member States, at least three per cent of the votes cast in each of those Member States at the most recent European Parliament elections;
- (c) it must observe, in particular in its programme and in its activities, the principles on which the European Union is founded, namely the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law;
- (d) it must have participated in elections to the European Parliament, or have expressed the intention to do so (Article 3, Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003).

By this definition, there are currently thirteen Europarties that qualify for the funding from the EP: EPP, PES, ALDE, EGP, AECR, EL, EDP, EFA, EAF, EUD, ECPM, AENM and MELD. Political groups on the other hand function within the European Parliament and thus are also older, formed in the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1953 (Hix & Hoyland, 2011). Currently, there are seven political groups in the EP: EPP, S&D, ALDE, Greens/EFA, ECR, GUE/NGL and EFD (see Table A1 in Appendix).

Hence, in order to analyze boundary maintenance of Europarties, we inevitably come across three different units that cooperate with each other: national parties, Europarties and party groups in the EP. According to Luciano Bardi, three types of structures at European level correspond to Katz and Mair's "three faces" of party organization. He sees national parties as equivalent to "party on the ground", party groups in the EP correspond to "party in public office" and Europarties (extra parliamentary organizations) represent "party in central office" (Bardi in Luther & Muller-Rommel 2002, 296). In this sense, Katz and Mair in their work on how parties organize propose two different approaches to studying party organizations. The first approach sees party as a unitary actor and allows the researcher to study everything that can be found in their Data Handbook (1992): development and structure of party membership, numbers and allocation of party staff, distribution of power, organization of internal party organs, party finance, etc. (Katz & Mair 1995). The second approach looks at three different

elements of the party (above mentioned “three faces” of party organization) and analyzes how they interact with each other.

This study combines both approaches. In the first part of the empirical analysis, each Europarty is analyzed as a “unitary actor” with different internal structure. The advantages of unitary approach are twofold: it allows us to analyze each and every Europarty with similar tools as those often applied for the analysis of national party. Moreover, the unitary approach allows us to compare Europarties and thus, see the differences and similarities in their organizational structure. The second part of the empirical study (case studies) employs “three faces” approach and analyzes how a Europarty (and to some extent a party group) interact with its member parties.

One interesting observation that has emerged during the course of the research is that neither national parties nor party groups in the EP see the Europarty as one actor that unites their member parties and respective party group in the EP. On the contrary, the majority of contacted members of the EP underlined the fact that Europarty and its party group in the EP are two distinct organizations with different rules and structures. Despite the fact that Europarties are represented in the EP by their party groups and that members of parliament often hold an office at Europarty level, contacted members of the EP did not feel competent to answer the question about Europarties.

2.1.1. Connecting Boundary Maintenance to Internal Party Structure

The term “boundary-maintenance” is frequently used in a variety of fields from psychological and social-psychological to social-scientific studies. According to Lowenthal et al., boundary-maintenance refers to “activities used to maintain the separation between one system and another, where the separation may be between individuals or between groups” (Lowenthal et al. 1997, 201). The simplest definition of “boundary” is given by Anthony P. Cohen,

according to whom “the boundary marks the beginning and the end of a community”. Communities interact with each other (or other entities) “from which they are, or wish to be distinguished” (Cohen 1985, 12).

The literature distinguishes between the social boundaries and symbolic boundaries, where social boundaries represent forms of social differences among the communities which are translated for example into “identifiable patterns of social exclusion or class and racial segregation” (Lamont & Molnar 2002, 169). More important for this research are symbolic boundaries, defined as “conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space” or “tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality” which “[...] separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership” (Lamont & Molnar 2002, 168). In this sense, boundaries of Europarties are symbolic, constructed by the Europarty itself.

Instinctively, voters tend to differentiate one party from another by its ideological position, or the “identity” it represents. Before the impact of the party ideology on the organizational structure is discussed, let me focus the reader’s attention to the other factor that is directly connected to the party’s internal structure: the degree of institutionalization. This view is presented by Panebianco, who hypothesizes that political parties differ according to the “degree of institutionalization” which is measured on two scales: the organization’s degree of autonomy (in relation to its external environment) and degree of systemness (interdependence of organization’s internal sectors). In his view, organizations that are more autonomous have also more defined boundaries and thus, it is possible to identify “where it [organization] starts and where it leaves off” (Panebianco 1988, 56). The degree of systemness is measured by the “internal structural coherence of the organization” - low degree of systemness means that internal sub-groups can act autonomously (heterogeneous organization) and vice versa, high

degree of systemness implies centralized control and interdependency of organization's sub-groups (Panebianco 1988, 56).

Panebianco also identifies five indicators of a party's degree of institutionalization: 1) the degree of development of the extra-parliamentary organization, 2) the degree of homogeneity of organizational structures at the same hierarchical level, 3) sources of finance, 4) relations with external collateral organizations, and 5) the degree of correspondence between the statutory norms and actual power structure. Thus, highly institutionalized parties are those who 1) have a well developed central bureaucratic apparatus, 2) have homogenous organizational structure throughout the national territory, 3) with plurality of regular financial sources, 4) dominate over the external organizations, 5) and their actual power corresponds to the party's statutory norms (Panebianco 1988, 58-59).

It is important to emphasize that Panebianco's concept of party institutionalization was created for analysis of parties at national level. Thus, the question is to what extent (if at all) can we apply the same concept on Europarties, the organizations that scholars classify as "weak institutions" (Bardi 2002)? Since the focus of this study is on the factors that influence how selective or inclusive the Europarties are, the degree of party institutionalization at European level is not primarily addressed. However, the study may contribute to the further research in this area since it provides data on all Europarties, whether more or less developed and institutionalized.

More important for this analysis are factors that Panebianco labels as "technical", such as the number of party's hierarchical levels, size of the organization, internal specialization, etc. Although he argues that technical factors are of secondary importance when compared to the role of power, conflict or alliances within the organization, they still do play a role in structuring party organization (Panebianco 1988, 183). Among the most important

technicalities that influence party organization are the size of the party, its relationship vis-à-vis the environment and its professionalization (Panebianco 1982). In this paper I analyze factors that Panebianco and others (e. g. Katz & Mair) identify as important, since they are possible independent variables that influence the dependent variable of this research (how selective/inclusive Europarties are).

Party size: one of the most important factors?

The party literature relates the size of the party (as an independent variable) to the internal cohesion of the party, participation/mobilization of members, and bureaucratization (Panebianco 1988). It is argued that the difference between small and large organizations accounts for the different levels of organizations' internal cohesion. Because in small organizations "shared political values and tight organizational ranks are easier to attain [...]" (Panebianco 1988, 187), small and highly centralized groups are usually more cohesive than large-sized groups. However, Panebianco argues that the small size of the organization is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition and thus, the small size of the organization does not necessarily imply the internal cohesion of the organization. Nevertheless, he concludes that the relationship between the organization's size and political homogeneity "probably" exists (also because the leaders believe and act as if it exists) and affects the level of internal cohesion.

Party size also influences the participation and mobilization of its members (small organizations are more participatory) since the increased number of members usually implies higher division of labor within the organization. Hence, the increase in the size of the organization leads to the increase of the bureaucratization and centralization of the authority (Panebianco 1988, 187). Moreover, Panebianco argues that size affects bureaucratization in two opposing ways - it stimulates vertical and horizontal differentiation, which results in

administrative expansion (“bureaucratic hypertrophy”) and at the same time, after reaching a certain threshold it permits the decrease of administration (“the economy of scale”) (Panebianco 1988, 188).


Party size can be also treated as a dependent variable. Size is on the one hand the factor that can influence the structure and functioning of the organization, but on the other hand, it can be an important character of the organization per se. Panebianco claims that leaders often try to expand or reduce the size of the organization (“control over organizational boundaries”) through “tampering with membership recruitment” (Panebianco 1988, 190). The reasons why leaders want to control the size of the organization could be different, most often connected to certain goals such as receiving financial aid from the state (when the amount of state funding depends on the number of members) or electoral success (“catch-all party” strategy, penetration to different social environments; more members→ more diversity→ more potential supporters). In this view, a Europarty may be reluctant to apply strong disciplinary measures (suspension or expulsion) when any conflict within the party arises, since the size of the party would be directly influenced. This was one of the most common arguments in the media when explaining why EPP did not suspend Fidesz from its structures: it would lose votes in the European Parliament.³

Besides the party size, other technical factors and their influence on Europarties’ relationship with applicant and member parties are studied in this project, such as number of party staff, decision-making, party structure and party finance. Before that, the literature on party ideology, the factor that is argued to be crucial for this analysis, needs to be scrutinized.

³ However, the interviews with the EPP representatives revealed that this argument is not valid, since suspension or expulsion from the EPP does not necessarily imply suspension/exclusion from EPP’s party group in the EP.

2.1.2. Impact of Ideology on Party Structure

The Europarties represent different party families or “familles spirituelles”, as Klaus von Beyme calls them (von Beyme 1985). According to the author, there are nine “familles spirituelles”: 1) liberal and radical, 2) conservative, 3) workers’ (social democratic and socialist), 4) regional and ethnic, 5) agrarian, 6) Christian democratic, 7) communist, 8) extreme right, and 9) ecological. The Figure 1 shows the position of main party families in the two-dimensional space, as presented by Hix and Lord (1997). In this analysis, the main focus is on the left-right dimension since it represents the basic distinction among different Europarties.



Note: The mean position of each party family is shown by an X.
The ellipses represent the ranges of the member parties of each party family.

Figure 1. Positions of the party families

Source: Hix & Lord 1997, 50

Several authors claim that ideology is a factor that can shape the organizational structure and style of the party (von Beyme 1985; Hix & Lord 1997; Enyedi & Linek 2008). Klaus von Beyme, for example, argues that parties of the Left (e.g. Social Democrats) are more

consistent in their programmes when compared to the parties of the Right (e.g. Christian Democrats who are considered to be centre-right parties) (von Beyme 1985). Similarly, Bolleyer finds that “ideology can account for the basic choice between a power-concentrating (i.e. hierarchical) and power-dispersing party structure” (Bolleyer 2012, 317). The influence of ideology on the style of party organization is summarized by Enyedi & Linek:

Centre-right parties, as opposed to leftist parties, tend to be less bureaucratized, have fewer staff members, a simpler structure, more individualized leadership and the ‘party-in-public-office’ tends also to have a more elevated role. Parties that have more individualistic ideologies tend also to have ‘lighter’ organization and weaker embeddedness, while parties subscribing to a more collectivist and corporatist type of conservatism have developed more complex party organization and rely more heavily on affiliate organizations (Enyedi & Linek 2008, 455).

Enyedi & Linek identify three main reasons for correlation between ideology and type of party organization: First, there may be a direct causal impact of ideology on party organization, for example when the “ideology of party explicitly addresses issues of organization and cooperation among citizens” (e.g. belief in direct democracy, collectivism, Führerprinzip and so on) (Enyedi & Linek 2008, 457). However, they add that examples of direct causal impact of ideology on party organization are not numerous. Second, the covariation may be “spurious” and there is no direct causal relationship between ideology and party organization (and vice versa), but both variables are influenced by the third factor (e.g. social group that party represents). Third, correlation may be a result of historical path dependency and members of one ideological family may resemble each other, for example, because their origins are similar (Enyedi & Linek 2008, 458).

Although Enyedi and Linek conclude that direct causal relationship between ideology and party organization is not so common, they acknowledge the fact that ideology can shape the organizational structure of parties. Building on the argumentation of Enyedi & Linek, Bolleyer and others, I argue that ideology shapes the organizational structure of the

Europarties and influences how organizations work, what kind of rules parties have and also, whether they strictly apply what is written in their internal rules and regulations. Thus, the ideological differences between the Europarties may account for the differences in the formal rules of organization, adherence to those rules and application of any type of disciplinary measures. It is argued that ideology does not only play a crucial role in determining collective identity of newly-formed organizations, as Panebianco argues (Panebianco 1988, 53), but influences also the way how Europarties manage their boundaries and define their identity towards external actors.

2.1.3. Formal Rules and Organizations

As outlined above, formal rules of Europarties – the requirements for the entry to the party, obligations of members and potential disciplinary measures – are at the main focus of this study. The main reason for analysis of formal rules is that rules in organizations “consist of explicit or implicit norms, regulations, and expectations that regulate the behavior of individuals and interaction among them” (March et. al 2000, 5) but moreover, they “define organizational identities and boundaries and stabilize linkage with other organizations” (March et. al 2000, 9). The authors also claim that important rules are not necessarily written down and vice-versa, rules that are written may sometimes be very loosely connected to actual behavior within the organization (March et. al 2000). Considering the relationship between the size of the party and rules within the organization, March et al. argue that

It is commonly hypothesized that increases in either organizational size or complexity or both will lead to increased use of written rules, which are alternatives to informal relationships and understandings. A small, homogeneous, simple world can, it is argued, be coordinated and controlled through shared values and beliefs that make explicit rules unnecessary and even wasteful. As organization grows in scale, diversity and complexity, these informal and value-based mechanisms become less feasible. Relevant people are not connected to one another, or if connected, they do not share understanding, experience, or meaning. By this analysis, rules are substitutes for informal understandings. They will be more frequently created (and perhaps more often

subject to revision) as organization becomes more heterogeneous (March et al. 2000, 62).

Internal rules not only define identity and boundaries of the organization, but also regulate life within the organization, especially when a conflicting situation emerges. There is a great amount of work about the ideological disputes inside the European Parliament and numerous scholars have analyzed the party group cohesion and party discipline within the EP. We also know about the “agents with the two principals problem”⁴. However, there is no theory and almost no work about the cases when a national member party adopts a position or takes a step which is in some form of conflict with the Europarty or even against the ideological position of the European party. In the 2006 book edited by Paul G. Lewis and Zdenka Mansfeldova, “The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe”, Zsolt Enyedi touches upon the problem of the possible conflict between the national member and the European party. He argues that Europarties are able “to inflict damage” when national member parties divert from the established norms (Enyedi 2006, 78). However, the broader analysis of the relationship between the two actors, why they sometimes are in an ideological conflict, how they behave when such a conflict arises, why they behave so and what factors determine the response from both sides, is still missing. By addressing all these problems, this project aims to fill the gap in the existing literature and thus, provide the first step for the further research.

2.2. Conceptual Framework

To remind the reader, the research question of this project is: What determines how selective or inclusive Europarties are? Thus, before the analysis of independent variables can be introduced, several concepts need to be defined: what is meant by “selective” and “inclusive”

⁴ For example, Hix & Hoyland argue that MEP’s are under the constant tension between two principles - one from the national party and another from the European party group, which may sometimes contradict each other (Hix & Hoyland 2011, 55)

and what the term “Europarties” stands for. Since the definition of Europarties was provided in first part of this chapter, let me proceed to the conceptualization of boundary maintenance. In the context of this study, boundary maintenance of Europarties refers to selectivity or inclusivity of Europarties in terms of their members. Borrowing Panebianco’s words again, by defining where the boundaries of Europarties are, we can also identify “where it starts and where it leaves off” (Panebianco 1988, 56).

Operationalization of the term selective/inclusive

In order to identify how selective or inclusive the Europarties are, we need to analyze three aspects: 1) how easy/hard is to enter a Europarty 2) how easy/hard it to remain a member of Europarty and 3) how easy/hard is to be excluded from a party. Hence, selectivity/inclusivity is measured by three dimensions (see Table 1): application, membership and control.⁵

Table 1. Operationalization of “selective/inclusive”

Dimension	Application		Membership			Control		
	Entry Req.	Strength of voting	Open to individuals	Exclusive membership	Obligations of members	Official review of member performance	Categories of disciplinary measures	Strength of voting
Categories	-high -medium -low	-high -medium -low	-yes -no	-yes -no	-financial -additional	- yes - no	-1, 2 -3 -7	-high -medium -low

Source: compiled by the author

1. Application (corresponding to interview questions about applicants)

Indicators:

⁵ These three dimensions were created for the purpose of this analysis, since there are no similar concepts in the literature directly connected to the study of Europarties.

Entry requirements: the type of requirements that applicant party has to fulfill in order to be accepted to the Europarty. Three-scale typology is applied. **Low** entry requirements indicate that applicant parties must subscribe to the political programme of the Europarty and accept statutes and/or internal regulations of the party (common for all thirteen Europarties, thus labeled as “low”). **Medium** entry requirements indicate that in addition to acceptance of programme and statutes/internal rules, the applicant party must fulfill additional criteria – most commonly to be a viable political force at the national/regional level. **High** entry requirements indicate that in addition to requirements described above, applicant party must subscribe to some form of declaration of principles (either directly attached to statutes or not) and/or respect standing orders of Europarty.

Strength of voting: Here, **low** indicates that applicant parties are approved by majority vote. **Medium** corresponds to absolute majority/superqualified majority and **high** strength indicates that applicants must be approved by three-quarters of allocated votes or by consensus. To allow comparability, the differences among the party organs that take decisions are not taken into account. Most commonly, the decision is being made by the council or the Congress.

2. **Membership** (corresponding to interview questions about members)

Indicators:

Open to the individual members: **Yes** indicates that individual members can join the Europarty, **no** indicates that individual members cannot join the Europarty.

Exclusivity of membership: **Yes** indicates that member parties cannot join other Europarty, **no** indicates that membership in Europarty is not exclusive.

Member obligations: **Financial** means that member parties must in addition to entry requirements officially fulfill only financial obligations. **Additional** indicates that member

parties have other obligations as well, such as report on their domestic development or “maintain regular contacts”, etc.

3. Control (corresponding to disciplinary measures questions)

Indicators:

Official review of member performance: **Yes** indicates that some form of official review of membership status exists, **no** indicates that officially, there is no review process.

Categories of disciplinary measures: presents the number of categories of disciplinary measures that Europarty recognizes in its statutes/internal regulations. The number indicates how many different levels of ex post rules a Europarty can apply.

Strength of voting: **Low** indicates that applicant parties are approved by majority vote. **Medium** corresponds to absolute majority/superqualified majority and **high strength** indicates that applicants must be approved by three-quarters of allocated votes or by consensus. Again, differences among party organs are not taken into account.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The analytical part of the paper consists of 1) the analysis of the party organizations at the European level and 2) case study of two Central European parties: Slovak social-democrat party SMER-SD (Direction-Social Democracy) and conservative party Fidesz, (Hungarian Civic Union). The main research question is: What determines how selective or inclusive the Europarties are? In other words, is there a difference in how Europarties treat their members and if yes, what factors account for that difference? As presented in the previous chapter, the dependent variable is measured on three dimensions: application, membership and control within a Europarty.

3.1. Methods and Data

3.1.1. Analysis of Documents and Content Analysis

The first part of the project consists of the analysis of the factors which influence dependent variable – boundary maintenance of Europarties. In order to do so, I collected the data and built the dataset of the all existing European parties (EPP, PES, ALDE, European Green Party, AECP, EL, EDP, EFA, EAF, EUD, ECPM, AENM, MELD). Here, it is important to remind that I keep the distinction between the European Parliament's party groups and transnational European parties, since those two are not the same. Transnational European parties exist independently of European party groups within the European parliament. Thus, there might be cases when the national party is a member of transnational European party but is not sitting in the European parliament and therefore is not a member of the EP party group (because its party members were not elected). Since this research aims to analyze current state of all Europarties, the time period is not specified or limited and differs according to the development of the concrete party. For example, when the data on the party finance are

presented for the period of 2004-2013, this means that Europarty was officially recognized in 2004.

Several factors that influence the dependent variable (how selective/inclusive Europarties are) will be analyzed. I adopt Katz & Mair's (1992) focus on the "official story" of the parties and thus, all the information will be obtained from the content analysis of the statutes and internal rules and regulations of Europarties, when those statutes are available online and in English language. At the later stage of the research by the help of semi-structured elite interviews, I will be able to identify the difference between the rules and the praxis (if it is the case) and test whether hypothesized factors really play a crucial role in leaders' decisions whether to "accept", "not accept", "punish" or not. I drop the analysis of the governing status of the parties (party as a governing organization: political parties are not those who "govern" in the EU) since the parties' power-relations within the European parliament are of secondary importance to this analysis⁶. Hence, the analysis of party organizations at the European level is divided into four main parts and the data are collected about: 1) the size and membership structure of the party (party as a membership organization), 2) the party staff, 3) decision-making within the party (party structure) and 4) party finance. All information will be obtained from the web-pages of Europarties and from the web-page of the European Parliament (the data on party finance).

The number of national parties where European parties took some disciplinary measures is quite small and it can be concluded that any kind of disciplinary measure is rather the

⁶ However, when it comes to the case-study analysis, one of the arguments suggests that the "party as a governing organization"- European party groups within the European parliament may play a crucial role in the explanation of different behavior of EPP and PES when dealing with conflicts between the Europarty and national member party.

exception than the rule. So far, there have been four cases of suspension of the member party and one other disciplinary measure:

1. Lega North, Italy; suspended from European Free Alliance (1994)
2. SMER-SD, Slovakia; suspended from the PES (2006)
3. MDF, Hungary; suspended from the EPP (10.9.2009) with initiated exclusion
4. Green Party, Bulgaria; suspended from EPP (2010)
5. Downgrade of LSDSP (Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party) from member party status to an observer party (29.09. 2012)

Several other cases were “salient” (identified in the mass media) and were considered as possible “candidates” for disciplinary measures:

- UDF, Bulgaria; from EPP (2007)
- DSS, Serbia; from EPP
- Fidesz, Hungary; from EPP (2012)

This, however, does not necessarily mean that the member of parties not behaving in accordance with the proclaimed principles of the European parties is small.

3.1.2. Case studies

The second part of the project is the case study of two political parties from Central-Eastern Europe, both members of transnational European parties: the Slovak party SMER-SD in 2006 and the Hungarian party Fidesz in 2012. The case studies aim to provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between European parties (former Party of European Socialists & European People’s Party) and “disobedient” national member parties (SMER-SD

& Fidesz) from both perspectives. I hypothesize that the difference in the ideological position of the European People's Party and the Party of European Socialists account for their different treatment for SMER and Fidesz.

The rationale behind the case selection of Hungarian and Slovak parties are geographical accessibility, the possibility to use native language and thus better understand and explain the phenomenon and also that both cases were/are relatively salient topics in the region. Moreover, both parties are similar (two big parties in the government from the same region), however, with different treatment from the Europarty. Thus, I aim to analyze why PES suspended SMER, whereas EPP did not apply any disciplinary measures (change of membership status) towards Fidesz. The primary aim is to provide the explanation and understanding of these cases separately, since they represent the illustrative example of how a Europarty treats its "boundary cases". It should be reminded that Slovak and Hungarian case are neither so similar, nor so different as to qualify for the most similar systems design or most different systems design. The main sources for the analysis of two cases are online articles, journal articles, official statements, press releases and semi-structured interviews with the EPP and PES representatives. The interviews were approximately 40 minutes long, conducted in April 2013 in Brussels, Belgium (at the EPP Headquarters and at the European Parliament).

3.1.3. The use of interview data

In addition to the data obtained from the documents and web-pages of the European parties, semi-structured elite interviews are conducted to confront the official story (written rules, statutes, etc) with personal experience and views of the politicians. Several representatives from the Party of European Socialists were contacted multiple times through emails and/or phone calls - either Party officials from the PES Secretariat, or politicians (MEPs of the

European Parliament belonging to the S&D Group, Members of the PES Presidency). The list includes:

- Sergei Stanishev, PES President
- Yonnec Polet, First Deputy Secretary General
- Hannah Deasy, Adviser to the President's Office, political coordination of Presidency and Congress
- Kristian Vigenin, Member of the Presidency, BSP Bulgaria
- Sophocles Sophocleous, Member of the Presidency, MEDEK Cyprus
- Martin Schulz, Member of the Presidency, President of the European Parliament, SPD Germany
- Sylvana Rapti, Member of the Presidency, PASOK Greece
- Boguslaw Liberadzki, Member of the Presidency, SLD Poland
- Katarína Neved'alová, Member of the Presidency, SMER Slovakia
- Mojca Kleva, Member of the Presidency, SD Slovenia
- Zita Gurmai, Member of the Presidency, PES Woman
- Hannes Swoboda, Member of the PES Presidency, Chairman of the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the EP

Mr. Bohuslaw Liberadzki (a member of the Presidency from Poland) for the lack of time agreed to answer the questions via email. The reply from Martin Schulz's office was that he has been elected the President of the European Parliament and thus, I should contact his successor. Later, another reply specified that seeking information on the processes within the party, I should contact the Party of European Socialists instead of the S&D Group. "The S&D Group in the European Parliament is the parliamentary group of members of PES sister parties, but it is a different internal structure" (email communication, 2013). However, Mr.

Hannes Swodoba, the current Chairman of the S&D Group replied that as the research refers to the Party of European Socialists, the PES Headquarters should be contacted. Ms. Mojca Kleva's advice was to contact "specific parties", since they have the most knowledge about the topic. Successfully, the interview with Ms. Katarina Nevedalova, Vice President of the PES was conducted. Other people that have been approached did not reply.

Similarly, the representatives of the European People's Party were contacted. The list includes:

- Wilfried Martens, EPP President
- Corien Wortmann-Kool, Vice President of the EPP, Chairman of the WG3 on membership issues
- Nicolas Briec, Secretary of External Relations, EPP
- Luc Vandeputte, Deputy Secretary General, EPP
- Antonio Lopez-Isturiz, EPP Secretary General, MEP Spain
- Anna Zaborska, Head of Slovak National Delegation of EPP Group in EP
- Joseph Daul, Chairman of EPP Group in EP
- Christian Kremer, Deputy Secretary General, EPP
- Melanie Dursin, Political Adviser to the Political Assembly
- Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Vice President of the EPP, MEP Poland
- Edit Bauer, MEP Slovakia

The reply from the Chairman of the EPP Group in EP was very similar to the Chairman's of the S&D reply - his agenda is fully packed but even if it was not, the suggestion was to contact the representatives of the EPP since "the subjects that you are referring to are very much attached to the European People's Party rules of procedures" (Delia Vlase, Spokeswoman of the EPP Chairman's Office, email conversation. Unfortunately, the

Chairperson of the WG3 on membership issues - Corien Wortman-Kool was not available for the interview. Nevertheless, two interviews with the EPP representatives (Mr. Nicolas Briec and Christian Kremer) were conducted. Other people that have been approached did not reply.

4. THE DATA ON EUROPARTY ORGANIZATIONS: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

4.1. Three Dimensions of Boundary Maintenance

The Table 2 presents the detailed data on thirteen Europarties and their boundary maintenance, measured by the three dimensions: Application, Membership and Control. The first dimension measures how easy or hard it is to enter the Europarty. The second dimension measures how easy or hard it is to remain within the party and the third dimension represents the control over the members.

Table 2. Boundary maintenance of Europarties

Europarty	Applicants/ Geographic restriction?	Scope/Identity*	Entry Requirements
EPP	European parties (EU member states, applicants for EU, EFTA members)	Christian Democrat, Centrist and other like-minded parties	Viable political force; Adoption of Political programme and by-laws and internal regulations of the association
PES	Socialist International parties in EU member states/applicants for EU/EFTA members; Non Socialist International member parties respecting statutes	socialist, social-democratic, labour and democratic progressive parties and organizations	National or European parliamentary representation in one of the two parliamentary terms (applicable for full and associated members); Accept statutes and if applicable, standing orders
ALDE	European parties	Parties defending liberal, democratic and reformist ideals	Accept statutes of the Association, the Internal Regulations, the policy programmes and the Stuttgart Declaration
EGP	Parties from within <u>and</u> outside the European Union; Exclusive representation of one green party in a country	Green parties, green organizations and movements	Promote Green politics which are ecological, social, democratic and progressive; Accept Statutes and Rule Book of EGP
AECR	Parties from countries of the European Union	Euro-realist parties that subscribe to personal freedom, open markets, subsidiarity, limited government, parliamentary democracy and respect for national sovereignty	Accept statutes, subscribe to the principles of the Prague Declaration
EL	European parties	Democratic parties of the alternative and progressive Left	Agree with the aims and principles of the political programme (manifesto) and accepts statutes
EDP	European parties	Members that share the common values and the principles indicated in the preface to statutes	N/A
EFA	European parties; Nation/region may be represented by only one political party;	Federation of political parties which subscribe to the political programme as described in the statutes	Accept the EFA political programme; Accept the Statutes and the Rules of Internal Order;

	(Another politically active party from the same geographical area may become a member with the consent of the member of the EFA, forming a single delegation)		Be structured political party; Politically active on the territory of their nation; Have elected members of European and/or state and/or national or regional and/or local assemblies; Issue publications (at least an internal information bulletin)
EAF	European parties	Members from a wide political spectrum	Subscribe to the objectives laid down in EAF statutes
EUD	European parties	pan-European Eurorelists who subscribe to democratic and non-racist principles	Subscribe to the objectives laid down in statutes
ECPM	European parties; politicians	Christian-democratic parties and organizations	Endorse the basic programme (Article 3 of the Statutes)
AENM	European parties (regardless of whether they apply to join the EU or not)	Patriotic and national movements of the same sensitivity	Declaration of adhesion to the Political Program, the Statutes and the regulations of the association
MELD	Not defined	Committed to the principles of Democracy, Freedom and cooperation among sovereign states in an effort to impede the complete bureaucratization of Europe	Subscribes to the programme

Table 2. Boundary maintenance of Europarties (cont.)

Europarty	Decision-maker and voting	Membership status	Exclusive membership **	Obligations of members ***	Disc. measures
					Number of categories
EPP	Political Assembly on the advice of Working Group on EPP Membership; Absolute majority of the members present (casting vote of the President)	Ordinary, Associate, Member Association/Individual, Observer	Yes (“strictly exclusive”)	Financial obligations	2
PES	Socialist International parties: Congress by qualified majority; non Socialist International parties: Congress by superqualified majority, Individual observer: Presidency by simple majority	Full, Associate, Observer	Not defined	Financial obligations	2
ALDE	Full and affiliate membership: Council by majority of two-thirds of the votes cast; Individuals: Bureau by simple majority of the votes cast (casting vote of the chairman of the meeting)	Full, Affiliate, Individual	Not defined	Financial obligations	2
EGP	Approved by the Council (upon a proposal by the Committee) by three-quarters majority of the Allocated Votes	Full, Candidate, Associate, Special Category Membership	Not defined	Financial obligations; Every two years - membership reporting on party and policy	7

				developments (Article 4, Rule Book)	
AECR	Council by majority of two-thirds of the votes cast	Full, Associate, Observer	Yes	Financial obligations	3
EL	Council of Chairpersons; not specified (basis of consensus)	Member parties/political organizations with full rights, Observer parties/political organizations, Individual	No, if their acting is not contrary to the aims and principles of the EL	Financial obligations	2
EDP	Council by two-thirds majority	Party members, individual members, associated, observer, physical persons, legal persons	N/A	N/A	1
EFA	General Assembly by majority vote of the full members	Full, Observer Individual, Honorary members	Not defined	Maintain regular contacts with the other members; Financial obligations Forward the party publication to the secretariat; Demonstrate political solidarity with the other members;	2
EAF	Board by majority of its members	Not defined	Not defined	Financial obligations	1
EUD	Board by majority of its members	Not defined	Not defined	Financial obligations	1
ECPM	Board	Full members, Associated bodies/friends	Not defined	Financial obligations (board may grant full or partial exemption from obligation to pay contribution)	2
AENM	Bureau	Full members, Associate, Observer	Not defined	Financial obligation	2
MELD	Not defined	Not defined	Not defined	Not defined	N/A

Source: compiled by the author

4.2. What influences boundary maintenance?

4.2.1. Party Size and Membership Structure

The European People's Party (EPP) unites 73 "Christian Democrat, Centrist and like-minded parties" (Statutes of the EPP, 2011) and thus forms the biggest Europarty. The EPP differentiates between four types of membership: ordinary, associate, observer and individual. Ordinary members (currently 43) have full rights in all EPP organs and come from countries

based in the European Union. Parties from EU candidate states and/or EFTA members are usually associate members with similar rights as full members with one obvious exception: they do not participate in decisions connected to EU policies, structure or institutional setting. Parties close to the EPP from countries that are members of the Council of Europe may become observer members without voting rights. In addition, EPP recognizes individual members and supporting members. When a member of the EPP group in the European Parliament is elected on a list of EPP's member party, he/she becomes an individual member, or "member ex officio". Also, the Political Assembly (on the proposal of EPP Presidency) can accept any other MEP as an individual member. Supporting members, persons or associations may be invited to join and attend the EPP meetings and do not have the rights of members.

The procedure from application to acceptance has several steps: First, the party has to send the request to the EPP Presidency. The request should include the statement that the party adopts the political programme, by-laws and internal regulations of the EPP and a commitment to respect the values and principles of EPP. Moreover, the applicant party should be a "viable political force" in its respective country. The application is then transmitted to the Working Group on Membership, which sends recommendations to the Political Assembly. When the party is accepted as a member of the EPP, its elected representatives must join the EPP group in the Parliament as well as in the Committee of the Regions, Council of Europe etc. (EPP homepage, 2013).

Similarly, the Party of European Socialists (PES) consists of 53 full, associate and observer members with the conditions more or less the same as in case of EPP. Most of the PES members are also members of the Socialist International – "worldwide organisation of social democratic, socialist and labour parties" (Socialist International homepage, 2013). However, the PES also recognizes the possibility to become a full member party for European applicants that are non Socialist International members. PES Presidency examines applicants

on a case by case basis and the decision is made by the Congress. All applications for membership are voted upon on the basis of a qualified majority, only non Socialist International members are voted upon on the basis of a superqualified majority and applications for individual observer membership are decided upon by simple majority (PES Statutes, 2012).

The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) grants automatic full membership to the Belgian non-profit association European Liberal Youth, otherwise it consists as other European parties of affiliate, full and individual members (55 in total). Application for membership has to be sent to the Bureau that consequently submits the application to the Council. The Council then examines whether the party meets the requirements for membership and takes its final decision with a majority of two thirds of the votes cast. Individual members apply through the Secretary-General, who submits the application to the Bureau, which then decides with the simple majority of the votes cast (Statutes of ALDE Party, 2004).

The European Green Party (EGP) recognizes four categories of membership: full members, candidate members, associate members and “special category membership” (30 members in total). Geographically, full members and candidate members are parties from within Europe. Associate parties are those that are close to the European Green family, “closely related” to Europe but not European, and any other green movements and organizations which meet the criteria specified in the Rule Book. Special category membership is reserved for the members of the EGP group in the EP. Thus, the EGP is the only Europarty that accepts parties from within as well as from outside Europe (EGP Statutes, 2011). Moreover, the EGP is one of the two Europarties (the other being the European Free Alliance) that recognize exclusive representation of one Green party per country (Article 6, Rule Book of the EGP).

The European Free Alliance (EFA) is the fourth biggest Europarty in terms of its member parties (approx. 40), however, most of them are small regional parties. In addition to the full, observer and individual category of membership, the EFA recognizes “honorary members”. Statutory rules of the party explicitly say that a nation or region “may be represented by only one political party” and in special cases of applicants from the same region, the consent of the member party is needed (EFA Rules of Internal Order, 2010).

The five Europarties described above are the biggest Europarties in terms of number of member parties and also in terms of number of MEPs in the European Parliament (for exact numbers see Table A1 in Appendix A). From the other eight Europarties, the Party of European Left that unites “democratic parties of the alternative and progressive left” stands out as the biggest party (Statute of the Party of the European Left, 2010). For the lack of space, detailed data on the size of all thirteen Europarties and their member parties can be found in Table A3.

What is important for this analysis is the answer to the question how party size relates to the boundary maintenance of Europarties and, in particular, how party size influences whether and to what extent a Europarty is selective or inclusive. The opposite relationship may be obvious: the assumption is that parties with open and inclusive entry requirements have more members than parties that are more selective. Party size is thus seen as a variable that can be manipulated by the leaders?

ability to change size [of a party] by tamping with membership recruitment (be it open or selective). The leaders decide who enters, who does not, and who is to be ousted. By controlling organization’s boundaries, the leaders can make it grow or shrink (Panebianco 1988, 190).

In other words, in order to increase the membership base, a party may apply an inclusive approach to its applicants and lower the criteria for the entry. As can be seen from Table 2 and 3, the smallest Europarties have also the lowest entry requirements (EAF, EUD, ECPM,

AENM and MELD). However, the smallest Europarties are also the ones that are least developed in terms of their structure, probably because they are relatively new parties. Moreover, some of them have either very short Statutes (e.g. ECPM) or no Statutes at all (MELD). Therefore we cannot conclude (but also not refute) that their low entry requirements are the results of leaders' strategy to attract more members.

Nevertheless, as presented in chapter two, the size of a party can influence three aspects: a party's internal cohesion, participation/mobilization of members and bureaucratization within the party (Panebianco 1988, 186) and thus also how a party manages its boundaries. Increase in size of a party may decrease its internal cohesion, since "shared political values [...] are easier to attain in small organizations" (Panebianco 1988, 187). Hence, as the heterogeneity increases, bigger parties may find the coherent identity of the organization harder to sustain. Moreover, as the number of member parties increases, the control over each and every individual member party's performance may become harder as well.

Table 4 represents an additional aspect of party size. Statutes of the EGP and the EFA limit the number of member parties per country or region to one. Thus, if the EGP and the EFA want to increase their membership base, they need to attract member parties from new countries (no geographical restriction for the EGP). In addition, this requirement also means that after a certain threshold – if, for instance, all European countries are represented in the EAF, new applicants are not a relevant category anymore and Europarties need to focus on membership (second dimension) and control (third dimension). Although the PES does not have the provision that says one member party per country, the reality shows that most of the countries are represented by only one party (see Table A3). That is not to suggest that the PES is more selective than the EPP. It may well be the case that there exists only one successful social democratic party at national level. Nevertheless, comparing all thirteen Europarties, the

EPP stands out not only as the biggest party but also as the party with the highest number of national member parties per one country, followed by the ALDE (see again Table A3).

Table 4. Membership structure by country: EPP and PES compared

Europarty	Member Country	No. of full member p.
EPP	Austria	1
	Belgium	2
	Bulgaria	5
	Cyprus	1
	Czech Republic	2
	Denmark	2
	Estonia	1
	Finland	1
	France	1
	Germany	2
	Greece	1
	Hungary	2
	Ireland	1
	Italy	3
	Latvia	1
	Lithuania	1
	Luxembourg	1
	Malta	1
	Netherlands	1
	Poland	2
	Portugal	2
	Romania	3
	Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3	
Spain	2	
Sweden	2	
	Total	47

Europarty	Member Country	No. of full member p.
PES	Austria	1
	Belgium	2
	Bulgaria	1
	Croatia	1
	Cyprus	1
	Czech Republic	1
	Denmark	1
	Estonia	1
	Finland	1
	France	1
	Germany	1
	Greece	1
	Hungary	2
	Ireland	1
	Italy	1
	Lithuania	1
	Luxembourg	1
	Malta	1
	Netherlands	1
	Norway	1
	Poland	2
	Portugal	1
	Romania	1
Slovakia	1	
Slovenia	1	
Spain	1	
Sweden	1	
United Kingdom	2	
	Total	32

4.2.2. Party Staff

Party literature relates the size of the party staff to the party bureaucracy. This study looks at the “administrative component” of the Europarties, measured as “the proportion of bureaucrats responsible for the maintenance of the organization to total membership” (Panebianco 1988, 223). The number of party staff expresses the number of people working at the party’s headquarters (the Secretariat) according to the information obtained from the

websites of the parties. The table 5 presents the results for all Europarties where the information on the number of employees was available. In addition, staff ratio measuring the proportion of party employees to total number of member parties was computed⁷. From the table 4 it can be seen that the European Democratic Party (EDP) has the highest number of party employees compared to the number of member parties, followed by the PES that employs one “bureaucrat”⁸ for every two parties.

Table 5. Party staff and staff ratio of Europarties

European Party	Number of member parties	Number of staff	Staff ratio
EPP	73	28	1:2.6
PES	53	25	1:2.1
ALDE	55	12	1:4.5
EGP	30	12	1:2.5
AECR	15	3	1:5
EL	27	N/A	N/A
EDP	10	6	1:1.6
EFA	36	2	1:18
EAF	-	1	-
EUD	12	N/A	N/A
ECPM	18	1	1:18
AENM	10	N/A	N/A
MELD	-	N/A	N/A

Note: Staff ratio - proportion of staff to the number of member parties (full, associated, observer). If a party is composed mainly of individual members, the ratio is not calculated.

Source: web pages of Europarties, 2013

Panebianco acknowledges the fact that in reality, political parties are controlled and managed by party leaders rather than by bureaucrats (Panebianco 1988, 233). However, when it comes to Europarties that unites numerous national parties, the information on number of party employees and their role can reveal how Europarty treats its members. For the illustration, the EPP employs 28 people, among whom is a Secretary of External Relations who is coordinator of EPP’s working group on membership issues. Similarly, the allocation of people and their role can tell us about party’s political preferences. For example, among the people that work for the PES, we can find advisor for “Democracy and Institutional Affairs” or advisor on

⁷ Although administrative component of the party is usually measured by the proportion of party staff to the number of individual party members, this study takes one national member party as the basic unit of analysis.

⁸ “bureaucrat” as an employee of a party, not professional politician or expert.

“country studies and monitoring”. But most importantly, administrative organs are usually responsible for all technicalities that are connected to the three dimensions of boundary maintenance - application of new members, control of membership requirements (most commonly financial obligations) and application of disciplinary measures.

4.2.3. Party Structure: Decision-making Within the Party

The formal rules of decision-making within a party are defined in party’s statutes and internal regulations. Not all Europarties have their statutes available online but the assumption is that they exist, since they are a necessary requirement in order to qualify for funding from the EU.⁹ All thirteen Europarties to some extent define their internal organs, although in case of the MELD, party statutes are not available online (see Table A4). The biggest parties have nearly the same party organs: the Congress, the Council, the Presidency and the Secretariat (Delwit et al. 2004; party statutes).

Out of thirteen Europarties, nine party statutes recognize “the Congress”. Generally, the Congress serves as the highest decision-making body (supreme organ) of a party and unites the greatest number of delegates/representatives from member parties. The PES, for instance, recognizes also “the Election Congress” that meets before the European elections and elects common candidates to the EC Presidency as well as adopts a party manifesto. The highest decision-making organ of the European Green Party is the Council and the Congress in this case is “the enlarged meeting of the Council” (EGP Statutes, 2011).

As outlined above, “the Council”¹⁰ is another party organ that serves as “assembl[y] of national representatives” (Delwit et al. 2004, 11) with meetings being held more often than those of the Congress. Most of the Europarties have also a party organ that brings together

⁹ According to Article 4, Europarties have to submit a statute defining bodies “responsible for political and financial management” as well as their political programme (Article 4, Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003)

¹⁰ Alternatively, the “Political Assembly” (EPP), the “General Assembly” (EFA, ECPM), the “Assembly”(AENM)

party leaders – usually called the Presidency (EPP, PES), “the Council of Chairpersons” (EL), “the Board of Directors” (AEER), “the Bureau” (EFA, AEMN) etc. On a daily basis, the Europarties are represented by the team of permanent party employees - the Secretariat (described in the section on party staff). The detailed description of all party organs, their responsibilities, the frequency of meetings and their composition is analyzed in Table A4.

The Party of European Socialists and the European Green Party stand out as the Europarty with more elaborated party structure as compared to other Europarties. The PES officially recognizes six party organs (compared to usual number three): the Congress, the Election Congress, the Council, the Presidency, the Leader’s conference and the Secretariat. Similarly, the EGP recognizes the Council, the Congress, the Committee, the Finance Advisory Board and the Conciliation Panel. Thus, the EGP is the only Europarty that has a special organ for settling disputes between the member parties. According to the EGP Statutes, the Conciliation Panel shall “assist in settling disputes [...] relating to the interpretation of these Statutes or the Rule Book or other operational matters.” Moreover, “all persons and bodies of the EGP shall be bound by the outcome of this procedure” (Article 8, EGP Statutes). The EGP Rule Book is another exception: 63 pages long document that specifies rules and procedures within the EGP with, for instance, provisions on membership evaluation and review.

4.2.4. Party Finance

Since 2004, Europarties are financed from the general budget of the EU. According to the Regulation, 15% of the budget “shall be distributed in equal shares” and remaining 85% is distributed among parties that have elected MEPs proportionally to their number (Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003). The EU funding shall not exceed 75% of the party’s budget and thus, parties have to rely on additional sources such as membership fees.¹¹ In 2012, the EU budget for party funding was approximately 18.9 million euro (EPP homepage, 2013) and in 2013,

¹¹ For example the EPP on their webpage claims that the EU funding accounts for exactly 75% of party budget.

this number has been increased (see Table A6). The two biggest Europarties – the EPP and the PES together received more than 57% of all funds in 2012. This year, the EPP received approximately 7.3 million euro, followed by the PES with 5 million euro and the ALDE with 2.2 million euro.¹² (For detailed information on party funding during the period 2004-2013, see Table A6).

4.3. The Role of Party Ideology: Discussion

This paper argues that the change in independent variables is influenced by the party ideology and consequently, this influences boundary maintenance of Europarties. I argue that ideology influences the organizational structure of the Europarties (the size of the party organization, party staff, party finance, decision-making within the party) and thus also the fact how each and every Europarty treats its members and whether it applies disciplinary measures or not.

Connecting the expected results to the literature on boundary-maintenance, Lamont & Molnar refer to the work of several authors who argue that “boundary crossing, blurring, and shifting are central to negotiations between newcomers and hosts” (Lamont & Molnar 2002, 185). This paper argues that European parties can be characterized as communities based on symbolic boundaries and thus, boundary crossing and shifting is easier, possibly also for the fact that boundaries of the European parties only exist in the minds of their members (as Anthony P. Cohen (1985) argues). This results in a less strict ideological position of the European party and hence, when a national member party diverts from the ideals/goals/aims of the European party, there is less incentive to apply strong disciplinary measures such as suspension or exclusion of the party. The number of cases when a national party was suspended or excluded is small even though the number of cases when we can speak about

¹² The ALDE is then followed by the EGP – 1.6 mil. euro, the AECR – 1.4 mil. euro, the EL – 0.9 mil. euro, the MELD - 0.8 mil euro, the EDP – 0.6 mil. euro, the EFA, the EAF and the AENM – 0.4 mil. euro, and the ECPM and the EUD with 0.3 mil. euro.

some form of conflict is higher. Thus, disciplinary measures are rather the exception than the rule, which again supports the hypothesis that Europarties are less strict when it comes to the adherence to their own internal rules and regulations.

When we look at the Table 3 with three dimensions of boundary maintenance, we see that differences among parties point to the explanation that they are ideologically rooted. Both parties with the highest entry requirements are left-wing parties (PES, EGP). The example that stands out is the European Green Party that has high entry requirements, high strength of voting on applicants, financial but also other additional obligations for member parties (membership report every two years on the development of party), high strength of voting when it comes to the disciplinary measures and in addition, the highest number of categories of disciplinary measures. The qualitative differences (for example) among the low-medium-high category for the entry requirements are not the same and the “distance” between those categories is different. Although it may not be visible from sole looking at the table, qualitative analysis of the party statutes shows that while Statutes of the EPP are more “technical” without substantial reference to the identity of the organization, the PES Statutes include several “ideological” provisions with the declaration of principles included in the document.

Table 3. Boundary maintenance of Europarties - summary

Dimension	Application		Membership			Control		
	Entry Req.	Strength of voting	Open to individuals	Exclusive membership	Obligations of members	Official review of member performance	Categories of disciplinary measures	Strength of voting
Categories	-high -medium -low	-high -medium -low	-yes -no	-yes -no	-financial -additional	- yes - no	-1, 2 -3 -7	-high -medium -low

Europarty								
EPP	medium	medium	yes	yes	financial	no	2	medium
PES	high	P: medium I: low	yes	N/A	financial	no	2	medium
ALDE	medium	P: medium I: low	yes	N/A	financial	no	2	medium
EGP	high	high	no	N/A	financial additional	yes	7	W: medium S/E: high
AECR	medium	medium	yes	yes	financial	no	3	low
EL	low	high	yes	no	financial	no	2	high
EDP	?	medium	yes	?	?	no	1	medium
EFA	high	low	yes	N/A	financial additional	no	2	medium
EAF	low	low	yes	N/A	financial	no	1	low
EUD	low	low	yes	N/A	financial	no	1	low
ECPM	low	N/A	yes	N/A	financial	no	2	N/A
AENM	low	N/A	N/A	N/A	financial	no	2	N/A
MELD	low	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: compiled by the author

Notes: P – parties; I – individuals; W - withdrawal of voting rights; S/E - Suspension/exclusion; N/A - information not available or not specified

Judith Kelley argues that regional organizations can apply two types of membership rules: “convoy” rules which according to Kelley “allow all regional states to participate unconditionally” and “club” rules that “enforce strict admission and participation criteria” or in other words, use high entry requirements (Kelley 2010, 2). As a consequence of the inclusive nature of convoy organizations, they may be more heterogeneous than “clubs”, since they “admit more outlier states” (Kelley 2010, 8).

When analyzing boundary maintenance of Europarties, the “convoy”/“club” distinction can be useful. Convoy organizations are in this sense organizations with low entry criteria and vice-versa, club organizations are more selective. According to the Table 2 and 3, we may conclude that the PES and the EGP are “club” organizations, compared to centre-right Europarties that operates more like “convoy” organizations.

The author also differentiates between “ex ante tools” and “ex post” tools that organizations can apply. The example of ex ante tool that regulate membership is different level of entry requirements (or membership conditionality), but also the use of different levels of membership (Kelley 2010, 7). Kelley argues that club organizations “are more likely” to use different levels of membership “as a tool of influence” which may not be the case of convoy organizations where different stages of membership are not seen as “halfway stations to full membership” (Kelley 2010, 7). Ex post tools according to the author include socialization of members (e. g. through their monitoring), or use of “drastic measures” such as suspension and exclusion. However, Kelley also adds that it is hard to apply these measures since they usually require “high level of agreement within the organization” (Kelley 2010, 12). According to the interview with Ms. Katarina Nevedalova and the case study of SMER that follows in next chapter, the Party of European Socialists not only uses different levels of membership status, but also applies ex post tools to “socialize” disobedient members.

5. CASE STUDY

After the analysis of the organizational structure of Europarties, this part of the paper focuses on the analysis of two cases that illustrate how the Party of European Socialists and the European People's Party perception treat their "border line" member parties. Each section is divided into four parts: the founding of the party, the member parties, the case itself and the party's perception of the case. Every part adds to the overall understanding of the case studies themselves since before analyzing specific case, we first need to have a closer look on the origins of the PES and the EPP and the nature of member parties as well as how they were incorporated into their respective Europarties. The analysis of the Europarties' perception of the two cases - SMER and Fidesz is largely based on the elite interviews with the representatives of both the PES and the EPP.

5.1. Party of European Socialists and SMER-SD 2006

In 2006, the Slovak SMER-SD party was suspended from the Party of European Socialists (PES) for its decision to form a government with the Slovak National Party (SNP), which was believed to be "far-right xenophobic, nationalist party" (Euractiv 2006). That time PES Chairman Poul Nyrup Rasmussen said that he was "proud of this historic decision" because "forming a coalition with the extreme right is unacceptable" (Poul Rasmussen in Nicholson 2006). However, two years later the Slovak party SMER was accepted back after Prime Minister Robert Fico promised to amend the controversial Media Law.

The official resolution adopted by the PES Presidency in Brussels (October 12, 2006) refers to the PES Declaration "For a modern, pluralist and tolerant Europe" adopted in May 2001 in Berlin¹³ when explaining the reasons for SMER's suspension. According to the declaration,

¹³ On the date January 31, 2012 Annex 3- Article 3.3 of PES Statutes

[...] all PES parties adhere to the following principles of good practice and invite other European political families to do the same: to refrain from any form of political alliance or co-operation at all levels with any political party which incites or attempts to stir up racial or ethnic prejudices and racial hatred (For a modern, pluralist and tolerant Europe, 2001).

The suspension of SMER was planned to be reassessed in June 2007, however, SMER regained its provisional membership only in 2008. The Presidency declared to “remain vigilant” and “act as a monitoring body” with possibility to review its position at any time in case that SMER again “breaches PES principles as expressed in [their] statutes [...]” (Applications for membership adopted 2009). After the Congress in Prague, SMER officially became full members of PES in December 2009.

Surprisingly, SMER-SD was in the government with SNP till the year 2010 and thus, the initial “cause” of suspension seemed not to bother PES Presidency after a while. PES former vice-president Jan Marinus Wiersma in the interview for Euractiv.sk said that the most important thing was to show SMER and other parties what is not acceptable anymore. He highlighted that SMER’s suspension was more signal of where the boundaries are than the punishment itself. Wiersma also added that SMER regained full membership even though it was still in the government with the Slovak National Party (SNP) because there were “some improvements” in social conditions of people in Slovakia, even Roma. Another important factor was that the Slovak National Party did not enter the Le Pen’s group in the European Parliament (Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty¹⁴). Moreover, PES appreciated the individual work of members of the EP Monika Beňová, Miloš Koterec and Vladimír Maňka in the issues of human rights (Euractiv.sk, 2009).

President of the European People’s Party Wilfried Martens from the beginning strongly criticized Slovak coalition of SMER, SNS and HZDS (People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia), saying that “the new coalition partners have a manifest reputation of

¹⁴ author’s note

populism (SMER), autocratic behavior (HZDS), and xenophobia (SNP)” (Martens in EPP Press release, 2006). He was also joined by his colleague, the chairman of EPP-ED group in the European Parliament Hans-Gert Poettering who said that he is “[...] astonished that the most extreme xenophobic party is to be part of the next government. This development is not justified by any lack of suitable partners in the Slovak Parliament and it can only harm the real interests of Slovakia [...]” (Poettering in EPP Press release, 2006). The criticism continued after PES lifted the suspension: Martens said that “EPP strongly condemns this irresponsible decision [to re-accept SMER] by the European Socialists.

The Vice-President of the PES and a member of Slovak party SMER, Ms. Katarina Nevedalova in the interview from April 10, 2013 admits that for the Party of European Socialists, forming a coalition with the parties that are considered to be “not fully democratic” is very sensitive. When explaining the SMER case, Nevedalova claims that during the suspension of SMER, the Party of European Socialists organized two fact-finding missions¹⁵ to Slovakia in order to examine domestic situation in the country. After year and a half, SMER was accepted back to the PES structure. However, SMER was granted the status of full member only in 2009.

Nevedalova explains this prolonged period by the decision-making procedure within the PES, which to some extent shows the nature of the social democratic Europarty and thus is also relevant for the study of boundary maintenance. The Slovak party SMER applied for the membership in the PES in year 2005. According to the PES Statutes, all applications for PES membership are decided by the Congress, however, the PES Congress meets only twice in every five year period and therefore, provisional membership may be granted by the PES Presidency (PES Statutes, 2012). As a consequence, in 2006 when SMER formed the

¹⁵ Moreover, Nevedalova claims that one fact-finding mission was also organized by the worldwide organization of social democratic parties - Socialist International.

coalition with the SNP, its membership was still not approved by the Congress. For the similar reason, the SMER became official member of the PES only after the meeting of the Congress in 2009 in Prague.

Factors that were mentioned during the interview and may have influenced the PES's position towards the SMER: 1) Formation of the coalition with anti-democratic party and 2) Party Ideology. Connecting the findings to the literature, von Beyme argues that

As the indirect membership structures were eliminated the Social Democrat parties became more bureaucratic and more oligarchic. In the rapidly growing parties, especially, the need for solidarity over pluralism and variety of opinions was stressed. 'Democratic centralism' which Lenin was first to ideologise, was a feature of the early Social Democrat parties which came in for repeated criticism. But only a Socialist party which laid great stress on ideology could discipline its members to the point of formalised exclusion procedure (von Beyme 1985, 165).

5.2. European People's Party and Fidesz 2012

The origins of the European People's Party were laid down by the Christian Democratic Group in the European Parliament that first met in 1953, after the formal recognition of the General Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community. In 1965, the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD)¹⁶ was created as an umbrella organization for Christian Democratic parties in Europe and in 1972, a special body for cooperation between the parties and parliamentary group - the Political Committee of Christian Democratic Parties from Member States of European Communities - was set up (Dewit 2004; The Jansen & Van Hecke 2011; EPP's website 2013). Discussions about the direct elections to the EP enhanced motives to create a political party at the European level, particularly because the EUCD was perceived as relatively loose organization and MEPs "sorely missed an active party organization at the Community level" (Jansen & Van Hecke 2011, 34).

¹⁶ follower of the New International Teams (Nouvelles Équipes Internationales, NEI) that was created after the WWII in 1946

On 8 July 1976, the European People's Party: Federation of Christian Democratic Parties of the European Community was established (with the member parties from Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), and Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans became the first elected President of the Party. Soon after the EPP's first Congress (Brussels, 1978), the Group in the European Parliament changed its name¹⁷ to Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democratic Group) (Jansen & Van Hecke 2011).

Although the founding parties agreed on the goal - creation of the European political party - there was a controversy over the name of the organization because the "a name signals not only the message to be conveyed; it also gives an idea who is delivering the message and whom the message is for" (Jansen & Van Hecke 2011, 40). Some of the EUCD members pressured the EPP to establish formal links with the British and Danish conservative parties, and to invite them to the EPP, although they in the meantime formed their own group¹⁸ in the European Parliament. The German parties CDU and CSU were in favor of the openness to conservative and liberal parties and thus, wanted to avoid "too narrow and exclusive" name "Christian Democratic". On the other hand, Italian Democratic Party together with Dutch and Belgian parties argued that the character of the organization "should be reflected in the name" (Jansen & Van Hecke 2011, 40). Inspired by several members (for example Italian Partito Popolare (PPI)), the compromise was reached and "People's Party" signaled both openness and adherence to Christian Democratic tradition.

In 1978, another organization was created: European Democratic Union (EDU) by the Austrian People's Party (OVP) and the Swiss Christian Democratic People's party with the aim to connect Christian Democrats, Conservatives and other "like-minded" parties. Hence, already three organizations were aiming to unite centre-right parties: EUCD, EPP and EDU.

¹⁷ from Christian Democratic Group (Group of People's Party)

¹⁸ 1973- Conservative Group, in 1979 renamed to European Democratic Group

The EPP, however, wanted to strengthen its position and therefore had to look for the Conservative allies. However, “eliminating the anomaly of having three transnational organizations within the political spectrum of centre-right” according to the authors turned out to be “difficult and long-term challenge” (Jansen & Van Hecke 2011, 48).

The accession of some of EPP’s member parties played a considerable role in defining party’s identity: Spanish Partido Popular (centre-right); British, Danish and Nordic Conservatives; the Austrian People’s Party; Portuguese Social Democratic Party; Italian Forza Italia and the French Christian Democrats of the Democratic and Social Centre (Jansen & Van Hecke 2011). The claim that “if the EPP was to avoid the danger of being marginalized, it would have to look for the allies outside the traditional Christian Democratic world” (Jansen & Van Hecke 2011, 50) shows the nature of the EPP and the fact, that it prefers pragmatic goals at the expense of ideological homogeneity.

Although Hungarian party never joined the government with extremist national party, similarly to SMER case, it was heavily criticized for the adoption of Media Act. Some of the members of the European People’s Party believe that Hungary breaches EU's fundamental principles such as liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Mason 2012) and thus, there has been a pressure to suspend Hungarian ruling party Fidesz from the EPP party. In other words, they believe that Fidesz has violated the internal rules and values of the EPP and thus, should be suspended or even expelled from the transnational party.

Following the constitutional changes in Hungary after January 2012, the Party of European Socialists also called on the EPP to suspend Fidesz from its structures¹⁹. That time PES

¹⁹ Party of European Socialist also came up with a campaign “Fighting FIDESZ”: they asked PES supporters to send an email to Hungarian Embassy in their respective countries and also to the MEPs that are members of EPP. The template and the campaign can be found at: <http://www.pes.eu/en/my-pes/fighting-fidesz%20>, Accessed: February 2, 2013

General Secretary Philip Cordery²⁰ said that “the silence” of EPP “is becoming deafening” and that Hungarian party should be suspended from EPP until Hungarian democratic institutions “regain their independence” (Cordery in Euractiv.com 2012). However, the EPP group in the European Parliament rejected “politically motivated accusations” on the Media Act and Hungarian government, declared that “EPP group is confident that, should any should some elements of the Media law have to be changed, Hungary would do so [...]”, referring to what Prime Minister Viktor Orbán promised to do when European Commission's analysis finds it necessary (EPP Press release 2011).

While the European Commission opened “accelerated infringement proceedings” against Hungary²¹ (Europa Press release 2012), the EPP silence supported speculations that EPP did not want to suspend Fidesz for a pragmatic reason: it would lose 14 votes in the Parliament and reduce the EPP’ s lead over the Socialist group PES to 67 votes (e. g Spiegel 2012).

Hungary: Transition away from democracy?

Several scholars think that Hungary is not democratic country anymore. Bohle and Greskovits for example argue that since 2010, the regime in Hungary can be classified as “workfarist illiberal semi-democracy” (Bohle & Greskovits 2011). Bozóki in his article from February 2012 argues that Hungary still has few “basic characteristics of multiparty democracy”, however, in his view liberal democracy has been replaced by “wrecked version of ‘majority’ rule” (Bozóki 2012, 49). Since the beginning of 2012, political situation in Hungary changed again and with new amendments to the Constitution, the opinions might have changed.

Kim Lane Scheppele’s testimony in front of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe from March 22, 2013 is the latest serious criticism of Hungary.

²⁰ At September 2012 PES Congress, Cordery was replaced by Achim Post.

²¹ Proceedings on three issues: the independence of the national central bank, the retirement age of judges and the independence of the data protection authority.

Scheppele argues that the latest “‘Fourth Amendment’ removes the last traces of separation of powers from the Hungarian Constitutional system” (Scheppele 2013). Her criticism touches upon several important issues, among the most important ones are the independence of Constitutional Court in Hungary, the protection of civil rights, the independence of Central Bank and Media Council and electoral laws and elections as such.

The fact that scholars start to call Hungarian political regime with different negative attachments to the word democracy (Bozoki 2012; Bohle & Greskovitch 2011) resembles situation in Slovakia during Mečiar’s government (1992-1998). Prime Minister Orban for example shares Vladimir Mečiar’s belief in majoritarian democracy. Although Mečiar’s party (HZDS) had never two-thirds majority in the Parliament and was always in a coalition with other parties, Mečiar did not see the parties in the opposition as relevant partners for any debate - the fact that is reflected in his famous statement “Je po voľbách, zvyknite si!” (The elections is over, get used to it!). Similarly, Orbán’s response to the criticism is often characterized by his belief that “the most important talks with the society had already taken place, namely at the polling stations in 2010” (Bozóki 2012, 46).

Moreover, the fact that the Hungarian party Fidesz is recently at the centre of attention was acknowledged by both interviewees from the EPP. When questions about the review process of members have been asked, both Nicolas Briec (Secretary of External Relations) and Christian Kremer (Deputy Secretary General) used the Hungarian case as an illustrative example to explain their point:

Well of course at the moment - it is not an actual issue-but depending on how the situation escalates in Hungary and with Hungary, between Hungary and the EU, I could imagine that some people would say we have to review what is up with Fidesz (Christian Kremer 2013).

Nicolas Briec, a Secretary of External Relations in the interview from April 2013 summarizes current position of the EPP towards the Fidesz:

we have adopted a clear line since the very beginning, so not only for the last events – its already one year or two years ago. The question is whether the country policy respects the EU principles. This is the official line. And the only institution in Europe which is able to assess this is the European Commission. If the Commission says the country doesn't respect the EU principles, then we will have a serious discussion with Fidesz. But it did not happen (Nicolas Briec 2013).

It is not surprising that EPP's party officials and employees present the position towards the Fidesz as a clear-case. According to the EPP Statutes, disciplinary measures can be also initiated by seven member parties from five different countries. However, Briec and Kremer claim that this has never happened – not only in case of Fidesz, but ever in EPP's history. Thus it seems that the criticism of Hungarian party comes from the political opponents only, thus resembling what Nicolas Briec calls “political game in the interest of the country” (Briec 2013). In the view of Katarina Nevedalova, there is a “huge antipathy” among the PES members towards the Fidesz, partly because two Hungarian member parties (Hungarian Socialist Party and Hungarian Social Democratic Party) “always brings it up at the Presidency” (Katarina Nevedalova, 2013).

From the interviews, several factors that might have influenced the EPP's position towards Hungarian party Fidesz can be identified:

1) The position of the European Commission

The most important factor that influences why the EPP does not see the Fidesz as a “disobedient party” is the position of the European Commission. Since democratically elected government is a legitimate government, important is “what will be the policy that government will implement” (Briec 2013). Then the question is whether the policy that country implements respects EU principles. “This is the official line. And the only institution in Europe which is able to assess this is the European Commission” (Briec 2013). Similarly, Kremer argues that the EPP put itself “clearly behind the Commission in this” (Kremer 2013),

acknowledging that his personal fear is that the issues between the Hungary and the EU “might go a bit in the wrong direction at the moment” (Kremer 2013). Although it is not claimed here that the opinion of two party officials represents the overall mood within the EPP, the similarities between the two answers point to the direction that this, indeed is the official position of the PES leaders as well.

The justification of party’s own position by the reference to another institution brings us back to Panebianco’s concept of party institutionalization, particularly to the organization’s degree of autonomy in relation to its external environment and to the fact that more autonomous organizations have well defined boundaries – but when the organization depends on decisions of another organization (as described above), it is not autonomous (Panebianco 1988).

1) The size of the Fidesz

Neither Nicolas Briec nor Christian Kremer see the overall size of the EPP as a factor that is important per se because “It will change one day” (Nicolas Briec 2013). Briec also emphasizes the fact that currently, the EPP has around 15 or 20 pending requests for the EPP membership, “but we take time, we are not in hurry” (Briec 2013). In this sense, he gives the example of Partido Popular - a party that waited ten years for the acceptance, claiming that numbers do not play a role. However, the size of the Fidesz is another case. Christian Kremer admits that

I would certainly not be honest if I would say the size of the party totally doesn’t play role. If let’s say if the PNTCD in Romania would do something like that - you know party which let’s say almost disappeared from the political scene - and they would make completely unacceptable statements, then for many people it would be easier to say let’s kick them out than with a party that is so strong and very long standing political force in Central and Eastern Europe. Sure, in practice, there is a relation there (Kremer 2013).

2) European Elections

Christian Kremer admits that the European elections may on the one hand influence EPP's reluctant position towards potential conflicting situations, but on the other hand, in case that the European Commission "would go into some kind of Article 7 procedure [...], political opponents in many countries would take this as a second Berlusconi case and ask with whom are you together on European level?" (Kremer 2013).

3) Party ideology of EPP

Kremer argues that since 1989, the question of ideology in politics became less important. In his view, although the EPP became broader, the discussions are "easier nowadays, because ideology doesn't play such an important role anymore and politics become more pragmatic" (Kremer 2013). That is in contradiction with Ms. Nevedalova's conclusions that the difference between the PES and the EPP are "pure ideology": "EPP cares more about numbers and important, strong actors, for us [the PES] it is about democracy, human rights, minorities, etc.- and that is the biggest difference" (Nevedalova 2013).

3) Relations with Viktor Orban (position at EU level)

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has a very positive image at European level and especially among his colleagues from the EPP, partly because he has been seen as someone who "very actively participated in EPP work" and was "one of the people with the highest attendance in the EPP Presidency" (Kremer 2013). Moreover, he "was always available to discuss everything, to explain everything" (Briec 2013). Hence, his positive "image" at European level as well as his former position within the EPP decreases probability that in the future, the EPP will apply any form of disciplinary measures towards the Fidesz.

6. CONCLUSION

The findings of this study can be concluded as follows: first, this paper argued that the Europarties differ according to the way how they manage their boundaries. The dependent variable of this study - boundary maintenance of Europarties was measured on the three dimensions and it was shown that difference among the thirteen Europarties may be ideologically rooted. Second, the study analyzed internal organizational structure of thirteen Europarties with the focus on their size and membership structure, party finance, decision-making within the party and number of professional party employees. It was argued that ideology influences organizational structure of Europarties and therefore, also how selective and inclusive the Europarties are and how they “manage their boundaries”.

The two case studies of the Slovak social democratic party SMER in 2006 and Hungarian conservative party Fidesz in 2012 showed that the Party of European Socialists and the European People’s Party treat their members differently and that different factors account for their different treatment. The semi-structured interviews with elites showed that the ideology itself was the most important factor for the PES to suspend the Slovak SMER. On the other hand, the interviews with the representatives of the EPP revealed that for the biggest centre-right Europarty, the size of the Fidesz, personal contact and positive experience with Viktor Orban plays the crucial role. Moreover, the decision of the EPP to apply disciplinary measures or not was (and is) to large extent influenced by the position of the European Commission, suggesting that the EPP is not autonomous actor vis-à-vis its environment.

The research encountered several limitations. First of all, the topic of the research and especially the case that have been selected from Hungary is very salient and controversial with the circumstances being changed from one day to the other. In addition, both national

parties are currently ruling parties in their respective countries and thus, political elites may be reluctant to criticize them.

Secondly, the access to the statuses and internal regulations of the parties is not always easy, either because they are not available online or are in Dutch or French language. For example, internal rules of EPP are available online on their web-page, however, they are very brief. In addition, Political Assembly of the EPP is according to the Article 9 of EPP's By-laws "not obliged to disclose its reasons [for suspension/exclusion]"²². Similarly, some Europarties have not yet well developed internal rules and regulations and thus, the comparison of the formal rules may be meaningful.

The most problematic part of the study was collection of the interviews with the elites. Either they did not feel competent to answer the questions on Europarties, or they did not find the time. In this sense, there is a great possibility for the further deeper research in this area.

In addition, it may be argued that concepts used in this analysis are not "the best" measurement of the boundary maintenance and similarly, it may be argued that relationship between ideology and organizational structure of parties is influenced by some additional variable that has not been identified. This study has to be seen as the first step that opens door to further empirical analysis of Europarties. However, I believe that by collecting data on all thirteen Europarties, this research can be a great contribution to the field of party politics.

²² Art. 9, EPP By-laws, available at: [http://www.32462857769.net/EPP/e-PressRelease/PDF/EN%20Statutes%20&%20Internal%20Regulations%20\(November%202011\).pdf](http://www.32462857769.net/EPP/e-PressRelease/PDF/EN%20Statutes%20&%20Internal%20Regulations%20(November%202011).pdf), accessed: 17. 03.2012, 17:00

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APPENDIX A.

Table A1. Europarties and their party groups in the European Parliament

EP party group	Abbreviation	No. of MEPs	No. of member countries	Corresponding Europarty
European People's Party	EPP	265	26	European People's Party (EPP)
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats	S&D	184	27	Party of European Socialists (PES)
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	ALDE	85	20	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE), European Democratic Party (EDP)
European Greens – European Free Alliance	Greens/EFA	55	9	European Green Party (EGP), European Free Alliance (EFA)
European Conservatives and Reformists	ECR	54	15	Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR), European Christian Political Movement (ECPM)
European United Left – Nordic Green Left	GUE/NGL	35	12	Party of European Left (EL)
Europe of Freedom and Democracy	EFD	31	10	Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy (MELD)
Non-attached		27		Alliance of European National Movements (AENM)
Total		736		

Source: European Parliament, Europarties 2013

Table A2. Party families and party groups

Party family	Party group
Social democrats	SOC, S&D (PES)
Centre-right	EPP,EPP-ED, EDA, UFE, UEN, EDG, FE
Liberals	EDL, ELDR, ALDE
Radical-left	COM, LU, EUL, EUL/NGL
Greens and regionalists	G, G/EFA, RBW, ERA
Anti-Europeans and extreme right	EN, EDD, IND/DEM,ER, TGI

Source: Hix, Noury & Roland, 2007

Table A3. Europarties and their national member parties

European party	Full member parties
<p data-bbox="209 801 496 864">European People's Party (EPP)</p> <p data-bbox="261 925 440 987">47 full members All: 73</p>	<p data-bbox="547 271 986 297">Austria - Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)</p> <p data-bbox="547 302 1385 360">Belgium - Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V); Humanist Democratic Centre (CDH)</p> <p data-bbox="547 365 1390 481">Bulgaria - Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB); Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB); Union of the Democratic Forces (SDS); Democratic Party (DP); Agrarian People's Union-People's Union (ZNS)</p> <p data-bbox="547 486 932 512">Cyprus - Democratic Rally (DISY)</p> <p data-bbox="547 517 1366 575">Czech Republic - Christian and Democratic Union - Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL); Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09 (TOP09)</p> <p data-bbox="547 580 1310 607">Denmark - Conservative People's Party (C); Christian Democrats (KD)</p> <p data-bbox="547 611 1075 638">Estonia - Pro Patria and Res Publica union (IRL)</p> <p data-bbox="547 642 1011 669">Finland - National Coalition Party (KOK);</p> <p data-bbox="547 674 1067 701">France - Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)</p> <p data-bbox="547 705 1353 763">Germany - Christian Democratic Union (CDU); Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU)</p> <p data-bbox="547 768 895 795">Greece - New Democracy (ND)</p> <p data-bbox="547 799 1358 857">Hungary - Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz); Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP)</p> <p data-bbox="547 862 1043 889">Ireland - Fine Gael (Family of the Irish) (FG)</p> <p data-bbox="547 893 1378 952">Italy - The People of Freedom (PdL); Union of the Centre (UDC); People for the South (UDEUR);</p> <p data-bbox="547 956 751 983">Latvia - Unity (V)</p> <p data-bbox="547 987 1358 1014">Lithuania - Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1019 1123 1046">Luxembourg - Christian Social People's Party (CSV)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1050 879 1077">Malta - Nationalist Party (PN)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1081 1102 1108">Netherlands - Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1113 1177 1140">Poland - Civic Platform (PO); Polish People's Party (PSL)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1144 1358 1202">Portugal - Social Democratic Party (PSD); Social and Democratic Centre - People's Party (CDS-PP)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1207 1378 1283">Romania – Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party (PNȚCD); Democratic Liberal Party (PDL); Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1288 1374 1373">Slovakia - Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS); Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK); Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1377 1331 1435">Slovenia - Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS); New Slovenia – Christian People's Party (N.Si); Slovenian People's Party (SLS)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1440 1273 1467">Spain - People's Party (PP); Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1471 1289 1529">Sweden - Moderate Coalition Party (MOD - Moderaterna); Christian Democrats (KD)</p>
<p data-bbox="188 1727 515 1789">Party of European Socialists (PES)</p> <p data-bbox="261 1816 440 1879">32 full members All: 53</p>	<p data-bbox="547 1532 1102 1559">Austria - Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1563 1219 1590">Belgium - Socialist Party Different (SP.a); Socialist Party (PS)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1594 1007 1621">Bulgaria - Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1626 995 1653">Croatia – Social Democratic Party (SDP)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1657 1102 1684">Cyprus - Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1688 1171 1715">Czech Republic - Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1720 900 1747">Denmark - Social Democrats (S)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1751 979 1778">Estonia - Social Democratic Party (SDE)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1783 1107 1809">Finland - Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1814 852 1841">France - Socialist Party (PS)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1845 1145 1872">Germany - Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1877 1102 1904">Greece - Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1908 1369 1966">Hungary - Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP); Hungarian Social Democratic Party (MSZDP)</p> <p data-bbox="547 1971 890 1998">Ireland - Labour Party (Labour)</p> <p data-bbox="547 2002 1219 2029">Italy - Democrats of the Left (DS); Italian Socialist Party (PSI)</p> <p data-bbox="547 2033 1166 2060">Lithuania - Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDP)</p>

	<p>Luxembourg - Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party (LSAP) Malta - Labour Party (PL) Moldova - Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) Netherlands - Labour Party (PvdA) Norway - Labour Party (Ap) Poland - Democratic Left Alliance (SLD); Labour Union (UP) Portugal - Socialist Party (PS) Romania - Social Democratic Party (PSD) Slovakia - Direction-Social Democracy (Smer) Slovenia - Social Democrats (SD) Spain - Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) Sweden - Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) United Kingdom - Labour Party (Labour); Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)</p>
<p>Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE, former ELDR)</p> <p>All: 55</p>	<p>Austria - Liberal Forum Belgium-Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats; Reformist Movement Bulgaria - Movement for Rights and Freedoms; National Movement for Stability and Progress Cyprus - United Democrats Denmark - Danish Social Liberal Party; Venstre – Liberal Party of Denmark Estonia - Estonian Centre Party; Estonian Reform Party Finland - Finnish Centre; Swedish People's Party Germany - Free Democratic Party Greece - Democratic Alliance Hungary - Alliance of Free Democrats Ireland - Fianna Fáil Italy - Italian Radicals; Italy of Values Lithuania - Labour Party; Liberal and Centre Union; Liberals' Movement of the Republic of Lithuania Luxembourg - Democratic Party Netherlands - Democrats 66; People's Party for Freedom and Democracy Poland - Democratic Party - demokraci.pl Romania - National Liberal Party Slovakia - Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) Slovenia - Liberal Democracy of Slovenia; Zares Spain - Democratic Convergence of Catalonia; Liberal Democratic Centre Sweden - Centre Party; People's Party – Liberals</p>
<p>European Green Party (EG)</p> <p>All:30</p>	<p>Austria - The Greens Belgium - Green, Ecolo Bulgaria - Green Party (suspended) Cyprus - Ecological and Environmental Movement Czech Republic - Green Party Estonia - Estonian Greens Finland - Green League France - The Greens Germany - Alliance '90/The Greens Greece - Ecologists Greens Hungary - Politics Can Be Different Ireland - Green Alliance Italy - Federation of Greens Latvia - Latvian Green Party Luxembourg - The Greens Malta - Democratic Alternative Netherlands - The Greens; GreenLeft Norway - Environmental Party The Greens Poland - Greens 2004 Portugal -The Greens Romania - Green Party Slovakia - Green Party Slovenia - Youth Party of Slovenia</p>

	<p>Spain - Initiative for Catalonia Greens Sweden - Environmental Party The Greens Switzerland - The Greens Ukraine - Green Party of Ukraine UK - Green Party of England and Wales; Green Party in Northern Ireland; Scottish Green Party</p>
<p>Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR)</p> <p>All:15</p>	<p>Belgium - Libertarian, Direct, Democratic (LDD) Czech Republic - Civic Democratic Party Denmark - Anna Rosbach (<i>Independent MEP</i>) Hungary - Lajos Bokros (<i>Independent MEP</i>) Iceland - Independence Party Latvia - For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK Lithuania - Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania Luxembourg - Alternative Democratic Reform Party Poland - Law and Justice; Poland Comes First Romania - National Liberal Party Slovakia - Civic Conservative Party (OKS) United Kingdom - Conservative Party; Ulster Unionist Party</p>
<p>Party of the European Left (EL)</p> <p>All:27</p>	<p>Austria - Communist Party of Austria Belgium - Communist Party (Wallonia); Communist Party (Flanders) Belarus - Belarusian United Left Party "Fair World" Bulgaria - Bulgarian Left Czech Republic - Party of Democratic Socialism Estonia - Estonian United Left Party Finland - Communist Party of Finland; Left Alliance France - French Communist Party; Left Party; Unitarian Left Germany - The Left Greece - Synaspismos Hungary - Workers' Party of Hungary 2006 Italy - Communist Refoundation Party Luxembourg - The Left Malta - Democratic Alternative Moldova - Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova Portugal - Left Bloc Romania - Romanian Communist Party San Marino - Sammarinese Communist Refoundation Spain - United Left; Communist Party of Spain; United Alternative Left of Catalonia Switzerland - Swiss Party of Labour Turkey - Freedom and Solidarity Party</p>
<p>European Democratic Party (EDP)</p> <p>All:10</p>	<p>Belgium - Citizens' Movement for Change Cyprus - European Party Czech Republic - Path of Change; Party for the Open Society France - Democratic Movement Ireland - Marian Harkin, Independent MEP Italy - Alliance for Italy Poland - Alliance for Democrats San Marino - Popular Alliance Slovakia - European Democratic Party Spain - Basque Nationalist Party</p>
<p>European Free Alliance (EFA)</p> <p>All:36</p>	<p>Austria - Unity List Belgium - Social Liberal Party; New Flemish Alliance; ProDG Bulgaria - United Macedonian Organization Ilinden–Pirin Czech Republic - Moravané Croatia - List for Fiume Finland - Future of Åland France - Savoyan League; Savoy Region Movement; Occitan Party; Party of the Corsican Nation; Breton Democratic Union; Unser Land; Catalan Unity Germany - Bavaria Party; The Friesen; South Schleswig Voter Federation Greece - Rainbow</p>

	<p>Italy - South Tyrolean Freedom; Liga Veneta Repubblica; Sardinian Action Party; Slovene Union; Autonomy Liberty Participation Ecology</p> <p>Netherlands - Frisian National Party</p> <p>Poland - Silesian Autonomy Movement</p> <p>Slovakia - Party of Entrepreneurs of Slovakia</p> <p>Spain - Galician Nationalist Bloc; Aragonese Junta; Majorca Socialist Party; Republican Left of Catalonia; Basque Solidarity; Andalusian Party</p> <p>UK - Mebyon Kernow; Plaid Cymru; Scottish National Party</p>
<p>European Alliance for Freedom (EAF)</p>	<p>Austria – Andreas Mölzer, Franz Obermayr (<i>Freedom Party of Austria</i>)</p> <p>Belgium – Philip Claeys, Peter Kleist (<i>Vlaams Belang</i>)</p> <p>France – Marine Le Pen (<i>National Front</i>)</p> <p>Germany – Torsten Groß (<i>Citizens in Rage</i>)</p> <p>Hungary – Krisztina Morvai (<i>non-partisan</i>)</p> <p>Lithuania – Rolandas Paksas, Juozas Imbrasas (<i>Order and Justice</i>)</p> <p>Malta – Sharon Ellul-Bonici (<i>non-partisan</i>)</p> <p>Sweden – Kent Ekeröth (<i>Sweden Democrats</i>)</p> <p>United Kingdom – Godfrey Bloom (<i>UK Independence Party</i>)</p>
<p>EUDemocrats (EUD)</p> <p>All:12</p>	<p>Denmark – People’s Movement Against the EU</p> <p>Finland - Danne Sundman member of the Parliament of Åland</p> <p>France – Arise the Republic (<i>Debout la République</i>)Nicolas Dupont-Aignan</p> <p>Ireland - National Platform; People's Movement; Thomas Pringle, TD</p> <p>Italy - Euro Sceptic Party (<i>Euro Scettici – Partito Animalista Italiano</i>)</p> <p>Latvia - Party of Action (<i>Ricibas Partija</i>); Normunds Grostins</p> <p>Portugal - New Democracy (Portugal) (<i>Partido Da Nova Democracia</i>) 1 member of the Parliament of Madeira: Baltazar Aguiar</p> <p>Slovakia - Direct Democracy (Slovakia); Vladimir Kostilnik member of the regional parliament of Prešov; Rudolf Kusy member of the regional parliament of Bratislava; Peter Kopecký</p> <p>Slovenia - June List (Slovenia) (<i>Junijska lista</i>); EUD Slovenia; Gorazd Drevensek</p> <p>Sweden - June List (<i>Junilistan</i>)</p>
<p>European Christian Political Movement (ECPM)</p> <p>All:18</p>	<p>Armenia - Christian Democratic Union</p> <p>Belarus - Belarusian Christian Democracy</p> <p>Belgium - Federal Christian Democrats</p> <p>Bulgaria - Bulgarian Christian Coalition; Christian Democratic Forum</p> <p>Estonia - Estonian Christian Democrats</p> <p>Germany - Party of Bible-abiding Christians; Centre Party; Party for Labour, Environment and Family</p> <p>Latvia - Christian Democratic Union</p> <p>Lithuania - Lithuanian Christian Democrats</p> <p>Netherlands - ChristianUnion</p> <p>Romania - Bulgarian Union of Banat Romania</p> <p>Serbia - Alliance of Vojvodina Romanians</p> <p>Switzerland - Federal Democratic Union; Evangelical People's Party</p> <p>Ukraine - Christian Democratic Union</p> <p>United Kingdom - Christian Peoples Alliance</p>
<p>Alliance of European National Movements (AENM)</p> <p>All:10</p>	<p>Belgium - National Front</p> <p>Finland - Freedom Party (Finland)</p> <p>France - National Front</p> <p>Hungary- Jobbik</p> <p>Italy- Tricolour Flame</p> <p>Portugal - National Renovator Party</p> <p>Spain - Republican Social Movement</p> <p>Sweden - National Democrats</p> <p>Ukraine - All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda"</p> <p>United Kingdom - British National Party</p>

Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy (MELD) All:11	Bulgaria - People for Real, Open and United Democracy (PROUD), represented by Mr. Slavi Binev Belgium - Frank Vanhecke, independent Denmark - Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) Finland - True Finns (Perussuomalaiset) France - Movement for France (Mouvement pour la France) Greece - Popular Orthodox Rally (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός) Italy - Lega Nord & Io amo l'Italia Lithuania - Order and Justice (Tvarka ir teisingumas) Poland - Solidarna Polska Slovakia - Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana)
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Source: web pages of European parties

Table A4. Structure of Europarties

Europarty	Organ	Responsibility	Meetings	Composition*
EPP	Presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • general political guidelines of the Party • presides over the Political Assembly • ensures the implementation of decisions taken by the Political Assembly 	at least eight times annually	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the President of the EPP • the President of the Commission, the President of the European Council, the High Representative on Foreign and Security Policy, the President of the EP (if they are affiliated to the EPP) • the Chairman of the EPP Group in the EP • the Honorary President(s) • ten Vice-Presidents • the Treasurer • the Secretary General
	Political Assembly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • defines the political positions of the Party • deciding on membership applications • defines final political guidelines • decides on the budget 	at least four times annually	<p>Ex-officio members:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • members of the Presidency • members of the Presidency of the Group of the EPP in the EP • Presidents of Ordinary or Associated Member Parties, Member Associations or their mandated representatives • Presidents of national delegations of member parties of the Group of the EPP in EP • members of the Presidency of the EP, the Commission and the Presidency of the Committee of the Regions (if they belong

				<p>to an Ordinary Member Party)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presidents of the EPP Groups in the Committee of the Regions and in the Parliamentary • assemblies of the Council of Europe, the OSCE and NATO (if they are member of an Ordinary/Associate Member Party) <p>Delegated members:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • from EPP members and associated member parties according to the election results in last European election
	Congress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the highest decision-making body of the Party • deciding on the main policy documents and electoral programmes • electing the President, Vice-Presidents, the Secretary General and the Treasurer 	once every three years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • delegates from EPP member and associated member parties, member associations and groups
PES	Congress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • supreme organ; lays down the political orientation of the PES • elects the President and the Vice-President(s) • adopt resolutions and recommendations to parties, the Presidency and its group in the EP • adopts and amends the Statutes of the PES • decides on the admission and exclusion of members 	twice in every five year period (each parliamentary term)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • representatives from full member parties • a representative from each National delegation of the Group in the EP • two representatives from each other full member organization • the members of the PES Presidency • plus delegates without voting rights
	Election Congress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • elects the PES common Candidate to the European Commission Presidency • adopts the PES Manifesto for the European elections 	ahead of the European elections	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the same as for Congress
	Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • contributes to the shaping of PES policy • serves as a platform for strategic discussions 	those calendar years where no Congress is held	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • representatives of full member parties, representing half of the Congress delegates • representatives of the its group in the EP

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (equal to 50% of the number of National delegations, rounded upwards) • one representative from each other full member organization • the Members of the Presidency • plus delegates without voting rights
Presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • highest organ for the management which leads and represents the PES • implements the decisions of the Congress and of the Council 	as often as necessary - not less than three times in each calendar year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the President of the PES • the Vice-President(s) of the PES • one representative from of each full member party • the Secretary General of the PES • the President of its group in the EP • one representative from each other full member organization • plus members without voting rights
Leader's conference	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • defines the strategy and adopt common resolutions and recommendations to the member parties and organizations, the Presidency, the Congress and its group in the 	three to five times a year (at least twice a year)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the President, the Vice-Presidents and the Secretary General • Prime Ministers and Party Leaders from member parties • the President of EP, if he/she is a PES member • two representatives from the PES Members of the Commission (incl. the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, if he/she is a PES member) • the President of the European Council, if he/she is a PES member • the President or Vice-President of the Committee of the Regions, if he/she is a PES member
Secretariat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ensures the daily running of the PES 	daily	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secretary General • Coordination Team (one representative

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> from each full member) administrative organ (the President, the Treasurer and the Secretary General)
ALDE	Congress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> election, dismissal and discharge of the members of the Bureau amendments to the Articles of Association dissolution and liquidation of the Association approval of the common political programme for the European elections 	at least once in each calendar year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> full and affiliate members (proportional representation) and the members of the Bureau
	Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> decides on the budget deciding on membership applications approval, amendments, interpretation of the Internal Regulations upon proposal of the Bureau, appointment and dismissal of the Secretary General 	at least twice a year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> two delegates from each full member party one additional delegate for every 500 000 votes in last EU elections members of the Bureau (delegates of full member party) one delegate of European Liberal Youth
	Bureau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> power to undertake any act necessary or useful to achieve the purpose and objectives of the Association, except for those powers that are reserved to the Council or the Congress 	at least three times a year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> at least nine members, elected by the Congress, amongst whom a President, seven Vice-Presidents and a Treasurer for no more than six years
European Green Party	Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> highest decision-making body decide on the common political agenda decide on the budget deciding on membership applications changes to the Green Charter, the Statutes and the Rule Book 	at least once a year in person	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the principle of a minimum of two delegates per Member - allocation of votes for Full Members is based on their size and other criteria
	Congress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> an enlarged meeting of the Council 	at least once every 5 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the principle of a minimum of four delegates per Member - allocation of votes for Full Members is based on their size and other criteria

	Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> day to day management of the European Green Party, its finances and the execution of decisions of the Council 	at least 6 times per year in person or by telecomm. means	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> nine members elected by Council: one female Co-Chair, one male Co-Chair, the Secretary-General, the Treasurer, five further persons
	Finance Advisory Board	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> supervise the financial management of the European Green Party 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Three persons elected by the Council
	Concilia-tion Panel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> assist in settling disputes between Members, persons and/or bodies of the EGP on issues relating to the interpretation of Statutes or the Rule Book or other operational matters 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> minimum of 5 persons
AECR	Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> decide on the budget and membership fees deciding on admission, suspension, exclusion of members amendments to the Statutes & Internal Regulations and their interpretation approval of strategies for elections to the European Parliament Appointment/dismissal of the President, the two Vice-Presidents, Secretary-General and external auditor 	at least once per year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> full and affiliate members and the members of the Board, including The Chairmen of ECR group in the EP, Committee of Regions, Council of Europe Assembly, and the European Security and Defense Assembly (WEU)
	Board of Directors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> political responsibility for the administration of the Alliance on a day to day basis 	at least twice a year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> at least four members: the President, the two Vice-Presidents and Secretary General
	The Conference	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the advisory board of the Alliance states the general aims and objectives of the Alliance for given term approves the work and aims achieved of the past term 	once per term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> delegates from full and associate members Chairman of ECR group in EP, Committee of Regions, Council of Europe Assembly and the European Security and Defence Assembly (WEU)
EL	Congress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> approves basic documents and the statute ratifies the admission of applicant parties elects EL chairperson, vice-chairperson(s), 	at least one session every three calendar years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> delegates of each member party (the key decided upon by Congress) with at least 50% of women observers and guests without voting rights

		<p>treasurer, Executive Board, auditors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • decides on political statements of the EL and recommendations to the Executive Board • elaborates common guidelines for the elections to the EP 		
	Council of Chair-persons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • rights of initiative and of having objection on important political issues • adopts resolutions and recommendations that are passed to the Executive Board and the Congress • decides about applications for EL membership 	at least once a year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the Chairpersons of all member parties, the EL Chairperson and Vice-chairperson/s
	Executive Board	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • carries out the decisions on the basis and orientations of the Congress and in accordance with the Council of Chairpersons • responsible for organizing the daily work of the EL • determines the political guidelines of the EL between the Congresses 	at least four times a year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the Chairperson and vice-chairperson/s • the treasurer • elected Members (two persons from each member party by the Congress at a gender-quoted basis) • the Head of the secretariat
EDP	Congress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • sets the principle orientations and the political program of the EDP • decide on the statutory modifications • decide on the membership applications • approve the budget • nominates/revokes one or more commissioners • nominates/revokes the Council members • gives the discharge to the Council members 	every two years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • six delegates per party member (up to 40 rep. for party members) • the members of the EP who are members of the EDP • the members of Council • the individual members • two delegates per party with the status of affiliate • other invited guests with advisory votes
	Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • powers for the administration and the management of the association 	at least two times per year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • two delegates per member party • one supplementary delegate per member party for each share of 800 000 party votes in

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the last EP elections one supplementary delegate for each member party that participated in the EP elections with the same rule as above the members of the Presidency ex-officio one delegate per affiliated party the members of the Commission that belong to member parties or who are members of individual title of the EDP
Presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> propose the Secretary General(s) to the vote of Council propose the Treasurer to the vote of Council 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the President(s) the President(s) of honor the Vice-President(s) one representative by national delegation of the member of the EDP to the Parliamentary group at the EP the Treasurer the Secretary General(s) two representatives of European Assemblies chosen by the Council
President (s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> represent(s) the party both internally and externally preside(s) Congress, Council, and the Presidency may create any position necessary for the proper functioning of the association and may delegate his own powers 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> nominated; mandate lasts for two years (renewable)
General Secretary/ies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> supervise(s) the daily activities, and bring(s) into effect the decisions made by the organs of the party 	daily		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> nominated; mandate lasts for two years (renewable)
Treasurer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> responsible for the daily management of the association-communal and national norms in the matter of the financing of the parties 	daily		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> nominated; mandate lasts for two years (renewable)
General Assembly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> supreme body 	at least once a year		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> all the full members

EFA		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • decides on the political and financial policy • establishes the political programme of the party • can adopt an internal regulation for the organization • accepts or excludes members 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • observer members without voting rights
	Bureau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • financial management • manages the business of the association and represents it in all judicial and non-judicial transactions • in charge of the administrative management of the organization • defines the political policy and the activities of the organization on a day to day basis 	at least once a year outside sessions of General Assembly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President, ten Vice-Presidents and the Secretary General • at least three members appointed from the full members of the association • the number of member must at all times be fewer than the number of members forming the general assembly
	Secretariat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • carries out decisions of the Federation • assists the President and the Vice-Presidents for preparing and organizing meetings and for relations with the member parties, the press and the public 	daily	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chosen by the Bureau and for a period that the Bureau decides
EAF	Congress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • supreme governing body • appoint and dismiss members of the Board • amend the Statute of the Association • determine and approve the political programmes of the Association • appoint an auditor to audit the accounts 	at least once every three years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consists of representatives of the member organizations and movements, the individual members, and all members of the Board and the Steering Committee (final number determined by the Founding Congress and decided upon by every Congress for the next Congress)
	Board	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • manage the Association • implement the decisions of the Congress • lay down the mid-term objectives • lay down the budget • appoint a Steering 	at least once a year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • minimum of three members appointed by the Congress (appoints from among its members a president, one or more vice-presidents, a secretary, a treasurer and any other officers it deems

		Committee headed by a Secretary-General		necessary)
	Steering Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The administrative and political tasks of the Association implements the decisions of the Board and the Congress 	on a regular basis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> at least two Members of the Board and at least two members of staff
EUD	Congress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> amends the Statute of the Association appoints and dismisses members of the Board determines and approves the political programmes of the Association 	once a year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> one representative per member organizations/party members on an individual capacity all members of the Board
	Board	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> approves the annual budget decides on the information campaign budgets implementation of political decisions 	once a year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> one member per participating party/organization President Vice-President
	Secretariat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> support and assistance to the organs of the Association under the supervision of the President 	Not defined	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the Secretary staff
ECPM	Board	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> responsible for the management of the association issues annual financial report 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> at least four private individuals who are either 1. member 2. member of a member-party or 3. member or staff member of an associate and who are to be elected by the general assembly
	General Assembly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> appoints the chairman of the board all powers in the association not conferred on the board by law or in statutes 	ultimately six months after the end of each association year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> open to members of the association, board members, representatives of the associated bodies and all friends
AEMN	Bureau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> executive body represents AEMN 	during periods separating each meeting from the Assembly and the Congress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The President The Vice-Presidents The Treasurer The Secretary General The Assistant Secretary General Representatives of associated parties
	Assembly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> elects the President and the Treasurers body deliberating between the behavior on two Congresses 	as often as necessary and at least once a year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the President of AEMN Two representatives of each party member Members of the Bureau Chiefs of national

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> names the Secretary General and the Assistant Secretary General adopts the annual budget 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> delegation at the European Parliament or their representatives One associate member for each associated or observant party
	Congress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> constitutes the sovereign authority of orientation of AEMN lays down the main political trends, and the political programme 	at least once by legislature of the European Parliament.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Members of the Assembly Member of European and National Parliament of the parties members, associated and observant Members of Regional Assembly of parties members, associated and observant other delegates (proportional representation)
MELD	Board of Directors, President, Treasurer	No statutes		

Source: Statutes of the European parties

* only delegates with full voting rights are mentioned

Table A5. Disciplinary measures

Europarty	Disciplinary measures	Decision-maker	Voting	Reasons
EPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> suspension exclusion 	Political Assembly (initiated by the Presidency, or seven Ordinary or Associated Member Parties from five different countries)	absolute majority of the members present (casting vote of the President)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> not any more a viable political force (not represented in regional/national/European parliaments for two consecutive parliamentary terms) not obliged to disclose its reasons
PES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> suspension 	Presidency	super-qualified majority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> non respect of the statutes or the Standing orders non compliance with the criteria for membership not fulfilling financial obligations for two successive terms (Congress by simple majority)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> exclusion 	Congress		
ALDE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> expulsion of full and affiliate members 	Council	majority of two-thirds of the votes cast	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> not abiding by the Articles of Association or the Internal Regulations not abiding by the decisions of any body of the Association not fulfilling the conditions for membership
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> expulsion of individual member 	Bureau	not specified (in general,	

			Bureau decides by simply majority of the votes cast)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> when any of its acts is contrary to the interest and the values of the Association in general decision does not need to be justified
European Green Party	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> withdrawal of speaking rights withdrawal of voting rights withdrawal of participation in EGP meetings withdrawal of access to information 	Council on the proposal of the Committee	two-thirds majority of the Allocated Votes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> fail to meet the membership criteria or other obligations non-payment of membership fees act in such a way as to bring the European Green Party into disrepute
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> suspension temporal withdrawal permanent withdrawal 		three quarters majority of the Allocated Votes	
AECR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> suspension of voting rights (full member) 	Council	simple majority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> fails to meet its financial obligations
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> suspension exclusion 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> not abiding by the Statutes of the Alliance or the Internal Regulations not abiding by the decisions of any body of the Alliance not fulfilling the conditions for membership acting against the interests and values of the Alliance in general
EL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> temporary / provisional suspension cancellation of membership 	Council of Chairpersons; ratified by the Congress on suggestion of the Executive Board	not specified (basis of consensus)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> seriously violates statutes and political aims
EDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> exclusion 	Council on the recommendation of the Presidency	with a majority of two thirds of the votes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> do not respect the statutes of the EDP or the internal regulation do not respect the decisions made by an instance of the EDP, in accordance with these statutes no longer respect the conditions of eligibility act in a way that is detrimental to the interests and values of the party
EFA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> loss of all voting rights 	General Assembly on the basis of an opinion from the Bureau	two-thirds majority of the voting members present or represented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> member parties who do not meet their financial commitments
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> exclusion 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> not explicitly specified; presumably when parties do not perform their duties (Article 4: Rights and duties of members; EFA Rules of Internal Orders)
EAF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dismissal 	Board on a	simple	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> not abiding by the principles and

		proposal from the Steering Committee	majority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> objectives of Article 2 of the statute not abiding by the principles and objectives of the Association's political program not fulfilling the conditions for membership of the Association
EUD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dismissal 	Board on a proposal from the Board	simple majority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> not abiding by the principles and objectives of Article 2 of the statute not abiding by the principles and objectives of the Association's political program not fulfilling the conditions for membership of the Association
ECPM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Termination of membership 	Board	not specified	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ceased to meet the requirements for membership
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> disqualification 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> fails to perform its obligations only if member acts contrary to the association's charter, the regulations or the resolutions, or prejudices the association
AENM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> suspension 	Bureau	not specified	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "cautelatives reasons"
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> exclusion 	Assembly		
MELD	not defined/no statutes			

Source: Statutes of the European parties

Table A6. Party finance

European Party	Funding from EP (in EUR)	Membership fees	Total revenue*
EPP	2004 1 051 469	N/A	N/A
	2005 2 398 941	N/A	N/A
	2006 2 914 060	N/A	N/A
	2007 3 156 414	N/A	N/A
	2008 3 354 754	2008 N/A	2008 4.5
	2009 3 485 708	2009 1.3	2009 4.9
	2010 4 959 462	2010 1.30	2010 6.4
	2011 6 183 988	2011 1.3	2011 7.9
	2012 6 482 715	N/A	N/A
	2013 7 276 292	N/A	N/A
PES	2004 1 093 853	N/A	N/A
	2005 2 489 175	N/A	N/A
	2006 2 580 000	2006 0.7	2006 3.5
	2007 2 992 218	2007 0.7	2007 4.0
	2008 3 027 647	2008 0.7	2008 3.8
	2009 3 100 000	2009 0.7	2009 4.0
	2010 3 395 323	2010 0.9	2010 4.3
	2011 4 117 825	2011 0.9	2011 5.0

	2012 4 323 313	N/A	N/A
	2013 4 985 352	N/A	N/A
ALDE	2004 462 661	N/A	N/A
	2005 819 563	N/A	N/A
	2006 883 500	N/A	N/A
	2007 1 022 344	N/A	N/A
	2008 1 115 665	2008 0.35	2008 1.5
	2009 1 179 191	2009 0.3	2009 1.5
	2010 1 553 984	2010 0.3	2010 1.9
	2011 1 815 770	2011 0.3	2011 2.2
	2012 1 950 344	N/A	N/A
	2013 2 232 476	N/A	N/A
European Green Party	2004 171 461	N/A	N/A
	2005 568 261	N/A	N/A
	2006 581 000	N/A	N/A
	2007 631 750	N/A	N/A
	2008 641 534	N/A	N/A
	2009 643 562	2009 0.2	2009 1.2
	2010 1 054 999	2010 0.3	2010 1.4
	2011 1 298 539	2011 0.3	2011 1.7
	2012 1 333 372	2012 0.3	2012 1.8
	2013 1 563 218	N/A	N/A
AECR	2010 327 164	0.035	N/A
	2011 1 140 478	N/A	N/A
	2012 1 285 913	N/A	N/A
	2013 1 402 596	N/A	N/A
EL	2004 120 895	N/A	N/A
	2005 365 868	N/A	N/A
	2006 439 019	N/A	N/A
	2007 524 251	N/A	N/A
	2008 536 539	N/A	N/A
	2009 562 405	2009 0.16	2009 0.7
	2010 708 080	2010 0.2	2010 0.9
	2011 846 936	2011 0.2	2011 1.0
	2012 835 049	N/A	N/A
2013 947 500	N/A	N/A	
EDP	2004 69 862	N/A	N/A
	2005 253 933	N/A	N/A
	2006 163 571	N/A	N/A
	2007 152 611	N/A	N/A
	2008 407 693	N/A	N/A
	2009 249 084	N/A	N/A
	2010 423 886	2010 0.08	2010 0.5
	2011 598 555	2011 0.07	2011 0.7
	2012 550 293	N/A	N/A
	2013 571 946	N/A	N/A
	2004 163 222	2004 0.03	2004 0.2
	2005 217 906	2005 0.06	2005 0.3

EFA	2006 220 914	2006 0.06	2006 0.3
	2007 215 198	2007 0.07	2007 0.3
	2008 226 600	2008 0.07	2008 0.3
	2009 226 600	2009 0.07	2009 0.3
	2010 339 152	2010 0.06	2010 0.4
	2011 395 333	2011 0.08	2011 0.5
	2012 384 185	N/A	N/A
	2013 438 864	N/A	N/A
EAF	2011 372 753	2011 0.004	2011 0.4
	2012 360 455	N/A	N/A
	2013 385 323	N/A	N/A
EUD	2006 57 763	N/A	N/A
	2007 226 280	N/A	2007 0.3
	2008 226 700	2008 0.007	2008 0.3
	2009 217 167	2009 0.03	2009 0.3
	2010 176 069	N/A	2010 0.3
	2011 259 852	2011 0.025	2011 0.3
	2012 241 807	N/A	N/A
	2013 278 242	N/A	N/A
ECPM	2010 208 359	N/A	N/A
	2011 259 852	N/A	N/A
	2012 241 807	N/A	N/A
	2013 305 012	N/A	N/A
AENM	2012 289 266	N/A	N/A
	2013 385 323	N/A	N/A
MELD	2012 621 482	N/A	N/A
	2013 813 649	N/A	N/A

Note: * including other resources like reimbursement supplies etc.

The numbers represent final grant award, only year 2013 represents maximum grant award.

Source: EU spending on parties 2004-2013, (available at:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/grants/grant_amounts_parties_25-03-2013.pdf) and web pages of European parties

Party of European Left financial reports 2006-2008 are available only in French thus marked as N/A. English version only since 2009.

N/A: means not available, either because the report is not public, or the report is written so that it is hard to decode individual items

EDP 2006-2009 french version

EUD 2006, 2007 available only in Danish

ECPM, AENM, MELD do not have any financial reports available on their websites

APPENDIX B

Semi-structured interview questions, EPP

APPLICANTS

1. You are a member of EPP Working Group on Membership (number 3). Can you tell me who the other members are? Are they permanent members?
2. How often do you meet? How does your usual meeting look like?
4. Let's say that a new (Christian democratic) party wants to join EPP. How would Political Assembly evaluate and examine the readiness of parties to enter the European People's Party?

MEMBERS

5. When parties are already members, is there something like a review process of compliance with the criteria for a membership?
6. If yes, how does it look like? Can you describe it?
7. Who is responsible for this review process?

DISCIPLINARY MEASURES

8. What are the sufficient conditions for taking any disciplinary measures against EPP members?
9. EPP Statutes says that suspension or exclusion of EPP members is decided by the Political Assembly initiated by the Presidency or seven Ordinary or Associated Member Parties from five different countries. Do you recall of any such initiative that came from member parties?
10. Hypothetical questions: Let's say one of EPP member parties makes a coalition with an extremist party. Would you expel/suspend such a member?
11. What if the member party suddenly became too Eurosceptic or too nationalistic?
12. Related question- do you think that EPP somehow changed after British Conservatives left the party? Did it have any impact on the organization?

CASE STUDIES

13. Are you familiar with the case of Slovak party SMER which was suspended from PES in 2006?
14. On March 27, 2013 EPP adopted a "resolution that denounces offensive statements against minorities from Slovakia's Socialist Prime Minister Robert Fico" where you called on the PES to "distance itself from such a dangerous and unacceptable remarks made by the leader of PES member Party". How would you describe such a strong position when it comes to PES party when EPP is not doing anything towards Hungarian party Fidesz?
15. What is the current position towards Fidesz?
16. Would it be easier to make a decision in a similar situation? e.g. party would not be domestically so strong, would be smaller for example?

CLOSING QUESTIONS:

17. Can you point out any document that would specify the identity of the organization beyond Manifesto would that be EPP Platform?

APPENDIX C

Semi-structured interview questions, PES

APPLICANTS

1. The European People's Party (EPP) has a specific working group that deals with the membership of the EPP (WG3 on membership). Does some similar structure exist within the Party of European Socialists (PES)?
2. If yes, can you specify who take part in this unit/working group?
3. How often do they meet? How does the usual meeting look like?
4. Let's assume that a new (social democratic) party wants to join the PES. How would the Presidency evaluate and examine the readiness of parties to enter the Party of European Socialists?

MEMBERS

5. When national parties are already members of the PES, is there something like a review process of compliance with the criteria for a membership?
6. If yes, how does it look like? Can you describe it?
7. Who is responsible for this review process?

DISCIPLINARY MEASURES

8. In your opinion, what are the sufficient conditions for taking any disciplinary measures against the PES members?
9. Let's assume that one of the PES member parties makes a coalition with an extremist party. Would the PES expel/suspend such a member?
10. Do you know about any particular reason that would lead to the application of the disciplinary measures against PES member party?

CASE STUDIES

11. In 2006, the Slovak SMER-SD party was suspended from the Party of European Socialists for its decision to form a government with the Slovak National Party (SNS), which was believed to be "far-right xenophobic, nationalist party" (Euractiv 2006). What do you think about the decision to suspend SMER?
12. In your opinion, why was SMER accepted back as a full member of the PES in 2008 even though the initial reasons for suspension were still present (SMER was still in the coalition with Slovak National Party)?
13. On March 27, 2013 the EPP adopted a resolution that denounces offensive statements against minorities from Slovakia's Socialist Prime Minister Robert Fico where EPP called on the Party of European Socialists to distance itself from such a dangerous and unacceptable remarks made by the leader of PES member Party. How would you describe EPP's strong position when it comes to criticism of the PES while at the same time the EPP for instance fails to criticize the Hungarian party Fidesz?
14. What is your opinion on current situation in Hungary with regard to the governing party Fidesz? In your opinion, why the EPP did not take any disciplinary measures against Hungarian party Fidesz?

CLOSING QUESTION:

15. Can you point out any document beyond PES Statutes that would specify the identity of the whole party?