

A POSTSTRUCTURALIST APPROACH TO IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY:

KEMALISM IN THE TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE

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Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations and European Studies

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Philosophy of
Doctorate in Political Science

Supervisors: Nicole Renee Lindstrom and Paul Roe

Word Count: 90,082

Budapest, Hungary
2008

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that no parts of the thesis have been submitted to no other institution different from CEU towards a degree. To my knowledge nor does the thesis contains unreferenced material or ideas from other authors.

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ABSTRACT

The foreign policy literature witnesses a renewed interest in the so-called ideational factors in foreign policy. Most of these works aim to show the independent impact of identities and ideas on a specific foreign policy action or orientation. In contrast, poststructuralist research agenda employs a discursive and indeterministic approach to study how interests and identities are reconstituted through foreign policy making. Building on this approach, this dissertation presents a theoretical framework for studying the role of ideology in foreign policy and argues that the relationship between foreign policy and ideology is discursively constructed; it is co-constitutive, rather than causal. Being a construct of the foreign policy discourse, ideology is not intrinsically suggestive of a particular policy, identity or rationality.

The dissertation examines the role of a particular ideology, Kemalism, conceptualized here broadly as the set of ideas and objectives attributed to following Atatürk's path. It focuses on the question of how Kemalism has served as a template in the Turkish official discourse to reconcile and counterpoise Turkey's Western/European-orientation and the Cyprus policy – two allegedly incompatible foreign policies. In order to investigate the role of Kemalism in this relationship, the study follows a discursive epistemology and conducts an in-depth discourse analysis to analyze the way the leaders of government parties and the military establishment linked these policies to each other by recourse to Kemalism during three periods – 1960-1979, 1980-1989, and 1997-2007.

It is found that both policies have been reconciled and counterpoised by means of competing constructions of the objectives of Kemalism, rather than a single Kemalist template. There were remarkable differences between the governmental discourse and the individual party discourses, as well as between what is identified as the defensive and integrationist approaches to the role of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy, followed by the

party leaders regardless of their political affiliation. While the same elements of Kemalism were used in the legitimization of policies, each discourse ascribed competing definitions to these elements as well as to the relationship between the Cyprus policy and the Western/European orientation. This process, as the study reveals, has also contributed to the construction and the continuous change of the ideology of Kemalism. Thus, it is problematic to claim that Kemalism directs Turkish foreign policy towards a specific goal and that these policies are inherently opposite to or compatible with each other.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------|--|
| CENTO | Central Treaty Organization |
| DLP | Democratic Left Party |
| DP | Democratic Party |
| EC | European Commission |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| EU | European Union |
| IR | International Relations |
| JP | Justice Party |
| JDP | Justice and Development Party |
| MP | Motherland Party |
| NAP | Nationalist Action Party |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| NSP | National Salvation Party |
| NUC | National Union Committee |
| OIC | Organization of the Islamic Conference |
| RPNP | Republican Peasant Nation Party |
| RPP | Republican People's Party |
| RoC | Republic of Cyprus |
| TPP | True Path Party |
| TRNC | Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus |
| UN | United Nations |
| U.S. | United States |
| VP | Virtue Party |
| WP | Welfare Party |

INTRODUCTION

Turkey showed remarkable persistence in her quest to be a member of the EEC and then the EU for more than four decades. Yet, the relationship between the EEC/EU and Turkey has been tumultuous as both diverged in the way they approached a number of issues, ranging from the right of international institutions to interfere in the domestic affairs of countries to conflict resolution, especially with regard to the Cyprus issue. A recent event revealed this tension when the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that Turkey would not comply with the EU's demands to open her ports to the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) for trade unless the trade embargo to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was lifted. This statement signalled a "train crash" in the EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn's words, as failing to comply with the terms of the Association Agreement could lead to the suspension of Turkey's EU membership negotiations.¹ While the question as to why the Turkish government undertook such an attempt that could derail Turkey's EU accession process is important and interesting, it is equally important to examine how both Cyprus policy and the EU objective have been legitimized in the Turkish foreign policy discourse, as it helps *understanding* Turkey's actions rather than *assuming* possible causes for them. Examining the role of the Kemalist ideology in this context is vital to understand Turkey's foreign policy moves since Kemalism has been a self-evident legitimating criterion for both Turkey's Cyprus policy and Western/European-orientation. This provides an interesting case study to explore the theoretical link between ideology and foreign policy. The questions that demand an answer in this context are the following: Is Turkey's Cyprus policy indeed at its odds with her Western/European-orientation? If so, how can a single ideology, namely Kemalism, affirm both of these irreconcilable policies?

¹ Ian Traynor and Nicholas Watt, "Turkey clashes with EU over Cyprus," *Guardian*, June 16, 2006, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/cyprus/story/0,1799567,00.html>> (accessed December 1, 2007).

To the realist school in International Relations (IR), the examination of the role of ideology seems extraneous as foreign policy is mainly about pursuing the national interests rather than certain ideas, ideologies or ideals. If we accept this conventional view, focusing on how the set of ideas/ideals and objectives called Kemalism have structured the Turkish foreign policy discourse would amount to analyzing the *façade* of Turkish foreign policy. However, if we questioned the assumption that it is possible to know whether a policy maker has the sort of rationality we attribute to him or her, and if we suggested instead that it is impossible to ascribe a meaning to a policy outside of the discursive context, then we would arrive at an opposite conclusion: epistemologically, there is no difference between the *façade* and the *core*. Ironically, the fact that Kemalism is an important *façade*, then becomes precisely the reason why Kemalism should capture the *core* of our attention in studying its role in Turkish foreign policy—if it had no legitimate meaning for the policy makers or for the general public, it would not have been present in the Turkish foreign policy discourse since 1930s until today in the first place. In this context, the persistent presence of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy discourse makes the following questions too important to overlook: what is the significance of Kemalism for Turkish foreign policy? What does it signify? Moreover, what can we learn from this example about the relationship between ideology and foreign policy?

Despite its endurance as one of the most referred legitimating criteria of Turkish foreign policy, Kemalism has not been fixed to a single definition or been exempt from the diverging articulations of the policy makers. Indeed, all governments that came to power have declared their allegiance to Atatürk's principles. However, what has been signified by Kemalism ranged from reaching the level of the Western civilization and the EU, to affirming the policies that are declared as deviations from Turkey's cherished Western-orientation, to posing one of the greatest obstacles for Turkey's future EU membership. On the one hand,

Turkey's Western-orientation and European aspiration are seen central to Kemalism and the path towards the EU is regarded as the protection and the advancement of Atatürk's reforms and principles. On the other hand, Kemalism is also presented as an anti-thesis of Turkey's EU vocation. Taken together, these two irreconcilable articulations suggest a rather tragic position for Turkey where one of the most adhered ideologies, Kemalism, appears both as a facilitator of and as an obstacle to Turkey's EU path, locking Turkey to being not European enough to enter the EU but too European to look elsewhere. If one has to choose one over the other, this brings the following questions to the front: Does Kemalism direct Turkish foreign policy towards the West/Europe? Alternatively, does it impede Turkey's quest for EU membership? More generally, can an ideology have a causal impact on a specific foreign policy orientation of a country?

The puzzle does not end in here. Kemalism has also been employed as a template in the articulations on one of the so-called deviations from Turkey's Western-orientation, the Cyprus policy, which has remained as the 'national cause' of Turkey since late 1950s and early 1960s despite the fact that it created a continuing source of tension throughout the evolution of relations between Turkey and the West/European Union. Turkey's Cyprus policy has been seen as an example of an active and Realist foreign policy directed against Western imperialism and implemented for the full-independence right of the oppressed nations. As will be discussed in detail in the first chapter, these elements are also attributed to following Atatürk's path. Indeed, according to some, Turkey's Cyprus policy, in that it diverges from the EU's position on the issue, is presented as a direct consequence of Kemalism, while submission to EU's wishes on the matter is taken as a deviation from it².

Turkey's Cyprus policy is also seen as a disengagement from Turkey's Western-orientation as the 1974 intervention was undertaken unilaterally and against the warnings of

² Ergun Aybars, *Atatürkçülük ve Modernleşme* (Izmir: Ercan Kitabevi, 2000), 109-122; Yekta Güngör Özden, *Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük*, 13th ed., (Istanbul: İleri Yayınları, 2005), 117.

the Western bloc, which Turkey chose to be a part of as of late 1940s. In this regard, some scholars have seen it as a divergence from the regular parameters of the pro-Westernist foreign policy, pursued especially since the beginning of the Cold War.³ Some, however, referring to the style with which Turkey has conducted her Cyprus policy, consider Turkey's Cyprus policy as incompatible with her European-orientation rather than seeing it simply as a temporary disengagement from the West. According to this view, Turkey's insistence on keeping the Turkish military troops in the island and her refusal to recognize the RoC until Turkish Cypriots are considered as the co-founders of the Republic manifest that Turkey conducts her policy through blackmailing rather than complying with the terms of the treaties she is a part of.⁴ It is hence argued that Turkey's insistence on giving no concessions on her traditional policy pursued in relation to Cyprus neither serves Turkey's goal to be an EU member, nor does it accord with the European style of dealing with the issue.⁵ This suggests two important conclusions: 1) Turkey's Cyprus policy is irrational, given Turkey's quest for joining the EU. 2) Turkey's Cyprus policy is pursued in a non-European manner. Thus, it is assumed that the interests and the identity of a state (as well as those of larger entities such as the EU) can be identified separately from and independently of how they are articulated in the discourse.

Indeed, these arguments center on an apparent clash between the EU's and Turkey's views on the matter. However, if we focus on how both policies are legitimized in the Turkish official discourse, we get a more complex picture. To the present government, there is neither

³ Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, 1 (January 2000): 37; Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 114; and William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), 149.

⁴ Tarık Oğuzlu, "The Impact of 'Democratisation in the Context of the EU Accession Process' on Turkish Foreign Policy," *Mediterranean Politics*, 9, 1 (Spring 2004): 108; Costas Melakopides, "Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union for Greek-Turkish and Euro-Turkish Relations," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 17, 1 (Winter 2006): 73-101.

⁵ Ibid.

an incompatibility between Turkey's policy towards Cyprus and the EU,⁶ nor even a slightest deviation from Turkey's EU-orientation.⁷ However, as we will see in our discussion, there have been attempts to revise Turkey's Cyprus policy as to accelerate Turkey's integration with the EEC/EU. Furthermore, Kemalism has been employed both in the articulations that reconciled Turkey's traditional Cyprus policy and the EU objective as well as in those that counterpoised them. What is more, there is also a difference in the way the parties that took part in the government interpreted the content of Kemalism. The clash between these Kemalisms not only complicates the link between Turkey's Cyprus policy and the EU goal but also makes the relationship between Kemalism and Turkish foreign policy rather precarious.

How can we make sense of the apparent "clash of Kemalisms"⁸ especially with regard to Turkey's Western/European-orientation and the Cyprus policy? The present dissertation aims to contribute to the discussions on the role of ideology in foreign policy by focusing on the role of Kemalism in Turkey's Western/European-orientation and Cyprus policy and raises the following research questions: Can Kemalism be conceptualized as an ideology and if so, does it have a causal role in Turkey's foreign policy? How can an ideology structure the foreign policy discourse in a way that certain policies are posed against and reconciled with each other?

The theoretical approach

Given its exclusive focus on interests, the Realist school in IR does not provide a suitable venue for answering these questions. Most of the Turkish foreign policy analyses are

⁶ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, "Bakanlar Kurulu Toplantısı," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, December 11, 2006, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed December 1, 2007).

⁷ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "Başbakan Erdoğan: 'Açık ve net söylüyorum, kim ne derse desin, AB yönelimimizde en ufak bir sapma yoktur,'" Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, November 5, 2006, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed February 12, 2008).

⁸ The term was first used in Özlem Demirtaş Bağdonas, "The Clash of Kemalisms? Reflections on the Past and the Present Politics of Kemalism in Turkish Political Discourse," *Turkish Studies* 9, 1 (March 2008): 99-114.

based on this approach, and there are numerous studies on the determinants of Turkey's Western-orientation and Cyprus policy that refer to certain economic, security, and political reasons for these 'rational' policy preferences.⁹ From the perspective of what can be called as the ideational school, however, ideologies and ideas emerge as a causal variable in foreign policy analysis.¹⁰ In a quest to point out the role of the ideational factors in foreign policy, some studies on Turkish foreign policy assign a place to Kemalism, referring to its role in guiding Turkish foreign policy practices.¹¹

Nevertheless, just as the conclusions of the Realist approach depends on the pre-given definition of interests, the arguments of the ideational approach vary according to the loosely or narrowly defined boundaries of Kemalism—for some it is inherently Westernist, for others it means a cautious approach in foreign policy. Furthermore, the ideational approach does not refrain from giving a causal role to what the Realist approach takes as an interest, but merely ascribes an ideational character to it. While the Realist approach takes defending the national interests as a variable for foreign policy, the same reason emerges as one of the elements of the Kemalist ideology in analyses that show the impact of Kemalism on foreign policy. In this respect, the ideational approach does also not present a suitable framework to analyze how the

⁹ See for instance, Barry Rubin, and Kemal Kirişçi, eds., *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001); Meltem Müftüler Baç, *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997); Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*; Tareq Y. Ismael and Mustafa Aydın, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics* (Cornwall: Ashgate, 2003); Oral Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1998); Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctions during the Cold War"; Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*.

¹⁰ See, for instance, Rick Fawn, "Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies," *Journal of Communist Studies & Transition Politics* 19, 3 (September 2003): 1-41; Werner Levi, "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 14, 1 (March 1970): 1-31; Alan Cassels, *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996); Judith Goldstein, and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993).

¹¹ For instance, Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner, "The Impact of Institutionalized Ideas in Coalition Foreign Policy Making: Turkey as an Example, 1991–2002," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, 3 (November 2005): 249-78; Bülent Aras, "Turkish Foreign Policy and Jerusalem: Toward a Societal Construction of Foreign Policy," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 22, 4 (Fall 2000): 31-58; Aras, *Turkey and the Greater Middle East* (Istanbul: TASAM, 1994); Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs," *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, 4 (1999): 171; Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the end of the Cold War* (London: Hurst & Co., 2003), 139; Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

same ideology can lead to contradictory foreign policies or how the definition of Kemalism changes over time. Both approaches ignore that interests and ideas are constituted by the foreign policy discourse rather than independently producing it.

This dissertation moves away from this rationalist/ideationalist divide and centers on the argument that discourse analysis can be utilized as a valuable theoretical framework to study the relationship between ideologies, foreign policies, the extent of their compatibility and the interests and identities produced in the process of foreign policy making. Moreover, the contested relationship between Kemalism and Turkish foreign policy discourse on the one hand, and the compatibility of Turkey's Cyprus policy with her European-orientation and the role of Kemalism in this relationship on the other provide a good case for an application of the discourse theory of ideology and foreign policy.

The dissertation takes foreign policy as a discursive construct rather than an output of a pre-discursively defined interest or identity. In doing so, it draws on post-structuralist approaches to foreign policy analysis and mainly the works of Ole Wæver and Lene Hansen.¹² This approach is based on the view that while the foreign policy decision makers have recourse to certain identities or material interests in their representations of a certain foreign policy, it is also through their formulation of foreign policy that the identities and material interests are produced and reproduced.¹³ This suggests that it is impossible to define a pre-discursive identity or rationality for a foreign policy (Turkey's inherent Europeanness or interest to increase the strategic importance of Turkey as causes for Turkey's EU vocation) as these identities and rationalities do not exist outside of the discursive sphere. In other words, if it is through discourse that we have access to the definitions of certain identities and interests, there can be no causal relationship between foreign policy and identity: their relationship can

¹² Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London and New York, Routledge, 2006); Ole Wæver, "Identity, Communities, and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory," in *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*, ed. Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (London: Routledge, 2002), 20-49.

¹³ Hansen, 1.

only be argued to be co-constitutive. Therefore, what is of interest of this approach is to reveal the main structures of the foreign policy discourse and analyze how exactly certain identities are reconstituted in the foreign policy articulations of the policy makers (heads of governments, parties, media representatives, academics, NGO leaders, etc.).

While this research agenda is mainly centered on the co-constitutive relationship between foreign policy and identity¹⁴, one does not need to have an exclusive focus on identities for examining the main legitimating criteria for foreign policy or the discursive construction of variational identities and interests. Indeed, ideologies are also one of the main templates employed by the policy makers in justifying their foreign policies. When policy makers legitimize foreign policies by recourse to certain ‘isms’, their articulations also involve statements as to whether the ‘ism’ in question is found compatible with a particular national/regional identity and rationality. As ideologies are not exempt from the interest and identity-based articulations of the foreign policy makers, focusing on the relationship between ideology and foreign policy also makes it possible to examine what sort of foreign policy identity and rationality is constructed by an ideology-driven discourse. What is more, it also makes it possible to analyze how ideologies are also reconstituted by the foreign policy discourse.

In this sense, this study aims to extend the scope of the poststructuralist research agenda in foreign policy studies by studying the co-constitutive relationship between foreign policy and ideology. This requires taking not only identities, interests and foreign policies but also ideologies as a discursive construct. In most of the studies on ideology, ideology is usually considered as a tool employed by the governing elite to perpetuate their power at the

¹⁴ See especially, Wæver, “Identity, Communities, and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory”; David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Campbell, *Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Cold War* (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 1993); Pinar Bilgin and Eylem Yılmaz, “Constructing Turkey’s ‘Western’ Identity During the Cold War: Discourses of the ‘Intellectuals of Statecraft’,” *International Journal* 61 (Winter 2005-2006): 39-59.

expense of the rest or as a system of beliefs and thoughts that is genuinely shared by the society.¹⁵ In these studies, ideology is conceptualized either as a negative system of beliefs that creates false-consciousness on the part of the society, leading people to adhere what is actually against their ‘real’ interests or as a system of beliefs that is genuinely adhered by all or some segments of the society as a result of their affiliation with a certain identity. In this imagery, ideology appears as a medium of power either used by the political elite against the society and/or by the public against the political elite.

In line with its poststructuralist approach, however, this study departs from those arguments that take ideology as a product of certain interests and identities, and a causal variable for the formation of certain policies. Hence, contrary to the conventional approaches to ideology and Kemalism in particular, which will be discussed in detail in the first and the second chapter, this study does not take ideology as a fixed set of ideas that direct policies in a certain direction. Rather, ideology is taken here as a repertoire of various ideas, the content of which is exposed to certain changes as the policy actors redefine its elements while justifying competing foreign policies. In this sense, ideology, despite being structured as a single ‘ism’ in the individual representations by the policy actors and intellectuals, cannot remain as one as actors assign competing meanings to its components and construct contending compositions for it.

This deconstructivist approach to ideology owes to several works on hegemony and discourse, mainly, that of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, and Louse Phillips, which will be discussed in detail in the first chapter. While these authors’ focus is not the role of ideology in foreign policy discourse, ideology is similarly taken in these studies as a discursive construct, constituted by the hegemonic attempts of the political actors, who struggle with one

¹⁵ See for instance, John Thompson, *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), 4; Roger Eatwell and Anthony Wright, eds., *Contemporary Political Ideologies* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), ix; Will Fowler, ed., *Ideologues and Ideologies in Latin America* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1997); Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 188.

another's formulation of the key concepts of the ideology in question. Laclau and Mouffe's discussion of hegemony and ideology suggests that ideology is a dynamic discourse and hence establishing a fixed definition for it is impossible.¹⁶ Phillips' analysis of Thatcherism contributes to this discussion by defining it as a mixed discourse, composed of the terms of the later party discourses and the initial concepts of Thatcherism.¹⁷ Informed by this approach, this study focuses on the political actors' discursive struggle for establishing legitimacy in the foreign policy sphere through ideology constitution.

Bringing this conceptualization of ideology into the poststructuralist literature in IR, this study argues that studying the continuity and discontinuity of a certain foreign policy orientation requires focusing on the basic legitimating criteria of policy and the narratives that structure the foreign policy debate rather than identifying whether a certain foreign policy constitutes a deviation from a specific identity, material interests or ideology. While ideology provides one of the main repertoires for the decision makers for their foreign policy articulations, foreign policy discourse (in defining a specific identity and/or rationality) in turn reconstitutes the main contours of the ideology in question. If foreign policy discourse refers to a system of statements that link the so-called directives of an ideology to a certain policy, and if ideologies are also reproduced by the foreign policy discourse as actors attempt to legitimize different policies and emphasize different ideas by recourse to the name of the same 'ism', then the focus of analysis should not be to reveal a causal relationship between ideologies and foreign policies, or to take the task of comparing the policies of a country to a to-be-acquired identity or should-be-held rationality. Rather, the focus should be to show how variational ideological templates are constituted and how they structure the foreign policy discourse. In this sense, an analysis into the constitution of a particular foreign policy orientation and/or deviations from it also allows for studying how an ideology (and a specific

¹⁶ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (London: Verso, 1985), 105.

¹⁷ Louse Phillips, "Hegemony and Political Discourse: The Lasting Impact of Thatcherism," *Sociology* 32, 4 (November, 1998): 855.

identity and/or rationality together with it) is constituted and reconstituted. If ideology is constructed by the hegemonic attempts of the foreign policy actors, then ideology can never be 'fixed' once and for all, but asserted and reasserted as each policy maker challenges or affirms the previous or alternative templates of that ideology. Thus, given the contested nature of this discursive process, even apparently irreconcilable policies could also be legitimized by reference to the 'same' ideology, while some constructions of that ideology are marginalized in time.

Methodology

How could one study this complex process? This dissertation is based on the view that, since identities, interests, ideologies do not reside in a non-discursive place and it is through discourse that policy makers articulate their policies (present certain policies as a part of a general policy orientation or articulate the need to move away from the traditional policy), then discourse analysis is the best means to study the ideological templates constructed in foreign policy discourses. In this respect, it does not follow a psychoanalytic approach to discourse (attempting to get in the minds of actors to find out why they formed a particular statement or what they meant by it) or the other positivist approaches to discourse analysis, such as content analysis (trying to measure the relative importance of ideology to material interests). Hence, it is interested in uncovering the constellations of key concepts articulated by the political actors to show how variational meanings are attributed to the goals of a particular foreign policy and ideology. Second, it is interested in analyzing the interactions between different discourses and how these dynamics serve to reconstitute the ideology in question. To refer to Hansen's terminology, this can be partly done by identifying "basic discourses"¹⁸ within the general foreign policy discourse to trace the change of the

¹⁸ Hansen, 52.

ideology in question within a certain discourse in time. Yet, one also needs to analyze how each discourse responds to the formulations provided by the other discourses.

Insofar as this dissertation traces the constitution of the present construction of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy discourse back in history to understand how it was constituted and how alternative representations were marginalized, it follows the crux of the Foucaultian genealogy. This method, which can be referred as ‘the history of the present’, takes as its object those institutions and practices that have become so self-evident in our daily practices that they are usually considered to be totally exempt from change and evolution if not beyond history.¹⁹ The main focus of genealogical analysis is to show how these institutions and practices undergo changes, how they constitute identities, disciplines, subjects and objects and to reveal that there is not a single and grand history of them but rather multifarious trajectories, interwoven histories, each having varied power-knowledge effects.²⁰ While Foucault’s main attempt in his various works was to unravel the continuing power struggles and strategies in this process, the crux of this approach can be summarized as asking the question of what has been remembered in history to legitimize the present courses of action²¹; in other words, asking how we came to this point without taking the task of writing an objective and a single history of events.

In line with this approach, the present dissertation does not attempt to provide an objective history of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy discourse but analyzes how various contending Kemalisms have served to legitimize particular policies that are juxtaposed to each other. In taking Kemalism as a set of elements associated with following Atatürk’s path, it does not provide a separate or alternative definition of Kemalism to show how this ideology is

¹⁹ See Michael Foucault, *Power: Essential Works of Michael Foucault, 1954-1984*, vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley et. al. (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 225; Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism”, in *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd ed., ed. Scott Burchill et. al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 163-168; 161-187; Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 112.

²⁰ See Devetak, 163; Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. D. F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 139-164.

²¹ Devetak, 167.

being stretched or misinterpreted by the policy makers. Since this would contribute to yet another construction of Kemalism rather than examining the meanings associated with it, this study analyzes instead the definitions provided by the policy makers and accepts what they refer to as Kemalism as the Kemalism of that particular discourse. In this respect, the dissertation relies on the discourse as the only possible source of knowledge.

In its identification of ‘basic discourses’ in Turkish foreign policy discourse that is legitimized by Kemalism, the present study follows the genealogical approach as it is interested in how these discourses change in time, both in terms of their content and as a result of their relations with each other and the historical developments. In this respect, particular attention is given both to the main events that take place during the case periods (to reveal which developments made certain articulations possible) and how each discourse establishes its legitimacy by attempting to delegitimize the alternative discourses (to show how changes within a particular discourse is also dependent on discourses’ clash for legitimacy with one another). The analysis focuses on the official discourse, that is, the discourses of parties that take part in the government and that of the military establishment during the period, and basic discourses are structured in terms of the political identity that they represent, i.e. nationalist, social democratic, or conservative. While this serves to show the plurality and the precariousness of the official discourse which is usually analyzed as one in most of the studies, as it will be seen, the number of basic discourses at a given time depends on, albeit not necessarily, on the number of parties that take part in the government and the level of political polarization during the period. Hence, while the third chapter is structured around five basic discourses (as the analyzed era involves coalitional governments composed of highly polarized parties—multi-party rule), chapter four focuses on two basic discourses (which analyzes the discourse of the military establishment and that of the party that was in power during the period—single-party rule). Here the main focus is not only on the circulation

of various constructions of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy discourse but also on how the elements of Kemalism are being linked to both the Cyprus policy and Turkey's Western/European-orientation; in other words, what sort of relationship is being established between Kemalism, Cyprus policy and Western/European-orientation (to find out which 'linking' made it possible to situate Cyprus policy as compatible with Western/European-orientation, and which elements of Kemalism were used in de-linking these policies).

In the last case chapter, the study moves to analyze the party/military discourses under two main discourses that are identified as 'integrationist' and 'defensive', based on the identity/rationality they represent, the elements of Kemalism being prioritized, and the meanings attributed to them. Structuring the analysis around these two discourses serves to show how the present politics of Kemalism can be read as a clash of two Kemalisms while many different parties are involved in the making of it and how the divide between these two approaches gets blurred as a result of the clash between the competing parties and the attempt of each to capture the terms initiated by the other. Second, as the present constructions of Kemalism also depend on the terms developed by the previous discourses, the study as a whole can be read as the history of the integrationist and defensive approaches to Kemalism.

While analyzing the official discourse in three time periods helps showing how the constitution of Kemalism was exposed to certain changes in time, focusing on the discursive moves undertaken by the political actors in each period gives a further analytical reach to the study in showing change within continuity. Each discourse is constructed by actors' struggle to gain legitimacy for a particular policy and give a new meaning to ideology as the context changes. This process, as the study shows, also involves actors' delegitimization of the previous or alternative discourses. In this regard, studying the dynamics between contending discourses is crucial in understanding how a specific term attributed to an ideology is in fact a reaction to an alternative formulation of that ideology; how ideology is hence constituted by a

series of delegitimizations and additions made by the political actors from the position of the discourse they speak for. The study draws on Laclau and Mouffe's use of the term 'nodal points' to refer to the contingent definitions provided for a certain ideology. Based on this framework, I investigate which nodal points have been tied to Kemalism by the basic discourses in each period and how various policies (with regard to Turkey's EEC/EU vocation and Cyprus policy in our case) have been legitimized by recourse to these nodal points. Here the main focus is to show how the nodal points of each discourse are dependent on both that of the previous chain constructed by the previous era and the other basic discourses in the same period. This provides a promising venue for not only analyzing how certain policies are reconciled with each other (in case the same nodal point is employed to justify both policies) but also examining which nodal points provide the main legitimating criteria for foreign policy at a given time and how these structures evolve.

Research design

While this theoretical and methodological approach is presented in the first two chapters, the following part of the dissertation is devoted to the detailed analysis of the role of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy discourse on Western-orientation/EU vocation and Cyprus policy. Applying this framework to the role of Kemalism I analyze how the elements associated with following Atatürk's path were propagated in the discourse of the parties that took part in the government in the periods 1960-1979, 1980-1989, and 1997-2007, each period involving decisive moments in relation to Turkey's Western/European-orientation and the Cyprus issue, how competing Kemalist identities and rationalities were constructed in these discourses, and how the so-called incompatible policies of Cyprus and Western-orientation/EU vocation were linked to each other through the elements of Kemalism.

Hence, this study takes the parties that took part in the government (and the military establishment at times of modern/postmodern military coups) as a unit of analysis. The

analysis encompasses a wide range of primary sources: government and party programs, military declarations, public statements of the party leaders, press conferences, as well as the books written and the interviews given by the party leaders. This choice is based on the assumption that focusing on the individual party programs and the statements delivered by the party leaders allows examining the points of contestation between different political factions while these differences may be reconciled at the governmental level. Second, while it is fair to argue that differences also exist within the parties themselves, the analysis assumes that the opinion variations within the parties are less likely to be reflected on the public debate than those among different parties. Moreover, the study is also based on the premise that foreign policy discourse is the projection of the political discourse on to the foreign policy sphere. In this sense, examining the way each party and government defines its political view (political identity) and Kemalism allows for a good starting point to analyze the source of differentiation among them with regard to the links made between the foreign policy articulations and the elements of Kemalism.

Structure of the dissertation

Chapter 1 introduces the contested definitions on Kemalism in the literature. This chapter reviews the main elements and foreign policy objectives associated with following Atatürk's path in the literature on Kemalism, identifies two basic approaches in the literature, i.e. 'defensive approach', and 'integrationist approach', and provides an alternative conceptualization of ideology that is integrated in the theoretical framework developed in the second chapter. In this respect, the chapter serves both as a historical introduction to the ideology of Kemalism, a literature review, and the first part of the theoretical framework.

Chapter 2 continues the discussion by analyzing the role of ideology in foreign policy. After discussing the main assumptions, arguments and the problems of the studies that draw on the Realist and ideationalist approaches, the chapter turns to the poststructuralist approach,

presents the main theoretical and methodological framework to be employed to analyze the role of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy discourse by building on some of the assumptions of this approach, and situates the proposed theoretical framework within this agenda in IR. Here it is argued that: 1) discourse analysis can be used both as a methodological and theoretical tool to analyze the role of ideology in foreign policy; 2) the relation between foreign policy and ideology are not causal but co-constitutive; 3) ideology provides the foreign policy discourse with the elements to be used for the legitimization of certain policies; 4) ideology construction through foreign policy discourse also involves constitution of a certain identity and rationality; 5) as a certain constitution of ideology and foreign policy bear its alternatives, ideology is never linked to a single foreign policy direction; 6) ideology serves to denote certain policies as deviations from or an affirmation of a general foreign policy orientation through the link established between its constituent elements and the objective of the proposed policy; and 7) if deviations from a certain foreign policy as well as ideologies are discursive constructs rather than an unchallengeable reality, then one has to examine the foreign policy discourse rather than assuming the objectives for a single foreign policy or components of a specific ideology.

Chapter 3 discusses how the elements of Kemalism structured the foreign policy debate on Turkey's Western/European-orientation and the Cyprus issue between 1960 and 1980, and how these policies were legitimized and linked to each other. During this period, Turkey became an associate member to the EEC and undertook a military intervention in Cyprus which was followed by American military embargo and economic sanctions on Turkey. There were also three domestic crises during this period, mainly the 1960 military coup, and 1971 and 1973 military interventions and an era of political instability and coalition governments composed of polarized parties. This period hence serves as an excellent example of competing representations of Kemalism and diverging party discourses. The chapter

identifies significant differences in the way the link between Turkey's Western-orientation and the Cyprus cause were made by the decision makers during this period, examining the elements of the basic domestic discourses represented by the chief officials of the military staff, heads of governments and chairmen of the parties that took part in the coalition governments and how these discourses were structured by the elements of Kemalism. The analysis reveals a triangular discursive template that constructed an indirect link between the Cyprus policy and Western/ European-orientation, each associated with the ideational and rationalist elements ascribed to pursuing a Kemalist foreign policy. It is argued that while this contested discourse constructed competing Kemalist identities, elements of Kemalism did not produce a single link between Cyprus and Turkey's Western /European-orientation.

Chapter 4 turns to discuss another crisis period for Turkey. In contrast to the 1960s and the 1970s, the 1980s present a different picture which is not colored by the pole-apart political factions but an era of de-politicization by a long military coup period followed by a stable single party government. The period encompasses the time when the TRNC was established and when Turkey's application for full membership to the EEC was rejected, partially because of Turkey's Cyprus policy, as stated in the EC report. In this respect, a change in Turkey's position on the Cyprus issue became closely linked to Turkey's EEC membership as it turned into an indirect condition for it. Here it is argued that it was a specific reading of Kemalism and the re-ordering of the Kemalist elements that integrated the Cyprus policy within Turkey's cherished Western-orientation, notwithstanding the differences in approaches. Despite the significant consensus reached in this period, the analysis of the speeches delivered by the decision makers reveals two significant approaches to Kemalism, one undertaking a defensive approach and emphasizing security threats, and the other propagating an economic rationalism that elevated the role of sustainable development. Second, the analysis shows that these competing approaches suggested divergent policies to

be pursued in relation to Cyprus and West and reproduced competing identities and rationalities for Turkey.

Chapter 5 focuses on the recent period which is also marked by significant events with regard to Turkey's European integration and the Cyprus issue. Despite the insistence of the official discourse that Turkey's position on the Cyprus issue and the EU membership should not be linked to each other, these two policies became inseparable as the RoC applied for EU membership and then became a member. The period involved several crisis moments for Turkey, i.e. the so-called 'postmodern coup' of February 28 military memorandum, and the EU's failure to approve Turkey's candidacy and acceptance of the RoC as a member with no conditions for the resolution of the dispute. There have been also extensive liberalization and democratization measures in Turkey during this period. This chapter examines how the elements of Kemalism structured the main divide between the defensive and integrationist approach, one viewing the democratization as dependent on Turkey's specific context, focusing on threats rather than individual freedoms and taking the EU as a neo-colonial power, while the other conditioned democracy to further integration with the EU. It analyzes how Turkey's European-orientation and Cyprus policy have been situated within this debate, and how the role of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy was reconstructed during what is called as the 'post-Kemalist' era. It is shown that despite the claims to the contrary, objectives attached to accomplishing Atatürk's path do not only circulate within the discourse of the military staff but are employed by all the parties that took part in governments. The elements associated with pursuing Atatürk's path continued to structure the foreign policy articulations of the policy makers in relation to Turkey's European vocation and the Cyprus policy.

The conclusion provides a summary of the theoretical and analytical arguments discussed in the first two chapters, a review of the findings of the case chapters, and discusses a number of theoretical conclusions derived from the analysis of the role of Kemalism in

Turkish foreign policy. Finally, upon reviewing the weaknesses and strengths of the approach, the chapter suggests a number of research questions for future research on the role of ideology in foreign policy.

CHAPTER I: CONCEPTUALIZING IDEOLOGY: KEMALISM AS AN IDEOLOGY AND BASIC APPROACHES TO KEMALISM

Introduction

The role of Kemalism as well as what it signifies is largely contested in the literature. For some, Kemalism represents a type of regime and governance, given its similarities to a military-bureaucratic model.²² For some, it is an extinct ideology, defended by a minority of elites, who preserve their power at the expense of the will of the majority of the population.²³ For others, it is an ideology that has a potential to be renewed according to the changing circumstances and, therefore, it is an embodiment of social and political progress.²⁴ It is defined by some as a rational pragmatic ideology that represents the transformation of an Eastern society into a Western one and is intrinsically democratic²⁵; while for others it has never developed into an ideology but is a modernization movement that continually renews itself.²⁶ Some argue that a Kemalist cannot be against the Western civilization²⁷, while for others Kemalism means resistance to Western imperialism.²⁸

²² See Ergun Özbudun, "The nature of the Kemalist Political Regime," in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, ed. Ergun Özbudun and Ali Kazancıgil (London: Hurst and Company, 1981), 79-102.

²³ See Cengiz Çandar, "Atatürk's Ambiguous Legacy," *The Wilson Quarterly* 24, 4 (Autumn 2000): 88-96; M. Hakan Yavuz, "Turkey's Fault Lines and the Crisis of Kemalism," *Current History* 99 (January 2000): 33-38; D. Mehmet Doğan, *Kemalizm* (Istanbul: Üniversite, 1993), 12.

²⁴ See for example, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, *Atatürk'e Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1996), 21-22; Anıl Çeçen, *Kemalizm* (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1998); Toktamış Ateş, "Atatürk ve Demokrasi" in *Geçmişten Geleceğe Atatürk*, ed. Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Vakfı (Ankara: Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Vakfı, 1993), 33; Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, "Kemalizm'in Günümüzdeki Anlamı ya da Yeniden Doğuşu," in *Geçmişten Geleceğe Atatürk*, ed. Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Vakfı (Ankara: Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Vakfı, 1993), 75-92.

²⁵ Kışlalı, "Kemalizm'in Günümüzdeki Anlamı ya da Yeniden Doğuşu," 92; Ateş, 27; İsmet Giritli and Hülya Baykal, eds., *Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük* (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 2001), 7; Çeçen, 20.

²⁶ See for example Halide Pek, "Atatürkçü Düşünce Sistemi ve Çağdaş Türk Bireyi," in *Geçmişten Geleceğe Atatürk*, ed. Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Vakfı (Ankara: Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Vakfı, 1993), 146; Menter Şahinler, *Atatürkçülüğün Kökeni, Etkisi ve Güncelliği* (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1996), 6.

²⁷ Giritli and Baykal, 128; Turhan Feyzioğlu, "Atatürk'ün Dış Politikasının Özellik, İlke ve Amaçları," in *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, Atatürk Türkiyesi'nde (1923-1938) Dış Politika Sempozyumu: Bildiriler* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1984), 11; Turhan Feyzioğlu, "Atatürk Yolu: Akılcı, Bilimci, Gerçekçi Yol," in *Atatürk Yolu*, ed. Turhan Feyzioğlu et. al. (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1995), 37-38; Mehmet Gönlübol, "Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası: Amaçlar, İlkeler," in Feyzioğlu et. al., 250-51; Yusuf Ziya İnan, *Atatürk'te Temel Prensipler* (Istanbul, Akın Yayınevi, 1971), 10; Hamza Eroğlu, *Gerçek Yönüyle Atatürkçülük: Türk Devriminin Prensipleri ve Cumhuriyet Rejimi* (Ankara: Kardeş

This dissertation aims to examine how Kemalism is used as a reference to legitimize Turkish foreign policy. In this regard, the views that take Kemalism as a type of regime is beyond the scope of this study and we will focus on those works that take Kemalism/Ataturkism as a set of ideas that either propels or obstructs a specific foreign policy orientation. However, one has to define the concepts and meanings attached to Kemalism before examining how it is being enunciated in the foreign policy discourse: What are the ideas, objectives, and the principles of Kemalism; or rather, which ideas, objectives, and principles are associated with Kemalism in the literature? The task is difficult, as the available definitions seem to range within a wide spectrum. However, this very diversity of interpretations contributes to one of the main contentions of the dissertation, that there is not a single Kemalism that propels a specific foreign policy direction.

Indeed, the argument that there are different interpretations of what Kemalism refers to is not original; many scholars confirm that there are multiple narratives of Kemalism.²⁹ Nevertheless, this observation is usually followed by yet another definition of what the ‘genuine’ Kemalism is and how other interpretations overlook or intentionally distort its ‘true’ essence. There is also a lack of consensus on the term ‘Kemalism’ as well as on calling it an ideology. For Kışlalı, for instance, one must make a clear distinction between Kemalism and Ataturkism, as the former is the scientific name for following Atatürk’s path while the latter means the extensive idolization of Atatürk’s personality.³⁰ On the other hand, Şahinler, ascribing a negative meaning to ideology, prefers to use Ataturkism instead, and argues that

Matbaası, 1965), 62; Bedia Akarsu, *Atatürk Devrimi ve Temelleri* (Istanbul: İnkılap Kitapevi, 1995), 229; Halil İnalçık, “Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük,” *Doğu Batı* 7, 29 (August, September, October 2004): 101.

²⁸ See Özden, *Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük*; Nermin Abadan, “Laiklik ve İkinci Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları,” in *Geçmişten Geleceğe Atatürk*, ed. Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Vakfı (Ankara: Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Vakfı, 1993), 5.

²⁹ For instance, see Şahinler, *Atatürkçülüğün Kökeni, Etkisi ve Güncelliği*, 5; Doğan, *Kemalizm*, p. 14; Kışlalı, *Atatürk’e Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği*, 21; Çeçen, 117-18; Abdurrahman Dilipak, *Bir Başka Açıdan Kemalizm* (Istanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1988), 12.

³⁰ Kışlalı, *Atatürk’e Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği*, 86; Çeçen, 20.

Kemalism refers to a doctrine, a frozen set of principles, which does not capture the renewable characteristic of Atatürkism.³¹

Contrary to the views above, Kemalism and Atatürkism will be used interchangeably here. Indeed, whether it is called Kemalism or Atatürkism, or as an ideology or movement, it is associated with following Atatürk's path and attributed to the set of ideas and objectives that led the National Independence War (1919-1923) and the following reform measures carried out under the leadership of Atatürk. These ideas were later institutionalized as the six principles – the so-called 'six arrows', representing republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, statism, and revolutionism, incorporated into the program of the Republican People's Party in 1931 and officially described as Kemalism in 1935. While following Atatürk's path is strictly understood as maintaining the initial interpretation of these principles, it also involves a linear dimension as opposed to the circular logic of the former: to accomplish Atatürk's vision. As will be shown in this chapter, it is here that Kemalism's relevance in the foreign policy is most visibly articulated, discussed mainly in relation to the two main objectives here: 'raising Turkey to the level of the contemporary civilization' and attaining 'full-independence'.

The purpose of this chapter is to review the main elements associated with following Atatürk's path in the literature on Kemalism and examine whether Kemalism can be conceptualized as an ideology. In this sense, the chapter provides a brief introduction and clarification for the later chapters rather than an exhaustive analysis of the meaning of Kemalism. The first two sections lay out the historical origins of Kemalism, Kemalist principles and Atatürk's reforms. We will then turn to discuss the main foreign policy parameters of the Kemalist foreign policy and identify two main approaches to the objectives of Kemalism ('defensive' and 'integrationist' approach), each suggesting a diverse reading of

³¹ See Şahinler, *Atatürkçülüğün Kökeni, Etkisi ve Güncelliği*, 6

following Atatürk's path. It will be argued that while these approaches diverge in the way they interpret the objectives of the Kemalist foreign policy, both treat Kemalism as a fixed package of idealist and realist principles that produces a specific foreign policy orientation. Finally, building on Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau's discussion on hegemony, and other studies on ideology, an alternative conceptualization of Kemalism will be offered that does not take Kemalism as a once-and-for-all construction but as a dynamic ideology constituted by the hegemonic attempts of the political actors who claim legitimacy to their foreign policy articulations. This will allow us to examine how Kemalism structured the Turkish foreign policy discourse without assigning a directive and causal attribute to Kemalism.

1.1. The origins of Kemalism

While it is generally agreed that Kemalism was not an ideology that developed prior to the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) but after the establishment of the Republic in 1923,³² the term 'Kemalists' first began to be used in 1920 by a British High Commissioner De Robeck in relation to the followers of Mustafa Kemal.³³ Indeed, Kemalism was not initially referred to as an ideology, but a movement against the occupation of several parts of the Ottoman territories by French, Italian, and British forces under the terms of the Mudros Treaty, signed between the Ottoman government and the Allied forces following the defeat in the First World War. In a number of secret treaties signed by the representatives of Great Britain, France, Tsarist Russia, and, later, Italy between the years 1915 and 1917, the Ottoman Empire, including Anatolia, was partitioned among these countries.³⁴ These secret treaties were later formalized by the Sevres Treaty, signed on August 20, 1920 by the representatives

³² Suna Kili, *Kemalism* (Istanbul: Menteş Matbaası, 1969), 5.

³³ Hamza Eroğlu, *Atatürkçülük* (Ankara: Olguç Matbaası, 1981), 10-11.

³⁴ For further details about the secret treaties, see Abdülhalat Akşin, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), 19-22.

of the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Government.³⁵ It was during these crisis years that Mustafa Kemal began to be considered the leader of this movement.³⁶ He used his authority as the Inspector General for the Ottoman Government to unify the regional military defense groups with his close associates by means of organizing secret meetings formed by the civilian and military authorities in Anatolia and, eventually, to found a new state. These secret meetings and circular letters sent to the civilian and military authorities in Anatolia revealed some of the principles of Kemalism. Suna Kili lists the following as the most important: full-independence, total commitment to modernization, civic nationalism, changing the identity of the Turkish state from that of the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey, and grounding the new regime on popular sovereignty.³⁷ Hence she defines anti-imperialism, popular sovereignty, nationalism, populism, and republicanism as the earliest developed principles long before a systemization under the name of Kemalism took place.³⁸

The turning point in the institutionalization of Kemalism, however, was with the establishment of the People's Party in 1922, to be named as the Republican People's Party (RPP) in 1924³⁹. This party became the central political entity carrying out the new measures after a new temporary government was founded in 1920. Mustafa Kemal, who was the president of the National Assembly, the chairman of the only party in the parliament, and, upon the foundation of the Republic in 1923, the president of the Republic, had a significant control over political developments.⁴⁰ The early political programs of the RPP outlined the principles underlying the social/political reforms, as well as the goals of the new state. The

³⁵ Under this treaty, most of the areas where Turks had the majority were to be lost. See Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, I (1919-1980)* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002), 113-39.

³⁶ On how Mustafa Kemal secured the leadership after his reputation in Dardanelles, see especially Sina Akşin, "Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün İktidar Yolu," in *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk* (Istanbul: Dr Nejat F. Eczacıbaşı Yayınları, 1993), 49-80.

³⁷ Kili, 2.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 33-35.

⁴⁰ Doğan, *Kemalizm*, 81. While some suggest that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk respected the resolutions of the Assembly (Aydemir 1973, 315; Karaosmanoğlu 1998, 87), Şahinler points out that even though Atatürk was not a dictator, yet no resolution would pass without his signature. (1996, 157).

third congress of the Party, held in 1931, was also a crucial step in the institutionalization of Kemalism. At this congress, the principles of secularism, statism, and revolutionism were added to the former principles of republicanism, nationalism, and populism with a broader explanation of each. Thus, the concept of the ‘six arrows’ emerged and was inscribed in the party program, with each arrow representing one of the fundamental principles of the party, which were referred as the principles of Kemalism as of 1935.⁴¹ In this program, Kemalism was declared as the foundation of the state, not only for a few years, but for the future as well.⁴²

1.1.1. The ‘six arrows’ of Kemalism and Atatürk’s reforms

Among the ‘six arrows’ of Kemalism, republicanism, nationalism and populism were the earliest ones to be stressed. The concepts of national sovereignty, full-independence, anti-Ottomanism, anti-Pan-Islamism and territorial integrity constituted the common denominator of these principles, which were intimately connected with the reforms that took place thereafter, referred as Atatürk’s Reforms.⁴³

According to the explanations provided in the 1935 program of the RPP, in the preparation of which Kemal Atatürk played a dominant role before his death in 1938, republicanism stipulated that the republican regime could best represent and accomplish the ideal of popular sovereignty.⁴⁴ The establishment of the Republic was attained through people’s efforts, so it had to be defended for the good of the people, not for a particular class, dynasty, or group.⁴⁵ In this sense, one can observe a close relationship between republicanism, nationalism and populism, all recognizing the equality of all citizens before the law irrespective of their ethnic origin or religious belonging, and all rejecting the idea of

⁴¹ Kili, 66-67.

⁴² Ibid., 76. For the whole text of the program, see Donald E. Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939), 307-309.

⁴³ Kili, 40.

⁴⁴ Kili, 80.

⁴⁵ Kili, 80.

dictatorship of one class over another. In this sense, republicanism was the security belt for the *type* of the new regime in protecting it against any attempts to restore monarchy or sultanate. Populism complemented this principle in ascertaining that the national sovereignty would not be based on any class, family or an individual, but on civic nationalism. Therefore, Kemalist nationalism not only diverged from the Ottoman nationalism but also from the pan-Turanianist/Turkist (merging with the outer Turks) trait of Turkish nationalism embraced by the Union and Progress Party in the early 20th Century.⁴⁶

The principle of secularism also found great emphasis in the party documents and developed into the cornerstone of Kemalism by 1930s. Secularism was initially defined as the complete separation of the state and religion, a statement that revealed the anti-caliphate characteristic of the new state that led to the abolition of the caliphate in 1923. The principle later received the utmost attention in terms of both official propagation and the enforcement of series of laws designed to guarantee state dominance over religious movements.⁴⁷ In this sense, Kemalist secularism did not only mean the separation of state and religion but also that of religion from the whole public sphere.⁴⁸ The importance of this principle was indicated in Recep Peker's introductory speech he delivered in the General Assembly in 1931: "Without secularism and revolutionism, the new state would lose the two major supports that make its existence possible."⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Giritli and Baykal, 89.

⁴⁷ Along these lines, the Sheria courts were abolished in 1924 and the entire court system was attached to the Ministry of Justice. Between 1926 and 1930, European codes of law were adopted. The weekly holiday was changed from Friday, which was the weekly holiday accepted in Muslim countries, to Sunday; and the Moon calendar was replaced by the International Calendar. The measures and numbers system were changed into the European system. The Arabic Alphabet was replaced by the Latin alphabet. In 1925, the Hat Law was passed prohibiting the wearing of the fez. All the religious orders and sects were abolished. In 1928, several amendments were made to the Constitution to complete the move toward the secularization of the Turkish state and society. With these amendments, reference to 'Allah' in the official oath as well as the provision stating that the official religion of the Turkish state was Islam was removed. See Kili, 45-47.

⁴⁸ Binnaz Toprak, "The Religious Right," in *Turkey in Transition*, ed. I. C. Schick and A. E. Tonak (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 462. For further discussion about the role of religion in the Ottoman state and secularism in Turkey, see Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey," in *Atatürk, the Founder of a Modern State*, ed. Özbudun and Kazancıgil (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 191-220.

⁴⁹ *C.H.P. Genel Sekreteri Recep Peker'in Söylevleri* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935), 102; cited in Kili, 76.

While the aforementioned principles underlined the main characteristics and the ideology of the new state in opposition to that of the Ottoman state, the principle of statism, on the other hand, bore a separate section in the party program as it involved the immediate economic reforms to lead the country to prosperity as quickly as possible.⁵⁰ In 1931, statism was declared as the economic policy of the party, which considered the state as the guide for quick modernization, leading the economic activity in matters that were considered vital to the public interest.⁵¹ According to this definition of statism, while the economic activity would be initiated and undertaken by the state, private work and activity would not be forbidden.⁵² In this sense, the Kemalist state was neither socialist nor liberal. However, radically different interpretations of this principle were also available at the time. For instance, according to Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, one of the leading theorists of the Kemalist ideology during the presidency of Atatürk, statism meant state socialism, particularly designed to protect the local market from foreign competition.⁵³

As for the sixth arrow of Kemalism, revolutionism was defined as the commitment to reformist, radical, and, if necessary, revolutionary change for the modernization of Turkey.⁵⁴ As many authors suggest, this meant the protection of the reforms that had taken place during the early years of the Republic, as well as the necessity for new reforms in order to keep abreast with the new developments.⁵⁵ In this regard, it is possible to observe a close relation between this principle and the expressed ideal of modernization underlying Atatürk's reforms. While the reforms of the early Republic can be seen as practical applications of the earliest

⁵⁰ Cited in Kili, 78.

⁵¹ Ibidem. In fact, while liberal economic policy was experimented in the early years of the Republic, this initiative was later retracted due to the lack of capital, both foreign and domestic, the lack of skilled workers, the lack of entrepreneurship, the discouraging results of the experiment with a liberal economic policy, and the world-wide economic depression of the late 1920s (Kili 1969,101). See also Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), 457.

⁵² Kili, 8-19.

⁵³ See Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali* (Istanbul: As Matbaası, 1967), 317-318.

⁵⁴ Kili, 108.

⁵⁵ For example, see Kili, 109; Şahinler, *Atatürkçülüğün Kökeni, Etkisi ve Güncelliği*, 115; Giritli and Baykal, 28.

concepts of Kemalism, they were also the guiding projects of modernization and civilization which the principle of revolutionism secured in principle.

1.2. Beyond the ‘six arrows’ and reforms: the objectives of Kemalism and the principles of Kemalist foreign policy

While Kemalism was initially based upon the six principles as explained in the RPP regulations, it is also broadly understood as what Çeçen calls as “following [Atatürk’s] path, pursuing his vision and defending his principles”⁵⁶, thereby involving the so-called ‘side principles’, also referred to as the objectives of Kemalism and the Kemalist foreign policy in particular. The Kemalism literature accounts for several principles in this regard, based on the speeches of Atatürk: mainly, the principle of ‘full-independence’, an objective that originated during the Independence War; the principle of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’, which is taken as the non-adventurist and the non-aggressive characteristic of the Kemalist foreign policy; the principle of ‘adherence to the international law’, which is seen as dependent on the former principle; and ‘civilizationism’, which is defined as ‘raising Turkey to the level of the contemporary civilization’ and as such declared as the main objective guiding the Kemalist foreign policy.⁵⁷

Based on these agreed principles, Feyzioğlu lists the characteristics of the Kemalist foreign policy as realist (as opposed to pursuing futile ideals)⁵⁸, non-adventurist, pacifist, rationalist, respectful of the international law and the country’s international obligations, exemplary to the oppressed nations, and directed towards the main goals of full-independence, and civilizationism.⁵⁹ Other works also cite the principles of ‘pursuing the national honor and

⁵⁶ Çeçen, 20.

⁵⁷ Kışlalı, *Atatürk’e Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği*, 56; Çeçen, 122; Abadan-Unat, 5.

⁵⁸ Some works see these realist characteristics of Kemalism as the core elements of Kemalism and use the term ‘Realism’ instead of ‘Kemalism’. See for instance, Karaosmanoğlu, 140.

⁵⁹ Feyzioğlu, “Atatürk’ün Dış Politikasının Özellik, İlke ve Amaçları,” 1-11.

interest' and 'non-submissiveness in conducting the foreign policy',⁶⁰ and 'raising Turkey's respectability among the Western states'⁶¹ as the objectives of Kemalist foreign policy.

Indeed, it is possible to observe a close link between the earlier concepts of Kemalism (national sovereignty, national independence, anti-Ottomanism, anti-pan-Turkism, anti-pan-Islamism and territorial integrity), the initial 'six arrows', and the 'side principles', which shows the inseparable link between the 'domestic' and the 'foreign'. For instance, as opposed to the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire, the Kemalist foreign policy was defined as anti-adventurist and non-aggressive, preoccupied with protecting the territorial integrity rather than having an imperial goal of extending Turkey's borders. This can be read both as the extension of the earlier concepts of Kemalism and that of nationalism, as it was defined in the RPP programs and the speeches of Atatürk. Similarly, the anti-pan-Turkism and anti-pan-Islamism can be seen not only as concepts stressed in the definitions of the nationalism principle, but also that of secularism as well. The fact that the Kemalist foreign policy was described as having realist and rationalist goals, as opposed to being guided by a utopian idea of merging with the other Muslim nations or extending Islam's reach, also shows how the religious matters were kept out of the definitions of the Kemalist foreign policy. By the same token, it is also possible to observe an intimate relation between the oft-stated dynamic goal of 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization' and the principle of revolutionism.⁶² The primary goal of the Kemalist foreign policy was not only defined in terms of protecting the *status-quo* that was established in the mid-1920s, but also complemented with the dynamic

⁶⁰ For instance, see Aybars, *Atatürkçülük ve Modernleşme*, p. 132; İzzettin Doğan, "Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anlayışı," in *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk*, 173; Çeçen, 45.

⁶¹ See for instance, İnan, 21; Mustafa Akdağ, "Türkiye'nin Batılılaşmasını Zorunlu Kılan Tarihsel Koşullar," in *50. Yılı Anma Kitabı* (Ankara Üniversitesi, 1973), 398; Giritli and Baykal, 159.

⁶² It should be noted here that the principle of revolutionism is also taken as a *revolutionary* change in order to reach 'the dynamic ideal'. The remarks of Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun, who participated in the committee for drafting the new Constitution in 2007, are illustrative. In an interview with the daily *Radikal*, he commented that the principle of revolutionism is not congruent with the methods of reaching the 'dynamic ideal' of Atatürk today, as revolutionism implies an imposed change upon the public. See, "Taslağı hazırlayan Özbudun Radikal'e konuştu: Anayasa taslağında Atatürk var altı ok yok" [Özbudun, who prepared the draft speaks to Radikal: There is Atatürk, but no six arrows in the draft Constitution], *Radikal*, August 6, 2007, <<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=229052>> (accessed August 6, 2007).

ideal of ‘raising Turkey to the level of the contemporary civilization’, which inevitably involved keeping abreast with the new developments and continuously redefining what the contemporary civilization referred to, objectives that were stated as the main components of the principle of revolutionism. In this sense, given the emphasis placed on the sovereign, rationalistic, pacifist, and civilizationist characteristics of the Kemalist foreign policy, the principles of nationalism, secularism, and revolutionism can be argued to have a foreign policy dimension as well. In a similar vein, we can also argue that the principles of the Kemalist foreign policy involve both the circular (defending the established *status-quo*) and the linear logic (revising the foreign policy objectives in terms of the new conditions for the dynamic ideal of being on par with what is identified as more civilized countries) of the ‘six arrows’.

While reading Kemalist foreign policy in terms of the principles of nationalism, secularism and revolutionism is legitimate, it makes more sense for our purposes to focus on the ‘main objectives’ of the Kemalist foreign policy as stated in the literature. Indeed, the objectives of ‘full-independence’ and ‘civilizationism’ seem to best represent the circular and the linear logic that can be noticed in the diverging articulations on the Kemalist foreign principles. Identified as the primary goals of the Kemalist foreign policy, these two objectives were defined not only in terms of the general principles of the Kemalist foreign policy, but also to stress its realist and idealistic aspects. What is more, one can clearly observe how the way these two objectives were defined suggested two divergent foreign policy orientations for Turkey.

1.2.1. Full-independence and the realist foreign policy

In the studies that focus on the objectives of the Kemalist foreign policy, the ‘full-independence’ principle is generally assigned a special place and used to refer to the realist aspects of the Kemalist foreign policy, mainly: a) preserving the territorial integrity, b)

accepting no interference in domestic affairs, c) maintaining the freedom of choice in conducting foreign affairs, and d) implementing the balance of power politics and pursuing the national interests.

Notwithstanding this defensive dimension attributed to ‘full-independence’, the literature involves two divergent interpretations of this principle, in terms of the degree of emphasis put on sovereignty, the anti-imperialistic characteristic of the Independence War, and how the West is viewed. One establishes a direct analogy between the conditions of the Independence War and Turkey’s contemporary foreign policy, arguing that the Kemalist foreign policy and its principle of ‘full-independence’ requires a non-allied or active-neutral foreign policy which takes a stance against any type of imperialism (especially Western).⁶³ The other takes ‘full-independence’ less radically than the former, and suggests that this principle is not inherently incongruent with the practice of forming alliances with other countries (especially with the Western ones), so long as these alliances are not imposed on Turkey.⁶⁴

From the perspective of what could be termed as the ‘defensive approach’ to full-independence, Kemalist foreign policy is predominantly anti-imperialistic. While generally acknowledging that Kemalism is inherently pro-Western and that the Kemalist foreign policy accordingly gives priority to ‘raising Turkey to the level of the Western/European countries’ and taking a respectful place among them, this approach conditions this objective upon the attainment of complete independence from the West.⁶⁵ According to this approach, notwithstanding that the Kemalist foreign policy is oriented towards Europe (the West), the European countries continue advancing their imperial interests against Turkey just as they were during the Independence War. The pro-Western (and pro-European in particular)

⁶³ Çeçen, 145, Aybars, *Atatürkçülük ve Modernleşme*, 131, Kili, 117; Pek, 112; Abadan-Unat, 5.

⁶⁴ Doğan, “Atatürk’ün Dış Politikası ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anlayışı,” 151-197; Feyzioğlu, “Atatürk’ün Dış Politikasının Özellik, İlke ve Amaçları,” 10-11; Mehmet Gönülbol, “Atatürk’ün Dış Politikası: Amaçlar ve İlkeleri,” in Feyzioğlu et. al., 248; Giritli and Baykal, 96.

⁶⁵ *Atatürkçülük: Atatürkçü Düşünce Sistemi* (Ankara: Onkur Basımevi, 1983), 59.

characteristic attributed to the objectives of the Kemalist foreign policy thereby does not translate into an unconditional Westernist foreign policy, mainly because the West is understood in a binary way, both as an idea, as a source of civilization, and as a rival and even a potential enemy, hence as a source of threat. Thus, the presumption that the 'West' still views Turkey from the lenses of the Sevres Treaty (1920) and aims to subdue Turkey by dividing it, leads to the formulation of a type of defensive foreign policy, in which any idea of integration with the West/Europe is viewed with suspicion.

Çeçen's and Aybars' discussions on 'full-independence' are illustrative in this regard. For Çeçen, the main concern of the foreign policy during the Atatürk era had been to struggle against the colonization plans of the West in order to be a fully-fledged Western country.⁶⁶ The rapprochement of Turkey with the Soviet Union in 1920, he argues, was not a substitute to this orientation, but a balancing act which was due to the mistrust that developed especially after the secret treaties of the Allied countries became known.⁶⁷ Therefore, the struggle to make Turkey recognized by the West did not mean that the West was viewed as an enemy, only that their aims were seen as incongruent with establishing a respected relationship with them as a fully independent state. In such a context, a foreign policy that is indexed to integrating with the Western countries by submitting to their demands is nothing but a disregard for the national honor and full-independence, and, as such, a fundamental departure from the Kemalist foreign policy and the objective of 'raising Turkey to the level of the contemporary civilization'.⁶⁸

By the same token, Aybars sees the foreign policy after Atatürk as increasingly deviant from its initial Kemalist line. Joining the NATO, siding with the West against the independence of Algeria, and submitting to the EU's wishes on the Cyprus dispute, all exemplify, for Aybars, how the Turkish foreign policy lost its character of standing honorably

⁶⁶ Ibid., 152.

⁶⁷ Ibidem.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 146.

against imperialism and its model role for the “oppressed nations.”⁶⁹ Similarly, Özden, seeing the EU as a neo-colonial power which applies double standards to Turkey, accuses the EU-oriented foreign policy of being ignorant of Turkey’s national interests, national security, indivisibility, national honor, and full-independence, and considers it as contrary to the contemporary civilization path pointed by Atatürk.⁷⁰

Here it is remarkable how the demonization of the West as a neo-colonial power that aims to resurrect the Sevres Treaty dominates the other take on the West, which considers it the most advanced civilization. The emphasis on taking a stand against imperialism shifts the civilized character from the West to the Kemalist foreign policy. With a similar twist, alliance with the West is stripped off its civilized character, and the suggested foreign policy route that is independent from the West is cherished as the only way to reach the dynamic ideal of Kemalism. This powerful position attributed to Kemalism even leads Aybars to see criticisms against Kemalism as a similar neo-colonial attempt to divert Turkey from her civilized route. The following remarks are illustrative in this regard:

It seems that the EU, which had not refrained from putting pressure on the Ottoman state, having focused on impoverishing Turkey and thereby rendering her in need of foreign debts and adding new criteria next to the Copenhagen Criteria, such as the so-called Cyprus, Aegean, Armenian and Kurdish issues, is now targeting Kemalism – Turkey’s formula for independence and modernization. Turkey that draws her strength from the Kemalist ideology and reaches the modern civilization goal prescribed by it is seen by the imperialist forces as a serious threat against their passions in the Middle East.⁷¹

As seen above, in bringing up the imagery of the Independence War, when the country was encircled and the defense of the country was a matter of survival, this approach reconstructs the crisis situation that had been present during that period. As such, Kemalism is not only taken as the basis for an independent foreign policy, but also a tool for rescuing Turkey from the ‘claws’ of imperialism.

⁶⁹ Aybars, *Atatürkçülük ve Modernleşme*, 109-122.

⁷⁰ Özden, 117.

⁷¹ Aybars, “Kemalizm ve AB,” *Kemalist Düşünce E-Dergisi*, April 3, 2003, <<http://www.haberdunyasi.net>> (accessed May 10, 2004).

From the perspective of what could be called as the ‘integrationist approach’ to full-independence, however, suggesting a non-allied foreign policy, based on the oft-referred full-independence and anti-imperialism maxims of Atatürk, does the worst to Kemalism’s dynamic ideal of ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’, as it places Turkey among the Third World countries. According to this approach, full-independence means engaging in multi-faceted relations with other countries based on the sovereign authority of the state and national interests of the country.⁷² As such, full-independence does not require a total disengagement from the established alliances, but it is the alliances that secure the full-independence of a country, serving as a guarantee against potential threats and protecting the national interests.⁷³ In this sense, what is the key in full-independence is not anti-imperialism, but sovereignty, that a country is not forced into an alliance which the state authority considers contrary to the national interests.⁷⁴

In this regard, while the ‘integrationist approach’ also relies heavily on realist/nationalist concepts, such as national interest and state sovereignty, it diverges from the ‘defensive approach’ in suggesting a different foreign policy orientation. In contrast to the ‘defensive approach’, it neither considers alliances as concessions given from the national interests nor does it view the West as ‘imperialist’. Accordingly, Turkey’s participation in the League of Nations in 1932, the Balkan Entente and the Sadabat Pact in 1934, and the NATO in 1952 are regarded as the foreign policy preferences for Turkey that maximized her national interests at the given conjuncture.⁷⁵

Similarly, this approach draws a full continuity between the foreign policy conducted during Atatürk’s era and the contemporary Turkish foreign policy, without reconstructing a crisis situation that the former perspective draws upon. In this vein, Gönlübol argues that

⁷² Giritli and Baykal, 96.

⁷³ Gönlübol, 248.

⁷⁴ Giritli and Baykal, 96.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*.

those who find allying with the West incongruent with ‘full-independence’ gloss over the fact that it was Atatürk who laid the foundations for allying with Britain and France in 1939 during the Second World War⁷⁶, and that the Western-orientation has always been a part of Turkey’s national foreign policy.⁷⁷ In this sense, there has been no deviation from the Kemalist foreign policy, since Atatürk indicated integration with the West as the final goal.⁷⁸ Thus, disengaging from the Western-orientation, diverting from the EU goal, and looking for an alternative orientation path for Turkey are unthinkable. As the EU represents the most legitimate and viable integration symbol of the West today, joining the EU would amount to accomplishing the goal of ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’.⁷⁹

1.2.2. Modernization/ civilizationism/ Westernism and the idealist foreign policy

It is remarkable that, although both of the approaches outlined above envision the Kemalist foreign policy as realist, idealist elements are not absent from their analyses either. Both attach a fundamental value to ‘raising Turkey to the level of the contemporary civilization’ as the primary objective of Kemalism and use this ideal interchangeably with modernization. Indeed, ‘the requirements of the contemporary civilization’ provided the common rationale for the early Republican reforms, the principles of Kemalism and Turkey’s foreign policy orientation in the RPP programs. This intimate relation between modernization, Kemalism, and the reforms was further indicated in the speech that Mustafa Kemal gave on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic in 1933:

Our greater cause is to raise ourselves to become the most civilized and the most prosperous nation. This is the dynamic ideal of the great Turkish nation that has implemented fundamental reforms not only in her institutions but also in her ideas. In order to realize this ideal in the shortest possible time, ideas and actions must proceed together.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Gönübol, 248.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 250.

⁷⁸ Giritli and Baykal, 148.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 159.

⁸⁰ *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri 1919-1938*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Kurumu Basımevi, 1961), 344.

However, while this link is rarely questioned, the absence of direct reference to the West in the above-mentioned speech and in the RPP programs, and the ambiguity as to what the civilization refers to spurred divergent interpretations in the literature. As it was mentioned in the context of the ‘defensive approach’ to the ‘full-independence’ principle, for some, while the West represented the advanced level of civilization during 1920s and 1930s, this was merely temporal, and the implied source of civilization in Kemalism is “the community of world nations.”⁸¹ Accordingly, the dynamic aim of Kemalism is to continue the modernization measures at home, merge the universal ideal with nationalism, thereby become a modern democratic state within the community of nations and serve as a model to the all non-Western countries.⁸² In this sense, being a civilized democracy does not necessarily depend upon a Western-oriented foreign policy.

For our purposes, what is important here is how the foreign policy orientation is legitimized by an ideal – that is, how the ‘objective of Kemalism’ constitutes the idealist aspect of foreign policy. The ‘defensive approach’, besides emphasizing the pragmatic aspects of the Kemalist foreign policy (in that it explains being fully independent as a foreign policy that best maximizes Turkey’s national interests and security), can also be argued to provide an idealist explanation for foreign policy making – it explains following the maxim of ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’ by recourse to serving as an alternative model for the oppressed nations.

As was discussed in the context of the ‘integrationist perspective’ to full-independence, there is also a considerable consensus that this civilizational ideal is associated predominantly with the Westernist values, albeit from different viewpoints and with varying degrees of reservation. For Giritli and Baykal, for instance, what is meant by the contemporary civilization is unmistakably the West, and particularly Europe, as it represented

⁸¹ See, for instance, Kışlalı, *Atatürk’e Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği*, 57; Özden, 295; Aybars, *Atatürkçülük ve Modernleşme*, 131.

⁸² Aybars, *Atatürkçülük ve Modernleşme*, 131.

the humanism of the Renaissance-Reformation, and the most advanced civilization at the time.⁸³ For Gönlübol and Çeçen too, Atatürk used modernization as equivalent to Westernization.⁸⁴ Thus, contrary to the ‘defensive approach’, from this perspective, modernization as a process and an ideal implies Turkey’s transition from the Eastern civilization to the Western civilization.⁸⁵ The most referred speech of Atatürk in this context is where he said the following: “Which nation that wanted to be civilized has not turned towards the West?”⁸⁶ This, however, is not taken as a blind adherence to all of the values the West represents, but as the incorporation of the Western values within the Turkish culture.⁸⁷ Here we see an underlying assumption that these two are not in contradiction with each other. In this vein, İnan describes the objective of Kemalism as “turning back to the self and orientation towards the West”.⁸⁸

This Westernist interpretation of civilizationism takes the above-mentioned transformation and self-discovery inseparable from its foreign policy dimension. According to this line thought, the modernization/civilization ideal can be best accomplished through harmonizing the modernization measures at home with the level reached by the European countries, which are still the most advanced pluralist democracies.⁸⁹ Ultimately, this means full integration with the West and, under the present circumstances, the goal of membership in the EU.⁹⁰ In this context, Giritli and Baykal’s remark is revealing. Viewing Turkey’s EU quest from this perspective, they consider the ‘level’ of the EU as “the contemporary civilization

⁸³ Giritli and Baykal, 131.

⁸⁴ Gönlübol, 251; Çeçen, 152.

⁸⁵ Giritli and Baykal, 125.

⁸⁶ Quoted in Enver Ziya Karal, *Atatürk ve Devrim* (Ankara: ODTÜ, 1998), 56-7.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 128.

⁸⁸ İnan, 10. It should be noted here that while the modernization reforms and Turkey’s becoming a part of the European system date back to the 19th Century Ottoman Empire, the Westernism of the Ottoman Empire did not involve a Western-oriented foreign policy or cultural Westernization. As Gönlübol states, the reforms undertaken in the 19th Century were not systematic and remained superficial, whereas the Atatürk reforms were more comprehensive. See Gönlübol, 250-51.

⁸⁹ Şahinler, *Atatürkçülüğün Kökeni, Etkisi ve Güncelliği*, 165.

⁹⁰ Giritli and Baykal, 159.

stage the Turkish society has reached by following Atatürk's path".⁹¹ The authors also denounce any other foreign policy orientation that might be associated with 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization': "It is obvious that the protection and the advancement of Atatürk's reforms and principles can be only viable through integration with the EU."⁹² On the other hand, acknowledging that 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization' depends on establishing stable and relations with the Western countries and being in harmony with them, Şahinler does not view the 'membership' in the EU as a necessary condition for reaching this ideal and argues that "there is no way back from the modernization ideal, whether the EU supports us or not."⁹³ Hence, the idealist element in the foreign policy making can also be seen in the 'integrationist approach', in that it associates the objective of 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization' with the integration with the West, membership in the EU, and development of stable relations with the Western countries.

This shows that the role of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy is largely contested in the literature. In this regard, we can argue that there is not a fixed link between the initial interpretation of the 'six arrows' (both in the RPP programs and Atatürk's speeches) and what is attributed to following Atatürk's path in conducting foreign policy. While Atatürk's own speeches may have contributed to associating the contemporary civilization with the West, as our discussion showed, this has by no means remained the only available interpretation. Even in the discussions that see an inseparable link between this ideal and the Western-oriented foreign policy, the EU is not taken as the only way to accomplish this maxim.

1.3. Conceptualizing Kemalism

We have seen that the studies reviewed up to here presuppose that Kemalism has a determinable directive characteristic: whether in requiring the defense of the Turkish Republic

⁹¹ Ibidem.

⁹² Ibid., 160.

⁹³ Şahinler, *Atatürkçülüğün Kökeni, Etkisi ve Güncelliği*, 315.

against the Western imperialism or in propelling Turkey towards integration with the West. Second, the literature also involves a diverse range of conceptualizations with regard to Kemalism/Ataturkism, which is due to diverging views on the functions and characteristics of ideology. While some prefer to define Kemalism as an ideology, understanding ideology as a progressive thought system, others see it as a movement or a set of ideas since ideology is rather understood in the latter as a utopian and frozen set of principles which are contrasted to the objectives of Kemalism/Ataturkism. On the other hand, regardless of whether Kemalism is defined as an ideology or a movement, all works cited here consider it as a set of ideas that either facilitates or blocks a certain type of foreign policy; in other words, all see it effective in producing a specific foreign policy output. Yet, the question remains, as to which conceptualization serves the purposes of the present dissertation to examine the role of Kemalism in the Turkish foreign policy discourse.

As our non-exhaustive review of the literature on Kemalism showed, there is no commonly accepted interpretation of what sort of foreign policy direction Kemalism leads to, as there are multiple constructions of what Kemalism refers to. If we want to focus on how Kemalism is associated with a certain type of foreign policy, that is, if we want to focus on the very plurality of this discourse, then we cannot indeed draw upon the available conceptualizations in the literature as all tie the provided definition to a specific orientation, without leaving any room to examine multiple constructions associated with following Atatürk's path. Hence, the task ahead, is to clarify the conceptual position with regard to Kemalism before proceeding to discuss the role of the above-discussed objectives and the side principles of Kemalism in the context of the Turkish foreign policy discourse. The critical ideology studies provide an illuminating starting point in this respect.

1.3.1. Conceptualizing ideology and Kemalism as an ideology

Much of the traditional discussion on ideology has been couched in terms of two positions: One that takes ideology as a system of beliefs and thoughts that is socially embedded⁹⁴, and/or providing the needs of the society to reach at a better stage than it is at the moment; and the other that takes it as a ‘negative/false’ system of thoughts used by a minority of elites to secure their power at the expense of the rest.⁹⁵ While according to the former, ideology integrates the society and propels a legitimate course of action, to the latter, it forms the basic divisions in the society and creates a ‘false’ unity by motivating people to adhere what is against their ‘real’ interests on the one hand, and securing the power of those who propagate it on the other.

Following a neutralist position, Martin Seliger defines ideologies as action-oriented set of beliefs, which are capable of providing their adherents with goals, motivations, prescriptions, and imperatives.⁹⁶ As our review of the literature on Kemalism showed, most of the works that define Kemalism as an ideology also draw on this approach. They attribute a positive characteristic to the objectives of Kemalism in taking it as a progressive set of ideas directed at ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’. The critical ideology studies, on the other hand, connect the internal dynamism of ideology to its relation with its dissidents and show how one ideology becomes dominant as opposed to another. Terry Eagleton’s following remark is illustrative of this approach:

Part of the strength of the bourgeois ideology lies in the fact that it speaks from a multiplicity of sites, and in this subtle diffuseness presents no single target to its antagonists. Oppositional ideologies, similarly, usually reflect a provisional alliance of diverse radical forces.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ See for instance, Jie Chen, ed., *Ideology in U.S. Foreign Policy: Case Studies in U.S. China Policy* (London: Praeger, 1992), 1; Edward, Weisband, *The Ideology of American Foreign Policy* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1973); Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987); Şerif Mardin, *İdeoloji* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1993), 186.

⁹⁵ See Thompson, 4; Eatwell and Wright, ix; Fowler, *Ideologues and Ideologies in Latin America*, 2; Schurmann, 188.

⁹⁶ Martin Seliger, *Ideology and Politics* (London: Free Press, 1976).

⁹⁷ Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction* (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 45.

Hence, the critical perspective integrates the action-oriented-ness and the dynamism of ideologies with the dimension of power, considering the ideology construction more as a strategic game than a natural process. Based on this conceptualization, Thompson suggests that “to study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning (or signification) serves to sustain relations of domination.”⁹⁸ Hence, the ‘falsity’ attributed to ideology is not due to its contradiction with some form of scientific thought, but rather its implications: sustaining asymmetrical relations of power through obscuring what is ‘real’. Hence, ideology appears both as a side effect of perpetuating relations of domination, and a window-dressing for the hegemonic aims of some groups in the society. Based on this approach, it is not possible to view Kemalism as inherently democratic or with a genuine social base, since it is taken as a tool that serves to perpetuate the power of a segment of a population at the expense of the rest.⁹⁹ A similar observation was also emphasized in a European Commissioner’s report on Turkey’s entry to the EU in 2003. Kemalist philosophy, Arie Oostlander stated, with its strict anti-Islamic insight, in giving an excessive power and role to the military, and with its emphasis on the homogeneity of the Turkish culture and nationalism, poses a serious obstacle to the country’s future EU membership.¹⁰⁰ Here too, we see that Kemalism is taken as a fixed set of ideas that do not correspond to the basic needs of the society. Thus, just as the approach that considers ideology as a progressive set of ideas, the critical view ignores the contesting interpretations of what ideology (and Kemalism, in our case) signifies.

On the other hand, the primary function of ideology, for Antonio Gramsci, is not to obscure what constitutes the basic divisions in society, but to elicit consent, as what he terms

⁹⁸ Thompson, 4.

⁹⁹ See especially Çandar, 88–96; Yavuz, 33–38; and Doğan, *Kemalizm*, 63–79. Indeed, this negative conceptualization of ideology has been the explanation given as to why Kemalism should not be seen as an ideology but a movement.

¹⁰⁰ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, *Report on Turkey’s Application for Membership of the European Union*, European Parliament Session Document, (COM(2002) 700 – C5-0104/2003 – 2000/2014(COS)), prepared by Arie M. Oostlander, May 20, 2003, FINAL A5-0160/2003, <[http://www.dpt.gov.tr/abigm/abib/Diger/Oostlander%20Report%20EP-2003%20\(En\)%205%206%202003.pdf](http://www.dpt.gov.tr/abigm/abib/Diger/Oostlander%20Report%20EP-2003%20(En)%205%206%202003.pdf)> (accessed January 13, 2007).

as hegemony. To win hegemony, according to this view, is to establish moral, political, and intellectual leadership in social life by diffusing one's 'world view' over the whole panorama of society.¹⁰¹ Stuart Hall's analysis of 'Thatcherism' is illustrative of considering ideology as a hegemonic attempt from this perspective. According to Hall, Thatcherism was hegemonic not only because it sought to legitimize some economic policies, but also because it attempted to restructure the whole texture of political imaginary.¹⁰² Applying a similar framework to analyze Kemalism, Nur Betül Çelik argues that, since 1990s, "Kemalism has lost its ability to mediate among the floating elements in order to produce political consensus" and "has been unable to fix totally the meaning of all social and political activities."¹⁰³ This observation allows for a more dynamic and symbolic constitution of ideology by focusing on the receding limits of Kemalism and its gradual dissolution. Yet, it ignores the fact that hegemony does not exist by itself, but bears a counter-hegemonic experience that also seeks to conquer the spaces left by the central political agency.

Louse Phillips' discussion of Thatcherism is worth reviewing here. Rather than showing the initial hegemonic attempt of Thatcherism, Phillips focuses on how Thatcherism penetrated into the later political discourse by showing how the Labor Party incorporated Thatcherism within its discourse through appropriating the concepts that belonged to the Thatcherite terminology. He states that this appropriation did not involve integrating these concepts within a discourse which was completely antagonistic to Thatcherism. Rather, it was re-articulated within a mixed discourse, which contained elements of both Welfare discourse and Thatcherite discourse, constituting new meanings in line with the elements of both.¹⁰⁴ In this regard, hegemony is not a *state* of ideological domination but a continuous *struggle* for

¹⁰¹ For further information on hegemony, especially see Antonio Gramsci, *Selection from Prison Notebooks*, ed. Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith (London, Lawrence and Wishard, 1991).

¹⁰² Stuart Hall, "Authoritarian Populism: A Reply to Jessop et al.," *New Left Review* 151 (1985): 119.

¹⁰³ Nur Betül Çelik, "The Constitution and Dissolution of the Kemalist Imaginary," in *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies, and Social Change*, ed. David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), 193.

¹⁰⁴ Phillips, 855.

meanings in which different groups participate albeit unequally.¹⁰⁵ Taken from this perspective, ideology is not simply a *tool* of a governing power, but refers to the *way* power-struggles are fought at the level of significations. Hence, the emergence of alternative discourses on what an ideology seeks to hegemonize does not represent the dissolution of an ideology but underlies its dynamic constitution.

Thus, ideologies are not *true* or *false*, or either hegemonic or non-existent, but rather a lived practice of a dynamic nature. For hegemony to succeed, ideology has to win over alternative forms of thoughts, which is, given all practical considerations, never possible. Ideology then always needs to be asserted and reasserted, because eliciting consent is never a once-and-for-all achievement, but a process. Therefore, the following conceptualization of ideology is legitimate: ideology is a set of elements, the content of which is exposed to certain changes as the policy actors, in their hegemonic struggle with the alternative discourses, redefine them while justifying competing foreign policies. In this regard, ideology is constructed by the hegemonic *attempts* of and the continuing political struggle between the political actors, who provide plausible explanations and justifications to the elements of an ideology.¹⁰⁶

This not only provides us with a dynamic understanding of ideology that does not presuppose a fixed set of ideas, but also helps us make sense of the fact that many of the floating concepts of the current political discourse are still anchored to the fulfillment of Atatürk's vision. As discussed above, while Kemalist statism was used as a means to further economic protectionism during Atatürk's presidency, this later led to suggesting a type of statism that is more foreign investment friendly. Similarly, participatory democracy, political liberalism, and social democracy are some of the other concepts that have been integrated

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 847.

¹⁰⁶ From this perspective, Kemalism can be regarded as a hegemonic discourse, not in *accomplishing* an ideological domination but in *attempting* to 'fix' the political order. Based on this view, the emergence of counter-hegemonic discourses cannot be shown as evidence to Kemalism's dissolution.

within the Kemalist chain through being associated with following Atatürk's path.¹⁰⁷ Similarly, being a member of the EU or the need to remain out of it is another discourse that has been tied to the objective of 'raising Turkey to the level of the contemporary civilization' or 'full-independence'.

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffee's conceptualization of hegemony is also revealing in this sense. Their popular term 'suture' captures well how ideology is not a fixed set of ideas, or separated chains of discourse, but is constructed through partial fixations to give meaning. With this term, Laclau and Mouffee draw on the metaphor of a body, whose skin is permanently open, requiring endless efforts from the "surgeons of hegemony" to try to close the fissures.¹⁰⁸ This implies the 'unfixed' character of ideology as well as the continuous attempts by the political actors to 'fix' its meaning. These discursive points of partial fixation constitute what Laclau and Mouffe call as the 'nodal points'.¹⁰⁹ Hence, if ideology cannot be 'fixed', it only exists as an effort to construct that impossible object. In other words, ideology, without an ongoing fixation, cannot exist.

Building on this conceptualization, we can argue that Kemalism, as an ideology, does not operate according to strict structuralist logic - the practices of the actors bring changes in its constitution. In this sense, Kemalism is not a unified system that drives the action in a consistent direction. Rather, it comes as a package of various meanings, as a repertoire, from which political actors select different pieces for constructing their discourses. Actors may have various intentions for selecting particular concepts rather than others or for attributing specific meanings to them; but they are not only constrained in terms of the concepts of the previous discursive chain of Kemalism but also in terms of the discourses of other actors in doing so. Each articulation of a policy in terms of the ideas/principles of Atatürk, each

¹⁰⁷ See Giritli and Baykal, 149. On how Kemalism is associated with social democracy, see, for instance, Kışlalı, *Atatürk'e Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği*, 93.

¹⁰⁸ Michele Barrett, *The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991), 66.

¹⁰⁹ Laclau and Mouffee, 105.

'fixation' of the Atatürk's vision, therefore constitutes another nodal point, adding another chain to an already existing chain, in such a way that each fixation is translatable to another.¹¹⁰ Political actors then have to capture what an opposing discourse uses either through arguing that their version of Kemalism is the true one, or through delegitimizing the previous nodal point altogether.

This conceptualization provides a better perspective to examine how the concepts we have identified as representative of following Atatürk's path are associated with a certain foreign policy orientation, and how certain foreign policies are seen as a deviation from these concepts. Having also distinguished the objectives and the principles associated with following Atatürk's path in conducting foreign policy, what remains now is to identify what type of foreign policy conceptualization would allow to examine their role in the Turkish foreign policy discourse. This is the subject of the next chapter.

¹¹⁰ For a discussion on the translatability of different discourses with one another, see Thomas Diez, "Speaking 'Europe': The Politics of The Politics of Integration Discourse," *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, 4 (1999): 598-613.

CHAPTER II: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN FOREIGN POLICY: FROM THE RATIONALIST/IDEATIONALIST DIVIDE TOWARDS A POSTSTRUCTURALIST FRAMEWORK

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the following question: How does ideology as a set of ideas influence foreign policy? How does ideology structure the foreign policy discourse in a way that a particular foreign policy is seen as an affirmation of or a deviation from a general foreign policy orientation? The previous chapter already provided some of the conceptual tools necessary to examine the link between the two. Yet it has to be clarified what type of influence an ideology may have in foreign policy in order to explain the role of Kemalism in the Turkish foreign policy discourse.

While the previous chapter already defined Kemalism as an ideology and took it as a set of concepts and principles, it makes more sense for our purposes to loosen our definition and place ideology within the group of ‘ideational factors’, and focus on the foreign policy side of the problem as a starting point for the chapter. Indeed, looking from the other end of the equation, ideologies, just as it is with the other ‘ideational factors’, such as identities and ideas, are either not considered at all, or seen as the main determinant of foreign policy in the foreign policy literature. Approaching from this angle also allows us to see how Turkey’s foreign policy orientation is conceptualized and how certain foreign policies are seen as a deviation from this orientation. In this regard, while we will first revisit the so-called rationalist/ideationalist divide to formulate the problem, we will then move beyond this dichotomy to clarify the role of ideology in the post-structuralist approach which we will build upon by bringing our previous discussion on ideology and Kemalism into the debate.

2.1. Ideas as a 'trifle' of foreign policy

According to most definitions, foreign policy refers to a complex, multilayered process, involving the objectives that governments pursue in their relations with other governments and their choice of means to accomplish these objectives.¹¹¹ This comprehensive approach finds its sharp contrast in neorealism, in which the aim has been to move away from descriptive case studies, explaining why an individual state acts in a particular way, towards a uniform theory: what explains the interaction between states.¹¹² Hence, contrary to the other perspectives that infer outcomes exceptionally from the attributes of actors producing them, neorealism mainly focuses on the causation at the systemic level and takes the domestic attributes as constant. This systematic exercise abstracts from the picture everything internal to states, i.e. subjective influences, ideas, norms, and unique events. As such, neorealism does not aspire to be a foreign policy theory, but as put by Kenneth Waltz, “the theory of international politics”.¹¹³ It might therefore appear as a foregone attempt to begin examining the role of a domestic ideology within an approach which does not take it into consideration. Yet, our purpose is legitimate so long as we want to show how not only the domestic but also the ideational factors occupy a trivial space in the studies that draw on this approach, and hence emphasize the divide drawn between the material/rational and the ideational.

From the neorealist lenses, the causality in international politics runs in two directions, both from the interacting units (states) to the outcomes produced, and from the structure of the system to the interacting units.¹¹⁴ Yet, both realism and neorealism assume the attributes of the system and the main drive for the states in such a way that shift their focus on the constraining effects of the system, how it encourages certain behaviors and penalizes those

¹¹¹ Vendulka Kubalkova, “Foreign Policy, International Politics, and Constructivism,” in *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), 19.

¹¹² See Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey, Patrick J. Haney, “Generational Change in Foreign Policy Analysis,” in *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation*, ed. Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey, and Patrick J. Haney (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1995), 3.

¹¹³ See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), 106.

¹¹⁴ Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” *Journal of International Affairs* 44 (1990): 31.

who do not respond to the encouragement. For (neo) realism, states are unitary and rational actors operating in an anarchic environment, and striving to survive (protecting their national sovereignty within their territorial borders) and enhance their security. As the anarchy implies the constant possibility that force might be used against anyone,¹¹⁵ securing the survival requires states to seek for relative gains (increase their material capabilities *vis-à-vis* other states).¹¹⁶ In this regard, the assumption of rationality and anarchy conveys a system of mutual insecurity in which only one type of policy is rational, hence unavoidable for states: that of balance of power. Anarchy, therefore, appears as a homogenizer, which makes each state functionally undifferentiated despite the differences in their material capabilities.

In this imagery, states are such entities that are preoccupied with their security and wealth, mainly the defense of their territorial borders, their material wealth, and the power to prevent outside interferences, and controlling what they depend on or lessening the extent of their dependency.¹¹⁷ However, it should be noted that there are also varying views within this approach. On the one hand, Waltz argues that “in a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest.”¹¹⁸ On the other hand, Mearsheimer, not drawing a sharp contrast between the economic and security interests, argues that states become more concerned about their relative gains when security is scarce.¹¹⁹ While realism is generally understood in terms of its preoccupation with relative interests¹²⁰, for Mastanduno,

¹¹⁵ This assumption has been challenged by neo-liberals, who argue that even under a self-help system cooperation is also possible as states seek to increase their absolute gains. On this view see Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1989).

¹¹⁶ See Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962); Michael Mastanduno, “Do Relative Interests Matter? America’s Response to Japanese Industrial Policy,” *International Security* 16 (Summer 1991): 73-113; R. Harrison Wagner, “Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives,” *International Organization* 28, 3 (1974): 435-66.

¹¹⁷ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 106. See also Stephen Krasner, “Compromising Westphalia,” *International Security* 20, 3 (Winter, 1995-1996): 121.

¹¹⁸ Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” p. 107.

¹¹⁹ John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” *International Security* 15, 1 (Summer 1990): 44, 45.

¹²⁰ See Stephen Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” *Foreign Policy* 110 (Spring 1998): 35, where he describes the most important contribution of Realism to IR theory as its focus on the relative interests.

however, there is no such a necessary divide between the absolute and the relative, since striving for relative economic wealth could be also directed towards future absolute gain (welfare, real income)¹²¹. For Donnelly, too, if one focuses on the principal objectives that realists typically consider (survival, security, prosperity, autonomy), then it is legitimate to take the maximization of absolute gains as a characteristic of realist conclusions.¹²² From this perspective, states do not only balance the power of other states (pursue relative gains) but also bandwagon (pursue absolute gains) with a more powerful one.¹²³

Can we argue then, that realism exceptionally considers material interests, with no consideration of ideals at all? Despite Waltz's inclination to view international politics as almost entirely a matter of material interests, some realists take into consideration some motives that cannot be seen as purely material. For Morgenthau, for instance, prestige is also a motive for a state action, albeit rarely sought.¹²⁴ For Machiavelli, too, as Donnelly notes, "glory drives imperial expansion."¹²⁵ Yet, given that accumulation of power is still considered as a means, even when glory or prestige are considered as an end for a state action, and that these motives are seen only exceptional and rarely sought under the anarchic environment, it is fair to argue that the consideration of ideals remains rather trivial within the power-dominated approach of realism and that material interests are still prioritized over the ideal ones.¹²⁶ While one can extract an ideal as a motive from realism as well, the exceptional focus placed on the material base of the international system and the material means to operate within it still produces only one type of identity for the states, that of self-help, without

¹²¹ Mastanduno, 75-77.

¹²² Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 61.

¹²³ Ibidem.

¹²⁴ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 94

¹²⁵ Donnelly, 69.

¹²⁶ It should be added here that, apart from the classical realists that consider certain ideas as a motive for a state's action, there are also neoclassical realist works that explain why a certain state chooses to bandwagon or balance by recourse to a combination of domestic factors, among which identities also take part. For a review of the neoclassical approach to foreign policy, see especially, Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, 1 (1998): 144-172.

allowing any room for the construction or the reconstruction of these identities.¹²⁷ In this regard, questioning whether a particular policy is compatible with an ideology or an ideal is not something that occupies the central place among the ‘rational’ questions of the decision maker, who mainly asks: which policy maximizes the material interests at this given conjuncture, which power threatens the national sovereignty, and which policy would balance it? In other words, “considerations of power dominate considerations of ideology.”¹²⁸

2.1.1. (Neo)realist approaches to Turkey’s Western-orientation and Cyprus policy

This rationalist framework can be observed in the analyses that endeavor to reveal the ‘real’ causes for Turkey’s particular foreign policy choices, mainly her orientation toward the West. Drawing on the assumptions of the (neo) realist/rationalist approach described above, some scholars have examined the effect of the international system during the Cold War on Turkey’s integration with the Western bloc, and particular foreign policy fluctuations from this orientation.¹²⁹ The evolution of the international system into a bipolar structure, it is argued, pushed Turkey towards the Western tutelage, as “the policy of neutrality was not very realistic or possible for a country like Turkey, a middle-range power situated in such a geopolitically important area.”¹³⁰ In most of the analyses Turkey’s Western-oriented foreign policy is thereby taken as contingent to the Cold War politics and depicted as a rational if not

¹²⁷ See K. Krause and M. G. Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies? Politics and Method,” *Mershon International Studies Review* 40, 2 (1996): 239-42; Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwill, “Revisiting the ‘National’: Towards an Identity Agenda in Neorealism,” in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, ed. Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwill (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp: 123-24.

¹²⁸ Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” 31.

¹²⁹ See, for example, Steve Smith, “Foreign Policy Theory and the New Europe,” in *European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe*, ed. Walter Carlsnæs and Steve Smith (London: Sage, 1994); William Hale, “Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis,” *International Affairs* 68, 4 (1992): 679-92; Sabri Sayari, “Turkey: the Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis,” *Middle East Journal* 46, 1 (1993), accessed from <<http://www.ciaonet.org>> (accessed June 5, 2005); Faruk Sönmezoğlu, “Turkey and the World in the 21st Century,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era*, ed. İdris Bal (Boca Raton, Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004), 79-95; Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 103-139; Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*.

¹³⁰ Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 106.

the only foreign policy *choice*.¹³¹ Hence, the argument follows that this bandwagoning behavior was rational; because this option maximized Turkey's absolute economic interests: Turkey was in a great need for the Marshall Aid and the Truman Doctrine which provided substantial amounts of financial and military aid for Turkey together with Greece.¹³² It was rational; because Turkey chose to increase her relative interest *vis-à-vis* Greece, since Turkey's isolation in the international arena would not give her the necessary leverage over the Cyprus issue.¹³³ Last, but not the least, it was driven towards survival, as the Soviet Union was posing a great threat against the Turkish territory and her national sovereignty.¹³⁴

From this perspective, for which the main constraining factor of Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War was the bipolar structure of the international system, Turkey's Western-orientation appears as a series of foreign policy actions that confirm Turkey's role as the southwestern flank of the Western bloc in containing the Soviet threat. Turkey's participation in the Korean War, allowing the United States to use her bases for intervening in the civil war in Lebanon in 1958, and siding with the West in opposing the non-allied policies of the Third World countries during the Bandung Conference of 1955 fit well within this role in that they took place during when the arms-race between the Soviet Union and the United States was at its peak.¹³⁵ Indeed, the systemic factors receive such predominance in these analyses that even the so-called deviations from the Western-orientation, Turkey's failed attempt to intervene in Cyprus in 1963 and her final intervention in 1974 during which the Turkish foreign policy is

¹³¹ See for instance, Rubin, and Kirişçi; Bağ; Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*; Ismael and Aydın; Sander; Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War"; Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*.

¹³² See Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War," 110, Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, xii.

¹³³ Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War," 124.

¹³⁴ As a condition for renewing the Friendship and Non-Aggression Agreement signed in 1921 between the Soviet Union and Turkey, Joseph Stalin demanded the Kars and Ardahan provinces from Turkey, and the right to control the international passages from the Straits. See F. Vâli, *Turkish Straits and NATO* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 77-78.

¹³⁵ Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War," 114; Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 37.

argued to have strayed from its regular parameters,¹³⁶ are situated within the explanatory reach of systemic attributes. According to this approach, although the 1974 intervention was realized despite the warnings of the United States and the Western European countries and was hence an open defiance,¹³⁷ it was still responsive to the encouragements of the system. Cyprus crises took place during the D tente period, when the hostilities between the superpowers were somehow abated. Having diversified her foreign policy partners, Turkey was hence neither constrained by the interests of the West, nor dependent on the financial or military support provided by it while undertaking such an action.¹³⁸

Therefore, similar to Turkey’s orientation towards the West, her contextual disengagement from this orientation is also viewed from the realist glasses: Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974 was rational; because, Turkey was not constrained by the limits of the bipolar system, during the presence of which her action would amount to self-destruction. It was rational; since Turkey was driven by the motive of increasing her relative interest *vis- -vis* Greece: The geographical position of the island of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean was strategically important for Turkey since a Greek-led Cyprus would cut off Turkey from the open sea.¹³⁹ Indeed, this was ruled out as a possibility with the London and Zurich Agreements and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee which created an independent Cyprus Republic in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots would share the power, and secured the

¹³⁶ Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 114;  elik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 37; Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 149.

¹³⁷ The most common reference in this context is the so-called Johnson letter, sent by the President of the U.S., Lyndon Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, upon Turkey’s notification that revealed her intentions to intervene in the conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1963. Johnson wrote that “NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies” ( elik 1999, xiii).

¹³⁸  elik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, xiii.

¹³⁹ Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 120; Sabahattin İsmail, *150 Soruda Kıbrıs Sorunu* (Istanbul: Kestaş Yayınevi, 1998), 49. In fact some argue that Turkey did not need to increase her relative interests *vis- -vis* Greece as she maintained about three times as many troops under arms as did Greece. (Castlebarry 1964, 119). However, the argument is valid so long as one takes into consideration how the unification of Cyprus and Greece would change this advantageous position Turkey enjoyed in the 1960s.

balance of power among the guarantor powers Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.¹⁴⁰ The thirteen constitutional amendments made in 1963 by the Archbishop Makarios, the President of the RoC, and later the Athens-instigated *coup d'état* of 1974, however, changed this balance of power at the expense of Turkey's interests, in limiting the political rights of the Turkish community,¹⁴¹ and in seeking to unify Cyprus with Greece.¹⁴² A possible *Enosis* (unification with Greece), seen as the first step in achieving the *Megali Idea* (the re-establishment of the Byzantium Empire), and the assimilation of the Turkish community living in the island was therefore what Turkey attempted to prevent from happening in order to protect her security interests in the region.¹⁴³ With a twist, Aydın argues that *Enosis* turned the issue not only a matter of national security for Turkey, but also that of national pride.¹⁴⁴

Second, Turkey's action is considered to confirm the realist approach in representing an independent policy, pursued in accordance with the already acquired rights to intervene. Based on this approach, it is argued; it was Turkey's *right* to unilaterally intervene as a guarantor power to restore the order established in 1960.¹⁴⁵ While this does not fit in the conceptualization of sovereignty as 'the degree of control exercised within the given territory', it is however representative of another understanding of sovereignty, the power to exercise an independent foreign policy, and the ability to lessen the degree of dependency, especially given that the failure to act is seen as a serious obstacle to the country's room for maneuver, and that Turkey's action is regarded as having been pursued independently from the United States.¹⁴⁶ In this regard, this 'deviation' was rational; as it was driven by Turkey's desire to defend her sovereignty. From this perspective, which values relative interests over

¹⁴⁰ Seyment Atasoy, "Cyprus, Turkey, and the EU: The Need for a Gradual Approach," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 10, 1 (Fall 2003): 258.

¹⁴¹ For details, see Robert Stephens, *Cyprus, a Place of Arms: Power Politics and Ethnic Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean* (London: Pall Mall, 1966), 168-94.

¹⁴² Atasoy, 258-59.

¹⁴³ Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctions during the Cold War," 120.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴⁵ Atasoy, 259; Şahinler, *Türkiye'nin 1974 Kıbrıs Siyaseti* (Istanbul: Yeni Karar Matbaası, 1979), 53.

¹⁴⁶ Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, xiii.

the absolute, the costs of the intervention, maintaining the Turkish troops in the island, the subsequent American embargo and economic sanctions in the aftermath of the operation, as well as the absence of a clear economic interest in undertaking the operation are not seen as something that supersede the gains of securing the balance of power and the national security upon the intervention. The mere presence of national security and honor motives and the diminishing constraints of the international system qualify the action as a realist and a rationalist one.

The tendency of this approach to prioritize the material over the ideational can be also observed in how it views an ideologically driven policy as an irrational one. This can be seen in the studies that suggest that Turkish foreign policy should be based upon an ‘interest’, not an ‘ideal’,¹⁴⁷ and that praise Turkey’s Cyprus intervention as not having followed an ideology.¹⁴⁸ Similar arguments are also provided in relation to Turkey’s present policy on the Cyprus issue and her EU membership goal. While the rationality of Turkey’s quest for EU membership is not doubted,¹⁴⁹ Turkey’s holding on to her Cyprus cause is not seen incompatible with her national interests, despite the fact that it leads to a stalemate in Turkey’s negotiations with the EU.¹⁵⁰

According to this rationalist view, if Western-orientation is taken in its ideological sense, it can hinder Turkey’s freedom of maneuver as a Westernist policy may be incompatible with Turkey’s national interests.¹⁵¹ For this reason, it is argued, Turkey should not accede to the Western pressures over the Cyprus issue for the sake of following a

¹⁴⁷ İsmail Cem, *Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya* (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2004), 258; Sönmezoğlu, “Turkey and the World in the 21st Century,” 90.

¹⁴⁸ Şahinler, *Türkiye’nin 1974 Kıbrıs Siyaseti*, 76; Sönmezoğlu, *Türkiye’nin 1974 Kıbrıs Siyaseti*, 93.

¹⁴⁹ Sönmezoğlu, *Türkiye’nin 1974 Kıbrıs Siyaseti*, 89; Hüseyin Bağcı and İdris Bal, “Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era: New Problems and Opportunities,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era* ed. İdris Bal (Boca Raton, Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004), 105.

¹⁵⁰ Atasoy, 257; Ahmet O. Evin, “The Future of Turkish-Greek Relations,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 5, 3 (September 2005): 400.

¹⁵¹ Sönmezoğlu, “Turkey and the World in the 21st Century,” 93.

Westernist or European foreign policy.¹⁵² Just as the membership in the EU should be pursued as long as the EU continues to be an important strategic and trade partner, Turkey's policy in relation to the Cyprus issue should also be based upon the requirements of the balance of power at the international and regional systemic levels and Turkey's own national interests.¹⁵³ As a consequence, in that it does not assign a central position to the pursuit of ideology or ideals, the rationalist/realist approach falls short of providing a framework to examine how an ideology can be seen as a deviation from or an affirmation of a specific foreign policy. Kemalism, according to this view, simply appears to have no role in Turkey's Western-orientation or her Cyprus policy. Its pursuit as an ideology can only render a certain foreign policy action an irrationally conducted one, even if the decision happens to serve the national interests of Turkey in the long term.

2.2. Ideas/ideologies as factors in foreign policy

Having discussed the realist approach that relegates the role of ideas and ideology under the material interests, we can now move to consider another approach which treats ideas as important factors in conducting foreign policy. Within this ideas-oriented research agenda, the constructivist studies are noteworthy in their focus on the role of ideas, norms and identities in shaping the relations between states. According to the constructivist approach to international relations, inter-state relations are "determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces".¹⁵⁴ In contrast to the (neo) realist works, constructivist studies consider the environment in which agents/states operate as social rather than material; and argue that this setting constitutes both the identities and thereby the interests of the interacting agents.¹⁵⁵ Thus, whatever is taken constant in the realist works (anarchy, identities and interests) are

¹⁵² Ibidem.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 90; Cem, *Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya*, 235.

¹⁵⁴ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1.

¹⁵⁵ Joseph K. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50 (1998): 324.

shown here as contingent to the interaction between the agents as well as the interaction between the agents and the international ideational structure.¹⁵⁶ In this respect, just as in neorealism, the causality in constructivism runs in both directions; however, the latter emphasizes the ideational characteristics of the structures in which states operate, and the process of change as a result of this interaction. A constructivist analysis of state behavior hence focuses on 1) how states' expectations produced by their interaction with the international (normative) system affect their identities, 2) how identities construct and transform actors' interests, and 3) how states' actions based on their interests construct and transform the international (normative) system.¹⁵⁷

Indeed, most of the constructivist studies are centered on the role of international norms in international politics rather than the question as to how the meanings assigned to these norms are generated from within the states.¹⁵⁸ On the other hand, there is also a large body of work that focuses on national identity construction in particular cases, how international norms are filtered through domestic norms and ideologies, how domestic ideas bring revolutions in international norms through identity constitution and changes in social forms of power, and the role of domestic ideas and ideologies in foreign policy making.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ As Checkel states, by pointing out this mutual constitution, constructivists open up the "black-box of interest and identity formation" and show how state interests, which are taken by the realist works as given and dependent on the 'fixed' anarchical nature of the international system, are endogenous to states' interaction with structures (international norms) and the resulting identity formation (Checkel 1998, 326).

¹⁵⁷ Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992): 417. For other constructivist works, see John Ruggie, *Constructing the World Politics: Essays on International Institutionalization* (London: Routledge, 1998); Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 3, 3 (1997): 319-59; Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Friedrich Kratochwill, *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Andreas Antoniadis, "Epistemic Communities, Epistemes and the Construction of (World) Politics," *Global Society* 17, 1 (2003): 21-38.

¹⁵⁸ On this view, see also Wæver, "Identity, communities and foreign policy," 21-22; Erik Ringmar, "Alexander Wendt: a Social Scientist Struggling with History," in *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?* ed. Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (London: Routledge, 1997), 269-89.

¹⁵⁹ See, for instance, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Adler, "Ideological 'Guerrillas' and the Quest for Technological Autonomy: Brazil's Domestic Computer Industry," *International Organization* 40, 3 (Summer 1986): 673-705; Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999): 83-114; Checkel, "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change,"

Within this research agenda, which can be called as the ideational approach to foreign policy, there is not a consensus over how and to what extent ideas/identities/ideologies play a role in decision making. Nevertheless, all rely on the premise that realist approaches to foreign policy are not sufficiently helpful to understand many unexpected foreign policy choices (anomalies) and that the decision makers are not only constrained by material systemic factors and interests but by certain ideational factors as well. Hence, in order to show that ‘ideas matter’, ideational explanations are first separated from the material factors to be measured against them. This results in either assigning ideas/ideologies/identities an independent causal role or re-integrating them with the material factors to provide a more comprehensive analysis for specific foreign policy actions.¹⁶⁰

Franz Schurmann’s *The Logic of World Power* is illustrative of locating ideology within the ideational sphere, which is somewhat separated from the material world (interests). Imperialism, according to Schurmann, is inherently an ideological growth, since it is an emanation of not the realm of interests, but that of ideology.¹⁶¹ Cassels provides a similar account in his analysis of the familiar ‘isms’ of the past two centuries, arguing that the realist thinking undervalues the emotional appeal of ideologies in viewing them as rationalist exercises.¹⁶² Jie Chens’s below-quoted remark also represents a similar attempt to isolate ideology as a significant cause for foreign policy:

...the set of values, cognitions, ideas, and ideals — namely the ideology held by a majority of the American people — substantially affects U.S. foreign policy.¹⁶³

International Organization 55, 3 (Summer 2001): 553-88; Daniell Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Douglas W. Blum, “The Soviet Foreign Policy Belief System: Beliefs, Politics, and Foreign Policy Outcomes,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37, 4 (December 1993): 373-94; Thomas Risse Kappen, “Ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war,” *International Organization* 48, 2 (Spring 1994): 185-214; Zbigniew Brezinski, “Communist ideology and international affairs,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4, 3 (September 1960): 266-91.

¹⁶⁰ Wæver, “Identity, communities and foreign policy,” 22.

¹⁶¹ Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 188.

¹⁶² Cassels, 246.

¹⁶³ Chen, 1.

In contrast to the realist view which takes it as a window-dressing, ideology is taken here as a socially shared enterprise. Ideology, as Chen states, is rooted in the cultural traditions into which the society is internalized; thus its role in foreign policy is inevitable.¹⁶⁴ Yet, Chen does not take ideology as a constant but rather an intervening variable between the objective conditions (material capability of states, distribution of power in the international system) and the foreign policy behavior. Hence, he states that, while people's perception of the objective conditions and threat influence the strength of an ideology, change in the strength of an ideology produces foreign policy fluctuations, leading to either cooperative, coercive or flexible policies.¹⁶⁵

Thus, ideology appears here as a medium through which perceptions of an audience as regards the 'objective conditions' affect the foreign policy decision making. In some works, however, the causality runs in both directions, taking ideology also as a medium through which foreign policy issues are transmitted to and perceived by an audience.¹⁶⁶ According to this line of thought, ideology affects the patterns of attitude at the level of mass public through the foreign policies conducted by the state elite and influences the patterns of policy making at the elite level (the beliefs and actions of the rulers may also be shaped by the values from below). Indeed, the need for ideology to be consensual and responsive to social needs is taken so important in some of the works that without this characteristic, it is argued, ideology ceases to exist, let alone have any role in the making of foreign policy.¹⁶⁷

While these accounts take the emotional and consensual aspect of ideology as a necessary component for foreign policy, it can be argued that this aspect is not a necessary condition for a policy's implementation. For Mark Haas, for instance, ideology affects the

¹⁶⁴ Chen, 2-4. For a similar view, see Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1960), 158, 159; and Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

¹⁶⁵ Chen, 11.

¹⁶⁶ On similar arguments, see Cassels, 8 ; and Walter Carlsnæs, *Ideology and Foreign Policy: Problems of Competitive Conceptualization* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 2.

¹⁶⁷ Brezinski, 275.

foreign policy by shaping the policy actors' understanding of the security environment in which they operate.¹⁶⁸ In this sense, ideology is a filter through which leaders (rather than the society in general) perceive their objectives and threats posed to their domestic and international interests and perform means for realizing their goals.¹⁶⁹ Hence, diverging from the view that sees ideology as a shared enterprise, this approach confines ideological calculation to the environment in which foreign policy leaders operate.

This also suggests that the presence of an ideational system in which the state elites function does not necessarily mean that there are no ends and means calculations. In this respect, the fact that the objectives of a given ideology may be believed by the decision maker does not exclude the possibility that there are no political interests involved therein. Based on this view, in *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, Keohane and Goldstein seek to show the significance of ideas in determining the foreign policy behavior while not challenging the rationality assumption. Hence they argue: "Ideas matter for policy, even when human beings behave rationally to achieve their ends."¹⁷⁰ Thus, instead of showing the effect of ideas on a foreign policy behavior by focusing on the irrationality of the action or on the social acceptability of the ideas in question, the authors rather point out how ideas change the way decision makers interpret the means and ends of their actions, and how this in turn influences foreign policy.

According to this approach, ideas, when they are institutionalized, guide the foreign policy behavior by stipulating clear causal or moral motivations for an action and providing the range of what is permissible in a given context.¹⁷¹ Hence, ideas affect the foreign policy when they are embedded in political institutions, and when the roadmaps they provide increase actors' clarity about their goals, thereby providing guidelines for achieving foreign

¹⁶⁸ Mark L. Haas, *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989* (London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 2.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁷⁰ Goldstein, and Keohane, 5

¹⁷¹ For a similar discussion without an emphasis on institutionalization, see Blum, 373-94, where he argues that ideas shape the foreign policy making by placing limits on the kinds of options available to decision makers and hence defining the range of politically legitimate positions.

policy objectives.¹⁷² In other words, ideas influence behavior under conditions of uncertainty over the realizable goals of an action, as it is under such circumstances when decision makers would be more inclined to pursue the clearly set guidelines of an institutionalized idea. Özkeçeci-Taner contributes to this discussion by identifying the conditions under which a certain idea can be more effective in foreign policy decision making. Examining the ideas of the political parties that take part in coalitional governments, she argues that ideas are more influential in decision making when the party organized around a certain idea is the major party in the coalition, holding major ministerial positions that are effective in foreign decision making; when the coalition is composed of highly polarized groups, and when the foreign policy issue is a highly salient one among the public.¹⁷³

In this regard, the consideration that institutionalized ideas, ideologies or identities can have a causal role in foreign policy does not necessarily presuppose that interest-based calculations are absent from decision making. Then, what makes an approach ideational is the very attempt to show that foreign policy is not a purely strategic realm as conceptualized by realists, and that ideas, ideologies or identities, be they are shared by all or upheld by a rather few, do motivate the leaders to push for a certain agenda in foreign policy. Hence, the main goal is to show the causal role of ideas, ideologies or identities in foreign policy which is subsumed by the realist studies.

2.2.2. Ideationalist approaches to Turkish foreign policy

Drawing on the ideationalist approach discussed above, some studies examine how Turkish foreign policy has been guided by identity considerations, how the interests of the foreign policy decision makers are filtered by various identities and ideas in Turkey (e.g. Westernism, Kemalism, Islamism, Nationalism, Internationalism, and Conservatism) and how parties, each having been organized around a certain idea or identity compete with each

¹⁷² Goldstein and Keohane, 3-10.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 270.

other to influence decision making.¹⁷⁴ In order to point out the role of Turkey's foreign policy interactions and domestic transformation in this context, some works also show how certain changes in the way Turkey conducts her foreign policy are a result of the transformation of the Turkish foreign policy identity and particular political identities in Turkey, and how Turkey's foreign policy interactions and her domestic transformation (via Europeanization and democratization) form and change these identities.¹⁷⁵

From an ideationalist perspective, Turkey's Western/European-orientation appears a result of the Westernist identity that was institutionalized in the earlier years of the Turkish Republic.¹⁷⁶ Westernism, it is argued, has influenced the Turkish foreign policy decision making by shaping the world-view of the Turkish foreign policy elites who interpreted national interests accordingly.¹⁷⁷ Turkey's decision to take part in NATO, OECD and the EU was hence a result of the Westernist world-view of the Turkish elites who saw it in the interest of Turkey to join various Western/European organizations, not because these policies objectively maximized Turkey's national interests.¹⁷⁸ In other words, Turkey's Western-orientation was born out of the value system of the Turkish elites "rather than a more detached and comprehensive evaluation of national interest".¹⁷⁹ Hence, while identity and ideological considerations are taken as an independent variable for Turkey's Western-orientation, Western-orientation in turn is understood as a series of actions that are driven with the

¹⁷⁴ Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*; Aras, *Turkey and the Greater Middle East*; Özkeçeci-Taner, "The Impact of Institutionalized Ideas in Coalition Foreign Policy Making: Turkey as an Example".

¹⁷⁵ See for instance, Diez, "Turkey, the European Union and Security Complexes Revisited"; Rumelili, "Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish Cooperation"; Oğuzlu, "The Impact of 'Democratisation in the Context of the EU Accession Process' on Turkish Foreign Policy"; and Ahmet İçduygu and Özlem Kaygusuz, "The Politics of Citizenship by Drawing Borders: Foreign Policy and the Construction of National Citizenship Identity in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, 6 (November 2004): 26-50; Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, "Turkey and the Middle East: frontiers of the new geographic imagination," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, 4 (December 2007): 471-88; İhsan Dağı, "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization," *Turkish Studies* 6, 1 (March 2005): 21-37.

¹⁷⁶ Bozdağlıoğlu, 6; Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs," 171; Robins, 138-39.

¹⁷⁷ Bozdağlıoğlu, 6; Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs," 171; Robins, 138-39.

¹⁷⁸ Robins, 138-39.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 139.

objective to be a part of the West, mainly the Western organizations. Accordingly, it is argued that the foreign policy moves Turkey undertook in the context of her Western-orientation, such as the membership in NATO and especially her quest to be a member of the EU, cannot be purely understood by recourse to material factors as these also symbolize an identity orientation for the foreign policy elite and the society in Turkey: transition from being 'Eastern' to 'Western'.¹⁸⁰

To another ideationalist view, on the other hand, Western and European identity did not drive Turkey's application to a number of Western/European organizations but was constructed as a result of Turkey's interactions with these organizations. This is based on the view that identity considerations can be argued to have a stable impact on foreign policy only after a long process of socialization, and in so far as the foreign policy of a country manifests a certain norm of behavior which corresponds to a certain identity. Studies that have this view especially focus on Turkey's relations with the EU. To this view, Turkey's Westernization and Europeanization began to be a social and a foreign policy reality after Turkey was granted membership candidacy status in 1999.¹⁸¹ As of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey's previously conflict-ridden relations with her neighboring countries (especially with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus) gave way to more cooperative policies; and Turkey began to pursue her security through cooperation.¹⁸² The changes that took place in this context — the resignation of the Turkish government from considering confederation as a solution for the Cyprus issue, and backing instead the Annan Plan for the creation of a United Cyprus Republic — show the behavioral shift that represents a change in the norm content of Turkish

¹⁸⁰ Barry Rubin, "Introduction", in *Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*, ed. Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (London, Portland, and Oregon: Frank Cass, 2003), 1.

¹⁸¹ See, for instance, Diez, "Turkey, the European Union and Security Complexes Revisited"; Rumelili, "Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish Cooperation"; Ahmet Evin, "The Future of Greek-Turkish Relations," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 5, 3 (September 2005): 395-404. İhsan Dağı calls this process as the normalization of Turkey's Westernization. See Dağı, *İnsan Hakları, Küresel Siyaset ve Türkiye* (Istanbul: Boyut, 2000), 162.

¹⁸² Rumelili, "Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish Cooperation," 45.

foreign policy.¹⁸³ Hence, while these foreign policy moves are shown as proofs for the ‘Europeanization’ of Turkish foreign policy, many other policies previously pursued by Turkey in this context —Turkey’s reactions against the accession of the RoC to the EU, the installation of S-300 missiles in Cyprus, and the criticisms with regard to the presence of the Turkish military in Northern Cyprus; Turkey’s support for the confederation thesis of the leader of the TRNC and her refusal to recognize the RoC, as well as her strong reservations concerning the role of the EU in the resolution of the conflict — are not seen concordant with a ‘European’ style of dealing with the issue and/or Turkey’s European-orientation.¹⁸⁴

Indeed, such a view on ‘Europeanization’ or ‘European-orientation’ rests on a certain understanding of ‘Europe’ and ‘European identity’ which are confined to the EU integration process and separated from the individual identifications of those who are concerned. According to this view, European integration represents an evolution whereby the definition of security exclusively as the protection of sovereign national borders from military threat is replaced by the one that involves benefits received from mutual cooperation.¹⁸⁵ Thus, even if economic incentives may initially guide the foreign policy practices of the countries that are undergoing the process of integration, ‘European identity’ becomes a properly internalized social reality and drives the later foreign policy actions after a period of routinized actions that conform to the above-mentioned norms. Hence, according to this view, European-orientation entails a set of actions each conforming to the assumed ‘European’ behaviour. Similarly, certain actions that do not represent this identity, such as the traditional policies Turkey pursued towards Cyprus, seem to constitute a deviation from it or reveal that the ‘European identity’ has not yet been a fully internalized social reality in the Turkish context.

¹⁸³ Diez, “Turkey, the European Union and Security Complexes Revisited,” 170-72.

¹⁸⁴ Oğuzlu, “The Impact of ‘Democratisation in the Context of the EU Accession Process’ on Turkish Foreign Policy”, 108; Melakopides, “Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union for Greek-Turkish and Euro-Turkish Relations,” 74.

¹⁸⁵ Pernille Rieker, “Security, Integration and Identity Change”, Working Paper 611, Dec 2000, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), 16, <<http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/rip10/rip10.pdf>> (accessed July 5, 2008).

This shows that the way a specific identity, ideology or a set of ideas is defined is significant in showing its impact on foreign policy. This can be observed in the ideationalist analyses that refer to the role of Kemalism in directing Turkish foreign policy. Kemalist ideology, according to some of these works, was decisive in Turkey's Western/European-orientation in her foreign policy as Kemalism is inherently Westernist and since it was the Kemalist elites who decided for many foreign policy moves that pushed Turkey towards modernization and integration with the West/Europe.¹⁸⁶ In this respect, Turkey's Western-orientation in her foreign policy is taken as a natural adjunct to the Kemalist elite's identification of 'modernization' with 'Westernization'.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, Bozdağlıoğlu suggests that "for the Kemalist elite there existed only one civilization, and it meant European civilization."¹⁸⁸ Hence, he argues that it was from this self-ascribed European and Kemalist identity the Turkish elites filtered down their foreign policy objectives and took further steps in making the country an ally of the West/ Europe.¹⁸⁹

Indeed, if one subscribes to the integrationist view to Kemalism as discussed in the first chapter, then Turkey's Western/European-orientation could be seen as guided by Kemalism. As discussed before, this even led some scholars to take the Kemalist principles as a necessary condition, let alone a significant ideological factor, for Turkey's future membership in the EU.¹⁹⁰ On the other hand, such an argument would not be viable if one defines Kemalism as inherently anti-Western. As discussed in the previous chapter, for many scholars, Kemalism cannot be linked to being a member of the EU or other Western/European

¹⁸⁶ Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs," 171; Bozdağlıoğlu, 5; Robins, 138.

¹⁸⁷ Ibidem. See also Diez, "Turkey, the European Union and Security Complexes Revisited," 175.

¹⁸⁸ Bozdağlıoğlu, 5.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 6.

¹⁹⁰ See, for instance Giritli and Baykal's discussions on Kemalism and the EU.

institutions as Kemalism means fighting for the full-independence of Turkey and since membership in these institutions works contrary to this goal.¹⁹¹

Indeed, some studies that follow the ideational approach to Turkish foreign policy do not take Kemalism as an ideological variable for Turkey's Western/European-orientation as they draw on a different definition of Kemalism. In order to explain Turkish foreign policy practices through competing identities and ideas in the Turkish context, some take Kemalism/Kemalist identity as one among many other ideas/identities in Turkey and define it as pursuing a cautious approach in international affairs and being skeptical towards the EU rather than giving an unconditional support for it.¹⁹² Although these works do not conceptualize Kemalism as an ideology, according to their definition, Kemalist ideology cannot not be shown as a causal factor for Turkey's harmonization of her foreign policy actions with that of the EU. Aydın provides a similar line of argument. He argues that while the Westernism of the Kemalist ideology can be argued to have an impact on the superiority attributed to the West and the Western/European institutions during the 1950s, Turkey's Western-orientation cannot be considered to be based upon this ideological variable, as Kemalism does not suggest dependence on the Western interests.¹⁹³ Hence, while Kemalism is not ascribed any significant role in the realist analyses, the role of Kemalism is largely contested in the ideationalist studies as the latter utilizes competing definitions of Kemalism. Thus, while for some the Kemalist ideology appears as the main variable for a certain foreign policy action (Western-orientation), to others, it leads to the very resistance against the foreign policy in question.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ See, for instance, Aybars and Özden's discussions on Kemalism and the EU.

¹⁹² See, for instance, Özkeçeci-Taner, 261; Aras, "Turkish Foreign Policy and Jerusalem," 35.

¹⁹³ Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjectures during the Cold War," 105.

¹⁹⁴ It should be noted here that there are also 'middle way approaches' to the role of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy. Robins, for instance, argues that while Western-orientation and European aspiration were central to Kemalism, it coexisted with other potentially contradictory features, mainly the Sevres Syndrome (the suspicion that Turkey is an object of a continuing conspiracy by outsiders to be territorially dismembered) and the "thin-skinned nationalism" which is reactionary towards the perceived insults against the integrity and capacity of the

According to this view that takes ideas and ideologies as the main causes for the Turkish foreign policy practices, the *raison d'être* of the 1974 operation and Turkey's persistent position on siding with the Turkish Cypriots on the Cyprus issue were also due to several ideational concerns of the Turkish foreign policy elite rather than their evaluation of Turkey's national strategic interests. According to some, Turkey's 1974 Cyprus intervention was driven by the goal of saving the Turkishness of Cyprus; and hence it was a reaction against the followers of the Greek-led coup that not only attacked Turkish villages in the island but also the Turkish identity.¹⁹⁵ In this sense, the decision for the operation neither involved the mere national security concerns of Turkey, nor was it exclusively constrained by the structure of the international system. Instead, it was implemented due to the concerns over securing the Turkish identity intact. Turkey's Cyprus intervention was based on nationalism rather than strategic interests of the policy makers, as it sought to show the Western countries that Turkey was courageously able to step out of the role that was imposed on her by the West and act independently.¹⁹⁶ In this sense, Cyprus intervention shattered the one-dimensional image of Turkey as the Southwestern bastion of the Western alliance during the Cold War.¹⁹⁷

To another ideationalist approach to Cyprus, it was not nationalism but rather human rights concerns that led to the intervention and the policy pursued thereafter. From this perspective, Turkey's position is first and foremost based upon bringing freedom to the island and saving the fundamental rights and liberties of the Turkish Cypriots.¹⁹⁸ Guided by this morality, it is argued, it cannot be expected from Turkey to withdraw her troops from Cyprus

country (2003, 141). This leads the author to claim that rather than a clash of opposite ideologies, the coexistence of these two opposite features of Kemalism has worked to produce an 'unintended consequence' on Turkey's part, by damaging the strategic goal of EU membership (2003, 141).

¹⁹⁵ Cem, *Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya*, 14; Şahinler, *Türkiye'nin 1974 Kıbrıs Siyaseti*, 53.

¹⁹⁶ Cem, *Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya*, 14; Şahinler, *Türkiye'nin 1974 Kıbrıs Siyaseti*, 76; Mümtaz Soysal, *Aklım Kıbrıs'la Bozmak* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1995), 9-10.

¹⁹⁷ It must be noted here that the Sevres Syndrome of Kemalism mentioned by Robins is also present in the analyses where it is argued that Turkey's submission to the Western pressures regarding the Cyprus issue could lead to series of other demands from the West which are reminiscent of the unacceptable terms of the Sevres Treaty that was imposed on the Ottoman Empire in 1920. On this view, see Soysal, 119, 148.

¹⁹⁸ Soysal, 10, 48, 33; Cem, *Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya*, 184; Şahinler, *Türkiye'nin 1974 Kıbrıs Siyaseti*, 76.

just because the RoC joined the EU. This is because Turkey cannot give up on protecting the rights and freedoms of the Turkish Cypriots as long as she believes in the rightfulness of the intervention.¹⁹⁹ Secondly, it is suggested, the intervention was neither a territorial conquest, nor an annexation, nor an act of vengeance, but a result of Turkey's pursuit of the principle that every oppressed nation has a right to full independence²⁰⁰, an idea generally attributed to Kemalism as discussed in the previous chapter. Thirdly, it is stated, the 1974 intervention did not involve the selfish security interests of Turkey but undertaken with the sole purpose of restoring order and law in Cyprus in accordance with her guarantor rights that emerged from the London and Zurich Agreements.²⁰¹ While this aspect of the intervention is usually used to demonstrate the legality of Turkey's action, it is also suggested that the action was guided by a certain ideational framework that valued abiding by strict legality over other concerns. Aydın's note is revealing where he cites Atatürk: "in Turkey it is honorable to comply with international commitments."²⁰² This, according to Váli as well, has evolved into an important factor of Turkish foreign policy and implemented not only as a goal in itself but also as a means to preserve the existence and independence of the country.²⁰³

Putting a high emphasis on human rights, freedom, peace, the right to full-independence, and the legitimacy and honorability of foreign policy is hence seen not as a retrospective justification of an implemented action, but an ideational attribute and a roadmap that directs the foreign policy decision.²⁰⁴ It is also possible to observe how each of these

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 285

²⁰⁰ Cem, *Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya*, 179; İhsan Gürkan, "1974 Kıbrıs Barış Harekati'nda Siyasal İradenin Oluşumu ve Askeri Uygulama," in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994), 136.

²⁰¹ Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs," 181; Soysal, 12.

²⁰² Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs," 181.

²⁰³ Ferenc Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus* (Baltimore, London: The John Hopkins Press, 1971), 71; cited in Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs," 181.

²⁰⁴ Apart from these ideational causes, following Atatürk's decrees regarding Cyprus is also taken as another motive and cause for Turkey's Cyprus intervention. For Sabahattin İsmail, Atatürk once pointed out that the next generation should make sure Cyprus does not pass on the hands of an enemy as it is crucial for Turkey's security (1998, 49).

stated causes is based on the elements that are attributed to Kemalism. Cem's remark on the traditional aspects of the Turkish foreign policy making is revealing in this sense. The traditional Turkish foreign policy, according to Cem, involves the three characteristics of the Kemalist foreign policy, mainly, "peace at home, peace in the world, protecting the oppressed nations, and embracing the full-independence as the main identity of the state."²⁰⁵ While this definition excludes the other aspects of the Kemalist foreign policy as discussed in the previous chapter, it seems to encompass all the ideational reasons given with respect to Turkey's 1974 intervention and her policy on the Cyprus issue: the principle of 'full-independence' (the right of the Turkish Cypriots to full-independence and relying on international agreements for attaining full-independence), 'peace at home peace in the world' (making and keeping the peace in the island), 'reliance on the international agreements' (relying on the London and Zurich Agreements that gave Turkey the right to act as a guarantor state), and 'protecting the oppressed nations' (saving the Turkish Cypriots from enslavement and assisting them to have an equal political power in the administration of the RoC). Based on this view, Turkey's Cyprus policy does not present a deviation from Kemalism, but is the very implementation of it. In this sense, ideas can be seen as playing the central role in foreign policy making, even though a certain foreign policy decision may seem unrepresentative of a specific foreign policy orientation.

2.3. From the rational/ideational dichotomy to their discursive construction

As the previous section attempted to show, the explanatory power of the ideational approach depends on how the boundaries of Kemalism, as well as those of the ideas Kemalism is supposed to include are defined. While the argument that Kemalism guides the Turkish foreign policy towards the EU may be rejected if one subscribes to the view that Kemalism does not suggest a policy that leads to a loss of national sovereignty, a broader

²⁰⁵ Cem, *Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya*, 11.

definition of Kemalism (which also includes Internationalism and Westernism) can lead one to consider Kemalism as the key variable in Turkey's Western/European-orientation. Yet, the similar can be stated with regard to the realist approach. While Turkey's Cyprus policy can be found rational if national interests are defined along the strategic security interests of Turkey, it can be found irrational and against the national interests of Turkey if the real interests are based on avoiding confrontation with the West.

Indeed, it is possible to see how both approaches converge in the definitions they provide as regards the 'causes'. This produces an interesting merge of what is called an interest from the rationalist approach with what the ideational approach states as an idea. According to one of the arguments based on the rationalist approach, it is in the economic interest of Turkey to join the Western institutions including the EEC/EU as it contributes to the national income and hence national welfare.²⁰⁶ Interestingly, this is not against the conclusions of some ideationalist analyses. According to one of them, the Kemalist elite gave a great importance to economic development because they wanted Turkey to be recognized as European and to join the European civilization which Atatürk considered superior and as the symbol of the modern civilization.²⁰⁷ Here we find a consideration of economic development not as a national interest but as a means to reach an idealistic goal ('reaching the level of the modern civilization' and following Kemalist directives in reaching it).

Similar can be stated as regards the explanations given towards Turkey's Cyprus policy. Both the rationalist and ideationalist analyses take Turkey's right to act independently and intervene as a guarantor power as causes for the Cyprus intervention. While the realist approach emphasizes Turkey's rational decision to secure the independence and sovereignty of the country in this context,²⁰⁸ ideationalist explanations, on the other hand, emphasize the normative framework under which these actions acquire meaning. From an ideationalist point

²⁰⁶ Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs," 181.

²⁰⁷ Ibidem.

²⁰⁸ Atasoy, 259; Şahinler, *Türkiye'nin 1974 Kıbrıs Siyaseti*, 53.

of view, the decision was guided by the principle to abide by the international commitments and to secure the full-independence of Turkey, principles both attributed to following Atatürk's path.²⁰⁹ Here again, we see that what appears as an interest to the rationalist approach is attributed an ideational character in the latter. In this sense, while from a realist point of view foreign policy is not guided by ideologies but rationality, there is little difference between arguing that 'Turkey's Western-orientation in the 1950s was rational as it maximized Turkey's security and economic interests' and that 'the Turkey's Western-orientation was guided by Kemalism in that it maximized Turkey's security and economic interests'. 'What constitutes the national interest' and 'what is ideological' is a contested issue, rather than an objectively identifiable 'fact'.

As our focus is how ideology (Kemalism) structures the foreign policy in a way that a particular foreign policy is seen compatible with or as a deviation from the foreign policy orientation of a given country, realism does not seem offer a useful theoretical venue in examining this question. This is because, as discussed above, it does not assign any role to ideas/ideologies in foreign policy. While ideational approach takes ideas/ideologies central to foreign policy and examines how they direct the foreign policy objectives, it still does not present a suitable approach to the question examined here due to the fact that it takes ideas as causes in foreign policy. Based on this framework, we cannot analyze how the same background can sustain contradictory foreign policies and how the way Kemalism is defined is exposed to certain changes in time. As the political actors do not have ideology independently of the discourse mobilized by them, ideology cannot be separated from the foreign policy discourse that both constitutes and is constructed by it. In this sense, providing a clear definition of ideas, interests or ideologies does not only attribute a pre-political and pre-discursive meaning to them, but also contributes to their construction.

²⁰⁹ Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs," 181; Cem, *Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya*, 14; Şahinler, *Türkiye'nin 1974 Kıbrıs Siyaseti*, 76; Soysal, 9-10.

If our aim is not to provide an additional chain to Kemalism but rather examine how it structures and is constituted by the foreign policy discourse (the “self-constituting politics”²¹⁰ of Kemalism), then we should undertake an approach that rejects the rationalism-ideationalism dichotomy and that follows a discursive epistemology in analyzing the role of ideology in foreign policy. Poststructuralist approaches to foreign policy provide a suitable venue in this context.

2.3.1. Poststructuralist approaches to foreign policy

Poststructuralism takes all discursive systems as temporal and fragile and focuses on the meanings that structure them.²¹¹ Poststructuralist research agenda in foreign policy is therefore rested on the view that while decision makers have recourse to certain identities or material interests in their representations of a certain foreign policy, it is also through their formulation of foreign policy that the ideas, identities, and material interests are produced and reproduced.²¹² This suggests that identities, ideas, and interests are ontologically inseparable constructs of the foreign policy discourse. As they do not exist in a pre-discursive realm, an epistemology that documents their causal impact on policy cannot be adopted.²¹³ In this sense, poststructuralist approaches to foreign policy stand in stark contrast to the realist and ideationalist approaches. They are not interested in revealing what the foreign policy decision makers genuinely believe or their ‘real’ interests in conducting a policy but how these are represented in their foreign policy articulations.²¹⁴

²¹⁰ Gearoid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, “Introduction,” in *Re-thinking geo-politics: Towards a critical geo-politics*, ed. Tuathail and Dalby (London: Routledge, 1998), 1.

²¹¹ See for instance, Michael Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Wæver, “Identity, Communities, and Foreign Policy”; Hansen, *Security as Practice*; Hansen and Wæver, *European Integration and National Identity*; William E. Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Campbell, *Writing Security*; Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

²¹² Hansen, 1.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 27.

²¹⁴ Wæver, 26.

Led by this aim, most of the poststructuralist discussions in IR focus on the question of how representations of threat ascribe meaning to a situation and construct the identity of the national, institutional, and regional Self.²¹⁵ According to this view, identity (Self) is always defined through reference to what it is not (Other) and the meaning is given through a series of juxtapositions, where one element is valued over its opposite.²¹⁶ Campbell's discussion of the U.S. foreign policy is illustrative in this sense. Here Campbell shows how the discourses of danger in the U.S. reconstituted Americanness (Self) by externalizing the enemy (Other) through ascribing it a devalued identity and thereby attributing a privileged value to Americanness.²¹⁷ Referring to the Cold War, Campbell suggests that during this "hysteria of the red scare", denoting the enemy as 'barbarian', 'sick', and 'oppressive' served to secure a stable American identity as 'civilized', 'right', and 'pro-freedom'.²¹⁸ Similar is argued also with regard to Turkey's Western-orientation during the Cold War period. It is suggested that Turkish elite's representation of the Eastern bloc states as 'traditional', 'non-democratic', 'under-developed' and 'non-Western' helped constructing Turkey's Western identity as 'democratic' and 'modern'.²¹⁹ According to this binary construction of identity, Turkey's Western-orientation during the Cold War appears as a chain of discourses that valued the 'anti-communist' Western identity over the 'communist' East.²²⁰

Although this binary view is established on the premise that there is not an intrinsic identity against which the policy of the country can be based upon, it does not follow from the poststructuralist point of view that identity constitution should necessarily be based on

²¹⁵ Hansen, 6; on this view see especially, Campbell, *Politics Without Principle*; Campbell, *Writing Security*; Bilgin and Yılmaz, 40.

²¹⁶ On this view see, Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought* (London: Routledge, 1996); Connolly, *Identity/Difference*.

²¹⁷ See Campbell, *Writing Security*.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 177.

²¹⁹ Bilgin and Yılmaz, 44.

²²⁰ Özlem Demirtaş Bagdonas, "Türkiye'nin 'vazgeçilmez' iki davası: Kıbrıs ve 'Batı'/'Avrupa' ya yönelim," *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* 3, 11 (November 2007): 21-22.

antagonisms.²²¹ While contrasting identities are an important part of discourses of danger, neither are they their only constructs, nor are the foreign policy discourses exclusively based on danger. This can be observed in the post-September 11 discourse of the Bush administration. This discourse constructed Iraq as bifurcated between its state and society: the regime of Saddam Hussein, the ‘dictator’ and his followers as committing ‘atrocities’ on the one hand, and the oppressed Iraqi people who are in need of ‘liberation’ and ‘freedom’ on the other.²²² Here the American Self was not only juxtaposed against a purely antagonistic Other but also ‘the one that is in need of liberation’. Nizar Messari’s analysis of the American foreign policy discourse during the Bosnian crisis provides another revealing example.²²³ Messari shows that during the Bosnian crisis the American foreign policy discourse represented Bosnians as those who favor democracy and multi-ethnicity, ideas that are propagated as important elements of American identity.²²⁴ By the same token, it can be argued that Turkey’s Western identity was not only constructed by denoting a communist East, but also through showing how different civilizations can coexist (multiculturalism) which is a value that is also ascribed to the Western identity.²²⁵ As the following chapters will show, antagonistic constellations, despite being present, were not the only constructs of the Turkish foreign policy discourse in relation to the ‘West’ and the Cyprus issue. There were a number of variations in the way Western and Turkish identity were cast in relation to one another.

If foreign policy discourse constructs variational identities, one cannot establish a single and stable link between a certain foreign policy orientation and a specific identity reference. As Hansen shows in *Security as Practice*, while Balkan identity was constructed in negative terms during the policy of inaction, the link between policies and identity

²²¹ Wæver, 24.

²²² Hansen, 28; Özlem Demirtaş, “Considering the positive other in a discourse of danger: The re-played American ‘drama’ of the ‘noble’ and the ‘evil’ in the aftermath of the September 11 attack” (MA thesis, Central European University, 2003), 34.

²²³ See Nizar Messari, “Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Islam in U.S. Foreign Policy,” in *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), 227-45.

²²⁴ Messari, 244.

²²⁵ Demirtaş Bagdonas, “Türkiye’nin ‘vazgeçilmez’ iki davası”, 32-38.

representations during the conflict were far more varied, complex, and open-ended.²²⁶ Indeed, if foreign policy and identities are neither fixed nor unchangeable pre-discursive ‘givens’, it is not puzzling to observe a change in the way a specific identity or a policy is articulated. Second, if politics is never a homogenous arena, variational identity-policy links are inevitable. One should then also focus on the competing discourses to investigate which meanings structure the debate. This quest for structures of meaning makes discourse analysis an invaluable methodology for poststructuralism.

2.3.2. Methodological considerations in poststructuralism and the use of discourse analysis

While most of the poststructuralist authors have preferred abstract theory to case analyses and deconstructivist analyses of the discipline to setting a new research agenda, it does not follow from a poststructuralist position that one should apply a ‘non-method’.²²⁷ Discourse analysis can be taken both as a methodological tool to study the structures of meaning constructed in foreign policy discourses as well as a theoretical approach in countering the truth claims of rationalist and ideationalist writings.

Led by this goal, in *European Integration and National Identity*, Wæver and others examine how various constellations of state and nation in relation to Europe have structured the identity construction of the Nordic countries.²²⁸ Taking discourses as a system for the formation of statements and focusing on the official statements as representatives of the dominant discourse upon which the dominant policy is based, they analyze how a specific constellation of nation-state is based on a specific construction of a European policy and hence a particular ‘Europe’.²²⁹

²²⁶ Hansen, 31.

²²⁷ Hansen, xix.

²²⁸ Hansen and Wæver, eds., *European Integration and National Identity*.

²²⁹ *Ibid*, 33.

Hansen makes a further step to present a more comprehensive framework that is not biased towards an analysis of the dominant discourse. Understanding the foreign policy discourse as situated within a wider discursive field, she suggests examining not only the main basic parameters within the dominant discourse but also how representations articulated by oppositional political forces reinforce or compete with each other as contesting representations can be a source of an unstable foreign policy.²³⁰ According to this view, discourse analysis should start with identifying the “basic discourses” that point to the main points of contestation within a debate that articulate different (spatial, temporal, and ethical) constructions of identity.²³¹ Once the basic discourses are identified, the aim must be to trace the constitution of the present concept back in history to understand how it was constituted and how it marginalized alternative representations.²³² This suggests that a poststructuralist analysis does not need to be free of any methodological consideration or limits as to which texts should be selected. Foreign policy discourse can be analyzed to show how different basic discourses structure the foreign policy debate, which identities are constructed during this process, and whether and how there is a change in these articulations.

2.3.3. A poststructuralist approach to ideology and foreign policy

Poststructuralist analyses in the IR discipline have either engaged in purely meta-theoretical debates or examined the co-constitutive relation between foreign policy and identity. This notwithstanding, a poststructuralist approach does not need to have an exclusive focus on identity. It is hence the contention of this section that discourse analysis both as a methodology and theory allows for a suitable venue to examine the role of ideology construction in foreign policy. Hence, the task ahead is to integrate our previous discussion on

²³⁰ Hansen, 7.

²³¹ Ibid., 52.

²³² Ibid., 53. This genealogical approach is mainly based on Foucaultian ‘history of the present’ and has been the main methodology used in the analyses that examined how discourses of danger reproduce identities. See, for instance, Campbell, *Writing Security*.

ideology with the approach discussed above and situate this contribution within the poststructuralist research agenda in foreign policy.

At the core of the foreign policy debates is the struggle to elicit consent through making legitimate and plausible policy articulations. While representing a certain policy as compatible with a certain identity may be one of the foreign policy templates, it is not, by any means, the only one, as interests and ideologies are also employed in the legitimization of foreign policies and are (re)constructed through discourse. Such an argument does not suggest that ideology construction is at the center of the foreign policy debates or is omnipresent in any political discussion as such a claim would construct a further dichotomy between identities and ideologies in addition to the one created between interests and ideas. Instead, I suggest that examining the ideology construction through the foreign policy discourse allows also considering the discursive construction of identities and interests as ideologies are not exempt from the interest and identity based articulations foreign policy makers employ.

Based on the poststructuralist view discussed above, it can be argued that an inquiry into the continuity and discontinuity of a certain foreign policy orientation requires focusing on the basic legitimating criteria of policy and the narratives that structure the foreign policy debate rather than identifying whether a certain foreign policy constitutes a deviation from a specific identity or material interests. As discussed in the previous chapter, ideologies, just as interests and identities, form one of these structures since the primary function of an ideological construction is also to elicit consent. As the foreign policy makers refer to an ideology, their articulations not only reconstitute the ideology in question but also structure the foreign policy debate along ideological lines.

As argued in the first chapter, ideology is not a unified system that leads foreign policy towards a consistent direction or that produces a fixed and unitary subject position. It is rather a repertoire of various values and objectives that are linked to certain policy goals as actors

struggle to capture the main elements associated with it in order to legitimize their policies from the political position they speak for. Each articulation of a foreign policy in terms of its 'fit' with the previously constructed template of an ideology constitutes a new nodal point to be challenged (and delegitimized) by another foreign policy-ideology articulation made by another actor. Hence, while ideology is 'what actors make of it', it is not a free-floating discursive system. In articulating their policies, actors are both constrained in terms of the nodal points of the previous ideological templates and those provided by the alternative foreign policy discourses of other actors. In this sense, ideological constitution involves an inescapable competition between various versions of the ideology in question in so far as the political arena is constituted of differences.

A poststructuralist approach to the relationship between ideology and foreign policy orientation requires taking the foreign policy discourse as a system of statements that link the so-called directives of an ideology to a certain policy. Therefore, ideology constitution and foreign policy making need not be analyzed separately. Taking as both parallel to and dependent upon each other seems to be an analytically useful framework in order to examine the structuring role of ideology in foreign policy orientation.

Hence, the first task is to identify a certain time period where arguments with regard to the foreign policy orientation parallels the statements made in relation to a specific policy (in order to examine whether it is cast as an extension of or a deviation from the foreign policy orientation). One then needs to analyze the foreign policy discourse by splitting it among differential discourses (that diverge in the way they link the ideology to the policy). The third task is to examine how these discourses compete with each other and among which discursive variations a certain ideology is constructed. After the identification of which nodal points are represented in the official discourse and reproduced by others, this composition can be

compared to the analysis of another time period. In this way, one can analyze how foreign policy-ideology variations evolve and how some are marginalized.

This framework can be applied to examine the role of ideology in the official discourse or in the wider discursive field as Hansen suggests. The present dissertation will focus on the official one, analyzing how the statements delivered by the military establishment and the political parties that take part in the Turkish government linked the elements of Kemalism to Turkish foreign policy. The analytical reach of the study can be extended by showing how academic discussions also relate to the official discourse. Yet, this relation could only be a side conclusion for our purposes as the aim of the following case studies is not to examine the extent to which the academic debates circulate in the official discourse. Based on the framework presented above, the following chapters will analyze variational links constructed between Kemalism and Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus and the West/Europe through three different periods.

CHAPTER III: THE CLASH OF KEMALISMS? THE FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE ON THE WEST/EUROPE AND THE CYPRUS ISSUE (1960-1979)

Introduction

This chapter analyzes how Kemalism structured the foreign policy debate on Turkey's Western/European-orientation and the Cyprus issue in 1960-1979, how these policies were legitimized and linked to each other, and how the role of Kemalism was reconstituted in return. Having joined various Western institutions since the wake of the Cold War, i.e. OECD (1948), Council of Europe (1949), and NATO (1952), Turkey became an associate member to the EEC in 1963. This era also involves major turning points for Turkey's Cyprus policy. While there was no Cyprus issue for Turkey until the early 1950s²³³, the official policy shifted from supporting the British colonial rule in Cyprus²³⁴ to the division of the island into Greek and Turkish zones in the late 1950s²³⁵, to the independence of Cyprus²³⁶, and to Turkish Cypriots' right of self-determination in the RoC. In 1974, with an open defiance to her Western allies, Turkey undertook a military intervention in Cyprus which resulted in the *de-facto* separation of Cyprus. This led to the U.S. arms embargo and European economic sanctions, which blocked all aid and loans until there was a progress on the Cyprus question.²³⁷ For the Turkish foreign policy makers, this constituted a challenge as to how to

²³³ While both AKEL (the communist party of Cyprus) and the Greek Orthodox Church (which made referendum that 96 percent of Cypriots wanted *Enosis*) began making *Enosis* claims in 1950, the Turkish position on Cyprus was clarified by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Necmettin Sadak on 23 January 1950 as follows: "There is no such an issue called as 'Cyprus question'...English government will not leave the island to another state. Our youth engages in a vain excitement." (Oran 2002, 598). In the 1950 election campaign, Cyprus issue was not mentioned. On 20 June 1950, Fuad Köprülü, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Democratic Party (DP) stated: "There is no Cyprus issue" (Oran 2002, 598).

²³⁴ After EOKA began its activities in 1955, Turkish position was still centered on maintaining the *status-quo*. For the Turkish side, the best solution was the continuation of the British governance in the island; however, if the *status-quo* would change, in the words of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, "the most legitimate solution would be to hand it over to its real owner, Turkey" (Oran 2002, 602).

²³⁵ After 1955, the slogan of "Either Cyprus or Death" was replaced by "Either Division or Death" (Oran 2002, 604). In 1958, however, both Greece and Turkey declared that they gave up on *Enosis* and division theses, and that they would support the independence of the island. (Oran 2002, 607-614).

²³⁶ The turning point came in 1960 with the London and Zurich Agreements when Cyprus became an independent state and Turkey became a guarantor power for the then established status-quo on the island.

²³⁷ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 176.

legitimize the mission in Cyprus and Turkey's role in the Western Alliance: was the operation an extension of Turkey's Western-orientation or was it a stance against the West? Did it reconstitute Turkey's Western identity or her difference and Otherness from the Western world?

It is problematic to assume a unitary response to these key events especially if one takes into consideration that Turkish politics was highly polarized in this period.²³⁸ Following the military coup in 1960, the electoral system was changed into proportional representation which increased the range of views represented in the parliament. This followed a period of coalitional governments consisting of a wide range of political factions. The richness of the discourse during this period as well as the disputed nature of the Cyprus question and Turkey's Western-orientation provides a good case to study the variations within the political discourse in responding to these key events, and examine which elements of the Kemalist ideology were employed to draw a stable link between the Cyprus policy and the Western-orientation, and which identities and rationalities were constructed in making this link.

The first section will focus on the way the military legitimized its rule and how the coalitional governments during the period drew on this discourse. While this may suggest that the main actors of the Kemalist discourse was the military establishment, it will be seen that the politics of Kemalism was not confined to the statements of the military establishment as the articulations of the civilian leaders also built on this discourse. The second section will thus turn to examine the diversity in the constructions of Kemalism focusing on the political factions represented in the coalitional governments between 1965 and 1980.

²³⁸ For further information on the fragmentation and polarization of Turkish politics in the 1960s and the 1970s, see especially, Ergun Özbudun, "The Turkish Party System: Institutions, Polarization, and Fragmentation," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17 (April 1981): 228-40; and İlter Turan, "Stages of Political Development in the Turkish Republic," in *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Ergun Özbudun (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 59-112.

3.1. The official discourse (1960-1979)

3.1.1. Peace at home, generals in the parliament: the officers' take on Kemalism

The 1960s began with an unexpected military coup which brought an extensive political restructuring in Turkey. The Democratic Party (DP) government was dissolved, the party was disbanded, and the prime minister and his two ministers were executed. This followed an era of unstable coalitional governments. Neither the new Justice Party (JP), a virtual successor of the dissolved DP nor the Republican People's Party (RPP), which presented itself as the inheritor and the guardian of Kemalism since the 1920s, could obtain the majority of the votes in the general elections of 1961. In due course, İsmet İnönü, the Head of the RPP was given the duty to head three unstable coalitions until a temporary government took over for the 1965 elections. These were won by the JP, led by first Ragıp Gümüşpala and later by Süleyman Demirel, who remained as the prime minister until 1971. In 1971, there was yet another military intervention to force Demirel to resign which led to a quasi-military regime under supra-party governments until 1973.

The political discourse between 1960 and 1973 was therefore largely dominated by the hegemonic attempts of the military establishment and reproduced by the articulations of the subsequent coalitional governments. The main elements of the political discourse in this period involved 'restoring order at home', 'restoring and defending democracy', and 'elevating the status of the Turkish society to the level of contemporary civilization'. The military coup of 1960 and the later interventions by the military were proclaimed as a means to bring an end to the regressive and undemocratic policies that drove the country from the 'true' realization of the Kemalist principles. In defining the Islamism and communism as separatist and deviant ideologies, Kemalism was thereby reconstituted as a means to safeguard the country against any communist or Islamist claims for power and to establish the national unity. The Article 35 of the Armed Forces Statues extended the responsibility of the Armed

Forces to include such an internal function.²³⁹ By the same token, the booklet prepared by the National Unity Committee (NUC) that was established after the coup said:

The aim of the National Unity Movement is to consider Turkey and the Turkish nation *as a whole*, and to establish an *impartial* and virtuous administration *based on Atatürk's reforms* The national unity of the Turkish nation is rested on national independence regardless of race, language, religion or creed; and any kind of activity *that tends to divide and harm this unity* shall be strenuously opposed.²⁴⁰

Similar statements were also made by the following coalition governments which associated Kemalism with democracy and national unity. The program of the second coalitional government after the 1960 coup stated the following:

The regime in Turkey is a democracy that builds upon Atatürk's revolutions. It is based on Atatürk's nationalism and secular state as described in the constitution. Hence, our government will defend the country from the extreme left and right currents As a logical result of this view, we will not permit any agitations that could harm the constitutional rules and endanger the democratic regime.²⁴¹

The following remark also shows how the subsequent governments reproduced the discourse of the military establishment: "With the May 1960 coup it became certain that it is impossible to move away from Atatürk's principles; Turkey can be advanced only via these principles."²⁴² In a similar vein, the JP government led by Demirel used the same elements to claim legitimacy for its rule after the 1965 elections:

Our primary goal is to ascertain that our government program is in compliance with the spirit and script of our constitution, which is based upon Atatürk's principles and the 27 May (1960) Revolution and which represents the national will. We see it as a duty to protect Atatürk's revolutions, which form the basis of our democratic order and the Turkish state.²⁴³

Nevertheless, the Demirel government could not survive the military memorandum of 1971 which implicated the view that democracy was not yet 'mature' enough. The three-point memorandum delivered to the Prime Minister Demirel by the Chiefs of the Land, Navy, and the Air Forces and the Chief of the General Staff stated that Kemalism was the only way to

²³⁹ The Article 35 of the Armed Forces Statues states that "[t]he duty of the Armed Forces is to safeguard and defend Turkish territory and the Republic of Turkey as designated by the Constitution." (Birand 1987, 2).

²⁴⁰ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milli Birlik Komitesi, *T.C.M.B.K. Direktifi ve Temel Görüşleri* (Ankara: Maarif Matbaası, 1960), 1-11. Italics added.

²⁴¹ Cited in Nuran Dağlı and Belin Aktürk, eds., *Hükümetler ve Programları II 1960-1980* (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1988), 32-33.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 54.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 92.

rise above the contemporary civilization and to purge the threats such as communism and Islamism²⁴⁴. After the resignation of the prime minister, the supra-party governments under the leadership of Nihat Erim, Naim Talu and Ferit Melen reconstituted the nodal points made by the NUC in the early 1960s and the chief military officials in 1971. It was declared that their primary aims were to complete the “realization of Atatürk’s reforms and principles”²⁴⁵ and safeguard the country “against any attempts that [sought] to divide the country, both extreme left that aspire[d] to establish communism and the extreme right that [was] after establishing a sharia order.”²⁴⁶ In the following government program, this was stated once more. Declaring the new government as the “Kemalist Movement Government,” Melen’s government said, “It is our duty to make the democratic order function efficiently.”²⁴⁷

Looking at the justifications given for the political order established after the 1960s and the attempts to extricate the communist and Islamist ideologies from the public sphere by reference to Kemalism, it becomes clear that the official discourse during this period reconstituted the role of Kemalism in establishing ‘national unity’, ‘democracy’, and ‘peace at home’.

3.1.2. ‘Peace in the world, Turkey in the West’

Atatürk’s principles will continue to shape our foreign policy.

—Nihat Erim, 1971

The foreign policy articulations of the period did not only declare adherence to Atatürk’s principles but also conditioned the fulfillment of the principle of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ to ‘reaching the level of the West’ and ‘gaining a respected status within the West through being recognized as equals’. Concomitantly, the program of the second

²⁴⁴ Cited in Birand, 13-14.

²⁴⁵ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 201.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 217.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 234.

coalitional government in 1962 stated, “We will not fall short of our contributions to the Council of Europe, which serves the purpose of developing the Western civilization and integrating nations, through our constructive efforts as a member of the organization and having a respectful place within the Western community.”²⁴⁸ The following remarks of Nihat Erim also made a similar discursive move:

Turkey embraces the Western civilization Her strategy may change but this will not. Thus, what applies to everywhere else in the world applies to Turkey as well: Foreign policy and domestic politics are intrinsically attached to each other. As long as the rule of law is not implemented completely at home and adherence to the human rights does not materialize into a deed, it cannot be expected from Western democracies to consider any state to be one of them. Our international respect depends on this.²⁴⁹

From this perspective, Turkey’s Western-orientation and reputation in the West depended on the development of democracy at home and the adherence to the same set of ideas and values with the West. The articulations made during the period also made sure to construct a legitimate anchor for this orientation by emphasizing Turkey’s pursuit of Atatürk’s principles, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘equality’ in the context of Turkey’s relations with the West. Thus, Western-orientation was legitimate, as it helped fulfilling Atatürk’s principle of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ as well as defending Turkey’s national interests, independence and sovereignty.

Following the 1960 coup, the Gürsel government, which was appointed by the orders of the NUC, saw Turkey’s membership in NATO, CENTO, and the Council of Europe as a direct extension of the ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ principle.²⁵⁰ Considering Atatürk’s revolutions as a trigger for Turkey’s NATO membership, the program of Gürsel’s government stated:

NATO is an institution founded by the Western countries, in accordance with the UN Charter, with an aim to defend the principle of individual freedom and the real principles of the humanity and civilization. It is one of the main pillars of our foreign policy principles to

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 25.

²⁴⁹ Nihat Erim, “Nihat Erim’in Dış Meseleler Konusundaki Genel Görüşme Sırasında Konuşması,” Millet Meclisi, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Cumhuriyet Arşivi, İstanbul, January 9, 1963, Ref. no: 030/01/50/299/3, 2.

²⁵⁰ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 5.

strengthen our relations with these friends and allies with whom we have strong relations and developed even closer ties as a result of Atatürk's revolutions according to the principles of equality and sovereignty.²⁵¹

These were reiterated in the following coalitional governments. In the first coalition government headed by İnönü, the principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world' was defined as establishing a world order that depended on the principles of justice, equity, freedom, common security and peace, seeking international cooperation, resolving the conflicts through peaceful means, and being respectful of the international agreements.²⁵² It was further noted that the pursuit of this principle best protected Turkey's national interests, national sovereignty, and independence and that Turkey's membership in NATO, CENTO, and the Council of Europe played an important role in achieving this goal.²⁵³ In this sense, Turkey's participation in the Western organizations was legitimized not only through drawing a link between Atatürk's revolutions and Turkey's internalization of the Western values, but also through considering the mission of these organizations as compatible with the principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world'.

In this context, the Ankara Agreement which made Turkey an associate member of the EEC was met with great enthusiasm. On September 13, 1963, the front page of the daily *Milliyet* cherished the event as follows: "It is acknowledged that Turkey is a part of Europe!"²⁵⁴ This was further reverberated in the words of the Prime Minister İnönü, who stated, "Turkey is attached to Europe for good We see the agreement as a natural and logical result of our relations with the Western Europe."²⁵⁵ This was restated in the government program, which defined the agreement as an extension of Turkey's great efforts to strengthen her relations with the Western community.²⁵⁶ On the same occasion, the

²⁵¹ Ibidem. A similar statement was also made by the following coalitional governments until 1965.

²⁵² Ibid., 5, 24, 122-123, 234.

²⁵³ Ibid., 25, 46.

²⁵⁴ "Türkiye'nin Avrupa'nın bir cüz'ü olduğu tescil edildi" [It is acknowledged that Turkey is a part of Europe], *Milliyet*, 13 September 1963.

²⁵⁵ "Ortak Pazar'a Girdik" [We have entered the Common Market], *Cumhuriyet*, 13 September 1963.

²⁵⁶ Cited in *Türkiye-AET İlişkileri* (Ankara: Avrupa Topluluğu Yayınları, 1976), 222.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Feridun Cemal Erkin linked this pro-Westernist policy to Atatürk's reforms:

In acknowledging Turkey as a part of Europe, this [agreement opens] an era of promises as regards progressing towards peace and welfare Atatürk's Westernization reforms present clear evidence that Atatürk also considered Turkey's future and welfare as dependent on joining in the civilization represented by Europe.²⁵⁷

In the program of the Erim government, too, which was established following the 1971 military memorandum, Turkey's relations with the EEC were considered both as a part of Turkey's role in the Western alliance during the Cold War and as a means to establish economic development and defend Turkey's national interests in a way that is compatible with Atatürk's principles.²⁵⁸ This involved conducting special negotiations with the EEC so that the Additional Protocol of 1971 would not include provisions that would undermine Turkey's national economy and its mixed structure.²⁵⁹

In this sense, the objectives attributed to the pursuit of Atatürk's principles served as the main template for the articulations on the EEC. This not only helped linking the defense of national interests and economic welfare to an ideational goal but also further legitimized the pursuit of Atatürk's principles by representing them as complementary with the national interests of Turkey.

3.1.3. The Cyprus issue: a brief overview of the discourse

As stated by the government officials in the early 1950s, there was no Cyprus issue for Turkey as long as the British colonial rule continued in Cyprus.²⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the

²⁵⁷ Cited in *ibid.*, 230-31. It is worth noting here that this template was further reverberated in the words of the EU officials as well. The same source includes another speech delivered in 1971 by the Secretariat the General of the European Commission, Emile Noel, who said, "Turkey is realizing the ideal of Atatürk by entering in the Common Market" (*Türkiye-AET İlişkileri* 1976, 243).

²⁵⁸ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 217, 175.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 218, 228.

²⁶⁰ Consider the following remarks of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Necmettin Sadak on 23 January 1950: "There is no such an issue called as 'Cyprus question'...English government will not leave the island to another state. Our youth engages in a vain excitement." (Oran 2002, 598). In the 1950 election campaign, too, the Cyprus issue was not mentioned. On 20 June 1950, Fuad Köprülü, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Democratic Party (DP) also stated: "There is no Cyprus issue." (Oran 2002, 598).

heightening of the conflict between the Turks and the Greeks living in the island turned the situation into both a humanitarian and a national security issue for Turkey.²⁶¹ Turkey's position shifted between two 'causes': protecting the rights and interests of the Turkish community in Cyprus and 'not leaving Cyprus to Greeks' to defend Turkey's security, sovereignty, and national interests. From the latter position, İsmet İnönü stated the following in 1956: "It is obviously a security cause for us to ensure that Cyprus does not pass on to the hands of Greece."²⁶²

The London and Zurich agreements, which created an independent Cyprus and a power-sharing Constitution for the island, constituted a turning point in this respect. The agreements also granted Turkey special guarantor rights (along with Greece and the United Kingdom), allowing her to station a small number of troops in the island responsible for maintaining the *status-quo*. The official position was modified accordingly, considering the order established with the 1960 agreements as "the best solution for the welfare and happiness of the citizens of Cyprus as well as the peace and security of the region."²⁶³

The collapse of the bi-communal government on the island in 1963 introduced two main challenges for the Turkish decision makers: how to restore the previous situation and whether to use the guarantor rights to intervene.²⁶⁴ The program of the third coalitional government after the coup of 1960 stated that Turkey would be ready to intervene in accordance with her foreign policy principle of respecting the international agreements.²⁶⁵ This was in line with the Kemalist foreign principles as stated in the program. Articulations on the new developments in Cyprus also involved the principle of 'supporting the oppressed nations' right to sovereignty', a principle which was also stated as a constituent of Atatürk's

²⁶¹ For the nature and the reasons for this conflict, see Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: IB Tauris, 1993), 241-42.

²⁶² Cited in Sabahat Erdemir, ed., *Muhalefette İsmet İnönü (1956-1959): Konuşmaları, Demeçleri, Mesajları, Sohbetleri, ve Yazıları* (Istanbul: Ekicigil Matbaası, 1959), 12.

²⁶³ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 47, 5, 26-27.

²⁶⁴ For details, see Robert Stephens, *Cyprus, a Place of Arms: Power Politics and Ethnic Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean* (London: Pall Mall, 1966), 168-94.

²⁶⁵ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 68.

principles, particularly the principle of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’. The warning given to the government by Nihat Erim in 1963 underlined this link:

The Turkish community with a population size of 120,000 is a part and furthermore an extension of the Turkish nation of thirty millions. The matter should be put like this. It is an honor debt of Turkey not to let 120,000 Turks to be under the servitude of another sovereign.²⁶⁶

Although this pushed the government towards a more pro-active stance in Cyprus to liberate the Turkish Cypriots, military intervention was removed from the list of Turkey’s possible responses following the so-called Johnson’s letter crisis. In 1964, the Prime Minister İnönü received a blunt letter from the President of the United States Lyndon Johnson which stated that the NATO equipment could not be used in the impending intervention in Cyprus.²⁶⁷ In due course, the new government’s discourse underlined a middle ground position. On the one hand, Demirel’s government highlighted that further negotiations should be sought with the other guarantor states and within the context of the UN.²⁶⁸ On the other hand, it was added that a foreign policy that was directed by the principles of Kemalism should include the principles of ‘supporting the independence and the sovereignty of the oppressed nations’ and ‘helping them reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’.²⁶⁹ In a similar vein, the government named the Cyprus issue as the “greatest national cause” of Turkey underlining that Turkey would not tolerate the colonization and oppression of Turkish Cypriots.²⁷⁰

With the military memorandum of 1971, the official discourse involved yet another shift. It was stated that Turkey would undertake *any* measures to defend Turkey’s national security interests and the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in case of a new attack against the Turkish Cypriots.²⁷¹ The next supra-party programs further underlined that Turkey should be

²⁶⁶ Nihat Erim, “Nihat Erim’in Dış Meseleler Konusundaki Genel Görüşme Sırasında Konuşması,” 2-3.

²⁶⁷ See Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 149.

²⁶⁸ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 125-26, 174, 195.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 121.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 125.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 212.

prepared to counter an imminent attack against the Turks living on the island and Turkey's national security.²⁷² This defensive approach to the Cyprus issue paralleled a concomitant reconstruction of the 'peace at home, peace in the world' principle. Melen's government began to use the principles of 'equity' and 'non-interference in domestic affairs' in the context of the 'peace at home, peace in the world' principle which was reproduced in the following government programs.

In this regard, Turkey's unilateral intervention in 1974 was not surprising, given the discursive context of the early 1970s in Turkey.²⁷³ Following the Greece-instigated coup in Cyprus and building on the then available discursive template, the newly established civilian government legitimized the operation by recourse to the principles of 'safeguarding the independence and the sovereignty of the island' and 'relying on the international agreements'.²⁷⁴ In this sense, the operation was represented in accordance with the principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world'. Similarly, despite the shifts in the policy discourse on Cyprus, the Cyprus policy was neither declared as an extension of Turkey's Western-orientation nor against it. While Turkey intervened in Cyprus despite the West in 1974, neither the intervention, nor the American embargo that followed Turkey's second intervention for the partition of the island led the official position to suggest an alternative to Turkey's Western-orientation. All government programs from 1974 until 1979 saw the Western alliance and Turkey's membership in NATO and other Western organizations complementary to fulfilling the principles of 'peace at home, peace in the world' and spreading the values of the 'contemporary civilization'.²⁷⁵ While different elements of the

²⁷² Ibid., 229, 263.

²⁷³ The Turkish Government relied on the following provision of the Treaty of Guarantee: "...In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty". For the text of the Treaty of Guarantee, see *Conference on Cyprus: Documents Signed and Initialed at Lanchester House on 19 February 1959* (London: H. Stationery Office, 1964). For a counter-argument that the Treaty of Guarantee did not equip Turkey with the right to unilaterally intervene, see Melakopides, 73-101.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 317.

²⁷⁵ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 249, 339, 375.

Kemalist template were employed in the legitimizations given for the Western-orientation and the moves in the Cyprus policy, both policies were indirectly linked to each other by being justified by recourse to the pursuit of Atatürk's principles.

The task ahead is then to break this unity into its components in order to examine whether and how the earlier constructions of Kemalism discussed above were integrated in the party discourses (as stated in party programs, election programs, public speeches delivered by the head of the parties and the books written by them), what type of identity and rationality these discourses represented, and whether Cyprus, from their position, constituted a break or not.

3.2. Deconstructing the official discourse

3.2.1.1. Kemalism from the 'left of center' to the 'democratic left': the view of the Republican People's Party (RPP)

Those who are against the left of center are against the Kemalist principles.

—Bülent Ecevit, 1966

The coup in 1960 provided the RPP with the opportunity to redefine Kemalism in terms of the 'six arrows' of the 1930s. As the party established by Atatürk, and having incorporated the ideology of Kemalism into its program in 1931, the RPP sought to legitimize its stand by declaring that its primary aim was to fulfill Atatürk's vision. The remark of İsmet İnönü, the Head of the RPP (1938-1972) is illustrative: "The RPP is the determined guardian of Atatürk's reforms."²⁷⁶

Determined to pursue the genuine version of Kemalism, the RPP stated that the economic developmental model the party called as the 'left of center' was in complete

²⁷⁶ C.H.P. XVII. Kurultayı (16 Ekim 1964) Genel Başkan İsmet İnönü'nün Açış Konuşması (Ankara: Ankara Basım ve Ciltvi, 1964), 6; cited in Kili, 189.

compliance with the Kemalist principles of statism, revolutionism, and populism.²⁷⁷ In representing the ‘left of center’ as “the most appropriate name for the RPP’s program, six arrows, and Atatürk’s path,”²⁷⁸ the party further assured that this perspective did not implicate any deviation from the six arrows of Kemalism.²⁷⁹ In this vein, Bülent Ecevit, who later replaced İnönü as the head of the party in 1972, declared that this perspective was not an addition to, but what best described Kemalism: “The left of center is not another principle added to the six arrows. It is what shows the essence of the six arrows.”²⁸⁰

In this sense, a ‘rightist’ interpretation of Kemalism would not reflect the ‘true’ essence of the six principles of Kemalism. This was prominent in the way the RPP delegitimized alternative perspectives to Kemalist nationalism. In its seventeenth congress, the RPP declared its view on nationalism as follows: “The RPP subscribes to Atatürkist nationalism which unites and exalts, and which rejects any movement that divides the nation and endangers our national unity.”²⁸¹ A year later, what was not considered as the ‘left of center’ was juxtaposed against this view on nationalism:

Our party program is in line with the Western democracies in its left of center perspective, (and) we do not need to make any revisions on it In our country racists declare themselves as nationalist, imperialists call themselves as nationalist, those who support foreign investment also call themselves nationalist. However, all of these clash with Kemalist nationalism.²⁸²

In this respect, the party did not only delegitimize the rightist constructions of Kemalism but also reconstituted Kemalism as the ‘left of center’, adding a new nodal point to Kemalism to be challenged by others. Building on the discursive template of the military establishment, the RPP suggested that the national unity could only be established through the

²⁷⁷ Cited in Hikmet Bila, *CHP 1919-1999* (Istanbul: Şefik Matbaası, 1999), 212; Orhan Koloğlu, *Ecevit ile CHP: Bir Aşk ve Nefret Öyküsü* (Ankara: Büke Yayınları, 2000), 89-91.

²⁷⁸ *Ulus*, 21 October 1966; cited in Necip Mirkelamoğlu, *Ecevit Ecevit’i Anlatıyor* (Istanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1977), 401.

²⁷⁹ It could be added here that in the fourth extraordinary congress of the RPP, which met in 1968, some of the placards carried by the party members read as follows: “Left of Center, the path of Humanity”, “We are in the Left of Center because we are Atatürkists” (Kili 1969, 194).

²⁸⁰ *Ulus*, 7 July 1966; cited in Mirkelamoğlu, 402.

²⁸¹ *C.H.P.: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Onyedinci Kurultay Bildirisi: İleri Türkiye Ülkümüz* (Ankara: Ankara Nasım ve Ciltevi, 1964), 8; cited in Kili, 190.

²⁸² *Cumhuriyet*, 14 October 1965.

extrication of the ‘separatist views’ from the ‘center’, which was where Kemalism was positioned. Yet, with a twist, communism was not considered as one of those ‘deviant’ ideologies that needed to be swept away in order to establish the national unity. In this vein, Ecevit reconstituted the source of threat which the official discourse had hitherto relied on and said, “The real threat facing Turkey does not come from communism but fascism.”²⁸³

This leftist but yet ‘centrist’ approach to Kemalism was pushed further before the 1969 elections, after which the RPP could not win the majority, nor could it obtain any seats in the government. The basic slogan before the elections involved changing the order through initiating the ‘base’ reforms, a terminology imported from Marxism.²⁸⁴ After Ecevit took over the leadership in 1972, the motto of the party was thereby changed into ‘democratic left’, suggesting a move away from the ‘center’. Yet to the RPP, this was “certainly not a deviation from Kemalism.”²⁸⁵ This view was further elaborated in the book written by Ecevit, based on the speeches he gave in the twentieth congress of the RPP.

In *Atatürk ve Devrimcilik* [Atatürk and revolutionism], Ecevit argued that Atatürk’s revolutions, which had the inherent objective to ‘raise Turkey above the contemporary civilization’, were superstructural reforms; in other words, they were implemented in order to induce changes in the administrative, political, and legal institutions of the state.²⁸⁶ While they were necessary under the conditions of the 1920s and 1930s, they failed to be fully realized as they were not complemented with the base reforms that involved the initiation of socio-economic changes through ‘participatory democracy’.²⁸⁷ In this regard, defining Atatürk’s revolutions from this perspective did not mean a deviation from Kemalism. Kemalism, Ecevit stated, required new changes within the limits of its principles; and in this sense, it was still

²⁸³ *Ulus*, 6 April 1966; cited in Mirkelamoğlu, 383. It is worth noting here that in 1956, Ecevit identified communism as the most serious threat for Turkey (Mirkelamoğlu 1977, 378).

²⁸⁴ *Bila*, 238.

²⁸⁵ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *CHP Tüzük ve Yönetmelikleri* (Ankara: Çoban Matbaası, 1976), 7.

²⁸⁶ Bülent Ecevit, *Atatürk ve Devrimcilik* (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1970), 62.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 63.

valid and had the capacity to be valid forever.²⁸⁸ The problem, for Ecevit was to evaluate Atatürk's principles according to Atatürk's era which would make one get stuck in history.²⁸⁹ In this sense, the real threat did not come from the ideas that were considered undemocratic; "the real obstruction and oppression [came] from those who [could not] move one step beyond the point reached by Atatürk's revolutions."²⁹⁰ In this vein, Ecevit further argued:

Just like we do not need to give up on democracy in the name of [Atatürk's] revolutions with an aim to enliven the dynamism of Atatürk's era, it is a vain dream to expect that we could attain the same dynamism and creativity of that time by giving up on democracy, even if we had a leader just as strong If we turn our heads away from the light of free thought, we will never come back to the enlightenment, creativity and the dynamism of Atatürk's era. We will find ourselves in the darkness, insipidness, and hopelessness of the age before Atatürk.²⁹¹

This view was further defined in the party's election program of 1973, where it was stated that the primary mission of the RPP was to strengthen the republican order and elevate the country to the level of contemporary civilization by means of realizing the Kemalist principles and strengthening democracy.²⁹² Declaring itself as "the founder of the new state, democracy, and the main guide for contemporary civilization", the RPP promised for a "just order" which would develop the country by means of participatory democracy.²⁹³ In this sense, the previously upheld view on democracy was delegitimized by recourse to Atatürk's revolutions and the additional nodal points that provided a new definition for the previous elements of Kemalism. To this view, 'participatory democracy' and the base reforms reflected the true essence of Atatürk's revolutions. The goal of 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization' could be realized only through way.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., 62

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 11.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., 20.

²⁹¹ Ibid., 59.

²⁹² Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Ak Günlere: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1973 Seçim Bildirgesi* (Ankara: Ajans-Türk Matbaası, 1973), 3.

²⁹³ Ibid., 4.

3.2.1.2. Flexible foreign policy and Turkey's role as a guardian of democracy

While in 1964 the RPP stated that its foreign policy principle was guided by the principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world'²⁹⁴, a new foreign policy concept was added to this principle in the 1970s: flexible foreign policy. This suggested that while Turkey should stay in the security alliances which she was a member of, she should not see this sufficient for ensuring her security and should hence develop her own national strategy.²⁹⁵ Indeed, this view was in line with the official discourse in that it emphasized the goal of getting a 'respected status' within the Western community by holding on to the principles of 'equality' and 'sovereignty'. Yet, the RPP's discourse diverged from this template in pointing out that Turkey's overdependence on NATO and the U.S. was dangerous.²⁹⁶ In this vein, Ecevit stated:

It has become obvious that Turkey has fallen into a very disadvantageous position because of her dependence throughout the years as a member of NATO almost exclusively on one source, that is, the United States, for her military equipment.²⁹⁷

Just as it legitimized its economic developmental policy by defining it in terms of Atatürk's principles and reforms, the RPP did not present this foreign policy initiative as a brand new construction. With a twist, the 'new foreign policy concept' was linked to the pursuit of the foreign policy principles as implemented during Atatürk's era. In this sense, decreasing the level of dependence on the U.S. and NATO implicated a clear return to the foreign policy pursued during the early republican era. To this view, foreign policy had to be more diversified and realistic of Turkey's geographical realities as it had been in the 1920s and 1930s:

Historically and geographically, Turkey is primarily a Balkan, Middle Eastern, and Eastern Mediterranean country. This certainly does not exclude the fact that Turkey is also a member of the Community of Europe, but our starting point is the Balkan area, the Middle East and the

²⁹⁴ The 1965 election program of the RPP stated: "The RPP accepts peace at home peace in the world as the basic principle in its domestic and foreign policy; it considers the contribution to the world peace to be the only condition to attain domestic peace and security" (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1965, 217).

²⁹⁵ Ibidem. Italics added.

²⁹⁶ Cited in *Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit Speeches, May-June 1978* (Ankara: Torunoğlu Ofset, 1978), 2.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 18.

Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore we should give greater emphasis to these historical and geographical realities This attitude in a way indicates *a return to a policy first adopted when the Republic started*, that of peacefully establishing Turkey in her own region by forming very close ties with the Middle Eastern countries as much as possible, and with the Balkan countries, before opening up to the rest of the world, and this is what we are trying to do right now.²⁹⁸

While this placed Turkey's Western identity within a range of other foreign policy identities, it was not complemented with the policy of non-alliance as the following remarks of Ecevit clarify: "In spite of everything, we do not want to leave NATO because we think that we have responsibility towards the world."²⁹⁹ In this vein, a new element was placed at the core of the relations with the 'allies', mainly, spreading the values of democracy beyond. The following statement is illuminating in this sense:

Turkey cannot be satisfied any more with being regarded and treated as the armed frontier guard of NATO. Turkey has another, and in our view, a greater contribution to make to the democratic world. In her capacity as a developing country it has been able to make democracy live under the most adverse conditions. Turkey happens to be the only developing country in the world in which democracy has survived continuously since the Second World War. By making a success of democracy, by making it survive during the stage of economic development, Turkey sets an encouraging example, and may set an encouraging example to many other developing countries.³⁰⁰

Consider also the following statement by Ecevit:

Our friends in the West have usually evaluated Turkey according to the contribution that Turkey might make to collective defense through the bravery of our people, but I think Turkey deserves to be evaluated according to other criteria as well, particularly according to the criteria of her success in democracy, because after all, our alliance is not merely a military alliance It is an alliance aiming at strengthening and spreading democracy and freedom.³⁰¹

Hence, the RPP's emphasis on flexibility within the Western alliance involved both placing the Western-orientation within a range of many other policies Turkey had to pursue and claiming a peculiar role within the West in accordance with the principle of 'participatory democracy' as defined by Ecevit and in the election programs of the RPP. To this view, Turkey needed to decrease her dependence on the West in order to spread her democratic values to the other developing countries. This move reconstructed Turkey's identity as a

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 20. Italics added.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 3.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 4.

³⁰¹ Ibid., 159.

‘democratic’, ‘free’ and ‘sovereign’ state both in domestic and international terms. Turkey was thereby represented as capable of standing alone while ‘choosing’ to stand by the West and willing to carry her domestic principles beyond her borders as a ‘responsible’ and ‘respected’ member of this community.

This perspective was also prominent in the RPP’s articulations on the relations with the EEC. By the same token, the RPP emphasized Turkey’s freedom of decision and Turkey’s democratic role within the Community. In this vein, Ecevit stated that Turkey’s integration with the Western Europe should not constitute a burden for Turkey:

In order to improve our links with the West, Turkey should take her place within the integration in Western Europe while maintaining her freedom of decision and movement But it is dangerous for the EEC to be a burden for Turkey as much as Turkey’s being a burden for the EEC Turkey might be drawn into a position that it needs to pay this burden by sacrificing from its national honor and independence. That is why it might be gradually more difficult for Turkey to maintain its relations.³⁰²

As was articulated in the statements regarding NATO, this did not suggest a break from the hitherto-pursued Western-orientation. Rather, the RPP upheld a defensive approach to Turkey’s integration with the West in that it underlined the significance of ‘national sovereignty’ (freedom of decision and movement), ‘national independence’ and ‘national honor’ in this context. According to this view, democracy building constituted the main area where Turkey could demonstrate her inherent Western identity. Turkey’s Western identity, to put it differently, was much more than merely being the Southeastern flank of NATO or maintaining the economic relations with the West under any conditions. Consider the following remark by Ecevit:

We have a kind of special relationship with democratic countries of Europe. Our membership in NATO and our associate membership of the European Economic Community are only minor factors in Turkey’s relationship with the democratic countries of Europe and the West as a whole. At the basis of our relationship with these countries is the Turkish people’s attachment to democracy.³⁰³

³⁰² Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Ak Günlere*, 223.

³⁰³ Cited in *Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit Speeches May-June 1978*, 41.

The RPP's foreign policy articulations on the Cyprus issue also involved the same emphasis on Turkey's special role in building democracy and extending it beyond her territorial borders. The RPP legitimized the Cyprus intervention by emphasizing Turkish Cypriots' rights to freedom and democracy on the one hand, and Turkey's policy as a 'responsible', 'democratic', 'peaceful' and 'pro-freedom' country on the other. In the aftermath of the intervention, which was called as "The Peace Operation," Ecevit made the following remark:

Nobody can touch on the rights of Turks in Cyprus now. We cannot consider leaving Cyprus The RPP considers it an indispensable national duty to ensure the emancipation of the Turkish people in Cyprus from any kind of oppression, danger and foreign sovereignty.³⁰⁴

In underlining that the Turkish Cypriots were 'in danger', 'under the foreign sovereignty' and 'oppressed' by the Greek dictatorship, this discourse reconstituted Turkey as a 'liberator' and a 'hero' that was driven by the sole purpose to 'democratize' and hence 'rescue the one in need'. In a similar vein, Ecevit stated, "The RPP believes that the Turkish Cypriots also have the right to free democracy, which Turkey considers as indispensable."³⁰⁵ Following the resolution that authorized Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974, Ecevit highlighted the same view in his speech at the parliament:

Your resolution is as much a triumph for democracy as for Turkey. The victory to be achieved in Cyprus will not be a victory for the Turkish nation alone, but will also be the victory of democracy over dictatorship; it will be the triumph of freedom over oppression.³⁰⁶

This was not only in line with the way the RPP represented 'building democracy at home' as a goal of Atatürk's reforms and a part of Turkey's role in the Western alliance. It was also concomitant with the definitions provided as regards the 'peace at home, peace in the world' principle prior to the operation. The election program of the RPP stated that the party would "realize 'peace at home, and peace in the world' not through pressure, punishment or

³⁰⁴ *Milliyet*, 23 July 1974.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁶ *Milliyet*, 21 July 1975.

fear, but through freedom, love and respect.”³⁰⁷ This also shows that the language used in relation to Turkey’s integration with the West and Turkey’s Cyprus policy was rested on the elements of Kemalism.

In line with the official discourse, the RPP oscillated between two approaches to the Cyprus issue and considered it also as a matter of Turkey’s own security. Related to this was the assumption that Greece was arming against Turkey.³⁰⁸ As a result, having room for maneuver within NATO was seen of high importance and urgency as NATO’s conception of threat exclusively focused on the Soviet Union. In this sense, the Cyprus case showed that it was crucial for Turkey to develop a flexible security framework. This approach involved an emphasis on the principle of ‘non-interference in domestic and foreign affairs’ as illustrated by the following remark by Ecevit:

Turkey and Greece cannot solve their problems and the Cyprus dispute cannot be resolved under the shadow of others. History bears witness to that because whenever other countries were involved in the Turco-Greek differences the Turks and Greeks ended up in conflict. But whenever they were left alone to settle their own differences they showed great ability to do so. So the elimination of outside interferences is essential for a solution of problems between Turkey and Greece and for the resolution of the Cyprus issue.³⁰⁹

Hence, from this approach too, the Cyprus intervention was not cast in opposition to Turkey’s integration with the West. Rather, the policies of the ‘West’ were represented as ignorant of (if not in contradiction with) Turkey’s national interests. Building on the elements of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘equality’ in its constructions of Kemalist nationalism and Kemalist foreign policy as argued above, the RPP pushed for a self-standing position for Turkey within the Western alliance. This not only defined the role Turkey ‘chose’ to take but also the domain upon which Turkey’s Western identity was based: ‘strengthening participatory

³⁰⁷ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Ak Günlere*, 213.

³⁰⁸ Consider the following remarks of Ecevit: “The urgencies of the threats facing Turkey have changed considerably in recent years; for instance, we are no more under imminent direct threat from the Soviet Union, but we are face to face threat from other, more real threats from other corners, and we have to reali[z]e our defense concept and defense structure accordingly” (*Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit Speeches May-June 1978*, 27). Following this remark, when asked by a journalist whether in saying ‘other corners’ he implicated Cyprus, Ecevit replied, “Obviously Greece has been arming against her ally Turkey” (*Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit Speeches May-June 1978*, 27).

³⁰⁹ Cited in *Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit Speeches, May-June 1978*, 23-24.

democracy at home and spreading it beyond'. From this perspective, the RPP's Cyprus policy did not suggest an alternative to Turkey's integration the West, but showed how Turkey was determined and sincere in fulfilling her mission.

3.2.2.1. Demirel's 'Justice Party': Western democracy to fulfill Atatürk's vision

The inspiration source of our attitude and behaviors is Atatürkism and Atatürk's Revolutions, the goal of which was to establish a social order that is free, Western, and civilized.

—Süleyman Demirel, 1965

The JP's discourse was preoccupied with Westernism as much as that of the RPP was with sovereignty and flexibility. The party, headed by Süleyman Demirel, first formed a coalitional government with the RPP after the 1961 elections; then obtained the majority in the 1965 elections, leading the government until 1971. The party later took place in the coalitional governments known as 'the Nationalist Front' between 1975 and 1977 and formed a minority government in 1979. Representing the conservative right in the parliament, and hence being against the 'left of center' as well as the 'democratic left', it presented itself as "the real Atatürkist party"³¹⁰ in being civilizationist, nationalist and populist as prescribed by Atatürk's principles.³¹¹

For the JP, Kemalism could not be interpreted from any point of view.³¹² Neither was it forgotten, nor was it vulnerable.³¹³ Rather, it was embraced by the whole nation and involved the following principles: 'sovereignty belongs to the nation', 'liberalism', 'Turkish nationalism', 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization by means of liberalism', and

³¹⁰ Cited in Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İnkılabın Anatomisi* (Istanbul: Şefik Matbaası, 1993), 35.

³¹¹ Cited in Adalet Partisi, *Süleyman Demirel, A.P. Genel Başkanı ve Başbakan: Seçim Konuşmaları II* (Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Yayınları, 1966), 30.

³¹² Demirel, *Büyük Türkiye*, 2nd ed., (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1977), 318.

³¹³ *Ibidem*.

‘respect for the national will’.³¹⁴ This nationalist, civilizationist, developmentalist and liberal perspective to Kemalism was, for the JP, also inseparable from being against communism and taking the Western civilization as a model.³¹⁵ This involved, as defined by Demirel in his book entitled as *Büyük Türkiye* [The great Turkey], establishing a welfare state that was based on private entrepreneurship, upholding the principle of liberal democracy, empowering the nation over the state, encouraging foreign investment and thereby realizing the goal of ‘peace at home’,³¹⁶ and ‘reaching the level of the Western civilization’.³¹⁷ Nevertheless, the JP did not suggest emulating the West; rather, it placed the national will and Kemalist principles at the center of Turkey’s Western-orientation. As declared in its 1965 election program, the goal of Atatürk’s revolutions was to establish a civilized, liberal and Western society.³¹⁸ Thus, for the JP, Turkey’s civilizational goal could not be detached from Atatürk’s Westernist civilizationism.³¹⁹

The party’s Kemalist stand met serious suspicion especially from the RPP’s circles. Yet with a twist, the JP employed the same tools used against itself. Demirel’s responses to the arguments that accused the JP of not being genuinely Kemalist show well how the party built upon the nodal points of the 1960’s Kemalism. Shortly before the 1964 elections Demirel noted:

The Justice Party has been exposed to many unfounded accusations since its establishment. It has been accused of being obstructionist, being against [Atatürk’s] reforms and Atatürk’s principles. I would like to state that I am rather astonished and offended with their disrespect and mistrust towards the majority of the Turkish people.³²⁰

Just as the RPP represented its Kemalist stance by delegitimizing the other approaches to Kemalism and pushing them out of the ‘center’, the JP’s response to the accusations

³¹⁴ Ibidem.

³¹⁵ Ibid., 75; Adalet Partisi, *Adalet Partisi: Program ve Tüzük* (Ankara: Doğu Matbaası, 1974), 3-4.

³¹⁶ Demirel, *Büyük Türkiye*, 242.

³¹⁷ Ibid., 19-21.

³¹⁸ Adalet Partisi, *Adalet Partisi 1965 Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ankara: Doğu Matbaası, 1964), 4.

³¹⁹ Demirel, *Büyük Türkiye*, 75.

³²⁰ Cited in Adalet Partisi, *Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Başkan ve Başbakan Yardımcısı, Yazdıkları ve Söyledikleri* (Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Neşriyatı, 1967), 38-39.

involved the same discursive move. For Demirel, representing the view of the majority, who wholeheartedly embraced Atatürk's reforms and principles, the party's line could not possibly contradict with Kemalism as it could not clash with the national will.³²¹ Hence, any accusation in this regard would be made only by those who were against the 'national unity', 'democracy',³²² who sought anarchy"³²³, and who deviated from Atatürk's path and principles.³²⁴ In this vein, Demirel stated:

An Atatürkist cannot disregard the Republic, national sovereignty or Turkish nationalism. The pursuit of Atatürk's path can only be realized with these principles. Atatürkism means loving the nation . . . [and] requires respecting the nation and her rights. A separatist view cannot be Kemalist . . . It is impossible to detach Atatürk from the nation . . . [Therefore] all behaviors and thoughts that endanger the republican order and national sovereignty are inevitably against Atatürk.³²⁵

In this sense, both Kemalism and Atatürk's personality were directly linked to the defense of the national sovereignty and the national will. Kemalism was represented once again as the 'melting pot' which dissolved any differences. Furthermore, in his election speeches Demirel declared the party's perspective as civilizationist, nationalist and populist as prescribed by Atatürk's principles,"³²⁶ and stated that "everybody but communists are nationalist"³²⁷ which situated the communist discourse against Kemalist nationalism and the 'national unity'. In a similar vein, Demirel made the following remark:

The RPP has moved away from the Atatürkist principles. They have broken many out of the nine arrows. It opposes nationalism; it is neither republican, nor populist. While it protects the left and communism, it does the most unfair thing to declare itself as Atatürk's party.³²⁸

With this link, the JP was thereby pushed back to the 'center' and represented as the real guardian of the 'national unity', hence, the main principles of Kemalism. Indeed, much later, in 1977, after establishing the coalitional government with the NSP and NAP under the

³²¹ Ibid., 87.

³²² Cited in Adalet Partisi, *Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Başkanı ve Başbakan: Muhtelif Konuşmalar* (Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Neşriyatı, 1969), 34-35.

³²³ Cited in Adalet Partisi, *Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Başkan ve Başbakan Yardımcısı, Yazdıkları ve Söyledikleri*, 69.

³²⁴ Demirel, *Büyük Türkiye*, 318.

³²⁵ Ibidem.

³²⁶ Cited in Adalet Partisi, *Süleyman Demirel, A.P. Genel Başkanı ve Başbakan: Seçim Konuşmaları II*, 25.

³²⁷ Demirel, *Büyük Türkiye*, 96.

³²⁸ Demirel, *Milliyetçiler Birleşiniz* (Ankara: Güneş Matbaası, 1976), 200.

motto of the ‘Nationalist Front’, the need to confront anti-communism for the ‘national unity’ was given further emphasis and included in the government program with the following remark: “Some ideological currents that are assembled to topple the regime and break down the integrity of the nation and the country by abusing the wide freedom rights given by the constitution, seek to replace the current order with communism through their links with the outside.”³²⁹ While this reproduced the defensive approach employed by the military establishment in the 1960s, Islamism, which had been defined as a separatist ideology in the early 1960s, was missing from this construction.

It was not only the individual elements of Kemalism that structured the discourse of the JP employed in relation to the alternative discourses. The JP’s move to place itself within the ‘center’ also involved making a direct link between its anti-communist stand with the words of Atatürk and the social legitimacy of Atatürk revolutions. The following remarks are illustrative in this regard:

The watchfulness of the Turkish nation, the patriotism of the state institutions and Atatürk’s directive (smash communism wherever you find it) make it impossible for this freedom throttling system to blossom on the Turkish soil.³³⁰

We do not support any thought system that does not accord with Ataturkism. We believe that thought systems and movements that are not in harmony with the scientific thought, Western mentality, national will, and human rights will not do any good for our nation.³³¹

As the above-quoted statements show, the JP’s anti-communist discourse involved several assumptions. First, communism was seen against the scientific thought, human rights, freedom, and Western mentality. Second, Atatürk, who sought to establish these ideas in Turkey, was in opposition to the communist ideology. Third, the Turkish society, having already embraced Atatürk’s revolutions as a whole, would not under any condition internalize communist ideas. In this sense, an anti-communist discourse would not only defend the

³²⁹ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 383.

³³⁰ Cited in Adalet Partisi, *Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Başkan ve Başbakan Yardımcısı, Yazdıkları ve Söyledikleri*, 171.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 88.

national unity, but also inevitably reflect the national will. Then there remained only one and legitimate path to follow: the West.

The goal of Atatürk's reforms is to reach the level of Western civilization. This does not mean deserting one's own traditions and culture but replacing the dogmatic beliefs with positivist thought, enlightenment, and increasing the prosperity level. Our culture is not in conflict with the Western civilization.³³²

In arguing that the goal of Atatürk's revolutions was to reach the level of Western civilization,³³³ the JP joined the pro-Western discourse of the 1960s used in relation to the Council of Europe, EEC and NATO, by building this projection strictly on an anti-communist and populist base. On the other hand, seeing Kemalism as having an inherent Westernist appeal separated the JP's discourse from that of the RPP, which confined Westernism to sharing the same democratic culture with the West and according to which the 'real' Kemalism could be best realized by a self-standing position within the Western alliance. In this vein, Demirel stated, "Turkish nation is very eager and determined to move on the road towards the Western civilization."³³⁴

3.2.2.2. A pro-Western foreign policy: Western and/or national interests?

In the 1965 program of the coalitional government, which was led by the JP, it was accordingly stated that the government would take the guidance of the principles and deeds of Atatürk in conducting its foreign policy.³³⁵ This followed a comprehensive definition of the objectives of the Kemalist foreign policy:

. . . [To] consider that one's domestic peace can be insured only by a worldwide stable peace, to safeguard and maintain Turkey's high national interests in accordance with other nations' interests, to trust Turkey's own security force first while at the same strengthening international peace and security through collective security precautions, to support the independence and sovereignty of all world nations and acquire a distinguished status in the struggle of all world nations in reaching the highest level of civilization, and to respect the principle of equity in our relations with our neighbors. Although world conditions have

³³² Ibid., 87.

³³³ Ibidem. It is worth noting here that Demirel also attached human rights values to Kemalism, saying that "the starting point for human rights is Kemalism" (Adalet Partisi 1969,106).

³³⁴ Adalet Partisi, *Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Başkanı ve Başbakan: Muhtelif Konuşmalar*, 58.

³³⁵ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 121.

changed considerably since then, we believe that [Atatürk's] principles are still suitable for Turkey's interests.³³⁶

While this definition drew upon the elements already circulating in the official discourse in relation to the principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world', neither did it involve the staunch Westernism as propagated in the election programs,³³⁷ nor did it associate the West with the highest level of civilization. The government programs prepared by the JP saw the relations conducted with the Western European countries and organizations as part of this traditional realist policy which placed the national interests above all other concerns. The foreign policy articulations on NATO underlined the security interests of Turkey *vis-à-vis* the threat of communism and the need for collective security³³⁸, while the economic interests were prioritized in the articulations made specifically on the EEC and even categorized under the subtitle of foreign economic relations instead of foreign policy.³³⁹

This realist approach to foreign policy was also stated in the public speeches and the press interviews of Demirel. In one of his speeches, he highlighted that the Western civilization marked the highest level of the contemporary civilization and that Turkey's interests and reputation could be maintained only through a pro-Western foreign policy.³⁴⁰ For Demirel, the main goals of the Turkish foreign policy, mainly, pacificism, economic development, and obtaining security through diplomacy, lied at the core of Turkey's policy towards NATO and the EEC.³⁴¹ From this perspective, the reason for why Turkey chose to become a member of the EEC was to reach the economic level of the West; and in this sense, it was not only in line with Turkey's national interests but also the Kemalist Westernization

³³⁶ Ibid., 121-22.

³³⁷ See for instance Adalet Partisi, *Adalet Partisi 1973 Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ankara: Doğu Matbaası, 1973), 73; Adalet Partisi, *Adalet Partisi 1965 Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ankara: Doğu Matbaası, 1964), 4, 31.

³³⁸ In the first Demirel government the following remark was stated in relation to the Westernist security organizations: "Considering her geographical and strategic position, Turkey is *obliged* to accomplish its maximum security only within a collective system. Our membership in NATO and CENTO alliances is based on these main reasons" (Dağlı and Aktürk, 122-23).

³³⁹ Ibid., 127.

³⁴⁰ Cited in Adalet Partisi, *Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Başkan ve Başbakan Yardımcısı, Yazdıkları ve Söyledikleri*, 70.

³⁴¹ Demirel, *Büyük Türkiye*, 322.

reforms and Western civilizationism.³⁴² In this respect, ‘rationalizing’ the elements of Kemalism helped reconstituting both the pro-Western foreign policy and Kemalism as realist. Similarly, Demirel’s answer to an interview question of why Turkey wanted to become a member of the EEC was as follows:

Turkey’s objective is reaching the level of the West, raising her level of economic development to that of the Western countries . . . [and] building a competitive industry [However] we do not want to be a weak member of the EEC; we want to be one of its strongest members Both parties have an interest in this.³⁴³

Besides the emphasis put on the national interests,³⁴⁴ here we also see how the party’s articulations on the EEC reproduced the elements of ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’ and ‘being a respected member of the world nations/Western community’ from a realist perspective. The above-quoted note further exemplifies how the ‘Western-civilizationism’ and ‘rationalism’ were taken as the two sides of the same coin. Indeed, in making such a link, Demirel also reordered the elements attributed to Kemalism, raising these elements above the other. The following remark is illustrative of a similar attribution: “The primary principles of Atatürk are rationalism and Western civilizationism.”³⁴⁵

Yet the JP did not only rationalize the ‘ideals’ but also ‘idealized’ those interests ascribed to following a pro-Western policy. The following statement makes a similar link in associating the EEC order with the model prescribed by Atatürk:

Great Atatürk’s direction to be followed by the Turkish Republic in political, economic and social justice terms is the pathway towards the West For Turkey, the EEC is a real success of the democratic order. The reason for why Turkey takes part on the side of the EEC without hesitation is because she shares the same ideal and understanding of democracy with it. Turkey made her choice for the EEC’s economic order. Turkey believes that this order, which gives priority and great value to the individual and private entrepreneurship, is the one that will take the nations to welfare and happiness.³⁴⁶

³⁴² Ibid., 75.

³⁴³ *Milliyet*, 24 July 1976; cited in *Türkiye-AET İlişkileri* (Ankara: Avrupa Topluluğu Yayınları, 1976), 250-51.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., 253.

³⁴⁵ Cited in Adalet Partisi, *Süleyman Demirel, A.P. Genel Başkanı ve Başbakan: Seçim Konuşmaları II*, 36.

³⁴⁶ *Milliyet*, 17 May 1967.

In this sense, the JP's legitimization of the EEC policy not only rearticulated the Kemalist foreign policy as being inherently Westernist but also ascribed a Western, democratic and liberal identity to Turkey.

It should also be noted here that the Westernism of the party involved significant differences with the one employed by the RPP, which, arguing for a strict statism for 'economic development' and 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization', mainly emphasized the 'participatory democracy' as what made Turkey similar to the countries in the West and refrained from identifying the private entrepreneurship as a constituent of this shared culture. The JP's staunch anti-communism, on the other hand, placed individualism as a primary pillar of democracy and defined it not only as the basic objective of the Westernist civilizationism of Atatürk,³⁴⁷ but also situated it at core of the relations pursued with the Western European countries.

Indeed, the Western-orientation was also legitimized by arguing that it was the 'will' of the Turkish nation to be on the side of the Western democracy and the private entrepreneurship which delegitimized the statist approaches to economic development as well as communism. The JP linked this 'choice' further to taking a stance against the Soviet Union and defined a pro-NATO policy in compliance with the 'peace at home, peace in the world' principle. In this sense, a reserved approach towards NATO did not only indirectly support communism but also contradicted the national will, the 'peace at home, peace in the world' principle, and the civilizationism 'inherent' in Kemalism. After Ecevit identified Greece as a bigger threat for Turkey than the Soviet Union, Demirel stated:

It has been expressed that some hopes emerged in Turkey with regard to taking Soviet Union's support. [The Western countries] is therefore asking: Is Turkey changing sides in her foreign policy? Today there are well-rooted conflicts between the free world and the Soviet Union. There are strategies to topple NATO from inside, by taking a stance against NATO, conducting rapprochements with individual countries and shaking the trust built on the member countries. I hope these efforts do not take the form of the Trojan horse. From the perspective of Atatürk's principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world', we believe our

³⁴⁷ Demirel, *Büyük Türkiye*, 75.

foreign policy should pursue a nationalistic and honorable path by holding the national interests above everything.³⁴⁸

Here we see how siding with NATO was considered as being a part of the ‘free world’, for the ‘peace’, and in compliance with Atatürk’s principles. This remark also shows how taking the support of the Soviet Union was associated with taking a stance against all the ‘positive’ values ascribed to the West. The question that can be asked here is hence the following: how did the JP integrate the policy propagated as regards the Cyprus issue within its Westernist approach? In order to answer this question, we have to examine the elements used in the party’s articulations on the issue. The following remarks of Demirel, stated in the government program of 1965, constitute a good starting point:

We have intimate links with the Republic of Cyprus. With all of our good intentions we hoped that the agreements that we signed ensured the peace and welfare of all of its citizens. However, the London and Zurich agreements, which have to be taken as a whole, were ignored . . . and our warnings to the Cyprus Government were disregarded As I stated earlier, Turkey expects from the other parties to the agreement the same faith and respect as she has towards it.³⁴⁹

This remark is illustrative of the first dimension of the official discourse that valued the rights and interests of both the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots, suggesting that the conflict resolution be sought within the context of international agreements. Turkey was hence defined here as a responsible actor who expected the same respect to international law from other states. In the following statement, however, a stricter tone is present:

In order to resolve the Cyprus question, which is our *greatest national cause*, in a way that ensures the rights and interests of the Turkish community is an unchanging objective of our government. . . . Turkey has always preferred peaceful negotiations between the parties involved because she sincerely values regional security and the prevention of future conflicts [However] unilateral peace is not possible It is unimaginable that Turkey could be ignorant to the colonization of Turkish Cypriots.³⁵⁰

Here we see Cyprus being represented as the ‘greatest national cause’ and placed above all other considerations. Yet, it is hard to situate this discourse as an example of an anti-

³⁴⁸ Cited in Adalet Partisi, *Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Başkan ve Başbakan Yardımcısı, Yazdıkları ve Söyledikleri*, 75

³⁴⁹ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 68.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 125. Italics added.

Western stance as the party did not define the Cyprus policy as a reaction against the West but the colonization of the Turkish community. The following remark of a member of the parliament from the JP is to the point:

What is the government's response to [the violation of London and Zurich Agreements and the subsequent bloody events in Cyprus] and what are their precautions? We believe that the government must share its opinion with the opposition so that the foreign policy, the main principles of which we agree upon, can have its national characteristic in its real sense. This is an indispensable element in all Western democracies.³⁵¹

Here we see how the elements of 'national sovereignty' and 'national will' used in relation to the Cyprus policy are employed not only as a constituent of the nationalist foreign policy but also as a characteristic of the Western democracy. In this regard both policies were linked in being articulated as an extension of the same identity. Indeed, this articulation does not draw a direct link between the Cyprus policy and Turkey's role within the Western alliance but establishes a link between being a part of the West and the way the Cyprus policy was pursued. In this sense, it reconstitutes the values attached to Westernism rather than representing a clear deviation from it.

A more direct link, however, was constructed in the articulations on how the developments in the island might lead to the spread of communism in the region. Blaming the communist AKEL party in Cyprus for the massacres directed against the Turks living on the island, a member of the JP made the following remark in the parliament on behalf of the JP:

AKEL, which is the most established party in the island having more than 80,000 members, spend all of its efforts to wipe Turks out of the island. The communist institution of AKEL intends to turn the island into the Cuba of the Mediterranean and a base of the Soviet Union. Turkey, Greece, Britain, and the NATO community should not disregard this development.³⁵²

With this articulation the Cyprus issue was not merely presented as a 'national cause' but also as a 'Western cause', the objective of which was represented as containing the Soviet threat. In that it drew a link between the events in Cyprus and communism, the above-quoted remark thereby situated the Cyprus policy within the general Western-oriented policy and

³⁵¹ Cited in Adalet Partisi, *Adalet Partisi* (Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Neşriyatı, 1963), 49.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, 26.

constituted the communist identity as the negative Other of the Western Self. This also reproduced the official discourse that linked the principles of ‘establishing peace at home’ and ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’ to the elimination of the communist ideology. In this sense, Turkey’s firm stand on the Cyprus issue was not only an example of a ‘responsible’, ‘humanitarian’ and ‘nationalistic’ policy, but also an extension of her Western-orientation.

On the other hand, as Cyprus was taken as the ‘greatest’ national cause, it can be argued that one has to look at how the Westernist position is integrated with it rather than examining how Cyprus policy was reconciled with the Western-orientation. Responding to a question as to whether it was in Turkey’s national interests to trust the ‘West’ in relation to the Cyprus issue, Demirel’s answer was the following:

Relationships are not constructed easily, one has to maintain them. As for the possibility as to whether the Cyprus issue can be resolved through peaceful means, we still maintain the hope that it can be. Today friendships are always built on interests. Friendships are strong when they are built on interests, not emotions.³⁵³

Here Demirel links the Western-orientation to the Cyprus issue by articulating the interests of the both sides in maintaining the relations. In this sense, in highlighting that the interests would be reconciled in the end, this remark further reproduces the realist and rationalist policy attributed to the Western-orientation.

If we move down to the elements used in relation to both policies, we see how both were reconciled also in being grounded on the same template. This approach allows us to see how both the Cyprus issue and the Western-orientation were represented by recourse to the elements attributed to the Kemalist foreign policy. The JP’s articulations on the Cyprus issue involved the elements of ‘defending Turkey’s national interests’, ‘supporting the independence of other nations’, ‘pursuing an honorable, nationalistic and peaceful approach’, ‘eliminating the spread of communism’, ‘defending the national will and national

³⁵³ See Adalet Partisi, *Süleyman Demirel, Adalet Partisi Genel Başkan ve Başbakan Yardımcısı, Yazdıkları ve Söyledikleri*, 150-51.

sovereignty’, and ‘respecting the principle of fairness and reciprocity in international affairs’. The party’s representations of the Western-orientation also involved the same elements except for ‘supporting the independence and sovereignty of other countries and helping them reach the level of the contemporary civilization’. Given the fact that the JP’s articulations on both policies were grounded on the elements attributed to following Atatürk’s path, it would be hence fair to argue that the Cyprus issue, from this perspective too, was not represented as incompatible with Turkey’s Western-orientation.

3.2.3.1. The discourse of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP): the Turkish-Islamic synthesis

Apart from the perspectives discussed above, the nationalist perspective of Alparslan Türkeş, represented first within the Republican Peasant Nation Party in 1965-1969, and later by the NAP since 1969, stood as another major discourse within the coalition government of the Nationalist Front between 1975-1977 and later 1977-1978. As both parties were headed by Türkeş (during the period the present chapter focuses on), we shall mainly focus on the book written and edited by Türkeş in 1979, *Dış Politikamız ve Kıbrıs* [Our foreign policy and Cyprus], which is a compilation of his statements and speeches since 1966, and which provides the basic approach of the NAP in relation to Turkey’s foreign policy orientation and the Cyprus policy.

The main objective of the NAP, as stated in the book as well as in the party programs, was “aiming at constructing an industrial and pluralist society by helping Turkey advance along a democratic line.”³⁵⁴ For attaining this objective, not a foreign ideology but Turkish nationalism was shown as providing the true guidelines. On this view, Türkeş noted, “In order to realize our goals we have to return to *our self* and combine our efforts as an indivisible unit.”³⁵⁵ The fundamental principles of the party, called as the ‘nine lights doctrine’ to counter

³⁵⁴ Alparslan Türkeş, *Dış Politikamız ve Kıbrıs* (Istanbul: Orkun Yayınevi, 1979), 446.

³⁵⁵ “Başbuğ’un Özlü Sözleri,” Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, <<http://www.mhp.org.tr/basbug/bsbsozler.php>> (accessed January 27, 2008). Italics mine.

the ‘six arrows’ of the RPP were as follows: nationalism, idealism, moralism, scientism, socialism (defined as being *for* the society), peasantism, liberalism and individualism, developmentalism and populism, and industrialism and technologism. Along this wide spectrum, the basic focus was countering communism and depicting democracy as the basis upon which all the other principles were built. Consider the following remark of Türkeş:

According to the NAP, democracy is a must and the starting point. But it is not sufficient. Just as the political democracy is based on the principle of separation of powers, its economic and social bases must also be based on a balance of power. It is not possible for systems such as fascism or communism to be democratized as they hold the economic power in their hands just like an oligarchy. Today political democracy is being strengthened in the West through the application of industrial democracy and mixed economy. That is why our economic view is against any kind of monopolism. This is because it is based on the idea of pluralist society.³⁵⁶

In this sense, the NAP proposed the formation of a national sector, inspired by the public sector of the RPP, and presented it as the free participation of the whole nation in economic matters.³⁵⁷ Thus, while this pluralist perspective was depicted in the same line as the RPP’s ‘participatory democracy’, it paralleled a corollary stress on anti-communism and anti-revolutionism, representing the communist and revolutionist discourse incompatible with democracy and pluralism. Indeed, this formed the major point of departure with the RPP, which was continuously accused by the NAP of employing the communist discourse, hence clashing with the Kemalist nationalism and ‘participatory democracy’ it propagated, and thereby inflicting a serious threat against the unity of the country, the democratic regime, and the national fate.³⁵⁸ In this vein, Türkeş reacted against Ecevit’s remarks on the possibility of a revolution in the Turkish context. As a response to Ecevit’s use of the ‘locked doors’ metaphor to refer to the obstacles for bringing about a revolutionary change in Turkey, Türkeş stated the following:

Ecevit has also referred to ‘Atatürk’s revolutionism’ at times, but whenever the topic comes down to the possibility of a revolution which could open new doors for Turkey, it is curious why he mentions the names of totalitarian dictators Ecevit wants to enter the room, the

³⁵⁶ Türkeş, 449.

³⁵⁷ Ibidem.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., 446.

doors of which were broken by Che Gueveras, Maos, Castros, by simply using the powers of the state.³⁵⁹

Here we see how Türkiye sought to delegitimize the revolutionism of the RPP by delegitimizing communism and depicting the RPP as strengthening this ideology further. The following remark also illustrates how this delegitimization involved a corresponding presentation of the NAP as the sole defender of the national will, democracy, freedom, prosperity, and the national unity against any type of separatism and totalitarianism.³⁶⁰

Realizing a free, just, and humanistic world depends on forming realist, democratic, and nationalistic policies We will not give up our peaceful and democratic cooperation policy which is indispensable for establishing both such a world and a developed, free, and prosperous Turkey Upholding those policies that base their political fate on separation and division is a treachery against the Turkish nation and the humanity. This would strengthen the totalitarian - communist threat . . . and drag Turkey to the edge of a civil war to be used by the Soviet Union.³⁶¹

While this defensive approach to democracy, freedom, prosperity and development involved excluding the communist discourse from the public sphere, around which the NAP drew the boundaries of legitimacy, this view, for the NAP, was not in any way exclusivist but integrationist, pluralist and humanitarian in essence. The following remark is also to the point:

Turks should form a unity around free democratic regime, the integrity of the nation and national interests, in short, the Turkish Constitution. We call this Turkish nationalism and will not give up on this ideal. A departure from this ideal means a departure from democracy, national integrity and independence At the core of Turkish nationalism is the objective to make Turkey take part among the world of nations as a free, democratic, modern, civilized, industrialized and pluralist society. But our starting point is humanitarianism. Our goal is to realize the oft-mentioned legal equality in international relations in also social and economic terms for both the Turkish society and all other nations. We call the domestic dimension of this ideal as Turkish nationalism and the international aspect of it as humanitarianism.³⁶²

Here we see all the elements attributed to the principles of Kemalism, and the elements associated with pursuing the principle of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’, except for the principles of secularism, revolutionism, and statism, which were also not prioritized in the discourse of the JP. What is also missing in the picture is the linking of these elements to

³⁵⁹ Ibid., 435.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., 446.

³⁶¹ Ibid., 451-52.

³⁶² Ibid., 448.

following Atatürk's principles which was undertaken by the RPP and the JP as well as the military establishment during the period.

The absence of such a reference was also apparent in the government programs of the so-called Nationalist Front Coalition in which the NAP took part. While the first program of this coalitional government omitted making any direct reference to 'Kemalism', 'Atatürk's reforms' or 'Atatürk's principles', that of second made only a brief note to Atatürk, yet not in relation to his principles or ideals but his role in establishing the Republic.³⁶³ Yet, despite this omission, the program appropriated the elements of the same template, mainly, 'being a respected and honorable member of the world nations', and 'raising Turkey *above* the level of the contemporary civilization'.³⁶⁴ This required, as stated in the program, following "Turkish Nationalism", and "fighting against communism, anarchy, illegal actions, and any attempts that could harm the national integrity, the Constitution, and the Republic."³⁶⁵ Therefore, only through holding on to 'nationalism' could one fight against the views that sought to "topple the regime, break down the integrity of the nation and the country in order to replace the current order with communism through their links with the outside."³⁶⁶

In this sense, the NAP can be argued to have built on the Kemalist template available in that period both in its developmentalist discourse, legitimized through the principle of 'raising Turkey to the level of the contemporary civilization, as well as in its emphasis on establishing the unity of the nation and democracy against the separatist views.³⁶⁷ On the other hand, by putting forward 'nine lights' instead of 'six arrows', and 'Turkish Nationalism' rather than 'Atatürk's nationalism', it did not represent itself as the real Kemalist party and

³⁶³ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 383.

³⁶⁴ Ibid., 321.

³⁶⁵ Ibidem.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., 383.

³⁶⁷ See Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey," Cahiers d'Etudes sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien 13 (January-June 1992):141.

remained reactionary to such articulations, an attitude which was also taken up by the National Salvation Party.

3.2.3.2. A multi-directional foreign policy: towards anti-Westernism

The foreign policy discourse of the NAP did not involve an unhesitant Westernism as propagated by the JP but participation in the Western organizations to fight against the threat of communism. Indeed, the common ground of the coalition partners during the Nationalist Front coalitions was their representation of NATO as an alliance for countering communism. For the NAP, “the potential threat from the Soviet Union and the imminent threat of communism made it indispensable [for Turkey] to remain in the NATO alliance.”³⁶⁸ For the NAP any ignorance of this fact would enslave Turkey to totalitarianism by harming democracy and disrupting the national integrity.³⁶⁹ However, as the NAP did not consider NATO as a symbol of the West but democracy, its slogan of “either democracy or communism”³⁷⁰ did not construct a Western but anti-community identity.

By the same token, the NAP did not attribute a Westernist connotation to Atatürk’s principle of ‘reaching the level contemporary civilization’. In this sense, it diverged from the Kemalist discourse propagated up until then which associated modernization and civilization with the West and Europe. For the NAP, modernization in Western lines was considered to be the root of all evils as it destroyed national morals and culture and hence contributed to the acceptance of another evil ideology – communism. On this view, Türkeş noted: “Turkish intellectuals have embraced it as an ideal to be under the trusteeship of the West. It is unimaginable to come up with a greater evil than that for our nation.”³⁷¹ In this sense, remaining in the alliance was not depicted in contradiction with the party’s anti-Western

³⁶⁸ Türkeş, 450.

³⁶⁹ Ibidem.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., 429.

³⁷¹ “Başbuğ’un Özlü Sözleri”, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, <<http://www.mhp.org.tr/basbug/bsbsozler.php>> (accessed January 27, 2008).

perspective, but complementary to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the sole means to counter communism. According to this perspective, humanism, democracy, and freedom, which were juxtaposed against communism, were not rooted in the Western ideology but the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, described as “valuing the ‘created’ because of the ‘Creator’.”³⁷² In this sense, Turkey’s survival depended on holding on to both Turkishness (the body) and Islam (the soul) as the rejection of one of them would pose an existential threat to Turkey’s survival.³⁷³ In foreign policy terms, this meant going back to the ‘roots’, hence de-orienting Turkey from her over-dependence on the West, and strengthening “the relations with the Muslim countries.”³⁷⁴ While the government programs in which the NAP took place stated the importance of Turkey’s cooperation with the Western countries,³⁷⁵ for the NAP, this cooperation was instrumental in countering the Soviet communism and increasing support for Turkey’s Cyprus policy.³⁷⁶

By this token, Türkeş declared that the NAP was not against Turkey’s economic cooperation with the EEC but the evolution of this integration towards a social, cultural and political unification, since such a development would not only be against Turkey’s national interests, national integrity, and economic development, but also her cultural values.³⁷⁷

There is absolutely nothing in common in social and cultural terms between Turkey and the European nations We believe that Turkey should refrain from being a refugee in the Western culture. Turkish nation has not chosen to be a colony or an imitator of foreign cultures but the goal of reaching beyond the level of the contemporary civilization as a strong country.³⁷⁸

As this remark suggests, Turkey’s integration with the West/Europe would not only bring about the assimilation of the Turkish culture and the loss of independence and sovereignty for Turkey but also a deviation from the goal of ‘reaching *beyond* the level of the

³⁷² Türkeş, 450.

³⁷³ “Başbuğ’un Özlü Sözleri”, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, <<http://www.mhp.org.tr/basbug/bsbsozler.php>> (accessed January 27, 2008).

³⁷⁴ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 407.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., 407, 339.

³⁷⁶ Türkeş, 189.

³⁷⁷ *Tercüman*, 6 February 1976; cited in *Türkiye-AET İlişkileri*, 248.

³⁷⁸ Ibid., 248-89.

contemporary civilization'. Here we see how the NAP presented its own construction of this principle and dissociated the hitherto-defended-cooperation with the West from its civilizational attributes. We also see how the NAP delegitimized Turkey's integration with the West also by situating it against the 'national will', and how it thereby represented itself as the guardian of the Turkish national interests, values, integrity and ideals. Hence, in this view, the real civilizational goal of Turkey was not 'reaching the level of the West' but *beyond* it; and according to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, this left only one option for Turkey: to be oriented towards the Self without being isolated from the world.

This suggested that foreign policy should be multi-directional and aim at disengaging from overdependence on any power. This was seen crucial especially with regard to Turkey's policy towards Cyprus, which received special attention from the RPNP and later by the NAP.³⁷⁹ Alparslan Türkeş, both in his memorandum letters to the Prime Minister Demirel in 1966 representing the position of RPNP, and later the NAP, criticized Ecevit's Cyprus policy and presented the most radical perspective regarding Cyprus. For Türkeş, a multi-directional policy and the defense of Turkey's national interests required developing a more elastic policy, as the resolution of the Cyprus issue could not be handed over the U.S. or the Soviet Union."³⁸⁰ While this was to some extent in line with the RPP's 'flexible foreign policy', for Türkeş, what this meant in effect was the annexation of the whole island, unification with Cyprus and the subsequent representation of this action as an extension of the "Independence War of Turks against the Greek imperialism."³⁸¹

In his memorandum letter to Demirel in 1966, Türkeş expanded on the reasons for and the requirements of this policy. As the document stated, Greece sought to become a strong naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean region, "occupy all Aegean islands and Cyprus, and

³⁷⁹ Türkeş, 183.

³⁸⁰ Ibid., 186.

³⁸¹ Ibid., 191-92.

control the Dardanelles and the South Eastern Anatolia.”³⁸² Subsequently, Greece would increase her reinforcements in Cyprus, give a minority status to the Turks in the island not to allow any room for Turkey’s intervention, and persuade the international community at the diplomatic level to delegitimize Turkey’s policy.³⁸³ Accordingly, Turkey, who also had the objective to “have a permanent control over some of the islands in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas and full sovereignty over the rest,”³⁸⁴ had to:

- a. establish a temporary Turkish Cyprus government in either Switzerland or Britain,
- b. found a voluntary jihad organization by realizing the executive power of this government,
- c. Turkify [Imros] and [Tenedos],
- d. evacuate Greek citizens from Turkey,
- e. cut the trade relations with Greece,
- f. sign a non-interference treaty with Bulgaria,
- g. withdraw three divisions from NATO to Turkey’s disposal,
- h. train jihadists for the proposed Cyprus Special Action.³⁸⁵

As this action plan illustrates, the Cyprus policy for Türkiye comprised the nationalistic, Islamist, and multi-directional elements discussed above. Cyprus, from this perspective, definitely had to be handed over to Turkey, not only due to security reasons, but also due to the historical fact that ‘Cyprus always belonged to Turks’:

Cyprus is a very important territory for Turkey. First of all, given its geologic structure, it belongs to Anatolia The one who has it has the control over the Southern Anatolia and its surroundings This has also implications for Turkey’s strategic security. A military plane that takes off from Greece cannot return to Greece after bombarding Ankara or Erzurum. But whoever has the island acquires the opportunity to bombard Ankara and Erzurum and go back In addition, the fact that 130,000 Turks live on the island makes the island an important territory for Turkey. Finally, Turkey has historical rights over Cyprus. Cyprus has never belonged to Greek sovereignty Hence, the fairest solution would be to hand Cyprus over to Turkey.³⁸⁶

Indeed, the NAP did not only seek to legitimize Turkey’s occupation of the whole Cyprus by recourse to the Turkish national interests but also Atatürk’s deeds. The following remark is illustrative of this discursive move:

³⁸² Ibid., 182.

³⁸³ Ibid., 183.

³⁸⁴ Ibidem.

³⁸⁵ Ibid., 192-93. Imros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada) are the Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea that have a remarkable Greek minority.

³⁸⁶ Ibid., 276-77.

Everything shows that Turkey has a right to have Cyprus altogether. Why do we hesitate on stating this? After the First World War, Atatürk evaluated the conditions of the time and the opportunities Turkey had, and realized his objectives through a realistic national policy. This is the case for Cyprus. No other solution will satisfy Turkey, or ensure its security, or protect its existence.³⁸⁷

In this sense, the NAP attempted to legitimize its policy by presenting it as a realistic goal and representing Atatürk's foreign policy as realist and nationalistic. This position did not change even during when the NAP was in power. Although no corollary change was made in the government program that declared the federation as the most suitable option for the integrity and independence of the island,³⁸⁸ for Türkeş, the annexation of the whole Cyprus remained as the only realistic and fair solution. Consider the following remarks of Türkeş that criticized Ecevit's Cyprus policy:

Ecevit stated that the aim of the operation was to restore the disrupted order in the island, insure the security of the Turks in the island, maintain the security of Turkey and the *status-quo* established by the Lausanne Treaty, and establish peace by protecting the rights of both the Greek and the Turkish community in the island In order to realize these objectives Ecevit should have deployed more reinforcements in the island, and moved them to occupy the half of the island in two or three days, or should have occupied the whole island from the very start For Turkey's security and survival, Cyprus, as a whole, should belong to Turkey.³⁸⁹

Thus, given its synthesis of anti-Westernism, anti-communism, Turkism, Islamism, and multi-directionalism, the NAP's discourse stood in stark contrast to the foreign policy articulations of the RPP and the JP. Although the NAP also relied on the concepts of realism, nationalism, national unity, populism, statism, democracy, modernism, and the principle of 'raising Turkey *beyond* the level of contemporary civilization', for the NAP, these ideals could not be realized through the policies advocated by other perspectives. According to the NAP, the JP, in following a pro-Western line, and the RPP, in strengthening the communist threat in Turkey, clearly overlooked the requirements of Turkey's national interests, damaging Turkey's independent stand, strengthening the separatist views in Turkey and furthermore dragging Turkey towards cultural assimilation and division. Hence, only through following

³⁸⁷ Ibid., 245.

³⁸⁸ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 290.

³⁸⁹ Cited in Türkeş, 306-309.

the ‘nine lights’ and a multi-directional policy would Turkey be able to accomplish the ideal of ‘reaching *above* the level of the contemporary civilization’, the inspiration source of which was not the West but the inherent Turkish-Muslim identity. This was because the Turks were more than capable of fulfilling the requirements of civilization. Then, Turkey should ‘return to her Self’ and become what she once was through taking a stance against the West. This was not only in accordance with Atatürk’s deeds but also the requirements of civilization. Hence, in view of the statements and the speeches of Türkeş, it would not be incorrect to state that Turkey’s Cyprus intervention, from this viewpoint, was only a ‘limited’ instance of what Turkey could achieve. In this sense, it was only a partial move towards securing Turkey’s survival and fulfilling Atatürk’s foreign policy vision.

3.2.4.1. The path towards ‘national salvation’: the discourse of the National Salvation Party (NSP)

We are against the exploitation of Atatürk We are on the right path. We are on the true path.

—Necmettin Erbakan, 1973

The demonization of the West and the celebration of Turkey’s Islamic roots found their starkest emphasis in the NSP’s discourse. The party, founded in 1972, formed a coalitional government with the RPP in 1974-1975, and later with the JP and the NAP. The NSP emerged as the virtual successor of the National Order Party (NOP), which was disbanded by the orders of the Constitutional Court in 1971 due to its extreme Islamist discourse that was found in conflict with the secular characteristics of the state and the Atatürkist revolutionism. This notwithstanding, the NSP also relied on Islamist and anti-Western elements in its discourse by declaring the principles of the party as informed and directed by Quran³⁹⁰, and stating that “the Westernist thoughts will turn us, who are in the

³⁹⁰ Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1975), 85

Muslim world, into a state of inability to learn our own reality of Islam.”³⁹¹ For the NSP, Turkey’s salvation depended on the ‘national view’, which was also the title of the book later written by Erbakan.

The ‘national view’ of the NSP, in elevating the religious identity above the national, separated the NSP’s discourse from that of the NAP, for which the religious identity was only complementary to the ethnic identity. In this sense, the ‘national view’ was an Islamist view *for* Turkey, and hence a national view *from* an Islamic perspective. The following remarks of Erbakan in *Milli Görüş* [The national view], illustrates how this discourse constructed the national identity as inherently religious and how it redefined the civilizational model for Turkey in these terms: “*As Muslims, we possess the biggest thought system ever The best for us and the Westerners is to be Islamized*”.³⁹²

The NSP regarded the West as the greatest threat inflicting a number of social ills on the non-Western Muslim world. Even communism, associated with ‘anti-Westernism’ in the official discourse, was situated by the NSP within the ‘evil’ Western camp. Nevertheless, this demonization of ‘whatever that was Western’ did not prevent the NSP to take part in the coalitional governments with the JP, which, according to Erbakan, “supported the imperialist capitalism of the West,” and the RPP, which was “oriented towards the socialism of the West,” both “rejecting the spiritual values and national interest.”³⁹³

Given its emphasis on Islamism and anti-Westernism, the NSP radically diverged from the official discourse. Indeed, its anti-communist campaign and emphasis on the national interests were the only common denominator with the other parties and the military establishment during the period. Yet, the NSP refrained from pursuing an anti-Kemalist discourse, despite the fact that it did not openly present itself ‘the guardian of Kemalism’. Erbakan’s response to a question that whether the party respected Atatürk’s revolutions is

³⁹¹ Ibid., 63.

³⁹² Ibid., 63-89. Italics added.

³⁹³ Ibid., 29.

illustrative in this respect. His answer was affirmative but yet circuitous: “Of course,” he said, “we are the real guardians of the regime and the Republic; nobody else.”³⁹⁴

3.2.4.2. The ‘national view’ and orientation towards the Muslim world

Given its declaration of the Islamic civilization as the most superior to all, the NSP did not consider the Western-orientation as an objective that could bring Turkey to the level of the contemporary civilization. For the NSP, integration with the West meant the ignorance of the real source of civilization, the loss of economic and political independence and the destruction of the Self. The NSP’s representation of the EEC followed the same logic, in describing it as a neo-colonialist project directed against the unity of Turkey:

The Common Market is a new colonialist project of the Western European countries which have been colonialist for ages. The reason as to why many African nations as well as Turkey are welcomed in this project is to practice the new methods of neo-colonialism. The Western countries have this colonialist outlook because they belong to the Judeo-Christian and Greek civilizations.³⁹⁵

Here we see a radically different representation of the Western identity and the Western-orientation than the one propagated by the other political parties and the military establishment in the same period. For the NSP, integration with the West would lead to Turkey’s colonization, the bankruptcy of the national industry,³⁹⁶ and the loss of national sovereignty by making Turkey the same state with Europe.³⁹⁷ For Erbakan, the EEC’s enthusiasm about Turkey’s future membership was only “a plan to assimilate the Muslim Turkey within the Christian Europe.”³⁹⁸ In this sense, as the EEC (Common Market)’s neo-colonialism was rooted in its Judeo-Christian-Greek identity, Turkey’s integration with the EEC would not only result in Turkey’s colonization, but also the loss of her Islamic identity.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., 340.

³⁹⁵ Ibid., 236.

³⁹⁶ Ibid., 262.

³⁹⁷ Ibid., 254.

³⁹⁸ Ibid., 241. Similar associations were made throughout the book: “Common Market is a Catholic Union” (1975, 246); “Common Market is a Zionist game” (1975, 247); “Common Market will assimilate us.” (1975, 259)

The below-quoted remark also shows how this spiritual loss would also lead to a loss of Turkishness according to this view:

The history shows us that whenever Turks departed from their national and spiritual identities, they lost their Turkishness. The most obvious precedent of this is the current situation of Khazars, Fins, and Hungarians. Therefore, joining the Common Market does not only mean declaring our lands, factories, and mines for sale but also converting our national and spiritual values and national existence into money.³⁹⁹

For the NSP, in order to keep away from such a tragedy and defend her national unity, national integrity, independence, sovereignty, and national interests, Turkey had to establish a common market with the countries she had historical and cultural ties, namely, the Muslim world.⁴⁰⁰ Here we see a double discursive move to legitimize the disengagement from the West and orientation towards the Muslim world. The first declares the West as a cultural threat and represents the Western values incompatible with the main principles of the republic. The second de-rationalizes Turkey's integration with the West and rationalizes her integration with the Muslim world. For Erbakan, with the crucial strategic raw materials at their disposal, the Arab countries could lead Turkey to make a fast and remarkable move in her industrial development.⁴⁰¹ Further delegitimizing the goal of integrating with the Western Europe, Erbakan also noted, "Yet, we struggle to sell our locust beans and parsley leaves to the Common Market in vain."⁴⁰²

These two aspects of taking a stance against the Common Market were also employed in the party's discourse on the Cyprus question, since the Cyprus conflict, by the same token, was considered as grounded in the 'deep-rooted crusade mentality' of the West. Erbakan's following statement is exemplary of this view:

This Community, which is composed of Christians and which put forward its inherent crusade mentality with the Cyprus question, aims to eradicate Turkey's great history and identity by linking the Muslim Turkey as a province to itself. Supporting such a movement that aims at assimilating us within Christians, in a determined manner until the Day of Judgment, cannot be compatible with the history, culture, or faith of our noble nation. Undertaking such an

³⁹⁹ Ibid., 260.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., 265.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., 266.

⁴⁰² Ibid., 266.

attempt can only be done by those who do not know the power of the national will. Our nation, as a whole, is strongly against such an attitude.⁴⁰³

In this sense, the NSP's discourse not only constructed Turkey's national identity along religious lines, but also ascribed a religious objective to Turkey's policy on the EEC and the Cyprus issue: 'defend the Muslim lands against the Crusaders'. Hence, just as the establishment of an Islamist Market against the EEC was proposed as the only option for Turkey to defend her identity and existence,⁴⁰⁴ Turkey's intervention in Cyprus was similarly represented as a 'national jihad'. In line with this view, Erbakan defined Turkey's Cyprus intervention as "the victory of *our* nation," won by the efforts of the "jihadist brothers" as well as the Turkish Armed Forces.⁴⁰⁵

With these articulations that challenged the official view, the Islamist discourse of the NSP did not find any representation in the government program of the coalitions it took place. In the first coalition government program, when it shared the power with the RPP, the common denominator of both parties was described as "believing wholeheartedly in the national, democratic, and secular characteristic of the Turkish state, governed with the rule of law" and "adhering and being obedient to Atatürk's principles."⁴⁰⁶ With regard to the foreign policy, the common ground was defined in the following way:

As it has been with all governments of the Republic, our foreign policy will continue to be inspired by the principles of great Atatürk. For us, Atatürk's proverb of 'peace at home, peace in the world' is the basic principle which will preserve its value forever. What we understand from 'peace in the word' is respecting the main principles of independence, sovereignty, integrity, equity and non-interference in the internal policies of other states, and enhancing cooperation within this framework. Indeed, *pact a sund servanda* and the rule of law are the basic elements of this principle.⁴⁰⁷

Apart from this remark, the Association Partnership with the EEC was also given a special emphasis in the government program, which stated, "Since her establishment Turkey has participated in the inter-European institutions with always a sincere and a realist

⁴⁰³ Ibid., 247.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., 265.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., 234.

⁴⁰⁶ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 269.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., 248.

attitude.”⁴⁰⁸ This pro-European attitude was however counterbalanced with a cautious note stating that it was necessary to insure that the integration would not prevent the national industrial development which was in line with the RPP’s flexible position thesis and the NSP’s protectionism. Yet, this ‘reservation’ was far from reflecting the absolutist confrontation the NSP had against the Common Market and all other European institutions.

Similarly, the NSP’s Islamism could not filter through the Westernist and pro-capitalist discourse of the JP in the National Front Coalitions, which did not include Ecevit’s RPP. The only statement that integrated the NSP’s spiritualism was that communism, fascism, and *other mentalities* that were dependent on materialism had to be countered as they were “in conflict with the pursuit of an honorable and free life” and destructive of “all material and spiritual values.”⁴⁰⁹ Thus, Westernism and capitalism were confined within the obscure content of ‘other mentalities’ that were noted in the document, hence freed from any direct negative emphasis.

In this sense, Turkey’s 1974 Cyprus intervention constituted the only domain where the NSP’s nationalism and Islamism could find a ‘real life value’. For the NSP, Turkey’s Cyprus intervention, in confronting ‘the crusade mentality of the West’ was a ‘real’ proof for the “strength of the Turkish Nation.”⁴¹⁰ It was definitely against the West, hence on the ‘true path’; and having these qualities, it reconstituted Turkey’s ‘national unity’. This was put by Erbakan in the following way: “Right after the Cyprus victory, what we observed from our trips to various cities in Anatolia from Izmir in the west to Hakkari in the east was that our nation was in complete unity and solidarity.”⁴¹¹ Yet, this construction of national unity did not involve the official emphasis on sweeping away Islamism and Communism from the public sphere. Similarly, it did not build on the ‘democracy’ element that was peculiar to the official

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., 249.

⁴⁰⁹ Cited in Dağlı and Aktürk, 338. Italics added.

⁴¹⁰ Cited in Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, 375.

⁴¹¹ Ibid., 370.

discourse that linked democracy to ‘raising Turkey to the level of the Western civilization’. For the NSP, the roots of the civilization were within the Turkish culture; hence, Turkey should rather sweep away the imperialist Western elements to secure her Self. In this sense, Turkey’s Cyprus intervention, represented as a stance against the crusade mentality of the West, was a deviation from the ‘wrong path’ and hence a move towards Turkey’s ‘purification’.

Conclusion

As our discussion showed, the foreign policy articulations in 1960-1979 towards the Cyprus issue and Western/European-orientation were grounded on the elements attributed to following Atatürk’s path. We have first examined the discourse of the military establishment, the elements it employed to legitimize its policies and delegitimize what it considered as the separatist views through Kemalism. We found that this template was reconstituted as the dominant Kemalist discourse as the following government programs mainly built on the same elements. In this sense, the official discourse constituted Kemalism as the symbol of national unity and a ‘melting pot’ that dissolved any differences within the country.

Despite this overtly stated allegiance, the official discourse involved a rift between the governmental (official) discourse and the party discourses composing it. Opening the official discourse into its constituents allowed us to notice that diverging political views were legitimized as complementary with the elements associated with Kemalism, each being challenged by their counterparts. While competing foreign policy discourses constructed competing Kemalisms as each party argued that theirs represented the genuine Kemalism (except for the discourse of the NSP), anti-Westernist, communist, and Islamist discourses were marginalized to the extent that they did not find representation at the governmental level. On the other hand, the parties went beyond the military’s template and added new points to Kemalism, mainly, ‘reaching *beyond* the level of the contemporary civilization’, and ‘building

participatory democracy at home and spreading it beyond'. The Kemalism of the 1960s and 1970s was indeed what the political leaders made of its elements, however, even the marginalized discourses built on the same template while claiming to legitimize their policies.

Focusing on how each constituent of the governmental discourse defined the elements of Kemalism and legitimized their articulations on the Cyprus issue and the Western-orientation showed that both rationalist and ideationalist explanations were employed in relation to these policies and that Kemalism was associated with both ideational and rationalist foreign policy objectives. This revealed a triangular discursive template that constructed an indirect link between both policies, each attached to the ideational and rationalist elements associated with the elements of pursuing a Kemalist foreign policy. The absence of a direct link between the Western-orientation and the Cyprus issue showed that neither could the Cyprus intervention be seen as a direct extension of Turkey's Western-orientation nor could it be situated against the Western-orientation. On the other hand, the analysis of the NSP's and NAP's discourses suggested that the opposite may be true, that exactly the same template may be used to situate both policies as opposed to each other. Hence deconstructing the unity of the foreign policy discourse revealed a more complex picture, further problematizing the views that Cyprus intervention constitutes a 'deviation' from Turkey's Western-orientation and that Kemalism produces a single foreign policy output. We saw that it was rather a specific interpretation of Kemalism that reconciled the Cyprus policy and Turkey's Western-orientation.

It can be argued that such a diversified picture is not surprising given the fragmentation and the extreme polarization of the Turkish politics during the 1960s and 1970s. The task ahead is to examine how the elements discussed above structured the foreign policy articulations on the Cyprus issue and the Western-orientation when the diversity was not apparent, at a time when the government was not formed by coalitions. The analysis of the

political discourse during the 1980s serves this goal by focusing on a period which began with a military coup and followed by a single party government. This was also the time when the Cyprus issue turned into an indirect condition for Turkey's membership in the EEC and when Turkey applied for full membership in the organization. In what follows is an analysis of how the elements of Kemalism structured the responses of the military establishment and the government towards these events.

CHAPTER IV: KEMALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980S

Introduction

In 1980, the senior officials of the Turkish Armed Forces assumed the administration of the whole country, beginning the military rule that lasted for three years which had both domestic and foreign policy consequences for Turkey.⁴¹² Following the collapse of the democratic regime in Turkey, the relations with the EEC came to a freeze upon the decision of the European Commission (EC) to block signing the Fourth Financial Protocol.⁴¹³ While the relations were restored back upon Turkey's transition to the civilian rule, they were far from being normalized, as there was still dissatisfaction on the part of the EC with the level of democracy, economic development, and human rights in Turkey which was announced in the Commission's report that rejected Turkey's application for membership in 1987.⁴¹⁴ Besides these economic and political barriers, there was also the 'Greece factor' which was linked to the Cyprus issue. Greece refused to sign and insisted on blocking the Fourth Financial Protocol⁴¹⁵ until the Turkish troops were withdrawn from Cyprus, a situation that turned the Cyprus issue into an indirect condition for Turkey's membership in the EEC.⁴¹⁶

What complicated the matters even more was the unilateral declaration of independence by the TRNC in 1983 and Turkey's being the first and the only country to

⁴¹² For further information on the undemocratic policies undertaken during this period despite the oft-stated ideal to restore democracy, see Ahmad, 181-84.

⁴¹³ See *Regular Report from the European Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*, <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/turkey_en.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2007). Had this Protocol been signed, 600 million European Currency Units would have been released to Turkey.

⁴¹⁴ Commission of the European Communities, *Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community*, Brussels, December 20, 1989, SEC (89) 2290 final/2, <http://aei.pitt.edu/4475/01/001842_1.pdf> (accessed January 14, 2008). See also Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 105.

⁴¹⁵ In addition, Greek lobbies also insisted that Turkey's membership could be considered only after the settlement of the Cyprus dispute. See Bölükbaşı, "The Turco-Greek Dispute", in *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*, ed. Clement H. Dodd (Wistow, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1992), 47.

⁴¹⁶ Indeed, the Commission's Opinion published in 1989 asserted that the unresolved conflict with Greece over Cyprus had a negative impact on Turkey's membership to the EEC. See Commission of the European Communities, *Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community*, Brussels, December 20, 1989, SEC (89) 2290 final/2, <http://aei.pitt.edu/4475/01/001842_1.pdf> (accessed January 14, 2008). See also Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 109.

recognize it. The Resolution 541 of the UN Security Council not only declared Turkey's action as illegal but also demanded the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island.⁴¹⁷ In this sense, the prolongation in the resolution of the conflict posed a serious barrier to Turkey's membership in the EEC.

Hence the question(s) of the present chapter: At a time when the 'radical' ideas were purged from the political scene, how did Kemalism structure the Turkish foreign policy discourse in relation to the Western-orientation and the Cyprus issue? Was there indeed only one consistent narrative? And last but not the least, which elements of Kemalism were employed in linking these policies? This chapter will focus on the discourse of the units representing the state authority, and deconstruct their representation of Kemalism into its constituent elements to explore the contention that it is a specific interpretation of Kemalism that integrated the Cyprus policy within Turkey's cherished Western-orientation, albeit with differences in approaches. In this aim, we will first examine the discourse in the military era (1980-1983) by focusing on the public speeches of the Chief of the Military Staff and the Head of state Kenan Evren, military declarations, and the program of the military-supervised government. Later we will turn to the civilian era (1983-1989) and focus on the government and party programs of the Motherland Party and the public speeches of the Prime Minister Turgut Özal and the President Evren during this period.

Between the specified dates, the government programs contained a single narrative that legitimized the position towards the West and the Cyprus issue by recourse to the principle of 'peace at home peace in the world'. However, as the following analysis will show, 1) this narrative involved diverse approaches towards the West and the Cyprus issue, and 2) this divergence was grounded in the elements provided by the individual discourses that interpreted the main pillars of Kemalism differently. While a more defensive approach to

⁴¹⁷ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Tarafların Tutum ve Tezleri Açısından Kıbrıs Sorunu (1945-1986)* (İstanbul: İ.Ü. İktisat Fakültesi Yayını, 1991), 115-130.

Kemalism paralleled seeing Turkey's Cyprus policy as a 'national cause', a more conciliatory approach to the Cyprus issue was made possible by elevating the rationalistic attributes of Kemalism over others. In addition, it will be seen that new nodal points were introduced into Kemalism during this period, mainly, 'peace at home, peace in the world through sustainable development and economic cooperation' and 'active foreign policy'. The following discussion will identify the main building blocks of this discursive chain.

4.1. The military era (1980-1983)

4.1.1. Kemalism from a 'battle-zone' to a 'buffer-zone'

Turkish Armed Forces has once again impeded the disastrous attempts of those unfortunates who, for the sake of their interests, aimed at disintegrating the country and even creating enmity against Atatürk by deviating from Kemalist principles.

—Kenan Evren, 1980

The 1980s began with a single Kemalist narrative which ended the polarization of the political discourse during the 1970s. Similar to the 1960s, this 'restoration' came with a military coup. Shortly after the coup, the National Security Council (NSC), set up after the intervention, delegated the executive authority to a cabinet composed of bureaucrats, professors, and retired officers, excluding all politicians who took place in the previous parliament. The new cabinet was led by Bülent Ulusu, an admiral, who had retired just before the coup, while General Kenan Evren became the head of state.⁴¹⁸ With no opposition in the parliament or from the press, the new administration secured that what it declared would become the dominant narrative without being challenged. Hence the political discourse of the early 1980s was dominated by the hegemonic attempts of the military establishment and reconstituted by the program of the Ulusu's government.

⁴¹⁸ Ahmad, 183.

The military narrative started on September 12, 1980, with the statement of General Kenan Evren, broadcast over radio and television, where he declared that the Armed Forces invoked the power granted to them to protect and safeguard the Republic and took over the administration of the country.⁴¹⁹ This was, as underlined in Evren's speech, because of the civil strife in the 1970s which was due to the promotion of "warped" ideologies instead of Kemalism.⁴²⁰ Hence, the aim of the operation was to "preserve the integrity of the country, restore national unity and togetherness, avert a possible civil war and fratricide, reestablish the authority and existence of the [s]tate, and eliminate all factors that prevent the normal functioning of the democratic order."⁴²¹ Similarly, in striving towards these aims, the administration announced that the only guidance would be taken from Kemalism.⁴²² Ulu's government reconstituted this template, stating that the primary duty of the government was to do the all-necessary political restructuring with the guidance of Atatürk's principles.⁴²³

Why was Kemalism considered to be so crucial for coping with the present conditions? Responding to the question of *Financial Times* in 1981, Kenan Evren said the following:

[Atatürk's] six principles of republicanism, populism, nationalism, revolutionism, secularism and statism are still applicable today. They were however distorted before September 12. Atatürk's view of statism was not strict but a soft statism. That is why the state should do what the private sector cannot accomplish. Similarly, his nationalism was not dogmatic. In this sense, there is no need to redefine Atatürk's principles.⁴²⁴

⁴¹⁹ Cited in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980-12 Eylül 1981)* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981), 17.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., 17. The English version of the document can be found in General Secretariat of the National Security Council, *12 September in Turkey: Before and After* (Ankara: General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 1982), 221.

⁴²¹ Cited in General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 221-22, 296.

⁴²² Ibid., 296.

⁴²³ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *Ulu's Hükümeti Programı*, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp44.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁴²⁴ Cited in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980-12 Eylül 1981)*, 241.

Against the background of the economic liberalization measures carried out after the economic crisis of late 1970s and the following IMF austerity package,⁴²⁵ a softer version of statism was perhaps the only reasonable way to argue that statism was still applicable. Stating that Atatürk's nationalism was not dogmatic also served to introduce Kemalism as a moderate ideology that had a dynamic character rather than static. This discursive move to link the present definition to what was assumed to be the 'original' Kemalism underlined that these principles were not in need of redefinition and were still applicable. An additional emphasis was not ignored nevertheless. As Evren reiterated in his public speeches and press conferences, the restoration of Kemalism did not merely involve the 'six principles', but also the principles of 'national independence', 'national sovereignty' and 'modernism'.⁴²⁶ Besides emphasizing the non-dogmatic character of Kemalism and hence its applicability and suitability to the changing circumstances, Evren's statement also showed how the military's interpretation of Kemalism diverged from and delegitimized the Kemalism(s) of the 1970s, which, for the establishment, represented a clear deviation from the real essence of Atatürk's principles. The following statement is also in this line:

Atatürk, by including the principle of revolutionism, has protected his philosophy from being constrained within a strict and narrow frame. In contrast to the regimes that reject change and development, such as communism, fascism, and [N]azism, he set it free to any new development that is positive and suitable for the social structure. On the other hand, this characteristic [of Kemalism] does not allow it to be pulled to the extreme right or left, due to the sensitive balance among his principles. Such an attempt either means not comprehending Kemalism at all, or consciously distorting and exploiting it for sheer interests.⁴²⁷

Here too, we see how Kemalism was presented as an inherently innovative and consensual ideology as opposed to the 'foreign' ideologies. This inherent flexibility, for Evren, came from the principle of revolutionism, which meant a continual renewal of this ideology. Yet, this did not mean that any new interpretation, however contradictory it would

⁴²⁵ The structural adjustment program with the IMF was signed before the coup, on January 24, 1980. On the immediate effects of these reforms on the Turkish economy, see Ahmad, 178.

⁴²⁶ See, for example, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980-12 Eylül 1981)*, 118-120.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, 120-21.

be with the ‘foundational arrows’, could be affirmed via the principle of revolutionism. The sensitive balance among the principles, for Evren, secured the limits of their interpretation. This balance, as stated in the same speech, mainly involved the short and the long-term objectives of Atatürk’s revolutions. The short-term objective of the revolutions was struggling with the ‘enemy inside’, while the long-term objective was ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’ and having a respected status within it.⁴²⁸ In this sense, the military establishment of the 1980s reconstituted the elements that were used to legitimize the 1960’s coup and the military intervention of 1971. This circular reproduction also involved three discursive moves that were also undertaken by the military establishment during the 1960s and the 1970s.

First, in underlining that the military regime was principally against the ‘extreme modes of thought’, the military establishment considered any leftist or rightist interpretation of Kemalism as principally against the main objectives of Kemalism. Neither could they unite the Turkish society, nor could they raise Turkey to the level of the contemporary civilization. This paralleled presenting the military as the only power that could ‘unite’ and ‘raise Turkey to the level of the contemporary civilization’ due to the fact that the military was the only impartial power and represented the ‘genuine’ Kemalism.⁴²⁹ Hence, without these linear aspects of Kemalism, any other interpretation, for the military, remained ‘obstructionist.’

Second, similar to the 1960’s military establishment, the 1980’s military authorities also considered democracy as a value to be defended against totalitarian interpretations of Kemalism. Based on this view, democracy could be suspended for its secure functioning in the future. This required uniting the society once again in the aim of reaching the level of civilization as prescribed by Kemalism.

⁴²⁸ Ibid., 119-121.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., 25.

Third, because Kemalism united the society against secessionism, anarchy, and totalitarianism, any deviation from it was directly accused of fostering fratricide, division, and obstructionism. Indeed, rather than prioritizing the economic and political conditions leading to the coup, the main reason for the main conditions that instigated the coup was represented as the “degeneration of Atatürk’s principles.”⁴³⁰ The following remark of Kenan Evren is illustrative in this sense:

The Atatürkist pattern of thought, and the proper pride in being a Turk, lies at the heart of the Turkish Republic. The principles of Atatürk are the cornerstone of this structure. When these basic principles were strayed from, fratricidal and separatist movements began to emerge in the country. If Atatürk’s principles are not followed faithfully and conscientiously, and if these are not accepted as the basic pillars of the Turkish Republic, it will be impossible for a modern, civilized, healthy, consistent, humane and stable state administration to function It was those great deviations from this path that necessitated the implementation of the September 12, 1980 operation throughout the country.⁴³¹

As this statement indicates, the 1980’s military administration considered Kemalism as the only legitimate ideological umbrella in the ‘national struggle’ against threats to the country.⁴³² In this sense, by uniting the people around Atatürk’s nationalism, and giving guidance for ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’, Kemalism would serve as a panacea to get out of the pre-coup battle-zone.⁴³³ To prevent any future sinister attempts to obstruct this path, constitutional precautions were taken which declared the main characteristics of the Republic in Article 2 as irrevocable. The Preamble which set forth the bases of the Constitution was also tied to Article 2, thereby removing any possibility of amendment on the following clauses:

In line with the concept of nationalism and the reforms and principles introduced by the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk, the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero, this Constitution, which affirms the eternal existence of the Turkish nation and motherland and the indivisible unity of the Turkish state, embodies . . . [t]he recognition that no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility

⁴³⁰ Ibid., 389. This was restated in the program of the Ulusu government which linked the chaotic situation before the military coup to the fact that the young generation was left with ‘foreign’ ideologies instead of being guided by Atatürk principles, Atatürk nationalism, national consciousness and ideals. See Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *Ulusü Hükümeti Programı*, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp44.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁴³¹ Cited in General Secretariat of the National Security Council, ix.

⁴³² Ibid., 230.

⁴³³ See Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *Ulusü Hükümeti Programı*, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp44.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

of the existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk . . . and that all Turkish citizens are united in . . . the desire for and belief in '[p]eace at home, peace in the world'.⁴³⁴

Hence, the military establishment did not present a radical reinterpretation of Kemalism; but rather a restatement of the elements employed by the earlier military establishment and the subsequent coalitions in 1960s and 1970s. The 'side-principles' of Kemalism and the objectives of Atatürk's reforms were given special attention as they represented the inherent goals of the foundational 'six arrows'. These were, mainly, defending the national interests, national independence, sovereignty and integrity, modernism, democracy, 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization', and 'peace at home, peace in the world'.

4.1.2. Kemalism and foreign policy during the military era

The establishment's pursuit of the Kemalist principles in conducting foreign policy mainly involved the projection of these elements on the foreign policy sphere by integrating them within the principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world'. Added to these elements was the presentation of the West as a 'symbol of civilization' on the one hand, and as 'an untrustworthy ally that threatened the national sovereignty of Turkey' on the other. Whereas the Western-orientation was taken as unquestionable and as an extension of Atatürk's reforms, it was further noted that the West should not interfere in Turkey's 'domestic matters', foreign policy being one. Below are the main building blocks of this foreign policy template.

4.1.2.1. Reconstituting the elements of the 'peace at home, peace in the world' principle

In its conduct of foreign policy, the new military administration promised to pursue a line that would conform to Kemalism and Atatürk's maxim of 'peace at home, peace in the

⁴³⁴ Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, "Preamble," under "The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey," Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, <<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm>> (accessed February 23, 2007).

world'.⁴³⁵ As clarified later, this line meant adhering to the principles of 'independence', 'sovereignty', 'respect for territorial integrity', 'non-interference in domestic affairs', and the 'equality of rights' as embodied in the UN Charter.⁴³⁶ Hence, just as it was immediately after the independence of the Turkish Republic, Turkey would continue to "stand against any threat and aggression which could be directed against Turkey, her territorial and national integrity," and "contribute to the world and regional peace in every way possible."⁴³⁷ This articulation reconstituted the oft-stated continuity between the policy implemented during Atatürk's era and the present period.

In this sense, the new administration did not suggest any change in the line of the traditional course of the foreign policy pursued so far.⁴³⁸ Turkey would adhere to her membership in NATO, strive for full membership in the EEC, and continue to strengthen her ties with the neighboring countries while avoiding taking sides in the conflicts in the Middle East. From this line of foreign policy, the resolution of the Cyprus issue depended on the principles of 'reciprocity', 'equity' and 'respect for past agreements'. It was repetitively declared that the Turkish Cypriot community had made constructive attempts and that a similar initiative was also expected from the other side.⁴³⁹ Furthermore, for the establishment, in line with the principle of 'looking for a peaceful solution for international disputes', the resolution of the Cyprus issue had to be found "within the framework of the agreements reached between the leaders of the two communities and through the process of inter-communal talks."⁴⁴⁰ From this perspective, the Cyprus issue was not a national security issue for Turkey, but a humanitarian and a legal issue which Turkey sought to resolve through peaceful and legal means with a humanitarian interest.

⁴³⁵ Cited in General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 298.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, 299.

⁴³⁷ *Ibidem.*

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*, 362-63.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, 364.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 300.

4.1.2.2. Domestic unity through Kemalism against the ‘divide, dismember, and swallow policy’ of the imperialist West

Turkey, being faithful to Atatürk’s principles of freedom, secularism, democracy, and peace at home, peace in the world, has accepted it as the main pillar of her foreign policy to continue friendly relations with all countries. However, not only that she could not receive the same sincere behaviors from some countries, but it has also been proven that they even assisted the spread of terrorism in Turkey.

—Kenan Evren, 1981

In representing the ‘outside’ in negative terms, the above-quoted statement of Evren constructs the Turkish identity as pacifist and respectful to international law. According to this line of thought, despite Turkey’s most ‘sincere’ efforts to establish peaceful relations, some countries aimed at “diving and disintegrating Turkey in order to accomplish their historical and ideological objectives,”⁴⁴¹ while others either hosted terrorist organizations that operated in Turkey, or simply ignored their activities.⁴⁴² The solution, for the establishment, depended on being strong and unified as a state and society,⁴⁴³ “remaining loyal to the principle of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’, developing consciousness for the national struggle, national sovereignty and Atatürk’s principles and reforms,⁴⁴⁴ and finally, pursuing Kemalism, instead of foreign ideologies of ‘hostile powers’. In that it viewed the ‘outside’ as hostile and considered the ideologies other than Kemalism as ‘foreign’, this discourse reconstituted Kemalism’s role in integrating the domestic sphere and countering the foreign ideological threats that turned into a foreign policy problem. Consider the following statement of Kenan Evren:

Friends! Many people nowadays would like to indoctrinate you with certain ideologies, with ‘isms’. We know them very well. If a doctrine with an ‘ism’ is necessary, there is already one of the sort: The ‘Kemalism’, the ideology of our Great Leader Atatürk. Indoctrinate this ideology!⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., 393.

⁴⁴² Ibidem.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., 402.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid., 398.

⁴⁴⁵ Cited in General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 302.

The call for national unity through Kemalism was also reverberated in approaches to Turkey's foreign policy in general. According to this line of thought, Kemalism served as a shield to confront not only the traditional security threats to Turkey's territory, but also the unconventional policies that aimed to "divide, dismember and swallow"⁴⁴⁶ Turkey by spreading terrorism, and establishing a communist, theocratic and fascistic regime in Turkey.⁴⁴⁷ In this vein, Evren stated:

Dear friends, the world is changing so rapidly that the styles of war also change The countries nowadays are forced to collapse from within by means of civil wars. If the type of administration of the country is transformed into a shape that is in accordance with its own ideology, then there would be no need for the occupation of the country. And this is the politics that our enemies attempt to implement.⁴⁴⁸

For the military establishment, the new ideological warfare the enemies of Turkey employed also involved dismembering Turkey from the pacts she was a part of.⁴⁴⁹ This frame was also used in relation to some Western countries without recourse to anti-Westernism. Drawing on the Independence War (1919-1923) image of the 'imperial West', it was stated that 'some' in the West, as well as the Soviet Union hoped for a civil war in Turkey in order to weaken the Southern flank of NATO and democracy.⁴⁵⁰ Based on this view, 1980's coup threw a major blow against the sinister plans of 'some' in the West which neither wholeheartedly supported NATO, nor believed in democracy. In this regard, the role of Kemalism was reconstructed both as a base for implementing a peaceful and realistic foreign policy and an ideological shield to confront unconventional threats to Turkey and the plans of some to dismember Turkey from her goal of integrating with the West.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibidem.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid., 321.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., 303.

⁴⁴⁹ Cited in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980-12 Eylül 1981)*, 392.

⁴⁵⁰ See Evren, *12 Eylül'den Önce Ne Demişlerdi, Ne Dediler, Ne Diyorlar* (Istanbul: Ad Yayıncılık, 1997), 276-78. Here Evren quotes James Spicer, who was then the Head of Turkey-United Kingdom Joint Parliamentary Committee. In his speech, which was published in the daily *Hürriyet* on 9 October 1984, Spicer expresses his opinion that 12 September was the most distressing day for some in the West who hoped that Turkey would be dragged into domestic conflicts and civil war. In his book, Evren refers to Spicer's comments as 'revealing'.

4.1.2.3. Kemalism, non-submission, and the Western-orientation

Despite its invocation of the image of the ‘imperialist West’ in relation to the plans of some to disintegrate Turkey, the administration’s general position regarding the ‘West’ was also in favor of further cooperation and integration with the West. For the establishment, becoming a part of the West, and especially Europe, was not a pragmatic and temporary objective, but the base of the Republic and an unchangeable project. Consider the following statement of Evren:

Turkey has always given a grave importance to her relations with Europe. One of the main objectives of the Turkish Nation, which embraced Atatürk’s principles, is to be a part of the West. This matter has been the permanent base of our young Republic. In this regard, Turkey ascribes great importance to her social and cultural relations with Europe as well as those in economic and political areas. One should not ignore the fact that the Western democracies’ border begins with Turkey.⁴⁵¹

Here we see a direct association of Kemalism with being a part of the West. According to this approach, Turkey’s place in the global community is the West, both in economic as well as in cultural and political terms. This showed that Turkey’s Western-orientation was not imposed by the West but was a result of Turkey’s own developmental project, the natural legacy of Atatürk’s principles of democracy and modernization. In this context, Atatürk’s statements were cited where he claimed he was not against the Western capital but economic exploitation.⁴⁵² Similarly, it was repetitively underlined that Turkey adopted the Western-European model of democracy for her development, while the emphasis again remained on Turkey’s inherent Westernist identity, as Turkish democracy was not imposed by the West, but embraced as a result of Atatürk’s reforms.⁴⁵³ The following statement by Evren illustrates this approach more explicitly:

Turkey will realize her transition to democracy not because the West wants it so, but because it suits Turkey and the Turkish nation best. Atatürk had said that the best system that would fit

⁴⁵¹ Cited in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980-12 Eylül 1981)*, 267.

⁴⁵² See *ibid.*, 235.

⁴⁵³ See *ibid.*, 263, 30.

Turkey was democracy. Because we are his children and we have taken over the duty from him, we will do our best for his wishes to come true.⁴⁵⁴

Turkey's membership to NATO was also represented in a similar line. In this sense, allying with the West did not mean losing Turkey's full-independence, or being against the Kemalist foreign policy. In this vein, Evren made the following statement:

Full-independence does not mean non-alliance [Atatürk] made his country fully independent; however, he established the Balkan Pact, and later the Sadabat Pact. To get in an alliance does not mean selling oneself to that alliance. That is why we linked our security to NATO; that is why we entered NATO.⁴⁵⁵

Thus, the pro-integrationist discourse of the military establishment also involved a defensive emphasis on Turkey's independent stance and her non-submissive identity as opposed to a Westernism that was subservient. For the establishment, Turkey's political, economic, and military alliance with the West did not mean 'selling Turkey to the West', as the origin of the Western-orientation was represented as 'domestic'. In this way, Westernism was integrated into the Kemalist foreign policy which had traditionally been understood in terms of the motto: 'peace at home, peace in the world'. Hence, Turkey would continue to be democratic, and a faithful Western ally as this 'suited her best' and as long as there were no domestic or international interferences that could spur secessionism or a civil war situation in Turkey. Consider the following remarks of Evren:

Our transition to democracy will be much faster if our European friends support us. But if they obstruct every step we pursue, this will not produce good results. You have seen how the American embargo in the aftermath of the Cyprus operation led to unintended consequences.⁴⁵⁶

According to this line of thought, the West had to trust Turkey's Cyprus policy and not interfere in it, as any intervention could lead to 'unintended consequences' that could also disrupt Turkey's alliance links. In this sense, despite the fact that Turkey's Cyprus policy was held separate from Turkey's Western-orientation, it was indirectly linked to it as the 'European countries' interfered in the issue. In this sense, any 'foreign' interference, even if it

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid., 300.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid., 64.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid., 241.

was undertaken with an intention to strengthen Turkey's alliance links by bringing her actions to a desired form, would produce an opposite result by distancing Turkey much further. On the other hand, Turkey, if supported by the West, would be democratized much faster, not because the West was needed for democratization, but because foreign support would facilitate the process, the source of which was domestic. In this regard, the non-submissive character of Turkey which was represented as an element of the Kemalist foreign policy was also expressed in approaching the Cyprus issue. The link drawn between Kemalism, Westernism and democracy on the one hand and Kemalism, 'non-interference', 'reciprocity', and 'sovereignty' on the other, helped the construction of a non-submissive identity without taking an anti-Westernist stance.

4.2. The civilian diplomacy and the Özal-Evren era (1983-1989)

The 1983 elections marked the beginning of the civilian rule and the success of Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (MP), which was a newly established party in the post-military era. The MP was new, in the sense that it was not a continuation of any other party that was dissolved by the coup; yet, following the unification campaign of the military establishment, it merged the principles that had been propagated by the previous parties that came to power. It was hence conservative and liberal as the JP, nationalist as the NAP, traditionalist as the NSP and even respected the social justice as the social democratic RPP.⁴⁵⁷ Özal played a leading role first as a prime minister between 1983 and 1989 during which Kenan Evren was the president, and later as a president between 1989 and 1993. Neither of them turned into a bleak figure when they assumed the presidency office; but on the contrary, both were actively involved in foreign policy.

⁴⁵⁷ Ahmad, 192. Indeed, there was also a personal continuity, as Özal was the deputy prime minister during the military era and also had been one of the designers of the economic stabilization program of 24 January 1980 launched by Demirel government before the coup (Ahmad 1993, 183).

In what follows is the examination of how the transition to the civilian era was legitimized in the party and government programs of the MP and which nodal points were tied to Kemalism. This will be followed by the discussion of how ‘active policy’, ‘Western-orientation’ and the ‘Cyprus policy’ were articulated in the discourse of the MP and mainly that of Özal by recourse to the elements of Kemalism. In an aim to make the divide between the defensive approach of Evren and the economic rationalism of Özal clearer, we will later turn to examine the foreign policy template employed in Evren’s discourse during the same time.

4.2.1. The Motherland Party’s moves to claim legitimacy: ‘sovereignty belongs to the nation’

The MP did not openly declare itself as a Kemalist party; however, it did have recourse to Atatürk’s principles to legitimize its policies. The new government’s program underlined that the party’s nationalism was faithful to Atatürk’s nationalism and that it was respectful of the integrity and independence of the Turkish nation and the indivisibility of the country.⁴⁵⁸ It referred to Atatürk’s maxim of ‘sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation’ to legitimize the transition to the civilian era and presented it as the main proof that there was no divergence from Atatürk’s principles.⁴⁵⁹ In this way, just as the military establishment legitimized intermissions in democracy by recourse to the principles of integrity, sovereignty and democracy, the MP also employed these elements in arguing for a need to end similar suspensions.

Yet, the MP’s view on democracy diverged from that of the military establishment in that it did not see democracy merely as a goal to be attained in the future but a condition that needed to be secured at all times. Similarly, the MP did not focus on ideological threats which had been the preoccupation of the military establishment; but rather, ‘national will’. This not

⁴⁵⁸ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *I. Özal Hükümeti Programı*, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp45.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid.

only served to highlight that undemocratic means to establish democracy delayed the realization of the principle of sovereignty but also reconstituted the element of sovereignty by linking it to the will of the nation to govern, rather than being supervised.

4.2.2. Putting the ‘national interests’ on the front: Kemalism as a pursuit of a realist, rationalist and active foreign policy

The MP’s emphasis on nationalism and national sovereignty paralleled an emphasis on national interests in conducting foreign policy. Indeed, the argument that foreign policy should defend the national interests of Turkey was not new; however, the MP’s discourse diverged from the articulations of the military establishment in that it elevated the economic interests over the relative power and security of Turkey *vis-à-vis* other countries. This involved a corollary translation of this policy into the Kemalist discourse, thereby reconstituting the Kemalist foreign policy as realist and rationalist. In this sense, the MP’s and mainly Özal’s discourse is exemplary of how ideologies are rationalized and how interest-based arguments are not necessarily exempt from an ideological discourse.

After coming to power, the MP stated that the *status-quo* approaches to Turkish foreign policy needed to be abandoned. Yet, the MP also sought to legitimize the ‘novelty’ it introduced into the Turkish foreign policy by recourse to the Kemalist principles and Atatürk’s policies. In this sense, it vacillated between representing continuity and initiating change, thereby attributing these characteristics to Kemalism in turn. As will be seen below, the MP’s discourse employed the same Kemalist template as was used by the previous policy makers. However, the way these elements were ordered and defined reveals how a more conciliatory approach to the Cyprus issue could also be legitimized via the same elements.

4.2.2.1. Pursuing the traditional foreign policy: advancing ‘peace at home, peace in the world’

Our government is determined to pursue Turkey’s rights and high interests with adherence to our traditional Atatürkist foreign policy, and advance it forward for our nation.

—The Program of the Motherland Party, 1983

As the above-quoted remark notes, in its foreign policy too, the MP claimed to follow the traditional Kemalist foreign policy, which it described as the pursuit of the national interest and peaceful relations with the other countries.⁴⁶⁰ This policy was later propagated by Yıldırım Akbulut (1989-1991) and Mesut Yılmaz (1991), who took over the Prime Ministry from Özal when Özal was the president, under the motto of following ‘peace at home, peace in the world approach’ of Atatürk.⁴⁶¹ According to this approach, Turkey would continue to contribute to the regional and world peace and security by remaining as the trustworthy member of the organizations she was a part of, and respect the principles of *pacta sunt servanda*, territorial integrity, independence and non-interference in domestic affairs on a reciprocal basis.⁴⁶² In its propagation for Turkey’s Western-orientation, too, the MP referred to the same elements. Similar to the previous governments and the military establishment that were in power before, the MP underlined that the balance of interests and equity should be the main focus of Turkey while strengthening her alliance links with the U.S. and the Western Europe, and seeking full membership status in the EEC.⁴⁶³

These elements were also present in the MP’s articulations on Turkey’s cooperation with the Muslim world. For the MP, so long as Turkey’s national interests were put at the center, her Western-orientation and relations with the countries in the Middle East did not

⁴⁶⁰ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *I. Özal Hükümeti Programı*, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp45.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁴⁶¹ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *I. Akbulut Hükümeti Programı*, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp47.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, and Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *I. Yılmaz Hükümeti Programı*, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp48.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁴⁶³ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *I. Özal Hükümeti Programı*, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp45.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

need to be mutually exclusive. On the contrary, maintaining close ties with both the West and the Middle East was seen complementary to the realization of the ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ principle.⁴⁶⁴ In this vein, it was underlined that Turkey needed to develop her relations with the Middle Eastern countries in order to serve as a bridge between the West and the Islam world, and that these efforts should be met with reciprocal actions on both sides to be effective.⁴⁶⁵

This approach was also pursued towards the Cyprus issue with an additional emphasis on the self-determination rights of the Turkish Cypriots. For the MP, the Turkish Cypriots were obliged to declare independence due to the violation of their rights and attacks against their existence for twenty years; however, their independent status did not in any way pose an obstacle to reaching a settlement in the form of a unified federal state.⁴⁶⁶ Turkey’s support for the acceptance of the TRNC to seek a federal solution under the supervision of the UN was a proof that it was not the Turkish side that escaped from the settlement of the problem.⁴⁶⁷ Hence, Turkey would “continue to guarantee and protect the life and the property safety of the Turkish Cypriot community” by following her traditional policy of seeking peaceful solutions on the basis of equity and reciprocity.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *II. Özal Hükümeti Programı*, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp46.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007). Here it is referred to the Framework Agreement Draft of 29 March 1986, which included the condition that the foreign troops would be removed from the island. This was signed by the President of the TRNC, while the Cyprus Government refused to approve on the ‘Preliminary Draft’ which was a precondition for signing the agreement. See Sönmezoğlu, *Tarafların Tutum ve Tezleri Açısından Kıbrıs Sorunu*, 116-19.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid. In the following government programs of the MP, when the party was represented by Yıldırım Akbulut and later by Mesut Yılmaz, the same emphasis remained with a special reference to the Framework Agreement and Atatürk’s maxim of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’. See Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *I. Akbulut Hükümeti Programı*, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp47.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007); and Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *I. Yılmaz Hükümeti Programı*, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp48.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

4.2.2.2. Playing active: sustainable economic development as a condition for ‘peace at home, peace in the world’

While the military establishment saw the removal of foreign ideologies and the indoctrination of Kemalism as a necessary condition for restoring order and peace and thereby protecting the country from the outside threats, for the MP, this was possible only through establishing a stable economy. The MP’s representation of this goal in terms of Atatürk’s principles, reconstituted a change in the order of the Kemalist chain, economics moving a step forward to be a condition for security rather than the other way round. The following remark in the government program is illustrative in this respect:

In an economy that develops stably, social problems can be resolved more easily and rapidly. [In this way] the conditions that instigate conflict are removed naturally. As Atatürk once said, ‘No victory can be permanent or continuous unless it is crowned with an economic victory.’⁴⁶⁹

Here we see the presentation of sustainable economic development as the main condition for ‘peace at home’, conveying the imagery of the ‘National Struggle’ of 1919-1923, in a similar vein with the military’s emphasis on purging the foreign ideologies. From this perspective, national security and peace depended on a sound economy which required liberalizing the trade and the financial market, encouraging foreign investment and exports, and improving the economic relations with the Western and Eastern countries alike.⁴⁷⁰ In other words, the ‘economic victory’ that is achieved through economic cooperation and liberalization would pave the way for the settlement of conflicts.

This functionalist approach to security, which was influenced by the European project of seeking economic cooperation for the prevention of future conflicts in Europe,⁴⁷¹ was also articulated in relation to the Middle East.⁴⁷² For Özal, the creation of economic and financial cooperation in the Middle East could contribute to the settlement of political conflicts in the

⁴⁶⁹ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *I. Özal Hükümeti Programı*, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hp45.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁷¹ In an interview with Uğur Dündar on 22 January 1991, Özal stated his admiration for the European countries’ initiative to create the European Coal and Steel Community that evolved into the EEC for the prevention of future wars in the continent. (Gözen 2000, 125).

⁴⁷² Gözen, 126.

region. Once such an order was established, “these countries would be obliged to think twice before they [took] steps that could upset the interests of each other.”⁴⁷³ While the project of establishing a common market for the Middle Eastern countries could not be realized partly because none of the countries involved was willing or able to build the necessary infrastructure,⁴⁷⁴ several initiatives were made to play an active role in the Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).⁴⁷⁵ In 1984, Turkey assumed the Presidency of the organization, the meetings were held in Istanbul, and the ‘Plan of Action’ was declared to serve as a framework for establishing a vision for mutual economic cooperation.⁴⁷⁶

On the other hand, this ‘Eastern’ vision was not supplementary to Turkey’s Western vocation, but seen complementary to it. The party program of 1983 stated that Turkey, being also a Western country, had to make a more active engagement in her cooperation with the ‘Western world’; and that the relations should not be limited to security concerns.⁴⁷⁷ Active policy was seen as the only way for Turkey to be indispensable for both the East and the West and play a bridge role between them:

Turkey has to be indispensable both for the West and the East. This is possible only through implementing a swift and active policy, which does not change directions, the objectives of which have been ascertained, and which does not make sudden maneuvers. It should not be a policy that is based on anger, complexes, and obsessions.⁴⁷⁸

This was also underlined with regard to Turkey’s full membership application and the settlement of the Cyprus dispute. According to this view, Turkey had to be an EEC member for cooperation between the Western and the Islam world and to build a common Judeo-

⁴⁷³ “An Inevitable War,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service FBIS-WEU, February 20, 1991; cited in Gözen, 126.

⁴⁷⁴ See Gözen, 126-30.

⁴⁷⁵ While Turkey became a member to the Organization for the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1975, representation was elevated to the Presidency level in 1981.

⁴⁷⁶ Cited in *Başbakan Özal’ın Yurtdışı Temaslarındaki Konuşmaları, 13.12.1988-31.10.1989* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1989), 4-6.

⁴⁷⁷ Anavatan Partisi, “Anavatan Partisi 1983,” BELGEnet, under “Partiler ve Programları,” Madde 35, <<http://www.belgenet.com/parti/program/anap-2.html>> (accessed March 2, 2007)).

⁴⁷⁸ Mehmet Barlas, ed., *Turgut Özal’ın Anıları* (Istanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1994), 126.

Christian-Islamic/Greco-Roman civilization.⁴⁷⁹ In his book titled as *Turkey and Europe, Europe in Turkey*, Özal expanded on this ideal, arguing that the best way to end the ethno-religious centrism in Europe was to admit Turkey as a full member in the EEC because Turkey represented the “alter-ego”, in other words, the “complementary [S]elf of Europe,” instead of being alien to it.⁴⁸⁰ Turkey, for Özal, was both European and Muslim; and hence the admission of Turkey as a member would provide the EEC with a more secular, global and humanistic perspective and thereby contribute to the global peace and security.⁴⁸¹ For Özal, this would not only resolve the present conflict between the two civilizations, but also create a permanent settlement for the Turco-Greek conflicts, including the Cyprus issue.⁴⁸² By the same token, in giving priority to economic development and cooperation, Özal suggested that the number of troops in Cyprus be decreased by 1500 for it was a burden to the Turkish economy and increased tension; and stressed the necessity to encourage foreign investment to the Northern Cyprus to turn the area into a free economic zone.⁴⁸³

4.2.2.3. An active and conciliatory approach to the Cyprus issue: challenging the *status-quo* policies

Placing the economic interests above the security concerns, the active and rationalist policy propagated in relation to developing economic cooperation with the West and the East also paralleled a more conciliatory and active approach towards the settlement of the Cyprus dispute. For Özal, the Cyprus issue required a swift action plan by Turkey as opposed to the traditional non-conciliatory approach that saw Cyprus as the ‘national cause’. Consider the following remark by Özal:

⁴⁷⁹ Özal, *Turkey in Europe, Europe in Turkey* (Nicosia: K. Rustem and Brother, 1991), 317-18, 285, 331.

⁴⁸⁰ Özal, 304.

⁴⁸¹ Ibidem.

⁴⁸² Cited in *Başbakan Özal’ın Yurtdışı Temaslarındaki Konuşmaları*, 30-32.

⁴⁸³ Following the same approach, Economic Cooperation Protocol was signed with the TRNC in 1986 which aimed at harmonizing the economy of the Northern Cyprus with that of Turkey. According to this protocol, arrangements would be made for free money transfer, increase in the retirement age, combined economic policy, budget cuts, and 30% increase in the customs tax. See Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (1980-2001)* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004), pp: 107-108.

It is a mistake to perpetuate a crisis in the name of ‘national cause’. To escape from a solution is not a courageous act. You have to decide with regard to Cyprus. Do you want two separate states or two communities coexisting under a loose federation? In my opinion, a loose federation is the best solution. In this way neither Turkey nor Greece will need to keep their troops and have bases in two separate Greek and Turkish states.⁴⁸⁴

Here we see how Özal redefines ‘the national interest’ in relation to the Cyprus issue in considering the Turkish troops as a burden for the national economy instead of a security necessity, and in stating the need for a more rational and problem-solving approach in Cyprus. This suggested a clear move from the *status-quo* approach pursued so far. In the following remark, this is put more explicitly:

Turkish foreign policy needs to be based towards achieving economic development. It is unfortunate that the Cyprus issue has captured our attention for the last fifteen years and gauged the overall foreign policy. Now it is the time to remove it from the number one priority of the foreign affairs. We have to turn ourselves to the changing world and calculate which policies can benefit us the most.⁴⁸⁵

While this initiative posed a challenge to the traditional policy towards Cyprus, for Özal, it was not a deviation from the Kemalist foreign policy but its very application. This can be seen in how Özal drew a parallel between the active policy towards Cyprus and Atatürk’s policy towards the Hatay province:

Atatürk’s Hatay policy is an example [to the active foreign policy]. Hatay is a precedent of achieving the maximum benefit with a minimum cost by means of calculating the international conditions. When conditions are convenient, important problems can be solved by means of an active policy. But our foreign policy has been dominated by the İnönü line instead of Atatürk’s line. They think status-quoism is politics.⁴⁸⁶

In this sense, having a conciliatory, anti-*status-quo* and active approach towards conflicts was not against the foreign policy pursued during Atatürk’s era, but against the *status-quo* approach that had been implemented by reference to Atatürk:

⁴⁸⁴ Cited in Barlas, 131.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., 180-81.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., 127. It should be noted here that Hatay (previously, Alexandretta) province was included within the French mandate in Syria in 1920 and gained autonomy in 1923. Although the Republican administration, and particularly Atatürk, stated that it should belong to Turkey as the majority of its inhabitants were Turks, they did not undertake a military intervention to annex Hatay. After Syria’s declaration of independence in 1938, Hatay became a province of Syria and later declared independence in 1938. With the referendum conducted in 1939, Hatay joined Turkey as a province.

We have two lines in our foreign policy; one is Atatürk's line, the other is İsmet Pasha's line. Atatürk takes Hatay when the conditions are convenient, changes the Straits regime in Montreaux, sides with England and France against Germany and Italy. But İnönü's line is conservative. He only perpetuates the *status-quo* Everybody talks about Kemalism, glorifies Atatürk. But the bureaucracy is in the line of İnönü, not that of Atatürk's. İsmet İnönü can be seen as the last Ottoman Sultan. On the other hand, Atatürk has been a reformist who always struggled to change the *status-quo*.

In linking the proposed foreign policy approach to the Cyprus issue to the realism of Atatürk's policy towards Hatay, Özal thereby highlighted that the insistence of the pro-*status-quo* discourse on giving no concessions on the official policy was neither in compliance with Turkey's national interests, nor realistic given the present conditions, nor Kemalist in lacking this realism and reformism. This in turn reconstructed 'active policy' as the real application of Kemalist foreign policy as it involved a rational calculation between the national interests and the conditions of the time. While the element of defending the national interests served to legitimize this new initiative, it was the specific interpretation of this element and that of Kemalism in general that made this link possible.

4.2.2.4. Legitimizing the Western/European vocation through 'reaching the level of the modern civilization' and Turkey's inherent European identity

At a time when the relations with the EEC were virtually frozen, Özal did not propagate a reactionary approach, but on the contrary, made a surprising application for full membership in 1987. In his official letter submitted to the Council of Ministers of the European Community, Özal declared Turkey's "commitment to European unity, as well as the ideals which gave birth to the treaties instituting the European Communities."⁴⁸⁷ In this sense, the rationalist and the realist discourse of Özal was not exempt from legitimizing the articulated foreign policies by recourse to certain ideals.

As discussed in the previous sections, the MP's Westernist policy suggested a rationalistic approach to conflicts and national economy. Because the EEC membership

⁴⁸⁷ Cited in Özal, xiii.

involved “the acceptance of laws, rules, and practices necessary for the successful operation of a market economy,” it would contribute to the economic policy pursued so far by encouraging further foreign investment in Turkey.⁴⁸⁸ However, apart from this economic outlook, the MP also defined Turkey’s application for membership in the EEC in ideational terms. In an interview in 1991, Özal noted that Turkey’s primary objective was to ‘reach the level of the contemporary civilization’, and that the civilization one needed to follow in this regard was the Western civilization.⁴⁸⁹ As the contemporary civilization was represented by the West, the EEC was naturally seen as the target to be followed in order to accomplish Atatürk’s maxim:

It fell upon us to apply for full membership in the EEC, which was set as a target by Atatürk’s goal of reaching the level of the modern civilization and which could not be attempted previously due to Turkey’s conditions.⁴⁹⁰

In this way, Turkey’s application for a full-membership status was presented as a natural consequence of Atatürk’s primary goal. This was because of the fact that all Atatürk’s reforms had as their aim the inculcation of the Western values into the Turkish society.⁴⁹¹ On the other hand, for Özal, the European vocation of Turkey was not merely a ‘duty’, but a ‘choice’ on the part of the Turks to be Europeans, “even before Atatürk set their face westwards.”⁴⁹² In this sense, Turkey’s membership in the EEC did not only represent the affirmation of Atatürk’s goal but also the confirmation of Turkey’s European identity, and therefore the ‘national will’. In *Turkey in Europe, Europe in Turkey*, which Özal dedicated “to the peoples of Europe and to the Turkish people who belong among them,” he stated the following:

⁴⁸⁸ Andrew Mango, *Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 90.

⁴⁸⁹ Cited in *Barlas*, 262.

⁴⁹⁰ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *II. Özal Hükümeti Programı*, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp46.htm>> (accessed on March 2, 2007). See also Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *I. Akbulut Hükümeti Programı*, <<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp47.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁴⁹¹ Özal, 275.

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*, x.

Turkey believes that in joining the European Community, she identifies her future with that of Europe. That is her fundamental purpose. At the cost of very good sacrifices Turkey has struggled more than two centuries to establish a democratic way of life based on liberty and human rights. Since we share these ideals with Europe Turkey believes that she can defend them better with the help of Europe, which represents for her the geographical area on which this way of life and these values depend. Turkey is a part of this area as she always has been throughout her history.⁴⁹³

Here we see how Özal's association of Turkey's pro-European policy with 'reaching the level of the modern civilization' and sharing common cultural roots and values with Europe constituted Turkey's European vocation as a fundamental and a domestically legitimated purpose. This also paralleled a corollary policy with regard to Cyprus, which did not view 'Europe' as a divisive force but regarded it as a partner for conducting a common policy in the region. For Özal, just as Turkey had to side with the Western coalition in the Persian Gulf War not to be rifted away from the West,⁴⁹⁴ Turkey needed to give up on the conspiracy theories and the unnecessary obstinacy pursued hitherto and develop instead a problem-solving approach towards the Cyprus issue not only for the resolution of the conflict but also not to be dragged away from her European vocation.⁴⁹⁵ In other words, according to this framework, the more Turkey insisted on the non-negotiability of her interests towards the Cyprus issue, the more would this rift Turkey away from her primary goal of integrating with Europe. In this vein, Özal said:

If u say 'I do not want this, I don't agree with it,' with a sheer obstinacy, if you do not want to give any concessions, this will be taken as a rude reaction by the other side. They will think that [you] do not deserve joining the EEC; because, they seek consensus in the EEC. How can they get on with you as you keep objecting everything?⁴⁹⁶

The rationalism of Özal's discourse thereby drew a stable link between the Cyprus policy and Turkey's Western/European-orientation in juxtaposing the previous approaches to Cyprus against Turkey's Western/European vocation and in reconciling the proposed policy towards Cyprus with being a member of the EEC. While this discursive move also involved a

⁴⁹³ Ibid., 339-40.

⁴⁹⁴ Cited in Barlas, 116.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid., 99.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibidem.

refusal to call the Cyprus cause as the ‘national cause’ of Turkey, this initiative was rather marginalized as it did not find official representation at the governmental level. Active policy became a part of the official discourse in so far as it stressed the need to develop the relations with both the West and the East to make Turkey an indispensable partner for both.

4.2.3. Kenan Evren’s reconstitution of Kemalism and foreign policy

Kenan Evren was also another dominant figure of the foreign policy discourse when the MP was in power. After assuming the Presidency office he continued to deliver public speeches regarding Turkey’s role in her foreign affairs in his traditional visits to various provinces in the country as well as in domestic and international press conferences. Taking the content and style of these speeches into consideration, one could pinpoint certain continuity in his approach, while a separate section is necessary to underline how this approach also involved changes after the democratic system was restored (as the anarchical conditions were represented as the main problem during the military era). In addition, juxtaposing the discourse of Evren during his presidency to the discourse of the MP during the same period can also help understanding the main parallels and rifts between the defensive and economic rationalist approaches to Kemalism.

4.2.3.1. Kemalism as a condition for achieving ‘peace at home’

While the discourse of the MP focused on the necessity for economic development, Evren’s discourse during his presidency continued to stress the extraordinariness of the present conditions and the need to establish the domestic unity. At a time when Özal declared Turkey’s biggest problem as the current account deficit,⁴⁹⁷ for Evren, it was the threat coming from the deviant ideologies of communism, fascism, and Islamic fundamentalism,⁴⁹⁸ which, to

⁴⁹⁷ *Ayin Tarihi*, 13 March 1985, <<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1985/mart1985.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁴⁹⁸ *Ayin Tarihi*, 18 October 1985, <<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1985/ekim1985.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007)

Evren, were the tools of those that attempted to push Turkey back to the pre-coup conditions.⁴⁹⁹ To confirm Evren's call to be vigilant against these divisive forces, the extraordinariness of the military era was not swiftly restored back to normality but the martial law that was declared throughout the whole country with the 1980 coup was totally lifted only until 1987. On the other hand, even when Evren himself affirmed that peace was finally established throughout the country with the embracement of Atatürk's principles, one still needed to be watchful for any future attempts to make Kemalism be forgotten.⁵⁰⁰ That was because, for Evren, Kemalism still preserved its vitality for the integrity and the survival of Turkey.⁵⁰¹ Consider the following remarks of Evren:

The games played on Turkey take place in the right and the left. The only way to save us is the way of Kemalism. If we cannot save ourselves from the extremes or embrace Atatürk's principles, then we can never achieve permanent stability.⁵⁰²

Hence, in contrast to Özal's emphasis on the sustainable economic development as a condition to achieve domestic peace, which couched Kemalism within a more neoliberal outlook,⁵⁰³ Kemalism, for Evren, served as a panacea to fight against the grave threats facing Turkey. According to the latter approach, the domestic peace was seen primarily dependent upon a unity around Kemalism.

4.2.3.2. Multidirectional foreign policy, and 'peace at home, peace in the world'

Turkey, since her establishment, in accordance with Atatürk's principles, has ascribed great importance to maintaining peaceful relations with other countries, and made every effort in order to contribute to the regional and world peace and security.

—Kenan Evren, 1987

⁴⁹⁹ *Ayin Tarihi*, 27 May 1984, <<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1984/mayis1984.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁵⁰⁰ *Ayin Tarihi*, 10 November 1985, <<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1985/kasim1985.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰² Cited in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kasım 1986-9 Kasım 1987)* (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1987), 60.

⁵⁰³ In his talk in the Second International Symposium on Atatürk, Özal identified the elements of freedom of speech, freedom of market and democracy as what represented the Kemalist vision (Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi 1996, v-viii).

As stated above, during his presidency too, Evren described the objective of the Turkish foreign policy as contributing to the regional and global security by recourse to the principle of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’, although there was a slight change in the approach in the latter period which is of concern here. Establishing the regional peace and in this aim developing peaceful relations with the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries gained a special emphasis in Evren’s later discourse.

While this could be seen as a shift in Evren’s Westernist foreign policy propagated during the early 1980s, for Evren, Turkey’s rapprochement with the Middle East and the Islam world was not a reaction to the recent cooling off of relations with the EEC.⁵⁰⁴ On the contrary, this policy was seen complementary to Turkey’s role as a member of the Western community. Evren’s following statement is illustrative:

In terms of its nature, Turkey’s belonging to the Western community does not have an exclusive security dimension Turkey has a comprehensive cooperation with the West including areas other than security as well. On the other hand, Turkey has common historical ties with the countries in the region, especially in the Middle East. In this sense, Turkey has the opportunity to lead a bridge role between the East and the West.⁵⁰⁵

In seeing the relations vital for strengthening Turkey’s cultural importance in the West, rather than an instance of a new Islamic orientation, this discourse reconstructed Turkey’s Western identity, by carrying it from the dimension of security to the cultural one. From this perspective, Turkey’s being the only secular and Muslim country in the region increased her strategic importance for the West as she served as a role model for the countries in the region.⁵⁰⁶ Yet, the traditional focus on the respect to the ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’ constituted the bottom line of the policy, as if it were to shake off the claims that Turkey’s search for an alliance in the East had ideological roots.

⁵⁰⁴ On his visits to Tunisia, Egypt and Qatar, Evren noted the following: “Turkey is making efforts to improve her relations with the West on the one hand, and with the Arab and Muslim countries in the Middle East on the other. Turkey has not diminished her relations with the West as some are trying to claim.” See *Ayin Tarihi*, 23 January 1986, <<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1986/ocak1986.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁵⁰⁵ Cited in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kasım 1986-9 Kasım 1987)*, 100.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 397.

Responding to one of such claims, Evren noted, “We maintain our relations with other countries regardless of their regime, as long as they recognize our independence and territorial integrity and don’t interfere in our domestic affairs.”⁵⁰⁷

Representing the Turkish state at various meetings of the OIC, Evren underlined how this forum would contribute to resolving the differences between Turkey and the Arab countries in the region and achieving a consensual understanding of the present problems.⁵⁰⁸ In a similar vein with his approach to the domestic peace, he also noted that the peace and stability in the Middle East could be restored only if the “lack of unity and solidarity among the Arab and Islamic countries” could be removed.⁵⁰⁹ In this sense, Turkey’s rapprochement with the Islamic countries was particularly important in reaching a consensus on matters that were vital for a peaceful solution for the problems in the region.

Being one of such problems where the differences between Turkey and the other countries were visible as Turkey still remained the only country to recognize the TRNC, Turkey’s ‘just stance’ in relation to the Cyprus issue became another focus of Evren’s discourse at his visits to the OIC countries as well as the Western Europe. The Cyprus problem, for Evren, was not rooted in Turkey’s present troops in the island,⁵¹⁰ an issue that became a political problem as the UN meetings did not turn into Turkey’s favor. The Turkish troops, Evren noted, arrived and remained in the island in response to the usurpation of the state partnership rights of the Turkish Cypriots, to protect their security in the framework of the rights entrusted to Turkey by the international agreements, and that there had been peace and tranquility in the island thanks to this role.⁵¹¹ In this sense, in that she responded to injustice and pursued a just cause for an eventual federal state solution that would be

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., 129.

⁵⁰⁸ *Ayin Tarihi*, 19 January 1984, <<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1984/ocak1984.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁵⁰⁹ *Ayin Tarihi*, 24 February 1984,

<<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1984/subat1984.htm>> (accessed March 2, 2007).

⁵¹⁰ Cited in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kasım 1986-9 Kasım 1987)*, 413.

⁵¹¹ Ibidem.

negotiated on equal conditions, Turkey was nothing but a peacekeeper.⁵¹² The real problem, for Evren, was “that the Greek Cypriots would not intend to share the economically and politically advantageous situation they received by virtue of being unjustly recognized as ‘the only and legitimate government’ of the whole Cyprus.”⁵¹³

By the same token, Evren noted that the perpetuation of the conflict was not due to Turkey’s obsessive logic as pointed out by Özal, but because of the non-conciliatory attitude of the Greek Cypriots, which was rooted in the fact that they never gave upon their ideal of Hellenism to turn Cyprus into a Christian island.⁵¹⁴ For Evren, the approval of the Preliminary Draft of 26 March 1986 by the Turkish side on the one hand, and the rejection of the document by the Greek side on the other, was a proof of this tendency as well as a support for the claim that Turkey was sincere in her will for the permanent solution in the island.⁵¹⁵ Hence, this “vicious circle” could only be overcome by “equal treatment to both sides and the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by the other countries.”⁵¹⁶

Therefore, while Evren’s later discourse also ascribed an active role to Turkey in developing her relations with the Islamic countries, thereby paralleling Özal’s foreign policy discourse, it resumed its traditional emphasis in articulating Turkey’s peace-building/keeping role in the conflicts from the standpoint of the traditional principles of ‘equity’, ‘territorial integrity’, *pacta sunt servanda*, ‘non-interference in the domestic affairs’, and ‘reciprocity’. In contrast to the MP’s discourse that saw economic development and cooperation as a condition for ‘peace at home, peace in the world’, Evren’s discourse underlined that the lack of consensus on the reasons for this conflict constituted the vicious circle. From this perspective, and to break the respective chain, Turkey had to insist on her ‘just’ cause in Cyprus and resolve her differences with the Islamic countries and the West in order to

⁵¹² Ibidem.

⁵¹³ Ibidem.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid., 397-98.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid., 92.

⁵¹⁶ Ibidem.

contribute to the peace, and thereby confirm her peaceful intentions and her Western identity. This, as stated in various occasions, was seen as the main component of the ‘peace at home peace in the world’ maxim of Atatürk, which was declared as the basis of the new Turkish state.⁵¹⁷ Hence, from this perspective, giving concession on such ‘just causes’ could only be considered if it was based upon the principles of ‘reciprocity’ and ‘equity’. In an official visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, the President Evren defined the Turkish foreign policy on this basis as follows:

Turkey sincerely wants to contribute to building cooperative relations that serve the peace, stability and mutual interests in her region and elsewhere. From this perspective, Turkey has fully supported the resolution of conflicts through negotiations and dialogue that is built on the equity basis. With no doubt, these peaceful intentions do not mean indifference for foreign interventions. Turkey has no desire for even a hand span of territory of others. Similarly, even a hand span of Turkey’s territory cannot be negotiated. Another basic principle of our policy involves respect to contractual commitments. Just as Turkey is attentive to abide by this principle, she expects other countries to act accordingly.⁵¹⁸

4.2.3.3. Turkey’s presence in the Western community and the pursuit of Atatürk’s goals

Turkey’s membership in the EEC will be the natural consequence of the Westernization period in our country which gained an indispensable dimension with the Atatürk’s reforms.

—Kenan Evren, 1988

As the above-quoted statement illustrates, after the military era too, Evren’s foreign policy discourse continued to link Turkey’s involvement in the Western organizations to Turkey’s inherent Western identity and following Atatürk’s project of turning Turkey into a truly Western country, an aspect that was not overtly stated in relation to Turkey’s participation in the OIC. Similar to the MP’s Westernist discourse that represented Turkey’s involvement in the Western organizations as an indicator for sharing common values with the West, Evren ascribed a prioritized and even an indispensable value to Turkey’s Western-

⁵¹⁷ Cited in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kasım 1987-9 Kasım 1988)* (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1988), 264.

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 396.

orientation by tying it directly to being in the Western community⁵¹⁹ and building on Atatürk's Westernist reforms, thereby reconstructing a Westernist interpretation of the Kemalist foreign policy. The following remarks of Evren are illustrative in this regard:

It cannot be expected that the countries of the Common Market will close their borders to Turkey. Because, whatever perspective one takes, Turkey is a part of Europe. Westernism has been the prioritized aspect in Turkish foreign policy since Great Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic.⁵²⁰

Turkey's close relations with the Western Europe and the U.S.A. are rooted in the common values we share with the West since the establishment of our republic. The embracement of democratic parliamentary system by our nation as an indispensable life style has been the most important element that strengthens our ties with the West.⁵²¹

Evren's Westernist discourse hence involved several assumptions that also constituted the integral components of the MP's discourse. First, Westernization, according to this perspective, became crucial due to the reforms of Atatürk. Second, the Turkish society, having already embraced Atatürk's revolutions as a whole, internalized the democratic and Western values as an indispensable life style. In this sense, Turkey's involvement in the Western organizations would not only build upon the path of Atatürk, but also inevitably and legitimately reflect the national will. The following remark of Evren puts this more clearly:

The steps taken by the Turkish society for Westernization has a long past. This basic choice on the part of Turkey has taken an irrevocable turn with the establishment of our Republic by the Great Atatürk . . . and the comprehensive Westernist reforms taken thereafter. Let me correct a misunderstanding here: Turkey has not chosen democracy because of her good relations with the Western Europe, but because our nation wanted it. With this aim, Turkey has sided with and became the founding member of the Western organizations established after the Second World War on the basis of democratic ideals and respect for human rights and principles.⁵²²

This approach that linked Turkey's place in the Western community to being a member of the Western institutions was also prominent in Evren's articulations on the EEC.⁵²³

⁵¹⁹ Ibid., 396.

⁵²⁰ Cited in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kasım 1986-9 Kasım 1987)*, 91.

⁵²¹ Ibid., 102.

⁵²² Cited in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kasım 1987-9 Kasım 1988)*, 396.

⁵²³ Accordingly Evren stated: "Turkey's NATO membership represents an important dimension of the present relations with the Western community, with which we share common values, and of which we are a part...Turkey aims at accomplishing her goal of taking a part in European organizations besides NATO" (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kasım 1987-9 Kasım 1988)*, 415).

According to this perspective, Turkey's EEC membership could not be reduced to economics but it involved the modernist goal of integrating the Western cultural values into the suburban sites, thereby Westernizing the whole society.⁵²⁴ This process was considered to be dependent on being a member of the EEC, the existence of which was also seen impossible without Turkey.⁵²⁵ On the other hand, Europeanness was not exclusively conditioned to Turkey's involvement in the EC, but on Turkey's already existing identity. The following remark of Evren is illustrative of this approach:

Indeed Turkey belongs to the European continent Let us assume that the EEC does not accept our full membership. Turkey will still maintain her existence. The existence of a country does not depend upon being included in the EEC. We see ourselves as already in Europe and believe that many of our allies also accept us as European For example, Austria, Yugoslavia, Norway, and Finland are not in the EEC but continue their existence.⁵²⁶

In considering the European-orientation as an extension of Turkey's Western identity established by Atatürk, Evren not only constructed a domestic base for the Turkish foreign policy, but also reconstituted the Kemalist foreign policy on a primarily Westernist basis by defining Kemalism in terms of this Westernist goal. To confirm Turkey's Westernness, special emphasis was given on Turkey's secular and democratic identity, while the EEC goal was also legitimized by recourse to the elements of democracy, national unity, and even national existence. In this sense, holding on to the European vocation also had the goal of preserving the national survival by uniting the society around the European and the Kemalist principles of democracy and secularism.

⁵²⁴ Ibid., 396.

⁵²⁵ Asked by a journalist what would Turkey's route be if the EC gave a negative response to Turkey's application, Evren said: "We cannot think of a Europe without Turkey" (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kasım 1987-9 Kasım 1988)*, 405).

⁵²⁶ Ibid., 28

4.2.3.4. The 'West' infringing upon Turkey's sovereignty and her European vocation: Westernist foreign policy under the 'sword of Damocles'

Those who have attempted to strain Turkey are not yet finished. They are still in a struggle to divide Turkey, and kick her out from where she belongs.

—Kenan Evren, 1984

As the statement quoted above illustrates, the President Evren's later discourse continued to be preoccupied with the division and the dismemberment plans of the outside forces, with an emphasis on the country's sovereignty and unity. This, however, did not fit comfortably within the foreign policy discourse that cherished the Western-orientation for serving the mutual security interests. This was because considering the 'Western allies' as having an agenda to dismember Turkey from her European vocation took the West more as an enemy than a partner. Yet, this discourse did not parallel an anti-Western-orientation either, as this would delegitimize the Western-oriented foreign policy seen as an extension of the Westernizing reforms of Atatürk. Rather, it involved the second dimension of the Westernist discourse that saw the Western-orientation as of domestic origin. Hence, this approach viewed the West with suspicion, as the West, in not being enthusiastic about Turkey's EEC application, blocked Turkey's primary goal of being a fully Western and democratic country. In this sense, for Evren, the EC's critical reports on Turkey's level of democracy and references to the problems of the previous enlargements implied less a concern for Turkey's development for an eventual membership in the EEC than the important fact that found its expression in the following statement:

West thinks of us as if we were the Turkey of 100 years ago, be sure of this. Their treatment is rooted in this fact [The West] does its best in order not to welcome us in the EEC. Look at the excuses they put forward: 'We took Greece, this was problematic. We could not even digest Spain and Portugal yet. If you also join, this will be backbreaking.' It is somehow not problematic to incorporate others, but is only while incorporating Turkey. There must be other objectives behind this. We have been trying to be a member for years, but there always is

always an obstacle We are either a European country, or not. We should make them say it!⁵²⁷

In voicing the dissatisfaction with the EC's procrastination of opening the negotiations for Turkey's membership, Evren's statement pointed to the insincerity on the part of the West and the clandestine efforts not to welcome Turkey in the European project.⁵²⁸ For Evren, as underlined in the statement quoted above, this 'implied' discrimination was rooted in the oriental (and therefore non-European) image ascribed to Turkey which traced back to 100 years. Evren's statement further illustrates how the Europeanness was linked directly to being a part of the European organizations: If Turkey was not welcome in the EEC, this connoted the outright rejection of Turkey's Europeanness, which had been seen as the primary goal since the Atatürk's era.

However, the digestion capacity of the EEC was not the only issue which was not conducive to Turkey's immediate membership. Another area of contention involved the dissatisfaction on the part of Western Europe with the level of democratization and human rights in Turkey.⁵²⁹ While from the EC's perspective, the establishment of efficient democratic institutions was a prerequisite to the inclusion of a country, for Evren, democracy and human rights belonged to the domain of 'domestic politics'. From the latter perspective, Turkey had already chosen democracy and Westernization following Atatürk's reforms, and had done so without interference by any other state but by her own will. In this sense, the EC's concern with the level of democracy and human rights in Turkey could only imply an infringement on Turkey's sovereignty, for it also involved the matters that lacked any direct

⁵²⁷ Cited in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kasım 1986-9 Kasım 1987)*, 291.

⁵²⁸ By the same token, Evren declared the following: "Turkey can be a member of NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, but when it comes to the EEC, Turkey should not be included. This is unacceptable. There is certainly a religious discrimination behind this. Because they are Christians before anything and we are Muslims. This is the all issue" (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kasım 1987-9 Kasım 1988)*, 272).

⁵²⁹ Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 105.

bearing on Turkey's democratic consolidation.⁵³⁰ The following remarks are illustrative in this respect:

Look what they invented now: If we do not sit at the table with Armenia, if we can't bring our problems with Greece to the International Court of Justice, and if we do not recognize Kurds' rights, we will not be considered as a democratic country. See what they link to the condition of democracy? Their aim is not to incorporate us [in the EEC].⁵³¹

The Cyprus issue, from this perspective, was one of the 'domestic issues' the EEC was unjustly employing in order to distance Turkey from her membership goal. At another public speech he delivered, Evren said the following: "They are trying to make us disincline from our European vocation by demanding that we remove our military forces from Cyprus...See how they are interfering in our domestic affairs?"⁵³² And he added:

They should not swing the Armenian issue, the Kurdish issue, or whatever issue above our head like the sword of Damocles...Turkey is European, and is in Europe. Because it is a European country, it is a part of the EEC. They should know this.⁵³³

As the above-quoted statements indicate, although Evren's discourse othered the West by defining it in these terms, it did not view the Cyprus policy as a policy against the West, neither did it represent it as an extension of the Westernist policy that was based upon accomplishing the last chain of Atatürk's reforms. The Cyprus issue was rather taken as an extension of the 'peace at home, peace in the world' maxim in which the principles of equity, sovereignty, reciprocity, and non-interference by other countries found more emphasis than the Westernist project. In articulating the Cyprus issue as the sword of Damocles, Evren also attributed a tragic meaning to the precarious situation of being rejected as a member of the EEC, which denoted the rejection of Turkey's Europeanness as though the Cyprus issue could trigger the eminent threat of 'being kicked out from where Turkey belonged' at any time. In

⁵³⁰ The criticisms as to why Turkey did not have communist parties was also met by a similar reaction by Evren, for whom this was not yet appropriate for Turkey's present political structuring. Turkey, for Evren, would have communist parties when the time was suitable. Viewing this comment as interference in domestic affairs, he said: "They are attempting to found a communist party in Turkey" (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (9 Kasım 1986-9 Kasım 1987)*, 270).

⁵³¹ Ibid., 292.

⁵³² Ibid., 269.

⁵³³ Ibid., 273.

this sense, Evren's discourse can be argued to have taken a Westernist line not *for* the West, but *despite* it.

Hence, as opposed to the MP's approach that saw Turkey's Cyprus policy as a burden for the Turkish economic development and against the integration plea of Turkey in the long term, Evren took a defensive approach in Cyprus, suggesting that this burden was rather *imposed* upon Turkey by virtue of being linked as a condition for Turkey's membership in the EEC. And more would be included within the list of conditions as the discrimination against Turkey's Europeanness continued. In this sense, as Turkey's Europeanness was not dependent upon the sword but her internalization of Atatürk's reforms and membership in many other European organizations, Turkey would not give up the seat of Dionysius but only suggest that this unjust 'threatening' be removed.

Conclusion

As the discussion above showed, the 1980's foreign policy discourse was more consensual than that of the 1960's and 1970's in the sense that it did not involve poles-apart Kemalist narratives that suggested competing policy orientations for Turkey. 'Peace at home, peace in the world' continued to be the main template upon which the foreign policy was based. While new foreign policy initiatives were also made in this period, such as strengthening the relations with the Islamic states, playing a bridge role between the Western and the Islamic world, and recognizing the independence of the TRNC for her future integration with the Greek side as a federal state, they were consensually coined with the 'peace at home, peace in the world' principle. Similarly, pursuing an active cooperation with the Muslim countries within the context of the OIC was not presented as a deviation from the Western-orientation but on the contrary, as a complementary goal to further integration with the West, legitimized through the principles of 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization' and realizing 'peace at home, peace in the world'.

By the same token, 'restoring democracy' and 'national sovereignty' were the other consensually propagated elements of Kemalism during the 1980s. These were prominent in both the legitimizations given for the coup as well as the transition to the civilian era after 1983. We have seen that the domestic role attributed to Kemalism (uniting the country) also helped defining the role Kemalism would play in Turkish foreign policy. Kemalism was constructed both as a tool against the dismembering plans of foreign powers (both the domestic and international supporters of 'foreign ideologies' and some countries in the West and the Soviet Union) and as a proof that Turkey was already Western as Kemalist civilizationism meant Western civilizationism. While the first template was used to legitimize Turkey's reactions against the West's non-interference in her domestic affairs, the latter was employed to legitimize Turkey's Western-orientation even during a time when new initiatives were made to diversify the Turkish foreign policy.

However, our analysis showed that the apparent consensus in the 1980s was in fact composed of two diverse narratives, one undertaking a defensive approach to the elements of Kemalism and emphasizing the grave security threats, and the other propagating an economic rationalism that elevated the role of keeping economic development intact. While the defensive approach of Evren focused on the non-submissive identity of Turkey in relation to the West, Özal's discourse emphasized the importance of developing economic cooperation with both the East and the West for the resolution of conflicts.

These constructions of Kemalism were reverberated in approaches to the Cyprus issue. The former attached a 'national cause' status to the Cyprus issue and represented the interferences of the West as what complicated the issue further, let alone driving Turkey away from her goal of being a member of the Western community. To the latter, a non-conciliatory and the *status-quo* approach to Cyprus was against the essence of the Kemalist foreign policy

because it disrupted the 'national interest' in the long term via being a burden for Turkey's national economy and an obstacle to her eventual membership in the EEC.

This analysis showed that it was a specific interpretation of Kemalism that integrated the Cyprus policy within Turkey's Western-orientation. As the last chapter showed, this involved drawing an indirect link between these policies by legitimizing both in terms of the elements attributed to the principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world' or 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization'. The policy makers in the 1980s employed both of these discursive moves. Both Turkey's Cyprus policy and the Western-orientation were depicted as a tangible example of the 'peace at home, peace in the world' principle. Second, the Western-orientation and especially Turkey's integration with the EEC was considered as a direct consequence of embracing the Atatürk's reforms which served to attribute it an 'indispensable' role. Having an already domestic legitimation, the Western-orientation was propagated regardless of whether the EC pressed demands on certain 'sensitive' issues such as Cyprus, or whether there was a perceived rejection by the West as stated in the speeches.

The discussion revealed that an additional discursive move draws a direct link between these policies in showing how Cyprus policy could help Turkey realize the goal of becoming a part of the West or deviate from it. Evren's discourse made this link in arguing that the West's failure to support Turkey with regard to the Cyprus issue drew Turkey away from her European vocation and damaged her alliance links. Özal's discourse also made a similar move in highlighting that a more conciliatory approach toward Cyprus was necessary to secure Turkey's future EEC membership. Indeed, the fact that a change in Turkey's policy regarding the Cyprus issue turned into an indirect condition for Turkey's future EEC membership played a role in making a direct link between the two policies by recourse to Kemalism. Nevertheless, this situation did not lead to a unified foreign policy, but rather involved different constructions of how Cyprus policy and Western-orientation were linked to each

other. While the Cyprus issue was reconciled with Turkey's Western orientation in both constructions, these approaches linked them separately as they diverged in the way they defined Kemalism as well as the 'West' and the Cyprus cause.

The template both approaches depended upon also limited their policy articulations. Evren's recourse to the 'national cause' in relation to Turkey's Cyprus policy did not propose a supplementary policy to her Western-orientation, neither did it suggest that the Cyprus bid be played as a card against the West thanks to the link made between the Western-orientation and pursuing the integrationist path drawn by Atatürk. Similarly, Özal's suggestion that the Cyprus cause be removed from the number one priority of Turkish foreign policy and that Turkey should be prepared to give concessions on her Cyprus policy to be an EEC member did not materialize into a component of the official discourse thanks to the dominance of the principles of 'non-interference in domestic affairs' and 'reciprocity' in the official discourse. This initiative was not officially represented at the governmental level and was delegitimized by an alternative construction by the President Evren.

Up to here we have discussed how competing Kemalisms were constructed from the perspective of the military establishment and the parties that took part in the government and how this made the contention that Kemalism produces a certain foreign policy output, rationality, and identity rather problematic. Yet, we have seen that despite the divergence in their political stands, actors of the Turkish official discourse oscillated between the defensive and integrationist positions while keeping their political identity intact. The task ahead is therefore to analyze the foreign policy discourse in these lines, regardless of the political affiliations of the parties involved in the decision making process. Indeed, Turkey's exclusion from the next round of EU enlargement in 1997, and the acknowledgement of Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999 provide an important context to analyze how the defensive and the

integrationist approaches to Kemalism structured the foreign policy discourse and how it was reconstituted by them in turn.

CHAPTER V: KEMALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY (1997-2007): AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE

Introduction

The analysis of the foreign policy discourse in 1960-1979 and 1980-1989 showed that Turkey's Western-orientation was taken by the political actors both as an extension of Turkey's civilizational project and a part of Turkey's role in the Western alliance versus the Eastern bloc. We have seen how the elements attached to Kemalism, Atatürk's reforms, and following Atatürk's path structured the pro-Western policy as well as the policy pursued towards the Cyprus issue and the variations in linking these policies. While similar elements were also used to propagate an anti-Western foreign policy and suggest a deviation from the official policy towards Cyprus, both policies were consensually linked to Turkey's role in the Western Alliance, which was limited to her membership in NATO and the relations pursued with the EEC. Nevertheless, together with the end of the Cold War and after Turkey's application for full membership to the EEC, the ideological value attached to NATO and defending the Westernist values versus the spread of communism gradually diminished, leaving the EEC and the EU (as of 1991) as 'the' symbol of the civilizationalist project besides the interest-based arguments made to legitimize the application. The articulations on the Cyprus issue were concomitantly detached from references to Turkey's role in NATO and linked exceptionally to Turkey's 'European vocation' as Turkey's position towards the issue constituted one of the barriers to her future membership in the EU, notwithstanding the official declarations that the resolution of the Cyprus issue should not be linked to Turkey's EU membership.

As Turkey's 'EU vocation' turned into less a long term objective of being a part of the European organizations than an immediate restructuring that involved a swift and comprehensive reform plan ranging from harmonizing the legal structure with that of the EU,

developing a competitive and functional economy, establishing democratic and pluralistic governance to establishing good neighborly relations with the surrounding countries and resolving the Cyprus issue, the previous enthusiasm attached to it began to diminish which was more apparent in the defensive discourse that elevated the role of the elements of ‘sovereignty’, ‘indivisibility’, ‘reciprocity’, and ‘non-interference in domestic and foreign affairs’. The pooling of sovereignty both in domestic and foreign policy terms was not something that could easily be fit into the oft-propagated discourse that linked ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’ and ‘realizing peace at home, peace in the world’ to adhering the principles of ‘sovereignty’, ‘reciprocity’ and ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’. Added to this was also the rejection of Turkey’s EU candidacy at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, which, to Turkey’s surprise, acknowledged the candidacy status of the RoC and that of the Central and Eastern European countries that had just made their transition to Western democracy. Moreover, the fact that the EU was willing to admit the RoC as a full member without any conditions regarding the resolution of the conflict left those that upheld the defensive position with no ‘element’ at their disposal to legitimize Turkey’s EU goal or undertake the necessary reforms to be a part of the EU but many elements to delegitimize it. While the defensive discourse had regarded the membership in the EEC as the last chain of Atatürk’s civilizational goal during the Cold War era, after the 1990s it began to identify the EU as an intervening force in the domestic affairs of Turkey and as a threat to the unity and integrity of the country as Turkey needed to do more than not only the Central and Eastern European countries but also what she was doing during the Cold War to have her European status acknowledged.⁵³⁴ This led to the questioning of the extent to which the present EU represented the ‘contemporary civilization’. In this regard, rather than delegitimizing

⁵³⁴ E. Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, “Helsinki, Copenhagen and beyond,” in *Turkey and European Integration*, ed. Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 182.

Atatürk's civilizational goal, the defensive approach delegitimized the hitherto ascribed address of the 'contemporary civilization'.

During the 1990s and the early 2000s this defensive approach was mainly represented by the military top brass, the president, higher echelons of bureaucracy and the judiciary, some of the main figures of the intelligentsia, some of the political parties such as the RPP, and the coalitional government of the Democratic Left Party (DLP), NAP, and the MP, headed by, respectively, Bülent Ecevit, Devlet Bahçeli and Mesut Yılmaz. The two dominant parties of the coalition, the DLP and the NAP represented a heavily nationalistic outlook, resisting the sensitive reforms such as the abolishment of the death penalty and the extension of cultural rights to minority groups.⁵³⁵ While the MP appeared to be more supportive of the necessary EU-related reforms, and it was during the era of this coalition when the National Program for accession into the EU was prepared and some of the sensitive EU reforms were undertaken, the general discourse turned radical and even more defensive and at times offensive, especially with regard to the new policy orientations for Turkey and a new policy for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. The new official position on Cyprus hence involved supporting the confederation thesis of Denktaş, the President of the TRNC, and further integration with the TRNC to counter the accession prospects of the RoC to the EU.

With the EC's acknowledgement of Turkey's candidacy status in the EU's Helsinki Summit of 1999, multiculturalism, liberalism, democratization, and pluralism, the elements which were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s, though under the shadow of the defensive approach to 'sovereignty', 'national unity and integrity', and 'non-interference in domestic and foreign affairs', began to be more dominant as the liberal think tanks and civil grass-roots organizations mounted their support for the EU membership.⁵³⁶ Another important

⁵³⁵ Ibid., 183.

⁵³⁶ For the increasing pressures from the civil society for Turkey's EU membership in late 1990s, see especially Ziya Öniş, "Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era," in *Turkey and the European Union: Domestic*

development in this regard has been the change in the discourse of the once Euro-skeptic and pro-Islamist NSP and its successors. As the Welfare Party (WP), which replaced the NSP after the military coup of 1980, began to take a pro-EU stand in late 1990s and argued for a more liberal perspective in human rights, democracy and secularism, the rupture between the defensive approach and the integrationist one, which was blurred before the 1990s, began to expand, constituting two basic discourses, one viewing the democratization as dependent on Turkey's specific context, and the other conditioning it to further integration with the EU.

Indeed, the military memorandum of February 1997 (which started the so-called February 28 process of secularization) was also remarkable in this change. In the aftermath of the dissolution of the WP government and then the disbanding of the WP by the orders of the Constitutional Court, new parties were founded by the previous members of the WP, mainly the Virtue Party (VP), and the Felicity Party (FP) and the Justice and Development Party (JDP) that were established after the disbanding of the VP by the orders of the Constitutional Court. However, the Islamist view's traditional linking of civilization to Islam began to be replaced by a conservative liberal view which linked modernization and the civilizational project directly to the membership in the EU.

After the 2002 elections during which none of the parties in the previous coalition could obtain seats in the parliament, the JDP emerged as the only party that that was vigorous in its commitment to the EU-related reforms, despite its pro-Islamic roots.⁵³⁷ The JDP, willing to receive a date for Turkey's accession negotiations, not only pushed for the necessary EU reforms⁵³⁸, but also employed a more integrationist discourse in the area of foreign policy, although this did not prevent it from also employing the defensive discourse. With regard to

Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics, ed. Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (London, Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2003), 9-35.

⁵³⁷ Ibid., 183.

⁵³⁸ On the domestic reforms that took place in the last decade, see, especially, Ziya Öniş, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era," *Turkish Studies* 4, 1 (Spring 2003): 9-34; Meltem Müftüler Baç, "Turkey's political reforms and the impact of the European Union," *South European Politics & Society* 10, 1 (April 2005):16-30.

the Cyprus issue as well, the JDP displayed a departure from the defensive approach of the 1990s. Beginning from 2002, the Turkish government began to take more active and constructive steps in pressing for a solution in Cyprus; resigned from supporting the confederalist approach for Cyprus; and backed the Annan Plan for the creation of a United Cyprus Republic.

The aim of this chapter is to examine how the elements of Kemalism structured this divide, how Turkey's European-orientation and Cyprus policy have been situated within this debate, and last but not the least, how the role of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy was reconstituted during what is called as the 'post-Kemalist' era. It will be seen that contrary to the argument that the post-Cold War Turkish policy context is an era of 'challenges to the Kemalist hegemony' and the 'dissolution of the Kemalist ideology', the discourse during this period was not exempt from the elements of the Kemalist ideology. Rather, the main objectives attached to accomplishing Atatürk's path structured the foreign policy articulations of the policy makers in relation to Turkey's European vocation and the Cyprus policy. In this aim, we will first review the elements employed by the defensive discourse, how the policy makers and the military establishment responded to the above-mentioned key events of the Luxembourg and Helsinki Summits and then turn to discuss the main elements employed by the integrationist discourse. While this divide was at times blurred as the representatives of each approach had recourse to the elements propagated by the other, the distinction provides a good analytical tool to view how competing notions of the elements of Kemalism were present in the Turkish foreign policy discourse regarding the Cyprus issue and Turkey's EU vocation regardless of the political stand of the parties involved in the decision making process.

5.1. The defensive approach

As the first chapter introduced and the third and fourth chapters revealed, at the core of the defensive approach is the emphasis on ‘sovereignty’, ‘national unity and integrity’, ‘non-interference in the domestic and foreign affairs’, ‘full-independence’, and ‘defending democracy by removing the extremist views’. What gives the defensive characteristic to this approach, however, is not the recourse to these elements of Kemalism, but rather a defensive interpretation of them which conveys a national-security-state-based conceptualization of the political sphere.

In 1997-2007, there were different articulations on what kind of foreign policy would defend and secure the elements that were propagated from this perspective. For some, the EU was as a European organization, which Turkey had a *right* to join but discriminated for other (security, political, and religious) reasons. For others, it was not only an untrustworthy and insincere institution, but also a threat to the sovereignty of the nation-state. While on this basis, some have argued that a new foreign policy orientation was necessary, for others, Western-oriented foreign policy was regarded as the best security-belt that would prevent Turkey from becoming a fundamentalist country like Iran.

Notwithstanding the variations as to the policy to be pursued in relation to the EU, the defensive approach represented an outright reservation towards the EU conditionalities. In seeing the sovereignty not only from a territorial perspective but also as the capacity for the formulation and the implementation of foreign policy, this discourse thereby rejected the intervention of the EU to what was seen as the ‘domestic affairs’ of Turkey and its claims regarding Turkey’s role in the Cyprus issue. From this perspective, Turkey’s Cyprus policy was a policy that needed to be ‘respected’, given Turkey’s legal and, for some, historical rights. What follows is how the main elements of Kemalism were employed in the foreign policy articulations that drew on this approach.

5.1.1. 'National struggle against the Customs Union' vs. 'national struggle against Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Westernism'

As the 'threat of communism' dropped from the political repertoire with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Islamism emerged as the only 'extremist view' to be purged from the political sphere in order to ensure the 'national integrity', 'national unity' and 'peace at home'. The WP, which was established in 1983 to replace the NSP that had been dissolved with the military coup of 1980, was not at the core of the political debates during the 1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, the municipal elections of 1994 and the general elections of 1995, during which the WP received more votes than expected, brought in the political agenda the threat of Islamism on the one hand, and secularism and Westernism to counter it, on the other.⁵³⁹ While the WP employed a pro-Islamist and anti-Westernist discourse in the start, the military establishment and some political parties linked secularism to a Western-oriented foreign policy. This has produced two variations of the defensive approach, one employed by the Islamist WP against the West, and the other by the secularist and Westernist reactions to it.

Perpetuating the NSP's emphasis on Islamism and anti-Westernism, Erbakan, the Head of the new WP defined the Customs Union as the enslavement of Turkey by the EU: "We will not recognize this paper rag when we come to power in eleven days. Just as we began the Independence War by tearing apart the Sevres Treaty, we will also tear this apart."⁵⁴⁰ Defining the EU as a "Christian Club", that sought to divide and disintegrate Turkey, Erbakan suggested that Turkey should establish a Common Market with the Muslim countries instead.⁵⁴¹ In this regard, the WP drew on the defensive approach in the way it employed the elements of 'full-independence', 'national unity and integrity' against imperialism and in that it equated the Customs Union with the Sevres Treaty against which

⁵³⁹ Süleyman Kocabaş, *Refahyol Hükümetinin Sonunun Perde Arkası* (İstanbul: Vatan Yayınları, 1997), 42-45.

⁵⁴⁰ *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 14 December 1995; cited in Kocabaş, 51.

⁵⁴¹ Erbakan, *Türkiye'nin Temel Meseleleri*, ed. Hasan H. Ceylan (Ankara: Rehber, 1993), 200.

the Turkish Independence War was cast, conveying the image of the ‘National Struggle’ in the 1920s.

On the other end of the defensive approach was the emphasis on secularism and Westernism which again built on the same element of ‘national unity and integrity’. From this perspective, Islamism would not only pose a threat to the secularism of the Republic but also the national unity and integrity of Turkey by diverting her from the Western-orientation (represented as the ‘core’ of the civilization) towards the orbit of the Islamist countries (presented as the symbol of ‘darkness’). In this vein, Tansu Çiller, the Head of the True Path Party (TPP), which presented itself as the successor of the DP of 1950s and the JP of the 1960s and 1970s, stated that they would not enter into a coalition with the WP as it was Islamist, and as it attempted to block the path opened by Atatürk.⁵⁴² Referring to Erbakan’s objections to the Customs Union Agreement with the EU, Çiller stated the following: “Customs Union is a start, we have to enter this door. This cannot be accomplished with the Welfare Party and the most unfortunate would take place. That is why I will not make a coalition with the Welfare Party.”⁵⁴³ After Erbakan began to approach Mesut Yılmaz for a coalitional government, Çiller warned Yılmaz with the following remarks: “We are the guarantors of the regime against those who endanger the country for their sheer personal ambitions. O, Mesut Yılmaz, do not bury the country to the darkness for the sake of a seat.”⁵⁴⁴ “Do not sell secularism.”⁵⁴⁵

5.1.2. Secularism as a foreign policy principle: countering further integration with the Muslim countries

Despite Çiller’s resistance to side with the WP, the ‘most unfortunate’ took place with the cooperation of the TPP with the WP and the emergence of Erbakan as the prime minister.

⁵⁴² *Sabah*, 15 December 1995; cited in Kocabaş, 46.

⁵⁴³ *Milliyet*, 5 December 1995; cited in Kocabaş, 46.

⁵⁴⁴ *Sabah*, 20 February 1996; cited in Kocabaş, 49

⁵⁴⁵ *Yeni Şafak*, 28 February 1996; cited in Kocabaş, 49.

While no initiatives were made to withdraw from the Customs Union Agreement during this coalition period, the new government embarked on its plan to seek further integration with the Muslim countries in the East. In this aim, Erbakan visited Iran, Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia as part of his ‘Eastern Trip’, which was unwelcome by the U.S., as stated by Edward Burns, the then U.S. Secretary of Foreign Affairs: “We have warned Turkey to be distant from Iran. Continuing the relations as if nothing had happened is not an appropriate way of conducting affairs.”⁵⁴⁶ While similar reactions were also given in relation to Erbakan’s Libya visit, another danger discourse involved whether the WP was initiating a development like the one that took place in Afghanistan with the Taliban movement. In this vein, the Chief of the General Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı stated, “We have to draw important lessons from the Afghanistan example. This is not a time to stop or wait.”⁵⁴⁷

In the early 1990s prior to the Luxembourg Summit of the EU in 1997, the political discourse in Turkey was thereby mainly centered on questioning/defending the extent to which the WP, and the WP-TPP coalition was secularist and Kemalist and whether it attempted to dismember Turkey from her Western-oriented course. On the one hand Erbakan stated that they were the guardians of the ‘real’ secularism and would not let Turkey be like Iran,⁵⁴⁸ and that “Atatürk would be a member of the WP were he alive today,”⁵⁴⁹ which served to counter the overtly proclaimed anti-Kemalist and pro-Sheria speeches delivered by some members of the WP.⁵⁵⁰ On the other hand, Çiller further reassured that it was ‘insane’ to compare Turkey to Afghanistan and that they were the gurantors of secularism and Atatürk’s

⁵⁴⁶ *Zaman*, 10 August 1996; cited in Kocabaş, 61.

⁵⁴⁷ *Sabah*, 2 October 1996; cited in Kocabaş, 71.

⁵⁴⁸ *Sabah*, 14 October 1996; cited in Kocabaş, 77.

⁵⁴⁹ *Refah Partisi ve Gerçekler*, RP Yayınları, 40-41; cited in Fehmi Çalmuk, *Bir Erbakan Hikayesi: Selamün Aleyküm Komutanım* (Ankara: Kim Yayınları, 2000), 103.

⁵⁵⁰ In the report submitted to the Constitutional Court by the public prosecutor Vural Savaş, it was documented that an MP from the WP publicly stated the following in 1994: “We will definitely call those to account who turn their faces away from the Quran order and not recognize the authority and power of Allah in our country” (Savaş 1997, 19-20). Another MP from the party also delivered a speech that the enemy of the party was Kemalists (Savaş 1997, 21-22).

path.⁵⁵¹ To also reassure that the visits made to the Muslim countries did not signal a deviation from the West, Erbakan argued that they sought rapprochement with the East without distancing Turkey from the West:⁵⁵²

Our initiative is not against the West. We can serve as a bridge between those who reject the West and some countries in the Muslim countries which the West rejects. We are struggling to make Turkey great once again. We will take a respected place in the world in this way.⁵⁵³

Despite this struggle to claim legitimacy by recourse to the oft-propagated elements of ‘Westernism’, ‘making Turkey gain a respected place within the world’, ‘defending secularism and the Republican order’, the WP’s ‘suspicious’ visits to a number of Islamic countries,⁵⁵⁴ allowing the female bureaucrats to wear headscarves in the office, using the PKK’s colors in one of the party logos,⁵⁵⁵ and the speeches delivered by some members of the party triggered, what came to be known as, the ‘February 28 process’ in Turkey. The General of the Sea Forces underlined the major concerns of the army as follows: “We will not give up on the secular and democratic characteristics of the Turkish Republic inherited to us by Atatürk. Facing such a threat, we must be vigilant and look for the guidance of only Atatürk’s principles.”⁵⁵⁶ Soon after, on February 28, 1997, the NSC announced its adoption of the 18 measures designed to stem the perceived growth of Islamism in Turkey, declaring the Islamic fundamentalism as the most serious threat to the Republic, and obliging the Prime Minister Erbakan to sign the recommendations which in due course led to his resignation and the fall of the WP-TPP coalitional government. The event was cherished by Ecevit, who became the prime minister following the 1999 elections, as an awakening after the nightmare, the

⁵⁵¹ *Sabah*, 2 October 1996; cited in Kocabaş, 71.

⁵⁵² *Zaman*, 10 August 1996; cited in Kocabaş, 61.

⁵⁵³ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁵⁴ Erbakan’s visit to Kaddafi in Libya created a big tension when it was combined with a visit to Iran. After a negative comment on this visit was made by the Foreign Affairs Speaker of the U.S, Nicholas Burns that the visit was inappropriate. See *Hürriyet*, 7 August 1996, cited in Çalmuk, 220.

⁵⁵⁵ Before the WP took part in the coalition government in 1994, the Head of the Democratic Left Party Bülent Ecevit argued: “We now have a photograph of a Welfare Party poster. In this photograph, the colors of the Kurdistan flag are added on the left corner of the party logo...This is a shameful situation for our state” (Çalmuk 2000, 134).

⁵⁵⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 1 October 1996; cited in Çalmuk, 218.

strengthening of the secular and the democratic republican order, and an inevitable attempt to follow Atatürk's enlightenment path, which was defined as "following science as the highest value".⁵⁵⁷ Soon after Erbakan's resignation, the political activities of the WP were banned by the orders of the Constitutional Court for having attempting to forge an Islamic-based state and dividing the national unity.⁵⁵⁸ In the accusation report Savaş presented to the Constitutional Court he argued the following:

Democracy primarily depends on secularism. Real democracies are those that are secular because two basic tenets of democracy are freedom and equality. The realization of these two is possible only in secular societies where there is no religious enforcement...At the center of Atatürk's revolutions is the principle of secularism which forms the foundation stone of [Atatürk's] revolutions. To put it differently, any compensation to be given from secularism may result in deviating from the orbit of Atatürk's revolutions.⁵⁵⁹

As seen in the above-quoted remark, the 1990s defensive discourse elevated the principle of secularism to be a security-belt for a genuinely democratic state, since a state that was not secular would not be able to uphold the basic tenets of democracy — freedom and equality. This reconstituted the 'democracy' that was upheld mainly by the military establishment in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s in legitimizing the moves that ranged from initiating a military coup to giving military memorandums. In that it placed secularism at the core of Kemalism, as the symbol of national unity and integrity and as a security-belt for the future democracy not only reconstituted democracy as 'a goal to be attained in the future', but also linked the defense of democracy and the principle of secularism to the objectives of Atatürk's revolutions. Based on this approach, any deviation from this conceptualization of secularism would inevitably constitute a divergence from the goal of 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization', 'taking a respected place among the world nations' and 'obtaining

⁵⁵⁷ Ecevit, "Bülent Ecevit'in 28 Kasım 1999 günü Ankara'da DSP'nin 14. Yıldönümü kutlama töreninde yaptığı konuşma," Demokratik Sol Parti, <<http://www.dsp.org.tr/MEP/index.aspx?pageId=4>> (accessed February 11, 2008).

⁵⁵⁸ See Savaş, 32. For the detailed description of the recommendations and the measures taken following the NSC document which then led to the resignation of the WP, see Niyazi Günay, "Implementing the February 28 Recommendations: A Scorecard," Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), *Research Notes* 10 (May 2001),

<<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/junior/note10.htm>> (accessed January 13, 2007).

⁵⁵⁹ Savaş, 14-15.

freedom and peace at the societal level'. While the WP's rapprochement with the non-secular states was represented as a deviation not only from secularism but also the Western-orientation as the secular states were those that were Western, establishing a democratic and secular state was presented as the basis of the Turkish foreign policy. In this sense, the principle of secularism served as an indirect condition for also pursuing the main goals of Turkish the foreign policy.⁵⁶⁰

Hence, the defensive discourse focused on associating the threats to the secularism principle with the threats to the peace and development of the country. This security-centered definition of secularism came to the fore again in the discourse of Deniz Baykal, the Head of the RPP, with the 2002 elections, during which the JDP obtained the majority of votes, while the RPP represented the only opposition in the parliament. For the RPP, the pro-Islamic roots of the JDP and its divergence from the security-centered discourse constituted the main reason as to why the principle of secularism needed to be defended more than ever. Ironically, however, the JDP did not present itself as a successor of the 'national view' but as a center-rightist conservative party with an underlying commitment to secularism and the goal of EU membership.⁵⁶¹ The Deputy Head of the JDP and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül made this break clear with his statement: "We have changed. We used to be more radical. We used to talk in favor of an Islamic state."⁵⁶²

⁵⁶⁰ Indeed, İsmail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the coalitional period between 1997-2002 also considered the principle of secularism as one of the basic characteristics of the state which defined the foreign policy vision of Turkey. Yet, he did not focus on the threats to this principle in reference to the threats to Turkey. Redefining the principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world' as the 'global view' Turkey had to take in the 21st century, he described this view as the "expression of the domestic characteristics of the Turkish state, mainly, being secular, democratic and governed by the rule of law (*Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem: Haziran 1997-Nisan 1999, Konuşmalar, Demeçler, Açıklamalar* 1999, 3).

⁵⁶¹ Consider Erdoğan's following statement: "We are not a religion-centered party." See Erdoğan, "Erdoğan-Pearson Görüşmesi, Erdoğan: 'İsteğimiz Kıbrıs konusunun adil, barışçı ve kalıcı bir çözüme kavuşturulmasıdır.' Dedi," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, November 7, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008). Erdoğan also said, "We are not a continuation of any party, we are the Justice and Development Party." See Erdoğan, "Hiç bir Partinin devamı değiliz. Biz AK Parti'yiz. Bu Böyle Bilinmeli," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, May 4, 2003, availabl from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁵⁶² "İslam Devletinden laik devlet anlayışına" [From the Islamic state to the concept of secular state], *Milliyet*, 24 December 2004.

Despite the reassurances given by the JDP that it was the guardian of the secular order, Atatürk's revolutions and that the party did not pursue a religion-centered policy, the secularist discourse of the JDP, for the RPP, could be only hypocrisy. From this perspective, the JDP was an obstructionist under the cover of a secularist.⁵⁶³ Similarly, the pluralist discourse of the JDP with regard to nationalism instigated separatism. This reconstituted the element of 'purging the extremist views that incite separatism'. Referring to Erdoğan's emphasis on sharing the supra-identity of Turkish citizenship, Baykal argued, "If you put all ethnicities under the pot of Turkish citizenship, including the Turkish under it alongside the rest, then you ignore the indivisibility of the Turkish nation. Is Turkey a confederation of sub-identities?"⁵⁶⁴

Therefore, given the continuation of the potential threats for Turkey, it was impossible to redefine the principles of secularism and nationalism from a pluralist perspective, which had no regard for the threats against the unity and integrity of the state. Moreover, for the RPP, the JDP's representation of its proposed presidential candidate, Gül, as a 'religious president', was against not only the principle of secularism but also the integrity and the indivisibility of the state. In this vein, Baykal made the following remark: "[If the definition of the president is made in this way]..., if this is not separatism, if this is not to damage the republican order, if this is not to place mines on the peace of society, what is it?"⁵⁶⁵ Hence, it was only logical that the 'real' Kemalist party was the RPP, as Kemalism could be defined only from the perspective Atatürk outlined.⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶³ Deniz Baykal, "Baykal'ın Grup Konuşması," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, April 25, 2006, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁵⁶⁴ Baykal, "72 Millet Bir Bizde. Kimse Kimseden Daha Üstün, Kimse Kimseden Daha Aşağıda Değil," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, December 13, 2005, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁵⁶⁵ Baykal, "18 Nisan 2007 Tarihli Grup Konuşması," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, April 18, 2007, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed February 11, 2008).

⁵⁶⁶ Baykal, "Baykal'ın Grup Konuşması," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, July 22, 2003, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

For the RPP, while the principles of human rights, democracy, and the supremacy of law were the main characteristics of the state, they could flourish only within a truly secular state.⁵⁶⁷ Declaring that they were determined to “defend secularism from any threat”, the party saw secularism as “the foundation stone of the Republic, democracy, national integrity and internal peace; the essence of a modern and civilized state order and life style; the only way to institutionalize peace; reciprocal understanding and tolerance; the security for the freedom of religion and conscience; and the indispensable precondition for scientism, innovation and change”.⁵⁶⁸ In redefining secularism in terms of enlightenment and contemporariness and perpetuating the security-driven discourse in identifying threats instead of emphasizing plurality, the RPP contained the secularist discourse of the 1990s, albeit by adding a new element to it. This involved not only the presentation of JDP’s approach as the main threat to secularism, and hence against the national unity and integrity of the state but also the integration of the element of ‘participatory democracy’ within the defensive approach. The following remarks of Deniz Baykal are illustrative in this sense:

We have two serious threats against Turkey, dear friends. The first is the potential threat against our secular democratic republican identity, which always has existed and which will continue to exist None of [the governments] until now have overtly engaged in such a disregard This is the first threat. The second involves a threat against the national unity and integrity and this will persist To disregard the existence of these threats is a shame Unfortunately today we have come to a point where secularism and the republic have to be protected by the people against the state We therefore call those who have respect to the constitutional order of Turkey, and who want to make the secular, democratic Atatürk Republic live, to show their stance against this development.⁵⁶⁹

In that it called the people to rally around the Kemalist principles to confront the threats against the democratic and secular characteristics of the state and its unity and integrity, the RPP thereby added a pluralistic element to the defense of Kemalist principles, freeing it from the narrow borders of the military establishment. To confirm Baykal’s

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid. See also Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *CHP Parti Programı*, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁵⁶⁹ Baykal, “Baykal’ın Grup Konuşması,” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, May 30, 2006, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

representation of the threat and the public reactions against it, on 14 April 2007, Ankara witnessed a massive demonstration, where thousands walked to Atatürk's mausoleum, holding up Turkish flags and Atatürk's posters, with the slogans: 'We are Turks, We are Turkists, We are Ataturkists', 'O, Atatürk, we are following your path!' Similar demonstrations were held in other cities as well, each giving the same message of defending the Kemalist principles and the Republican values. In celebrating these meetings as an example of the national will and democracy, Baykal stated, "this has shown that secularism and the Republic are not only guarded by the institutions of the state, but by the nation."⁵⁷⁰ Moreover, referring to the comments made in the Western media that the meetings showed that Turkey was divided into two, he said: "They had thought that there was only the Turkey of Erdoğan, they have found out that there is also the Turkey of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk."⁵⁷¹

Despite the JDP's recourse to secularism and allegiance to the EU membership, Erdoğan's path directed only one direction for Baykal, which was defined as "dragging Turkey into the cultural sovereignty of the Arabic-Middle-Eastern-Wahhabism."⁵⁷² The RPP represented itself as the genuine guardian of the 'Turkey Model' which had been inherited by Atatürk and left unguarded.⁵⁷³ This, for the party, inevitably suggested a choice between: "...either respect for beliefs, democracy, and the enlightenment of Atatürk's revolutions, or intolerance, non-contemporariness, and dogmatism; either a Turkey that is open to the world, a member of the EU and a regional leader, or a Turkey that is introverted, a third world country, and alone."⁵⁷⁴ In this sense, only with a genuinely upheld secularism that is guarded by the people could Turkey break free from the Third World and her Middle Eastern image and become a regional leader. Moreover, in that it associated the contemporariness,

⁵⁷⁰ Baykal, "18 Nisan 2007 Tarihli Grup Konuşması," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, April 18, 2007, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed February 11, 2008).

⁵⁷¹ Ibid.

⁵⁷² Baykal, "02 Mayıs 2007 Tarihli Grup Konuşması," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, May 2, 2007, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed February 11, 2008).

⁵⁷³ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Güzel Günler Göreceğiz: CHP 2002 Seçim Bildirgesi*, BELGenet, under "Türkiye'de Seçimler", <<http://www.belgenet.com/secim/bildirge/chp2002-1.html>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid.

enlightenment, and following Atatürk's revolutions with becoming a regional leader and a member of the EU, the RPP further reconstituted the link made in 1990s between secularism and the European-oriented foreign policy. In this sense, the principle of secularism was attributed a special role in redrawing Turkey's 'face' in the aim of gaining a respected status within the contemporary civilization. In this regard, besides being a domestic characteristic and being tied to the national security and the unity and integrity of the nation-state, secularism was also represented as what could shed the 'uncivilized' image of Turkey and get her closer to the 'civilized' countries by freeing her from the orbit of Arabic-Middle Eastern-Wahhabism.

This was, for the RPP, inseparable from pursuing a genuine secularist foreign policy by removing the religious affiliations from the main concerns of foreign policy. Since true allegiance to Atatürk's principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world' involved regarding the national interests beyond all other considerations, the JDP government's meeting with the Hamas leaders in Ankara and their failure to clarify to them the significance of secularism was a clear deviation, for the RPP, from the orbit of the main principles of the Turkish foreign policy pursued since Atatürk's era.⁵⁷⁵ With a complete disregard for this policy, the JDP's move, for the RPP, represented a certain foreign policy that was based on religious affiliations and communitarianism,⁵⁷⁶ and furthermore failed to distance Turkey from an institution which had been regarded by all the civilized countries, mainly the U.S. and those in the EU, as a terrorist institution.⁵⁷⁷ This paralleled the reactions given to the WP following the visits Erbakan made to Muslim countries. In this regard, the principle of secularism, by being linked to the principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world' and the 'reaching the level of the

⁵⁷⁵ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Merkez Yönetim Kurulu, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Parti Meclisi Toplantısına Sunulan Merkez Yönetim Kurulu Raporu*, Ankara, March 25, 2006, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed February 11, 2008).

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ Onur Öymen, "Genel Başkan Yardımcısı Öymen, 'AKP İçindeki Pazarlıklarla Türkiye'ye Cumhurbaşkanı Seçilmez. Olsa Olsa AKP'ye bir Grup Başkanvekili'," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, April 25, 2007, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed February 11, 2008).

contemporary civilization' was employed as a template in countering what was identified as the 'inappropriate rapprochements with the Middle East'.

5.1.3. The elements of 'reciprocity', 'equity', and 'respect for past-agreements': the 'EU and Cyprus as Turkey's rights'

From the perspective of the defensive approach, the EU was regarded as one of the Western institutions Turkey became a member during the Cold War, rather than a process of change that would require fundamental reforms shaking the previously established 'order'. To this view, the Association Agreement signed in 1963 already acknowledged Turkey's 'Europeanness' and gave the right for her future integration. Hence, the EU was expected to pursue the principles of 'reciprocity', 'equity', and 'respect for past agreements' in relation to Turkey's membership. This suggested that Turkey was ready to do what was necessary to achieve this goal as long as it did not undermine her sovereignty.

Shortly before the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, these elements were apparent in the discourse of İsmail Cem, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Consider his following remarks:

Full membership in the EU is a right for Turkey emanating from international agreements. On our part, we shall exert every effort to gain that right as soon as possible Nevertheless, Turkey is not doomed to wait for an ambiguous time or outcome to realize this goal. Without turning it into an obsession, Turkey will continue to do all the work that is necessary for accession to the EU membership, while projecting her political and economic dynamism to the other regions of the world.⁵⁷⁸

As underlined in the above-quoted remark, the EU membership was regarded as an undeniable right of Turkey that emanated from the past agreements made between Turkey and the EEC during the Cold War. In this respect, the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, which excluded Turkey from the list of formal candidates, was considered as an overt rejection of her right to become a member, resulting in a radical response by the government suspending

⁵⁷⁸ Cited in *Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem*, 3. See also Cem, "Turkey: Setting Sail to the 21st Century," *Perceptions* 2, 3 (September-November 1997), <<http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume2/September-November1997/TURKEYSETTINGSAILTOTHE21STCENTURY.pdf>> (accessed June 18, 2008).

the diplomatic dialogue with the EU. Shortly after the change in the government with the April 1999 elections which brought the DLP, NAP, and the MP together in a coalitional government, the new government decided to present its official view towards the membership that restated the will on Turkey's part to continue her pro-European policy, while at the same time highlighting the elements of 'reciprocity', 'equity' and 'respect for past agreements' in articulating Turkey's right for membership. Prior to the Helsinki summit on November 1999, the Head of the NAP, Devlet Bahçeli stated that the Helsinki Summit would be an opportunity to test the sincerity and equitability of the EU, which kept adding new conditions to Turkey's membership while Turkey had a right to join as an honorable member of the institution.⁵⁷⁹ In the same vein, the report presented to the EU Ministers by İsmail Cem, involved the following remarks:

. . . Our present government has maintained the same determination for further development of relations with the EU and on Turkey's EU membership. We consider this common approach of all Turkish governments as a reflection of Atatürk's ideal of 'sharing the contemporary civilization' In case Turkey's EU vocation is not realized, there will be no setback to our assertiveness, modernism and democracy. Turkey-EU relations entered a turbulent phase when candidate status was denied to Turkey by EU's Enlargement summit, December 1997. Turkey expects an end to this discrimination in the forthcoming 1999 Helsinki Summit Turkey has put the Cyprus issue outside the framework of her relations with the EU Turkey rejects any kind of linkage between her candidacy to the EU and the Cyprus issue.⁵⁸⁰

Hence, while it was publicly declared that the government did not consider any deviation from the traditional European-oriented foreign policy and that it saw Turkey's membership as a reflection of Atatürk's civilizational goal, it was also highlighted that the EU was not a *sine-qua-non* for democratization and modernization, but rather a stimulus, which would add a momentum to this goal. In this sense, the link provided between 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization' and the EU membership further legitimized Turkey's reference to her right to become an EU candidate, as her 'Europeanness' was not dependent on the EU's decision, but was rested on Turkey's 'own' civilizational project. The report also

⁵⁷⁹ Devlet Bahçeli, "Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli'nin TBMM Grup Konuşması," Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, November 30, 1999, available from <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed February 19, 2008).

⁵⁸⁰ Cited in *Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem*, 163.

underlined how the Luxembourg Summit was interpreted as a discriminatory approach towards Turkey's right to EU candidacy and how a similar disregard for the principle of 'equity' was being pursued in linking Turkey's Cyprus policy to the EU membership, as it was again Turkey's right to pursue the "honorable" policy implemented in relation to Cyprus, given that this right emanated from the London and Zurich Agreements.⁵⁸¹ In this vein, Cem stated:

The EU's insistence on opening negotiations with the Greek Cypriot Administration for full membership, in total disregard of the international agreements on Cyprus, is overshadowing the continuation of the talks between the two communities under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary General. The Turkish Cypriot people shall continue to enjoy both our political and military guarantees emanating from international agreements on Cyprus.⁵⁸²

In this regard, the only approach that would comply with the principle of equity would be the one that de-linked the Cyprus issue from Turkey's candidacy and that evaluated Turkey's fulfillment of the membership criteria objectively.

In this context, the decision taken at the EU's Helsinki summit in December 1999 represented a fundamental turning point in Turkey-EU relations. Keeping its promise, four months after the summit, the government finally announced that the coalition partners reached a compromise on the commitments Turkey would make to the EU.⁵⁸³ The National Program of the Accession Partnership of short and medium-term goals announced eighty-nine new laws and amendments to ninety-four existing laws, bringing new adjustments with regard to the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.⁵⁸⁴ Even though the path to membership seemed tumultuous, the Prime Minister Ecevit defined the EU membership as an

⁵⁸¹ Devlet Bahçeli, "Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli'nin TBMM Grup Konuşması," *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, June 6, 1999, available from <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed February 19, 2008).

⁵⁸² Cited in İsmail, 383.

⁵⁸³ On the difficulties implementing the reforms and the parties' focus on the national interest, see Gamze Avcı, "Turkey's Slow EU Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles to Membership or Simple Euro-Skepticism?" in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, 149-170.

⁵⁸⁴ For a detailed analysis on the National Program, see Sanem Baykal, "Turkey-EU Relations in the Aftermath of the Helsinki Summit: An Analysis of Copenhagen Political Criteria in Light of the Accession Partnership, National Program and the Regular Reports," *Ankara Review of European Studies* 2, 3 (Fall 2002): 15-63.

undeniable and indispensable right of Turkey and stated that Turkey must not look for other options just because of some obstacles and challenges on the way.⁵⁸⁵

While the Helsinki Summit of 1999 did not underline any direct link between Turkey's future membership and the Cyprus policy in acknowledging Turkey's candidacy, the two issues became inevitably inseparable from each other following a number of events —the application of the RoC for membership in the EU in 1990, the EC's acknowledgement of its candidacy status in 1997, the integration of the resolution of the Cyprus issue into the short-term goals of Turkey's EU Accession Partnership, and the President of the EU Commission, Romano Prodi's visit to the RoC in October 2001, when he stated that Cyprus would take her place within the first wave of EU members, regardless of a political settlement.⁵⁸⁶ This was a serious problem because if the RoC became a member of the EU representing the whole island before the resolution of the issue, this would not only delegitimize Turkey's support for the TRNC as well as the presence of the Turkish forces in the island, but also jeopardize Turkey's goal of being a member of the Union.⁵⁸⁷

From Turkey's official point of view, the accession of the RoC to the EU would be illegal as it would violate both the Article 185 of the Constitution of the RoC which stipulated that “the integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other state is excluded” and the Article 8, which underlined that the veto powers could be used in relation to the RoC's participation in international organizations or alliances in which both Greece and Turkey are not members.⁵⁸⁸ Based on this approach as underlined by all party leaders during the period, it was not Turkey's Cyprus position that was at odds with international law; rather, it was the

⁵⁸⁵ “Ecevit'ten AB açıklaması: ‘Başka seçenekler aramayız’” [Ecevit's statement on the EU: ‘We will not look for other options’], *Milliyet*, March 8, 2002, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2002/03/08/son/sontur15.html>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁵⁸⁶ Cited in Semin Suvarierol, “The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union,” *Turkish Studies* 4, 1 (Spring 2003): 62.

⁵⁸⁷ Indeed, this was both expressed in EU Commission spokesman's words and highlighted in the European Parliament's report. See Jack F. Poos, *Report on Cyprus; Application for Membership to the European Union and the State of Negotiations* (European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy, July 17, 2001); cited in Suvarierol, 62.

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 58.

EU's policy to accept the RoC as a member before admitting Turkey in the EU.⁵⁸⁹ Hence, to this view, the EU failed to comply with the principles of 'respect for past agreements' and 'equity' in pushing Turkey to give up on her rights in the Cyprus on the one hand, and promising membership to the RoC on the other⁵⁹⁰

After coming to power with the 2002 elections, the JDP's discourse did not completely diverge from the defensive approach, although the articulations made on Turkey's European vocation and Cyprus policy by the party members mainly underlined the parameters of the integrationist approach. The Prime Minister Erdoğan underlined the EU's failure to pursue the principle of 'reciprocity' and 'equity' on several occasions. He reassured that Turkey was able to implement the necessary EU reforms without giving up on her national sensitivities such as Cyprus and that both were her rights emanating from previous international agreements.⁵⁹¹ In response to the criticisms directed at the party that it was selling the Cyprus cause for the sake of EU membership, Erdoğan stated that Cyprus was the 'national cause', and selling Cyprus to the EU cause would be impossible.⁵⁹² In the same line with the discourse employed by the previous government, the JDP saw the failure of the EU to give a date to Turkey for the start of the accession talks in 2002 as a litmus test for its sincerity and compliance with the principles of 'equity' and 'reciprocity'. On this issue, the Minister of Justice, Cemil Çiçek stated, "Turkey has done what she needed to do. Turkey is in a better situation than the 10 other candidate countries If the EU decides to embrace the former Warsaw Pact countries on the one hand while excluding Turkey on the other, this would shade their sincerity."⁵⁹³

⁵⁸⁹ Erdoğan, "TBMM Grup Konuşması," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, June 5, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed February 13, 2008).

⁵⁹⁰ Bahçeli, "Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli'nin TBMM Grup Konuşması," Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, November 29, 1999, available from <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed February 19, 2008).

⁵⁹¹ Erdoğan, "TBMM Grup Konuşması," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, May 1, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed February 13, 2008).

⁵⁹² Erdoğan, "TBMM Grup Konuşması," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, February 2, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed February 13, 2008).

⁵⁹³ Cemil Çiçek, "Avrupa, Türkiyeyi Dışlamak İçin Bahane Aramamalı," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, October 31, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed February 13, 2008).

Similarly, the JDP government reiterated that they did not see the Cyprus issue within the orbit of Turkey's EU policy.⁵⁹⁴ They stated that it could not be linked in anyway to Turkey's fulfillment of the political criteria for the EU membership;⁵⁹⁵ and rejected the role of the EU in the resolution of the Cyprus issue.⁵⁹⁶ Nevertheless, despite all official efforts to de-link the Cyprus policy from Turkey's EU vocation, the two 'causes' became yet even more intertwined as the continuation of the EU accession talks depended on whether Turkey would comply with the Additional Protocol according to which she had to open her ports and airports to traffic from all members of the Union, including the RoC. For the JDP, the added clause to the Additional Protocol that Turkey did not have to recognize the RoC confirmed Turkey's rights in both aspects. However, for the RPP, this was only the beginning of the future deadlock for the Turkey-EU relations, because by signing the Additional Protocol, Turkey already obliged herself to open her ports to the RoC before any settlement of the Cyprus issue.⁵⁹⁷ To the RPP, the policy pursued by the government was not only submissive but also dishonorable,⁵⁹⁸ and that Turkey should not have signed the Additional Protocol before making it clear to the EU that both the EU and Cyprus were Turkey's rights.⁵⁹⁹ From this perspective, being committed to the ideal of full membership could co-exist with a respected

⁵⁹⁴ Erdoğan, "AK Parti Genel Başkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan AB Bürokratlarından Brifing Aldı," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, November 6, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed February 13, 2008).

⁵⁹⁵ Erdoğan, "Başbakan Erdoğan: Annan Planı külliye Kuzey Kıbrıs'a yaramaz demek yanlıştır, külliye bunu kabul ediyorum demek de bana göre yanlıştır," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, December 18, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed February 13, 2008).

⁵⁹⁶ Abdullah Gül, "AB, Kıbrıs'ta Bir Taraf Olamaz. Müzakerelerin İçine Girmesi Kabul Edilemez," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, February 13, 2004, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed February 13, 2008).

⁵⁹⁷ Baykal, "Lozan'a, Ege'ye, Kıbrıs'a Dokundurtmayız," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, June 28, 2005, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁵⁹⁸ Baykal, "Baykal'ın Grup Konuşması," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, February 17, 2004, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008). Indeed, Turkey's Cyprus intervention in 1974 was set as an example of a policy that is active, non-reactionary and respectable. See Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *CHP Parti Programı*, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>>, (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁵⁹⁹ Baykal, "Lozan'a, Ege'ye, Kıbrıs'a Dokundurtmayız," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, June 28, 2005, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

status in the international arena only by holding on to one's national vision and interest.⁶⁰⁰ In a similar vein, Baykal stated:

Can anyone question our desire to be within the Western civilization, within the contemporary civilization? Can anyone question our engagement with democracy? Nobody can doubt it. Nobody should take our view as being against democracy, or being against the EU. We want democracy and Europe, we want our rights to be respected, and we want it all.⁶⁰¹

When the Prime Minister Erdoğan declared in 2006 that Turkey would not open her ports to Cyprus for trade unless the EU lifted the trade embargo to the Northern Cyprus, this endangered Turkey's accession process, as failing to comply with the terms of the Additional Protocol could bring about the suspension of Turkey's EU membership negotiations.⁶⁰² Instead of yielding to the EU's pressure to prevent a possible 'crash', the government came up with an alternative offer instead, suggesting opening two of Turkey's ports to the RoC on the condition that it was followed by some reciprocal action from the RoC.⁶⁰³ While for Baykal, this marked the bankruptcy of the government's Cyprus policy and a deviation from the realist state policy pursued since Atatürk,⁶⁰⁴ Erdoğan, defining Turkey's EU goal as a reflection of Turkey's foundational principles and concomitant with Turkey's national interests,⁶⁰⁵ stated: "there is not even a slight deviation from our EU-orientation."⁶⁰⁶ He also underlined that the Cyprus policy was a part of Turkey's EU policy and realist in contrast with Baykal's accusation:

Turkey hopes that the EU conducts its relations with Turkey openly, honestly and fairly. Who dares to belittle Turkey's Cyprus cause! Who dares to look down upon the Turkish state! Who dares to turn the Northern Cyprus, every inch of which is covered by the Turkish nation's

⁶⁰⁰ Baykal, "Baykal'ın Grup Konuşması," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, July 1, 2003, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁶⁰¹ Ibid.

⁶⁰² Traynor and Watt, "Turkey clashes with EU over Cyprus," *The Guardian*, June 16, 2006, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/cyprus/story/0,,1799567,00.html>> (accessed December 1, 2007).

⁶⁰³ Despite having been seen as a significant step, this swift move was not found satisfactory since it put forward additional preconditions to fulfill the treaty obligations. See "Turkey 'will open up to Cyprus'," *BBC NEWS*, December 7, 2006, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6216498.stm>> (accessed June 20, 2008).

⁶⁰⁴ *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Parti Meclisi Toplantısına Sunulan Merkez Yönetim Kurulu Raporu*, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed February 11, 2008).

⁶⁰⁵ Erdoğan, "Türkiye zor bir ülke değil, dürüst bir ülke," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, June 20, 2006, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed May 24, 2007).

⁶⁰⁶ Erdoğan, "Açık ve net söylüyorum, kim ne derse desin, AB yönelimimizde en ufak bir sapma yoktur," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, November 5, 2006, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed May 24, 2007).

blood, into an issue of political haggling! Our government sees the Cyprus issue as a matter of realist diplomacy, rather than a tool for a conflictual policy.⁶⁰⁷

5.1.4. 'The EU is not the only address of the contemporary civilization'

As discussed in the previous section, the integrationist links made between Turkey's EU policy and the maxim of 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization' were counterbalanced by the defensive notes on the principles of 'equity' and 'reciprocity' and Turkey's right to pursue both the EU and Cyprus policies without being imposed to choose one for the other. The articulations on Turkish foreign policy during 1997-2007 also involved yet another defensive interpretation of the principle of 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization', freeing the civilizational goal from Turkey's relations with the EU. Based on this approach, neither did Turkey need the EU for the acknowledgment of her Europeanness, nor was her civilized character dependent on it.

From this approach, Turkey's EU vocation was not an "obsession"; and to see it in this way was "humiliating."⁶⁰⁸ Given her multiple identities and peculiar characteristics, Turkey should have a much broader perspective rather than limiting herself to a European reach. The following speech of the Foreign Minister Cem delivered in 1997 is illuminating in this sense:

Turkey is already European for 700 years. It does not have a problem or an obligation to have its Europeanness verified by foreign countries If being European is a cultural phenomenon, Turkey is a country that shares the values of democracy, pluralism, secularism, human rights, and gender equality, all of which constitute the basis of the 'contemporary European culture'. Turkey does not also have a need or obligation to choose between an Asian and a European identity. Turkey possesses the characteristic and the privilege of being both Asian and European. This is our uniqueness, richness, and our strength.⁶⁰⁹

In other words, the fact that Turkey was both Muslim and secular, both Asian and European did not mean that she had to choose between an Asian identity and a European one.

⁶⁰⁷ Erdoğan, "Doğrudan Ticaret Tüzüğü, Kıbrıs Türk Tarafının Beklentileri Esas Alınmak Suretiyle Ve Hiçbir Şarta Bağlanmadan Onaylanıp Uygulanmalıdır," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, December 16, 2006, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁶⁰⁸ Cited in *Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem*, 61.

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2. See also Cem, "Turkey: Setting Sail to the 21st Century," *Perceptions* 2, 3 (September-November 1997), <<http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume2/September-November1997/TURKEYSETTINGSAILTOTHE21STCENTURY.pdf>> (accessed June 18, 2008).

She embodied them all and could employ this ‘richness’ to her advantage. The following remarks of Cem are illustrative:

Turkey will naturally assign special importance to her relations with the societies she lived with. She will look for new economic and cultural openings in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East. This approach does not mean — as it has been usually misunderstood as — a ‘substitution policy’; in other words, it does not mean that we have put aside our EU goal and will have new preferences instead. It is about supplementing and complementing the preferences we have such as the EU with our other characteristics. Our foreign policy is in pursuit of being a global state.⁶¹⁰

With this articulation, Cem suggested a change from considering the EU as the only way to fulfill Atatürk’s vision to viewing the EU question as only *part* of Atatürk’s larger civilization project.⁶¹¹ In this sense, this view was not fully exempt from an integrationist approach. For Cem, Turkey had to rediscover her identities in its fullness, rather than presenting herself as the ‘staunch ally of the West’ as in the Cold War. This representation not only prevented her to contribute to the West, but also encumbered Turkey’s full membership in the EEC.⁶¹² In putting the EU into this larger context, this foreign policy vision, conceptualized as the ‘global outlook’, thereby reconstructed Turkey’s identity in its multiplicity. Cem also linked this policy to the Kemalist principles and defined the ‘global view’ as “the exact application of the principle of ‘peace at home peace in the world’ as set by Atatürk.”⁶¹³ Hence, in seeing Kemalism as its base, the ‘global outlook’ also reconstituted the Kemalist ‘civilizationism’ and ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ dictum accordingly.

In this regard, rather than insisting on an exclusive Western identity, or moving to the other end of the pendulum to demonstrate Turkey’s ‘Easternness’, the new policy propagated how Turkey could enrich the Western world with her diversity and how this depended on defining Turkey’s fundamental goal as her inner Self.⁶¹⁴ Asked in an interview whether this

⁶¹⁰ Cited in *Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem*, 64.

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁶¹² *Ibid.*, 109. Cem also stated that Turkey’s Cold War politics of being a gendarme of the West turned Turkey less democratic than it would have been otherwise. (*Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem* 1999, 358-76).

⁶¹³ *Ibid.*, 441.

⁶¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 247.

contradicted the Westernization goal Atatürk pointed to, İsmail Cem gave the following remarks:

What Atatürk pointed to was the level of contemporary civilization. In my opinion, Turkey has reached this level in many aspects. On the other hand, many countries have not reached the level of contemporary civilization as we had thought.⁶¹⁵

In this sense, the references that dissociated the EU orientation from being the sole goal of ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’ freed the EU from being the only representative of civilization and European identity. According to this approach, there were many instances that showed how the EU failed to embrace the ideals it propagated, such as multiculturalism and plurality, and how Turkey abided by them in contrast. This approach was especially present in the aftermath of the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, which failed to acknowledge Turkey’s EU candidacy. Shortly after the summit, the then Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, declared that the decision taken at the Luxembourg Summit built a new “Berlin Wall”,⁶¹⁶ and defined the EU’s underlying characteristic as a “Christian Club.”⁶¹⁷ Hence, the terminology of the 1970s Islamist discourse became a referential point in the Euro-skeptic discourse of the late 1990s.

In contrast to the 1970’s Islamist discourse, however, this discursive move did not juxtapose Turkish identity against the European identity. It rather pointed out that EU’s sincerity in upholding its civilizational ideals was dependent on its ability to embrace Turkey. The responses to the Helsinki Summit of 1999, which acknowledged Turkey’s candidacy, underlined this approach. For Cem, who declared the DLP as “the representative and the owner of the Republican revolution and Atatürk’s enlightenment,”⁶¹⁸ Helsinki decision meant the correction of the “existing injustice”⁶¹⁹ and a “historic decision” for Turkey as well as for the EU, which, in granting the candidacy to Turkey, also reconstituted itself as a “multi-

⁶¹⁵ Ibidem.

⁶¹⁶ “Avrupa şaşkın” [Europe is perplexed], *Milliyet*, December 16, 1997, available from <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/12/16/>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶¹⁷ Ibid.

⁶¹⁸ Cited in *TRT-1, Politikanın Nabzı: 4 Ocak 1998-29 Mart 1998* (Ankara: Basım Yayın Müdürlüğü, 1998), 178.

⁶¹⁹ Cited in *Turkey in the 21st Century* (Mersin: Rüstem, 2000), 161.

cultural, multi-religious and multi-ethnic entity.”⁶²⁰ The same approach also dissociated the EU from the ‘European ideals’ and gave the Copenhagen Criteria a new meaning which involved a more global perspective. To this view, the Copenhagen values were not particular to the EU; rather, they were the values that Turkey already shared and would continue to develop, whether she was a candidate, a member, or not.⁶²¹

This was reverberated in the discourse of the JDP following the years from 2002 until 2007. In the same line with the discourse of the previous government, the JDP officials repetitively declared that the EU’s criticisms on Turkey’s failure to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria were unjust.⁶²² They further stated that the decision to open the accession talks with Turkey was the final test that would show whether the EU was a Christian Union or a coalition of values as it propagated.⁶²³ Furthermore, in a similar vein with the ‘flexible foreign policy’ of the RPP during the 1970s, the ‘active policy’ of the 1980s, and the ‘global outlook’ of Cem in the 1990s, the JDP also suggested that Turkey should follow a flexible foreign policy.⁶²⁴ According to this perspective, Turkey needed more alternatives in her foreign policy, not as a substitution to but as an asset for her EU policy.⁶²⁵ From this perspective, the European-orientation did not depend on the EU’s acceptance of Turkey as an EU state but was the extension of Turkey’s own civilizational project. Confirming this, Erdoğan said, “The goals concerning the future of our nation are by no means indexed to a specified date No decision that is taken by the EU will lead us to change our destination and route.”⁶²⁶ Dissociating the EU goal from Turkey’s objective to ‘reach to the level of the contemporary civilization’, he further stated, “Our goal is crystal

⁶²⁰ Ibid., 166.

⁶²¹ Ibid., 157.

⁶²² Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, *Herşey Türkiye İçin: AK Parti (2002) Seçim Beyannamesi*, BELGEnet, under “Türkiye’de Seçimler”, <<http://www.belgenet.com/secim/bildirge/akp2002-1.html>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶²³ Ibid.

⁶²⁴ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, *Herşey Türkiye İçin: AK Parti (2002) Seçim Beyannamesi*, BELGEnet, under “Türkiye’de Seçimler”, <<http://www.belgenet.com/secim/bildirge/akp2002-1.html>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶²⁵ Ibid.

⁶²⁶ Erdoğan, “5. İstişare ve Değerlendirme Toplantısı,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, October 2, 2005, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

clear. In case the EU does not take us, we will call the Copenhagen Criteria ‘Ankara Criteria’ instead, and move on our path.’⁶²⁷

5.1.5. The elements of ‘full-independence’, ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’: ‘No submission to the EU’, and a bolder approach to ‘peace at home, peace in the world’

As discussed above, the official discourse in 1997-2007 involved a defensive approach to a number of issues, ranging from the reforms Turkey had to undertake in order to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, to the EU’s rejection of Turkey’s candidacy status in 1997 and its support for Cyprus’ membership in the EU prior to the resolution of the issue. Articulations on these issues also had recourse to the elements of ‘full-independence’, ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’ in taking these issues as a threat to Turkey’s national sovereignty and as part of a clandestine plan to divide Turkey and weaken her power.

While the coalitional government of the DLP, the MP, and the NAP prepared the groundwork for the main reforms for Turkey’s entrance in the EU, there was also a remarkable element of Euro-skepticism in the government,⁶²⁸ represented especially by the NAP.⁶²⁹ The NAP of the 1990s was certainly not the NAP of the 1970s, as the party acknowledged that it adopted a more “cool-headed” approach after the 1990s rather than the reserved and reactionary position taken during the 1970s.⁶³⁰ According to the NAP, the priority of the government had to be placed on economic development and opening new

⁶²⁷ Erdoğan, “Türkiye’nin Üyeliği AB’nin Stratejik Gücünü Arttırır,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, September 3, 2005, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁶²⁸ Indeed, it was during this coalitional period when the NPAA was prepared. Ziya Öniş’ statement is illuminating: “The National Program (NPAA) represented an attempt on the part of the political authorities in Turkey to strike a balance between the need to meet the Copenhagen criteria and the unwillingness to implement reforms on the most sensitive issues in the short-term” (Öniş, 2003, 13).

⁶²⁹ The following remarks of Mesut Yılmaz, the Head of the MP, are illuminating in this sense: “the [NAP] had some concerns pertaining to the preparation and implementation of the National program. They have stated those views. We made changes on many issues by taking their views into consideration. We had some difficulties when time came for final arrangements” (Avcı 2003, 169).

⁶³⁰ Bahçeli, “Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin MHP 6. Büyük Kurultay Konuşması,” Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, November 5, 2000, available from <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

centers for cooperation in the areas of trade and energy in order to be a regional leader in Eurasia.⁶³¹ From this perspective, it was curious as to why the PKK intensified its actions when Turkey attempted to take bolder actions towards this goal. For Bahçeli, there was only one explanation: The PKK as well as those that supported the PKK aimed to prevent Turkey from becoming a regional leader by inviting chaos and division within the country, dragging her from the democratic world towards a Middle Eastern regime, and turning Turkey into an introverted Third World country.⁶³² In this sense, the party did not have a strictly anti-Western outlook in its foreign policy discourse as in the 1970s. The party's identification of the main objective of Turkish foreign policy as 'raising Turkey to the level of the EU countries and even *beyond* them'⁶³³ further clarified how the foreign policy vision of the party was not exempt from the integrationist discourse.

Yet, the NAP underlined that the EU policies were against "the national interests of the Turkish nation and people."⁶³⁴ For the Head of the NAP, Devlet Bahçeli, the EU's position on the 'Kurdish separatism' and Cyprus was 'inconsistent, indeterminate, and insincere.'⁶³⁵ Responding to the Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz' statement that the EU progress reports were objective, Bahçeli stated, "Supporting the EU's stance or calling it 'objective' ignores the EU's insincerity towards Turkey."⁶³⁶ Hence, while Turkey's right to be a member of the EU was welcome for the NAP, the path towards membership was not a

⁶³¹ Bahçeli, "Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli'nin TBMM'de Yaptığı Grup Konuşması," Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, October 26, 2001, available from <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶³² Ibid.

⁶³³ Bahçeli, "Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli'nin TBMM Grup Konuşması," Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi March 21, 2000, available from <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2007).

⁶³⁴ Ibid.

⁶³⁵ Bahçeli, "Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli'nin TBMM Grup Konuşması," Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, June 11, 2002, available from <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2007).

⁶³⁶ Bahçeli, "Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli'nin TBMM'de Yaptığı Grup Konuşması," Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, November 29, 2001, available from <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2007).

journey to the heaven unless the accession was in accordance with Turkey's magnitude, history, and potential.⁶³⁷

The reservations of the party towards the EU were mainly in relation to the EU reforms, Turkey's policies against the PKK, and the Cyprus issue. For Bahçeli, the EU was disregarding the threat of terrorism and Turkey's right to defend her national interests and sovereignty in its references to human rights, just as it demanded that Turkey gave concessions on the Cyprus issue.⁶³⁸ The NAP also situated the Turkish 'Europhiles' in the same category. To Bahçeli, while they considered holding on to one's just causes as utopian and wrong, they found it right and realist to give concessions on these causes.⁶³⁹ In this context, concerning the new laws on extending minority rights, freedom of speech and abolishing death penalty, the NAP's position was very straightforward. For Bahçeli, there could be no negotiation on these issues.⁶⁴⁰ As regards the use of Kurdish in education and media, Bahçeli stated that this would certainly lead to separatism.⁶⁴¹ In this sense, the NAP saw the EU accession reforms as a direct threat against the sovereignty and integrity of the Turkish state. In the same vein, undertaking these reforms unconditionally would mean total submission to various other future *fait accompli*, such as recognizing the RoC and giving up on Turkish Cypriots. For Bahçeli, this was unacceptable, as these acts would pool Turkey's sovereignty before any exercise of the principle of 'reciprocity'.⁶⁴² By this token, Bahçeli stated, "What is indispensable for Turkey is the respect to our territorial integrity, national

⁶³⁷ Bahçeli, "Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli'nin TBMM Grup Konuşması," Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, June 11, 2002, available from <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2007).

⁶³⁸ Bahçeli, "Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli'nin TBMM Grup Konuşması," Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, December 6, 2002, available from <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2007).

⁶³⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁰ It should be noted here that this situation mainly involved the execution of the former leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. The NAP was openly against the abolishment of the capital punishment and for the execution of Öcalan. See Bahçeli, "Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli'nin TBMM Grup Konuşması," Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, November 30, 1999, available from <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2007).

⁶⁴¹ See Bahçeli, "Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli'nin TBMM Grup Konuşması," Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, January 31, 2002, available from <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶⁴² Bahçeli, "Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli'nin TBMM Grup Konuşması," Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, December 14, 2002, available from <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

culture, and unitary state structure. If the EU respected our national sensitivities, this would suffice to prove their friendliness towards Turkey.”⁶⁴³ This non-submissive approach was also prominent on the party’s main outlook regarding the Cyprus issue. The official website of the NAP stated, “Cyprus is not an impediment but a national cause. Submission cannot be a solution!”⁶⁴⁴

From this perspective, the EU’s support for the Greek side as regards the developments in Cyprus was a clear proof that the EU disregarded these ‘sensitivities’.⁶⁴⁵ When the RoC announced its decision to deploy the S-300 missiles in 1997, this produced a vigorous response by the Turkish military, which stated that this would mean *casus belli*, and a preventive bombing would take place.⁶⁴⁶ The Turkish government further announced that any attack against the TRNC would be perceived as an attack against Turkey, and that it would go ahead with plans to integrate Northern Cyprus should the EU launch accession talks with the island’s Greek Cypriot government.⁶⁴⁷ In this regard, the official discourse represented the issue as a matter of Turkey’s own national security problem. It was within this context that when the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 declared that the EU would start the accession negotiations with Cyprus and excluded Turkey from the list of the candidates for the next round of enlargement, the Turkish government accelerated the accession measures between the TRNC and Turkey. The first meeting of the Association Council between two countries took place on the date the EU began negotiations with Cyprus, as a symbolic

⁶⁴³ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁴ See the official web-site of the Nationalist Action Party at <<http://www.mhp.org.tr>> (accessed February 19, 2008).

⁶⁴⁵ Bahçeli, “Genel Başkanımız Dr. Devlet Bahçeli’nin Liderler Zirvesi’nin Ardından Yaptığı Basın Açıklaması,” Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, June 7, 2002, <<http://www.mhp.org.tr/genelbsk/gbskkonusma/2002/index.php?page=07062002>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶⁴⁶ Ibidem.

⁶⁴⁷ Similar declarations followed before the Luxembourg Summit, finally leading to the establishment of the Association Council between the TRNC and Turkey, working on a partial integration at the economic, military and foreign policy levels (İsmail 1998, 364). Shortly after this declaration, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey also stated that Turkey indeed wanted the independence of the TRNC for her survival; but in case they needed to join Turkey under the conditions of tyranny and pressure, the choice was in their hands (İsmail 1998, 383).

response to the summit's decision.⁶⁴⁸ The following remarks of Cem illustrate the security-centered discourse in relation to these developments:

The EU's consideration of the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus as the representative of the whole Cyprus is not only a violation of international law and denial of reality but also the first step of a culmination that may be very dangerous in the Eastern Mediterranean. We ask the EU to reevaluate the steps it will take with utmost attention before it is too late, and before the Greek administration deploys war enforcements.⁶⁴⁹

The fact that the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus decided to deploy sophisticated weapons in Cyprus . . . and the military doctrine signed by Greece has turned the issue into a security problem not only for the Northern Cyprus but also for Turkey . . . Turkey can no longer remain passive in front of these developments.⁶⁵⁰

In this sense, the EU's Luxembourg decision would not only contribute to the tension that was culminating in the region, but would also indirectly threaten Turkey's security. In this regard, Turkey needed to take necessary measures in case the EU failed to take an action against the 'unjust' and 'illegal' policies pursued regarding the island's future.⁶⁵¹ As these remarks show, the security-driven discourse concerning the Cyprus issue was reactionary; however, as stated by Cem, it did not involve playing the Cyprus bid against the EU:

We have no tendency and try not to use Cyprus against the EU in our evaluation of the problems between the current situation of Cyprus and the EU. Therefore, our approach to the matter is seeing it as rooted in different dimensions and looking for a corresponding solution. The solution of the problem is very much dependent on the power and welfare of the Turkish community in Northern Cyprus and their confidence on the future. We are trying to help in this respect.⁶⁵²

Hence, not having been seen as a stance against the EU but as a 'responsible deed', the Cyprus policy of the government was reminiscent of the policy pursued by the RPP during the 1970s, in constituting an identity for Turkey that was pursuant of international law,

⁶⁴⁸ See, İsmail, 362-363. See also Korkmaz Haktanır, *A Time to Remember* (Gazimağusa: Eastern Mediterranean University Center for Cyprus Studies Publications, 1999), 28-34; Erol Manisalı, *Dünden Bugüne KIBRIS* (İstanbul: Çağdaş Matbaacılık ve Yayıncılık, 2000), 120.

⁶⁴⁹ Cited in İsmail, 383.

⁶⁵⁰ Cited in *Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem*, 3-4. See also Cem, "Turkey: Setting Sail to the 21st Century," *Perceptions* 2, 3 (September-November 1997), <<http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume2/September-November1997/TURKEYSETTINGSAILTOTHE21STCENTURY.pdf>> (accessed June 18, 2008).

⁶⁵¹ Consider the following statement of Cem: "EU should realize how it was unfair and unjust towards us, how it ignored the rule of law and disregarded the 1960 Agreements, and its animosity towards the Turkish Cypriots" (*Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem* 1999, 72).

⁶⁵² *Ibid.*, 60.

responsible, and humanitarian.⁶⁵³ In placing Turkey's national interests at the center and having a peaceful approach to the relations with other countries, this policy was also considered to be based on Turkey's traditional foreign policy, mainly, Atatürk's 'peace at home, peace in the world' principle:

First, we see the existential interests of Turkey lie in both seas; we see the most crucial energy crossroads in both Eastern part of the Mediterranean. When we say Mediterranean, we naturally understand Cyprus. In this context, we consider the claims on the future of Cyprus, and policies towards a confederation important. Equally important is to create the power within ourselves to resist the policies of any state, especially the policies of Greece . . . and not to give any concession on that We will not step back from our national interests and will continue to pursue these goals with a contribution to the general peace 'Peace at home, peace in the world' is not a product of a passive policy but an active one that can go beyond itself . . . [It is] a positive bold step that is oriented to build the future.⁶⁵⁴

This bolder connotation added to the principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world' was reverberated in the words of the Head of the MP and the Deputy Prime Minister, Mesut Yılmaz, who stated that the EU was placing the whole pressure on Turkey regarding the Cyprus issue while giving guarantee to the Greek Cypriot side,⁶⁵⁵ and that Turkey thus needed to be more active in the Cyprus issue and take a bolder initiative in order to solve the problem.⁶⁵⁶ Yet, one of the 'boldest' voices came from the DLP, when the President of the EU Commission Romano Prodi stated that the RoC would be a member of the Union regardless of a political settlement in the island.⁶⁵⁷ This was when the defensive discourse took an offensive turn for 'defensive measures'. Following Prodi's statement, Cem declared that Turkey might be obliged to take drastic measures in case of the accession of the Greek Cypriots prior to an agreement on the Cyprus question.⁶⁵⁸ The Prime Minister and the Head of

⁶⁵³ On the need to change the perception of the EU, Cem stated the following: "Everybody has been seeing the situation as 'Turkey' has expansionist policies and Cypriot Turks are supporting the occupation'. We think that our press should exert their efforts into changing this" (*Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem* 1999, 72).

⁶⁵⁴ Cited in *Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem*, 658.

⁶⁵⁵ Mesut Yılmaz, "Başbakan Yardımcısı Yılmaz Brüksel'de Konuştu," Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği, Brussels, March 21, 2002, <<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=23998&l=1>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶⁵⁶ Yılmaz, "Mesut Yılmaz'ın Değerlendirmeleri," Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği, Brussels, June 14, 2002, <<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=22456&l=1>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶⁵⁷ Cited in Suvarierol, 62.

⁶⁵⁸ "Türkiye'den tarihi rest: 'Ya biz, ya Rumlar!'" [A historic gamble from Turkey: Either us or the Greeks!] *Milliyet*, November 3, 2001, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2001/11/03/siyaset/siy01.html>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

the DLP Ecevit added that Turkey could annex the TRNC if the EU admitted Cyprus before a settlement.⁶⁵⁹

While this reactionary attitude did not lead to putting aside the EU goal in search for an alternative, the most controversial statements came out of the government circles, from the Secretary General of Turkey's NSC, General Tuncer Kılınç, who put the EU's policy regarding the Cyprus issue, and the conditions Turkey had to fulfill to be a member in the same context. At a conference on foreign policy, Kılınç stated that "Turkey hasn't seen the slightest assistance from the EU," after 40 years of knocking on EU's door.⁶⁶⁰ Accusing the EU of looking negatively on Turkey's national interests,⁶⁶¹ Kılınç suggested that Turkey would do better by not compromising either with the EU or with the U.S., but by beginning "a new search [for allies] that would include Iran and the Russian Federation."⁶⁶² From this perspective, the EU was a divisive force not only because it put forward the reforms that pooled Turkey's national sovereignty, but also because of its links with the terrorist formations that directly threatened Turkey's territorial integrity and independence. The following words of the Chief of the General Staff are illustrative:

The developments that encourage the PKK, which has been trying to gain a place for itself in the platform of so-called democracy and human rights, take place in the context of Turkey's entry in the European Union Some EU members have been the main factors behind the [PKK] movement's survival by offering overt and covert assistance to it.⁶⁶³

For the retired General Suat İlhan, too, the path towards the EU could not be accepted as it would only pave the way for Turkey's loss of sovereignty and independence, in other

⁶⁵⁹ *Cyprus Mail*, 6 November 2001; cited in Suvarierol, 62.

⁶⁶⁰ Quoted in Jon Gorratt, "Turkish General Causes Controversy With Call For Turkey To Stop Seeking European Union Membership," *Eurasia Insight*, June 22, 2008, <<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav031302a.shtml>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶⁶¹ "A general speaks his mind," *Economist* 362, 8264 (16 March 2002): 53-54, *Business Source Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed June 24, 2008).

⁶⁶² Quoted in Gorratt, "Turkish General Causes Controversy With Call For Turkey To Stop Seeking European Union Membership," <<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav031302a.shtml>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶⁶³ "Ordudan Son Dakika Golü," [Last Minute Goal from the Military] *Milliyet*, 8 December 2000; cited in Hasan Kösebalan, "Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures," *Middle East Policy* 9, 2 (June 2002): 142.

words, it would prevent Turkey from realizing Atatürk's principles of 'full-independence' and 'civilizationism':

[Look at those] who were delighted by Turkey's EU candidacy: Greece, the Patriarch of the Fener [Greek] Orthodox Church Bartholomeos, the Greek Cypriot[s], the PKK supporters who in fact demonstrated against our candidacy in Europe, HADEP, [and Abdullah Öcalan]. Please tell me, candidly, don't you at least suspect there is something wrong with this? If Turkey joins the EU, the independence of [our] country will lose its present meaning; we will be part of EU's independent [entity] and sacrifice our own sovereignty The independence that Atatürk longed for was not this Atatürk showed [us] civilization rather than Europeanization as our mission. Integration with Europe is incongruous with Ataturkist thought.⁶⁶⁴

This anti-EU and Euro-skeptic approach that also pushed for a bolder stance with regard to 'Turkey's sensitivities' such as the Cyprus cause was abated with the 2002 elections, during which none of the parties that took place in the previous coalition could obtain a seat in the new parliament. However, the two parties in the new parliament, mainly the JDP and the RPP, continued to employ the defensive element of 'non-submission to the EU' and 'no-concessions on Cyprus' together with the elements of 'national sovereignty', 'independence,' and 'national honor'. These were mainly used in relation to the EU reforms, the statements made by some politicians in the EU countries and, the Cyprus issue.

The non-submissive attitude towards the EU was especially apparent after the RoC became a member of the EU in 2004. Identifying the Cyprus issue as a national security issue,⁶⁶⁵ and underlining that Turkey had done what she needed to do, the Head of the JDP, Erdoğan pointed out that any further imposition by the EU with regard to Cyprus was unacceptable,⁶⁶⁶ and that Turkey would not recognize the RoC unless the Cyprus issue was permanently resolved.⁶⁶⁷ On the other hand, for the Head of the RPP, Baykal, it was certain

⁶⁶⁴ Suat İlhan, *Avrupa Birliği'ne Neden Hayır?* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2000); cited in Kösebalan, 140.

⁶⁶⁵ Erdoğan, "Başbakan Erdoğan KKTC Cumhurbaşkanı Denктаş ile Görüşti," *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, May 9, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed February 19, 2008).

⁶⁶⁶ Erdoğan, "TBMM Grup Konuşması," *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, December 1, 2004, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed February 13, 2008).

⁶⁶⁷ Abdullah Gül, "Kıbrıs'ta Çözüm Olmadan Tanıma Olmaz," *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, December 1, 2004, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed February 13, 2008).

that the road towards the EU membership was a dead-end and full of additional conditions; the EU would come up with another condition as Turkey fulfilled the previous ones.⁶⁶⁸

In this context, for Baykal, Turkey had to pursue an honorable, respected and active policy that protected Turkey's national interest and that maintained her national independence and indivisible integrity as a nation and country.⁶⁶⁹ Being grounded on these principles, Baykal said, the national foreign policy of Turkey could only be based on Turkey's survival and security.⁶⁷⁰ As the EU was interested in keeping Turkey as the "permanent candidate for the EU",⁶⁷¹ a submissive policy would prevent Turkey from gaining an honorable and respected status in the international arena. Based on this, Baykal stated that Turkey should not give any concessions on her 'national causes', mainly, her Cyprus policy, interests in the Aegean Sea, and the minority rights perspective that she bases on the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.⁶⁷²

In this regard, similar to the NAP's position in the late 1990s, for Baykal, too, the EU was insincere and not observant of its past commitments. This was especially apparent when the EU did not keep its promise of removing the trade embargo to the Northern Cyprus after the Annan Plan, which was voted 'yes' by the Turkish Cypriots although this did not even fully coincide with Turkish interests.⁶⁷³ Thus, just as the recognition of the RoC turned into a precondition to be a member after 2004, Turkey's position on the Armenian issue would also be elevated to a condition of EU membership:

They could not turn [the Armenian issue] into a precondition [for membership] but made it a must Armenian genocide will be resolved, then will come the Pontus genocide, then the

⁶⁶⁸ Baykal, "Grup Konuşması," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, October 17, 2006, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed February 19, 2008).

⁶⁶⁹ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Güzel Günler Göreceğiz: CHP 2002 Seçim Bildirgesi*, <<http://www.belgenet.com/secim/bildirge/chp2002-1.html>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶⁷⁰ Baykal, "Dış Politika Bizim En Temel Dayanak Noktamızdır," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, February 21, 2006, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁶⁷¹ Baykal, "Baykal'ın Grup Konuşması," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, October 4, 2005, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁶⁷² Baykal, "Lozan'a, Ege'ye, Kıbrıs'a Dokundurmamız," Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, June 28, 2005, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁶⁷³ Ibid.

Assyrian genocide; they are all waiting in the line [The EU] will pursue its relation with Turkey by incessantly insulting her and putting her into a permanent guilt complex. This is not right, this is impossible to accept.⁶⁷⁴

Again, similar to the NAP's critical articulations on the EU reforms, Baykal sought to delegitimize the pro-reform arguments by recourse to 'national sovereignty'. As regards those that supported the abolishment of the Article 301 of the 1982 Constitution, which outlawed the statements that insulted Turkishness, Baykal stated:

Everybody is calling for 301, as if all were in the same the chorus. Why 301? What does the 301 defend? It defends Turkishness. Why does this disturb you, friends? How is this relevant to human rights, freedom of speech, or democratization? You (the government) promised to take the 'sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation' off the wall and give it to the people. You took it off the wall but submitted it to Europe!⁶⁷⁵

Similarly, Erdoğan warned the EU not to intervene in Turkey's domestic affairs by criticizing the Turkish Parliament's procrastination of amending the Article 301: "Nobody can interfere in our domestic affairs, the functioning of our parliament or its schedule. We are Turkey, and we are Turks, we will make our own decision."⁶⁷⁶

5.2. The integrationist approach

Apart from the defensive approach discussed above, the foreign policy articulations regarding the EU and the Cyprus issue also involved a de-securitized version of the elements of Kemalism. Those who had recourse to this approach did not view the EU or the Cyprus issue from a national security state perspective but rather emphasized the role of Turkey in integrating the European ideals and spreading it elsewhere by serving as a peculiar role model. From this perspective, the EU was not regarded as a rival, an untrustworthy ally or a negative Other against which Turkey needed to protect her own national interests and sovereignty, but rather as a coalition of values. While the elements of 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization' and 'serving as a model to the other nations' emerged as the main templates used

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁶ Erdoğan, "Başbakan Erdoğan'dan AB'ye Mesaj," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, September 17, 2004, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed February 19, 2008).

in this regard, the integrationist approach also provided a revised version of the other elements of Kemalism which the defensive approach ‘fixed’ to threat-based articulations.

5.2.1. Restoring ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘participatory democracy’: towards a pluralist and national security-free conception of Kemalism

The integrationist approach’s take on the elements of ‘national integrity’ and ‘sovereignty’ involved freeing these elements from the security-based connotation added to them by the defensive approach. In contrast to the preoccupation of the defensive approach with conserving the values of the state against the separatist views, those who followed the integrationist approach drew on a human-centered and pluralist conception of sovereignty especially in reconstructing the element of participatory democracy. This was first apparent in the discourse of the conservative parties, the TPP and the WP; and was later ‘captured’ by the JDP in 2002. Yet, as will be seen, just as it was not only the military establishment that followed the defensive approach, the integrationist approach was not only propagated by the leaders of the conservative parties.

In the late 1990s, the WP’s discourse emerged as a representative of this approach in the way it diverged from the threat-based articulations on the secularism principle.⁶⁷⁷ The program of the coalitional government (TPP-WP) stated that the “democratic and secular characteristics of the Turkish Republic and Atatürk’s principles together form[ed] the common compromising ground between the two coalitional partners.”⁶⁷⁸ Yet, Erbakan’s defense against the case initiated by Vural Savaş to disband the party revealed how the WP was neither against secularism as had been suggested by Savaş as well as by other party leaders during the period, nor did it uphold the secularism as had been defined by the defensive approach. Rather, Erbakan’s definition of secularism suggested a more pluralist and

⁶⁷⁷ The remarks of the Head of the RPP, Deniz Baykal, are illuminating in this sense: “We, as the RPP have long observed the danger and the threat the Welfare Party posed against the secular, democratic and republican regime... We have pursued our struggle against this threat with utmost determination.” Quoted in *TRT Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu: Dış Politikanın Nabzu*, 55.

⁶⁷⁸ Savaş, 114.

liberal understanding of democracy. For Erbakan, secularism did not only involve the separation of religion and state affairs but also the freedom of religion and the guarantee that all citizens received equal treatment before law irrespective of the faith they had.⁶⁷⁹ Closing down a party based on an unproven threat it posed to the Republic, would make the accusations groundless, and the decision undemocratic as well as contradictory to the European Human Rights Agreement to which Turkey had been a party since 1987.⁶⁸⁰ Erbakan warned against the definitions of secularism that could limit or remove the freedom of religion,⁶⁸¹ and focused on human rights rather than the protection of national security values of the state. In this way, the WP's discourse elevated democracy and basic rights and freedoms to a condition to be met at all times, rather than viewing it as a future goal at the expense of current democracy. Based on this view, democracy did not require a pre-established set of ideas shared by all, but also those that could "offend, shock or disturb certain segments of the society," because diversity and tolerance were the precondition for democracy.⁶⁸²

This approach became especially prominent in the discourse of the JDP, which also diverged from the defensive approach of the previous DLP-NAP-MP coalitional government in that it represented pluralism and liberal values as conditions for democracy. For the party, democracy was possible only if the threat element was removed from the discourse.⁶⁸³ From this perspective, democracy meant understanding different religions, ethnicities and cultures as an enrichment, decreasing the role of the state and taking a human-centered approach.⁶⁸⁴ Placing the human rights and pluralist democracy at the center of the definition given as

⁶⁷⁹ Erbakan, *Refah Partisi Savunması* (Istanbul: Fast Yayıncılık, 1997), 90.

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 102.

⁶⁸¹ *Ibidem.*

⁶⁸² *Ibid.*, 41.

⁶⁸³ Erdoğan, "Türkiye'de şu anda maalesef tam sağlıklı bir demokrasi yaşamıyoruz," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, December 25, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁶⁸⁴ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, *Herşey Türkiye İçin: AK Parti (2002) Seçim Beyanamesi*, <<http://www.belgenet.com/secim/bildirge/akp2002-1.html>> (accessed January 14, 2008). See also Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, *AK Parti Tüzüğü*, accessible from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

regards 'national sovereignty', the party also reformulated a different nodal point to Kemalism by reconstructing the previous one. This was apparent in Erdoğan's definition of what was called as the 'human-centered' approach. Defining the national sovereignty from a liberal perspective that ascribed a minimal role to the state, Erdoğan said, "Atatürk once said that farmers are the masters of the nation. Let me add another element to this formulation: Nation is the master of the state."⁶⁸⁵

The integrationist vision of the party also showed itself in the way it approached Kemalist nationalism, which was synthesized within the term 'I am from Turkey'. In that it placed different ethnicities under the supra-identity of Turkish citizenship, the JDP suggested a pluralist approach to nationalism.⁶⁸⁶ Second, similar to the WP that gave a primary role to democracy rather than seeing secularism as a precondition for it, the JDP's integrationist approach also involved seeing the religion not as a threat to be removed from the society but as a necessary ingredient of the Turkish culture. To this view, the genuine implementation of secularism depended on the establishment of brotherhood between different faiths and the protection of religious rights and freedoms of individuals, be they were Muslims, Jewish, or Christian.⁶⁸⁷ This aspect was also emphasized within the 'conservative' identity of the party.⁶⁸⁸ To the JDP, conservatism meant respecting cultural traditions without viewing them as an impediment to new developments necessary for modernization. Failing to do so, for the JDP, would endanger not only the social peace but also political pluralism.⁶⁸⁹

⁶⁸⁵ Erdoğan, "Başbakan Erdoğan Eskişehir'de: Atatürk 'köylü milletin efendisidir' dedi. Ben buna bir kelime ilave ediyorum ve 'millet devletin efendisidir' diyorum," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, March 4, 2004, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁶⁸⁶ Consider the following remarks of Erdoğan: "Turkish, Kurdish, Circassian, Laz, what have you, the identity that binds us all is citizenship of Turkish Republic." See Erdoğan, "Başbakan Erdoğan: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşlığı bizim ortak paydamızdır. Bizler Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olarak o üst ortak paydada birleşerek el ele vereceğiz," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, December 10, 2005, accessible from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed June 16, 2008).

⁶⁸⁷ Erdoğan, "İzmir," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, April 3, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁶⁸⁸ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, *Herşey Türkiye İçin: AK Parti (2002) Seçim Beyannamesi*, <<http://www.belgenet.com/secim/bildirge/akp2002-1.html>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶⁸⁹ Erdoğan, "Başbakan Erdoğan Sun-Valley Konferansı'nda Konuştu," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, July 6, 2005, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

These elements were also present in the JDP's articulations on the EU, which again diverged from the threat-based discourse of the previous coalitional government that emphasized 'national sovereignty' and the 'unacceptability of giving concessions on the high national interests'. In this vein, the JDP's 2002 election program stated:

Our party sees Turkey's full membership to the EU as a natural consequence of our modernization process The ideological attitudes of the anti-EU segments of the population with regard to national sovereignty, national security, national interest, national and regional culture hinder the realization of the Copenhagen criteria. Our party subscribes to the view that replaces these concepts, which aspire to maintain the bureaucratic and statist tradition, with a democratic, civil and pluralist understanding that ascribes a higher value a higher value to law that protects the individual and emphasizes public participation.⁶⁹⁰

This 'human-centered' approach was also evident in the party's motto: 'make the human live so that the states lives'.⁶⁹¹ In this sense, giving priority to privatization and removing the legal barriers for the freedom of speech did not mean pave the way for the withering of state. These were equally important for the state because they would not only provide it with legitimacy but also a higher reputation in the international arena.⁶⁹² Presenting these ideas as 'crucial' for the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria, and defining the EU as the goal that had been pursued by all governments of the Republic for decades, Erdoğan declared that the only 'obstructionists', a term that had been used to define the Islamists before, were those who were reserved towards or against the EU.⁶⁹³

It is possible to find a similar emphasis in the RPP's discourse as well. The RPP did not only seek to hegemonize the elements employed by the JDP from a social democratic perspective but also revised the hitherto-employed principles of the party according to the changing conditions. The RPP entered the 2002 elections with the motto: "a new beginning", which was based on the ideas the party had propagated since its establishment, mainly, secularism, republicanism, and democracy, defined as the core of the civilization project of

⁶⁹⁰ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, *Herşey Türkiye İçin: AK Parti (2002) Seçim Beyannamesi*, <<http://www.belgenet.com/secim/bildirge/akp2002-1.html>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶⁹¹ Ibid.

⁶⁹² Ibid.

⁶⁹³ Erdoğan, "Tekirdağ 2. Olağan Kongresi," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, April 29, 2006, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

Atatürk.⁶⁹⁴ In its party program, the six principles of Kemalism were revised from this new outlook as suggested by the sixth principle: revolutionism, interpreted as reformism and continuous change.⁶⁹⁵ From this ‘new social democratic perspective’, privatization began to be considered as a legitimate policy and the state came to be seen as the main agent for redistribution, social justice and the elimination of regional economic differences.⁶⁹⁶ While this diverged from the statism propagated during the 1970s, as it did not suggest expanding the public sector, for the RPP, it was statist in essence and social democratic in character.⁶⁹⁷ In this sense, supporting privatization reforms did not deviate from Kemalist statism so long as it was pursued with an interest to prevent monopolization and safeguard the rights of the labor within the neo-liberal order.

In its definition of ‘participatory democracy’, too, the party suggested a change from the 1970’s definition and ascribed a particular importance to the civil society institutions rather than focusing only on the basic rights and freedoms of individuals.⁶⁹⁸ In seeing the civil society institutions and basic rights and freedoms crucial for the preservation of the main institutions of the state, the party also provided a new interpretation of Kemalism. This new interpretation was also presented as a way to ‘raise Turkey beyond the level of the new contemporary age’ which reconstructed the element of ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’:

The Republican People’s Party is the representative of a big innovative movement, which has its roots in our history and national struggle, which realized the Republic with the leadership of Atatürk, established the basis of the modern Turkey, started the process of democracy, and gained a democratic leftist and social democratic character with the 1960s The RPP was once the expression of a rebellion against imperialism, the established order, inequality,

⁶⁹⁴ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Güzel Günler Göreceğiz: CHP 2002 Seçim Bildirgesi*,

<<http://www.belgenet.com/secim/bildirge/chp2002-1.html>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶⁹⁵ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *CHP Parti Programı*, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid.

[Islamic] obstructionism, and concessions. In today's reality, the RPP is the owner of the ideal of making Turkey new and supersede the contemporary age.⁶⁹⁹

5.2.2. The EU reforms as a primary means to 'reach the level of the contemporary civilization'

As discussed in the previous sections, the DLP-MP-NAP coalitional government did not only initiate the EU reforms but also drew a direct link between the EU membership and the civilizational goal. The RPP leader Baykal also ascribed a similar meaning to the EU membership as exemplified in his following remark: “. . . [E]ither respect for beliefs, democracy, and the enlightenment of Atatürk's revolutions, or intolerance, non-contemporariness, and dogmatism; either a Turkey that is open to the world, a member of the EU and a regional leader, or a Turkey that is introverted, a third world country, and alone.”⁷⁰⁰ In line with the discourse of the RPP, the Prime Minister Erdoğan said, “Turkey has always preferred the West. We can never choose to be alone in the region by means of being left outside of the EU.”⁷⁰¹ The Deputy Head of the JDP, Murat Mercan also stated, “We do not have any alternative other than being Westernized.”⁷⁰² In the same vein, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül defined the EU vocation of Turkey as a civilization project, and a choice that is “unquestionable.”⁷⁰³ In placing the EU membership, democracy, and Atatürk's revolutions on the one hand, and the non-contemporariness, dogmatism and being an ‘abandoned’ third world country on the other,

⁶⁹⁹ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *CHP Parti Programı*, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁷⁰⁰ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Güzel Günler Göreceğiz: CHP 2002 Seçim Bildirgesi*, <<http://www.belgenet.com/secim/bildirge/chp2002-1.html>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁷⁰¹ Erdoğan, “Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Türkiye’de modernleşme ve demokratikleşme sürecinin miladıdır,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, May 29, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷⁰² Murat Mercan, “Batılılaşmaktan başka alternatifimiz yok,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, May 22, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷⁰³ Abdullah Gül, “Türkiye için AB bir Medeniyet Projesidir. Tartışılması Mümkün olmayan bir Tercihtir,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, May 25, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.gov.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

these articulations thereby underlined the indispensability of the EU membership for reaching the civilizational goal as prescribed by Atatürk.

These articulations were also reverberated in relation to the EU reforms. Shortly after coming to power with the 2002 elections, Erdoğan did not only describe the membership goal as the “most important project in order to realize Atatürk’s goal of reaching the level of the contemporary civilization” but also declared that the new government would be the most determined to accelerate the EU accession reforms in order to attain this objective.⁷⁰⁴ Based on this view, the previous governments were reserved towards the EU accession reforms because they considered the principle of ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’ as the most important value to be defended for sovereignty. Unless a pluralist, democratic and problem-solving approach replaced this defensive view, neither could Turkey join the EU, nor could she be a respected member of the world nations, nor could she be civilized.⁷⁰⁵ In this regard, in extending the areas of freedom, the EU reforms represented a great opportunity for Turkey to complete her civilization project rather than serving as a means to ‘dismember Turkey from where she belonged’.⁷⁰⁶

For the JDP, attributing a civilizational goal to the EU reforms was legitimate as the “Turkish public had chosen the EU as the representative of the contemporary civilization”⁷⁰⁷ as a result of the European identity that became inseparable from Turkey since the Atatürk’s reforms.⁷⁰⁸ According to this view, what made Turkey European and Turkey’s EU vocation legitimate was that Turkey embraced “participatory democracy, pluralism, the supremacy of law, human rights, secularism, and freedom of speech and conscience, values that Europe

⁷⁰⁴ Erdoğan, “Erdoğan’ın KKTC Ziyareti,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, November 16, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷⁰⁵ Erdoğan, “TBMM Grup Konuşması,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, June 19, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>>; and Erdoğan, “TBMM Grup Konuşması,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, May 1, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷⁰⁶ Erdoğan, “TBMM Grup Konuşması,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, June 19, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷⁰⁷ Erdoğan, “Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Türkiye’de modernleşme ve demokratikleşme sürecinin miladıdır,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, May 29, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid.

represent today.”⁷⁰⁹ In this sense, while Atatürk’s reforms established the Turkish identity in these lines, the EU reforms would serve to complete this civilizational project, which had a ‘domestic anchor’. Thought of this way, Turkey would block her own developmental path and fail to complete the reforms initiated by Atatürk by viewing the EU reforms as ‘alien values’ to be imported to Turkey. In this vein, warning those that were skeptical towards the EU accession reforms, Erdoğan stated, “Nobody should dare to block our path to the EU.”⁷¹⁰ His following remarks further clarified how the JDP saw the successful implementation of the EU reforms as the only means for Turkey to achieve her civilizational goal:

We are definitely for Turkey’s entry in the EU. In order not to be on the margins of the development and civilization in a developing and globalizing world, Turkey’s membership in the EU is necessary. We believe that the EU reforms are an important catalyst and as such necessary for Turkey to emerge as a country that has a functioning democracy and the rule of law, to secure the basic rights and freedoms and remove all the barriers restricting the expression of freedom of thought, to have a free market based on the rule of competition and equity, to be a part of the developed world, and to live humanly in peace and tranquility. One could argue that we could achieve this without the EU Let us be realistic The EU is a ‘model’ that can raise the political, economic and administrative standards of Turkey. In this sense, there is no other ‘model’ that can serve as a solution.⁷¹¹

In this sense, the EU was seen as an economic, cultural, and political model that best fit Turkey’s civilizational objective. Not only the values it represented but also the economic prosperity it promised was seen as a means to ‘reach the level of the contemporary civilization’. The following remarks of Erdoğan illustrate how the two were seen as dependent on each other:

Our economic development will be triggered as the culture of discussion and compromise is rooted, as differences are taken as richness and as transparency and accountability are present The EU membership, in other words, the objective of *reaching the level of the EU criteria* is crucial for Turkey.⁷¹²

While this remark considered the economic development as a final goal and saw the values and reforms as a means to attain it, it also represented a remarkable link between the

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁷¹⁰ Erdoğan, “Başbakan Erdoğan Carrefour Açılışında,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, June 7, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷¹¹ Erdoğan, “TBMM Grup Konuşması,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, June 5, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷¹² Ibid. Italics added.

EU criteria and the civilizational goal. Legitimizing the EU criteria by recourse to the previous template of ‘reaching the level of contemporary civilization’, it thereby added a new nodal point to Kemalism from an integrationist point of view. The below-quoted remark of Erdoğan also shows how the EU membership was not only taken as an economic and ideational goal but as a continuation of Turkey’s historical path:

Membership in the EU is a natural extension of Turkey’s historical path [It] is Turkey’s dream to be democratic, liberal, just and prosperous. EU membership is in the interest of Turkey. Our ideal is a Turkey that takes part among the democratic, free and advanced countries. The EU is the best way to reach this ideal.⁷¹³

As these remarks show, the articulations that sought to legitimize Turkey’s EU vocation had recourse to both identity-based and interest-based arguments, while the elements associated with following Atatürk’s path served as a template for making both legitimizations. These remarks also suggest a problem-solving approach to the hitherto-stated ‘need’ to upgrade the civilizational and developmental status of Turkey rather than pointing out the threats confronting Turkey on her way to becoming a member. In articulating the integration as the final objective this view hence diverged from the defensive articulations on the EU.

5.2.3. Projecting the EU vision on the Cyprus issue: revising the concepts of ‘independence’, ‘non-interference in the domestic affairs’ and ‘sovereignty’

The above-discussed approach was also prominent in the articulations on the Cyprus issue. For the JDP, the EU accession reforms would also help Turkey solve the Cyprus problem as it was seen impossible to arrive at a permanent solution in the island without being involved in the EU accession process. To Erdoğan, Turkey did not have a luxury to hang on to her national sensitivities such as Cyprus by insisting on her previous position; rather, only by implementing the EU conditionalities could Turkey have a more say in the Cyprus issue.⁷¹⁴

⁷¹³ Erdoğan, “Başbakan Erdoğan: Türkiye geleceği için son derece önemli bir kavşaktan alınmış akıyla dönmüştür,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, July 27, 2004, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷¹⁴ Erdoğan, “TBMM Grup Konuşması,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, June 5, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

This paralleled the approach advocated by Özal in the 1980s when he had suggested that the obsessive insistence on the Cyprus issue would only obstruct Turkey's European vocation and the achievement of her civilizational goal. Based on this view, one should pursue a more problem-solving approach with regard to the Cyprus issue instead of insisting on the national security concerns, and should never relegate the European vocation under other foreign policy concerns.

The JDP called this policy as “the policy of solution and the win-win approach.”⁷¹⁵ This suggested that Turkey should take an active role as a guarantor state in resolving the conflict and refrain from viewing the resolution of the Cyprus issue as a precondition to undertake the EU reforms. For Erdoğan, if Turkey failed to implement the EU reforms and insisted on giving no concessions on the national security interests of Turkey regarding Cyprus just because some in the EU saw a change in Turkey's Cyprus position as a precondition for Turkey's membership, then Turkey would lose in both of her ‘national causes’.⁷¹⁶ As Erdoğan stated, this would not only lead to further isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and exacerbate the settlement of the conflict, but also make the Cyprus issue an ever-existing obstacle for Turkey with regard to her EU membership.⁷¹⁷ In this regard, the hitherto separated ‘causes’ of the EU membership and the Cyprus policy were integrated within the same ‘EU’ vision. While Turkey's accession to the EU was the best way to have a more say in the Cyprus issue, a problem-solving approach towards the issue would also trigger Turkey's membership. Second, if Turkey extended her EU agenda to the Turkish Cypriots, this would

⁷¹⁵ Erdoğan, “Başbakan Erdoğan: Kıbrıs Konusunda Çözüm Siyaseti İzleyeceğiz,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, October 17, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷¹⁶ Erdoğan, “AK Parti Kurucular Kurulu Genel Başkan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Başkanlığında Toplandı,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, February 1, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷¹⁷ Ibid.

further serve to attain both goals. In this vein, Erdoğan stated, “Turkish Cypriots are also a part of our EU vision.”⁷¹⁸

In legitimizing the new Cyprus policy in these terms, the JDP government clearly challenged the hitherto-pursued policy towards the resolution of the Cyprus issue.⁷¹⁹ The JDP’s discourse not only de-securitized Turkey’s EU conditionalities but also the Cyprus policy as a ‘national cause’. This paralleled a national-security-free conception for the principles of ‘full-independence’, ‘non-interference in the domestic affairs’ and ‘sovereignty’, which were employed in the articulations that linked Turkey’s EU vocation and Cyprus policy from a defensive approach. While the defensive approach underlined that the EU should not interfere in Turkey’s policy in Cyprus and respect Turkey’s sovereignty and independence, the JDP employed these principles to refer to the sovereign rights of the TRNC and Turkey’s non-interference in the TRNC’s domestic matters. Responding to a question as to whether Turkey would intervene after the Greek Cypriots voted ‘no’ in the referendum for a unified Cyprus,⁷²⁰ Erdoğan said, “Cyprus is an independent state. As an independent state, she will give her decisions herself. We cannot intervene.”⁷²¹ Similarly, “to demand a solution”, from this perspective, did not mean “giving up on the sovereignty rights of the Turkish citizens on the island”, but on the contrary, “safeguarding the future of the Cypriot Turks.”⁷²² Hence, the elements of ‘full-independence’, ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’ and ‘sovereignty’ were not used as a shield against the EU reforms or imminent security threats but rather as a

⁷¹⁸ Erdoğan, “AB vizyonumuzun içinde Kıbrıs Türkleri de var,” November 15, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷¹⁹ Öniş, “Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era”, 30. Consider the following remarks of Erdoğan: “We do not want to use the language of the status-quo.” See Erdoğan, “Kıbrıs’ta asla ver-kurtul politikasından yana değiliz ama bu saatten sonra 40 yıllık politika ile de bir yere varılamayacağımızı söylüyoruz,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, January 5, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷²⁰ Kofi Annan presented the Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem on November 11, 2002 and the deadline was set for February 7, 2003. In case the final proposal was accepted, then Cyprus would become a member as a united country. The full text of the Annan Plan can be available from <<http://www.tcea.org.uk/Annan-Plan-For-Cyprus-Settlement.htm>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁷²¹ Erdoğan, “Bavulumuzu Toplamak Yok,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, December 14, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷²² Ibid.

confirmation that Turkey respected the rights of others in accordance with her ‘foundational principles’.

The government’s support for the Annan Plan, which envisioned a united Cyprus, was in this sense an indicator for the government’s willingness to extend its EU vision to both the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots living on the island. In this vein, the government gave full support for the integration of both Greeks and Turks in the EU, and promised that the ports to the RoC would be opened in return for the EU’s removal of its embargo on the Northern Cyprus.⁷²³ This was in line with the government’s attempt to de-securitize the issue and shift the focus towards the rights and freedoms of the Turkish Cypriots within the context of their accession to the EU together with the Greek Cypriots. From this integrationist perspective, Turkey would not only help the settlement of the conflict, contribute to the peace and democracy building in Cyprus and assure that both sides in Cyprus could reach the EU norms, standards and values.⁷²⁴ She would also secure her civilizational goal to become a member of the EU.

5.2.4. The elements of Kemalism as a ‘model’ to other countries: projecting the Kemalist principles and ‘civilization’ beyond Turkey

‘Reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’ was also linked to another element of Kemalism in the integrationist foreign policy articulations of the period: ‘serving as a model to the other nations’. The articulations that made this link suggested that as Turkey integrated the contemporary values within her domestic values with an aim to ‘reach the level of the contemporary civilization’, she would also project this unique civilizational model to

⁷²³ On Erdoğan’s speeches on the necessity to remove the embargo applied to both Greeks and Turks on the Northern part of the island, see Erdoğan, “Başbakan Erdoğan KKTC Cumhurbaşkanı Denктаş ile Görüştü,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, May 9, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008). Accordingly, Erdoğan stated: “I do not find a view that supports embargos as congruent with human rights. These type of approaches do not bring a solution but only exacerbate the existing problem.” See Erdoğan, “Başbakan Erdoğan Lübnan Başbakanı Hariri Ortak Basın Toplantısı,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, May 12, 2004, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷²⁴ Gül, “Dışişleri Bakanı Gül, Kıbrıs Eylem Planını Açıkladı,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, January 24, 2006, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed February 13, 2008).

the other countries both in order to raise their status to the level she aspired to reach and to serve as a bridge between the so-called ‘irreconcilable cultures’, namely, the Muslim and the Western worlds. In this sense, ‘serving as a model to the other countries’ was not only seen as an extension of the civilizational objective attributed to Kemalism but also a tangible example of the principle of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’.

Indeed, Ecevit’s RPP in the 1970s, Özal’s MP in the 1980s, and Erbakan’s WP in the early 1990s had employed this template. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Cem also referred to the same template in his references to the ‘global outlook’ of Turkey. While Cem drew on the traditional components of the ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ principle in legitimizing the ‘global outlook’ as the foreign policy Turkey should conduct in the 21st century, he also added new elements to this principle, mainly, ‘respect for human rights’ and ‘tolerance’. Cem’s following remark shows how this new template was represented as a model to be ‘exported’ to the other regions of the world:

The goal of today’s generation should be to carry Turkey to the 21st century with the characteristics of a ‘[g]lobal State’ that acts as a role model with its democracy, secularism, respect for human rights and its traditional characteristic - tolerance...that truly fulfils the requisites of our great leader Atatürk’s dictum; ‘Peace at home, peace in the world’... that competes with the best in the realms of science, technology and economy... and that becomes one of the major centres of attraction with its historical record, cultural richness, humanism, and sense of identity with all contemporary values a Turkey, that can be a model for others in the direction pointed by Atatürk.⁷²⁵

In this regard, Turkey’s incorporation of her ‘foundational principles’ with the contemporary values and her ability to reflect this synthesis far beyond her borders was not only seen as the ‘genuine’ application of the ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ principle but also as a ‘civilizational model’ that affirmed Turkey’s already ‘civilized’ status. As the above-quoted remark of Cem underlines, a ‘global Turkey’ would emulate neither the West nor the East; she would rather be the one whom others looked up to. Instead of engaging in an ‘obsessive’ emulation that would flatten the richness of Turkey’s unique synthesis, a ‘global

⁷²⁵ Cited in *Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem*, 1. See also Cem, “Turkey: Setting Sail to the 21st Century,” *Perceptions* 2, 3 (September-November 1997), <<http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume2/September-November1997/TURKEYSETTINGSAILTOTHE21STCENTURY.pdf>> (accessed June 18, 2008).

Turkey' would be the one that incorporated the global values within Turkey's domestic principles and that presented them as a model for the rest. Consider the following remarks of Cem:

With her values such as democracy, human rights, and secularism, Turkey sets an example to the countries that share the Islam tradition Turkey is a 'model'. We will not impose this role on to others but exhibit it as a historic experience for their benefit. This will be Turkey's major contribution to the Islam world.⁷²⁶

Here we see how Turkey's Muslim characteristic was presented as a unique advantage insofar as it was escorted with the successful application of secularism, democracy, and human rights. The following remarks of Cem are also exemplary: "Being the only country with a predominantly Muslim population which has the ideals and practices of a pluralist democracy, secularism, the rule of law, human rights, and gender equality, Turkey enjoys the privilege of constituting a paradigm of modernization."⁷²⁷ This 'rare' combination of having a predominantly Muslim population on the one hand, and pursuing the principles of secularism, human rights, gender equality, the rule of law and pluralist democracy on the other was thereby presented as a proof that Turkey could contribute to both civilizations. In this sense, while the emphasis put on the Muslim characteristic of Turkey specified for whom she could serve as a model (the Islam world), it also ascribed yet another role to be played by the 'global Turkey': serving as a 'bridge' between the two civilizations.

In the late 1990s, this role began to be emphasized also in relation to yet another concept, the 'harmony of civilizations', which was integrated within the principle of 'peace at home, and peace in the world' and 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization'. These articulations suggested that as Turkey already possessed the characteristics of both civilizations, her projection of this model on other countries would not only serve to establish 'harmony between civilizations' but also reaffirm that Turkey represented the very 'harmony' in her unique synthesis. This was apparent in Cem's statements that situated the bridge role

⁷²⁶ Cited in *Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem*, 2.

⁷²⁷ Cited in *Turkey in the 21st Century*, 156.

within the context of Turkey's EU vocation. As he stated in 1999, while Turkey could contribute to the "harmonization of civilizations" with the Copenhagen values she already possessed, the EU could do the same by including Turkey at a time that was "endangered by the much discussed 'clash' of civilizations."⁷²⁸

Following the events in September 11, this template began to receive more emphasis in the Turkish foreign policy discourse. This was also prominent in the RPP's discourse, which also captured the term 'harmony of civilizations' and integrated it within the principles of 'peace at home, peace in the world', 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization', and 'serving as a model to the other countries'. In its 2002 election program, the RPP reassured that it was the 'owner' of the principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world', which targeted a strong and effective Turkey that would be the leader for the regional and world peace. Similar to Cem's 'global state', the RPP defined its foreign policy vision in terms of what it called as the "unprecedented" Turkey Model, the formation of which was dated back to Atatürk.⁷²⁹ For the RPP, this model gained a particular relevance and importance after September 11, which created a historic opportunity and responsibility for Turkey.⁷³⁰ From this perspective, Turkey, as the only country that managed to merge Islam, secularism, participatory democracy, human rights and market economy, was "the sole country which had the opportunity to serve as a model for a geography that covered both Atlantic and China."⁷³¹ The RPP further linked this 'unique' role model to Turkey's pursuit of her 'foundational principles', and considered it as the main contribution she could provide for the EU. In legitimizing Turkey's EU objective in this way, the RPP hence represented

⁷²⁸ Ibid., 156-157.

⁷²⁹ In the 2002 election program of the party, the following statement was made: "We are conscious of our responsibility and experience to realize the 'Turkey Model' formed by Atatürk which is unprecedented in the world." See Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *CHP Parti Programı*, available from <<http://www.chp.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷³⁰ Ibid.

⁷³¹ Ibid.

Turkey's integration with the EU as a direct application of Turkey's 'own model'. The following statement is illustrative in this respect:

The 'Turkey Model', the bases of which were established by Kemal Atatürk, provides a guideline for the Islam and the Western World to live together in harmony and peace. For this reason, we believe that the success and the exemplary characteristic of the 'Turkey Model' will contribute to the peace and stability in the region and the world. With this characteristic, Turkey, which will reach the level of contemporary civilization by fulfilling the EU criteria, will gain reputation both in the West and the East and fulfill her mission to be a cultural and harmony bridge between the two civilizations more effectively.⁷³²

As a party that emerged as a staunch supporter for multi-culturalism, pluralism, liberalism and the EU reforms, it was of no surprise that the JDP government that was established with the 2002 elections would also capture this new element integrated in Kemalism. In the same line with its definition of secularism that suggested the peaceful coexistence of different religions, the JDP focused on how Turkey could contribute to the secular, liberal and pluralist characteristic of the EU by means of her 'difference' from the rest of the EU countries. To this view, Turkey's 'unique' role on the one hand, and her EU membership quest on the other served as a great opportunity for the EU given that it sought to represent unity within diversity rather than cultural homogeneity. In contrast to the defensive discourse that viewed the EU as a Christian Club, this view rather redefined the EU in terms of the ideas both Turkey and the EU shared and emphasized Turkey's role in strengthening and spreading these values further. In this vein, the Prime Minister Erdoğan stated, "The EU is neither a Christian Union nor a regional unity. EU is a sum of political ideas. The EU is not a union that invites clash of civilizations; it is an address of the meeting, harmonization and compromise of different civilizations."⁷³³ Hence, Turkey's difference would strengthen the values upon which the EU was founded:

The European identity is a product of the quest to forge harmony among different identities, traditions, cultures and religions. Turkish history is shaped by tolerance, secularism, democracy, rule of law and her European vocation. Historically, geographically, politically and economically, Turkey has been and will continue to be part of Europe and share the same

⁷³² Ibid.

⁷³³ Erdoğan, "Başbakan Erdoğan ve Barroso'nun ortak basın toplantısı," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, July 2, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

values and principles. Turkey has been pioneering a model of conciliation between cultural identity and modernism. This should be taken as a model in the world where divisions between religions and cultures are growing, where terrorism is wreaking havoc.⁷³⁴

In this sense, the reconstitution of the principles of ‘serving as a model to the other countries’, ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’, and ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ in terms of the new term of ‘harmony of civilizations’ also helped building a stable link between the European identity and the Turkish identity. As the above-quoted remarks show, Europeanness was defined in terms of the same principles that were linked to Turkey’s pursuit of her civilizational project and her model. Confirming this, Erdoğan stated, “The EU is not an Other for us anymore.”⁷³⁵ Similarly, he argued, “While Turkey is gaining something from the EU, she also has a lot to offer. Turkey is a model that conciliates democracy and Islam culture.”⁷³⁶ To this view, Turkey’s entry in the EU and her ability to fulfill the EU criteria in a country where the majority was Muslim would inevitably change the perspective of the EU countries towards the one and a half billion Muslims in the world, while at the same time changing the view of the one and a half billion Muslim towards the European countries.⁷³⁷ As Turkey carried out her ‘unique’ civilizational model at home and projected it elsewhere, she could also show that the previous conceptions of Otherness could be demolished and replaced by tolerance towards differences. In this vein, Erdoğan defined Turkey as “a symbol of peaceful coexistence.”⁷³⁸

This template was also employed in the articulations on the Cyprus issue. From this perspective, the solution of the issue depended on Turkey’s projection of her civilizational model on the Northern Cyprus and the accession of Cyprus to the EU as a unified state. In this

⁷³⁴ Mercan, “Mercan: Modernizm ve kültürel kimlik arasındaki uyum modeli için Türkiye örnek ülke,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, September 25, 2003, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷³⁵ Erdoğan, “AB bizim için artık bir Öteki değildir,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, December 28, 2005, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷³⁶ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, *Herşey Türkiye İçin: AK Parti (2002) Seçim Beyannamesi*, <<http://www.belgenet.com/secim/bildirge/akp2002-1.html>> (accessed January 14, 2008).

⁷³⁷ Erdoğan, “Başbakan Erdoğan Chicago’daki Türkler’le biraraya geldi,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, June 12, 2004, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷³⁸ Erdoğan, “Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın Kurban Bayramı ve Yeni Yıl mesajı,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, December 30, 2006, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

vein, special emphasis was placed on the economic development of the Northern Cyprus and the removal of the EU's economic embargo on the Northern part of the island. In contrast to the defensive view that emphasized how the RoC's membership in the EU would pose a security threat to Turkey, this approach rather pointed out the importance of the EU reforms on the rule of law, democracy, human rights and secularism in resolving the conflict that haunted both communities living on the island. According to this view, only by implementing the Copenhagen reforms throughout the whole island and thereby becoming a member of the EU could Cyprus turn into an island of "peaceful coexistence."⁷³⁹ Similarly, it was suggested that the integration of the Muslim Turkish Cypriots within the accession plan of Cyprus would also "prove the world that democracy and Islam culture could coexist."⁷⁴⁰ The following remarks of Erdoğan are also illustrative: "End to ethnic religious and regional nationalism! That is what we are doing in Turkey. If the same is done in Cyprus as well, then all [the problems] will vanish."⁷⁴¹

In this sense, the revision of the Cyprus policy to involve a humanitarian, economic and civilizational dimension supported and confirmed the model advocated in relation to Turkey's EU vocation. From this perspective, having a de-securitized view towards Cyprus was not associated with a submissive policy towards the EU but Turkey's own civilizational agenda and the pursuit of her 'foundational principles'. Hence, from this approach, there was no incompatibility between Turkey's European vocation and the Cyprus cause by virtue of this link. Choosing one over the other was not necessary since both were informed by the same principles and as both served to reach the same goal. The remarks of the government speaker in response to the accusations by the RPP towards the JDP's Cyprus approach are

⁷³⁹ Erdoğan, "Başbakan Erdoğan: Temennimiz odur ki Kıbrıs bir barış adası haline Birleşik Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti olarak gelsin," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, April 20, 2004, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷⁴⁰ Erdoğan, "Erdoğan'ın KKTC Ziyareti" Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, November 16, 2002, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

⁷⁴¹ Erdoğan, "Başbakan Erdoğan ABD'de," Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, December 18, 2006, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed January 13, 2008).

therefore to the point. As a response to this defensive remark, the JDP stated that blaming the present government for selling the ‘Cyprus cause’ for the EU goal was unacceptable; the government did not face a dilemma of choosing between Cyprus and the EU.⁷⁴²

Conclusion

As our discussion showed, the foreign policy articulations between 1997 and 2007 on Turkey’s European vocation and Cyprus cause were not exempt from the elements of Kemalism; rather, these elements provided the main repertoire for the terms used in relation to both policies. Structuring the analysis according to what was identified as the defensive and integrationist discourses helped us show that while there were many different political factions represented in the government during the period, the party discourses on Turkey’s European vocation and Cyprus cause vacillated between these two discourses that diverged in the way they represented and ordered the elements of Kemalism.

The articulations that drew on the defensive discourse constructed a security-centered narrative out of the elements of Kemalism. From this perspective, the term of ‘national struggle’ was employed both to counter Customs Union and Turkey’s integration with the Muslim countries; secularism was used as a foreign policy principle to delegitimize Turkey’s integration with the Islamic world; the elements attributed to the ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ principle and the principle of ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’ were employed to emphasize a non-submissive policy both towards the EU and the Cyprus issue. Turkey’s security interests and ‘national honor’ were elevated over other foreign policy concerns.

The articulations that drew on the integrationist discourse, on the other hand, presented a de-securitized narrative out of the elements of Kemalism, in representing economic

⁷⁴²Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, “Bakanlar Kurulu Toplantısı,” December 11, 2006, available from <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (accessed December 1, 2007).

prosperity, participatory democracy, pluralism, multiculturalism, peaceful coexistence, and the harmony of civilizations as a means to realize the principles of ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’, ‘peace at home, peace in the world’, and ‘serving as a model to the other countries’. Secularism was not used to counter Turkey’s integration with the Muslim world but presented as one of the ‘foundational principles’ of Turkey that showed Turkey’s unique role in the Muslim world. From this perspective, Turkey’s integration with the EU and the resolution of the Cyprus issue depended on the extent to which Turkey could incorporate the global values with her ‘foundational principles’ and project them beyond her borders. While a defensive version of the principle of ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’ pointed out that the consideration of the EU goal as the only way to reach the contemporary civilization was ‘humiliating’, the integrationist approach constituted a new formation of this element in linking Turkey’s civilizational goal directly to the EU reforms: ‘raising both Turkey and Northern Cyprus to the level of the EU criteria’.

In this regard, the contemporary period does not represent the ‘dissolution of the Kemalist principles’ or ‘the end of the ideology’ in Turkish politics. Rather, it suggests an extension of the Kemalist chain. The contemporary discourse not only drew on the previous elements of Kemalism but also added new formations to the previously constructed chain — ‘reaching the level of the EU criteria’, ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization through becoming a strong Eurasian power’, and ‘the harmony of civilizations through peace at home, peace in the world’.

Second, while new policies were legitimized by recourse to the ‘foundational principles’ and became part of the official discourse, some initiatives remained marginalized as a result of the changes in the international context and the dynamics between the integrationist and defensive discourses. The Islamist defensive discourse was replaced by an integrationist one as Turkey moved closer to the EU goal and as the defensive discourse

delegitimized Islamism. This made the pro-EU and secularism-centered discourse emerge as the only legitimate template at the disposal of the once Islamist parties to counter the defensive overtures that delegitimized Turkey's rapprochement with the Muslim countries. Similarly, the articulations of some military officials that suggested an alternative to Turkey's European orientation were also pushed to the margins of the political discourse as Turkey became a candidate country and as the political parties that took part in the government delegitimized any attempts that sought to permanently drift Turkey from her European vocation. Similarly, as the EU reforms clashed with the principles of 'non-interference in domestic affairs' and 'full-independence', the integrationist articulations on Turkey's European vocation were counterbalanced by a defensive emphasis on these elements within the context of Turkey's accession to the EU.

Third, the legitimization of the Cyprus cause and Turkey's European vocation in terms of the elements of Kemalism, as well as their translation in terms of the values attributed to the European integration did not permit viewing the Cyprus cause and Turkey's European vocation as separate paths to be chosen over the other. They were reconciled in being seen as part of Turkey's 'foundational principles'. On the other hand, given the competing constructions of Kemalism, the way these policies were handled also suggested a clash between the integrationist and defensive articulations on these policies. Hence, while these policies were reconciled within each discourse, they were juxtaposed against each other when competing articulations on these policies were at stake; in other words, when each discourse attempted to delegitimize the view of the other. In this sense, from a defensive position, a de-securitized approach to Cyprus was seen against Turkey's European vocation as the latter did not have any value if Turkey's security was endangered. By the same token, from the integrationist approach, a security-centered Cyprus policy derailed Turkey's accession to the EU as it delayed the implementation of the EU reforms.

Indeed, the borders between the defensive and integrationist approaches were blurred as the parties had recourse to both discourses in their struggle to legitimize their policies and their stand in politics. While this suggests that parties were not consistent in the way they interpreted the elements of Kemalism, it also shows that Kemalism has not produced a unanimous foreign policy reaction and served as a contested template to both reconcile and counterpoise different foreign policy objectives. In this sense, it was not an objectively identifiable Kemalism but the ‘clash of Kemalisms’ that structured the foreign policy articulations on Turkey’s European orientation and Cyprus policy.

CONCLUSION

The goals of the study

As it is with most of the studies that fall within the domain of IR, the main focus of the analyses of Turkish foreign policy has been tilted towards revealing an answer to a number of *why* questions posed with regard to Turkey's particular foreign policy 'actions' or 'choices'. In most of these works, the role of ideology captures minimal space, if any at all. On the other hand, the studies that reserve a more substantial role for a particular ideology in a given foreign policy attribute a causal role to ideology by providing an operationalizable definition of the ideology in question and assuming an interest-free ideational space that can shape the interest-based material world. While this is mostly undertaken in an attempt to show that 'ideology matters', these studies overlook the role of alternative definitions for the ideology in question and ignore a number of other issues, e.g. how the meaning of a particular ideology may change over time, how 'ideological' it is to provide a fixed definition for an ideology, and the self-constitutive aspect of the discourse.

In an attempt to reveal the problems with attributing a non-discursive and directive role to ideology in shaping foreign policy, this study has sought to show that the relationship between foreign policy and ideology is discursively constructed and is co-constitutive rather than causal, and that multiple constructions of 'truths', identities and interests, lie at the core of ideology and foreign policy making. Following a poststructuralist approach, this study took discourse as the sphere within which both ideology and foreign policy is constructed and thus the medium of their mutual constitution. Within the poststructuralist literature, however, both objects of analysis, i.e. ideology and foreign policy, are studied separately. While poststructuralist works on ideology do not examine the self-constitutive aspect of ideology in the foreign policy sphere, the poststructuralist research agenda in foreign policy focuses on the relationship between identity and foreign policy. The main ambition of the present study

was therefore three-fold: 1) situate the poststructuralist conceptualization of ideology within the IR literature, 2) fill the gap in the poststructuralist research agenda in IR by examining the co-constitutive relationship between ideology and foreign policy, and 3) contribute to the Turkish foreign policy studies which are dominated mostly by the realist and, to a certain extent, the ideationalist approaches.

Resolving the puzzle

With these aims, the dissertation focused on the role of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy discourse on the Western/European-orientation and the Cyprus policy – two allegedly incompatible foreign policies. The arguments that defined these policies as irreconcilable pointed out that the Cyprus policy diverged from Turkey's Western/European-orientation in having been undertaken as an independent policy from the Western bloc (during the Cold War period) and the EEC/EU (during and after the Cold War). Turkey's defensive and occasionally-manifested offensive overtures with regard to this policy led some authors to argue that Turkey's Cyprus policy neither fit in the framework of Turkey's EU accession, nor corresponded to a European identity or the sort of rationality that placed the EU goal as the fundamental objective of Turkish foreign policy. According to this view, following an-EU-oriented/European approach required more 'compromising' policies, e.g. being willing to abandon the traditional stance towards the Cyprus issue. On the other hand, some approached the 'irreconcilability' from the other side of the coin, arguing that Turkey's Western-orientation and EU vocation conflicted with the Kemalist principle of 'full-independence', while the Cyprus intervention of 1974 was a successful application of this principle. The main puzzle in this context was how a single ideology, namely, Kemalism, could be used as a legitimating criterion for the policies that were apparently irreconcilable with each other.

This study argued that understanding compatibility and incompatibility of particular policies should rather focus on the basic legitimating criterion for these policies rather than

taking the task of attributing an *a priori* identity and rationality to them. The case analyses showed that articulations on these policies were embedded with different elements of Kemalism (the objectives/principles attributed to following Atatürk's path), and that both policies have been reconciled and counterpoised by means of the competing formulations of the objectives of Kemalism. This process, as was shown, also contributed to the construction and the continuous change of Kemalism as each foreign policy articulation ascribed a corollary meaning to it. Hence, this study argued that it is problematic to claim that Kemalism directs Turkish foreign policy towards a specific goal and that these policies are inherently opposite to or compatible with each other. Thus, the main task of the dissertation was to examine which discursive moves were made in linking these policies to the pursuit of the Kemalist principles, and how a certain type of rationality and identity was constituted in making this link.

Focusing on how each of these policies were legitimized by recourse to the elements of Kemalism revealed a triangular discursive template that constructed an indirect link between both policies, each being attached to the objectives of Kemalist foreign policy. We have seen that most of the party discourses (before the 1980s) suggested that the Cyprus policy and the European vocation were rather separate policies. On the other hand, as the Turkish army's withdrawal from the Northern Cyprus turned into an indirect condition for Turkey's EEC/EU membership, the political discourse offered a direct link between these policies in either representing Turkey's traditional Cyprus policy as an extension of Turkey's European orientation or as an obstacle to Turkey's membership in the EEC/EU.

Our discussion showed that viewing these policies as incompatible or compatible rather depended on a specific interpretation of the Kemalist principles. Given its security-centered emphasis on Turkey's interests, 'national sovereignty', 'full-independence' and 'non-interference in domestic affairs', a defensive interpretation of the elements of Kemalism

suggested that 1) a submissive Cyprus policy was a clear deviation from Turkey's European vocation, and that 2) a submissive policy with regard to the EU was also a deviation from the principles of Kemalism. To those that constructed a de-securitized narrative out of the elements of Kemalism, however, it was the non-compromising and the security-centered Cyprus policy that constituted a deviation from both Turkey's European vocation and the path drawn by Atatürk. In other words, while these policies were reconciled within each discourse, they were juxtaposed against each other in an attempt to delegitimize the link made by an alternative discourse. On the other hand, we have seen that there were also other views represented in the political discourse that legitimized alternatives to Turkey's European orientation by recourse to Kemalism and that pushed for a bolder approach in the Cyprus issue. These propagated the view that only by de-orienting herself from the West/EEC/EU and annexing Cyprus altogether could Turkey fulfill the realism of Atatürk's era and accomplish Atatürk's goal of 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization'. The fact that there were competing constructions of Kemalism in the Turkish foreign policy discourse showed that Kemalism did not serve as a fixed and a single template for the articulations on Turkey's Western/European orientation and Cyprus policy. It was rather the clash between these constructions that structured the foreign policy discourse on these policies.

Having thus reiterated the main goals of the study and the answer to the initial puzzle, let us turn to the findings of our analysis.

The findings

1. The present analysis of the role of Kemalism in the Turkish foreign policy discourse showed that Kemalism has not been associated with a single foreign policy orientation. The discourse of the military establishment (in the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s), and the majority of the parties since the 1960s until the 2000s directly linked following Atatürk's path to Western/European-orientation and membership in the NATO and

other Western institutions, the EEC/EU being one. Yet, we have found that the Western/European-orientation was not the only policy direction that was seen as corollary to the Kemalist principles. The intervention in Cyprus (the military establishment and the parties in government in the 1960s and the 1970s), flexible foreign policy (the RPP in the 1970s), active policy towards the Cyprus issue (the Motherland Party in the 1980s and the JDP in the 2000s), the annexation of Cyprus (the Nationalist Action Party in the 1970s), and non-alignment with the West (the military establishment in the early 2000s) were also legitimized via recourse to the pursuit of Atatürk's path.

2. Related to the previous point, the elements of Kemalism did not structure the foreign policy discourse merely between the two ends: either a staunch Westernist policy or a complete isolation from the West. More variations of the policy to be pursued in relation to Turkey's Western/European-orientation were present in the official discourse. Some suggested that integration with the West/Europe was Turkey's *right* and had to be pursued despite the insincere and duplicitous approach of the West/Europe (as articulated by the majority of the political leaders). On the other hand, some argued that Turkey had to pursue a more global foreign policy that is reflective of her geographical location and that her EU-orientation was only a *part* of this global outlook (as argued by Cem's approach in the late 1990s and the early 2000s). We have also found that different and competing rationalities were attributed to these policies. To some, the national interests of Turkey required Turkey to de-orient herself from her European vocation. To others, on the other hand, joining the EU maximized Turkey's national interests. Similarly, our study confirmed that identity constitution did not necessarily involve constitution of a negative Other versus a pure

Self. Variational identities were reconstituted through these foreign policy articulations. Some associated the principle of ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’ with a Westernist policy, hence constructing Turkey’s Westernness by attributing a civilized identity to the West. On the other hand, others used the same template to articulate how the West diverged from its once-cherished identity. Hence, as the foreign policy makers legitimized competing policies by means of the components of Kemalism, this process also constituted multiple Kemalisms, hence competing Kemalist identities and rationalities.

3. Thus, the constitution of Kemalism did not only involve chronological revisions to the ideology of Kemalism, but also competing articulations made in the same period. The present analysis showed how the 1960’s and the 1970’s association of ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’ with a pro-Western policy was challenged by some parties (e.g. the Nationalist Action Party, the Democratic Left Party) via a new construction: ‘reaching *beyond* the level of the West’. We have seen that a new nodal point was added to this template in the 2000s (especially by the Justice and Development Party) in order to delegitimize the arguments that were critical of the EU reforms: ‘reaching the level of the *EU criteria*’. This showed that the individual party discourses did not only build on the previous Kemalist template by revising it in terms of the changing conditions, but also sought to delegitimize alternative constructions of Kemalism by hegemonizing the ‘nodal point’ employed by them.

4. By deconstructing the official discourse into its components, we have found that Kemalism was not limited to the discourse of a minor group of state elite, mainly the top military officials. The government programs not only built on the Kemalist

template employed by the military establishment in the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s but also expanded the content of the Kemalist chain. The government programs adopted the principles employed by the military establishment ('raising Turkey to the level of the contemporary civilization', 'gaining a respected status within the Western community through being recognized as equals', 'defending the sovereignty, independence, and national interests', 'resolving disputes through peaceful means' and 'being respectful of the international agreements', the elements integrated within the principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world'). On the other hand, the elements of 'reaching the level of the Copenhagen criteria', 'establishing participatory democracy', 'serving as a model to the Muslim nations', 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization through sustainable development' and 'the harmony of civilizations' were integrated within the Kemalist chain, through the articulations of the civilian leadership, rather than the military establishment.

5. Not only did the government programs as well as the individual statements made by party leaders declare adherence to the principles of Atatürk but they also sought to delegitimize their opponents by arguing that the other parties deviated from the path of Kemalism, a discursive move that reconstituted their Kemalist stance. Attributing non-Kemalism to what they saw as separatist views and hence seeking to push the discourse of their opponents out of the 'center', parties ranging from nationalist and conservative to social democratic and pro-Islamist not only repositioned themselves within the 'center' but also reconstructed Kemalism as the symbol of national unity and a melting pot which dissolved any differences within the country.

6. In this sense, the official discourse constructed Kemalism as a symbol of legitimacy and the common denominator of divergent ideas in the Turkish political discourse. Nevertheless, this was not, as discussed in this study, because Kemalism has been unique in accommodating divergent ideas within its reach, but due to the articulations of the political leaders that attributed competing meanings to its components. One of the striking instances of Kemalism's role in serving as a base of legitimacy for Turkish foreign policy was revealed in the way the policy makers legitimized their policies regarding the Cyprus issue and the Western-orientation by recourse to the elements of Kemalism. In this way, these policies were represented as 'national causes' and 'domestic policies' rather than being policies that were imposed from the 'outside'.

7. Thus, since what was seen as a deviation from Kemalism was attributed a 'foreign' dimension and thereby pushed 'outside' of the political legitimacy, and since particular foreign policies (e.g. the Cyprus issue) were seen as the 'domestic affairs' of Turkey by recourse to the Kemalist principles (e.g. 'non-interference in the domestic affairs'), the politics of Kemalism involved drawing the borders between the 'inside' and the 'outside', between the 'domestic' and the 'foreign'. As our analysis showed, the border separating the 'inside' and the 'outside' was not fixed; rather, the 'border' was constructed differently by means of different constructions of Kemalism in the competing foreign policy articulations of the policy leaders. This not only confirmed the poststructuralist assumption that there is not a clear border between the 'domestic' and the 'foreign' but that this rupture is discursively constructed. It also suggested that despite serving as a base of legitimacy, the role of Kemalism was constructed on different bases and, in this regard, it constituted competing legitimacies as well.

8. The analysis of Kemalism in the Turkish foreign policy discourse further showed that there are significant parallels between the academic discourse and the official one in terms of the *content* of the Kemalist ideology. In both constructions, the concepts and principles attributed to following Atatürk's path – the elements of Kemalism – ranged from a set of 'realist' principles (e.g. 'defending national interests', 'sovereignty', 'integrity', 'full-independence', 'reciprocity', 'rationalism') to 'ideational' ones (e.g. 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization', 'serving as a model to the all oppressed nations', 'peace at home, peace in the world'). However, the divide between the 'ideational' and the 'realist' principles proved to be rather blurred in both the academic and official discourses: following certain ideas (e.g. 'reaching the level of the contemporary civilization', 'peace at home, peace in the world') has not been seen contradictory to the national interests, while the pursuit of certain 'realist' principles (e.g. 'defending the national sovereignty') was legitimized by recourse to the pursuit of certain 'ideals' (e.g. 'peace at home, peace in the world') in both the academic discussions on the role of Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy and the official discourse. This supports one of the main assumptions of poststructuralism that rejects the divide between the material and the ideational and that sees both as dependent on the discourse. Following a certain idea is not necessarily exempt from the interest-based arguments as pursuing certain interests could also be seen as a component of an ideology.
9. We have also found remarkable similarities between the way academic and the official discourses defined the *role* of the Kemalist ideology in Turkish foreign policy. Similar to the academic discussions on the role of Kemalism, the official discourse ascribed wide-ranging principles and objectives to following Atatürk's path and

constructed a number of roles for Kemalism, ranging from making Turkey a respected member of the Western/international community to securing full-independence of the country. The two competing approaches to the role of Kemalism that were identified in Chapter 1 (the ‘defensive’ and the ‘integrationist’ approaches) were also represented in the official discourse. Articulations on Turkey’s integration with the EEC/EU suggested both the intensification of the reforms (by recourse to the principle of ‘reaching the level of the contemporary civilization’) and reluctance to further the reforms (by recourse to the principles of ‘sovereignty’, ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’, ‘reciprocity’ and ‘fighting against the imperialism’).

10. However, our analysis showed that the official discourse did not completely correspond to the academic debates. While the elements of ‘fighting against imperialism’ and ‘full-independence’ have been one of the major components of the defensive discourse in academic discussions, they have captured only a marginal space in the official debates. In addition, contrary to the arguments that ‘the non-democratic nature’ of Kemalism poses a serious obstacle to Turkey’s integration with the West, neither the military establishment nor the parties that came to power ever saw Kemalism as non-democratic. Indeed, there were suggestions for Turkey’s disengagement from the West in the official discourse (as propagated by the National Salvation Party in the 1970s, the Welfare Party in early the 1990s, and the military establishment in the early 2000s). What is more, these arguments were legitimized by recourse to the elements of Kemalism. Yet, the so-called non-democratic characteristics of the Kemalist ideology have not found any circulation in the official discourse, not even in the discourse of the allegedly non-Kemalist parties (e.g. the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party). The anti-Westernist discourse was not

legitimized by recourse to anti-Kemalism but legitimized and delegitimized through it.⁷⁴³

11. Moreover, contrary to the argument that Kemalism has lost its hegemonic characteristic or its dominant and legitimate role in structuring policies as it is challenged by alternative discourses, our analysis further showed that Kemalism still serves as one of the main legitimating criteria for Turkish ‘foreign’ policy. If one understands hegemony as the absence of any competing views, then Kemalism has never been hegemonic, as competing interpretations of its elements have always existed. However, if by hegemony we mean the continuous attempts by the policy leaders to establish their construction of a particular ideology (the conceptualization this study drew on), then our analysis showed that the ‘surgeons’ of Kemalism are still continuing to ‘suture’ the gaps revealed by the delegitimization of alternative views. Indeed, there are fewer instances of direct references to the ‘Kemalism/Ataturkism’ phrase or to the ‘Kemalist/Ataturkist identity’ as was the case in the 1960s and the 1970s or during the military era of 1980-1983. Nevertheless, the elements attributed to pursuing Atatürk’s path still seem to be the main template in ensuring that there are no deviations from the ‘foundational principles’, even though there are certain revisions.

12. This has shown yet another role of Kemalism in the Turkish foreign policy discourse: serving to reconstitute the foundational identity of Turkey by bringing the imagery of the Independence War (National Struggle) of 1919-1923 and construct a link between the conditions of the past and the present. Hence, the legitimization of new policies by reference to pursuing Atatürk’s path has also ascribed a ‘historic’ meaning to the

⁷⁴³ The only exception in this regard was the discourse of the National Salvation Party of the 1970s, which did not refer to following Atatürk’s path to legitimize establishing a Customs Union with the Muslim countries.

suggested policies, representing them as a ‘National Struggle’, that is fought either *against* the imperialism of the ‘West’ or *despite* the untrustworthy ‘allies’ or *with* the help of ‘friends’. Those articulations that represented the traditional policy towards Cyprus and the EU vocation as mutually incompatible depended on the first construction of this imagery in proposing to fight *against* the Western imperialism by not withdrawing from the historically claimed rights in Cyprus. Those that argued that the two policies should be held separate from each other drew on the second construction of this imagery in insisting on pursuing both ‘causes’ *despite* the fact that the resolution of the issue turned into an indirect condition for membership in the EU. On the other hand, those articulations that reconciled both policies built on the third construction of this imagery, in viewing Turkey’s EU path as the only viable way to resolve the Cyprus issue. As our analysis showed, while Turkey’s Cyprus policy and the Western/European vocation have not followed a stable route but oscillated between the above-mentioned constructions, the official discourse was rather tilted towards the second template, marginalizing the first and the third templates. While the defensive view of the West as a neo-imperial Other has been ‘moderated’ by the integrationist approach to link the civilizational goal to integration with the West/Europe, the integrationist remarks on the EU membership were added a defensive dimension by representing both policies as the *rights* of Turkey.

Concluding remarks

Studying the co-constitutive relationship between foreign policy and ideology by focusing on the nodal points helped us show the dynamic constitution of ideology and foreign policy. Discussing competing ‘nodal points’ in terms of the basic discourses has given us a further analytical reach to structure the main difference between the competing discourses that link ideology and foreign policy, and how particular constructions have been marginalized

while others became dominant. The divide between the basic discourses was blurred as the political actors sought to capture the nodal points of the alternative discourses and thereby shifted between competing discourses rather than remaining loyal to their own 'nodal points'. This, however, was not taken as a weakness of the methodology employed in the study but rather as a methodological advantage of discourse analysis to point out how the divisions between different discourses are not clear-cut and how they are constituted and reconstituted in attempts to delegitimize the alternative constructions.

Hence the main theoretical conclusions of the thesis can be outlined as follows. If the poststructuralist approach to foreign policy requires focusing on the basic legitimating criteria in foreign policy making, a poststructuralist conceptualization of the relationship between ideology and foreign policy involves taking ideology as one of the main legitimating criterion for foreign policy. If manifestations of whether a particular foreign policy is affirmative or divergent from a foreign policy orientation are embedded with the elements of an ideology, this shows that identity is not the only tool employed by the policy makers to formulate and legitimate their policies. Second, if ideology, just as foreign policy, is a discursive construct, then ideology is dependent on the articulations of the agents of foreign policy who seek to provide a stable link between ideology and foreign policy to gain legitimacy for the policies they propagate. Third, if politics, in essence, is about gaining legitimacy and the political sphere is never a homogenous realm, then ideology constitution is also a struggle for hegemony. As such, it involves a dynamic discursive practice, as actors formulate the ideology in question to legitimize their own stand. In other words, foreign policy agents are not completely free in pulling the strings of ideology to any policy-relevant sphere they wish. They are rather dependent on the templates that already exist (those that were constituted by the previous agents) and the fixations (nodal points) provided by the other political agents against which they compete. This means, while foreign policy is structured by the components

of ideology, what an ideology is composed of and what it refers to also changes as a result of the struggle between the foreign policy agents who seek to reformulate the terms that are 'fixed' by the other agents.

In this regard, while this dissertation focused on the role of a particular ideology in structuring the divide between particular foreign policies, the arguments made in the study also helped revealing certain points that provide a theoretical angle to make sense of the role of particular ideologies in the past and contemporary foreign policy debates. This study pointed out how the taken-for-granted divisions between interests and ideas, foreign and domestic, inside and outside, material and ideational, ideological and non-ideological were constructed through discourse. Hence we took discourse both as a medium of practice (it is through the discursive practices that interests, identities and ideologies are constituted) and as an ordered set of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices (which makes ideology a discourse as well, given our conceptualization). While this renders a circular logic, which links a particular discourse to itself through discourse, this circularity and interdependence is precisely what poststructuralist works aim to reveal and their reason for refraining from drawing a strict causal link between a particular policy and a separate identity/interest/idea. However, as it was pointed out in Chapter 2, while the poststructuralist works in the foreign policy literature focused on revealing that identity is not an objective entity that directs an action but that the foreign policy articulations constitute subjects by presenting identities as objectively given, a poststructuralist approach to foreign policy does not need to center on the constitution of identity as such. Hence, it was the main ambition of this study to open a new research agenda in poststructuralist foreign policy studies, by pointing out that foreign policy articulations also objectify ideologies in legitimizing particular foreign policies; and that the ideologies, being discursive constructs as they are, are

not objective entities that direct the foreign policy in a certain direction. They are not intrinsically suggestive of a particular policy, rationality or identity.

Indeed, some findings of this study were country-specific (e.g. Kemalism still serves as one of the main legitimating criteria of Turkish foreign policy, the politics of Kemalism has not been limited to the discourse of the military establishment, and it has served to legitimize the foreign policies as of a domestic origin, rather than being imposed from the 'outside'). Similarly, the particular nodal points attached to Kemalism are not generalizable, just as the fact that the ideological discourse that was studied here involved following the path of a particular national leader. Taking the former leader's ideas as a binding precedent and presenting them as a prescriptive solution to the problems and challenges being faced may be an outdated tendency for many countries' foreign policy discourse today since not the ideas of the once-reified personality cults but the principles of democracy, human rights, liberalism, and security seem to be the major legitimating principles of domestic/foreign policies even in the countries which once had personality cults. However, even though ideological discourses that are attached to a certain leader may be considered as something of a past, given the conceptualization of ideology developed in this study, it is problematic to attribute a similar 'historical' characteristic to ideology. We may have left behind the hot clash between communism and capitalism; yet, even in the so called post-ideological times, liberalism, secularism, nationalism, humanitarianism, fundamentalism, civilizationism, Islamism, socialism, capitalism, neo-liberalism and many other 'isms' do structure the policies according to the set of claims contained within them. In this regard, studying the co-constitutive relationship between Kemalism and Turkish foreign policy discourse and pointing out how various 'isms' form the codes used in a foreign policy discourse has implications for those studies that analyze, for instance, how liberalism is used to legitimize an application to the European Union membership, how Islamism is equated with pursuing an anti-Western

policy, or how humanitarianism is employed to justify a unilateral intervention that makes the ideologies and the suggested policy appear consistent with each other. As this study endeavored to show, such articulations do not only structure the foreign policy discourse in a certain order but also inescapably reconstitute the ‘isms’ that are used to justify the policy in the first place.

This shows that regardless of whether a policy maker believes in a particular ideology or not, and regardless of whether certain interests are involved in preferring a particular policy rather than another, each link that is made between a particular ‘ism’ and a policy is both dependent on a certain discursive template (a discursive chain) and contributes to its reconstitution. Ideology rather resides in and is dependent on the discursive practices of the political actors rather than belonging to a separate pre-discursive sphere. Each causal link established between them constructs an additional nodal point rather than pointing out the ‘real’ relation between them. In this regard, academic discussions on a particular ideology cannot be held separate from the politics of ideology. Regardless of whether a specific set of ideas are defined as an ‘ideology’, ‘world view’, ‘principled ideas’ or a ‘movement’, each articulation that establishes a causal link between a particular policy and the ideas in question also gets involved in an ideological practice in constituting an additional nodal point to the chain of the ‘ism’ that is studied. Thought of this way, one can argue that this dissertation also involved in a similar practice in considering what is taken as a pursuit of Atatürk’s path within the ideological reach of Kemalism. Nevertheless, contrary to the works that fix the borders of an ideology to study its role in shaping a particular policy, the aim of this dissertation was to reveal how this link is established discursively, deconstruct what is taken as Kemalism by the official and academic discourses, and thus point out the fluidity of the borders that are taken for granted, the impossibility of showing the independent impact of an ‘ism’ on a particular policy and the inseparability of the so called ‘isms’ from the discourse.

This study focused on a single country's foreign policy discourse both in order to answer the case-oriented puzzles and for the necessity to conduct an in-depth analysis for revealing how particular nodal points are constructed through the foreign policy discourse and how particular constructions are marginalized and hegemonized over time. One area that was not investigated was the media discourse and other alternative discourses represented by think-tanks, civil society institutions and the parties that do not manage to take part in the government. This area, which was left in the grey-zone by the present study due to its particular focus on the official discourse, provides a promising and fruitful research field to show how the foreign policy discourse is not only limited to the particular speeches delivered by heads of governments or chief military officials but also constructed, to a considerable extent, by news reports, editorials, writings of influential think-tank researchers, press conferences given by business associations, and other civil society institutions. This area, in extending the boundaries of the official discourse to the more general public sphere and vice versa, serves not only as a medium between the public and official discussions by reconstructing the nodal points already circulating in the discourse and thereby blurring the borders separating the public from the private. It also constructs additional nodal points and hence provides additional concepts to the official repertoire to be captured by the government leaders in their quest for establishing legitimacy. In this regard, the foreign policy makers are indeed not limited to the chief state officials; and thought of this way, an investigation into the more general public discourse does not only serve to show whether the officially constructed nodal points remain dominant or marginal in the more general public discussions but also whether they are indeed officially constructed.

This shows that there is a need for further theoretical and methodological research establishing the implications of the media and civil society studies on foreign policy. The methodology employed in this study and the arguments developed can provide a starting point

to explore how the self-evidently drawn role(s) of a particular 'ism' by the official nodal points circulate among the more general public discourse if the reach of the data is extended from the government and party programs and the speeches of party leaders to the declarations given by influential civil society institutions, news reports and business associations, etc. Hence, the questions for the future research agenda can be placed as follows: How is an ideological foreign policy discourse reproduced by the civil society? What are the dynamics between the civil society and the official discourses? How does a particular ideology structure the foreign policy discourse and how does it circulate in the discourse of the more general public? How does the constitution of a particular ideology/ or an 'ism' evolve in the more general public discourse, and how does this construct competing rationalities and identities? Although this study attempted to free the constitution and the role of ideology from the narrower angle of military and governmental discourse to the wider party discourses to show the 'inclusiveness' and the contested state of a particular ideology and its role in structuring the foreign policy discourse, widening this angle further is not only possible but also promising. While this also depends on the special context of each case and the puzzles involved therein, a further analysis in this direction can contribute and provide further analytical reach to some of the points revealed by this study: the 'sphere' and the 'dynamics' of ideology constitution is far more complex than it is generally assumed. Ideology is neither something of a past, nor is it in the exclusive domain of narrow state elite. Finally, ideology matters – not as an independent variable of particular policies but as a template for structuring the policy discourses in a certain order, as well as legitimizing and rationalizing allegedly incompatible policies.

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