

**MILITARY DISLOYALTY AND REGIME CHANGE:
A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF LOYALTY
SHIFTS IN THE ARMED FORCES**

By

Fruzsina Tófalvi

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Political Science

Supervisor: Carsten Q. Schneider

Budapest, Hungary
(2012)

ABSTRACT

This study applies a comparative analysis of loyalty shifts in the armed forces during popular uprisings for regime change in authoritarian states in the period of 1990-2012. The theoretical framework proposes that the relationship in the armed forces between superiors and subordinates can be described as a principal-agent relationship. Accordingly, there are two fundamental loyalty-creating methods: rewards and control. The thesis examines a series of variables that enable these two mechanisms to function in the military: loyalty creation through financial benefits and the privileged position of the armed forces, and a series of selection procedures that keep the armed forces distant from society, including the creation of voluntary forces and the application of discriminative selection procedures to both the rank and file and the officer corps.

In the thesis I use both statistical and case study analyses. Firstly, I test a sample of 48 cases by statistics to examine whether the proposed variables influence loyalty. In the second half of the thesis I compare three cases from the Arab Spring, Egypt, Syria and Bahrain in order to find qualitative differences and identify the dynamics of disloyalty. The findings prove that the privileged position of the military has a considerable positive effect on loyalty and the distance of the armed forces from society also matters. However, the discriminative selection of the rank and file is the “privilege” of a few states (e.g. Bahrain), therefore, its effect remains questionable; furthermore, the effect of increasing defense budget is also doubtful.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, *Carsten Schneider* for his continuous guidance, support and patience. I am also deeply thankful to *Eszter Tímár* for her immense help in the past two years in all questions related to academic writing.

Furthermore, I would like to thank *Laura Lehóczki*, *Zoltán Debreczeny* for their uninterrupted tolerance and to *Tamás Marjai* who is unquestionably the best boyfriend ever.

Table of Contents

List of Figures, Graphs and Tables.....	iv
Introduction.....	1
CHAPTER I: THE THEORY OF MILITARY DISLOYALTY.....	7
1.1 Disloyalty and defection.....	14
1.2 Finances and Privileges.....	16
1.3 Rivalry.....	18
1.4 Distance from Society.....	20
CHAPTER 2: EXPLAINING DISLOYALTY.....	24
2.1 Data, Sources, Case Selection.....	24
2.1.1 Case Selection.....	24
2.1.2 Sources.....	26
2.1.3 The Dataset.....	27
2.2. Testing the Theory.....	30
2.2.1 Budget change.....	32
2.2.2 Rival Security Forces.....	36
2.2.3 Recruitment.....	37
2.2.4 Selective Recruitment and Officer Selection.....	39
2.3. Explaining the Results.....	41
CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDIES.....	44
3.1 Egypt (2011).....	46
3.1.1 Events.....	46
3.1.2 Analysis.....	48
3.2 Syria (2011).....	51
3.2.1 Events.....	51
3.2.2 Analysis.....	54
3.3 Bahrain (2011).....	57
3.3.1 Events.....	58
3.3.2 Analysis.....	60
Conclusions.....	65
Bibliography.....	71

List of Figures, Graphs and Tables

Figure 1. The Disaggregation of the Concept of Disloyalty	15
Figure 2. The Results of the Hypothesis Testing Concerning the Examined Variables	43
Graph 1 The Distribution of Cases According to Budget Change and Loyalty	33
Graph 2. The Ratio of Loyalty and Disloyalty in Militaries With and Without Rivals.....	37
Graph 3. The Ratio of Loyalty and Disloyalty in Conscript and Volunteer armies	38
Graph 4. The Distribution of Loyal and Disloyal Armed Forces with Respect to Officer Selection	40
Table 1. The Correlation of the Independent Variables.....	30
Table 2. Testing the Effect of the Independent Variables On Disloyalty	31
Table 3. The Comparison of the Means of Budget Change In Loyal and Disloyal Militaries	32
Table 4. The Effect of Budget Change On Disloyalty in Volunteer Armies	34
Table 5. The Effect of Budget Change On Disloyalty in Conscript Armies.....	34
Table 6. The Mean of Defense Budget in Conscript and Voluntary Armies	35
Table 7. The Odds of Loyalty in Case of Armies With and Without Rivals	36
Table 8. The Odds of Disloyalty in Conscript versus Voluntary Armies	38
Table 9. The Odds of Disloyalty in Selectively Recruited Armies.....	39
Table 10. The Odds of Disloyalty In Armies with Rational and Irrational Officer Selection	39
Table 11. Case Studies and Explanatory Variables	44
Table 12. The Distribution of Cases According to Four Explanatory Variables.....	45
Table 13. The Military Expenditure of Egypt 2000-2011 (million USD)	50
Table 14. The Military Expenditure of Syria 2000-2011 (million USD).....	54
Table 15. The Military Expenditure of Bahrain 2000-2011 (million USD)	61

“...the fate of every revolution at a certain point is decided by a break in the disposition of the army. Against a numerous [...]military force, unarmed or almost unarmed masses of the people cannot possibly gain a victory. But no deep national crisis can fail to affect the army to some extent. Thus, along with [...] a truly popular revolution there develops a possibility [...] of its victory.”

Leon Trotsky, 1959¹

Introduction

Mass protests on the streets demanding a regime change are unquestionably extraordinary times in the life of any nation or state. The success and failure of these initiatives have produced significant scholarly interest. The role of the armed forces in determining the outcome of these movements has received varying attention during the so-called ‘*third wave of democratization*’.² During the transitions of Latin America the role of the armed forces was considered to be a significant factor for examination, as the states of the region were widely impregnated by military power. The significance of the military concerning regime change has been somewhat reduced in the literature and the academic discourse after the transitions in East Central Europe as the armed forces have played a relatively minor role. The current events in the Middle East have, however, raised awareness about the importance of the coercive institutions as an important factor concerning the outcome of the events. The potential effect of the protests and revolts of the Middle East demanding democratic reforms and regime change seems to be very much influenced by the position the military takes. One would make the superficial statement based on the Egyptian and Tunisian experience that in most countries undergoing revolts, the military’s position is

¹ Diane, E. H. Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force* (London: Academic Press, 1974), 81.

² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization In the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

almost decisive. The aim of my thesis is to build a framework to explain the loyalty shifts within the armed forces that occur during a popular attempt to change the regime. As my effort is mostly inspired by the events of the “Arab Spring”, I will apply this framework to explain the behavior of the armed forces in the Middle East during the popular uprisings. I will show that the efforts of the autocrats to create loyalty through rents and privileges and their efforts to keep the armed forces distant from society have a strong influence, therefore a significant explanatory value all around the globe, including the Middle East.

The observation that the military itself has the ability to conserve the regime or the state institutions and nip substantial changes in the bud does not come as a surprise. The armies of the region had played a significant role ever since the formation of the states in the Middle East. Independence from colonial rule was achieved by military coups, supported by nationalism and to some extent by civil society, as well (for example in Syria, Egypt and Iraq).³ As a consequence, in some cases the armed forces continue to play an important role in the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes of the area. Furthermore, these armies have somewhat different functions from their counterparts in for example Europe. As *Bruce W. Farcau* notes, the militaries of the Middle East have been traditionally inward-looking, “*with a primary role of suppressing internal dissent, on behalf of either a colonial or imperial power or an authoritarian regime.*”⁴ What is interesting about the Middle East is that currently the alliance between the regime and the armed forces has been breaking up.

It is, however, not only the Middle East where the question comes in the foreground, previous examples from other regions of the world are also intriguing. The Latin American experience showed that despite of the central role of the armed forces in the maintenance of

³ Nicola Pratt, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Arab World* (London: Lynne Rienne Publishers, 2007), 38.

⁴ Bruce W. Farcau, “Lessons from Latin America for the Muslim World,” in *Modernization, Democracy and Islam*, ed. Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2005), 142.

internal order, in a significant number of cases the militaries were actually in favor of the transition and liberalization, or they were even its promoters and initiators, usually due to the pressure from society and as a result of divisions within the elite.⁵ But another set of recent examples, the Color Revolutions also show that weak relations between the regime and the military are conducive to the success of social movements. In *Mark R. Beissinger's* article on the Color Revolutions the chart on structural factors clearly shows that in all the four successful cases (Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Georgia and Serbia) the relationship between the armed forces and the regime were troubled.⁶ In most of the unsuccessful ones these ties were rather strong, but of course, the dissent of the coercive institutions is treated by *Beissinger* as a necessary but insufficient condition for a successful campaign.⁷

The empirical observations show that military loyalty or disloyalty is an important factor to consider for social movements and for authoritarian regimes who seek survival all over the globe and in all historic times. If we take a closer look at the literature of transition, democratization and revolution, we can conclude that the role of coercive mechanisms was seriously considered by prominent scholars, such as *Barrington Moore*, *Charles Tilly*, *Diana E. H. Russell* and *Theda Skocpol*. The question, however, remains: why remain loyal or why choose to be disloyal? This puzzle has not been significantly addressed by the literature yet. Most of the studies that consider military loyalty as an important factor for regime survival usually do not go beyond the scope of small-N comparative case studies, or they enumerate influential factors for only one historic era and geographic area.

⁵ Felipe Agöero, "The Military And The Limits To Democratization," in *Issues In Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies In a Comparative Perspective*, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 166.

⁶ Mark R. Beissinger, "Structure and Exemplar in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," *Perspectives On Politics*, Vol. 5. No. 2. (2007): 272.

⁷ Beissinger, 272.

Similarly, hints about what factors may influence military loyalty and disloyalty in the Middle East have been implied by *Eva Bellin*⁸, *Derek Lutterbeck*⁹, *Zoltan Barany*¹⁰. *Barany*, for example considers the legitimacy of the regime, the unity and well-being of the armed forces, the threat of a foreign intervention and the training of the officers as important factors to explain disloyalty.¹¹ *Bellin* focuses on the ability of the state to maintain the means of coercion financially, the international legitimacy of the regime, the size of the mobilization against the regime, and finally the level of institutionalization in the coercive apparatus.¹² *Lutterbeck*, at the same time names the level of institutionalization of the military and the ties of the armed forces to society as influential variables concerning loyalty shifts.¹³ The question, however, remains, whether these variables are applicable to a wider sample of cases, or are they limited in scope. Furthermore, although the works of *Barany* and *Lutterbeck* are especially useful in identifying the dynamics of loyalty shifts in the Arab Spring, they lack a coherent theory about the reasons.

On the one hand, comparative case studies are useful to create fine-grained arguments, to understand small differences and hidden dynamics behind certain events. On the other hand, if scholars apply different variables throughout different studies, adapting the variables merely to a small number of cases within one region and historic era, the results will not bring us closer to a general understanding of loyalty and disloyalty. At the same time, they have the danger to make contradictory conclusions about the same variable for different cases.

⁸ Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in a Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36. No. 2. (January 2004).

⁹ Derek Lutterbeck, *Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance*, (Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011).

¹⁰ Zoltan Barany, "Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 22. No. 4. (October 2011).

¹¹ Barany, 25.

¹² Bellin, *The Robustness of Authoritarianism*, 144.

¹³ Lutterbeck, 18.

In my view, it would be necessary to establish a general theory and determine a series of influential variables before carrying out case study analyses in order to complement them. This is the reason why I believe that a statistical analysis on a cross section of regime change movements throughout the world could provide general evidence for the explanatory value of a series of variables. Therefore, the aim of the first part of my thesis is to construct statistical analysis about the potentially influential variables by which I could start filling in a blank in the literature. Afterwards, my case studies refine the results and explain the gaps that are left unexplained by the results of the statistics.

To address the possible influential variables, the thesis will adopt a mostly political economic, interest based approach to the problem: it rests on the assumption that autocrats have two fundamental methods to control the population and remain in power: creating loyalty (through ideology and rents)¹⁴ and through repression.¹⁵ This is not only true for the population but also for the bureaucracy and the coercive institutions. Naturally, these institutions also have internal control mechanisms through the hierarchy and the *principal-agent relationship* that structures them.¹⁶ Based on these background ideas and already existing comparative case studies on military disloyalty I identified some variables that signal the functioning or the break-down of these loyalty creating mechanisms. The variables include rents, the privileged position of the armed forces compared to other coercive institutions, recruitment methods and the selection of the leadership of the armed forces from a specific group of society.

The thesis comprises of two fundamental parts. In the first part (*Chapter 1*) I follow up on the previously proposed idea of loyalty and put forward a general idea on the possible

¹⁴ Ronald Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of a Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 36.

¹⁵ Wintrobe, 33.

¹⁶ Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 14.

structural variables. In *Chapter 2* I test the influence of the variables by a series of statistical analyses on a dataset from 1990 to 2012. In the second part of the thesis I examine cases from the recent uprising of the Middle East, more precisely, Egypt, Syria and Bahrain (*Chapter 3*).

Although this case selection is similar to those I have criticized earlier, as they are limited to one area and historic timeframe rather than showing a cross-section of cases through history and geographic space. However, I test my theory on a diverse sample of cases in the statistics section, and only then examine the variables that I found influential on these cases. In this respect, the three cases have the merit of being quite similar, still producing three different outcomes of loyalty shifts: disloyalty, loyalty and partial defection. Therefore, the thesis exploits the merits of both the hypothesis testing by statistical analysis on a larger universe of cases and case study analysis on a specific area.

The thesis embarked on a road taken by the few: to approach civil-military relations from a theoretical point of view and test the theories on a large sample. The findings indeed show, that it was a worthwhile approach, as the thesis provide a series of straightforward results. The findings prove that keeping the armed forces in a privileged position raises the likelihood to prevent loyalty shifts in case of regime change attempts. At the same time, I also show that there are certain recruitment and selection techniques that strengthen the control mechanisms within the principal-agent relations and help to prevent deviations within the armed forces. Such technique is the creation of voluntary forces as opposed to conscripted armies, furthermore, to keep the army distant from society by different selection mechanisms, based on ethnic, religious, geographic or other cleavages. The findings also show that as opposed to my expectations, neither budget increase nor the discriminative selection of the rank and file has an effect on loyalty shifts. In the following section I explain the theoretic background further and establish my hypotheses.

CHAPTER I: THE THEORY OF MILITARY DISLOYALTY

As I have explained before, the research on why military loyalty is essential for regime survival is quite extensive. *Theda Skocpol* pointed out that a successful revolution is impossible without the break-down of the state, which is marked by the inability of the central administration to maintain its control over the coercive institutions.¹⁷ Therefore, successful uprisings can only be carried out by armed forces abandoning their loyalty towards the regime. *Alfred Stepan* also notes that

*[i]n a struggle for democracy, the relationships of power in an authoritarian regime depend, on the one hand, on the regime's capacity to lead its allies and to maintain the unity of its coercive apparatus, and on the other hand, on the capacity of the democratic opposition to constitute itself and to generate support for a ruling alternative.*¹⁸

One of the most important researches leading up to this thesis was carried out by *D.E.H. Russell*. In *Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Forces* she examines the potential effect of military loyalty concerning the outcome of rebellions. In her thorough comparative analysis she shows that the military and the police have to be coherent and they have to be effectively used in order to make revolutionary aims unsuccessful.¹⁹ She does not, however, examine what determines loyalty or the lack of loyalty towards the regime, therefore, in my thesis I would like to continue research along this idea, but with some modifications. *Russell* herself proposes that a research should be conducted on the loyalty shifts within the armed forces based on structural factors.

¹⁷ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 32.

¹⁸ Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 55.

¹⁹ Jack A. Goldstone, "Theories Of Revolution: The Third Generation," *World Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 3. (1980): 436.

Considering the theories and even empirical data, it is still hard to establish when the armed forces can be expected to break ties with the regime. As *Stepan* wrote in connection with the interests and capacities of the military,

*any large complex organization has some institutional interests of its own and prerogatives its members seek to advance, as well as some changes or outcomes in the overall political system that it, more than other organizations, particularly fears and resists. Complex organizations thus have interests and capacities to advance their interests.*²⁰

However, the military is not only an institution which has its independent interests but it also owns perfectly suitable means to seek to satisfy these interests by pressure underlined by the possibility of violence.

At the cross-section of the interests of the armed forces and the will of the governance to exercise control over the military stands the effort of the governance to build a network of support in the institutions, especially in coercive bodies. *Ronald Wintrobe* in the *Political Economy of a Dictatorship* has outlined a theory on the institutions of autocracies where institutions are merely a tool of the regime to redistribute spoils among its supporters and maintainers and eliminate its enemies and serve as a complementary tool to repression.²¹ In his account, the regimes seek to combine loyalty and repression in a way to be able to remain in office. Gaining loyalty among the members of the armed forces would be a result of the combination of personal, institutional and economic benefits.

Eva Bellin is also in favor of this idea. She examines why a regime would lose its means of coercion and enumerates the following factors: fiscal problems where the state is unable to maintain the means of coercion, when the regime loses its international legitimacy, when there is a large mobilization against the regime, and finally if there is a high level of

²⁰ *Stepan*, 10.

²¹ *Wintrobe*, 4.

institutionalization in the coercive apparatus.²² *Bellin* puts emphasis on the finances: the economic difficulties of the autocracies trickle down to the coercive apparatus, thereby making it difficult for the government to maintain their staff and the supplies. She recalls the phenomenon that in several states of the Middle East the regimes continue to maintain or even increase the defense budget despite the economic problems they face.²³

Zoltan Barany also enumerates structural variables concerning loyalty shifts during the examination of the Arab Spring. He explains the lack of loyalty in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya by the relatively disadvantaged situation of the armed forces (mostly in economic terms) and the dark future perspectives on the succession after Mubarak in Egypt, whereas he claims that the Syrian and Bahraini militaries were kept loyal by their well-being.²⁴

However, it is important to point out that beside to the distribution of spoils, control mechanisms cannot be spared. I have already proposed that in case of regimes which cannot be characterized as military dictatorships, the relationship between subordinates and leaders should be fundamentally treated as a ‘*principal-agent*’ relationship. *Peter D. Feaver* has proposed that military obedience should not be treated as default but is a result of the threat of civilians to detect military “*shirking*”.²⁵ The assumption behind principal-agent relationships is that the agents act on behalf of and in accordance with the will of the principal. However, in most autocracies, mostly due to the lack of formal control mechanisms, the “*enforceability problem*” arises.²⁶ Failing to deliver the rents may put the dictator at risk, mainly if the armed forces are put in a morally ambiguous situation where they may have to exert violence on the

²² Bellin, *The Robustness of Authoritarianism*, 144.

²³ Eva Bellin, “Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders,” in *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, ed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angrist (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 32.

²⁴ Barany, 27-29.

²⁵ Feaver, 14.

²⁶ Wintrobe, 27.

citizens of their own state. They have to size up the privileges and the worth of loyalty versus institutional unity, prestige and the possible gains from the transition.

Although the primary route of enforcement functions still through the hierarchical chain, it is bold to claim the hierarchy is the only influential relation: *Wintrobe and Breton* have analyzed hierarchical organizations where they found that there are fundamentally two directions where trust or loyalty can work: either horizontally or vertically.²⁷ *Vertical loyalty* functions when trade occurs between the subordinates and superiors, whereas *horizontal loyalty* networks mark exchanges between subordinates. Consequently, although the functioning of hierarchical organizations, the military in our case is primarily founded on vertical loyalty, horizontal relations have to be taken into account, as well. When horizontal loyalty takes primacy, efficiency is reduced and vertical loyalties will be damaged.²⁸

Mapping the importance of horizontal relations in a large and socially diverse institution is a difficult, nearly impossible task. When there is a popular challenge to the autocratic regime, the reactions on the individual level are nearly impossible to determine. What follows from the theories outlined above is that disloyalty, in this case can be the result of three, not exclusive mechanisms:

- (1) the failure of vertical enforcement and spoiler mechanisms,
- (2) the emerging primacy of the horizontal relations,
- (3) external influences.

In the previous paragraphs the first reason has been already identified. However, the second and third mechanisms need further clarification. In any case, when a mass movement

²⁷ Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe, "The Bureaucracy of Murder Revisited," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 94. No. 5. (October 1986): 910.

²⁸ Breton and Wintrobe, 910.

is formed to change the regime, it is hard to avoid to take sides. Still, to opt for disloyalty is necessarily a more significant step. To predict or explain such decisions on an individual level is nearly impossible, but in an organization the number of variables would probably be near infinite. Who is a potentially disloyal soldier or officer, is unforeseeable by the outside observer. It is very similar to the “*identification problem*” raised by *Stathis N. Kalyvas* in *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*.²⁹ The identification problem fundamentally reflects on the question of what side the individual takes in case of a crisis, which, in some cases, is hard to grasp by the environment or the enemies. *Kalyvas* pointed out that when violence occurs, the “*preference formation*” might be based on grievances, economic considerations, fear of violence, ethnic, religious, class and any other ties may have a significant influence on the behavior of the individual.³⁰ This should be no different when a regime cracks down on its own citizens.

The identification issue and the preferences are highly connected to the horizontal loyalty and the external influences. It is logical to assume that when the soldier identifies himself with the opponents of the regime, because external influences and interests (eg. grievances, family) or horizontal loyalties come into the foreground (eg. ethnicity), the likelihood of disloyalty will be bigger. As the point of the thesis is not to examine no individual-level data, but structural variables, I would argue that there are certain identifiable structures and mechanisms within the armed forces that raise the probability of the identification problem and raise the odds of disloyalty. Such mechanisms cause the loyalty towards the military to be second-rate as compared to the external or horizontal influences. An umbrella concept for these external and horizontal influences is the *distance from society*.

²⁹ Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 89.

³⁰ Kalyvas, 94-104.

Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan used the term “social distance”³¹ to explain why some coercive institutions are more likely to be useful for repression than others: when the coercive institutions are distant from society (e.g. the members are from a different country, or they are a member of a special, advantaged group), they are less likely to defect, as the probability that networks exist between the members and the protestors is less likely.³²

An example for the measurement on the distance from society is the recruitment of the army: conscription does not entail long-term loyalty-creating mechanisms as compared to voluntary affiliation.³³ The conscripts are part of the armed forces for a couple of months and in most cases the service does not lead to a career. For the volunteers being a member of the armed forces entails long-term interests, such as livelihood and career. Another example might be a state where the majority of the people is ruled and disadvantaged by a minority ethnicity. When popular mobilization occurs, defection will be more likely to happen, as the networks between the members of the armed forces and the protestors, or horizontal loyalty between the members of the military coming from the same disadvantaged ethnicity might become a priority over institutional or vertical loyalty. It is important to emphasize again that the spoiler mechanisms are not necessarily independent of the process of identification: they might very well reinforce each other.

In the following sections I elaborate more on the potential variables that effect disloyalty. Let us resume the most important assumptions of the theoretic chapter. The first assumption claimed that rents and privileges are likely to contribute to the conservation of the loyalty of the armed forces. The second assumption claimed that vertical loyalty has to enjoy primacy over horizontal loyalty in order to maintain the chain of command and the

³¹ Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011), 189.

³² Chenoweth and Stephan, 46.

³³ Lutterbeck, 15.

institutional efficiency. When horizontal loyalties or external influence come in the foreground, loyalty becomes endangered. Based on these assumptions I set up the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Armies that continue to receive generous economic benefits are less likely to be disloyal.

Hypothesis 2: Armies whose influence remains primary compared to other coercive institutions (paramilitary forces, police) are less likely to be disloyal.

Hypothesis 3: Armies whose selection mechanisms keep the army distant from society are less likely to be disloyal.

Before I turn to hypothesis testing, I elaborate on the conceptual background and the variables. In the following chapter I introduce the concept of loyalty and defection, Afterwards, I propose three main areas of determinants which should be examined when trying to explain loyalty shifts. First of all, I turn to the privileges and benefits the armed forces enjoy in autocracies. Secondly, I examine whether rivalry between different branches of the armed forces and different coercive institutions may have an effect on disloyalty. Thirdly, I examine the different attachments and rationale of the officer corps and the rank and file that might influence loyalty. Lastly, I reflect on the concept of “*distance from society*”, meaning the structural factors that determine whether there is a higher probability of network formation between the members of the armed forces and the members of the regime change campaign.³⁴

³⁴ Chenoweth and Stephan, 46.

1.1 Disloyalty and defection

Loyalty, in this context should not only be understood as a motive that includes emotional attachment, but rather as the acknowledgement of the special relationship between the military and the regime: in theory, the military is a tool of coercion in the hands of the regime, therefore, departure from this relationship must entail special considerations.³⁵

Defection, in this case, should be understood as a form of lack of loyalty.

Kalyvas conceptualized defection, when he examined collaboration in civil wars. Although the focus of the two questions is rather different, there are some concepts that are worth considering for military defection, as well. First of all, he divides defection into “*public*” and “*private*”, regarding the domain which is affected by the action.³⁶ Secondly, he disaggregates defection into three subgroups: “*noncompliance*”, “*informing*” and “*switching sides*”.³⁷ These concepts, or at least the degree these concepts represent, will be useful for my own disaggregation of disloyalty.

First of all, let me clarify that although the words “disloyalty” and “defection” are not synonyms, I often use them synonymously. The difference is the degree to which the armed forces or the members of the armed forces become disloyal. Disloyalty is essentially the umbrella concept. *Figure 1* shows the disaggregation of the concept of disloyalty.

At the “softest” end, disloyalty means “*noncompliance*”³⁸, when the disloyal member does not actively seek to support the contesting power or diminish the power of the regime. Noncompliance, therefore, would entail cases where the members of the military refuse to carry out commands, or the leadership refuses to transmit the orders of the government to the capabilities. This can happen privately and publicly: private noncompliance causes damage to

³⁵ Simon Keller, *The Limits of Loyalty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1-23.

³⁶Kalyvas, 104.

³⁷Kalyvas, 105.

³⁸Kalyvas, 105.

the extent which the disloyal individual is replaceable. A more active form of noncompliance is when it happens publicly, at the extreme where it contains an assurance towards the public and the protestors that they are safe. This case is already bordering defection.




Figure 1. The Disaggregation of the Concept of Disloyalty

Defection covers the active sabotage of orders, with the likely inclusion of desertation from the military. Such an act is almost the equivalent of “*switching sides*”. In this case, private defection becomes less meaningful, although desertion from the armed forces might be an example. When defection is public, e.g. it includes threatening the police with intervention in case of violence, it is very close to the extreme end of disloyalty, sedition. Sedition and defection, in my understanding, are extremely close concepts. Sedition, as of Article 54 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice means an

*intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful civil authority, creates, in concert with any other person, revolt, violence, or disturbance against that authority.*³⁹

Sedition is, however, the extreme end of disloyalty; thereby it also includes military coups.

Although I acknowledge the immense difference between noncompliance and sedition, and every level in between, in my thesis I will use the umbrella concept of disloyalty for the statistical tests and only disaggregate the variables for the case study section. The reason is that most often the cases are mixed and the measurement of each case would require sources that are rarely available about military organizations. At the same time, using the umbrella term of disloyalty still incorporates only cases of noncompliance with a significant number of soldiers involved, as sources generally do not consider either individual defection or a low-ranking soldier's refusal of order as cases of political significance (but rather as criminal cases). All in all, I do not believe that using the concept of disloyalty distorts the results of the tests: the point of the examination is to find variables that make armed forces more likely to abandon loyalty, whatever form that may take.

1.2 Finances and Privileges

As the members of the military are just as much connected to the regime through vertical loyalty as to society through horizontal connections, in times of a popular revolt they are exposed to the difficult question whether to join the upcoming forces or stay loyal to the *ancien régime*. Earlier this chapter it has been stated that partly due to the lack of civil control

³⁹ Mutiny or Sedition, 10 U.S.C. § 894, Art. 94, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/894> (accessed April 20, 2012).

the armed forces are also somewhat independent of the regime in most autocracies. We can assume, therefore, that the military as a body also has its own interests independent of the governance, so that they have the potential to break ties with the regime in case of popular mobilization.⁴⁰

The decision to remain loyal can be the result of a mere economic calculation, as *Wintrobe* describes, with the military being a mere “budget-maximizing” group, which only concentrates on accumulating wealth and raise salaries.⁴¹ He claims that the institutions of autocracies only serve as means to create loyalty by distributing rents and purge the enemies of the system.⁴² Therefore, the well-being of the military makes the members more likely to remain loyal to the regime. All in all, my proposition is that the loss of these financial privileges aggravated by a popular uprising is quite likely to produce disloyalty.

Naturally, both individual and institutional interests go beyond the budget. There are several privileges that might not be *on par* with the direct financial benefits, but provide the armed forces with influence and power. What is quite clear that in extraordinary times, such as a regime change, the armed forces may get involved in the events in order to secure their interests for the upcoming times. Although examining all the privileges that armed forces enjoy are beyond the capacities of the author of this thesis, some words will be still denoted to this widely acknowledged factor.

Stepan detects three areas that can be generally treated as a scene for significant military influence: firstly, the structure, mission and control of the military; secondly the military budget; and thirdly, in case of a regime change how to treat the human rights abuses of the previous era.⁴³ Beside to these the armed forces may also enjoy a series of institutional

⁴⁰ Stepan, 10.

⁴¹ Wintrobe, 341.

⁴² Wintrobe, 4.

⁴³ Stepan, 68.

privileges. These range from constitutional privileges, through their role in the defense sector and state enterprises, to their possible role in the executive power, in the legislature and in the jurisdiction.⁴⁴

However, it is important to point out that even privileges (let them be financial, institutional or personal ones) are two-edged swords: they might conserve loyalty, but at a certain point the officers may feel that the privileges can only be conserved by a military takeover, or switching sides. It is also possible, that the overtly privileged armed forces themselves serve as a reason for social upheaval, thereby making it problematic for the officers to support such claims.

All in all, my position is that privileges generally have a loyalty-creating effect. Although I acknowledge the importance of all different kinds of privileges, it is hard to consider all of them for an individual researcher in a cross-country dataset. Therefore, I concentrate on financial privileges in the dataset, and touch upon different privileges in the case study section.

1.3 Rivalry

If one accepts the fundamental claim of this paper, that the armed forces are institutions the members of which calculate rationally when they weigh the pros and cons of defection, it is quite an intuitive idea that the existence of rival forces is a drive for disloyalty. This is quite important in the MENA region, as *Kamrava* highlighted the existence of militias and other paramilitary forces as a primary characteristic in some Middle Eastern states. These alternative forces are generally created to balance out the army and prevent a coup, therefore, they are often indoctrinated and their existence is dependent on the regime only, consequently

⁴⁴ Stepan, 94.

their loyalty is nearly unshakable.⁴⁵ However, considering the loyalty of the regular army this is a two-edged sword for the regime: a competition between the security forces is likely to emerge, mainly if the regular army officers feel second in the hierarchy, let that be prestige or financial loss.

Divided coercive institutions are not only making defections more likely because the different branches may engage in rivalry. It is also significantly harder to keep the different branches together and to keep them loyal without a unified leadership.⁴⁶ Therefore, dividing the armed forces may be an effective protection against military coups, but in case of a popular uprising it may complicate the task of controlling the different branches and enforcing loyalty.

The rivalry, however, can happen between the armed forces and other coercive institutions, as well, such as the police, if the advantages of the latter are obvious and ‘irritating’ to the armed forces. *Barany* has, for example explained the lack of loyalty of the Tunisian Armed Forces partly by the relatively disadvantaged situation of the armed forces as compared to the police (both in its relation to the regime and in financial terms).⁴⁷ In Libya the army was quite underprivileged compared to other security forces, but primarily to the rival paramilitary force.⁴⁸ Therefore, rivalry both within the armed forces and within the coercive institutions have to be examined.

⁴⁵ Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No. 1. (2000): 68.

⁴⁶ Jack A. Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2011): 11. and Barany, 29.

⁴⁷ Barany, 27.

⁴⁸ Barany, 30.

1.4 Distance from Society

The idea of using the concept of the distance of the armed forces from society comes from *Erica Chenoweth* and *Maria J. Stephan*. In the intriguing book of *Why Civil Resistance Works* they shortly touch upon the question why loyalty shifts may occur within the armed forces. In the book the different mechanism of violent and nonviolent campaigns are examined and their potential to produce success under certain conditions, for example secessionist, or transition efforts. The analysis showed that the number of participants in these movements have a positive effect on the likelihood of considerable defections in the coercive institutions.⁴⁹ This is what makes nonviolent campaigns more successful: they generally attract more participants and supporters by which there is a chance that a significant part of the members of the armed forces will be affected by it through their ties.⁵⁰ It is not the aim of this paper to investigate how these reactions would be different from the case of nonviolent movements, but it is an important factor to control for, along with the approximate number of participants in the movement.

Other researchers, such as *Robert H. Dix* and *Jack A. Goldstone* also dealt with the issue of distance: they claimed that neo-patrimonial regimes are vulnerable to revolution, as the power holders and the beneficiaries of the system are detached from the rest of the population.⁵¹ Furthermore, these theories suggest that the concept of the distance from society should be further elaborated on and variables should be established that raises the likelihood of the presence of strong ties between the members of the armed forces and society.

Derek Lutterbeck also considers the “*strength of the link of the armed forces to society*” in his examination about the Arab Spring and measures the distance by the selection

⁴⁹ Chenoweth and Stephan, 48.

⁵⁰ Chenoweth and Stephan, 46.

⁵¹ Richard Snyder, “Explaining Transitions From Neopatrimonial Dictatorships,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 24. No. 4. (July 1992): 379.

procedures (e.g. forces with tribal connections, or mercenaries and the importance of conscription).⁵² These variables will be useful for my analysis as well, however, it is important to note that the military is a complex institution, with several levels in the hierarchy, where the individuals are coming from significantly different background, education, have different interests within society and might be selected by different considerations. Between the top and the bottom level we may even discover completely opposing interests.⁵³ For example, in a conscript army the ties between society and the army may result in a reluctance to use violence against the citizens, which may contradict the interests of the officer corps that is kept loyal by the spoiler strategy of the regime (high salary, prestige, etc.) Consequently, it is logical to relate the distance from society by differentiating the rank and file from the officers in case of certain variables and distinguish armed forces with different recruitment mechanisms.

In a dictatorship winning the loyalty and preventing the shirking of the officer corps is relatively easy compared to the lower segments of the armed forces. Traditionally clientelistic relationships help to achieve these ends beside to the economic benefits, privileges and a feeling of prideful attachment to the organization. These are also important, as the high-ranking members of the military can be assumed to have a long-term interest vested into the army, as compared to a conscripted soldier, or a member of the rank and file.

However, the rank and file is much harder to monitor and keep loyal. They might share both the economic benefits, but generally the rank and file of a primarily conscripted army has less long-term interest in economic benefits, than a voluntary army, and their attachment to the organization is only temporary, therefore, assumedly, much weaker. Consequently, although we can presume that although losing economic benefits will weaken

⁵² Lutterbeck, 18.

⁵³ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order In Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 193.

the loyalty of the rank and file as well, it is more threatening to the voluntaries than the conscripts. Thus my first claim is that conscripted armies are closer to society than voluntary armies, as the interest of the rank and file and their prospects within the organization are only temporary.⁵⁴ Also, horizontal loyalties easily form between the conscripted members of the rank and file and their external loyalties remain important as compared to the temporary and enforced vertical loyalties. Voluntary armies, in this respect, should be treated differently, as the interests of the members are strongly tied to the institution of the armed forces. *Barany* points out for example that the conscript army of Egypt made it unlikely for the army to step up violently against the protestors.⁵⁵ Therefore, I believe that the recruitment methods also have some predictive value concerning loyalty.

Furthermore, the world, but the Middle East is particularly full states, where the officer corps is selected from a distinct class of society, or religious group. This means that there are special cases of states and dictatorships, where definite ethnic or religious affiliations dominate the governance and they have a notable role in maintaining the legitimacy of the regime. A special case of dictatorship is where a minority group dominates over the majority. The survival of the dictator, in these cases may be better ensured by an officer corps that is selected from the group that the regime represents.⁵⁶ If the necessary resources are available, in my view, the regime survival is even more likely, if the rank and file is also selected from the preferred group.⁵⁷ Kyrgyzstan is an example where the majority also dominates the army: despite the fragmented ethnic composition of the country, the dominant ethnic group, the Kyrgyz dominates the whole body of the military.⁵⁸ Bahrain would represent the "minority dictatorship", where the armed forces are mostly selected from the Sunni branch of Islam

⁵⁴ Lutterbeck, 16.

⁵⁵ Barany, 28.

⁵⁶ Barany, 31.

⁵⁷ Lutterbeck, 18.

⁵⁸ Erica Marat, "Kyrgyzstan's Fragmented Police and Armed Forces," *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, Issue 11. (2010), <http://pipss.revues.org/3803#ftn10> (accessed March 15, 2012).

representing a minority in the country.⁵⁹ The situation may be further complicated in cases, where the selection mechanisms are only applied to the officers, and the rank and file is randomly selected, *horrible dictum*, a randomly selected conscription army, where not even long-term interests tie the rank and file to the institutions. *Barany*, for example finds the selection procedures influential concerning military loyalty in Bahrain and Syria.⁶⁰

All in all, the distance of the armed forces from society in general or from the movements in particular is essentially determined by the four factors: the size of the movement, the recruitment of the armed forces and the selection mechanisms of the rank and file and the officers.

Although in this chapter I thematically collected literature for my theory, from the literature I have reviewed it is quite clear that even the same authors have a tendency to explain different cases with different variables. For example, although *Barany* employs similar variables, he applies them selectively to one case or another, furthermore, he disregards the fact that many of the states he examines have experienced major opposition movements and protests previously with different outcomes. Very few have attempted to collect universal variables to explain cases throughout the globe and history. In case of small-N qualitative analysis such approach is acceptable, however, it would be also interesting to see whether a selection of variables has an effect on a larger number of cases. In the following chapter, therefore, I will examine a host of variables throughout a wider cross-section of cases.

⁵⁹Barany, 31.

⁶⁰ Barany, 29-32.

CHAPTER 2: EXPLAINING DISLOYALTY

2.1 Data, Sources, Case Selection

2.1.1 Case Selection

In the following chapter I use statistical models to test my propositions established in *Chapter 1*. I selected my cases from the universe of popular movements in non-democratic countries from the timeframe between 1990 and 2012 the declared aim of which was transition or regime change. I need to emphasize that the purpose of the movement had to be regime change in order to qualify for a case! Therefore, an event where the movement did not want to get rid of the dictator, but for instance only his government, would not be selected. The reason is that if I do not apply strict selection criteria it would be hard to draw the line between the different shades of democratization efforts, which often claim only governmental changes, or the expansion of rights, but not straightforward regime change.⁶¹ Furthermore, as my dataset incorporated several cases from the dataset of Stephan and Chenoweth, who also applied this criteria, this was the only way to merge their work with my cases.

I believe that the selected time frame is quite suitable, as the end of the Cold War has brought around changes where the regime change was less determined by outside powers and where democracy seemed to triumph over autocracy, creating a more unified normative evaluation of democratic regimes in the public opinion throughout the world.

⁶¹ Chenoweth and Stephan, 14.

The cases were carefully selected in order to be separated from cases where military regimes governed⁶² and where the country was involved in a civil war during the movement. The reason for this is that loyalty and disloyalty may be influenced by different dynamics when the regime itself is the military, or when serious security concerns enjoy priority. Cases from the post-Communist transition process from the end of the Cold War were also excluded. Lastly, cases where the military initiated the movement for regime change, therefore, defection was not the effect of popular movements, were also excluded (e.g East Timor and Burkina Faso).

I attempted to select all the cases which suite the description above and I managed to find 48 such cases. Among others, the cases include the campaigns of the Color Revolutions, the Arab Spring, and cases from the Sub-Saharan Africa from the 1990's.

Before starting the examination of loyalty and disloyalty, it must be clarified that an analytical difference has to be made between the armed forces and paramilitary troops. This type of “*alternative army*” is present in several states, for example in Iran and Libya.⁶³ Although in my case study analysis these alternative troops will have a crucial influence as a potential rival force, the target of analysis will always be the regular military!

⁶² Samuel Huntington differentiated three types of possible relationships between the military and the regime in autocracies. The first type is the *military regime*, where absolutely no civil control can be detected and the military engaged itself in a series of activities traditionally not related to military functions and missions. The second type is where the military is controlled by the people of the dictator's confidence, using the *divide et impera* principle to exercise close control. The third type is when the military is treated as an *instrument* of the regime, where officers have to be loyal to the regime (and not to the state). (Samuel P Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 4.)

⁶³ Kamrava, 68.

2.1.2 Sources

I have built my own data with the help of the dataset of Chenoweth and Stephan for their book, *Why Civil Resistance Works*.⁶⁴ As their dataset includes several cases that do not qualify for a case in mine, and sometimes our conclusions on loyalty versus disloyalty do not coincide, the dataset has been seriously modified. Furthermore, the database of Chenoweth and Stephan does not include my explanatory variables and only includes cases only until 2006, therefore it had to be extended. The extension of the dataset by new cases and the explanatory variables happened through the following sources: the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program*⁶⁵, the *Global Nonviolent Action Database*⁶⁶, *Military Balance*⁶⁷, the *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*⁶⁸, the *Military Recruitment Data Set*⁶⁹, the *CIA Factbook*⁷⁰, *Jane's World Armies*⁷¹, the reports of *Human Rights Watch*⁷², the *International Crisis Group*⁷³ and *Amnesty International*⁷⁴, the *Coup d'Etat* database of the *Center for Systemic Peace*⁷⁵, the *Minorities at Risk Project* of the *UNHCR*⁷⁶, the publications of the *Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa)*⁷⁷, news reports, articles from CNN, BBC, Al-Jazeera and many more sources on a case-by case basis.

⁶⁴ Dataset available <http://echenoweth.faculty.wesleyan.edu/wcrw/> (accessed February 13, 2012).

⁶⁵ *Uppsala Conflict Data Program*, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php> (accessed February 15, 2012).

⁶⁶ The *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/> (accessed February 16, 2012).

⁶⁷ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance* 1994-2011, (London: Routledge).

⁶⁸ *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, <http://milexdata.sipri.org/> (accessed February 15, 2012).

⁶⁹ Foreign Military Studies Office, *Recruitment Codebook* (September 12, 2007), <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/mildat/RecruitmentCodebook.pdf> (accessed February 14, 2012).

⁷⁰ *CIA Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> (accessed May 20, 2012).

⁷¹ *Jane's World Armies*, <http://jwar.janes.com/public/jwar/index.shtml> (accessed May 15, 2012).

⁷² *Human Rights Watch*, <http://www.hrw.org/> (accessed April 20, 2012).

⁷³ *International Crisis Group*, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed March 15, 2012).

⁷⁴ *Amnesty International*, <http://www.amnesty.org/> (accessed March 10, 2012).

⁷⁵ Center for Systemic Peace, *Coup d'état Database*, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm> (accessed March 10, 2012).

⁷⁶ UNHCR, *Minorities at Risk Project*, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher/MARP.html> (accessed May 10, 2012).

⁷⁷ Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa), <http://www.iss.co.za/> (accessed March 28, 2012).

2.1.3 The Dataset

In the dataset there are 48 carefully selected cases. The small number of cases can be attributed to the strict case selection I have described earlier. Furthermore, although avoiding endogeneity in this case is almost impossible, still, I allowed each country to be represented in the dataset only if there was a significant change in the examined variables between the cases, let that be dependent or independent, the other cases were eliminated.⁷⁸

In order to test the above outlined ideas, I will create a dichotomous dependent variable concerning **disloyalty**. Any significant disloyalty, where troops, a mass of soldiers, or officers have physically defected from the army, or where at least a declaration of disloyalty or non-compliance with the regime occurred, will be coded as disloyalty. Out of the 48 cases 25 cases could be coded as loyalty and 23 as disloyalty.

The first explanatory variable is **budget change**, representing the relative economic well-being of the military. This variable refers to the loyalty creating mechanism of rent, included in *Hypothesis 1*, claiming that armed forces with generous economic benefits are less likely to become disloyal. In each case the defense budget of the armed forces is calculated possibly excluding the budget of the paramilitary forces, other irregular forces and the police. As this condition is not met by any single database, the data is compiled by my own calculations from the SIPRI Database and Military Balance judging the values on a case-by-case basis. The budget of the year before the campaigns is compared to the average of the previous five years. If all five years were not available, I used the available data from the same timeframe, but always at least the average of three years.

⁷⁸ For example, Egypt is represented twice in the dataset, once as a case of defection and once as a case of loyalty. Madagascar was present three times in the dataset, once as a case of disloyalty and twice as loyalty. However, in case of the two cases with identical outcomes (end year 1993 and 2003) there was no difference in either recruitment, structure, peak membership, the method of the campaign, and so on. Therefore, the case of 1993 was eliminated. The last example is Thailand, where there are two cases of loyalty (1992, 2011). The reason to include both of them is because conscription was abolished in 1997.

The second explanatory variable marks the existence of a **rival security force**. This variable still partly refers to the spoiler mechanisms that the regime applies. According to *Hypothesis 2*, when an alternative army or a privileged security force emerges, the likelihood of disloyalty increases. This dichotomous variable is coded as '1' if a coercive body exists, which is preferred by the regime as compared to the armed forces, let that be an indoctrinated paramilitary, a mercenary army, or even when the police is given primacy over the armed forces concerning their treatment, and '0' when there was no proof of the existence of such force.

The following explanatory variable is the type of **recruitment** in the army. This variable reflects on the distance of the armed forces from society, which means the likelihood of horizontal and external loyalties gaining primacy over vertical obedience, formulated in *Hypothesis 3*. The armed forces are coded as a voluntary or a conscript army. This set of data is based on the records of Military Balance and the *Military Recruitment Data Set*⁷⁹ and other secondary sources in debatable cases.

Beside to the type of recruitment the military applies, some armies, generally in divided societies establish certain conditions for participation in the military. Such **selective recruitment** is mostly aimed at exclusion. The first variable concerns the selective recruitment of the army: it is coded as '*unspecified*' when the armed forces are mostly representative of the population in general, or at least no specific rules of selection are in place. The variable is coded as '*selective*' when minorities are excluded from the armed forces, and even when the majority is excluded from the armed forces. Minority in this case should not be only understood along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines, but geographically, as well. The variable **officer selection** is coded along the same lines, except that it is also coded

⁷⁹ Foreign Military Studies Office, *Recruitment Codebook* (September 12, 2007), <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/mildat/RecruitmentCodebook.pdf> (accessed February 14, 2012).

as '*selective*' when the officer corps or commanders are so much the private domain of the dictator that they are selected from his kin or family.

A dichotomous control variable is applied marking the cases when the **army was deployed** or requested to restore order. Another control variable estimates the **membership of the movement** in question. This is naturally hard to judge, therefore, I follow Chenoweth and Stephan and approximate it by the number of participants on the largest protests.⁸⁰ The final control variable represents the **method of the campaign**, more precisely, if it is a violent or a nonviolent movement. This variable is also suggested by Chenoweth and Stephan, they code it as the following: physical destruction of property and people are coded as violent campaigns, and the use of economic, social and psychological techniques are coded as nonviolent campaigns.⁸¹

All in all, I have created a dichotomous dependent variable marking disloyalty, and eight independent variables reflecting on the defense budget change, the recruitment type of the army, the discriminative selection mechanisms of the army and the officers, the existence of a favored rival, the classification of the campaign as violent and nonviolent, and finally the membership of the campaign. In the following section I will test these variables using binary logistic regression and independent samples t-test.

⁸⁰ Chenoweth and Stephan, 31.

⁸¹ Chenoweth and Stephan, 12-13.

2.2. Testing the Theory

Before testing the theories outlined before, it needs to be established whether some of the independent variables correlate with each other. The suspicion that there might be a correlation is well-founded: For example, the officer selection variable and the rank and file selection variable are tightly connected: in all seventeen cases, where the rank and file was selectively recruited, logically the officers were also discriminatively appointed, and there are eight more cases where only the officers were promoted selectively, but the rank and file was selected randomly. Furthermore, the discriminative rank and file selection procedures are more realistic in case of volunteer armies than in conscripted forces. Lastly, it is logical to assume that when the governance denotes resources to apply selective or discriminative selection mechanism for the recruitment of the armed forces and the promotion of officers, they would be more likely to deploy that army to restore internal order.

Table 1. The Correlation of the Independent Variables

		Army Deploy.	Recruit.	Rank&F. Select.	Officer Select.	Rival S. Force	Nonviol. Camp.
Army Deployment	Pearson Corr.	1	,000	,328(*)	,346(*)	,066	-,320(*)
	Significance	.	1,000	,028	,020	,674	,032
	N	45	45	45	45	43	45
Recruitment	Pearson Corr.	,000	1	,146	,140	-,147	,151
	Significance	1,000	.	,321	,343	,329	,306
	N	45	48	48	48	46	48
Rank&File Selection	Pearson Corr.	,328(*)	,146	1	,710(**)	-,122	,029
	Significance	,028	,321	.	,000	,419	,843
	N	45	48	48	48	46	48
Officer Selection	Pearson Corr.	,346(*)	,140	,710(**)	1	-,026	-,197
	Significance	,020	,343	,000	.	,865	,180
	N	45	48	48	48	46	48
Rival Security Force	Pearson Corr.	,066	-,147	-,122	-,026	1	-,220
	Significance	,674	,329	,419	,865	.	,141
	N	43	46	46	46	46	46
Nonviolent Campaign	Pearson Corr.	-,320(*)	,151	,029	-,197	-,220	1
	Significance	,032	,306	,843	,180	,141	.
	N	45	48	48	48	46	48

Significance: * 0.1 ** 0.5 *** 0.01

Table 1 shows that there is a strong, significant correlation between the discriminative rank and file selection and officer selection procedures. Therefore, these two variables will be separated during the regression. The table also shows evidence that there is a correlation between deployment and discriminative selection procedures (both for the officer corps and the rank and file), and although the correlation is statistically significant, it is weak at most. Interestingly, there is a significant negative correlation between two control variables as well, army deployment and nonviolent campaigns. However, this correlation is not strong, either.

In the light of the correlation tests, *Table 2* shows the overall significance of each independent variable on disloyalty. As the officer selection and army selection mechanisms proved to be endogenous, I only include the officer selection variable in *Model 1* and apply the rank and file selection variable in *Model 2*.

Table 2. Testing the Effect of the Independent Variables On Disloyalty

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Exp(B)	Coefficient	Standard Error	Exp(B)
Budget change	-,02	,03	,98	-,02	,03	,98
Rival force (yes)	3,14**	1,67	23,13	3,15**	1,69	23,26
Recruitment (conscript)	3,41**	1,96	30,25	3,24**	1,90	25,61
Officer selection (unspecified)	1,05	1,18	2,85	-	-	-
Rank&file selection (unspecified)	-	-	-	1,45	1,16	4,24
Army deployment (yes)	1,84	1,40	6,27	2,11'	1,42	8,23
Campaign Membership	,00**	,00	1,00	,00'	,00	1,00
Nonviolent (yes)	,45	1,26	1,56	,82	1,36	2,26
Constant	-5,85**	3,05	,00	-6,40*	3,12	,00

N = 30

Significance: ' 0.15 * 0.1 ** 0.5 *** 0.01

Due to the small sample size, the significance levels of the two tests in *Table 2* have to be treated with caution. If we disregard the significance of some variables, it is clear that the effect of the variables point towards the direction of my theoretic propositions in both models. Large campaigns, army deployment, conscription and the presence of a favored rival have a

significant effect on disloyalty. The strongest effect can be observed in case of the recruitment variable, which shows that conscript armies are significantly more prone to disloyalty than volunteer ones, and the other variable is the favored rival, which shows that rivalry makes the armed forces significantly more likely to be disloyal.

The non-discriminative rank and file and officer selection also have a positive effect on disloyalty, whereas increasing budgets have an inverse effect, decreasing the odds of disloyalty. These latter two variables are, however, not statistically significant. As for now, the preliminary results show that *Hypothesis 1*, reflecting on the negative effect of financial well-being on the likelihood of military disloyalty is unconfirmed, whereas *Hypothesis 2* and *Hypothesis 3* concerning the negative effect of an army distant from society and having primacy over other security institutions on military disloyalty has found some support. However, in the following sections I examine each variable in details in order explore some hidden mechanism and details about each of them.

2.2.1 Budget change


Since the binary logistic regression tests have raised doubts about the significance of the effect of budget increase on disloyalty, the first tests will examine the effect of budget change on loyalty versus disloyalty without controlling for other variables.

Table 3. The Comparison of the Means of Budget Change In Loyal and Disloyal Militaries

	Defection	N	Mean	St. Deviation
Budget Change	Loyalty	24	28,08 *	64,75
	Defection	20	2,35 **	11,82

N=48 Significance: ' 0.15 * 0.1 ** 0.5 *** 0.01

Table 3 shows that if nothing else is controlled for, the defense budget of disloyal armed forces are increasing slower than that of loyal forces. The budgets of loyal forces were 28% higher on average compared to previous years, whereas the budget of defecting armies was increasing by only around 2% on average. What is even more interesting, that defection is not caused by real decrease in economic benefits, on the contrary: a slight increase is still not enough to keep some armies loyal to the regime. These results would confirm my economic account on the loyalty of the armed forces, claiming that forces treated well are more likely to be loyal. However, the mean and the standard deviation show that the values are probably spread out and the significance of the results can be attributed to a couple of the outliers. Graph 1 shows the distribution of the cases in each sample according to budget change.



Graph 1 The Distribution of Cases According to Budget Change and Loyalty⁸²

Graph 1 sheds light on the reason why the results concerning budget change are somewhat ambivalent. There are some outliers for both loyalty and disloyalty but the bulk of the disloyalty values are distributed around -10 and +8%, whereas the majority of loyalty

⁸² The case of Georgia from 2007 is not depicted in the graph, as it is an extreme outlier with 317% change in the defense budget and would have hindered the effective demonstration of data.

cases are spread out around +8 and 30%. The reason why the averages are different is probably due to the outliers. The outliers are, however, often misleading: for instance, one of the outliers among the loyalty cases is Chad from 1990, where the 21% relative decrease in the defense budget makes the results of the tests less significant. However, in Chad the budget decrease should not be attributed to a political decision rather than a natural process of post-war budget decrease. Furthermore, my data is also somewhat distorted by the global post-Cold War budget decreases, as well.

Bearing in mind that this variable generally does not influence disloyalty, I had another proposition in the theoretic part which should be reflected on. My theory claims stronger attachment of volunteers towards the military institutions regardless of the economic benefits of the army. *Table 4* and *Table 5* will disaggregate the results into volunteer and conscript armies.

Table 4. The Effect of Budget Change On Disloyalty in Volunteer Armies

	Loyalty / Defection	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Budget Change	Loyalty	11	14,27 '	22,61
	Defection	4	-1,25 '	11,87

Significance: ' 0.15 * 0.1 ** 0.5 *** 0.01

Table 5. The Effect of Budget Change On Disloyalty in Conscript Armies

	Loyalty / Defection	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Budget Change	Loyalty	13	39,77 '	85,36
	Defection	16	3,25 '	12,02

Significance: ' 0.15 * 0.1 ** 0.5 *** 0.01

The test in *Table 4* is only a hint, as the sample size of defecting voluntary armies with data on budget change is very small and asymmetrical. *Table 4* and *Table 5* show that the average budget change in case of loyal volunteer militaries is much lower, 14% compared to the loyal conscripted armies with an extreme 40% growth on average. *Table 5* shows that the

threshold of defection for volunteer armies is much lower than for conscripted armies, as their average decrease in defense budget is 1%. In case of disloyal conscript armies we cannot even observe an average decrease, but a growth of 3%. Although we have to count with shrinking sample sizes and massive standard deviations, consequently with variables that fare badly, we can still conclude that the threshold of loyalty in voluntary armies is generally lower than in conscript armies. This reinforces the assumption that loyalty attached to economic benefits plays a much less important role in volunteer armies than in conscript armies. This might be attributed to institutional loyalty, or that volunteer soldiers have more long-term interests vested in the armed forces. But we might be observing a trend that for some reason conscript armies generally require more steeply increasing budgets.

This assumption is confirmed by a general mean comparison in *Table 6*, which shows that the average growth of the defense budget in states with conscript forces is much larger than in case of volunteer forces.

Table 6. The Mean of Defense Budget in Conscript and Voluntary Armies

	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Conscript	23,48	29	70,86
Voluntary	8,00	15	23,22
Total	18,20	44	59,02

All in all, there is some evidence that of budget increase somewhat makes the armed forces more likely to remain loyal; however, the results are ambiguous mostly because of the outliers. The statistical tests and the graph showed that the expected relationship between defense budget increase and loyalty prognosticated by *Hypothesis 1* cannot be confirmed.

Therefore, budget increase as an indicator might be necessary to be reconsidered. It is likely that in failing states, and states with inefficient or unfair redistribution, defense budgets may not reflect on the benefits of the soldiers. A good example is Burkina Faso (not included

in the sample) where although the defense budget has risen by 28% compared to the average of the past five years, the soldiers rebelled against the government partly because of economic reasons and unacceptable conditions in 2011.⁸³

2.2.2 Rival Security Forces

The defense budget change however is not alone in testing the idea whether spoilers and privileges make armed forces more likely to stay loyal. According to *Hypothesis 2*, the existence of a rival security branch also signals the lack of privileged position of the armed forces. I found only 12 cases, where there was straightforward evidence of the existence of such rival force. *Table 7* shows that the presence of a favored rival makes the armed forces somewhat more prone to disloyalty, the odds are four times higher than without such a rival force when no other variables are controlled for.


Table 7. The Odds of Loyalty in Case of Armies With and Without Rivals

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Significance	Exp(B)
With Rival	1,46**	,75	,05	4,28
Constant	-,36	,35	,31	0,70

N= 46 Significance: ' 0.15 * 0.1 ** 0.5 *** 0.01

Graph 2 shows the distribution of loyalty and disloyalty among armed forces with and without rivals. It makes clear that although not having a rival is not a decisive factor concerning loyalty or disloyalty, having one seems to have an important negative effect on loyalty.

⁸³ Burkina Faso: Mutiny at President Compaore Barracks, *BBC* (April 15, 2011), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13090094> (accessed March 3, 2012).



Graph 2. The Ratio of Loyalty and Disloyalty in Militaries With and Without Rivals


The presence of a rival force has been already found influential in the overall model, and the finding has been confirmed by the more detailed analysis. All in all, it is intriguing to compare that budget increase does not have a provable effect on disloyalty as compared to the privileged position of the armed forces relative to other security forces. These findings invite us to consider non-material spoiler mechanisms or loyalty creating procedures more influential than financial benefits.

2.2.3 Recruitment

Recruitment has been found highly influential in the overall model. In this section I further examine whether recruitment has an effect on disloyalty in line with *Hypothesis 3*.

Graph 3 depicts the distribution of loyalty and disloyal armed forces according to recruitment type. The graph provides an intriguing result: although conscript armies seem to

be just a little more likely to defect, voluntary armies are much more likely to remain loyal. Cases of defection are almost only accounted for by conscripted forces. Therefore, conscription tends to be an important condition for disloyalty, whereas although voluntary recruitment does not explain loyal behavior alone, it can be considered a significant factor.



Graph 3. The Ratio of Loyalty and Disloyalty in Conscript and Volunteer armies

Table 8. The Odds of Disloyalty in Conscript versus Voluntary Armies

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Significance	Exp(B)
Conscript	,96 [*]	,62	,12	2,61
Constant	-,69	,50	,17	,50

N=48 Significance: ^{*} 0.15 ^{*} 0.1 ^{**} 0.5 ^{***} 0.01

The binary regression in *Table 8* reinforces the same trend that conscript armies are more likely to be disloyal, although the significance of the results is not very high due to the small sample size. It shows, however, that conscript armies are 2.6 times more likely to defect

when nothing else is controlled for. As for now, the recruitment mechanisms confirm the predictions of *Hypothesis 3*.

2.2.4 Selective Recruitment and Officer Selection

Based on the evidence I collected, general discriminative recruitment applied to the rank and file appears to be quite rare in my dataset, there are only 17 cases marked as ‘selective’. Accordingly, the variable was not significant in the overall model.

Table 9. The Odds of Disloyalty in Selectively Recruited Armies

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Significance	Exp(B)
Unspecified	,80	,62	,20	2,23
Constant	-,61	,51	,23	,55

N=48 Significance: ' 0.15 * 0.1 ** 0.5 *** 0.01

The binary regression in *Table 9* shows that the odds of the selectively recruited forces to become loyal or disloyal is not significant if we do not control for other variables, either. This result is, again, in line with the overall model.


Interestingly, in case of the selection of officers, the results become significant when only one variable is considered. The sample of officer selection contains 25 cases of selective promotion versus 23 cases of unspecified promotion. *Table 10* shows that armed forces with discriminatively selected officer corps are much more unlikely to defect.

Table 10. The Odds of Disloyalty In Armies with Rational and Irrational Officer Selection

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Significance	Exp(B)
Unspecified	1,02**	,60	,09	2,77
Constant	-,58	,41	,17	,56

N=48 Significance: ' 0.15 * 0.1 ** 0.5 *** 0.01

The binary regression in *Table 10* shows that armies with rationally selected officers are 2.8 times more likely to defect than their peers with rational selection. *Graph 4* demonstrates the discrepancy between the two types of armies.



Graph 4. The Distribution of Loyal and Disloyal Armed Forces with Respect to Officer Selection

The graph shows that defection can almost only be attributed to armed forces with rationally selected officer corps, whereas loyalty is almost fully provided by armed forces with discriminative selection procedures. The data shows that selecting the whole body of the army from a specific group only raises the costs of recruiting an army, but not the odds of keeping the military loyal. However, applying selective standards when appointing the members of the officer corps raise the odds of preventing defections.

2.3. Explaining the Results

After performing the test on the dataset, I sum up the results and pass judgments about the hypotheses outlined at the beginning of the thesis. First of all, let us revise Hypothesis No.1. H1 stated that “*armies that continue to receive generous economic benefits are less likely to be disloyal.*” I approximated this issue through the relative change in the defense budget. The results of the tests depicted in *Table 1* have proved that shrinking budgets did not have an effect on the loyalty of the armed forces. This result can be explained by the fact that budget increase and decrease does not necessarily determine the change in the magnitude of the benefits distributed among the soldiers. Furthermore, budget increase and decrease is affected by several external factors, such as security considerations, economic crisis, post-war and post-Cold War decrease. Of course, *Bellin* would probably argue that it is not always so, mainly in the Middle East⁸⁴, and indeed, for several years it was firmly believed that not all states adapt their defense budgets to the changes in the economy of the country. However, the most recent data shows that due to the current economic crises the defense budgets are shrinking all over the world. All in all, when the political considerations are undetectable among the reasons for budget change, the causal effects between disloyalty and budget decrease are less self-explanatory.⁸⁵ Consequently, we can conclude, that there is no proof of a relationship between decreasing defense budgets and military disloyalty, therefore, we can reject H1.

Hypothesis No.2 claimed that “*armies whose influence remains primary compared to other coercive institutions (paramilitary forces, police) are less likely to be disloyal.*” *Table 1* and *Table 7* showed that indeed, the existence of a rival force increased the likelihood of

⁸⁴ Bellin, 32.

⁸⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data 2011* (April 17, 2012), <http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/press-release-translations-2012/milexbgeng.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2012).

defections. The variable was influential in both in the overall model and in the test where nothing else was controlled for. The latter test showed that a rival force makes disloyalty 4 times more likely in the armed forces and that 75% of all the militaries with rivals became disloyal. Therefore, we can confirm H2.

Hypothesis No.3 states that “*armies whose selection mechanisms keep the army distant from society are less likely to be disloyal.*” This hypothesis was tested through three variables: the type of recruitment, selection mechanisms for the rank and file and for the officer corps. As for the type of recruitment, the background idea was that conscripted armies are more likely to defect, because the identity of the soldiers is less established within the armed forces, so their social linkages remain stronger to society and they have no long-term interest in the institution of the military. The tests showed that conscript armies are more prone to defections, but what was even more stinking is that volunteer forces were especially unlikely to defect: the latter that scenario happened in only 33% of the cases.

The results of the variables examining the selection mechanisms when recruiting the armed forces and promoting the officers were less straightforward. The theory behind these variables claimed that forces that are selected from society as a whole without special selection rules are more likely to defect, whereas those who were selected from a special group within society are more likely to remain loyal. These selection rules should be even more true for officers, as the reason for specific selection rules to the officer corps is generally the maintenance of the social, political or military primacy of a group. The results from the rank and file selection were quite ambiguous, as they signaled a trend of confirming the theory, but the results were not significant statistically. The results point out that this variable has to be reconsidered: whether the whole rank and file of an army can be genuinely selectively recruited remains yet questionable. At the same time, the selection of the officer corps was both statistically and substantially significant: armies with rationally selected

officer corps were 2.77 times more likely to defect than their irrationally selected peers. Based on the evidence presented by the three variables, H3 should be confirmed.




Figure 2. The Results of the Hypothesis Testing Concerning the Examined Variables

Figure 2 summarizes the results of the tests. For the further examination in the case study section we can establish that armed forces of privileged situation with selection mechanisms keeping them distant from society can be mostly predicted to remain loyal to the regime. Furthermore, large mass movements should also have a significant effect on the decision of soldiers to defect or remain loyal. However, it is important to keep in mind that the examined variables are only structural ones and results only reflect on trends and means, therefore, the variation in real-life situations is infinite. This is the reason why I will examine the effect of these variables on case studies.

CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDIES

In the following section I follow up on the statistical analyses with three case studies, providing an opportunity to reveal the dynamics behind defection and loyalty from the perspective of my previous findings. The three selected cases are all from the Middle East, all of them being part of the recent upheaval starting in 2011. *Table 11* describes the cases in light of the variables examined previously.

Table 11. Case Studies and Explanatory Variables

	Egypt (2011)	Syria (2011)	Bahrain (2011)
Budget Change⁸⁶	-8	+6%	+19%
Rival Force	+	-	-
Recruitment	Conscription	Conscription	Voluntary
Officer Selection	Unspecified	Selective	Selective
Rank and File Selection	Unspecified	Unspecified	Specified
Army Deployment	+	+	+
Nonviolent Campaign	+	-	+
Disloyalty	+	+	-

The selection shows a variation in budget change, recruitment criteria, officer and rank and file selection, rivalry, campaign methods and the outcome, that is, whether loyalty shifts occurred within the military. The reason why I selected these cases is not only that they are popular topics currently, although it provides the considerable advantage of being well-documented. When building the dataset I was convinced that traditions of civil-military culture do not play a significant role concerning defections and loyalty, however, I received criticisms from experts of military sciences that controlling for military culture is essential.

⁸⁶ The defense budget of the year before the uprising is compared to the mean of the defense budget of the previous five years.

Therefore, the fact that all the case studies are from the Middle East allows a control for military culture and traditions of civil-military relations.

Table 12 shows the distribution of the cases among the variables. Based on the theory and partly on the results of the statistics, Egypt (2011) is expected to have a disloyal army. As the outcome confirms the expectations, this case represents an outlier among the loyal cases. The complete outlier for the disloyal cases is Bahrain (2011). Syria (2011) represents a case in between, as neither the disloyalty nor the loyalty model fits it completely, however, the outcome of the events is also less straightforward: at the end of the events in Egypt and Bahrain most of the military stood by the loyal or disloyal behavior, however, in Syria the defections occur mostly among the lower ranks and conscripts, whereas only few officers have defected to the rebels.

Table 12. The Distribution of Cases According to Four Explanatory Variables

	Rival Force	No Rival		Conscript	Voluntary
Steep Budget Increase		Loyalty (Bahrain)	Discrimin. Officer Selection	(Syria)	Loyalty (Bahrain)
Slow Bu. Increase/Decrease	Disloyalty (Egypt)	(Syria)	Unspecified Officer Selection	Disloyalty (Egypt)	

Before explaining the loyalty shifts in the armed forces in the Middle East, I need to point out that when I discuss the importance of the minority question in these states, I do not want to create the false impression that I downplay the importance of cleavages within groups, or cross-cutting cleavages, including ethnic religious, class, or simply political differences. All I attempt to do is to point out cleavages that are important from the point-of-view of military disloyalty in connection with the apparent selection mechanisms.

3.1 Egypt (2011)

Egypt is one of the intriguing cases of the Arab Spring. Egypt had experienced a series of protest even before 2011. The *Kefaya* movement of 2005 was probably one of the most influential pro-democracy movements of the Middle East. It is likely, therefore, that any analysis, or difference-seeking will look like a post-hoc wisdom to the outside observer. However, in this case, both cross-country analysis and analysis of different cases within the same country are carried out, trying to identify general patterns. Following the Arab Spring, many of the scholars doing comparative examinations have forgotten that the positive outcomes of 2011 should be also contrasted with the failure of previous popular attempts.

3.1.1 Events

The events in Egypt heated up from the 25th of January. The protestors marched on the streets against poverty, unemployment, against the police and for regime change. In a couple of days it became obvious that Mubarak could not fully rely on the armed forces for protecting the regime. At first, the officer corps did not directly support the protestors, they called upon activists to quit the campaign.⁸⁷ The majority of the rank-and file was also more loyal than not, some troops stepped up against the protestors, and most of them supported the regime by their presence on the streets and by not preventing the events from escalating. On the other hand, already in the first couple of days, stories of fraternizing soldiers and protestors appeared on the internet. While suffering from the violent crackdowns of the police, the discussions gradually started to refer to the possibility that the army might end the crisis in favor of the popular claims. On January 28, the “Day of Rage” the army, which was supposed to enforce the curfew in Cairo, announced that it would not fire at the protestors. On that day, already hundreds of thousands participated in the protests. The result was that

⁸⁷ Lutterbeck, 28.

Mubarak fired his cabinet.⁸⁸ It is hard to tell when and where the loyalty shift occurred and to what extent the military took part in the violence or abstained from it. What is quite clear is that although on February 2 when a violent police crackdown occurred, the army stood by and did not act, from the next day, however, the army started to side with the protestors more openly and took up the role to reconcile between the two sides. Massive violence on the nonviolent protestors backfired. As Barany reconstructs the events:

*The generals concluded that Mubarak's mix of concessions (agreeing not to seek reelection or have his son succeed him) and repression (the February 2 attacks) had failed, and that rising violence and disorder would only hurt the military's legitimacy and influence.*⁸⁹

The disloyalty of the chief of staff was manifested in the form of a communiqué: they acknowledged the claims of the people and denied action against them, although they continued to call upon the activists to quit the protests.⁹⁰ Regime change was finally achieved on the 11th of February with the active involvement of the armed forces: the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces took over the power.⁹¹

Admittedly, there is no sufficient historic distance to reliably reconstruct the events: although the protests are richly documented, different commentators made quite different observations on the role of the armed forces. *Khaled Abol Naga*⁹² reported that the reason why such confusions occurred is because although mostly police exerted the violence, usually both the army and the police were present at the scene, therefore, it was unclear who the

⁸⁸ Global Nonviolent Action Database, *Egyptians bring down dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak*, (2011), <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/egyptians-bring-down-dictatorship-hosni-mubarak-2011> (accessed March 29, 2012).

⁸⁹Barany, 28.

⁹⁰Lutterbeck, 28.

⁹¹ Timeline: Egypt's Revolution, *Al-Jazeera*, (February 4, 2011), <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html> (accessed April 29, 2012).

⁹² *Khaled Abol Naga* is an Egyptian film-maker, the goodwill ambassador of UNICEF and human rights activist. He discussed his first-hand experience with the protest in the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs and at CEU in March 2012.

violence should be attributed to. Furthermore, the members of the coercive institutions often insulted the protesters in civilian outfit.

Finally, we can list five key observations about the events:

- the Egyptian uprising was a nonviolent mass-movement with hundreds of thousands of members;
- the loyalty of the army was unstable from day one, and apparent loyalty shifts occurred in around a week;
- the loyalty shifts were more apparent in the rank-and-file of the armed forces at first, but spread quickly to the officers, as well;
- the loyalty shifts reached the level of noncompliance at first, which, through a short period of defection turned into a military coup;
- cleavages became visible between the police and the armed forces.

3.1.2 Analysis

First of all, let us examine the structure of the Egyptian Armed Forces. According to the data of Military Balance 2011, the personnel of the Egyptian military is 468,500 and has a paramilitary force of 397,000. This is, however, not all, as Egypt keeps a reserve of 479,000 troops. The military is largely conscripted: the army alone has 280-340 000 conscripts according to the estimates of the IISS, and there are approximately 20,000 more in the navy and the air force.⁹³ The army is quite close to society from this point-of-view. According to the calculations of *Stephen Gotowicki*, the military affects 12.3% of the young male

⁹³ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 2011* (London: Routledge, 2011), 306.

population yearly.⁹⁴ This is quite a significant number, mainly if we consider that the revolutionary forces came from the same age group, which might have raised the odds of linkages between the rank and file and the participants of the uprising and explain the fraternization between the two sides that occurred quite soon after the protests began. One could argue that when the army is requested to crack down on a popular movement, even though the officers may be willing to do so, such a huge army having close ties to society would be likely to defect. The other issue is why the officers would do so.

Naturally, one reason can be that the soldiers on the streets started to fraternize with the protestors quite early, which was likely to produce an effect on the officers, as well. But this reasoning is flawed: firstly, there was hardly time for such accommodation, as the whole sequence of events lasted only about two weeks, secondly, the loyalty of the officers and generals was far from being stable already at the beginning.

Most researchers have been preoccupied by the economic wealth of the Egyptian military and have named that factor among the most influential ones when explaining the loyalty of the armed forces to the regime. *Ken Stier*, the publicist of *The Time* magazine recalls the calculations of different agencies and researchers and states that the Egyptian military budget may be four times as large, as it is reported to be. In that case, the calculation would include the assistance of the USA, and the revenues of the military from the economy: the military is claimed to have a 10% share in Egypt's economy.⁹⁵ However, due to the economic crisis, the Egyptian economic growth has slowed down, and as opposed to 2004, the military budget is also shrinking (*see Table 13*). Still, it would be hardly defensible to

⁹⁴ Stephen H. Gotowicki, *The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society* (1995), <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/egypt/egypt.htm> (accessed March 20, 2012).

⁹⁵ Ken Stier, Egypt's Military-Industrial Complex, *The Time Magazine* (February 9, 2011), <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2046963,00.html> (accessed March 20, 2012).

attribute military disloyalty to such a minor decrease considering all the other benefits the military receives.

Table 13. The Military Expenditure of Egypt 2000-2011 (million USD)

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
4280	4,580	4,790	5,010	4,740	4,730	4,840	4,880	4,540	4,410	4,290	4,110

(Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2011. Available: <http://milexdata.sipri.org/>)

What is more striking is that *Barany* reports that the government has been performing the budget cuts largely in favor of the police and the rest of the security sector, causing disadvantages to the armed forces.⁹⁶ Consequently, in my view, the emphasis has to be placed on the relative change compared to the police and not on the decrease in itself. There are two reasons to do so. Firstly, the statistical analysis found the presence of a rival force influential as compared to budget change. Secondly, emerging cleavages and conflict between the pro-regime police and the defecting army was one of the key observations made during the events of 2011.

In Egypt the popular movement faced an army with a rank and file closely tied to society, and coincided with the apparent effort of the regime to strengthen the police. It would be vague to attribute the final decision of the general staff to abandon loyalty to either of these reasons, there must have been special circumstantial considerations behind these structural variables. However, it is clear that the loyalty of the rank and file appeared to be unsustainable, the campaign uncontrollable and the violence against peaceful protestors indefensible. The benefits of the armed forces also seemed quite entrenched and were unlikely to be limited in the near future, even if regime change had happened:⁹⁷ we need to consider that over the years society did not express a dissatisfaction with the economic and budgetary shares of the military, which is also possibly because of the interconnectedness of society and

⁹⁶Barany, 28.

⁹⁷ Bellin, *Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders*, 29.

the armed forces, as every family has or had a member in the military.⁹⁸ Consequently, acting against Mubarak was a safe bet.

3.2 Syria (2011)

In Syria, just like in Egypt, the armed forces have been widely regarded to be vital for the survival of the regime. Bashar's father, *Hafez al-Assad* ruled the country among wars, internal turmoil and uprisings between 1970 and 2000.⁹⁹ The key partner in this undertaking was the military itself. The military establishment created by the Assads did not only enable them to sustain their power throughout thirty years of difficulties, but through the suddenly arising succession crisis in 2000 and it supports the regime even today when Syria is slowly sliding into civil war due to the popular revolt and pro-democracy protests. To make this achievement even more remarkable, they managed to retain this support under difficult circumstances: the regime belongs to the Alawite branch of Islam, which constitutes less than 10% of the total population. In the following lines I will introduce the events from 2011, but in the analysis part I will also flash the background of the Bashar al-Assad regime, as most of the methods of co-optation were already established and practiced by his father, Hafez.

3.2.1 Events

The coverage and knowledge of the Syrian events is much less detailed than it was in Egypt, which is partly because the uprising did not prove to be successful yet, and partly because the access of media to information has not been especially smooth.

⁹⁸ Imad Harb, "The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 57, No. 2. (2003): 285.

⁹⁹ Joshua Stacher, "Reinterpreting Authoritarian Power: Syria's Hereditary Succession," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 65, No. 2. (Spring 2011): 197.

The protests in Syria started in January 2011. The purpose of the protests was quite similar to Egypt: the call words were unemployment, oppression and human rights abuses. Assad also attempted to make some concessions to the demands, or at least make elaborate promises, but he focused his efforts more on violent repression.¹⁰⁰ Initially, the protests were smaller and could be easily dissolved by the armed forces. From March 2011, however, hundreds of thousands protested in the streets. The regime used snipers and tanks to stop the protests.

Up to August 2011 there were hardly any defections among the armed forces. Defections started primarily due to the massive violence as the armed forces were commanded to attack the unarmed protestors with heavy weaponry. *Stratfor* reported, that occasionally the Sunni protestors were put down by troops selected from the Christian and Druze community.¹⁰¹ The death toll in 2011 surpassed 5,000, and has steeply risen ever since, to 11,000 as of March 3, 2012.¹⁰² The number of soldiers deserting, and those joining the *Free Syrian Army* (FSA) is quite ambiguous, but we can make an estimate of around 15 000 (according to the leader of the FSA, it would be much more of course, around 40,000¹⁰³). This estimate is merely for the FSA, but some deserters joined groups other than the FSA, whereas others quit fighting and melted into the local population. Although in absolute terms this is a significant number, compared to the military of Assad, which counted 295 000 soldiers before the uprising, this number is still small.¹⁰⁴ The majority of deserters are from the rank and file, but some generals have been reported to have defected, as well. The disloyalty of soldiers of higher ranks became more frequent in 2012.

¹⁰⁰ Sharon Erickson Nepstad, "Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical role of Military-Opposition Alliances," *Swiss Political Science Review* 17 (2011): 487.

¹⁰¹ Reva Bhalla, *Making Sense of the Syrian Crisis* (May 5, 2011) under "Stratfor" <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110504-making-sense-syrian-crisis> (accessed March 20, 2012)

¹⁰² ECHO Crisis Report, *Syria Crisis* (May 10, 2012), 1.

¹⁰³ Shashank Joshi, "Syria analysis: Can Assad's army withstand growing pressure?" *BBC* (February 9, 2012), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16969501> (accessed May 20, 2012).

¹⁰⁴ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 2012* (London: Routledge, 2012), 348.

It is important to see, that at the moment supporting the opposition is not only dangerous, but somewhat hopeless, as well: in Syria there is no unified opposition against the government. Although the goals are shared by most participants, there is little agreement on the means to achieve the ends. The Syrian National Council, the Free Syrian Army, the National Coordination Committee and the grassroots civil movements can hardly agree on the methods of transition, whether peaceful or violent methods should be applied and foreign intervention would be favorable. This is not surprising: the particular interests and the cross-cutting cleavages (such as sectarian and ethnic cleavages) are prevailing within the opposition movements as well, where, for the time being they might be hidden behind the common goal of regime change, but cannot remain so on the long-term. The fragmented opposition with no common voice might be one reason why mobilization from within the armed forces is less successful.

All in all, Syria is a case that is located between Egypt and Bahrain concerning the outcome: although defections did occur, they did not include the majority of the armed forces, most of the signs of disloyalty appeared typically among the rank and file. As of today, the outcome of the events in Syria is yet unknown. The protests turned into chaos, and despite the current ceasefire and the involvement of the international community the fighting continues around Hama, Damascus, Daraa, Homs and Idlib¹⁰⁵ and the situation is on the verge of descending into a full-blown civil war.

What we can conclude is that

- although the regime change is a common goal of a mass movement, the opposition is fragmented;
- massive violence has been used to put down the uprising;

¹⁰⁵ ECHO Crisis Report, 1.

- loyalty shifts occurred primarily because of the violence;
- the level of disloyalty is often defection, but mostly sedition;
- loyalty shifts are common primarily among the rank and file and have only limited appeal among the officers.

3.2.2 Analysis

It is clear from the events, that the armed forces and society of Syria are organized along tribal and sectarian cleavages hidden behind a pan-Arab, secular veil. Putting aside this more obvious factor, first let us examine the financial standing of the armed forces.

Table 14 demonstrates the military expenditure of Syria between 2000 and 2011. By a sheer look at the numbers, one can diagnose a slow but steady growth in defense expenditure. However, it would be too early to close the discussion here. To what extent the financial well-being of the armed forces and the individuals within the military should be sought in the defense budget in developing, undemocratic countries, might be up for question. Although reports suggest that the salary of the high-ranking officers has not been especially high, the generals were allowed to treat their troops as their private domain, which provided them with extra revenues and entrenched power.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, we can conclude that the officers are in a privileged position financially, and the defense budget is also fair, therefore, the influence of the variable of defense budget change cannot be abandoned in Syria.

Table 14. The Military Expenditure of Syria 2000-2011 (million USD)

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
1,840	1,935	2,008	2,302	2,306	2,319	2,086	2,217	2,010	2,282	2,346	2,490

(Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2011. Available: <http://milexdata.sipri.org/>)

¹⁰⁶ Zisser, 5.

Although the defense budget looks fair in Syria, it is important to see that all in all, loyalty is achieved primarily through different channels. Kinship ties and clientelism are the key for military loyalty in Syria. This was true during the reign of both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad. Hafez al-Assad filled the leadership of the defense and intelligence sector with his relatives: among others, *Rifa'at al-Assad* was the leader of the Defense Units and *Jamal* commanded the special units for the protection of Alawites.¹⁰⁷ This tradition has been continued by Bashar, as well, for example, his brother, *Maher* leads the Republican Guard and an army division.¹⁰⁸ The remaining key positions were distributed among people not directly related to the Assads, but belonging to the same Alawi tribe, the *al-Matawirah*, and occasionally to other Alawi tribes, such as the *al-Haddadin* and *al-Kalbiyyah*.¹⁰⁹ In the 1970's around 75% of the important positions of the armed forces were held by Alawis¹¹⁰ and by the early 2000's, when Bashar inherited the presidency, this number rose even more: 90% of the high-ranking officers were Alawites.¹¹¹ However, Alawis make up only 7% of the population in Syria, the total Shiite population is around 15%,¹¹² and Sunnis make up about 74% of society, which means that the officer corps and the state is primarily under minority rule.

At the same time, it is important to note that conscription does not allow for such strict selection, although some special units are selected from among the Alawites (e.g. the Republican Guard¹¹³), the rest of the soldiers are mixed and reflect the structure of society

¹⁰⁷Hanna Batatu, "Some Observations On the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling, Military Group and the Causes for Its Dominance," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Summer, 1981): 332.

¹⁰⁸Jamestown Foundation, "Alawi Control of the Syrian Military Key to Regime's Survival," *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 9 No. 23. (9 June 2011), <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e3fb2452.htm> (accessed May 5, 2012).

¹⁰⁹ Batatu, 332.

¹¹⁰ Mordechai Nisan, *Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2002), 123.

¹¹¹ Zisser, 5.

¹¹² Bhalla, *Making Sense of the Syrian Crisis*.

¹¹³ Jamestown Foundation, *Alawi Control of the Syrian Military*.

much more.¹¹⁴ This is probably the reason why the regime is less successful in keeping the rank-and file loyal.

Besides, it is important to note that the system was highly similar during the rule of Hafez, as the establishment does not only seem to help regime survival during the current popular uprising, but it enabled the smooth transformation of power in 2000 from Hafez to Bashar. The sudden death of Hafez and the following succession proved the strength of this establishment: the armed forces ensured the succession of his son, Bashar. Which layer of this set-up has enabled a succession based on elite cooperation, is still an open question: the family ties, the tribal belonging or the religious affiliations. But as *Stacher* interprets the succession process, it is clear that transferring the power to Bashar “*was not the work of elites unconsciously following a dead president’s command,*”¹¹⁵ but rather a process related to, but also detached from Hafez: the elite cooperated for and during the succession, formed and enforced the consensus, amended the Constitution, and did what was necessary to elevate Bashar to presidency.¹¹⁶ This story signals that the elite has an interest on its own vested into the maintenance of this system. One of the reasons is probably the conservation of minority rule.

All in all, the loyalty structure of the Syrian officer corps is quite straightforward. The officers are attached to the regime both through vertical loyalties, that is, the chain of command, and through external loyalties, created by personal and religious affiliations. It is easy to see that in case of a regime change, the Alawites would not only lose grip on the governance, but the majority of the officers would find themselves soon out of jobs.

¹¹⁴ Lutterbeck, 46.

¹¹⁵ Stacher, 205.

¹¹⁶ Stacher, 205.

Concerning the variable of the presence of a rival force, the tactic of the Syrian regime also fares quite well: the country is worth a paragraph about how to control a large army with several divisions and avoiding rivalry. Syria is a typical example of a state where there are several security branches, some of them especially established to control the citizens and protect the regime (Republican Guard, Military Security Department), which would generally cause rivalry in most states. But in Syria these divisions are not established in order to exert control over the armed forces by dividing it, but for controlling the population.¹¹⁷ This means that Syria does not have significant rivalry within the armed forces. An overtly divided military, could be difficult to control in times of popular uprisings, as it was outlined in *Chapter 1*. However, the special units of Syria are controlled by the relatives and close allies of Assad and have not been significantly isolated from each other.

Based on all this, it is quite a predictable outcome that the leadership of the armed forces remains largely loyal. However, as the events drag on, the loyalty of the rank and file will probably continue to degrade.

3.3 Bahrain (2011)

Bahrain represents the onlier disloyalty case in my selection. It is a country with an unquestionably tribal society, where the selection mechanism to the leading positions of the coercive institutions go even beyond the scale seen in Syria: the coercive institutions are led by the members of the royal family, whereas the rank and file is filled with foreign mercenaries and minority population.¹¹⁸ No wonder, that the regime change efforts stood little

¹¹⁷ Zisser, 5.

¹¹⁸ Lutterbeck, 41.

chance in the small monarchy. In the following lines I will provide a short outlook on the events in Bahrain and will continue with analyzing them from the structural point of view.

3.3.1 Events

The revolt of Bahrain started on February 14, 2011 against *King Hamad Al Khalifa* and the Sunni leadership. The Al Khalifa family has been ruling Bahrain since the 18th century, and King Hamad ascended the throne in 1999. Just as in Syria and Egypt, Bahrain had already experienced a revolt in the past (in 1994 and 2005) against the autocratic regime, also crushed by the coercive institutions.¹¹⁹ The demands include a new constitution, democratic elections, the removal of King Hamad from the throne and the end of the discrimination of the Shiites.

Bahrain, is again a country where the Sunni minority is ruling over a state where about 65-75% of the population is Shiite.¹²⁰ According to the *Bahrain Center for Human Rights*, only 18% of all government positions are occupied by Shiites. However, unlike in Syria, the issue of religion is highly emphasized in Bahrain: according to the Center, the regime applies “*blatant violations and systematic oppression against Shia in Bahrain*”.¹²¹

It is anticipated that the protestors are made up of the disenfranchised Shiite population of the state that are not only limited in their rights, but also form the middle and lower classes of society¹²², which have been mostly hit by unemployment in most of the states of the Arab Spring and which are, therefore, so critical for revolt and social movements.

¹¹⁹ International Crisis Group, “Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge”, *Middle East Report*, No. 40 (6 May 2005): 2, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Bahrain/Bahrain%20Sectarian%20Challenge.pdf> (accessed May 16, 2010).

¹²⁰ Marina Ottaway, *Bahrain: Between the United States and Saudi Arabia* (Carnegie Endowment, April 4, 2011), <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/04/bahrain-between-united-states-and-saudi-arabia/t8> (accessed May 16, 2012).

¹²¹ Bahrain Center for Human Rights, *Religious Freedom for Shia in Bahrain: Systematic Oppression and Marginalization* (January, 2006), <http://www.bahrainrights.org/node/1442> (accessed May 16, 2012).

¹²² Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor, *Minorities and the State in the Arab World* (London, Lyenne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 173.

However, it is likely that the regime overemphasizes the idea of a sectarian uprising in order to turn the two sides against each other.¹²³

Although the king, and most importantly, the prime minister practically refused the idea of concession, some reformist thoughts have emerged within the regime as well. The crown prince, *Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa*, embraced the idea of a genuine dialogue with the opposition. At the same time, the hardliners and the Gulf Cooperation Council, primarily Saudi Arabia pressed for crackdown.¹²⁴ Naturally, Saudi Arabia did not cherish the thoughts of a Shiite revolution in its neighborhood. The latter group seemed to have triumphed, as the protests were crushed by both police and military forces in an especially violent manner. The situation was intensified by the appearance of 1500 soldiers from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in March, invited by the royal family within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council. (Note that the entire population of Bahrain is around 1.2 million, around 700 thousand of which is Bahraini only.)

King Hamad refused to carry out significant reforms and used diversion tactics to gain time, like distributing money to the Bahrainis¹²⁵ and having the leader of the National Security Agency step down because of the violent crackdowns, but only to have him emerge as an advisor.¹²⁶ In May 2012 he introduced some amendments introducing some accountability on behalf of the cabinet, however, the concessions are regarded to be too little, too late by the opposition.¹²⁷

¹²³ *Sectarian Divide Widens After Bahrain Unrest*, (Reuters Africa, June 9, 2011), <http://af.reuters.com/article/tunisiaNews/idAFLDE74P22720110609?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0> (accessed May 16, 2012)

¹²⁴ International Crisis Group, "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform," *Middle East/North Africa Report*, No.111 (July 28, 2011): 12, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2011/mena/bahrain's-rocky-road-to-reform.aspx> (accessed May 15, 2012).

¹²⁵ "Bahrain doles out money to families," *Al-Jazeera* (February 12, 2011), <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201121251854857192.html> (accessed May 14, 2012).

¹²⁶ "Still rich but no longer so calm: Voices of dissent are popping up here and there in the Gulf too," *The Economist* (December 3, 2011), <http://www.economist.com/node/21541075> (accessed May 18, 2012).

¹²⁷ Andrew Hammond, "Bahrain king enacts parliament reforms as protests continue," *Chicago Tribune*, (May 3, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-03/news/sns-rt-us-bahrain-reforms-protestsbre8420wv-20120503_1_wefaq-bahrain-king-democratic-reforms (accessed May 18, 2012).

What we can conclude, therefore, is that in Bahrain the monarch used a similar tactic to that of Assad at the beginning of the Syrian revolt: the communication of the regime often suggests openness to reform, but in reality violent repression was used to roll back the opposition.¹²⁸ Significant defections or disloyalty did not occur in the armed forces and are unlikely to occur in the future, either.

What we learn from the protests in Bahrain is that

- the campaign was promoting regime change and rights, but the movement was framed and repressed by the regime along sectarian divide;
- the international support of the ruling dynasty enabled enhanced repression and intimidation;
- the military, which was comprised of an immense number of foreigners and led by the members of the Al Khalifa family remained entirely loyal;
- both the police and the armed forces were deployed, but no rivalry could be detected.

3.3.2 Analysis

Bahrain was selected as a case study, because it is an outlier for all the variables and confirms all the three hypotheses. Bahrain is a country where the increasing defense budget, the selectively recruited voluntary forces and selectively selected officers provide a solid base for the government which comes from a minority.

The defense budget has been growing since the early 2000's nearly uninterruptedly. The rentier incomes of the state provide a stable financial background for such expenses

¹²⁸ Michael Mitchell, "The Aborted Revolution: The Demise of Bahrain's Democracy Movement," *Harvard International Review*, Spring (2012): 35.

(Table 15). According to the data of the U.S. government, the Bahraini government spends about 20% of the expenditures on the armed forces.¹²⁹

Table 15. The Military Expenditure of Bahrain 2000-2011 (million USD)

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
386	406	485	557	561	555	604	639	691	777	776	883

(Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2011. Available: <http://milexdata.sipri.org/>)

Although the variable of the budget change has not been found influential, and we cannot claim that it influence loyalty, the stable defense budget increase probably contributes to the sustainability of the Bahraini mercenary army. Barany notes that although soldiers are especially well-treated in Bahrain, citizens are not eager to join the army, as the alternatives are even better in Bahrain.¹³⁰ The result is that the Bahraini Armed Forces employ mostly foreign members, recruited primarily from Pakistan, Syria and Jordan.¹³¹ According to the news reports, the regime was going to increase the number of mercenaries as a response to the crisis by ‘importing’ soldiers from Pakistan. This means that the armed forces of Bahrain are not merely voluntary: it is a straightforward mercenary army. This fact elevates Bahrain to a whole new level among the cases studies concerning the distance of the military from society. One can hardly find a type of military more detached from the population than the mercenary army, where the members are merely serving for livelihoods in a foreign country. Furthermore, the soldiers are selected mostly from the Sunni branch of Islam, by which the likelihood of the vertical loyalty to be overridden by horizontal or external loyalties is extremely small.

¹²⁹ Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, *Background Note: Bahrain* (January 13, 2012), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26414.htm> (accessed May 10, 2012).

¹³⁰ Barany, 31.

¹³¹ Faisal Husain, "Terror in the Dark," *Yale Daily News* (January 12, 2012), <http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2012/jan/19/husain-terror-in-the-dark/?print> (May 12, 2012).

However, just as in Syria, the essence of the military loyalty lies in the leadership of the armed forces. Family ties keep the armed forces and all the coercive institutions under control. Just to name a few, the minister of defense is *Muhammad bin Abdallah Al Khalifa*, the chief of staff is *Duair bin Salman Al Khalifa*, *Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa* is the minister of interior,¹³² and *Shaykh Khalifa bin Abdullah Al Khalifa* is the head of the internal security agency.¹³³ As the royal family oversees the armed forces, there is no point in dividing the armed forces in order to avoid a coup or limit the power of the different branches; consequently, there is no significant rivalry within the coercive institutions, either.

The institutions of coercion are under manual control, the armed forces are primarily selected from individuals sharing the sectarian belonging of the regime, but having no ties to the state itself. As the financing of the system is also stable, such an establishment is quite unlikely to fail. It is even more so, if we consider the dynastic ties and religious connection of the Al Khalifas to the royal families of the surrounding countries and the mutual interests and cooperation among the states of the area, which have now shown that cooperation might go as far as aiding each other with military personnel to repress internal dissent. All in all, the stability of the Bahraini monarchy seems to be prevailing due to its support from the coercive institutions.

The three case studies have shown that although one variable might be more influential in one case than in another, all in all, the variables do have a substantial and explainable effect on the loyalty shifts within the armed forces. In Egypt the horizontal and

¹³² Kenneth Katzman, *Bahrain: Reform, Security and U.S. Policy* (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, May 14, 2012): 1, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf> (accessed May 17, 2012).

¹³³ Katzman, 22.

external loyalties of the rank and file have overran the vertical loyalties the soldiers owed to their commanders, therefore, noncompliance and switching sides was a common phenomenon from quite the beginning. Furthermore, the defense budget decreased parallel to the growing budget of the police and other coercive bodies. These two processes reinforced each other, resulting in rivalry and the abandonment of loyalty. Also, the privileges that the armed forces enjoy in the national economy are quite entrenched and the military should not worry about losing its share in these enterprises. Thus, in the wake of an extremely controversial situation with an elderly dictator facing a mass popular movement, the behavior of the armed forces can be explained rationally.

In Syria despite the secular state institutions the governance is primarily organized along tribal and sectarian lines. This method is also used to co-opt the leadership of the military. As a minority is ruling over the majority, the connection of the officers to the regime is twofold: firstly, they are connected to the minority through external loyalty, which in this case luckily coincides with the vertical loyalties; secondly, it is very likely that in case of the success of the democratization efforts the minority would lose the leadership of the state, depriving the officers of their positions and privileges. The rank and file, however, is conscripted without significant discriminative selection procedures, therefore, the likelihood of external loyalties and network formation between the soldiers and the protestors is quite high. Consequently, despite of the extreme violence, defections and seditions are steadily growing in number in the rank and file.

At the same time, although the defense budget is rising, the spoils are less distributed on all levels of the military in the form of thick salaries, but rather through privileges given to the commanders. Therefore, the behavior of both the rank and file and the officers can be explained rationally, and in my view, defections will occur in an even growing number in the future.

Lastly, the royal dynasty of Bahrain has perfected the art of creating a military completely detached from the population. The financial background of Bahrain is suitable for this effort, which is also signaled by the steadily growing defense budget. Although the payments in the armed forces are reported to be decent, they are more teasing for the foreigners than for the citizens of Bahrain.¹³⁴ As the recruitment of the Shiites does not seem to be an option, and the Sunnis are mostly represented in the upper, wealthier classes, the trend is quite logical. Furthermore, the loyalty of the commanders and the highest leadership of the armed forces are ensured by kinship and family ties. The spoiler mechanisms and the selection procedures seem to have kept the military loyal, and the royal family safe in Bahrain for decades. All in all, I believe the three cases have proved that the mechanisms I have outlined in the theory and examined by the statistical tests also function in real life examples.

¹³⁴ Barany, 31.

Conclusions

My thesis has embarked on explaining loyalty shifts within the armed forces during popular uprisings for regime change. My theory outlined a framework which was fundamentally trifold: firstly, it proposed the importance of spoiler mechanisms, secondly it outlined the directions of loyalty within the organization and the loyalty of the members of the military vested in groups outside the organization, thirdly, it separated the loyalties of those members of the armed forces who have long-term interests vested into the institution and those who are only there for a short period of time and on whom the service was enforced.

First of all, I examined the loyalty that the members of the armed forces own to the governance. Following *Wintrobe* I put forward, that although in a principle-agent relationship control and enforcement mechanisms ensure the compliance of the agents, the creation of loyalty is usually of paramount importance for the autocrats as loyalty decreases the costs of control mechanisms.¹³⁵ One of the methods to create loyalty is through spoiler mechanisms. I proposed that increasing defense budgets signal the will of the regime to satisfy the needs of the armed forces and to keep them loyal by rents. Furthermore, I claimed that the privileged position of the armed forces as compared to other coercive bodies has to be primary, otherwise rivalry and ambitions might lead to disloyalty. Statistics confirmed that armed forces without significant rivals remained loyal: Bahrain, Thailand, Belarus, Nepal or Zambia applied this method of loyalty seeking, either consciously or unconsciously. However, failing to follow this tactic might be fatal for the regime: it is remarkable that 75% of all the armed forces with rivals became disloyal.

¹³⁵ Wintrobe, 33.

As opposed to my expectations, statistics showed that decreasing budgets do not affect loyalty shifts. When looking for possible explanations for this counterintuitive result I proposed that in states with inefficient or unfair redistribution defense budgets may not realistically reflect on the benefits of the soldiers. Not to mention that there are an infinite number of external factors that influence the fate of the defense budget apart from political considerations. Furthermore, the most significant economic benefits of the armed forces are often not included in the defense budget: for instance, the revenues from the economic activities of the armed forces, (mostly the military industry) yield significantly more than the incomes from the state. This is especially true for the Middle East and was quite visible in the case study analysis of Egypt.

My second proposition concerned the importance of the maintenance of the vertical and in-group loyalties as compared to horizontal or external influences. In case of mass mobilization, and even more when violence occurs, class, ethnic, religious and geographic loyalties might overrun institutional and vertical loyalties, which are likely to result in loyalty shifts within the armed forces. I proposed that the governance can prevent such developments and ensure loyalty by selective recruitment and promotion mechanisms based on the previously listed identities and by the introduction of voluntary recruitment, through which they can strengthen the in-group loyalty of the individuals. No wonder that 74% of all disloyalty cases occurred in conscripted armies. The size of the membership of the campaigns also had an effect on the overall outcome: large campaigns seemed to support network formation and thereby revitalized loyalties to external groups.

Although discriminative selection mechanisms in the rank and file did not contribute to loyalty, according to the third foundation of my theory the officer corps had to be examined separately in this respect. My intuition was confirmed by the analysis: the discriminative selection procedures had an especially strong explanatory value in case of officer selection:

whereas 64% of all loyalty cases came from armed forces with discriminatively selected officers, 61% of all disloyal cases came from militaries with ‘fairly’ selected officers.

Syria and Bahrain were perfect examples of the discriminative selection mechanisms. However, the fact that Syria only applied these selection mechanisms to the officers and not to the conscripted rank and file probably explains the different outcome of the events: in Bahrain the whole body of the military remained loyal, whereas in Syria defections occurred among the rank and file. Egypt also supported the argument that in case of popular movements, and mainly when violence is used to put down the protests, the conscripted soldiers are a dangerous factor.

The challenge, however, remains, to meaningfully explain the behavior of the officers in Egypt. Although this model gives hints about the structures among which the decisions were taken, disloyalty and military takeover was nevertheless an unpredictable outcome. I argued that fundamentally three structural factors must have contributed to this: firstly, the massive nonviolent campaign that seemed uncontrollable and against which violence was used, secondly, the emerging rivalry between the military and the police, thirdly, the fact that gain and loss calculations came out in favor of the regime change: the influence of the military on everyday politics was already rolled back and their extra-budgetary financial benefits seemed to prevail even in case of a regime change.

I believe that the thesis managed to point out certain trends to be considered when thinking about loyalty shifts. The results have important implications for opposition movements and for professionals involved in democratization projects both on the expert and the political-level. The conclusions one can draw for opposition activists is that the creation of loyalty shifts is very much dependent on the size of the movement. Furthermore, in order to create loyalty shifts, they have to target the proper level of the armed forces. Selection

mechanisms and recruitment varies from state to state, but a general rule of thumb is that loyalty shifts are more likely either in the lowest segments of the armed forces or on the highest level.

What the experts of democratization can use from the results is the fact that significant attention has to be paid to the selection and promotion mechanisms in the armed forces. Although the global trend is that conscripted forces are becoming obsolete and give place to voluntary ones, which is a normal process due to the increasing demand for the professionalization of the armed forces, the hidden discriminative selection procedures should be monitored and sanctioned.

I have been repeatedly provoked by the question whether I am trying to provide autocrats with guidance to maintain military loyalty. What the thesis has shown is that apparently most autocrats do not need guidance what loyalty creating processes to apply: from Ghana through Thailand to Cameroon regimes create loyalty by spoils and control. However, the conditions often do not allow for such tactics, or the autocrats might miscalculate the balance of concessions and austerity that so many of them introduce in order to prevent real democratization but still disarm the opposition.

Finally a few words have to be devoted to the limitations of my work. As I did the data collection alone, I faced several constraints. First of all, the examination of more cases from a wider time-frame should be carried out in order to provide the statistical results with more significance. Secondly, the variables I included already show my limitations in time, resources and language barriers. Therefore, in the following lines I propose a series of ideas for further research.

I believe that institutional privileges have a significant effect on military loyalty, such as the role of the armed forces in the economy (defense industry, other enterprises), their

executive power, and their role in the legislature and in the jurisdiction.¹³⁶ These areas should also be examined concerning military loyalty. Furthermore, I have established that the preservation of the privileges is of paramount importance for the armed forces. If that is true, then the chance of the upcoming forces to achieve loyalty shifts will depend on their capacity to show the soldiers a more promising alternative.¹³⁷ However, this chance also depends on the volatility of these privileges. That is why it is important to establish how institutionalized these privileges are. Mainly because one can also assume that the level of institutionalization predicts how open the armed forces will be in case of a reform, because the interests of an institutionalized military will be more independent of the political regime and the state.¹³⁸ Hints for the measurement of these privileges are included in Alfred Stepan's *Rethinking Military Politics*. Collecting a sample concerning institutionalized and non-institutionalized military prerogatives and privileges could shed further light on the dynamics behind military defections and loyalty.

All in all, although some variables had to be left out from my thesis, I am not planning to give up, and I hope to continue the research in a PhD program. However, I believe this thesis provides the foundations and has shown that indeed, the organization of the military and the loyalty creating efforts of the autocrats have a significant effect on loyalty shifts. With my thesis I also intend to raise awareness to the problem that civil-military relations are getting less and less attention among the scholars: one must never forget that although the West might downsize the armed forces and keep them on a tight leash, in most of the developing world the armed forces continue to play an extremely important role. Several states seem to be stuck in the viscous circle of uprisings, concessions and repression, in which the armed forces are often a significant player. Understanding the rationale behind loyalty

¹³⁶ Stepan, 94.

¹³⁷ Stepan, 10.

¹³⁸ Bellin, *Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders*, 29. and Lutterbeck, 18.

shifts in the supporting organizations of autocracies, most importantly in the armed forces should be enhanced in the future.

Bibliography

- Agüero, Felipe. "The Military And The Limits To Democratization." In *Issues In Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies In a Comparative Perspective*, edited by Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992.
- Bahrain Center for Human Rights. *Religious Freedom for Shia in Bahrain: Systematic Oppression and Marginalization*. (January, 2006) under <http://www.bahrainrights.org/node/1442> (accessed May 16, 2012).
- Bahrain doles out money to families. *Al-Jazeera* (February 12, 2011). <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201121251854857192.html> (accessed May 14, 2012).
- Barany, Zoltan. "Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 22., No. 4. (October 2011): 25-35.
- Batatu, Hanna. "Some Observations On the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling, Military Group and the Causes for Its Dominance." *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 35, No. 3. (1981): 331-344.
- Beissinger, Mark R. "Structure and Exemplar in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions." *Perspectives On Politics*, Vol. 5. No. 2. (2007): 259-276.
- Bellin, Eva. "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders." in *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, edited by Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angrist. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. 21-42.
- Bellin, Eva. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in a Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36. No. 2. (January 2004): 139-157.
- Bengio, Ofra and Ben-Dor, Gabriel. *Minorities and the State in the Arab World*. London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.
- Bhalla, Reva. *Making Sense of the Syrian Crisis*. (May 5, 2011) <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110504-making-sense-syrian-crisis> (accessed March 20, 2012).
- Breton, Albert and Wintrobe, Ronald. "The Bureaucracy of Murder Revisited." *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 94. No. 5. (1986): 905-926.

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. *Background Note: Bahrain*. (January 13, 2012). <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26414.htm> (accessed May 10, 2012).

Burkina Faso: Mutiny at President Compaore Barracks. *BBC* (April 15, 2011). <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13090094> (accessed March 3, 2012).

Chenoweth, Erica and Stephan, Maria J. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York, Columbia University Press, 2011.

ECHO Crisis Report. *Syria Crisis*. (May 10, 2012).

Farcau, Bruce W. "Lessons from Latin America for the Muslim World." In *Modernization, Democracy and Islam*, edited by Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2005.

Feaver, Peter D. *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.

Global Nonviolent Action Database. *Egyptians bring down dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak*, (2011). <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/egyptians-bring-down-dictatorship-hosni-mubarak-2011> (accessed March 29, 2012).

Goldstone, Jack A. "Theories Of Revolution: The Third Generation." *World Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 3. (1980): 425-453.

Goldstone, Jack A. "Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90. Issue 3. (May/June 2011): 8-16.

Gotowicki, Stephen H. *The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society*. (1995) <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/egypt/egypt.htm> (accessed April 18, 2012).

Hammond, Andrew. "Bahrain king enacts parliament reforms as protests continue." *Chicago Tribune* (May 3, 2012). http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-03/news/sns-rt-us-bahrain-reforms-protestsbre8420wv-20120503_1_wefaq-bahrain-king-democratic-reforms (accessed May 18, 2012).

Harb, Imad. "The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 57. No. 2. (2003): 269-290.

Huntington, Samuel P. "Reforming Civil-Military Relations." In *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*. Edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order In Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third-wave of Democratization In the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

Husain, Faisal. "Terror In the Dark." *Yale Daily News* (January 12, 2012) <http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2012/jan/19/husain-terror-in-the-dark/?print> (accessed May 12, 2012).

International Crisis Group. "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform." *Middle East/North Africa Report*, No.111 (July 28, 2011). <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2011/mena/bahrain's-rocky-road-to-reform.aspx> (accessed May 15, 2012).

International Crisis Group. "Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge." *Middle East Report*, No. 40. (6 May 2005). [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Bahrain/Bahrain's%20Sectarian%20Challenge.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Bahrain/Bahrain's%20Sectarian%20Challenge.pdf) (accessed May 16, 2010).

International Institute for Strategic Studies. *Military Balance 2011*. London: Routledge, 2011.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. *Military Balance 2012*. London: Routledge, 2012.

Jamestown Foundation. "Alawi Control of the Syrian Military Key to Regime's Survival." *Terrorism Monitor* Vol. 9. No. 23. (June 9, 2011). <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e3fb2452.htm> (accessed May 5, 2012).

Joshi, Shashank. "Syria analysis: Can Assad's army withstand growing pressure?" *BBC* (February 9, 2012). <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16969501> (accessed May 20, 2012).

Kalyvas, Stathis N. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Kamrava, Mehran. "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East." *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 115., No. 1. (2000): 67-92.

Katzman, Kenneth. *Bahrain: Reform, Security and U.S. Policy*. (May 14, 2012) <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf> (accessed May 17, 2012).

Keller, Simon. *The Limits of Loyalty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Kinninmont, Jane. "Bahrain's Re-Reform Movement." *Foreign Affairs* (February 28, 2011) <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67553/jane-kinninmont/bahrain's-re-reform-movement?page=2> (accessed May 18, 2012).

Lutterbeck, Derek. *Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance*. Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011.

<http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Arab-Uprisings-and-Armed-Forces-Between-Openness-and-Resistance> (accessed January 10, 2012).

Marat, Erica. "Kyrgyzstan's Fragmented Police and Armed Forces," *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, Issue 11. (2010) <http://pipss.revues.org/3803#ftn10> (accessed March 15, 2012).

Martin, Brian. *Uprooting War*. London: Freedom Press, 1990.

Mitchell, Michael. "The Aborted Revolution: The Demise of Bahrain's Democracy Movement." In *Harvard International Review*, Spring (2012): 32-37.

Mutiny or Sedition, 10 U.S.C. § 894, Art. 94. <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/894> (accessed April 20, 2012).

Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. "Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical role of Military-Opposition Alliances." In *Swiss Political Science Review*, 17. (2011): 485-491.

Nisan, Mordechai. *Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression*. Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2002.

Owen, Roger. *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. London: Routledge, 2004.

Pratt, Nicola. *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Arab World*. London: Lynne Rienne Publishers, 2007.

Rubin, Barry. "The Military In Contemporary Middle East Politics." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* Vol. 5. No. 1. (March 2001): 47-63.

Russell, D. E. H., *Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force*. London: Academic Press, 1974.

Sectarian Divide Widens After Bahrain Unrest. Reuters Africa (June 9, 2011). <http://af.reuters.com/article/tunisiaNews/idAFLDE74P22720110609?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0> (accessed May 23, 2012).

Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Snyder, Richard. "Explaining Transitions From Neopatrimonial Dictatorships." *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 24. No. 4. (July 1992): 379-399.

Stacher, Joshua. "Reinterpreting Authoritarian Power: Syria's Hereditary Succession." *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 65, No. 2. (Spring 2011): 197-212.

Stepan, Alfred. *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Stier, Ken. "Egypt's Military-Industrial Complex." *The Time Magazine* (February 9, 2011). <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2046963,00.html> (accessed March 20, 2012).

Still rich but no longer so calm: Voices of dissent are popping up here and there in the Gulf too. *The Economist* (December 3, 2011). <http://www.economist.com/node/21541075> (accessed May 18, 2012).

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data 2011*. (April 17, 2012) <http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/press-release-translations-2012/milexbgeng.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2012).

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data, 2011. (April 17, 2012) <http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/press-release-translations-2012/milexbgeng.pdf> (accessed March 20, 2012).

Timeline: Egypt's Revolution. *Al-Jazeera*, (February 4, 2011). <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html> (April 29, 2012).

Wintrobe, Ronald. *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Zisser, Eyal. "The Syrian Army: Between the Domestic and the External Fronts." *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 5. No. 1. (March 2001): 1-12.

Sources for the Database

Amnesty International. <http://www.amnesty.org/> (accessed March 10, 2012).

Center for Systemic Peace. The Coup d'Etat database.
<http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm> (accessed March 10, 2012).

Chenoweth, Erica and Stephan, Maria J.: Database for the book *Why Civil Resistance Works*. (2011). <http://echenoweth.faculty.wesleyan.edu/wcrw/> (accessed February 13, 2012).

CIA Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> (accessed May 20, 2012).

Foreign Military Studies Office. Military Recruitment Data Set. (September 12, 2007).
<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/mildat/RecruitmentCodebook.pdf>
(accessed February 14, 2012).

Global Nonviolent Action Database. <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/> (accessed February 16, 2012).

Human Rights Watch. <http://www.hrw.org/> (accessed April 20, 2012).

Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa). <http://www.iss.co.za/> (accessed March 28, 2012).

International Institute for Strategic Studies. *Military Balance* 1994-2011. London: Routledge.

International Crisis Group. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed March 15, 2012).

Jane's World Armies. <http://jwar.janes.com/public/jwar/index.shtml> (accessed May 15, 2012).

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2011. <http://milexdata.sipri.org/> (accessed February 15, 2012).

UNHCR. Minorities at Risk Project. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher/MARP.html>
(accessed May 10, 2012).

Uppsala Conflict Data Program. <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php> (accessed February 15, 2012).