

FORGING IDENTITY THROUGH NEGOTIATION:
THE CASE OF THE CONTEMPORARY BOSNIAK NATION

By

Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc

Submitted to
Central European University
Nationalism Studies Program

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Florian Bieber

Budapest, Hungary
2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	III
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	IV
INTRODUCTION.....	1
LITERATURE REVIEW	3
CHAPTER 1 – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	5
1.1 KALLÁY’S POLICY OF BOSNIAN NATIONHOOD.....	9
1.2 COMMUNIST POLICY TOWARDS BOSNIAN MUSLIMS.....	15
CHAPTER 2 – COMPETING NATIONALISMS VIS-À-VIS ‘BOSNIAN QUESTION’	18
2.1 CLAIM OVER PEOPLE	18
2.2 CLAIM OVER TERRITORY	24
2.3 ANTI-ISLAMISM.....	26
CHAPTER 3 – COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF THE NATION.....	29
3.1 MUSLIMS AS A NATION – “MUSLIM WITH CAPITAL M”	31
3.2 BOSNIAN NATION.....	33
3.3 BOSNIAK INCLUSIVE NATION	35
3.4 BOSNIAK EXCLUSIVE NATION	38
CHAPTER 4 – THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATION	40
CONCLUSION - WHY THE BOSNIAK EXCLUSIVE SOLUTION WON?	45
FAILED LEGITIMACY OF COMMUNISM/YUGOSLAVISM	45
SERBIAN AND CROATIAN PRESSURE	45
BIBLIOGRAPHY	48
NEWSPAPERS	52

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor Florian Bieber, for disciplining my thoughts, as well as Professors Mustafa Imamović, Zdravko Grebo, Nerzuk Ćurak and Šaćir Filandra, who were kind enough to share their knowledge and opinions on the troubling issues of Bosniak nation. Special gratitude deserves Mediacentar in Sarajevo and the head of its archives Dragan Golubović, who helped and hosted me so friendly.

Dedicated to my little one that is about to come to this world.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AH – Austria-Hungary

BCS – Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian language

BH – Bosnia and Herzegovina

CKSKBiH – [Centralni Komitet Saveza Komunista Bosne i Hercegovine] Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina

HDZ – [Hrvatska demokratska zajednica] Croatian Democratic Union

ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

MBO – [Muslimanska bošnjačka organizacija] Muslim Bosniak Organisation

NDH – [Neyavisna Država Hrvatska] Independent State of Croatia

SDA – [Stranka demokratske akcije] Party of Democratic Action

SDS – [Srpska demokratska stranka] Serbian Democratic Party

SFRY – Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia

SKBiH – [Savez Komunista Bosne i Hercegovine] League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina

VKBI – [Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca] Council of the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals

ZAVNOBiH – [Zemaljsko Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Bosne i Hercegovine] Regional Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

All terms in square brackets [...] are written in, or English translation of a word or phrase written in, Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian language if not specified differently. All translations from BCS to English are responsibility of the author if not specified differently.

INTRODUCTION

Nomen est omen. The name is a sign. This statement seems even truer if having in mind the name of a nation.

The initial idea for this paper, as well as the starting point of the research for it, was the question – why did the national group of Bosnia and Herzegovina called *Muslims* changed its name to *Bosniaks* at the beginning of the 1990s?

Existence of Slavic Muslims of Bosnia¹ as a recognised distinct group historically precedes their relative recent formation as a modern nation. In the 1960s Yugoslav Communist establishment endorsed official national name – *Muslims* (written with capital M) [*Muslimani*]² – for the ethno-religious group of Bosnian Muslims. During the course of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia of 1992-95, the term *Bosniaks* [*Bošnjaci*] became the official denomination for the same group.

The fact that a group changed its name is significant per se, since “the act of naming helps to establish the structure of the world,”³ therefore it may be reliable indicator that a change of group’s identity took place as well. The next dilemma is whether the name determines or reflects the nature of the thing that it signifies,⁴ and accordingly, whether the change of the name produces the change in identity, or the name was changed because the group identity was transformed. Subsequently the question of agency should be posed – who brokered the change of a group’s name, and how was the consensus achieved – because:

¹ Generally, hereafter *Bosnia* will stand for *Bosnia and Herzegovina*.

² In Slavic languages, religious membership is written with lower-case, while national membership with capital beginning letter. Therefore *muslimani* denotes Muslims in religious sense and *Muslimani* in national sense.

³ Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 105.

⁴ Question taken from Mary Neuburger, *The Orient within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria* (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2004), 143.

“Struggles over ethnic or regional identity ... are a particular case of the different struggles over classifications, struggles over the monopoly of the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the division of the social world and, thereby, to make and unmake the groups.”⁵

This line of thought inspired me to look for answers, not only why *Muslims* became *Bosniaks*, but also what is, if there is any, difference in the substance of the two identities. When exploring how the change evolved, my preliminary research has shown that this shift from *Muslims* to *Bosniaks* was not linear, preliminary determined, smooth nor instant. Actually, at the time of the change, specifically from 1990-93, several identity options were present in the public sphere of Bosnia that may be labelled as: ‘Muslim with capital M’, ‘Bosnian’, ‘Bosniak inclusive’, and ‘Bosniak exclusive’. Therefore, this paper will aim to present alternative group identification “offered” to Bosnian Muslims during the course of “identity negotiation”; to describe how subsequent alternatives failed to mount support; and to offer explanation why the ‘Bosniak exclusive’ concept prevailed. In order to provide necessary framework for the negotiation of Bosnian Muslims’ national identity, historical background of the issue will be presented. Special attention will be also given to Croatian and Serbian nationalisms the “significant others” in relation to which contemporary Bosniak identity had been forged.

⁵ Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, 221.

Literature review

English language literature⁶ tends to present shift from civic communist-style-designed national identification of ‘Muslims with capital M’ to ethno-religiously based concept of ‘Bosniakhood’ as a linear continuity. No author specifically indulged into the question of why and how this change took place. In most cases they do not even timely mark the shift, but only when beginning new chapter start to use the new name. Other option is to have a shifting period in which they use terms Muslim and Bosniak interchangeably, or phrase Bosniak-Muslim. Fair excuse may be Andjelić’s *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy* who informs the reader on the change, but still without explaining why. The only publication that briefly mentions the existence of the identity negotiation, and that outlines the main lines of argumentations, is Tone Bringa’s *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way*. She does so only in the introduction, since the book is based on pre-war anthropological research of a Bosnian village, where among other features of everyday life, some space is devoted to national and other identities. Therefore the author does not go into detailed explanation of how and why one concept of national identity overwhelmed the others.

There are many more publications on the topic written by the local authors. But they are, in most cases, individuals who actually took part in the public negotiation of Muslim/Bosnian/Bosniak identity, and cannot be taken as unbiased. Therefore I consider these materials to be part of the debate, and I will treat them as primary sources in the Chapter 3 - *Competing definitions of the nation*.

⁶ Here I call upon only those publications focusing on the topic and the time-frame specifically, such as: Neven Andjelić, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Ivo Banac, “From Religious Community to Socialist Nationhood and Post-Communist Statehood, 1918-1992,” in *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, ed. Mark Pinson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (London: Hurst and Company, 1994); Francine Friedman, *The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).

This common omission of not mentioning, or being aware of the process of negotiation of Muslim/Bosnian/Bosniak identity that lasted for few years, set out the goal of this paper.

CHAPTER 1 – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This paper deals with the most recent developments in the long lasting process of Bosnian Muslims' collective identity formation. In order to understand it one needs to be aware of the previous stages in the building of political and national identity of the group in question. Here will not be presented all-encompassing history of Bosnia and its peoples, but rather sequence of turning points relevant for our topic. Additional purpose of this historical excursion is to provide information regarding particular historical events that that were subjects of disputed historiographic interpretations, and material used in various national myths.

The region of Bosnia, geographically similar to the one we know today, was identified as such in medieval times. The medieval Bosnian state at its height, in the first part of the 14th century, covered the most part of the nowadays Bosnian territory. The peculiarity of this region is that it was in between the Western and Eastern Christianity zones of interest and control, thus subsequent Bosnian rulers [*ban*] turned to one or the other centre of power, thus changing their confession. This reflected on the religiosity of the population as well, which was generally low, with no strong Catholic or Orthodox network.⁷ Additionally, various Christian heretical practices were widespread in the medieval Bosnia, most organised of whom was the *Church of Bosnia* [*Crkva bosanska*]. It is often mistakenly referred to as Bogomil sect. The term *Bogumil* is distortion of original Bulgarian term *Bogomil*, which refers to medieval Christian heresy or Gnostic sect that emerged in nowadays Bulgaria. Contemporary historiography has proven that heresy practices in medieval Bosnia was not

⁷ See John V. A. Fine, "The Medieval and Ottoman Roots of Modern Bosnian Society" in *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, ed. Mark Pinson (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), 1-21.

Bogumil, but Manichean teaching of its own, which was loosely structured into Church of Bosnia. There was no historical or theological connection between the two.⁸

With the Ottoman occupation of Bosnia, in 1463, inter-Christian conflicts are put to the halt in the face of Islam as the state religion. From 15th to 18th century, there were several waives of conversion to Islam by local Slavic population, and overall, it was untypically high, comparing to other Balkan regions. The nature of conversion, particularly the level to which it was voluntary or forced; the motives of the converted ones; and the original Christian faith from which one converted to Islam are still disputed questions. As will be presented later, the issue of conversion has been excessively manipulated by Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak nationalisms.⁹

By late Ottoman period the *millet* system was well established in the province of Bosnia¹⁰, it regulated different statuses for the members of Muslim, Christian and Jewish communities, and provided for significant religious, educational and private-law autonomy of the non-Muslim subjects. Though privileged as a ruling class, Muslim elite had military obligation to the sultan. In Bosnia, due to the large rate of the Islamisation of the local population, the Muslim elite – landlords, judges, clergy – was in large proportion of the local origin. This was another peculiarity of Bosnia comparing to other Ottoman lands.¹¹

However, the long-lasting privileged position of Bosnian landlords as the ultimate military, political and economic power on the local level, came under danger by reforms of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839), “known as “Peter the Great” of the Ottoman Empire. The primary purpose of the reforms was to increase the power of the Porte and to turn the

⁸ John V. A. Fine, “The Medieval and Ottoman Roots of Modern Bosnian Society” in *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, ed. Mark Pinson (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), 8.

⁹ See Darko Karačić, “The perception of the Conversion to Islam in the Western Balkans’ Historiographies,” (MA Thesis, Central European University, Budapest, 2005); and Bojan Aleksov, “Perceptions of Islamization in the Serbian National Discourse,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 5 (2005): 113-127.

¹⁰ Tur. *Bosna eyelet, vilayet, paşalık* – depending on the period the administrative units changed.

¹¹ See Colin Heywood, “Bosnia under Ottoman Rule, 1463-1800” in *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, ed. Mark Pinson, 22-53.

Ottoman state into a centralised state similar to those in Europe. The main element of the programme was to create a large, modern, European-style army, under the direct control of central government. Faced with the diminishing liberties, Bosnian elite firmly opposed the reforms, which led to their open conflict with the Porte in 1831.¹² The political programme of Bosnian elite was not fully developed, but at its core were two demands: insisting on inviolability of their land tenure rights, and that position of Bosnian vezir may be occupied only by a local in the future. Determined to protect their local preiviledges, Bosnian elite organised armed rebellion under the leadership of Husein-kapetan Gradašćević, and proclaimed autonomy within the Ottoman state.¹³ Ottoman forces eventually crushed the rebellion, the year later.

Western scholars that researched history of Bosnia in their analysis of Husein-kapetan Gradašćević uprising agree in depicting it as a class movement of local lords that aimed at protecting their privileged status provided by the informal autonomy of Bosnian province. Drawing parallel to the similar situations of rebellious autonomy, and similar intentions by local leaders to preserve the status quo, they have put the Bosnian uprising of 1831 into the larger framework of opposition to “Europeanising” reforms conducted in the Ottoman Empire, which had its highlight in the Tanzimat Edict of 1839. On the other hand, scholars that consider themselves belonging to Bosnian Muslim/Bosniak ethnic/national group, tend to interpret the Gradašćević uprising as some sort of national emancipatory movement. However, it seems much more accurate to claim that national movements entered Bosnia and Herzegovina only in the second part of the 19th century.

As far as middle of 19th century, inhabitants of Bosnia were perceiving differences among themselves exclusively as religious ones. As one of the first Bosnian journalists,

¹² Mustafa Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka* [The History of Bosniaks] (Sarajevo: Bošnjačka zajednica kulture Preporod, 1998), 334.

¹³ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (London: Papermac, 1994), 121.

Franciscan, Ivan Franjo Jukić reports¹⁴, people were referring to themselves as either “*krstjani*” (followers of the “Western Church”), “*hristjani*” (followers of the “Eastern Church”) or “*Turks*” (“followers of Mohammed”). Jukić himself underline that the name “*Turks*” was used by Bosnian Christian population to refer to Slavic Muslims, and not to ethnic Turkish-speaking Turks. In the historical contest, this naming should be understood as intention of giving pejorative connotation to the group, since they were perceived by Christians as infidels. Otherwise, contemporaries note that the Slavic Muslims referred to themselves as “*muslimani*” i. e. Muslims. Therefore, the prime social identity was religious one. The national names of Serbs and Croats were not in use in Bosnia and Herzegovina up to the second half of the century, when this started to change.

Serbian and Croatian national ideologies penetrated into lands of Bosnia and Herzegovina thanks to organised propaganda of clergy that was, at the time, holding educational function as well. Without mutual coordination, Orthodox and Catholic clergymen had the same strategy of national entrepreneurship. In their view, the first step in raising national consciousness among their flock was to introduce them to their “true” national name. In 1863, an Orthodox priest founded society for propagation of the name Serb in Sarajevo, which soon established connections with United Serbian Youth from Novi Sad (then Hungary). At the same time, similar Croatian counterpart was organised. It aimed at spreading the use of Croatian name among Sarajevo Catholics, with young Franciscans as its most active members.¹⁵

However, the most effective role in the “national enlightenment” of Bosnian soon-to-be Serbs and Croats were playing schools. Within the Ottoman arrangement, religious hierarchy was in the charge of schooling. The educational staffs in Bosnia were provided

¹⁴ Ivan Franjo Jukić, *Zemljopis i poviestnica Bosne od Slavoljuba Bošnjaka* [Geography and History of a Glorious Bosniak], Zagreb, 1851, cited from Mustafa Imamović, “Integracione nacionane ideologije i Bosna” [Integration National Ideologies and Bosnia], *Godišnjak Pravnog fakulteta u Sarajevu*, no. 39 (1996): 112.

¹⁵ Imamović, “Integracione nacionane ideologije i Bosna,” 115.

from the educational centres outside of it – most of Orthodox clergymen were coming out the developed infrastructure of Serbian cultural autonomy in Hungary, similarly, Catholic ones were coming from Croatian lands within Habsburg Empire. These educators were deeply embedded into Romantic thoughts of “national awakening” and were eager to put them into practice. Therefore, up to the time of Austro-Hungarian occupation, new generations of Serbs and Croats were forming within Bosnia.

Austria-Hungary was allowed to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina by provisions of the Berlin Congress 1878. It was a big social change for the Muslim population. In general they felt declassified, no matter to which class they actually belonged, and disconnected from the political, cultural and religious centre in relation to which they were used to live.¹⁶

1.1 Kállay's policy of Bosnian nationhood

Especially important for our topic is particular policy of the most prominent Austro-Hungarian governor of BH – Benjámín von Kállay (in office 1882-1903) – the policy of “Bosnianhood”. The prime goal of Kállay's policies was to restrict development of the national movements among the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to achieve that, he envisioned an alternative – national movement that should gather all Bosnian inhabitants, with no regard to their religion. Therefore his policies aimed at developing specific Bosnian patriotism, within the framework of the Dual Monarchy, of course.

The idea of Bosnian nationhood was not entirely Kállay's invention. It can be recognised in Ottoman policies that local Bosnian authorities launched as part of the *Tanzimat* reforms of 1839 and 1856. These intentions are most visible in the conduct of the last

¹⁶ Mustafa Imamović, *Pravni položaj i unutrašnje-politički razvitak Bosne i Hercegovine od 1878. do 1914.* [The Legal Status and Domestic Political Development of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1878-1914] (Sarajevo: Bosanski kulturni centar, 1997), 105.

prominent Ottoman governor – Osman Šerif Topal pasha [Tur. paša] of the 1860s. His policies were based on the idea that all three confessions living in Bosnia comprise one group – Bosnian people.¹⁷ This view was, in a way, application of Tanzimat principle – all citizens of Ottoman Empire are equal, regardless of their religion – to the local level. Topal pasha’s concept had limited success, since it was regarded by Muslim elite as derogation of their privileged position, while Christians lacked the trust in Ottoman goodwill. Kállay’s endeavour in building Bosnianhood, therefore, may be assessed as “higher budget remake” of the Ottoman failure.

In order to encourage the sentiment of national affiliation with the land of Bosnia, Kállay embarked on two big projects – education reform and identity building, which included language codification, common history writing, and creation of national symbols. At the very beginning of the Austro-Hungarian rule, the religious institutions of the three confessional groups were placed under the jurisdiction of the Dual Monarchy. Therefore the matters that the communities hitherto handled independently – the election of bishops and priests, school policies and teachers appointment – came under scrutiny Provincial Government. Additionally, public education was established.

Bosnian language was proclaimed to be official local language of the Provincial Government in 1883, while its grammar was published in 1890, in both Latin and Cyrillic scripts, and was used in public schools until the First World War.¹⁸ Under the pressures of Serbian and Croatian national movements, The Provincial Government renamed the local language into *Serbo-Croatian* in 1907. Since the Muslims adopted the name Bosnian language for their own, they were allowed to officially use it in their autonomous cultural institutions.

¹⁷ Imamović, “Integracione nacionane ideologije i Bosna,” 113-114.

¹⁸ Ibid.

Benjamin von Kállay's administration in its formal communiqués, in its public declarations, in the textbooks it published, referred to the population of Bosnia as the *Bosniaks* [*Bošnjaci*]. This is not a word invented by Kállay's administration, as well. The Ottoman administration referred to the people coming from province of Bosnia as *Bosnaklar*. Since majority of those that communicated with the Porte were Muslims, this denomination, in Slavic version – *Bošnjak* [Bosniak], was used by the Bosnian Muslims themselves.

During the Ottoman period the name *Bosniak* denoted only regional origin, however, certain historiographic interpretations claim that, in the 19th century, it gained also national dimension. As stated before, contemporary Bosniak historians agree on the point that the uprising of 1831 of Bosnian (Muslim) elite against Ottoman government marks the beginning of national emancipation of Bosnian Muslims. In this context, the use of the phrase “*Bosniak people*”, by the leader of the movement¹⁹, to refer only to Slavic Bosnian Muslims, is taken to be the moment of birth of their national name. At the same time, there were scattered uses of the word *Bosniak* as the name for all inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the local and foreign authors. These were usually individual ethnographic endeavours to classify South Slavic “tribes”, typical for the social research of the 19th century. However, these texts do not imply that the use of the denomination was adopted by the locals. Therefore, we can conclude that by the time of Austro-Hungarian rule, there was no public consensus on the proper meaning of the name *Bosniak*, which made room for the Kállay's nationality policy.

As a historian by profession, Benjamin von Kállay was aware of the importance of the historic interpretations for the creation of a national ideology. Therefore, he stressed out those parts of Bosnian past that implied common fate of its peoples and their unique historic path. The textbooks and popular literature supported by the Provincial Government revitalised

¹⁹ In the letters of Husein-kapetan Gradašćević to Habsburg Kanzler Metternich and knez Miloš Obrenović, leader of the Serbian uprising in Belgrade pašalık, dated in Travnik and Gradačac, on 13th March and 23rd June 1832, respectively. Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka*, 13.

collective memory of the Middle Ages as the time when common Bosnian identity was born. The Bosnian Church, official religion of the medieval Bosnian Kingdom for a short period before the Ottoman occupation, was presented by Kállay's historians as authentic Bosnian tradition that remained in the folk culture, which surpasses the religious divisions.

Kállay's policies of Bosnianhood were confronted with constant critiques in Serbian and Croatian press. The idea of Bosnian nation was accused of being Kállay's fiction "created by decree"²⁰, while Bosnian language was denounced as forgery of Serbian/Croatian language, depending on the side which complained. The name Bosniak was not questioned itself; however, Serbian and Croatian national ideologies understood it as regional reference and applied it in general for all people coming from Bosnia.

The strongest support to the Kállay's policy of Bosnian nationhood came from a group of young Muslim intellectuals gathered around Enlightenment-thinker Mehmed-beg Kapetanović Ljubišak. He founded magazine with indicative name *Bošnjak* in 1891. Though directed towards Muslim audience, the magazine was intensively promoting idea of Bosnian patriotism. The *Bošnjak* was to be counterpart to the national propaganda coming from Serbian and Croatian magazines. It was fiercely opposing latent content of both Serbian and Croatian nationalisms which implied that Bosnian Muslims are Islamised Serbs or Croats, thus Muslims should take part in Serbian i. e. Croatian national movement. Therefore, authors in the *Bošnjak* indulged into history writing that would support Slavic Muslims' inherent belonging to the land of Bosnia, and Bosnia's unique historic path, independent from fates of Serbs and Croats, and their "historic" lands. In their interpretation, after coming to the Balkan Peninsula, South Slavs dispersed to different regions, divided by rivers, thus started to name themselves differently – Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks. The difference that was

²⁰ Ante Malbaša, *Hrvatski i srpski nacionalni problem u Bosni za vrijeme režima Benjamina Kállaya* [Croatian and Serbian National problem in Bosnia during the regime of Benjamin Kállay] (Osijek, 1940), 66. Cited in *ibid.*

growing between South Slavs due to geographic distance, different climate and customs, became even bigger when they adopted three different confessions of Christianity – Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Bogumilism. Since the Bogumils were constantly under pressure of the former two congregations, with arrival of the Ottoman occupation they adopted Islam. Within this historiographic narrative, leader of the Islamisation were Bosnian feudalists, who became Muslim elite of Bosnia. Safvet-beg Bašagić developed historical narrative that Bosnian Muslims originate from nobility. In his pioneer historiographic work, Bašagić tried to prove, though without using any primary sources, the continuity of Bosnian *bey* families (to which he belonged) with the medieval Bosnian nobility. In this way, the group around *Bošnjak* was eager to present historical continuity of Bosnia in which Muslims present, not only its intrinsic population, but the leading one as well – the social group that gave Bosnia uniqueness. Obviously, this narrative is distortion of the initial idea of historiography that Benjamin von Kállay wanted to promote.

Though authors of the *Bošnjak* were not using the name Bosniak consistently, sometimes referring to the whole Bosnian population, sometimes only to Muslims, from the beginning they were viewing the Muslims as a political, not only religious group. These national entrepreneurs were also inconsistent in naming their own group, sometimes Bosniaks, sometimes Muslims²¹. We can conclude that the concept of Bosniakhood served as trigger for articulation of national identity of Bosnian Muslims. This process was adequately described by Mark Pinson as “substitution of religion for national identity”²².

However, this support for the idea of Bosniakhood is not representative for the whole Muslim population in Bosnia. The abovementioned magazine was written and read by young intellectuals, offsprings of Muslim landlord elite, the first generation educated in European

²¹ Here Muslims was written with capital letter, *Muslimani*, in order to denominate political/national group.

²² Mark Pinson, “The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian Rule, 1878-1918” in *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, ed. Mark Pinson, 89.

manner. Therefore its discourse was distant for the majority of Muslim population²³ – peasants and urban lower classes – who continued to identify themselves within religious category, as Muslim. Thus, in general, Kállay’s concept of Bosnian nationhood was equally unsuccessful among Muslims as it was among Serbs and Croatians.

To conclude, Kállay’s policy failed because Serbian and Croatian nationalisms already took deep roots among the Christian population of Bosnia. Only the small Muslim intellectual elite responded to the idea of Bosnianhood, but lacking partnership in the other two communities, soon turned to cultural and political mobilisation of its own religious group. The appeal for Bosnian civic national unity came too late, when the notions of religion and nation irreversibly acquired equal meaning in Bosnia. On the other hand, the concept of Bosniak nation, in the way that Benjamin von Kállay designed it, proved to possess a “system mistake”. Though the idea Bosnian nationhood was aiming at civic loyalty to the state, the means for its achieving were mirroring endeavour of typical Romantic ethnic-national entrepreneurs – returning to the “folk traditions”, crafting the idea of Medieval Golden Age, and creating historic myths. This sponsored cultural production proved to be weak comparing to the flourishing Serbian and Croatian ones, which by that time managed to develop much more convincing national mythologies. Overall, the ideological argumentation that supported Kállay’s project was incompatible with the concept of a nation that aimed at overcoming emerging nationalisms. To build a civic-based nation civic tools are needed. The project was undermined not only by the developed Serbian and Croatian national movements outside Bosnia, but also, by their mirroring counterparts within it. The autonomous national movements of Bosnian Serbs and Croatians were getting formed towards the end of the 1880s. Serbian and Croatian magazines, cultural societies, educational funds, were

²³ Robert J. Donia, *Islam under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1878-1914* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1981), 5.

flourishing, and over time, getting ever more independent from Belgrade and Zagreb. Finally, first political grouping, future parties were getting organised at the same time – Serbian National Organisation, Croatian National Community, Croatian Catholic Union, Muslim National Organisation, Muslim Progressive Party. Clearly, the parties were founded on religious-ethnic, not ideological, bases. There was no self-organised pan-Bosnian political community. The Provincial Government, faced with reality, and in order to stabilise its rule, had no other option but to cooperate with local political representatives, that decided to organise themselves in this manner. By negotiating with ethnic-national leaders in Bosnia during 1890s, Benjamin von Kállay himself admitted the failure of the Bosnian nationhood policy.

As presented above, at the turn of the century, at the time of formation of the first political parties in BH, Bosnian Muslims were perceived as religious group that was getting politically organised. They were referred to as Muslims, written with capital or small-case beginning letter interchangeably. In a way, they were perceived as something more than just a religious group, but less than a nation. This type of denomination remained throughout the interwar period, when the leading Muslim political representative was Yugoslav Muslim Organisation.

1.2 Communist policy towards Bosnian Muslims

Before, during, and after the Second World War, Communist party of Yugoslavia did not reach consensus on how the Bosnian Muslim population should be treated – as a religious or a national group. There are war-time documents that recognise the Muslims as political group within Bosnia-Herzegovina, equal to Serbs and Croats, such as the Resolution from the founding session of ZAVNOBiH (Zemaljsko Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog

Oslobođenja Bosne i Hercegovine) [Regional Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina] that states that BH “is neither Serbian, nor Croatian, nor Muslim, but Serbian, and Croatian, and Muslim” state.²⁴

However, after the war, under the pressure of Serbian and Croatian party lords, Muslims were left outside the Yugoslav Communists' framework of nations and nationalities that provided certain statuses and rights for each national/ethnic group within the multiethnic state.²⁵ In the spirit of secularisation, it was expected for Bosnian Muslims to gradually evolve into either Serbian or Croatian national corpus. Close analysis of the census results can show that the population originating Bosnian-Muslim ethno-religious group predominantly opted for category ‘Muslims undecided’²⁶ [*‘Muslimani neopredeljeni’*], in 1948, and ‘Yugoslavs undecided’²⁷ [*‘Jugosloveni neopredeljeni’*], in 1953.

1961 census offered hybrid definition of “Muslims in the ethnic sense” [*‘Muslimani u etničkom smislu’*], which provoked some confusion, because of which still many Muslim from Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro declared themselves as Yugoslavs.²⁸ Josip Broz Tito personally recognised “Muslim nation” in a speech given at the 7th Congress of the League of the Youth of Yugoslavia in 1963.²⁹ Tito actually “condemned any insisting that Muslims should opt for some nationality [i. e. Croatian or Serbian], since – as comrade Tito says –

²⁴ Mustafa Imamović, “ZAVNOBiH kao legitiman izraz državnopravnog kontinuiteta Bosne i Hercegovine” [ZAVNOBiH as a Legitimate Expression of the Legal-State Continuity of Bosnia and Herzegovina] in *Ljudska prava*, no. 3-4 (2003): 10.

²⁵ For detailed explanation of arrangement of national statuses within the SFRY, i.e. nations [narodi] and nationalities [narodnosti], refer to Atif Purivatra and Kasim Suljević, *Nacionalni aspekt popisa stanovništva u 1971. godini* [The national Aspect of the Population Census in 1971] (Sarajevo: Komisija za međunacionalne odnose i međurepubličku saradnju Predsjedništva Republičke konferencije Socijalističkog saveza radnog naroda Bosne i Hercegovine, February 1971), 7.

²⁶ 788,403 in BH declared as ‘Muslim undecided’. See in Atif Purivatra and Kasim Suljević, *Nacionalni aspekt popisa stanovništva u 1971. godini*, 13.

²⁷ 891,800 in BH declared ‘Yugoslav undecided’. Ibid.

²⁸ There was 842,954 “Muslims in the ethnic sense” in the whole of Yugoslavia. Some authors speculate that out of 275,883 declared Yugoslavs in the Republic of BH “no fewer than 84% were Muslims”. In Šaćir Filandra and Enes Karić, *The Bosniac Idea* (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 2004), 242. Figures modified according to official data, available at: <http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/NacStanB.htm>

²⁹ Sedmi kongres Saveza Omladine Jugoslavije, Belgrade, 1963, pp. 10-11 in Šaćir Filandra and Enes Karić, *The Bosniac Idea*, 242.

everybody may be what they are, and nobody should force upon them any national membership”.³⁰ The same year Constitution of BH had been changed, and the new preamble referred to “Serbs, Croats and Muslims allied in the past by a common life”,³¹ thus equalising their status as nations [*narodi*]. In May 1968, on the 17th Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of BH (CKSKBiH) it has been stated that “Muslims are a distinct nation” [“Muslimani su poseban narod”]³², which was confirmed by the 5th Congress of the LCBH in 1969.³³ Finalisation of the policy was the new category on the 1971 census – “Muslims in the sense of nationality” [“*Muslimani u smislu narodnosti*”] – which was recognised by the population in question as the appropriate denomination. This instantly decreased the number of “Yugoslavs” in BH Republic.³⁴

There are several explanations for the change in the party policy towards national recognition of Muslims. To a point it is a product of Tito’s balancing Serbo-Croatian rivalry and centralisation/decentralisation streams within the party elite; but also it is a credit of a number of academics and officials, such as philosophy professor Muhamed Filipović and Communist functionary Atif Purivatra, who were actively advocating within the party and limited public sphere.

Consequentially, the principle that was spontaneously in use in Austro-Hungarian and inter-war periods – to write Muslim with capital beginning letter when referring to the nation, and with small-case letter, when referring to religious group – entered all legal codes of the SFRY, official grammar of all Yugoslav languages, school textbooks and media.

³⁰ Atif Purivatra and Kasim Suljević, *Nacionalni aspekt popisa stanovništva u 1971. godini*, 14.

³¹ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, 198.

³² Imamović, Mustafa, *Historija Bošnjaka*, 565.

³³ Francine Friedman, *The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation*, 159.

³⁴ 1,482,430 citizens declared as “Muslims in the sense of nationality”, while only 43,796 as “Yugoslav”. Figures from: <http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/NacStanB.htm>. Compare to the Footnote 27.

CHAPTER 2 – COMPETING NATIONALISMS VIS-À-VIS “BOSNIAN QUESTION”

2.1 Claim over people

Most of the authors dealing with the issue of Bosnian Muslims (Robert Donia, Noel Malcolm, Mark Pinson, Ivo Banac, etc.) have noted common feature to Serbian and Croatian nationalisms – that is claiming that Bosnian Muslims “are in fact” Serbs or Croats, respectively. This discourse, that I call “appropriation” of Bosnian Muslims, can be traced throughout history of Serbian and Croatian national ideologies, marginalised or activated depending on the political situation.

I will devote more time to the early period of formation of Serbian and Croatian national ideologies. My focus on the 19th century is justified by the fact that these ideas were (re)popularised during the rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia, in the 1980s and 90s. The “new” nationalisms not only claimed continuity with the old ideas, but also cited or republished the 19th century sources in order to prove “antiquity” of their national claims.

19th century, the time of romantic “national awakening” found Bosnia and Herzegovina within the complicated framework: Ottoman decaying power in the region, followed by Habsburg rule from 1878, developing (and successful) national movements of Serbs and Croats, and triadic religious composition of the population. “Plainly, neither Serb nor Croat national ideology could advance majority claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina without

winning the Muslims – hence the demand for Muslim “nationalisation” and arguments, scientific and historicist, by both sides on behalf of Serb or Croat status of Muslims.”³⁵

As codifier of Serbian folk language, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (1787-1864), in true spirit of romanticism, was the leading figure of Serbian cultural life in the 19th century, and in a way a “cultural father of the Serb nation“. In the article *Srbi svi i svuda* [Serbs All and Evrywhere], written in 1836, he set out his idea of the Serbian national identity and its (territorial) boundaries. The only criterion he used for identifying nations was the linguistic one. Karadžić considered all Slavic people who spoke Štokavian dialect to be Serbian, while “those who called themselves differently, ... in fact belong to this community, but do not know it yet, or refuse to acknowledge it”³⁶. Karadžić wrote that among Štokavians, three millions were Greek Orthodox, and the rest of two millions were Muslims or Roman Catholics, but all of them were Serbs according to the language they spoke. He admits that not all of them call themselves the Serbs, but only those of Orthodox faith. Particularly were criticised Slavic Muslims, since they called themselves Turks, and have “abandoned their national name after the Bosnian nobility had converted to Islam”.³⁷ The remedy for this “lack of collective awareness” among Muslim Serbs, Karadžić proposed founding schools for Muslims, who would “immediately understand and confess that they are not Turks, but Serbs”.

This idea of Serbs of three faiths, was not originally created by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, but by an older enlightenment intellectual, Dositej Obradović, Minister of Education, during the First Serbian Uprising 1804-13.³⁸ Before him, nobody expressed view

³⁵ Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, c1984), 361.

³⁶ Darko Karačić, “The perception of the Conversion to Islam in Bosnia in the Western Balkans’ Historiographies”, 19. Based on Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, *Kovčezić za istoriju, jezik i običaje Srba sva tri zakona* [Small Box for History, Language and Manners of the Serbs of All Three Laws], 1-27.

³⁷ Ibid. 24.

³⁸ Dositej Obradović, *Izabrana djela* [Selected Works], Belgrade: Politika, Narodna knjiga, 2005. As in Darko Karačić, “The perception of the Conversion to Islam in Bosnia in the Western Balkans’ Historiographies”, 21.

that the Serbs could be anything but Orthodox. However, Karadžić was the one to elaborate and get accredited for this challenging theory, and the popularity of him and his work up to nowadays, may be partly held responsible for the persistence of the notion of “Serbianhood of Slavic Muslims”. Finally, it should be underlined that these papers were never statement of official policy of the Serbian state.

Another dimension of this expectation that Muslims will eventually realise and “confess” their Serbian nationality, was also the expectation that the Muslims would “return to Orthodoxy”. Not only welcomed, the (re)conversion of Slavic Muslims to Orthodox Christianity, was often demanded as the proof of belonging to the nation. The best, and most influential, example is Petar Petrović Njegoš’s quasi historiographic³⁹ epic *Gorski vijenac* [Mountain Wreath], published in 1847. Though it is based on the assumption that Slavic Muslims are converted Serbs, it clearly states that if the “turning Turks [*Poturice*]” do not reconvert they are worse enemy to the Serbian nation, than the Turks themselves.⁴⁰ This idea of the “return to the predecessor’s faith” was present even among most liberal Serb intellectuals of the time. One of them is Jovan Jovanović-Zmaj, a poet from then Habsburg Novi Sad, who was open to “harmonious Serb triconfessionalism, [but] did not fail to portray his Muslim characters as sentimentally bound to Orthodox Christianity”.⁴¹

This “pan-Serbian ideological model”, as Srećko M. Džaja refers to it, can be bluntly summarised in following words: “Bosnian Muslims are Serbs of the Islamic faith – so it is only a matter of time when they will, in the spirit of evolutionary progress, become aware of their own (national) Serbian identity.”⁴²

³⁹ Depicting as historical an event that never happened in reality – massacre of Islamised Serbs on Christmas Eve 1702.

⁴⁰ See Bojan Aleksov, “Perceptions of Islamization in the Serbian National Discourse.”

⁴¹ Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, 362.

⁴² Srećko M. Džaja, “Bosna i Bošnjaci u hrvatskom političkom diskursu” [Bosnia and Bosniaks in Croatian Political Discourse], *Erasmus*, no. 9 (December 1994): 33.

On the other hand, “Croat national ideologies flattered the Muslims”⁴³. Ivo Banac notes that at the early modern period the “Illyrian generation” of Croat intellectuals shared the mistrust towards Islam. However, the “father of the modern Croat nation” and nationalism, Ante Starčević (1823-1896), was openly Turcophilic, and considered Ottoman state as more tolerant and just to its subject than any European Christian empire. He viewed Bosnian Muslims as best Croats, since they are, in his interpretation, descendents of medieval Croatian gentry, that converted to Islam after Ottoman occupation in order to preserve their natural rights to rule over the lands.⁴⁴ This pan-*Croatism*, as Srećko Džaja names it, claimed that “Bosnian Muslims, that is Muslim upper class, are the *oldest European and the purest Croatian nobility*”.⁴⁵

Compared to the Serbian Orthodox Church, Catholic institutions in Bosnia made difference between religious and national “entrepreneurship”. Especially conciliatory attitude marked the Franciscans, who dominated region of Mostar. Their magazine *Osvit* [Dawn], published from 1898 on, promoted idea that religion is a matter of personal choice, and opened its pages for Muslim authors as well, therefore introducing them to Croatian cultural circle. Besides this “pull” effect, equally important was “push” effect of Croatian intellectuals who wrote pieces with central Muslim themes⁴⁶, or under Muslim pseudonym when targeting this audience in particular⁴⁷. This approach proved successful in attracting Muslim intellectuals, especially their first generation that was university-educated in the West, majority of who declared themselves as Croats.⁴⁸ This is maybe even more explainable by the

⁴³ Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, 363.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Srećko M. Džaja, “Bosna i Bošnjaci u hrvatskom političkom diskursu“, 33.

⁴⁶ Josip Eugen Tomić (novel *Zmaj od Bosne* [Dragon of Bosnia] in 1879), Eugen Kumačić, Milan Ogrizović, all adherents of Starčević’s party. In Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, 364.

⁴⁷ Milan Ogrizović and Frane Binački jointly as *Omer and Ivo*, Krsto Pavletić as *Osman-beg Štafić*, Josip Šebečić as *Jusuf*, Ferdo Vrbančić as *Ferid Maglajić*, Ivan Milićević and Osman Nuri Hadžić jointly as *Osman-Aziz*. In *ibid.* 364-5.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 365.

fact that Zagreb was primary centre of university education of young Muslims, many of whom were on a stipend of Croatian cultural society *Napredak* [Progress].⁴⁹

Based on above presented tradition, there was long tendency in Croatian politics to simply declare Bosnian Muslims as the Croats of Islamic faith, as Džaja rightly puts it: “The acceptance of Croatian national identity by some, Western-style educated, Muslims was taken as crucial evidence; while the fact that the Muslim majority never clearly declared as Croatian was simply not considered.”⁵⁰ Therefore, in the eyes of Croat nationalists, adherence to Croat identity by some prominent Muslim individuals proved that *all* Muslims felt as Croats.

These claims towards Bosnian Muslims, by still fresh and forming national movements of Serbs and Croats, were clearly elite driven and elite targeting. In winning the sympathy of the Muslim intellectuals more successful was Croatian side. However, the larger response among population to these identity definitions is highly questionable. The population survey conducted by Austro-Hungarian administration was recording religious, not national, membership. That was in accordance not only with the ruler’s policy on national question, but also to the salience of religious divisions among Bosnian inhabitants, which was in many ways still in line with “*millet* way of life”.

With the articulation of the first political, later emerging to proto-national, movement of Bosnian Muslims, in the form of Yugoslav Muslim Organisation (founded in 1919), the loyalty of majority of Muslim intellectuals divided, between those who opted for Croatian (or Serbian) nationality, and those adopting new national ideology of *Yugoslavism*. However, the claims that Bosnian Muslims are/should be part of Serbian/Croatian national corpus did not vanish from the two national discourses, even when they were not/were less supported by the representatives of the population in question.

⁴⁹ Nada Kisić Kolanović, “Muslimanska inteligencija i islam u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj“ [Muslim Intelligentsia and Islam in the Independent State of Croatia], *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, no. 3 (2004): 905.

⁵⁰ Srećko M. Džaja, “Bosna i Bošnjaci u hrvatskom političkom diskursu“, 34.

The time of reactivation of the discourse on Muslim Croats was during the existence of pro-fascistic **Independent State of Croatia (NDH)** 1941-45. This is the only time when the subsuming Muslims into Croatian ethnic corpus actually was official state policy. Such a declaration had primary role to legitimise incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the NDH⁵¹, but it also brought few Muslims to high official positions⁵², highest of who was Džafer beg Kulenović, Deputy Prime Minister of the NDH. However, with the defeat of NDH, and its condemnation by the post-war Yugoslav communist regime, the idea of *nationalisation*, or better to say, *Croatization* of Muslims devaluated.

In the time of **SFRY**, the theories, either based on origin (Serbian discourse) or on belonging to the cultural sphere (Croatian variant), shifted from popular to more “scientific” historical magazines, from political to academic arena. However, they were generally considered as less relevant topics under the influence of the dominant politics of the time. Nevertheless, the diaspora was very active on these issues, such as Dominik Mandić (1889-1973), Franciscan historian. His vast historiographic work tries to “proves” that the population of medieval Bosnia was exclusively Croatian, both Catholic and *Bogomil* (heretic)⁵³. Therefore with the Ottoman occupation, Croatian Bogomils and majority of Catholics, converted under pressure, in the 16th and first half of 17th centuries. Mandić’s argumentation in many ways resembles the “Serbian-style” claim over Bosnian Muslims based on “ethnic” origin. What both theories fail to notice is the inapplicability of the modern national denominations, such as “Serbs” and “Croats” to the population of medieval times,

⁵¹ It should be clarified that the NDH in most parts inherited territory of *Banovina* Croatia, autonomous entity within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, established only in 1939.

⁵² Hakija Hadžić, Muhamed Alajbegović and Ademaga Mešić. In Nada Kisić Kolanović, “Muslimanska inteligencija i islam u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj“, 910.

⁵³ Dominik Mandić, “Herceg-Bosna i Hrvatska: Prigodom 500-godišnjice pada Bosne (1463-1963)” [Herzeg-Bosnia and Croatia: On the Occasion of 500-Years Anniversary of the Fall of Bosnia (1463-1963)]. *Hrvatska revija*, (1963). Reprint in *Hrvatsko podrijetlo bosansko-hercegovačkih Muslimana* [Croatian Origin of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims], eds. Petar Šarac and Miljenko Primorac (Zagreb: Hrvatska hercegovačka zajednica “Herceg-Stjepan”, 1992), 123.

and even more, the impossibility to “prove” any claims of ethnic continuity over centuries of intensive migrations, wars and epidemics.

Many of the works cited here were republished at the time of rise of nationalism predominantly among Serbs and Croats, at the **end of the 1980s and during the 90s**. Many of them are still being reprinted. One of the typical examples is compilation of articles from the 19th and first half of the 20th century, written by Croatian and Muslim (declaring Croatian) public figures, under suggestive title *Hrvatsko podrijetlo bosansko-hercegovačkih Muslimana* [Croatian Origin of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims], published amidst the war in 1992.⁵⁴ Equally important, national romantic literary works were repopularised, such as Njegoš's *Gorski vijenac* and Serbian folk epics. These pieces were disseminated, read on public events, and promoted through educational system, with no critical assessment and historical contextualisation. These works of fiction, due to their archaic language, and renommé of the literary classics, were considered and used as primary historiographic sources, i. e. the bearers of authentic and unquestionable truth.

Here we come to the second big dimension of the appropriation of Bosnian Muslims, that is: Claiming the “ownership” over the people leads to the issue of the “ownership” over the land.

2.2 Claim over territory

Considering Bosnian Muslims to be a part of one or the other ethnic group had significant territorial implications, in the sense that the imagined ethnic maps were envisioned as future boundaries of nation-states in the eyes of national entrepreneurs.

⁵⁴ Petar Šarac and Miljenko Primorac, *Hrvatsko podrijetlo bosansko-hercegovačkih Muslimana*, 1992.

Serbian proto-state, similarly to other such entities that were gradually emerging from the Ottoman Empire, harboured ideas of joining all members of the nation within one independent state. Who are the Serbs, and how far the expansion should go, were interdependent questions. As shown above, the elaborated explanations were offered, like the one by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, which implied that the whole population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is Serbian. On the other hand, the state expansionistic policy, epitomised in *Načertanije* [The Plan], a secret document written by Ilija Garašanin in 1843, Serbian Minister of Interior, though not indulging into ethnographic peculiarities, was still in the line with the aforementioned ideas. Garašanin referred to all Bosnian population as the Bosniaks, although considering them the Serbs too, no matter which confession they belong to.⁵⁵ According to the plan they were the first to be united with Serbia, followed by the unification of all Serbs in one state.

As mentioned before Independent State of Croatia (NDH) also used already existing claims of *Croathood* of Bosnian Muslims to advance expansionistic plans over the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia in the 1980s (re)opened the questions of Serbian and Croatian claim over the land of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Though not openly stating this aim from the beginning, Croatian and Serbian political parties, both in BH and the respective republics, that won on the first democratic elections in 1990 eventually called for, or supported, partition of Bosnia.⁵⁶ Over the course of 1991-92, and negotiations over the future

⁵⁵ Ilija Garašanin, *Načertanije*, cited in in Darko Karačić, “The perception of the Conversion to Islam in Bosnia in the Western Balkans’ Historiographies”.

⁵⁶ Croatian Democratic Union [Hrvatska demokratska zajednica – HDZ] won the elections in Croatia in May 1990, the branch of the same party in Bosnia became the leading Croatian party in BH on the election in November 1990. On the same elections Serbian Democratic Party [Srpska demokratska stranka – SDS] became the leading Serbian party in BH. It was openly supported by the regime of Slobodan Milošević, the president of Republic of Serbia.

of SFRY and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the leading Serbian (SDS) and Croatian (HDZ) parties became involved in mobilising paramilitary forces in order to “protect their endangered people”, practically leading to partition of the common Bosnian state.

2.3 Anti-Islamism

As appropriation of Slavic Muslims was present throughout the history of Serbian and Croatian nationalisms, equally so was its anti-Islamic dimension. In both nationalisms the duality of sentiments was depending on how the conversion to Islam was being interpreted.

The Serbian national movement was imbedded into deep antagonism towards Islam and the “Turks”, which was significant part of national freedom-fighter epics and literary heritage. Aforementioned Njegoš’s epic *Gorski vijenac* ends with “destruction of the *Poturice*”, massacre of Montenegrin Muslim, in order to give a rebirth to the Serbian nation. “Elimination of ‘the treacherous converts’ as described in the epic acquired in the national consciousness the significance of a ritual cleansing, a catharsis of the nation.”⁵⁷

The work of the first and only Yugoslav Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andrić (1892-1975) had large influence on the contemporary collective imagining of the nature of conversion to Islam, and thus the framing of Slavic Muslims. In his doctoral dissertation *Razvoj duhovnog života u Bosni pod uticajem turske vladavine* [The Development of the Spiritual Life in Bosnia under the Influence of Turkish Rule]⁵⁸ when explaining Islamization, he “invoked folk narratives and stressed two factors: the blood tribute (*devshirme*), and greed – the wish to obtain or preserve property”⁵⁹. Later in his novels and stories, Andrić vividly described *devshirme* as severe procedure of taking young Christian boys into Ottoman schools and

⁵⁷ Bojan Aleksov, “Perceptions of Islamization in the Serbian National Discourse“, 116.

⁵⁸ Original title: Die Entwicklung des geistigen Lebens in Bosnien unter der Einwirkung der türkischen Herrschaft, University of Graz, 1924.

⁵⁹ Bojan Aleksov, “Perceptions of Islamization in the Serbian National Discourse“, 118.

military. Due to establishment of Andrić as a classical figure of Yugoslav literature, his presentation of conversion to Islam within the context of injustice, severity, and greed influenced deeply not only on collective imagery of Islamization, but also on the general evaluation of the Ottoman rule. To certain point one can conclude that this way of viewing the process of “becoming a Muslim” also framed the idea what the Muslims are like – unjust, severe, and greedy.

In the 1990s nationalist propaganda not only intensified old prejudices and stereotypes, but also produced new ones. Flood of press articles, many of them written by “experts” on terrorism, Muslim fundamentalism, framed Muslims as an immanent danger, pretty much in line of contemporary orientalism, as Edward Said deconstructed it. Particular inflammatory role was played by academic orientalists, especially those of “Serbian” side.⁶⁰

These two legacies of Serbian nationalism, (1), claiming that Slavic Muslims are part of Serbian nation, and (2), claiming that a Serb can only be Orthodox Christian and that Muslims should either (re)convert or be exterminated, are the two sides of the same coin. Both of these ideas are part of tradition of Serbian national thought, and are based on the underlying assumption that Slavic Muslim are “in fact Serbs”, due to their genealogical origin.

Similarly to Serbian nationalism, the Croatian one also provides material for two legacies, (1) conversion to Islam provided continuity for our Croatian medieval nobility over centuries, or (2), conversion to Islam was forced, painful, and unjust. Therefore the Muslims could be equally easily welcomed to, or expelled from, *Croathood*. Though genealogical origin, as in Serbian case, remained as underlying assumption of both variants of nationalism, Croatian national ideology was enriched by the idea of “Croatian cultural sphere” to which

⁶⁰ The most detailed account provides Norman Cigar, *Uloga srpskih orijentalista u opravdanju genocida nad Muslimanima Balkana* [The Role of Serbian Orientalists in Justification of Genocide against Muslims of the Balkans] (Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, 2000).

Muslims belonged since they shared the common culture. This feature of Croatian national thought, helped in overcoming division between evaluating Muslim converts as “good” or “bad”. That is, in my opinion, explanation why Croatian appropriation of Bosnian Muslims met acceptance of it, by the Muslims themselves.⁶¹

What stems as underlying assumption from here presented ideological heritage of Croatian and Serbian nationalisms is that the issue of Bosnia and its population is predominantly viewed within the framework of Serbo-Croatian relations. Bosnian Muslims are presented as a historical malformation of some sort, those that do not fit in appropriately to our national idea. No matter how the process of conversion to Islam is explained, and how are Muslims framed – “good” or “bad”, the persistent idea is that generational continuity between the individuals can be transferred to ethnic/national continuity of the group. Serbian and Croatian national ideas generally do not see Bosnian Muslims as a distinct historical, social, or political group. Finally, when Croatian or Serbian nationalism tends to present itself as a concept of multi-confessional nation, by rule it is usually envisioned by the proposer as a way of promoting only one of the faiths – Catholic for the Croatians and Orthodox for the Serbs.

⁶¹ Here I would remind the reader that we are talking only about the responsiveness of elites.

CHAPTER 3 – COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF THE NATION

The tide of liberalisation swept Yugoslav republics starting from Slovenia in 1989 and continuing eastward. Calls for redefinition of the SFRY, raised by Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, as well as status-quo orientated Serbia and Montenegro, posed the troubling question of the future of the only republic without clear majority – that is Bosnia and Herzegovina. Common to all political stakeholders – republic-level communist establishments, reforming communists, emerging liberal democratic and nationalist parties – was invoking the principle of national sovereignty. It was used as a tool for both breaking and keeping the federation together, as an argument calling for both integral and divided Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conflict was not over the principle of national sovereignty, but sovereignty of whom. Therefore the true question was who comprises Bosnian the nation(s).

In this context the redefinition of Bosnian Muslim national identity commenced. The official category of '*Muslim with capital M*' was perceived as inadequate, especially eager to change it were certain groups that promoted *Bosniak* as the proper one for the people of Bosnia. However, there were ambiguities over who should be considered as Bosniak, all people living in Bosnia, or only Bosnian Muslims, since Serbs and Croats have their formed nations. Additionally, a group tried to promote idea of *Bosnian* nation that would surpass existing ethno-religious divisions. Therefore, the debate was not only regarding the name of the nation, but also on its concept – inclusive/exclusive, civic/ethnic, secular/based on religion. For analytical purposes I created labels for the conflicting identity options – 'Muslims with capital M', 'Bosnian', 'Bosniak inclusive', and 'Bosniak exclusive'.

Before presenting each of these identity options a word on methodology is needed. First of all, the identity options were not coherent organised groups. The four concepts were not presented by a lobbying group, political party, association of intellectuals or any kind of easily identifiable societal organisation. The classification is product of my synthesis, based on the empirical research.

When trying to determine authentic opinions at certain historical point, methodology of information gathering differed from group to group. The most authentic sources are those coming precisely from the time when the national identity was negotiated, that is 1989 to 1993. For that purpose I reviewed the press from the time frame, and publications on the topic. However, the proponents of different identity concepts were not equally active, therefore not equally present in the media. Even more important, the issue of national identity was of different salience for advocates of each of these concepts. For instance, the most active was the promoter of inclusive Bosniakhood who was eager to elaborate and debate on his ideas. On the other hand, it was hard to deconstruct position of those defending options of “Muslims as a nation” and “Bosnian nation”, because both solutions were parts of larger political programmes and not concepts of national identity per se. Therefore the level of my interference with interpreting here presented positions is opposite proportional to the level of their explicitness in primary sources. In order to be more precise I applied additional methodological tool – interview with the individuals that may be marked as representative for the three “less explicit” options.⁶²

⁶² For “Muslim” – Mustafa Imamović, “Bosnian” – Zdravko Grebo, “Bosniak exclusive” – Šaćir Filandra. The two prominent figures of the “Bosniak inclusive” option – Adil Zulfikarpašić and Muhamed Filipović – were unavailable at the time of the research; however they were the ones to publish the most on the issue.

3.1 Muslims as a nation – “Muslim with capital M”

The national name “Muslim” may be deceptive. As explained in the Chapter 1, the idea to create an official ethnonym by capitalising the name of the religious group was the idea of Communist officials, not of Islamic religious community. The official socialist SFRY policy insisted that it is a secular national group, as all other Yugoslav nations, and “implicitly denied that the national category ‘Muslim’ was dependent on religious identity”⁶³. The decision to recognise ‘Muslims as a nation’ “was led by Communists and other secularised Muslims who wanted the Muslim identity in Bosnia to develop into something more definitely non-religious”⁶⁴. Their primary concern was that Muslims of BH were politically underrepresented in the Communist administration and that Republic of BH had somewhat lower status compared to other republics, especially regarding Serbia and Croatia.

This new party politics of 1960s triggered the expansion of interest in the topic of the national question of the Muslims, that Malcolm calls “secular Muslim nationalism”⁶⁵. Publications (re)writing political and cultural history of Muslims mushroomed.⁶⁶ However, soon after endorsement the issue of (in)adequacy of the solution had been raised. Not only was it strange for a declared atheist Communist system to use a religious denomination for a national name, but also it often provoked misunderstanding in the ever-more intensive international encounters since the small/capital letter difference is not self-evident in most international languages. In order to clear out the confusion, Western social researchers used to explain to each other that “Muslims in Yugoslavia are those who don’t believe in Allah any

⁶³ Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way*, 10

⁶⁴ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, 200.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ The first one being published in 1968 – *Muslimani srpsko-hrvatskog jezika* [Muslims of Serbo-Croatian Language] by Salim Ćerić, followed by *Nacionalni i politički razvitak Muslimana* [National and Political development of the Muslims] by Atif Purivatra in 1969. Revolutionary new were the works of Avdo Sućeska in the field of history, and Midhat Begić – literature theory, Muhsin Rizvić, Muhamed Hadžijahić and Alija Isaković in the field of literature history. In Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka*, 566.

more”⁶⁷. In words of Mustafa Imamović “it was a political solution for inter-state purpose”.⁶⁸

On the other hand, there were opinions that the term Muslim (with capital M) perfectly appropriate, since it is “absolutely in accordance with the intuitive feeling that Muslims have towards themselves, their past and culture, and their future”.⁶⁹ That term may be contested on political, cultural and scientific fields, but it will be adopted when Muslims’ equality to other [Yugoslav] nations is fully recognised and achieved. “For a Muslim, denominations such as Bosniak, Montenegrin, Serbian, Macedonian, Gorani, Yugoslav, etc. may bear meaning of a homeland belonging, but cannot be a substitute for their national name.”⁷⁰ It is interesting to mention that Atif Purivatra, who wrote these lines in 1974, and reprinted them in 1991, very soon after, in 1992, was one of the founders of the Congress of Bosnian-Muslim Intellectuals [Kongres bosanskomuslimanskih intelektualaca], the organisation that renamed itself into the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals [Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca - VKBI], the following year. As the president of the VKBI, Purivatra was later the chief editor of the first *Who is who among Bosniaks*⁷¹, and his life was commemorated as a life of a great Bosniak⁷². This is not sole or untypical case, on the contrary; the similar shift of opinion regarding the national name is common also to another significant individual – Professor Mustafa Imamović – single greatest contributor to Bosniak political historiography.⁷³

⁶⁷ Rogers Brubaker, personal conversation, 18 March 2008, Budapest.

⁶⁸ Mustafa Imamović, personal interview by author, 26 April 2008, Sarajevo, digital recording.

⁶⁹ Atif Purivatra, “O nacionalnom fenomenu Muslimana” [On National Phenomena of the Muslims] in *Muslimani i bošnjaštvo* [The Muslims and the Bosniakhood], Atif Purivatra, Mustafa Imamović, Rusmir Mahmutćehajić (Sarajevo: Muslimanska biblioteka, 1990), 21-22.

⁷⁰ Ibid. 22.

⁷¹ *Ko je ko u Bošnjaka* [Who is who among Bosniaks] (Sarajevo: Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca, 2000).

⁷² Fadil Ademović, *Vrijeme uspravljanja Bošnjaka: Atif Purivatra – život i djelo* [The Time of Rising Bosniak: Atif Purivatra – Life and Work] (Sarajevo: Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca, 2002). The first part of the title is worded in such a way that it may mean both, a Bosniak, as an individual, and the Bosniaks, as the nation. It seems that this was not mere coincidence, since the author in his work tends to tie the destiny of the people with the destiny of the man.

⁷³ See Bibliography.

In 1990, Imamović was eager to defend Muslim (with capital M) ethnonym against its “renaming promoted in daily and periodical press”⁷⁴. It stays unclear whom did he have in mind, those who were calling for Bosniak name, or those who were negating Muslim nation as such, i. e. some streams among Serbian and Croatian nationalists. From the subject of the text, he was probably referring to the former. After presenting the historical use of the names Bosniak and Muslim, he concluded that in the first half of the 20th century, the term *Muslim* obtained “distinct national-political meaning”, while the old ethnic name *Bosniak* “vanishes from the official and everyday use”. “The right to Bosniak ethnic name was definitely denied to the Muslims [with capital M] after 1945 ... in order not to offend national, i. e. nationalistic, interests in Bosnia. Over time, it was clear to the Muslims that their integration and affirmation in national-political sense is achievable only under Muslim national name.”⁷⁵ Though admitting the confusing path to the national name, Imamović stresses out that for generations of Yugoslav citizens, to whom he himself belongs, the name is as real as their inner feeling of identity. In his opinion, this confirms adoption of the Muslim identity by the people on the censuses, and by international recognition⁷⁶.

3.2 Bosnian nation

At the time of introducing ‘Muslim as a nation’ policy, it was important for Communist party establishment to appease those fearing of the disturbance of the fragile Serbo-Croatian balance in the Republic of BH, and state as whole. For that purpose, the party was eager to distinguish national categories of Croats, Muslims and Serbs, from possible regional affiliation with the republic of BH, by openly claiming “regionalism is not

⁷⁴ “Naziv Musliman”, *Književna revija*, no. 31 (April 1990). Reprint in *Knjige i zbivanja* [Books and Events] (Sarajevo: Magistrat, 2008), 427-429.

⁷⁵ Ibid. 429.

⁷⁶ Imamović cites *Harvard Encyclopaedia of American Ethnic Groups* that, at that time, had entry on “Bosnian Moslems”.

nationality”. Therefore, “*Bosnianhood* historically was not, and still is not today, a national category”, but political and territorial one. Thus, any advocacy of Bosnian nationhood would mean a “negation of national individuality of each and every nation in BH, and negation of its multinational structure”⁷⁷. This position of the Party is understandable if knowing the dominance and rivalry of Serbian and Croatian officials in it, many of whom were latent nationalists.⁷⁸

However, at the time of delegitimation of Communism in 1989-90, a group of young reforming Communists, fearing rising Croatian and Serbian nationalisms in Bosnia, proposed a concept of civic Bosnian nation. The term *Bosnian* is indicative of the ideology behind. It is contemporary adjective that derives directly from the noun Bosnia, and denotes something belonging to Bosnia.

In 1989, “the group of five”⁷⁹ filed the petition to the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina to put into force the Declaration of citizens’ rights of the ZAVNOBiH of 1944. This Declaration defined the Republic of BH as a state of “all its citizens”, and the petitioners hoped that the document still bore enough symbolic strength to stop amounting ethnic divisions in the state. However, the petition failed, while petitioners refrained from political activities, and are now known as public intellectuals and university professors.

Most of the supporters of this national concept were people that were identifying themselves nationally as ‘Yugoslavs’. Yugoslav feeling did not negate regional, linguistic, religious (in the since of traditional origin, since ‘Yugoslavs’ were by rule communists and atheists) or “ethnic” differences, nevertheless, all these identities were present “but positioned

⁷⁷ Atif Purivatra and Kasim Suljević, *Nacionalni aspekt popisa stanovništva u 1971. godini*, 15-16.

⁷⁸ See Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, 193-212.

⁷⁹ Among whom were Zdravko Grebo, Tarik Haverić, Ivan Lovrenović, Miodrag Živanović.

low on the list of identity rankings”⁸⁰. For them Bosnian identification was the civic loyalty to the state, of the same sort that Yugoslavism used to be until the dissolution of the state.

3.3 Bosniak inclusive nation

As presented in the historical chapter of this thesis, the term Bosniak existed in the history of Bosnia to refer to different groups of people. During the Ottoman rule, Bosnian Muslims in the communication with the Porte were identified as Bosniaks [Tur. *Boşnaq*], in the sense of the people coming from that province. In the last period of Ottoman rule, the Tanzimat reforms proclaiming political equality of people of all faith, made local Bosnian governors to promote idea of Bosniak nation that included inhabitants of the province of all faiths. The similar was idea of Austro-Hungarian ruler of occupied Bosnia – Benjamin von Kállay – to promote inclusive Bosniak nation, in order to govern the people more easily, and subdue Serbian and Croatian nationalisms in the province.

Therefore the term Bosniak was either used as denomination for regional origin or for political programme of civic nationalism. This it was not a simple ethnonym, but a term that was charged with ideological pretext: equality of all faiths, loyalty to the territory of Bosnia, historical continuity with medieval times.⁸¹

In 1960s, at the time of deliberations over national name for Bosnian Muslims, outside Yugoslav public discourse, emigration group around Adil Zulfikarpašić and his magazine *Bosanski pogledi* [Bosnian Views], were eagerly debating on the issue as well.⁸² This

⁸⁰ Zdravko Grebo, interview by author, 27 April 2008, Sarajevo, digital recording.

⁸¹ Kállay’s administration tried to foster common Bosnian national identity by evoking collective memory of the medieval Bosnian state as the common national cradle. See Chapter 1 – Historical background.

⁸² *Bosanski pogledi*, “independent paper of the Muslims [with lower-case M] of Bosnia and Herzegovina in emigration”, had been published in Switzerland from 1960 to 1967. This magazine was virtually unknown in Yugoslavia until its reprint edition in London in 1984. The most detailed account of the post-war Bosnian Muslim emigration and the *Bosanski pogledi* provide: Mustafa Imamović, *Bošnjaci u emigraciji: Monografija*

informal group, consisting predominantly of Bosnian Muslims or generally Bosnian émigrés, was interested in the issue of national identification of Bosnian Muslims for two main reasons. First it was confronting the writings in the magazines of Croatian diaspora that was firmly standing on the point that Bosnian Muslims are nationally Croats. Secondly, it was unsatisfied with lack of recognition of Bosnian Muslims as nation [*narod*] in the SFRY and their political underrepresentation. At this time, Zulfikarpašić was recognising Bosnian Muslim as distinct political group, and was sincere supporter of its “political affirmation”. However, he was always tying this question to the issue of integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Though devoted Yugoslav⁸³, he was in constant fear of tendencies in Croatian and Serbian nationalisms, with or without Communist disguise, which favoured partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Compared to Serbs and Croats, “Bosnian Muslims never sacrifice their Bosniakhood, nor do they ever deny it”, because “to us [Bosnian Muslims] Bosnia is the centre and the goal, our ideal and our hope – our indivisible homeland”, Zulfikarpašić wrote.⁸⁴ He continues: “But everything suggests that the Bosniaks of all three faiths have become aware that a united Bosnia is the best solution, in the interests not only of the Muslims, but also of the Serbs and Croats living there”.⁸⁵ Therefore, when Zulfikarpašić used term Bosniakhood [*bošnjaštvo*] he had in mind national identity connected to the land of Bosnia. In his understanding, “nationalism is linked to the land where it arises”, thus presence of Serbian and Croatian nationalisms is foreign, and bore no “attraction for the indigenous

Bosankih pogleda 1955-1967 [The Bosniaks in Emigration: Monography of the *Bosniak Views* 1955-1967] (Sarajevo: Bošnjački institut Zürich – Odjel Sarajevo, 1996).

⁸³ Adil Zulfikarpašić and his group was intensively cooperating with liberal democratic emigrants from all over Yugoslavia, culminating in joint political project for reformation of SFRY – Democratic Alternative. See Desimir Tošić, “The Democratic Alternative” in *Yugoslavism* ed. Dejan Djokić (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 286-297.

⁸⁴ Adil Zulfikarpašić, “Nacionalno opredeljenje Muslimana i Bosna i Hercegovina” [The National identity of the Muslims and Bosnia and Herzegovina], *Bosanski pogledi*, vol. 3, no. 18-19 (1962): 15, translated and cited in Šaćir Filandra and Enes Karić, *The Bosniac Idea*, 243. This publication transcribes term Bosniak [Bošnjak] in English as *Bosniac*, therefore I modified the here cited translation.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, underlining mine.

population who considered itself Bosniak”.⁸⁶ For him “to equate Muslims with Bosniak, Catholics with Croat and Orthodox with Serb was destructive and [foreshadowing] the break-up of Bosnia”.⁸⁷ He was aware that, in the course of history, religious membership acted as nationalising factor for Croats and Serbs in Bosnia, but in his opinion, Bosniak identity should be open to entire population, to everybody who are ready to embrace it. Bosniak nationhood, for him, was realistic possibility with solid historical foundation.

The argumentation for inclusive Bosniakhood heavily relied on historical narratives. In this interpretation, contemporary Bosniaks are ancestors of *Bošnjans* [*Bošnjani*], people of medieval Bosnian state, both in genetic and symbolic sense. Their common identity emerged from their unique faith – *Church of Bosnia* [*Crkva bosanska*] – and constant pressure from Catholic and Orthodox states, who were seeking to conquer and convert them. With the Ottoman occupation, eventually all believers of Bosnian church adopted Islam, especially since there are many commonalities between the two, claims Zulfikarpašić.⁸⁸ This line of narration does not provide direct explanation of presence of Catholic and Orthodox population in Bosnia. What may be read between the lines is that the two congregations, either marginally existed in medieval times surviving until modernity, or they were imported through migration. Nevertheless, traditions of Catholicism and Orthodoxy are unquestionably parts of Bosnian heritage, but the bearers of the true “Bosnian spirit” are Bosnian Muslims. This historical narrative in many ways resembles the one constructed by Safet-beg Bašagić in the late 19th century, presented in historical chapter of this paper, which also ascribed special role to Bosnian Muslims in protecting continuity of Bosniakhood, even if understood as inclusive ideology. Even though living in a Muslim state, Bosnian Muslims kept their

⁸⁶ *The Bosniak: Adil Zulfikarpašić in dialogue with Milovan Djilas and Nadežda Gaće* (London: Hurst & Company, 1998), 86.

⁸⁷ Šaćir Filandra and Enes Karić, *The Bosniac Idea*, 244.

⁸⁸ Luka Mičeta, *Sudbina Bošnjaka: svedočenja Adila Zulfikarpašića* [The Destiny of a Bosniak: Testimonies of Adil Zulfikarpašić] (Tersit, Beograd 1997), 18.

Bosniak identity, which is proven by many uprisings of Bosnian Muslim elite during the Ottoman rule. The prime example is the uprising of 1831 led by Husein-beg Gradašević, which is by Western scholars regarded as class movement against reforms of Ottoman government, while Adil Zulfikarpašić and contemporary Bosniak intellectuals see it as national emancipatory movement. However, there are differencing interpretations when asking: emancipation of whom? Ahmed Aličić presents it as “undertaking of all Bosniaks, regardless of religion or social status”⁸⁹, while Muhamed Filipović as “national-political awakening of [only] Bosnian Muslims”⁹⁰. It is interesting to note that the later author used to be close colleague of Adil Zulfikarpašić in the 1990s. This is not strange since Zulfikarpašić’s own views shifted from ‘Bosniak inclusive’ to ‘Bosniak exclusive’.

3.4 Bosniak exclusive nation

Upon returning to Yugoslavia in 1990, Adil Zulfikarpašić decided to take part in political life and promote his ideas diligently developed during emigration years. The core of his political programme was introduction of national name *Bosniak*, for Bosnian Muslims and everybody who would identify themselves under that name. Practically, it meant political opposition to those protecting established national name Muslim (with capital M) – Communists, with whom he had ideological conflict as well, “clericalists”, as he called certain elements of Islamic community⁹¹, and Serbian and Croatian nationalist. His point was that the Muslim national name is not only inadequate, but also prevents Bosnian Muslim from

⁸⁹ Robert Donia, Review Article “The New Bosniak History”, 354. See Ahmed S. Aličić, *Pokret za autonomiju Bosne od 1831. do 1832. godine* [The Movement for Autonomy of Bosnia 1831-32] (Sarajevo: Orijentalni institut, 1996).

⁹⁰ Muhamed Filipović, “Muslimani-Bošnjaci u uvjetima političkog pluralizma“ [Muslims-Bosniaks in the Circumstances of the Political Pluralism] in *Bosna i bošnjaštvo* [Bosnia and the Bosniakhood], Adil Zulfikarpašić et. al. (Sarajevo: Muslimanska bošnjačka organizacija, September 1990), 24.

⁹¹ However, the standpoint of the Islamic community on the issue changed when Mustafa effendi Cerić became informal *Reis-ul-ulema* [the leader of the community] in 1993, since he was eager advocate of the Bosniak national name. See Šaćir Filandra and Enes Karić, *The Bosniak Idea* (Zagreb: Globus, 2004), 261.

full political emancipation that they still have not achieved, or to be precise, were not allowed to achieve, in his opinion. In 1990, Zulfikarpašić believed that “Bosniakhood is the only national identity of the Muslims [with lower-case M] of Bosnia, and furthermore, that [that was] a historic opportunity to articulate them as a state-constituent factor”.⁹² Therefore, it was of utmost importance to mobilise Bosnian Muslims to adopt Bosniak name and Bosniakhood as civic concept of nation. The part of Bosniak inclusive idea that was aiming at fostering national identity among all people of Bosnia, became marginalised in Zulfikarpašić’s political efforts.

However, Zulfikarpašić believed, and he was supported in that regard by his contemporaries, that Bosnian Muslims were in special relation to the idea of Bosniakhood. “The Bosniaks [Bosnian Muslims] are the majority people of Bosnia, a state-constituent nation that by their numbers, significance and sense of identity had been ordained by history to preserve Bosnia as independent, indivisible and possessed of equal rights with its neighbours.”⁹³ Bosnian Muslims are the protectors of Bosnian uniqueness, and bearers of its historical continuity. This idea will be later developed to its full extent when every idea of inclusive Bosniakhood vanished in the light of Serbian and Croatian nationalisms.

⁹² Adil Zulfikarpašić, “Bošnjaštvo – šansa ili bauk” [Bosniakhood – Opportunity or Bugbear], in *Bosna i bošnjaštvo* [Bosnia and the Bosniakhood], Adil Zulfikarpašić et al. (Sarajevo: Muslimanska bošnjačka organizacija, September 1990), 3-4.

⁹³ Šaćir Filandra and Enes Karić, *The Bosniac Idea* (Zagreb: Globus, 2004), 261-262.

CHAPTER 4 – THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATION

One would not be wrong if would suspect that the debate over the national name of Bosnian Muslims was opened by the most eager advocate for its change – Adil Zulfikarpašić. The question was opened at the time of political liberalisation when established Communists elites were confronted with heterogeneous political opposition. The Bosnian Communist establishment, did not feel the need for the change of social order, and were closed within apparatchik way of thinking and vocabulary. For them the questioning of the name ‘Muslim with capital M’ was useless and of no importance. The younger party members, the liberal group around student magazine Valter/Walter, the group that petitioned for the ZAVNOBiH Declaration, adopted not only “progressive” vocabulary of democracy, human rights and feminist movements, but were open and ready for ideological transformation and adaption to the new political environment. They showed some sympathy for the idea of Bosniakhood presented by Adil Zulfikarpašić, inasmuch as they recognised its inclusive character. The concept was acceptable to them since it incorporated, in their view, the principle that all citizens should have “constitutional loyalty” to the state they live in.⁹⁴

However, in 1990 the issue of national name was still a marginal one, sine the public sphere was dominated by issue of the first political parties being formed. The first party to be registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina was Party of Democratic Action [SDA] in March 1990. Its founding declaration stated that:

“the SDA is political Alliance of citizens of Yugoslavia who belong to the Muslim cultural historical sphere, as well as other citizens of Yugoslavia who accept the programme and the goals of the party ... the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims, both those who live in Bosnia-Herzegovina and those who live outside its borders, represent autochthonous Bosnian nation, thus comprising one of the

⁹⁴ Zdravko Grebo, interview by author, 27 April 2008, Sarajevo, digital recording.

six historical nations of Yugoslavia, who have their own historical name, their ground under their feet, their history, their culture, their religion, their poets and writers; in a word, their past and their future.”⁹⁵

At the beginning SDA was a quite heterogeneous political ensemble. It was gathering wide range of hitherto political outsiders, including victims of the Sarajevo trial of 1983⁹⁶ loyal to the party leader Alija Izetbegović, group around Adil Zulfikarpašić, and supporters of controversial businessman Fikret Abdić from his region of Velika Kladuša. However, gradually but in very fast pace, the party was freed from inside dissonance. Some individuals left due to ideological conflicts and some due to Izetbegović’s autocratic style of governing. Couple of those were two distinctive individuals, Adil Zulfikarpašić and well known public intellectual Muhamed Filipović, who in September 1990 founded their own party – Muslim Bosniak Organisation [Muslimanska Bošnjčka Organizacija – MBO]. In the words of Zulfikarpašić, it was a clash of political principles, since he sought to take part in forming a true Western-style and liberal-democracy orientated party, which was incompatible with Izetbegović’s Islamic zealotry.⁹⁷ Some interpret that the divorce was more due to high tension between the two leader-figures who were fighting over the position of the “father of the nation”.⁹⁸ It would be an overestimation to claim that they departed because of conflicting national concepts; however it seems they did have differing visions on this issue. As presented above, though Zulfikarpašić was inconsistent in the use of the term Bosniak – in his early works it was more inclusive concept, while later it rather referred only to Muslims – it

⁹⁵ Marko Attila Hoare, *The History of Bosnia: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day* (London: Saqi, 2007), 342

⁹⁶ Trial in Sarajevo in 1983 of thirteen people charged with “hostile and counter-revolutionary acts derived from Muslim nationalism”. Leading defendant was Alija Izetbegovic, member of the *Young Muslims* organisation [*Mladi muslimani*] which had opposed the Communist attack on Islam at the end of the Second World War. Prosecution used as the main piece of evidence *Islamic Declaration*, which, so they claimed, was “manifesto for ethnically pure Muslim Bosnian state”. The *Declaration* had no mention of Bosnia and its future, and this trial in general can be easily assessed as political one. See Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, 208. The most detailed account of the trial provides Rajko Danilović, *Sarajevski proces 1983* [Sarajevo Trial 1983] (Tuzla: Bosanska riječ, 2006). Islamic Declaration is available at: <http://www.bosanskialim.com/rubrike/tekstovi/000375R024.PDF> as of 20 May 2008.

⁹⁷ Luka Mičeta, *Sudbina Bošnjaka: svedočenja Adila Zulfikarpašića* [The Destiny of a Bosniak: Testimonies of Adil Zulfikarpašić] (Tersit, Beograd 1997), 131-133.

⁹⁸ Paraphrased: Nerzuk Ćurak, interview by author, 25 April 2008, Sarajevo, digital recording.

was by all means a secular national concept. On the other hand, Alija Izetbegović was a true practicing Muslim, whose religiosity deeply marked his political identity. At the beginning he was neither openly opposing, neither openly supporting idea of the change of Bosnian Muslims' national name. Nevertheless, for him the only genuine identity is the belonging to the group of Bosnian Muslims. Whether they are identified as religious group, ethnic or national group, was of less importance for him.

In the context of the Yugoslav dissolution crisis, SDA at the beginning of its existence called for maintenance of the federal arrangement, and insisted on the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the common state of Muslims, Serbs and Croats. After the first elections held in November-December 1990, the three nationally based parties – SDA, SDA, and HDZ – overwhelmingly won each within its own nationality, while both, the renamed and moderately modernised League of the Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina (SKBiH-SDP) and pan-Yugoslav Reformists of the last SFRY Prime Minister Ante Marković infamously failed. Muslim Bosniak Organisation of Adil Zulfikarpašić collected only 2 MP positions, thus becoming marginalised. Therefore, the first free and democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina proved failure of all inclusive national concepts, and gave legitimacy to ethno-religiously based concepts of nations.

Not indulging into the complicated story of the outburst and the course of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I will focus on how the Bosnian Muslim representatives and intellectual elite (re)defined its identity.

The moment that is often cited as the formal “return of historical name Bosniaks” for Bosnian Muslims is the *Second All-Bosniak Assembly* [*Drugi svebošnjački sabor*]⁹⁹, held in

⁹⁹ In many sources the same event is referred to as *the Second Bosniak Assembly* [*Drugi bošnjački sabor*] as in: Mustafa Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka* [The History of Bosniaks] (Sarajevo: Bošnjačka zajednica kulture Preporod, 1998), 569; and Šaćir Filandra, *Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću* [Bosniak Politics in the XX

the *Holiday Inn* in besieged Sarajevo on 27 September 1993. The meeting gathered 349 Bosnian Muslim intellectuals, on the occasion of reaching the “national consensus” regarding ongoing Geneva negotiations and the ‘Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan’ for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which proposed a loose union of three entities.¹⁰⁰ The main dilemma was whether to renounce the idea of integral and multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, and adopt smaller but Muslim nation proto-state. Finally, the Plan was rejected on the basis that it did not provide fair share of territory for the Muslim side.¹⁰¹ The decision of the All-Bosniak Assembly were not formally politically binding, however, it significantly influenced on the voting of the SDA MPs in the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the day after, when the plan was formally rejected as well. Not directly connected with the agenda of the All-Bosniak Assembly, an influential intellectual Alija Isaković proposed declaration for introduction of *Bosniak* as a formal national name for Bosnian Muslims. It was promotion of a “natural right to tradition”, since the national name *Muslim* was prone to be “ethno-genetically and politically doubted and questioned, even manipulated, while terminologically distancing Muslim people from the notions of land, origin and language”.¹⁰² Therefore the endorsement of the name *Bosniak* was presented not only as a historical retribution for denied identity, but also as underlining of the symbolic interconnection of Bosnian Muslims and the land of Bosnia. In the context of war over territories and ethnic cleansing of the occupied ones, this symbolic unity of Muslims and Bosnian soil was even more important. The clear answer to the question of inclusion into Bosniakhood gives Muhamed Filipović in his speech to the Assembly: “We, the Bosniaks, are that part of our initial Bosnian nation that preserves

Century] (Sarajevo: Sejtarija, 1998), 384. Here I decided to use the term *All-Bosniak Assembly* since it was originally used by the newspapers that covered it, such as *Oslobođenje*.

¹⁰⁰ See Hoare 381.

¹⁰¹ 15% of delegates of the All-Bosniak Assembly voted for the Plan, 22% against, while 64,5% voted for the Plan with reserve that “forcefully occupied territories, previously inhabited by Muslim majority should be returned”, in “Vraćanje otetog – pa potpis” [Returning of the Stolen – then the Signing], *Oslobođenje*, 29 September 1993, p. 2.

¹⁰² “Manje emocija, više razboritosti” [Less Emotions, More Rationality], *Oslobođenje*, 28 September 1993, p. 4.

continuity of the national essence of this land, fulfils in this essence historical meaning of this land and bears its historical and state law.”¹⁰³ Thus Bosniakhood is symbolical connectedness with the Bosnian land, but the only true bearers of the continuity of Bosniakhood are the Muslims. The session of the Assembly was closed with the following acclamation:

“Aware of the historical dimension of the moment in which we are gathered here ... we are determined to return to our people their historic and national name Bosniaks, in that way tying ourselves to our land Bosnia and its legal state tradition, to our Bosnian language and all-encompassing spiritual tradition of our history.

In the spirit of the regained name and confirmed identity we declare that we see our homeland Bosnia as free and democratic community that will protect and cherish centuries-old fruits of tolerance and mutual respect of all people and all traditions that live here. We invoke as a witness our entire history. ...

May Allah be the witness of our sincere intentions and supports us in them.”¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ “Smisao bošnjaštva” [The Meaning of Bosniakhood], *Oslobođenje*, 28 September 1993, p. 5.

¹⁰⁴ “Vraćanje otetog – pa potpis” [Returning of the Stolen – then the Signing], *Oslobođenje*, 29 September 1993, p. 2.

CONCLUSION - WHY THE BOSNIAK EXCLUSIVE SOLUTION WON?

Here I will present several explanations to the problem why national name 'Muslim with capital M' was changed for Bosniak, and why the exclusive, ethno-religiously based concept of Bosniakhood prevailed over other identity alternatives that were presented over the course of negotiation of Bosnian Muslim identity.

Failed legitimacy of communism/Yugoslavism

The concept of secular Muslim nation, 'Muslim with capital M', was generally perceived as Communists' product, and was delegitimized by the failure of communism. The concept finally failed when its creators and sincere promoters, such as Purivatra and Imamović gave up on defending it.

The civic concept of Bosnian nation, based on idea of citizens' loyalty to the state, seemed to have resembled too much the Tito's ideas of 'brotherhood and unity' of all Yugoslav people. Its young left-oriented advocates were unable to translate the idea into liberal democratic framework, more appropriate for the post-1989 politics. Thus their call for re-establishment of Second World War ZAVNOBiH declaration could only sound as anachronism.

Serbian and Croatian pressure

When thinking about the historical account of the concept of inclusive Bosniakhood, it seems as a legitimate question to ask: If Interconfessional Bosniak nationhood of Benjamin von Kállay failed in 19th century due to its strong opposition by Serbian and Croatian national

movements, how a similar idea can succeed at the end of 20th century? In the words of Ivo Banac, “creation of Bosniak nation is coming too late, because a Bosnian Croat or a Bosnian Serb will never be a Bosniak in national sense. That can only be Muslims. Bosnian Croats and Serbs nationally constituted themselves in 19th century. ... It is impossible to expect success of alleged Bosniak revival among them.”¹⁰⁵

Therefore when Adil Zulfikarpašić entered Bosnian political scene in 1990, his ideas sounded compelling to Bosnian Muslims. They provided colourful palette of historical narratives, which ascribed special symbolical role to Muslims in the history of Bosnia. On the other hand, the idea of national inclusiveness seemed as a guarantee that would mitigate aggressive Serbian and Croatian nationalisms. However, even Zulfikarpašić himself renounced the idea of Bosniak nationhood that would necessary involve all inhabitants of Bosnia. What is particularly interesting, he did not renounce historical narratives and myths that were developed in order to support Bosniak inclusive concept. On the contrary, subsequent national entrepreneurs of exclusive Bosniakhood, such as those gathered at the *All-Bosniak Assembly* of 1993, heavily relied on heritage of historical argumentation that tended to prove symbolic continuity of Bosnia and its people from medieval times till modernity. Thus the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina comes to be interpreted as history of Bosnian Muslims. This is at the same time final step in the group formation of Bosnian Muslims within the framework of ethnic-based exclusive concept of nation.

It can be concluded that in the context of competing and conflicting Serbian and Croatian nationalisms it was logical, if not inevitable, for Bosniak nation-builders to follow the pattern of national self-definition of their rivals. In general terms, in the context of exclusive ethnic based nationalisms disputing over a territory, it is impossible for an inclusive

¹⁰⁵ “Bosanske granice nisu od Tita” [Bosnian Borders were not Created by Tito], interview with Ivo Banac by Željko Gormaz, *Bosanski pogledi*, no. 16, 20 June 1991.

multiethnic civic-based concept of nation to survive. The environment forces all groups to follow the dominant pattern.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ademović, Fadil. *Vrijeme uspravljanja Bošnjaka: Atif Purivatra – život i djelo* [The Time of Rising Bosniak: Atif Purivatra – Life and Work]. Sarajevo: Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca, 2002.

Aleksov, Bojan. "Perceptions of Islamization in the Serbian National Discourse." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 5 (2005): 113-127.

Andjelic, Neven. *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*. London: Frank Cass, 2003.

Banac, Ivo. "From Religious Community to Socialist Nationhood and Post-Communist Statehood, 1918-1992." In *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia*, ed. Mark Pinson, 129-154. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996.

Banac, Ivo. "Introduction." In *The Bosniak*, Adil Zulfikarpašić, in dialogue with Milovan Djilas and Nadežda Gaće. London: Hurst & Company, 1998.

Banac, Ivo. *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, c1984.

The Bosniak: Adil Zulfikarpašić in dialogue with Milovan Djilas and Nadežda Gaće. London: Hurst & Company, 1998.

Bourdieu, Pierre. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Bringa, Tone. *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Čolaković, Ibrahim, et al. *Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca: 1992-1997* [Council of the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals]. Sarajevo: Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca, 1998.

Ćurak, Nerzuk. Interview by author, 25 April 2008, Sarajevo. Digital recording.

Donia, Robert J. Review Article "The New Bosniak History". *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2000).

Djokić, Dejan, ed. *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992*. Madison: The Wisconsin University press, 2003.

Džaja, Srećko M. "Bosna i Bošnjaci u hrvatskom političkom diskursu" [Bosnia and Bosniaks in Croatian Political Discourse]. *Erasmus*, No. 9 (December 1994).

Federalni zavod za statistiku, Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine, *Stanovništvo prema nacionalnoj pripadnosti, po popisima 1961 – 1991* [Population according to national membership, by the censuses 1961 – 1991]. Available at: <http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/NacStanB.htm> as of 28th May 2008.

Filandra, Šaćir, and Enes Karić. *The Bosniac Idea*. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 2004.

Filandra, Šaćir. *Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću* [Bosniak Politics in the XX Century]. Sarajevo: Sejtarija, 1998.

Filandra, Šaćir. Interview by author, 27 April 2008, Sarajevo. Digital recording.

Filipović, Muhamed, *Ko smo mi Bošnjaci: Ko smo mi Bošnjaci muslimanske vjere i šta želimo u našoj domovini Bosni i Hercegovini, u regiji s kojom smo svojim porijeklom i historijom povezani, i u Europi kojoj geopolitički i kulturno pripadamo?* [Who Are We the Bosniaks: Who Are We, the Bosniaks of Muslim Faith, and What Do We Want in Our Homeland Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the Region to Which We Are Historically and by the Origin Attached, and in Europe to Which Geopolitically and Culturally We Belong to?]. Sarajevo: Prosperitet, 2007.

Filipović, Muhamed. “Muslimani-Bošnjaci u uvjetima političkog pluralizma“ [Muslims-Bosniaks in the Circumstances of the Political Pluralism]. In *Bosna i bošnjaštvo* [Bosnia and the Bosniakhood], Adil Zulfikarpašić et. al., 19-36. Sarajevo: Muslimanska bošnjačka organizacija, September 1990.

Fine, John V. A. “The Medieval and Ottoman Roots of Modern Bosnian Society.” In *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia*, ed. Mark Pinson, 1-21. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996.

Friedman, Francine. *The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

Grebo, Zdravko. Interview by author, 27 April 2008, Sarajevo. Digital recording.

Haverić, Tarik. Interview by author, 23 April 2008, Sarajevo. Digital recording.

Heywood, Colin. “Bosnia under Ottoman Rule, 1463-1800.” In *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia*, ed. Mark Pinson, 22-53. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996.

Hoare, Marko Attila. *The History of Bosnia: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day*. London: Saqi, 2007.

Imamović, Mustafa. Interview by author, 26 April 2008, Sarajevo. Digital recording.

Imamović, Mustafa. *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Evolution of its Political and Legal Institutions*. Sarajevo: Magistrat, 2006.

Imamović, Mustafa. *Bošnjaci u emigraciji: Monografija Bosankih pogleda 1955-1967* [The Bosniaks in Emigration: Monography of the *Bosniak Views* 1955-1967]. Sarajevo: Bošnjački institut Zürich – Odjel Sarajevo, 1996.

Imamović, Mustafa, *Historija Bošnjaka* [The History of Bosniaks], Sarajevo: Bošnjačka zajednica kulture Preporod, 1998.

Imamović, Mustafa. “Integracione nacionane ideologije i Bosna“ [Integration National Ideologies and Bosnia]. *Godišnjak Pravnog fakulteta u Sarajevu* [Yearbook of the Law Faculty in Sarajevo], no. 39 (1996): 110-123.

Imamović, Mustafa. *Knjige i zbivanja* [Books and Events]. Sarajevo: Magistrat, 2008.

Imamović, Mustafa, “O historiji bošnjačkog pokušaja” [On History of Bosniak Attempt]. In *Muslimani i bošnjaštvo* [The Muslims and the Bosniakhood], Atif Purivatra, Mustafa Imamović, Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, 33-70. Sarajevo: Muslimanska biblioteka, 1990.

Imamović, Mustafa, *Pravni položaj i unutrašnje-politički razvitak Bosne i Hercegovine od 1878. do 1914.* [The Legal Status and Domestic Political Development of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1878-1914]. Sarajevo: Bosanski kulturni centar, 1997.

Imamović, Mustafa. “ZAVNOBiH kao legitiman izraz državnopravnog kontinuiteta Bosne i Hercegovine” [ZAVNOBiH as a Legitimate Expression of the Legal-State Continuity of Bosnia and Herzegovina]. *Ljudska prava* [Human Rights], No. 3-4, Year 4 (2003): 9-11.

Izetbegović, Alija, *Islamska deklaracija* [Islamic Declaration], 1970. Available at: <http://www.bosanskialim.com/rubrike/tekstovi/000375R024.PDF> as of 20 May 2008.

Karačić, Darko. “The perception of the Conversion to Islam in Bosnia in the Western Balkans’ Historiographies.” MA Thesis, Central European University, Budapest, 2005.

Kisić Kolanović, Nada, “Muslimanska inteligencija i islam u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj“ [Muslim Intelligentsia and Islam in the Independent State of Croatia]. *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* [Journal of Contemporary History], no. 3 (2004): 901-938.

Ko je ko u Bošnjaka [Who is who among Bosniaks]. Sarajevo: Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualaca, 2000.

Malcolm, Noel. *Bosnia: A Short History*. London: Papermac, 1994.

Mandić, Dominik. “Herceg-Bosna i Hrvatska: Prigodom 500-godišnjice pada Bosne (1463-1963)” [Herzeg-Bosnia and Croatia: On the Occasion of 500-Years Anniversary of the Fall of Bosnia (1463-1963)]. *Hrvatska revija*, Buenos Aires (1963). Reprint in *Hrvatsko podrijetlo bosansko-hercegovačkih Muslimana* [Croatian Origin of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims], eds. Petar Šarac and Miljenko Primorac. Zagreb: Hrvatska hercegovačka zajednica “Herceg-Stjepan”, 1992.

- Mičeta, Luka. *Sudbina Bošnjaka: svedočenja Adila Zulfikarpašića* [The Destiny of a Bosniak: Testimonies of Adil Zulfikarpašić]. Tersit, Beograd 1997.
- Neuburger, Mary. *The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria*. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2004.
- Pinson, Mark, ed. *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996.
- Purivatra, Atif, and Kasim Suljević. *Nacionalni aspekt popisa stanovništva u 1971. godini* [The national Aspect of the Population Census in 1971]. Sarajevo: Komisija za međunacionalne odnose i međurepubličku saradnju Predsjedništva Republičke konferencije Socijalističkog saveza radnog naroda Bosne i Hercegovine, February 1971.
- Purivatra, Atif, Mustafa Imamović, Rusmir Mahmutćehajić. *Muslimani i bošnjaštvo* [The Muslims and the Bosniakhood]. Sarajevo: Muslimanska biblioteka, 1990.
- Purivatra, Atif. "O nacionalnom fenomenu Muslimana" [On National Phenomena of the Muslims]. In *Muslimani i bošnjaštvo* [The Muslims and the Bosniakhood], Atif Purivatra, Mustafa Imamović, Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, 13-30. Sarajevo: Muslimanska biblioteka, 1990.
- Redžić, Enver. *Sto godina muslimanske politike: U tezama i kontroverzama istorijske nauke* [Hundred Years of the Muslim Politics: In Thesis and Controversies of the History]. Sarajevo: Akademija nauke i umetnosti BiH, Institut za istoriju, 2002.
- Šarac, Petar, and Miljenko Primorac, eds. *Hrvatsko podrijetlo bosansko-hercegovačkih Muslimana* [Croatian Origin of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims]. Zagreb: Hrvatska hercegovačka zajednica "Herceg-Stjepan", 1992.
- Tošić, Desimir, "The Democratic Alternative." In *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992*, ed. Dejan Djokić, 286-297. Madison: The Wisconsin University Press, 2003.
- Vukićević, Milenko M. *Znemaniti Srbi Muslomani* [Distinguished Serbs the Moslems]. Beograd: Nova štamparija "Davidović", 1906. Reprint, Beograd: Čigoja štampa, 2000.
- Zulfikarpašić, Adil. "Bošnjaštvo – šansa ili bauk" [Bosniakhood – Opportunity or Bugbear]. In *Bosna i bošnjaštvo* [Bosnia and the Bosniakhood], Adil Zulfikarpašić et al., 3-6. Sarajevo: Muslimanska bošnjačka organizacija, September 1990.
- Zulfikarpašić, Adil et al. *Bosna i bošnjaštvo* [Bosnia and the Bosniakhood]. Sarajevo: Muslimanska bošnjačka organizacija, September 1990.

Newspapers

Bosanski pogledi, Sarajevo

Bošnjak, Tuzla

NIN, Beograd

Oslobođenje, Sarajevo

Valter/Walter, Sarajevo