ETHNIC VOTING AS ISSUE VOTING? NON-PARTICIPATION AND CROSSOVER VOTING AMONG ETHNIC HUNGARIANS IN ROMANIA AND SLOVAKIA

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Abstract

The paper explores the electoral behavior of ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, focusing especially on the factors which may contribute to not supporting the major ethnic parties claiming to represent the community. The main argument is that voting for the major ethnic parties does not follow automatically from the ethnicity of the voters, but electoral decisions depend on the salience attributed to ethnic issues and evaluations about the competence/performance of ethnic and majority parties. A model is proposed about the possible impact of ethnic issue salience and the evaluations of ethnic and majority parties on non-participation, crossover voting and voting for fringe ethnic parties. Beside testing this model, another goal is to offer a more comprehensive explanation by identifying the other variables which may influence electoral behavior.

Survey data from both countries is analyzed with logistic regressions and QCA, to assess the factors behind the failure of supporting the ethnic parties. The results show that the outcome produced most consistently by the combination of high ethnic issue salience and negative evaluations of the main ethnic party is voting for fringe ethnic parties. However, in the absence of such parties both crossover and non-participation may occur. Overall, the findings also prove that ethnic voting can be conceptualized as issue voting, but the issue public is not the ethnic group at large, but rather a thin stratum of radicals.

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List of abbreviations

DAHR – Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség /RMDSZ/ – Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România /UDMR/)

HCP – Hungarian Civic Party (Magyar Polgári Párt /MPP/ – Maďarská Občianska Strana /MOS/)

HCU – Hungarian Civic Union (Magyar Polgári Szövetség /MPSZ/ – Uniunea Civică Maghiară /UCM/)

PA – Popular Action (Acțiunea Populară /AP/ – Népi Akció)

PHC – Party of Hungarian Coalition (Magyar Koalíció Pártja /MKP/ – Strana Maďarskej Koalície /SMK/)

SDCU – Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (Slovenská Demokratická a Kresťanská Únia /SDKÚ/)

SDP – Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat /PSD/)

1. Introduction

This paper is about the voting behavior of ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia. More precisely, its goal is to explain the electoral decisions of those members of the ethnic groups who do not vote for the most important ethnic parties claiming to represent the interests of the ethnic community, namely the *Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania* and the *Party of Hungarian Coalition.*

In general, the electoral behavior of ethnic groups is described as very ordinate, the electorate of the major Hungarian parties in both Romania and Slovakia is regarded as the most stable, and election results basically support these assessments. From the perspective of the party system, the fluctuations of the vote shares of ethnic parties are insignificant when compared to the shifts impacting the parties of the majority. Moreover, the presence of ethnic electorates may also be seen as contributing to the stability of electoral patterns, by reducing volatility (see Chapter 5 of Birnir 2006). However, these successful ethnic parties still fail to collect the votes of all potential voters (that is, members of the ethnic group). Some may not turn out to vote, others may support parties of the majority, and again others may defect to fringe ethnic parties which do not have any chance of passing the electoral threshold. While these acts of non-support may pass unnoticed if viewed from the level of the party system, they may cost seats for the ethnic party, and in the long run might even endanger the passing of the electoral threshold.

This research is not interested in the party systems, but only in the ethnic electorates, and in the causes of defections from the major ethnic parties. Consequently the central question it seeks to answer is why some members of ethnic communities are reluctant to support the main ethnic party standing for the community, what are the socio-demographic, attitudinal and other variables that can account for the failure to vote for these parties. The

analysis will be restricted to national level elections, as electoral behavior at the local elections is more complex and may be influenced by myriad of local idiosyncrasies.[1]

The goal of the paper is twofold. First, a model of ethnic voting as issue voting will be proposed and put to the test. This model draws on two bodies of literature: on the literature of the political behavior of ethnic groups, most importantly on a model developed by J. K. Birnir (2006), and on classical theories of electoral behavior, more specifically on the model of valence issue voting proposed by Donald Stokes (1963) and developed further into a theory of competence voting by Clarke et al. (2004). The main argument of the proposed model is that members of ethnic groups do not automatically vote for ethnic parties just because of their ethnicity, but their electoral behavior depends on the salience they attribute to ethnic issues and their evaluations about the competence/performance of ethnic and majority parties. High ethnic issue salience and positive evaluations of the main ethnic parties should be associated with a decreased likelihood of all forms of non-support (non-participation, crossover voting, or voting for fringe ethnic parties which have no chances to enter the legislature). Conversely, negative attitudes toward the ethnic party and low salience of ethnic issues should increase the probability of both non-voting and crossover voting. Positive evaluations of majority parties should also increase the likelihood of crossover voting, but not the chances of non-participation. However, the most interesting situation would be the one when the voter attributes high salience to ethnic issues, but evaluates the major ethnic parties negatively. This category is expected to vote for fringe ethnic parties (if available), or to stay at home on election day, but not to engage in crossover voting, as majority parties cannot be linked to ethnic issues, at least not positively.

The second aim of the paper is to provide a comprehensive explanation for all three forms of electoral behavior which are not supportive of the main ethnic parties. For this

[1] For example, local elections are more complicated because of the massive presence of ethnic Hungarians on the lists of parties of the majority, or running as independents, phenomena that are due to the lack of institutionalized political competition within the minority communities.

purpose the models constructed to test the hypotheses will be completed with other variables, so that the explained variance of the dependent variables can be as high as possible.

The focus is not on the voters of the main ethnic parties from the two countries, but exactly on those who do not support these parties. It might seem strange that not the vote, but exactly the non-vote will be investigated. The reason is that after the collapse of Communism in both countries the minorities perceived that no party of the majority would represent their interests, and regarded it as natural to establish their own parties or party systems,[2] even if this parallel development eventually lead to one-party "systems" for both communities. Consequently, the baseline against which we can compare the voting behavior of members of ethnic groups is one of an encapsulated minority electorate.

Although the paper is about two countries, it is not meant to be neither a case study, nor a comparative effort. The aim is to test a model of ethnic voting which may also apply in other situations on data at hand, and to find as many explanatory variables as possible for the outcomes, but no in-depth explanations are sought which would be specific to the two Hungarian communities. The cases were chosen because of familiarity and availability of data.

The data subjected to analysis comes from surveys conducted on exclusively ethnic Hungarian respondents from the two countries, representative for the Hungarian communities. Relying on survey data enables the analysis of the phenomena at individual level, eliminating the risks of ecological fallacies inherent in the use of aggregate data. To my knowledge, no studies exist about the voting behavior of the Hungarians minorities which would employ individual data, with the exception of a case study about local elections in the ethnically mixed city of Subotica in Vojvodina (Todosijević, 2002). The rest of the literature relies on

[2] It should be mentioned that in 1990 one of the Hungarian parties in Slovakia, the Independent Hungarian Initiative participated in the elections in coalition with the Slovak opposition movement Public Against Violence, and chose to go separately from them at the following elections after the disillusions of the first two years of transition in what it concerned minority rights.

aggregate data (Stroschein, 2001; Birnir, 2006). Furthermore, the few studies in Hungarian language are confined to comparing census data and electoral results broken down to the level of various administrative units and are purely descriptive (Bakk et al., 2004; Lelkes, 2004).

The data will be analyzed with two techniques. First, logistic regression models will be constructed for each possible outcome. Second, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) will be employed, but only with the purpose of testing the hypotheses, not in order to identify and assess each possible combination of conditions which can be conducive to the outcomes.

The relevance of this research would be manifold. First, it could contribute to a better understanding of Hungarian voters and parties in these countries. More importantly, studying the behavior of ethnic voters in two countries would add to our knowledge about ethnic parties and ethnic voting in general. Third, I will attempt to apply classic models of voting behavior to minority voters, to go beyond the practice that voters of ethnic parties can be described by a single relevant independent variable, ethnicity. Fourth, I will rely on survey data and analyze behavior at the individual level instead of the more commonly employed aggregate indicators such as election results and census data. Finally, the application of the QCA technique is also a novelty in the study of this specific domain.

The thesis is structured into 5 large units. The second chapter after the introduction describes the Hungarian communities from the two countries and their political organizations. The third reviews some literature about ethnic parties and ethnic voting, presents the theoretical foundations of the paper and provides a model and hypotheses derived from it. The fourth part presents the methodology and the operationalization of the variables. The fifth chapter presents the analysis of the data and the interpretation of the results. In the final part the paper is summarized and conclusions are drawn.

2. Ethnic politics in Romania and Slovakia

In both Romania and Slovakia, Hungarian ethnic parties have been operating with more or less success since the collapse of Communism. Most members of the minority have been supporting these parties instead of voting for parties of the majority, which, on their turn, showed relatively low interest in addressing minority voters. Nevertheless, not all ethnic Hungarians vote for the ethnic parties claiming to represent their interests: the *Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania* (DAHR)[3] and the *Party of Hungarian Coalition* (PHC). This paper tries to explain why some members of the minority do not support these parties, despite the fact that these are the only important political actors which are able and willing to represent the ethnic issues in the legislature.

The two selected Hungarian communities are rather similar regarding the political choices available to them, as in both countries there is only one important ethnic party. Other ethnic political organizations exist, but they either do not compete in elections, or are insignificant fringe parties which lack real support.

The *Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség)* has been representing the Hungarian community in the Romanian Parliament since 1990. Most Hungarian voters have continuously supported the party ever since, instead of voting for parties of the majority, which, on their turn, have showed relatively low interest in addressing minority voters.[4] As the proportion of the Hungarian population in Romania was

[3] This is the official name of the party in English, which is displayed on the web site of the party (www.rmdsz.ro). Unfortunately, various different attempts of translation are circulating in the English-language literature, such as *Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania*, etc.

[4] No ethnic Hungarian has ever been elected to the Romanian parliament as a candidate of a majority party after 1990 (though the nationalistic Greater Romania Party sometimes claims that one of its MPs, Iuliu Furo, is Hungarian). The first notable exception from the rule seemed to occur in early 2007, when a young Hungarian candidate was announced on the electoral lists for the elections to the European Parliament of the National Liberal Party. However, this happened in the context of EP and not national elections. Moreover, the elections have been postponed to fall 2007, and the support of the PNL seems to be much lower now than at the time when

7,12% at the 1992 census, and 6,6% in 2002, passing the 5% electoral threshold[5] has not represented a problem for the DAHR, which had virtually no competitor for the Hungarian votes. Fringe Hungarian parties contested the 1996 and 2000 elections, but attracted insignificant numbers of voters.[6] However, in 2003 a split occurred in the DAHR, when most members of the former internal opposition (the radical wing) left the party. Though this proved to be a serious split, the splinter opposition group failed to register a new political organization, partly because of the modification of the electoral law and of the law on political parties (keenly supported by the DAHR in parliament) that introduced much more difficult registering conditions for new parties. As a consequence of the failure to register the *Hungarian Civic Union (Magyar Polgári Szövetség)* as a party, the candidates of the HCU could contest the 2004 elections only on the lists of a Romanian party, the *Popular Action* (PA) in 5 counties with significant Hungarian population. PA obtained around 2-3% of the vote in these counties, posing no real threat to the DAHR. Obviously, the electoral result of the PA is not a very good measure of the potential support of the alternative ethnic parties, because many voters have voiced their unwillingness to support Romanian parties, even if the candidates are Hungarian. Moreover, voting for the PA meant wasting the vote, and the low support for this party nationwide was well-known before the elections.

To sum up, the DAHR is in a hegemonic position in Romania concerning ethnic Hungarian voters. It has to compete neither with parties of the majority, for which addressing specifically minority issues would pose the danger of alienating majority voters, nor with serious challengers from within the community. Notwithstanding this, in 2004 the party

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the list was decided upon, consequently it is no longer sure that the position on the list of the Hungarian candidate would suffice for election.

[5] At the founding elections of 1990 no explicit electoral threshold was in force. In 1992 a 3% threshold was introduced, which was raised to 5% in 2000.

[6] In 1996 the Szekler Youth Forum secured 2142 votes (0,02%) for the Chamber of Deputies, the Hungarian Free Democratic Party from Romania 14333 votes (0,12%) for the Chamber of Deputies and 12103 votes (0,10%) for the Senate; the latter party also contested the 2000 elections and gained 3510 votes (0,03%) for the Chamber of Deputies and 498 votes for the Senate (below 0,01%).
Source: http://valasztasok.adatbank.transindex.ro/, accessed on April 14, 2007.

recorded its weakest electoral result[7], and it became obvious that not all ethnic Hungarians vote for the single ethnic party claiming to represent their interests. The phenomenon of crossover voting, for long treated as a taboo in the Hungarian public discourse in Romania, had to be accepted as a fact.

Similarly to Romania, majority parties do not address ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia either. After the collapse of Communism three important Hungarian parties were established: the *Hungarian Civic Party* (*Magyar Polgári Párt*, earlier *Independent Hungarian Initiative* /*Független Magyar Kezdeményezés*/), the *Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement* (*Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Mozgalom*), and *Coexistence* (*Együttélés*). All three parties had been represented in parliament (except for the HCP which was not included in the 1992 electoral coalition of the Hungarian political forces and as a result failed to pass the threshold). Beside these other small parties also existed, most important of them being the *Hungarian People's Party* (*Magyar Néppárt*). These four parties merged in 1998 at the pressure of the new electoral law prepared by the Mečiar government, which was expected to be very unfavorable for the Hungarian parties. As the result of the merger the *Party of Hungarian Coalition* (*Magyar Koalíció Pártja*) was formed, which has been representing the Hungarian community since 1998 on its own. Fringe Hungarian parties appeared in Slovakia too, but their performance was not better than that of their counterparts from Romania.[8]

[7] 6,17% as compared to 6,80% in 2000. In absolute numbers the party lost around 110.000 votes. Taking into account differences in turnout and even the demographical losses of the community, about one third of this loss has to be attributed either to crossover voting, or to the lower turnout of Hungarians as compared to that of Romanians. Perhaps these figures do not seem serious, but in the absence of any competition they point to an erosion of the support of the DAHR.

[8] After the merger of the four Hungarian parties in 1998 two fringe parties contested elections: the Hungarian Popular Movement for Reconciliation and Welfare (*Magyar Népi Mozgalom a Megbékélésért és a Jólétért*) was established as an attempt of Vladimir Meciar to split the Hungarian electorate. The party contested the 1998 elections, gaining 6587 votes (0,19%). The Hungarian Federalist Party (*Magyar Föderalista Párt*) was backed by the World Federation of Hungarians, and participated only in the elections to the European Parliament in 2004, gathering an insignificant number of votes, but in no national elections. Source: www.statistics.sk, accessed on April 20, 2007.

Nevertheless, the record of the PHC is better than that of the DAHR. Since the 1998 elections it succeeded each time to increase its share of the vote, despite the decrease in absolute numbers of its support due to the constantly declining turnout.[9] Between 1998 and 2006 the party was also member of the two coalition governments of Mikuláš Dzurinda. Presently the PHC is in opposition. Notwithstanding its good performance, the decrease of the absolute number of votes indicates that a part of the electorate failed to support the party at the 2006 elections. While most probably lower turnout explains most of this decrease, it is obvious that similarly to Romania, there are ethnic Hungarians who do not vote for the major ethnic party which claims to represent to community in the Slovak National Council.

This short presentation of the two countries shed some light on why non-voting and crossover voting are relevant phenomena. The remainder of this paper will investigate the factors accounting for these outcomes of electoral behavior. Though it would certainly be worthwhile to study the fluctuations (or erosion in the case of the DAHR) of the support of these parties longitudinally, this research will be limited to snapshots which are proximal in time to the analysis. The data which will be subjected to analysis comes from pre-electoral surveys conducted in both countries before the last parliamentary elections: 2004 in Romania and 2006 in Slovakia.

In 2004 the DAHR was the only Hungarian ethnic party to contest the elections, but candidates of the HCU were running on the lists of the PA. Moreover, by the time of data collection the ban on the participation of the HCU could not be foreseen, so the questionnaire listed the party in the item about party choice. The support of this fringe party will be analyzed in the paper too. Conversely, no fringe Hungarian party contested the 2006 elections in Slovakia, consequently the analysis of the Slovak data will only refer to non-participation and crossover voting.

[9] In 1998 306623 persons voted for the PHC (9,13%). In 2002 the party gained 321069 votes (11,16%), and in 2006 269111 votes (11,68%). Source: www.statistics.sk.

3. Theoretical background and hypotheses

Relatively little research has been done about the electorates of ethnic/ethnoregionalist parties. This applies to some extent to all members of this party family from all over the world, but certainly even more to the parties of the Hungarian minorities. The generally low interest in this party family is due to the fact that most researchers regard these small parties as unimportant, and it is also usually more difficult to obtain reliable data about them. (Müller-Rommel, 1998: 18).

However, there are some studies about Hungarian ethnic parties, but they do not really focus on the behavior of the Hungarian electorate. Szász (2003) tries to explain the electoral success of all Hungarian ethnic parties from the Carpathian basin with system-level variables (characteristics of the electoral and the party systems). Sherrill Stroschein (2001) analyzes ethnic voting in ethnically mixed localities from Romania and Slovakia comparing election results with census data. The case study of Todosijević (2002), about the local elections in the ethnically mixed city of Subotica from Vojvodina is also worth mentioning, most importantly because it employs individual level responses from surveys instead of ecological data.

One goal of this paper is to add to this literature by explaining the behavior of those members of ethnic groups who do not support the major ethnic parties standing for the group. in this sense this paper is rather about the individual factors that act against the electoral success of ethnic parties than about electoral success *per se*. This chapter presents the theoretical background of the study, consisting of a theory of ethnic group mobilization, and of theories of electoral behavior. I conceptualize ethnic voting as a form of issue voting, which entails that members of the ethnic group do not support the ethnic party unconditionally just because of their ethnicity, but their votes are the function of the salience they attribute to ethnic issues and evaluations of the ethnic party. I proceed as it follows: in

the first section of the chapter I define the concepts of ethnic parties and ethnic voting. Second, I review the relevant literature and formulate the model that will be tested against the data. Finally, I present an alternative explanation, according to which the salience of ethnic issues has little impact on voting behavior.

3.1. Some basic concepts: ethnic parties and ethnic voting

The concepts of ethnic parties and ethnic voting are not as unequivocal as it would seem at first sight. Without getting lost in the details of the definitional debate, it is necessary to specify the meaning of ethnic parties and ethnic voting.

The probably best-known definition of ethnic parties is provided by Donald Horowitz, who writes that "[a]n ethnically based party derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group (or clusters of ethnic groups) and serves the interests of that group." (Horowitz, 1985: 291). The shortcoming of this definition is that it does not take into consideration the relative size of the groups, consequently it is unable to differentiate between parties standing for minorities[10] and majorities. With this definition, ethnic parties may be equally characteristic of ethnic majorities and minorities, the "test" of the ethnic party proposed by Horowitz being simply whether the party draws most its support from a certain ethnic group or not. Though Horowitz classifies parties as ethnic, multiethnic or non-ethnic, his definition of ethnic parties is too broad, as it would allow some parties of the majority to be classified into this category. This renders the definition inappropriate for the purposes of this paper. Moreover, his ethnopolitical theory is about severely divided societies from the Third World, where the presence of ethnic parties is the expression of "the mutual incompatibility of ethnic claims to power" (Horowitz, 1985: 294.), where elections play the role of ethnic censuses. Conversely, my focus countries are Central Europe democracies, even

[10] From the perspective of this paper the terms "minority", "ethnic minority" and "national minority" will be used interchangeably.

if young ones, where the parties are not the expressions of irreconcilable ethnic conflict, claims and other cleavages also structure society.

A similar but more differentiated approach is adopted by Sherrill Stroschein (2001). In her work majority parties still qualify as ethnic parties, but only those which advocate a nationalist or extremist platform, usually targeted against minorities. While such a definition may be useful for explaining the increased support of extremist or nationalist parties in regions with mixed population and a strong presence of ethnic parties representing the minority, the topic of this research calls for a more restrictive definition. Another shortcoming of both Horowitz's and Stroschein's definitions is that ethnic voting is seen as a systemic feature, an aggregate indicator that characterizes the whole party system, regardless of whether the focus is on the national polity or on local elections in an ethnically divided city. However, this paper does not aim to assess aggregate voting patterns, but individual electoral behavior.

In contrast with the former authors, Birnir defines ethnic groups as politically non-dominant groups organized around a characteristic which is impossible or very difficult to change (like race, language or culture) (Birnir, 2006: 22). She stresses that although dominant groups are not devoid of ethnicity, this is emphasized only rarely, under special circumstances, most notably external threats.[11] Consequently, internally unified dominant groups do not qualify as ethnic groups, but are considered nationalist groups if their platform is in opposition to ethnic groups.[12]

[11] Ethnic identity may become salient for dominant groups too, but only under exceptional circumstances, such as external threat. This external impetus unifying the dominant group is absent in democracies or democratizing countries, as democracies rarely fight each-other. Moreover, the demographic majority is not always the dominant group (e.g. South Africa before the abolishment of Apartheid). Thus, theoretically majority groups can also qualify as ethnic groups for Birnir, yet she restricts her analysis to electoral democracies, where being a demographic majority is a condition for becoming the dominant group (Birnir, 2006: 23–24.)

[12] The criterion of internal unity is made clear through examples: in South Africa, the blacks form a majority when compared to the whites, but they are internally divided into more ethnic groups (Zuku, Xhosa, etc.). Internally divided majority groups (which need not be dominant) are not treated as a single entity, but their subgroups are regarded separately as ethnic groups. In contrast, Serbians from Serbia are a unified dominant

Although Birnir's classification refers to ethnic groups and not to ethnic parties, it is very straightforward to adopt the same criteria for the parties standing for these ethnic groups. This conceptualization is better suited to the studied phenomenon, as the Hungarian communities in both Romania and Slovakia are non-dominant demographic minorities. The stakes of the elections for Hungarian ethnic voters and parties are not the elimination from power of the parties of the majority, but securing as many seats as possible in the legislature, and perhaps inclusion in coalition governments in order to further the interests of the group.[13] At the level of national politics we have to deal with ethnic asymmetry rather than with ethnic balance, and it follows from this asymmetry that it makes no sense to conceive of ethnic voting as of something equally salient for the majority and the minority. For minorities, the chance that the ethnic cleavage supersedes other divisions is indeed considerably high. Conversely, the majority will be divided along other cleavages too. As Birnir puts it, democracy "deemphasizes majority ethnic identity by taking it as given and by subjecting the dominant group to a multitude of cross pressures." (Birnir, 2006: 8.). The presence of small parties representing national minorities will not prevent the majority from developing a fully-fledged multiparty system, which would institutionalize the cleavages cross-cutting the group. To sum up, the ethnic cleavage will hardly become the only relevant one for the majority, and other divisions will be at least equally, if not more important, but for the minority the relevance of other cleavages will be diminished.[14]

In line with the arguments presented above, in this paper only the parties standing for the Hungarian communities are considered ethnic parties, while the nationalist or extremist parties of the majority are not addressed. Similarly, ethnic voting refers only to members of

group and are considered to be a nationalist group. (Serbians from Bosnia are an ethnic group). See *ibid.,* pp. 24–25. (footnote 12.)

[13] The stakes of local elections may be the exclusive control over the local council. But these elections are beyond the scope of this paper.

[14] This is not to say that minority groups cannot be divided along other cleavages too. The presence of multiple political parties may be possible within the minority, but fully-fledged political pluralism will always be limited by the explicit or implicit thresholds of representation in national politics. Consequently, minorities usually suffer some sort of democracy deficit.

the minority[15] voting for parties that are primarily concerned with the "expression, recognition and protection of the distinct cultural identity and the ensuing interest shared by the […] minority group."[16] (Szász, 2003: 144).

One more remark is necessary: Wolfinger (1965) distinguishes between two types of ethnic voting. Members of an ethnic community may vote for parties that claim to represent the group, or, they could vote for candidates of similar ethnic origin, regardless of their party affiliation. These candidates may run in the colors of different nonethnic parties or even for parties representing another ethnic group. Similarly, Birnir (2006) shows that sometimes non-ethnic parties incorporate some of the issues that are salient for ethnic groups and may even grant access for members of the ethnic group to the legislature or even the executive. In this paper the sense of ethnic voting is restricted to ethnic Hungarians voting for Hungarian ethnic parties, voting for ethnic Hungarian candidates running for parties of the majority is not considered. Ethnic Hungarians who vote for non-ethnic (majority) parties will be considered as engaging in crossover voting.

3.2. Ethnic voting as issue voting

The main argument of this paper is that though very tentative to believe so, the electoral success of ethnic parties does not follow automatically from the fact that part of the electorate is made up of an ethnic group. Ethnicity is a less than perfect predictor of the vote, voters do not support an ethnic party as a direct consequence of their ethnicity. The incentives of the members of ethnic groups to support an ethnic party may vary, as a function of both institutional and attitudinal factors. In this paper only the latter will be dealt with.

In the following sections I propose a model of ethnic voting as issue voting which draws on a recent theory of ethnic politics put forward by Jóhanna Birnir (2006), but also on

[15] Of course, ethnic parties do not receive all of their vote from members of the minority. Crossover voting exists within the majority too, but it is beyond the scope of this research.
[16] Though not really relevant for our purposes, the "regional" element is also satisfied in these cases: Hungarian minorities do not live on the whole territory of the focus countries, but only in certain regions.

the conceptual framework of the valence issue voting model proposed by Donald Stokes (1963) and developed further into a theory of voting based on perceived party competence by Clarke et al. (2004). I will combine Birnir's model, which explains ethnic party success with aggregate characteristics of the political context with the epistemologically individualistic valence issue model. This will produce theoretical propositions that can be tested on data measured at the level of individuals.

3.2.1. The costs of voting for members of ethnic groups

The main question of Jóhanna Birnir's book *Ethnicity and Electoral Politics* is under what circumstances do ethnic groups pursue peaceful electoral participation, and when do they resort to other means to voice their demands, such as protests or violence.[17] The proposed model explains behavior in function of the costs implied for the members of the ethnic group. The author argues that electoral participation is the "normal" behavior, protests and violence only occur when the ethnic group is prevented from having its policy preferences represented by certain factors, most importantly institutional barriers.

According to Birnir, Representation of preferences may be accomplished by both ethnic parties and nonethnic parties that may incorporate some ethnic issues. However, two conditions must be fulfilled for a party to be regarded as representative. First, the distance between the policy package offered by the party and the preferences of the voter should be minimal (policy proximity). Second, the party must be able to enact policy, that is, it must not permanently be excluded from government (enactment ability). Access to the legislature is not a warrant for the enactment of policies, only presence in the executive provides the ability to implement policies. It must be stressed that neither of the conditions is sufficient on its own, only those parties are regarded as representative which are proximal in terms of policy and able to implement policy. Supporting a party which is far from the voter's policy preferences

[17] The following section is based on chapter 3 of the book.

would imply policy costs, but voting for a party which is never included into the government poses enactment costs, which are more serious than policy costs.

Policy proximity depends on the salience of the ethnic issues. The model assumes that when ethnic issues are salient, the policy package of ethnic parties will be on average closer to the preferences of ethnic voters than the policy packages of any other party. Even in this case it is possible that nonethnic parties incorporate some ethnic issues, and become representative if able to access the executive. However, switching to a nonethnic party that incorporates some ethnic issues implies some policy costs for the ethnic voter. Conversely, when ethnic issues lose salience, nonethnic parties' policy packages will be closer to the preferences of the average ethnic voter than the policy package of ethnic parties, consequently members of the ethnic group incur no costs by voting for them.

The costs of voting, judged with respect to the salience of the ethnic issue, policy proximity between voter and party, and the parties' enactment ability, are summarized in Table 3.1.

The second column summarizes the situations when the ethnic issue is salient. In these cases the ethnic party is representative if it has the chance to be included in governments (the other condition, policy proximity, is assumed). If the ethnic party is able to enact the policy, ethnic voters will continue to vote for it, as this implies neither policy nor enactment costs. Switching to representative nonethnic parties (cell 3) would impose some policy costs (assumed), while switching to non-representative nonethnic parties (cell 1) has both policy and enactment costs. Of course, if ethnic groups are defined as politically non-dominant demographic minorities, non-representative nonethnic parties in cell 1 will refer to those cases when the nonethnic party is reluctant to deal with ethnic issues.

Table 3.1. The costs associated with the ethnic voters' electoral choices

representative capabilities of parties (is able to enact policy?)	ethnic issue salient (ethnic party on average closer to the ethnic voter's policy preferences)	Salience of ethnic issue decreasing or absent (nonethnic parties on average closer to the ethnic voter's average policy preferences)
ethnic party is representative and nonethnic party is not representative	none 1 high	moderate 2 high
ethnic party is representative and nonethnic party is representative	none 3 moderate	moderate 4 none
ethnic party is not representative and nonethnic party is representative	high 5 moderate	high 6 none
ethnic party is not representative and nonethnic party is not representative	high 7 high	high 8 high

None: no costs. Moderate: policy costs. High: representational (enactment) costs.
Source: Birnir (2006: 51.)

Cell 5 represents the situation when a nonethnic party incorporates some ethnic issues and the ethnic party is unable to access the government. In this case ethnic voters will migrate to the nonethnic party, even by incurring some moderate policy costs. Although the ethnic issue is salient, the enactment costs of voting for a nonrepresentative ethnic party are higher than the policy costs associated with voting for a representative nonethnic party which includes the ethnic issue. In other words, enactment ability trumps policy proximity.

The situations when the ethnic issue is not salient are depicted in the third column of the table. Cell 2 shows that ethnic parties can keep their support even if the ethnic issue loses salience, as long as they hold power and nonethnic parties do not have access to government. Of course this situation is impossible if ethnics group are defined as politically non-dominant demographic minorities.

When both the ethnic and the nonethnic party are representative (have access to the executive), ethnic voters will defect to nonethnic parties, because the diminished salience of the ethnic issue means that the policies of the nonethnic party will be closer on average to the voters' preferences (assumed). In theory cell 4 refers to situations when an ethnic and a

nonethnic party alternate in government in a two-party system. However, this is once again impossible in ethnically asymmetrical countries, such as the ones studied in this paper.

Cell 6 shows an obvious situation: when the ethnic party has no access to the executive, ethnic voters will vote for representative nonethnic parties, as their program is anyway more in line with their preferences than the platform of ethnic parties.

Finally, cells 7 and 8 stand for the cases when the ethnic party is unable to represent because it has no access to government, and the nonethnic party is unrepresentative because of its reluctance to include the ethnic issue. In this case the ethnic group renounces to electoral politics, regardless of the salience of the ethnic issue. If the preferred policy of the voters is not represented, they will seek other, non-electoral means for voicing their preferences. These are the cases when protests and violence may occur. The only difference between cells 7 and 8 is that the latter generalizes the situation beyond the ethnic issue.

In both Romania and Slovakia the ethnic issue has been salient since the Hungarian communities became part of these countries. An expression of this is the presence of strong Hungarian ethnic parties in both countries. Moreover, these ethnic parties are able to enact policy, as they were repeatedly included into coalition governments. In Romania the DAHR was part of the governing coalition between 1996 and 2000, and again after 2004, while between 2000 and 2004, though not formally part of the government, the party provided parliamentary support for the minority government of the *Social Democratic Party*, in exchange for offices and policy concessions. Similarly, in Slovakia the PHC participated in the coalition lead by the *Slovak Democratic and Christian Union* (SDKÚ) between 1998 and 2006, and despite being in opposition presently, there is no reason to believe that the party will not be included in future governments. As the policy package of ethnic parties is more in line with the preferences of ethnic voters whenever the ethnic issue is salient, we may conclude that ethnic parties are representative in both countries, as the requirements of both

policy proximity and enactment ability are fulfilled. Finally, as mentioned earlier, nonethnic parties do not incorporate any ethnic issues in these countries, as they are not ready to risk losing majority voters. Consequently, both Romania and Slovakia would qualify for cell 1 of Table 3.1., as the ethnic issue is salient, ethnic parties are representative and nonethnic parties are not.

However, the theory was not reviewed with the aim of categorizing the focus countries of the research, but because of the possibility of adapting the conceptual framework to individual voters. In Birnir's model both the salience of the ethnic issue and the representativeness of the parties were conceived of as of objectively observable characteristics of the political competition. These concepts also make sense in relation to the individual voters, but in this case as perceptions or subjective evaluations about the salience of the ethnic issue and the representativeness of the parties. I will adapt Birnir's model to the decisions of individual voters making use of the literature on issue voting, more precisely the valence issue and competence voting models. In what follows I review this literature, highlight the similarities with Birnir's theory, and finally reformulate the model for individual voters.

3.2.2. Ethnic voting as issue voting

The argument that the vote of the members of ethnic groups does not follow directly from their ethnicity draws heavily on the literature about issue voting, which builds on the rational choice tradition of electoral behavior rather than on approaches that emphasize the sociological background of the voters or the emotional attachments to the parties.

The main idea of issue voting is that voters derive the most benefit from voting for parties proposing policies that are as similar or congruent with their own preferences as possible. However, similarity or congruence may have different meanings, and different conceptualizations exist in the literature. Most importantly, issues can be classified into positional and valence issues (Stokes, 1963). Positional issues can be represented as an

ordered set of alternatives, over which the preferences of voters and parties can be defined. This enables the spatial representation of the positions of parties and voters.[18]

The valence issue approach does not assume the spatial representation of issues. According to Stokes, valence issues involve some condition that cannot be ordered on a continuum, but is regarded as good or bad by the electorate in general, and which is linked to the parties in different ways. Stokes' example for valence issues is corruption. No party would campaign for more corruption, and all voters would agree that corruption must be fought. However, some parties may be associated more with corruption than others and some parties may claim more credibly that they will fight corruption. Conversely, the classic example for position issues is government intervention into the economy: some parties and voters will advocate more intervention, others a minimal state (Stokes, 1963: 372-373). However, whether a particular issue is a valence or a position issue is not self-evident, it may also depend on the context, and some issues can be conceived of in both ways.

The ethnic issue is no exception. Some ethnic parties may have more moderate, others more radical views about how to obtain minority rights (language usage, various types of autonomy, etc.), and voters will also be split into moderates and radicals.[19] In this sense the ethnic issue would be a positional issue. However, it is also possible to conceive of the ethnic issue as of a valence issue. Within the minority community we may expect consensus about the desirability of improving the conditions of the minority, even if there would be differences regarding the importance attributed to this (relative to other issues) and about the means that should be employed. In this sense the ethnic issue conforms to Stokes' definition of valence

[18] Different sub-approaches exist within the spatial issue voting literature. It is debated whether voters will choose the party which they perceive to be closest to them in a multidimensional issue space (Downs, 1957), or the party which will pursue a policy in the direction preferred by the voter (Rabinowitz & MacDonald, 1989).Presenting the debate between the proximity and the directional models of issue voting is beyond the scope of this paper. For the essential ideas see Rabinowitz & Macdonald (1989).

[19] If we considered nationalist or extremist majority parties ethnic parties too (as some authors do, see e.g. Stroschein, 2001), the ethnic issue could be turned into a position issue: minority parties would adopt a position favoring the extension of minority rights, while the majority nationalists would adopt a restrictive stance.

issues "that merely involve the linking of the parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by the electorate." (Stokes, 1963: 373).

In this paper I will employ the latter approach and treat the ethnic issue as a valence issue. The main reason for this is that in both studied countries there is only one important ethnic party (some fringe parties may be present, but these are not realistic alternatives for the representation of the community), so multiple positions on the ethnic issue dimension are lacking, and consequently survey questions which would make possible the spatial representation of the ethnic issue are not available. Conversely, the fact that voters differ concerning the salience attributed to the ethnic issue enables the formulation of testable propositions about the relationship of ethnic issue salience and voting behavior even in the situation when only one ethnic party is present.

Obviously, the party linked to the positively valued condition (representation of the interests of the minority) will be the ethnic party, as majority parties do not compete for minority votes and do not have an elaborate program on ethnic issues. One might even claim that if parties of the majority are associated with minority issues, then the connection is in negative terms. In the words of Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, the ethnic issue will be "owned" exclusively by the ethnic party (see Budge & Farlie, 1983), consequently those voters who attribute high salience to ethnic issues will expect the ethnic party to represent these issues. Though it is not impossible that some voters associate the ethnic party also with other, nonethnic issues, I will assume here that nonethnic issues are not associated with the ethnic party.

Until this point it may seem that issue salience translates into votes automatically by virtue of the issue being associated with, or owned by a party. However, according to Clarke et al. (2004) voters evaluate the parties on the grounds of perceived competence on the issues that are salient for them, and will only vote for them if the assessment is positive. As the

ethnic party is the only one that is preoccupied with minority issues, ethnic voters will assess the competence of this party in what it concerns the ethnic issue. Failure to satisfy the expectations of ethnic voters may lead to being judged as not competent to represent the community and to losing voters.

According to Schmitt and Wessels (2005), the essence of the competence model is that voters evaluate "the job" the government or the party will do. While policies or ideology refer to the substance of political decision making, performance/competence is a formal or procedural measure, which refers rather to *how* the government will fare than to *what* policies will be implemented. Voters can evaluate competence retrospectively, basing their assessment on the performance of the party from the past, or prospectively, on the basis of the expressed intentions of the parties. Apart from the temporal dimension, the concepts of performance or competence are functional equivalents.

Schmitt and Wessels consider that performance/competence ratings have a more important role when politics are less polarized, when differences between policies are harder to discern, but also when voters doubt that the party will be able to carry out particular policies. It is possible that voters prefer one party on policies and another on performance, and vote for the second (Schmitt & Wessels, 2006: 9-10.). This argument is similar to the idea already familiar from Birnir's model that enactment ability may trump policy proximity.

One more parenthesis is necessary. An objection against conceiving of ethnic voting as of issue voting could be that issue voting is usually regarded as the privilege of the politically knowledgeable or aware, and it is not reasonable to expect the public at large to vote based on judgments about issues. According to Converse (1964) only a very thin stratum of the electorate (the most educated) has stable opinions about most political issues, the majority of voters have clear-cut beliefs only about one or a few issues. The electorate is thus divided into relatively narrow issue publics which overlap only sparsely. However, Carmines

and Stimson (1980) demonstrated that not all issues require the same amount of political awareness. They classified issues into hard and easy ones. The first category demands conceptual skills and is consequently accessible only to a restricted public, but the second is not the privilege of the politically sophisticated. Voters react with "gut responses" to easy issues, as these involve rather symbolic than technical content (Carmines & Stimson, 1980). The ethnic issue may be considered an easy issue, so it is reasonable to expect that all ethnic Hungarians (and also members of the majority) have an opinion about it.

3.2.3. Reformulating the model

In this section I attempt to adapt the model put forward by Birnir to the decision-making of the individual voter. Reformulating the model implies substituting the conditions gauged in the original model as aggregate characteristics with their equivalents measured at the level of the individual. Instead of assuming policy proximity between ethnic voters and ethnic parties whenever the ethnic issue is salient, the reformulated model supposes that individual voters may differ on the salience attributed to ethnic issues. Similarly, the representativeness of parties is not a fixed characteristic, but is judged by each individual according to her perceptions about the policy packages of parties and their enactment ability.

Birnir's assumption that whenever the ethnic issue is salient, the policy package of the ethnic party will be on average closer to the preferences of ethnic voters translates to individual voters by the valence issue model. Voters who attribute increased salience to the ethnic issue will consider the ethnic party as closest to their preferences, while those who do not regard the ethnic issue as important will prefer the platforms of other parties. But Birnir also emphasizes that policy congruence is not sufficient, the party must be able to implement the policy too. This idea is in line with the model of competence voting (Clarke et al., 2004; Schmitt & Wessels, 2005), which states that the performance or competence ratings of the parties associated with the salient issue are more important than issue salience *per se*.

consequently, individual voters will regard a party as representative if the party emphasizes the same issue which is salient for them and if they believe that the party will be able to enact policies related to that issue, that is, they regard the party as competent. The most important statement from the model is that both perceived policy proximity and a positive evaluation of a party are necessary conditions for supporting that party, but none of them suffices on its own: only if both are present will the voter support a party.

3.3. Hypotheses

The model put forward in the previous sections predicts that voters who regard the ethnic issue as salient and are satisfied with the performance of the ethnic party will vote for it, as both requirements for representativeness are met. Consequently the first hypothesis of the research is that

H1. High ethnic issue salience, as well as a positive evaluation of the ethnic party is negatively associated with both non-voting and crossover voting.

Conversely, voters for whom the ethnic issue is not salient should switch to majority parties regarded as representative, as their platform will be closer to their preferences. For this category of voters it is not the enactment ability of the ethnic party that matters, but that of the preferred majority party. So my second hypothesis is that

H2. Low ethnic issue salience and positive ratings of majority parties should show a positive association with crossover voting.

Finally, there will be a group of voters who regard the ethnic issue as salient, but who are not satisfied with the enactment ability of the ethnic party, that is, who are dissatisfied with the performance of the party or regard it as incompetent.[20] As these persons regard the

[20] A possible mechanism of how of how members of the ethnic group may become dissatisfied with the ethnic party is provided by Lieven de Winter. He distinguishes between the electoral, the office-holding and the policy success of ethnoregionalist parties, and points out that office-holding success may come at the expense of policy

party as unable or incompetent in dealing with the issue, they will not support it, despite the fact that it emphasizes the very issue which is salient for them. The vote choice of these persons will depend on the available options. As the ethnic issue is not represented by any nonethnic party, crossover voting should not be an alternative for them. Even the presence of fringe ethnic parties (which also lack enactment ability because of being unable to access the legislature) should not represent an alternative according to the theory, as supporting them would mean wasting the vote just like voting for the party deemed incompetent or unable to enact. Consequently, the theory would predict nonparticipation for these persons.

However, I will relax this assumption about fringe parties. Despite their inability to enact policies, members of ethnic group who are not satisfied with the performance of the major ethnic party might cast expressive or protest votes for fringe ethnic parties, even if they are aware that their vote will be wasted. Consequently, I formulate the third hypothesis in the following way:

H3. High ethnic issue salience and a negative evaluation of the main ethnic party may result in voting for a fringe ethnic party, or in nonparticipation.

More precisely, where no fringe ethnic party is available, I expect that the voters displaying these characteristics are more likely to stay away. For the situation when fringe parties are present no specific expectation is formulated.

Testing the hypotheses derived from the model are the main purpose of this paper. However, I also aim to explain the voting behavior of ethnic Hungarians as comprehensively as possible with the available data. The presented hypotheses cover only one of the possible paths which may lead to non-voting or crossover voting. Notwithstanding these expectations,

implementation, as it supposes compromise regarding the party's policy aims. Consequently, enacted policies may differ substantially from the promises made to voters. In turn, this may cause electoral losses for the ethnic party as voters may become discontent with the enacted policies. (Winter, 1998: 205–207).

non-voting or crossover voting may be due to other reasons too, some of them even rather trivial.

Most importantly, the typical reason for not going to the polls is disinterest in politics or disillusionment with politics. This is obviously true for minority voters too. Apart from accounting for these sources of nonparticipation, the aim is to differentiate between them and the nonparticipation of those who feel that no party would represent the issues they regard as salient.

3.4. An alternative explanation: ethnic voting regardless of ethnic issue salience

The model put forward was based on certain assumptions which cannot be taken for granted. First, I assumed that ethnic parties are associated with ethnic issues and only with ethnic issues, while nonethnic issues are relegated to nonethnic parties. A group of Hungarian sociologists from Transylvania argue exactly the opposite. According to their theory, members of the ethnic group do not expect the ethnic party to deal exclusively with issues related to ethnicity, leaving the task of handling the issues which are "universally" important in the whole country to the governing parties of the majority. Conversely, in everyday life problems cannot be classified as "universal" or "particularly Hungarian". Not poverty, inflation, bad roads or the conditions in the agriculture in general constitute the problem, but poverty, bad roads or corruption in the particular locality where the Hungarian community lives. Thus, these apparently "universal" problems are regarded just as particularly Hungarian as language usage in public institutions or autonomy. As the ethnic party is expected to deal with the problems of the ethnic group, according to this reasoning it is expected to deal with all the issues (Csata et al., 2005).

It follows that the evaluation of ethnic party is not based exclusively or even predominantly on its performance regarding ethnic issues, consequently ethnic issue salience would not be an efficient predictor of the voting behavior of ethnic Hungarians. However, the

attitudes toward the party (perceived competence and trust) should still matter for the vote, as the party is still supported with the purpose of dealing with the problems of the voters, the only difference being that now all the issues matter for its record. With this alternative theory the impact of party evaluations does not really differ from those put forward in the main model, the only important difference being that ethnic issue salience should not be associated positively or negatively with any of the particular outcomes of behavior. A negative evaluation of the main ethnic party on its own would still increase the likelihood of either non-participation, crossover voting or support for ethnic contenders. Furthermore, a negative opinion about the ethnic party together with positive attitudes toward majority parties would still lead to increased likelihood of crossover voting. Negative attitudes about all parties might lead to non-voting, but also to supporting fringe ethnic parties. However, if ethnic issues lack any impact on the vote, it is more difficult to set up specific predictions about the likelihood of occurrence of the particular outcomes of voting behavior (non-participation, crossover voting or supporting fringe ethnic parties).

4. Data, operationalization and method

4.1. The data

The data that will be subjected to analysis comes from surveys conducted exclusively on ethnic Hungarian respondents from the two countries. The Romanian data were collected in October 2004 by the Research Centre on Interethnic Relations (CCRIT), one month before the parliamentary and presidential elections of November 2004. The sample is representative for the Hungarian community from Romania and has 1094 respondents. The data for Slovakia comes from a survey ordered by the Party of Hungarian Coalition, conducted in April 2006, so this is a pre-electoral survey too. The dataset has 771 respondents.

Neither of the surveys was designed for the purposes of testing theories of electoral behavior, but with the much more practical goal of assessing the electoral intentions of the Hungarian electorate before the elections. Consequently it was difficult to find measures for all the relevant concepts, most questions had to be recoded and lots of proxies had to be employed. It is also very probable that the validity of the data may be questionable, in the sense that reported voting intentions may be different from real behavior. The fact that the surveys were ordered by the major Hungarian parties and carried out by ethnic Hungarian interviewers could have caused some respondents to give desirable answers. However, this is the best data available.

Data analysis was performed with SPSS 15.0. and with fs/QCA 3.0.

4.2. Method

Because all the dependent variables of the research are dichotomies, binary logistic regression models will be constructed. However, as the hypotheses imply conjunctural causation (the presence of the conditions in particular combinations leading to the outcome) and equifinal causation (different combinations of conditions are leading to the same

outcome), I decided to analyze the data also with the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) methodology.

Logistic regressions can be used when the dependent variable is not continuous, but categorical. Most common are binary logistic regressions, for dichotomous outcomes, but multinomial or ordinal dependent variables can also be estimated by multinomial or ordinal logistic regression techniques. The method calculates the probability of a certain event (e.g. the dependent variable taking the value of 1) occurring by maximum likelihood estimation. It calculates changes in the log odds of the dependent variable, not changes in the dependent itself as Ordinary Least Squares regression. The assumptions of logistic regressions are less demanding than those of OLS regressions. A linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables is not a condition, furthermore, variables need not be normally distributed, and homoscedasticity is not assumed.[21] However, other conditions apply, most importantly multicollinearity between the independent variables can still pose problems. Interaction terms can be entered into logistic regressions just like in OLS regressions, to capture the non-additive effect of certain combinations of variables.

QCA has been developed by Charles Ragin (1987) exactly for the study of complex or conjunctural causations, which cannot be captured adequately by inferential statistical techniques. While regression models capture relationships between variables, QCA focuses on membership of cases in sets (the presence or absence of characteristics) and consequently allows the identification of sufficient and necessary conditions for the studied outcomes. It also assumes equifinality, allowing for different, but logically equivalent combinations of conditions to produce the same outcome. (Ragin, 1987; Schneider & Grofman, 2006).

All these features of the method render it appropriate for the purposes of this paper, as the investigated phenomenon implies hypotheses involving a complex combination of

[21] The presentation of logistic regressions is based on information from David Garson's homepage at North Carolina State University. (http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/logistic.htm, accessed on the 17th of May, 2007).

conditions (ethnic issue salience and positive or negative evaluations of parties) which are expected to produce the outcomes of non-participation, crossover voting, or voting for fringe ethnic parties. However, none of these outcomes are expected to occur exclusively as the result of the hypothesized combination of conditions, other paths may also lead to them. For instance, non-voting may have multiple causes, the most straightforward being no interest in politics or general disillusionment. Consequently, the aim of employing QCA is 1. to test whether (or more precisely with what probability) the outcome *may* occur under certain conditions, or in other words, to assess the consistency of the hypothesized combinations of conditions with the outcomes; 2. to identify all the relevant paths leading to the outcome, and 3. to assess the empirical relevance of the hypothesized combination of conditions in what it concerns the outcome, or, put it more technically, to evaluate the coverage of the solutions.

Though multiple variants of QCA exist, I will rely on simple QCA, which employs crisp sets.[22] Simple QCA requires all variables to be coded as dichotomies, consequently I recoded all the variables into dummies. The coding is presented in the next section of the chapter.

QCA sorts cases into truth tables, each row of such a table standing for one logically possible combination of conditions. Some rows have equivalents in the data, but others do not, because some combinations of conditions might not occur because of limited diversity. The size of the truth table increases with the number of conditions, a truth table constructed from k variables will contain 2^k rows, which imposes limits on the number of variables to be entered into the analysis. This means that a high number of variables may yield huge truth tables and very complex and even idiosyncratic solutions.

[22] A crisp set is a conventional binary set with two categories (e.g., presence versus absence of a condition) (Ragin, 2006: 3).
Other, more complex developments of QCA are Multi Value QCA (MVQCA), which is able to handle multinomial variables, and fuzzy set QCA (fs/QCA) which is able to handle partial memberships in a set and allows the assessment of necessary and sufficient conditions by probabilistic statements.

Consequently selection of variables is crucial. Amenta and Poulsen (1994) review five possible strategies for selecting variables. Not all of them are relevant for this paper. Scholars who use QCA as a second option beside inferential statistics often include in the analysis only the variables which proved to be significant in the regressions. The opposite strategy is possible too: taking a "second look" at variables that were hypothesized to have an effect but failed the significance test. The first method is not in line with the epistemological basis of QCA, as even insignificant variables may turn out to have different effects in different combinations of conditions, or may alter the impact of other causes. The drawback of the second approach is that reinclusion of variables may easily be done arbitrarily, as no clear guidelines can be set up. The authors consider that the best method is to proceed from theories that are combinatorial in construction, which suppose conjunctural causation from the beginning.

From the perspective of testing the hypotheses of the paper variable selection is not problematic, as the relevant conditions are relatively few, and the expectations assume conjunctural causation. However, a thorough test of the hypotheses would imply the presence of as many conditions as possible, and a better specified model could also provide a more comprehensive explanation for electoral behavior. The inclusion of control variables into the logistic regressions is not problematic, but including all of them as conditions into QCA would inflate the truth tables way too much (this would lead to the approach called "comprehensive" by Amenta and Poulsen, which rarely yields interpretable results). Consequently, sociodemographic variables will not be entered into the QCA models, even if this runs the risk of overlooking important effects (e.g. some relationship might hold only for women, another for young people living in urban areas, speaking not only Hungarian in family etc.). However, my primary interest is to test the hypotheses, and only a secondary aim is to construct fully specified models for the different outcomes. The only variable that will be

included in addition to those which are relevant for testing the hypothesis is political knowledge (and education, where the former indicator is not available or cannot be employed). The inclusion of political knowledge is done on both significance considerations and because it is reasonable to expect that it will play a role in the alternative paths leading to certain outcomes.

4.3. Operationalization of variables

The dependent variables of the research are the reported intention to vote (or abstain) and reported intention of party choice. The latter will be decomposed into two variables, one for crossover voting and another for supporting fringe ethnic parties. The dichotomous nature of all dependent variables calls for logistic regressions, and also enables the use of simple QCA. Though non-participation, crossover voting and voting for fringe ethnic parties are related phenomena, all being ways of not voting for the major, "hegemonic" ethnic parties, in this paper separate binary logistic regression models will be constructed for the three outcomes. Notwithstanding this, all the independent variables will be included in at least one variant of the logistic regression models for all three outcomes, to enable comparability. Descriptive statistics about the variables are reported in appendix 1.

Non-voting was operationalized so that those who stated that they would probably or surely not vote were recoded as non-participants (1), while those who declared that they would probably or surely vote were classified as participating (0). Non-responses and the undecided were excluded from the analysis. Only those respondents were considered for the party choice question who were coded as 0 for the participation item. On the dependent variable about crossover voting all respondents who indicated voting for a party of the majority were coded as 1, regardless of which party they chose. Voters of the major ethnic party were coded as 0. As the Romanian dataset also listed for party choice the HCU, a fringe ethnic party, those who intended to support this party were coded as missing on the indicator

of crossover voting. Instead, another variable was created, on which HCU voters were coded as 1, while all other responses were coded as 0.

The independent variables can be classified into two categories. The first category comprises the variables operationalizing the tested model, while the second contains control variables, most but not all of these being sociodemographic variables.

Because beside logistic regressions Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was also employed (with all the variables related to the theoretical model but only with some of the control variables), all the variables which were initially non-dichotomous had to be recoded as dummies for the QCA analysis. The dichotomization process is reported after the operationalization of variables for logistic regressions.

4.3.1. Variables operationalizing the theoretical model

Salience of ethnic issues

For the Romanian data, the salience score for ethnic issues was computed on the basis of 16 issues, from which respondents had to choose the 3 most important. Seven of the issues were related to ethnicity, the remainder of eight not. The choices were coded as 3 if first choice, as 2 if second, as 1 if third, and as 0 if not mentioned, and the scores for items standing for ethnic issues were summed up. The maximum value of the composite variable is 6 (all the mentioned issues are ethnic), and the minimum 0 (no ethnic issue mentioned). Missing data were recoded as ethnic issue not salient.

For the QCA analysis the salience attributed to ethnic issues was coded as high (1) for those respondents who scored at least 3 on the composite indicator, lower values were recoded as 0. A score of 3 means that the respondent either named two ethnic issues as the second and third most important, or indicated only one, but that was the most important.

The data from Slovakia contained questions about 24 issues (six of which were related to ethnicity), and the respondents had to rate all according to how problematic they regarded the field on 3 point scales (1 – very problematic, 2 – not so problematic, 3 – not problematic at all). As the list contained both ethnic and nonethnic issues, the salience score for ethnic issues was computed by dividing the sum of ratings of the six ethnic issues with the sum of the ratings of all issues. Missing values did not constitute a problem. The resulting composite variable could take values ranging from 0 to 1 theoretically, but actually values higher than 0,4 are rare as out of the 24 issues only 6 could be classified as ethnic.

Because the variable is a composite one, computed from very numerous items, in the dichotomization for QCA no such "natural" thresholds could be set as for the item for Romania. Consequently, those respondents were assigned a 1 (high ethnic issue salience), who were situated above the 75th percentile of the variable (0,25). The others were recoded as 0.

Evaluation of parties

According to Schmitt and Wessels (2005), evaluations of the parties have two dimensions: trust in the actors (that they will be able to do a good job if elected to office) and judgments about their competence/performance. However, the authors do not provide precise definitions about the two components. I treat trust as the emotional component of the attitude toward the party, which is similar to party attachment or identification, and judgments about performance as the cognitive component. In practice the two may be difficult to distinguish and may go together. To avoid conceptual confusion, I will refer to the general concept as to party evaluations or as to attitudes toward the parties.

The Slovak data contained no question on trust, but items asking the respondent to assess the performance of the ethnic party were available. The Romanian dataset contained direct measures for trust and a proxy for satisfaction with the performance of the party could

be computed from several questions. For the Romanian data I used both trust and performance/competence to operationalize the general concept of party evaluations. As expected, the indicators of trust and dissatisfaction were correlated, but the correlation was not so strong as to lead to increased multicollinearity ($r = -0{,}343$, $p < 0{,}001$, see Appendix 2). Including both variables was also worthwhile in order to establish whether the more general and diffuse concept of trust or the more specific performance ratings turn out to be better predictors for voting behavior.

Trust in parties

Data on trust was only available in the surveys from Romania. Two variables were included in the analysis, one referring to the ethnic party and another to majority parties. Both variables are coded on 1-4 scales, 1 standing for low and 4 for high trust. However, including a variable for each Romanian party would have made little sense as the low number of crossover voters does not allow analyzing the vote for the particular majority parties separately anyway. Consequently, I employed the maximum value of trust for the seven Romanian parties listed in the questionnaire as an indicator for trust in Romanian parties in general.

Unfortunately, the number of missing values for the variable about trust in Romanian parties turned out to be relatively high. However, this was not the case with the ethnic party: discounting non-responses, only 49 respondents said that they did not know anything about the ethnic party, while the number for parties of the majority ranged from 239 to 380, 219 respondents saying they did not know anything about *any* Romanian party. As I am interested in the effect of high values of trust in Romanian parties (as these voters are expected to be more prone to engage in crossover voting), in order to reduce the very high number of missing values, those who stated not being familiar with a particular Romanian party were coded as scoring low on trust for that party. Perhaps handling missing data this way may seem as

relying on rather strong assumptions, yet doing so can be justified, as only those will engage in crossover voting due to identifying with a party of the majority who are familiar with that party.

Concerning QCA, both trust variables were recoded into dummies so that individuals were classified as scoring high or low on distrust. Those who stated that they trusted or totally trusted the (ethnic or a majority) party were coded as 0, as well as those who did not provide a valid answer, while those who rather did not trust the party or did not trust it at all were coded as 1.

Performance/competence of the ethnic party

Questions about performance were only available in relation to the ethnic parties. Different indicators for performance ratings were employed, as a function of the wording of questions in the surveys. However, all of these implied retrospective performance attributions rather than prospective assessments of the competence of ethnic parties.

All satisfaction items were coded inversely, as a measure of dissatisfaction, with high values denoting low satisfaction. The reason for this is that such a coding makes it easier to interpret the effects of the interaction of these variables with the salience of ethnic issues.[23]

In the Slovak data there was a question which required the respondent to indicate her satisfaction with the performance of the ethnic party on 16 policy domains. The options for response were satisfied/not satisfied/does not know. Once again, in order to reduce the incidence of missing data, I assumed that those who do not have an opinion (disregarding those who did not answer the question) are not dissatisfied regarding that particular policy. The responses were coded as 2 for satisfaction, 1 for indifferent or don't know and 0 for

[23] The reason for inverting the scales is the intention to test for the effect of the interaction of satisfaction with the salience attributed to ethnic issues. As the hypothesis refers to the behavior of dissatisfied individuals who regard the ethnic issue as salient, with a measure of dissatisfaction the effect of the interaction can be interpreted easier: the value of the interaction increases if either of the interacting variables increase, so a high value stands for those who are dissatisfied and deem ethnic issues as salient.

dissatisfaction, consequently the variable takes values between 0 and 32. The final indicator was obtained by computing the sum of the 16 questions and inverting the scales (subtracting the score from 32), so that low values stand for satisfaction and high values for dissatisfaction

For QCA once again the 75th percentile was set as a threshold. Respondents with higher values than 23 were assigned an 1, while lower scores were recoded as 0.

From the Slovak data a dummy variable was created too, indicating whether the respondent considered that another ethnic party would be needed. Though no direct reference was made in the original question to the evaluation of the main ethnic party (the PHC), a positive answer indicates that the respondent is not fully satisfied with the performance of the PHC. As the variable is a dichotomy, there was no need to recode it for QCA.

For Romania I had to rely on two proxies. The first consisted of multiple 4 point scales about satisfaction in general with the party and its leadership.[24] The shortcoming of these questions is their broad and vague wording, as no reference is made to any particular field of policy or political issue. Once again, missing data posed a problem (208 respondents did not have an opinion about anything) and stereotypical responses were also rather frequent. To get around these problems, I replaced the missing data with the mean value for on all survey items and computed an average. While these questions measured satisfaction with the ethnic party in general, the second item that I used referred to something more specific, namely, the agreement of respondents with the collaboration between the DAHR and the *Social Democratic Party*. As the two parties were collaborating between 2000 and 2004, it is reasonable to assume that the question measures the general satisfaction with the

[24] Respondents were asked to express their satisfaction with the activity of the local party organization, the county level party organization, the parliamentary group of the party and the Council of the Representatives of the Alliance (Szövetségi Képviselők Tanácsa – SZKT, the so-called "internal parliament" of the DAHR), and two of the most important leaders. Unfortunately the data about the leaders was missing completely from the 2004 database.

achievements of the DAHR from this period.[25] The variable could take values of -1 (disagree), 0 (no opinion) and 1 (agree). The scores on the two indicators were added and the resulting sum was inverted, resulting in a composite variable measuring dissatisfaction, taking values between 0 (satisfied) and 5 (dissatisfied).

For QCA dissatisfaction was recoded so that those who scored 3 or above on the composite indicator were assigned an 1 (dissatisfied), while the others a 0.

Political knowledge

Although John Zaller (1993: 21-22) warns that measures of political awareness should be simple tests of neutral factual information about politics (like which party controls the House of Representatives), I had to rely on less-than-perfect proxies, as no question explicitly addressed political knowledge in any of the surveys. In the Romanian data a political knowledge indicator was computed on the basis of two items: whether respondent heard about the establishment of the HCU[26], and about the primaries organized by the DAHR. Both items could be answered as "no", "yes, but I do not know much" and "yes, I am well informed about this". Consequently, the resulting composite variable takes values between 1 and 6, higher values meaning more knowledge.

Political knowledge was recoded for QCA so that only those qualified as knowledgeable who were well informed on at least one of the original questions, and somewhat informed on the other (the primaries organized by the DAHR and the establishment

[25] The collaboration of the DAHR with the SDP was a highly debated issue within the Hungarian community, as memories about the hostile attitude of the post-communist party from the period between 1990-96 were still alive. Moreover, the politicians of the PSD were involved in multiple corruption scandals during the collaboration too. Because of the collaboration the DAHR also had to face charges of drifting to the left and of oligarchization. Being aware that the issue is very complex, I still consider that respondents' opinions about the collaboration of the two parties can be used as a proxy for performance assessment.

[26] The inclusion of this item might seem strange, but the Hungarian Civic Union did not really penetrate into Hungarian public opinion until shortly before the 2004 parliamentary elections, when the organization was not allowed to register as a political party because the sheets with the signatures necessary for registration turned out to contain counterfeit entries. However, estimating political knowledge by this method has the drawback of being unusable to explain voting for the HCU, as using it would lead to spurious causality.

of the Hungarian Civic Union). This means that those who scored 5 or 6 on the continuous variable employed in the regressions were assigned a 1, the rest being coded as 0.

In the data from Slovakia there were no questions which could be used to assess political knowledge, consequently I relied on education as a proxy.

4.3.2. Control variables

Sociodemographic and identification variables

Sociodemographic variables were not included with the purpose of assessing theoretical propositions about their impact, but only to control for their effect when evaluating the results. However, as the paper also aims to provide a comprehensive explanation for voting behavior, their effect will be evaluated too.

From the sociodemographic variables age, gender, education, type of locality (rural vs. urban) and the percentage of Hungarian population in the locality will be entered into logistic regression models. Sociodemographic variables (except for education) will not be employed in QCA, consequently there was no need to recode them.

Age is a continuous variable in the datasets for Romania and a 3 category ordinal variable for Slovakia (the categories being 18-34, 35-54, and above 55). Age is usually positively related to participation, but should have no effect on party choice.

Gender and type of locality are dummies, with 1 standing for women, respectively for urban localities. No specific expectation is linked to gender, but the type of locality should matter and be related negatively to both non-participation and crossover voting as turnout rates are regularly higher in rural areas, and the rural electorate is considered to support the main ethnic party in a more orderly manner than voters from the cities.

The percentage of Hungarians in the locality is based on the 2002 census for Romania and on the 2001 census for Slovakia, and is a continuous variable. Research done on

aggregate data concluded that turnout is higher in the areas with higher proportions of ethnic Hungarians in Romania (Bakk et al., 2004), so a negative relationship with non-voting is expected. Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that crossover voting is less likely in areas where Hungarians form a majority.

Education was measured on an 10 point ordinal scale in the data from Romania and on a 4 point ordinal scale for Slovakia. For QCA, persons with low or unfinished middle education (less than high school) were coded as 0, and those with finished middle or higher schooling as 1. Education is usually positively related to turnout. While in some settings it can have an impact on party choice too, in the context of ethnic politics I will not expect any specific relationship between education and crossover voting or supporting fringe ethnic parties.

On more sociological variable was included, to capture assimilation to the majority, namely language spoken in the family. This is an ordinal variable for both countries, the difference being that for Romania it is a 5 point scale (only Hungarian – 1, mostly Hungarian – 2, both languages equally – 3, mostly Romanian – 4, only Romanian – 5), while for Slovakia a 3 point scale (1 – Hungarian, 2 – both, 3 – Slovak). Any other situation than the exclusive use of Hungarian in family interactions should be linked to an increased likelihood of crossover voting, but it should not be related to participation.

Importance of representation

The Romanian data contained an item which asked the respondents whether they considered that it is important that the Hungarian community have representatives in parliament. No such variable was available in the Slovak data. The variable could take three values: important, indifferent or not important (non-responses were recoded as indifferent), and it was recoded so that a higher value indicate no importance. As the variable refers to the importance attributed to the representation of the ethnic group in general, it is impossible to

fill it with precise content. It could measure a very general attitude about politics and being represented, but deeming representation unimportant could also result from the disillusionment with the achievements of the ethnic party. The importance attributed to representation should be related positively to both participation and voting for the ethnic party.

Perceived danger of losing parliamentary representation

The expectation about the election results can also influence voting behavior. If a tight result is expected, turnout may increase. In the case of ethnic parties the result can be tight not in the sense of winning an election, but in the context of passing the electoral threshold. In Romania the proportion of Hungarians is around 6,6%, while the electoral threshold is 5%, and before the 2004 elections there were concerns that the DAHR might not reach the threshold. Such taut situations may boost participation, or on the contrary, may keep people at home in the belief that the representation in parliament would be lost anyway. Whichever would be the right effect, a control variable was included about the perceived danger of not passing the electoral threshold. This might seem similar to variable about the importance of parliamentary representation. However, this latter variable only refers to an expectation and measures only a cognitive phenomenon, and has a weak attitudinal component. One may believe or not that the Hungarian minority may lose parliamentary representation, but this does not imply regarding representation as desirable or undesirable, no value judgment is associated.

Items for constructing such a measure were available only in the data from Romania. The variable was computed as the sum of two questions which asked the respondent whether she believed that the ethnic group/ethnic party may lose representation in parliament. The composite item takes values between 0 and 3, higher values denoting higher perceived danger. Again, the emphasis was on the positive answers, consequently don't knows were recoded as

not perceiving any danger. No particular expectation is linked to this variable, as it could generate an increased incentive to participate and vote for the ethnic party but also demoralize voters and keep them at home, or even to engage in strategic voting for a majority party in order not to waste the vote.

5. Data analysis and interpretation of results

This chapter presents the results of the data analysis and their interpretation. It is structured according to the three studied outcomes of behavior: (non)participation, crossover voting, and voting for fringe ethnic parties. As two methods were employed to test the hypotheses (logistic regressions and QCA), each subsection presents the results obtained with both methods, first the logistic regression models and second the qualitative analysis. Within the subsections, first logistic regression models are presented and interpreted for the data from Romania, and then for Slovakia, and next the data for both countries (in the same order) is also evaluated with QCA. Finally, at the end of the subsections preliminary conclusions are formulated.

Though different variables are expected to be associated with nonvoting and crossover voting, and some of the variables are hypothesized to be associated in different ways with the outcomes, at least one variant of the regression models for each outcome will contain all the variables. Similarly, the same conditions will be present the QCA truth tables for all three outcomes, with one minor exception.[27] The reason for this is that the investigated phenomena are related, all being ways of not supporting the ethnic party.

As stated in the beginning, the aim of the paper is twofold: to test the hypotheses and to provide a comprehensive explanation for each outcome. Consequently, different logistic regression models will be constructed for each outcome. To illustrate on a specific example: the first model for non-voting will test the hypotheses that nonparticipation is directly related to low ethnic issue salience, to a negative evaluation of the ethnic party, as well as to the combination of high ethnic issue salience and a negative evaluation of the ethnic party. Next, a model containing control variables will be presented, with the aim of testing the hypotheses

[27] The indicator for political knowledge would have produced a spurious relationship with voting for the fringe ethnic party HCU, as it was computed on the basis of a question which inquired whether the respondent heard about the establishment of the HCU. Consequently the variable will not be used in the models for the support of fringe parties.

when most possible conditions are kept constant. The other reason of employing as many controls as possible is that even if the hypotheses will be supported by the results, nonvoting may have other reasons too, like low interest in politics or a general disillusionment with politics. A better specified model should be able to explain a larger amount of variance of the dependent variable. Finally an attempt will be made to produce the most parsimonious model which still performs well in terms of explanatory and predictive power, so variables which do not improve the model and which are not significant will be removed.

Conversely, conditions will not be entered and removed from QCA models. Yet in some cases the thresholds applied for coding a combination of conditions as consistently displaying the outcome will be varied. This will result in more solutions for each outcome, differing in their consistency and coverage.

Before performing data analysis the correlations between all independent variables (except the sociodemographics) were checked. The results are reported in Appendix 2. Though there are statistically significant correlations between some of the variables (especially between trust and satisfaction with the parties), these are not so strong to pose problems for logistic regressions. The multicollinearity check shows that the variance inflation factor (VIF) is not above 1,2 for any of the variables, which is a comforting result.

5.1. (Non)participation

Logistic regressions

The data from Romania

As explained above, three logistic regression models will be presented for each outcome on the data from both countries. The models for the non-voting of ethnic Hungarians in Romania are reported in Table 5.1.1.

Table 5.1.1. Logistic regression models for nonparticipation (Romania)

		odds ratios (Exp (B))		
		model 1	model 2	model 3
ethnic issue salience		0,793**	0,893	0,924
Dissatisfaction		1,139	1,068	1,144
political knowledge			0,673***	0,665***
trust in DAHR		0,382***	0,439***	0,455***
trust in majority parties			0,722***	0,716***
interaction: dissat*salience		0,912	0,829	
interaction: distrust*salience [a)]		1,035	1,149	
Age			1,017***	1,018***
gender (woman)			0,650**	0,664*
Education			0,938	0,938
language used in family			0,927	
type of locality (urban)			1,284	1,292
% of Hungarians in loc. (2002)[b)]			0,752**	0,992**
importance of representation			3,188***	3,176***
danger of losing representation			0,949	
Constant		1,878***	3,929*	4,506*
classification table predictions	Vote	99,0%	98,1%	97,9%
	non-vote	5,0%	27,1%	28,4%
	Total	86,6%	89,0%	89,0%
Cox & Snell R^2		0,094	0,168	0,168
Nagelkerke R^2		0,174	0,314	0,313

* – 0,05<p≤0,1; ** – p<0,05; *** – p<0,01.

a) – For the interaction between trust in the ethnic party and ethnic issue salience the trust variable was recoded so that high values on the interaction term denote the combination of distrust and high salience.

b) – instead of the percentage of Hungarians living in the locality I used the standardized score of the variable, because entering the unstandardized variable into the model produced odds ratios around 0,950, which were very difficult to interpret due to the fact that the independent variable is measured in percents. Consequently, the odds ratio refers to the effect of one standard deviation increase on the independent variable. The standard deviation of the variable is 34,55%

Into Model 1 only ethnic issue salience, dissatisfaction with the ethnic party and trust in the ethnic party were entered, as well as two interactions: one between dissatisfaction and ethnic issue salience, and another between trust in the ethnic party and ethnic issue salience.[28] I included both interactions based on Schmitt and Wessels' (2006) argument that the perceived competence/performance of a party regarding an issue has two dimensions: trust in

[28] Adding interactions to the model runs the risk of inflating multicollinearity, which may result in insignificant coefficients. To avoid this problem, instead of the original interaction terms I entered the residuals obtained by regressing the interaction term on the two interacting variables. For detailed description of the method see Burrill (s.a.).

the party and judgments about its competence. The results show that both ethnic issue salience and trust in the ethnic party have a significant effect, being related inversely to the likelihood of nonvoting. That is, the increase of these variables is associated with a decreased likelihood of abstaining. Attributing high salience to the ethnic issue, as well as a positive evaluation of the ethnic party reduces the likelihood of non-voting. This supports the first hypothesis, even if the other dimension of the evaluation, dissatisfaction, did not prove to be significant. However, hypothesis 3 is not supported by these findings, as neither of the interactions was found to be significant. Moreover, the odds ratio for the first interaction is smaller than 1, indicating exactly the opposite relationship than hypothesized, a high value decreasing the chances of non-participation. Only the effect of the second interaction is in the expected direction, but it is far from being significant (p=0,735). Consequently, the third hypothesis is not supported by the data, the combination of high ethnic issue salience and dissatisfaction with the party does not induce absenteeism.

The explanatory power of model 1 is rather weak (Nagelkerke R^2=0,174), and it is able to predict only 5% of the non-vote.[29] This is not surprising, as important variables influencing participation were not included into the model. However, removing both interaction does not impact explanatory and predictive power at all (model not reported), which is indicative of the fact that the relationship expected in hypothesis 3 does not account for the variance of the dependent variable at all.

In Model 2 all the theoretically relevant variables were included: beside the variables from model 1 political knowledge and trust in Romanian parties were added, as well as control variables for the general attitude of the respondent about representation in parliament and her expectation about the representation of the Hungarian community. Sociodemographic characteristics were also controlled for. The purpose of this model is to test the viability of

[29] It is important to mention that the removal of any of the three variables from the model decreases the accuracy of the prediction of the non-vote (results not reported). Consequently all conditions matter, and the inclusion of all three variables is justified.

hypothesis 1 when as many circumstances are controlled for as possible (and also whether hypothesis 3, though not supported by Model 1, can turn out to hold in the presence of controls), but also to provide a more comprehensive explanation for nonparticipation.

The first conclusion that can be drawn from Model 2 is that ethnic issue salience loses its significance once the controls are inserted into the model. As a matter of fact it is sufficient that political knowledge be entered into the model to render it insignificant (model is not reported). Political knowledge is highly significant, and it is inversely related to nonparticipation. This indicates that the politically more knowledgeable are also more likely to attribute higher salience to ethnic issues, despite the argument that the ethnic issue is an easy issue. (The two variables are correlated, but the association is not very strong /r=0,192, p<0,001/). It is thus political awareness that counts for participation, and when it is held constant, the salience of ethnic issues no longer has an effect. Conversely, trust in the ethnic party remains significant and strongly associated with a decreased likelihood of abstaining. From the newly entered variables trust in Romanian parties has a similar effect, which was expected, as trust in any party should increase participation just like trust in ethnic parties does. From the control variables related to representation only the importance attributed to being represented in the parliament had a significant effect, those who attribute low or no importance to this being more likely to stay at home.

From the sociodemographic variables age, gender and the proportion of Hungarians living in the locality were found to be significant. Age is associated positively with the likelihood of nonvoting, which is a rather strange finding as older people are usually more willing to participate. The effect of gender is significant too, showing that women are less likely to stay at home on election day, all other things being equal. The proportion of Hungarians living in the locality is also influencing participation, the relationship being positive: as the percentage of Hungarians increases, so does the willingness to participate.

This is in line with the observation that the turnout figures of the counties with Hungarian majority are usually above the average, and also with the results of Bakk et al. (2004) who found a similar relationship by regressing turnout rates on the percentage of Hungarians in the locality using aggregate data for localities from Transylvania.

The other sociodemographic variables did not have a significant impact on the decision to participate. The degree to which the person is assimilated to the majority (captured by language usage in the family) does not matter for participation, what conforms to the expectations (I hypothesized that assimilation should have an impact only on the propensity for crossover voting). Perhaps surprisingly, the type of locality where the respondent lives was not significant, though real participation patterns show that turnout is usually higher in rural areas.[30] Neither was the impact of education, though this may be explained with the presence in the model of a variable about political knowledge.

Finally, from Model 3 some variables have been removed, so it can be considered the most parsimonious model which is still able to explain a considerable amount of the non-vote. Two variables did not add to the quality of the model but rather decreased it. These are the language spoken at home (which anyway was not expected to have an effect) and the control variable about the perceived danger of losing representation. The removal of these two explains why the classification tables of model 3 predict the non-vote somewhat better than those of model 2. Furthermore, both interactions were removed, as they did not add any important information to the model. As a result, model 3 predicts 28,4% of non-participation correctly, and has a Nagelkerke R^2 of 0,313, showing a moderately good explanatory power.

[30] For example, in the first round of the 2004 parliamentary elections the turnout measured at 20^{00} PM was 57,13% (data broken down to county level for the final turnout figures /the polls closed at 21^{00} PM/ are not available). In urban areas 54,41% of the electorate voted, while in rural areas 60,84%. In the counties with Hungarian majority the results conformed to the general trend. Moreover, in Harghita county the difference between the turnout in the cities (51,7%) was way lower than in the countryside (73,14%). Source: The Central Electoral Bureau of Romania. (http://www.bec2004.ro/documente/ora20harti.pdf, accessed on the 21st of May 2007).

To sum up, neither of the two tested hypotheses about nonparticipation was fully supported by the Romanian data. The combination of high ethnic issue salience and a negative evaluation of the ethnic party is not related in any way to the likelihood of participation, so hypothesis 3 is not supported. Neither does high salience on its own, as in the presence of controls the relationship loses statistical significance, so hypothesis 1 does not hold either. The models show that only the evaluation of the parties matters for participation, positive attitudes toward any of the parties increasing the likelihood of participation. Consequently, non-participants are most likely apolitical people (who are not interested in politics, as it follows from the effect of political knowledge), or politically disillusioned individuals (as reflected in the negative association of the trust scores for all parties with the outcome and in the effect of the control variable about importance attributed to representation in parliament). No evidence was found for the non-voting of the sophisticated out of protest or lack of choice could. Moreover, it seems that ethnic issue salience does not have an effect on participation at all (its apparent impact being in reality due to political knowledge), which would be in line rather with the alternative explanation put forward at the end of chapter 3, than with the proposed model.

The data from Slovakia

Three models were constructed for the Slovak data too. The logic is the same as for Romania, but the variables are different, as no measures of trust and political knowledge were available in the Slovak data. Furthermore, all the controls are sociodemographics, there are no controls for attitudes or expectations about representation in parliament.

Into the first model (4) a measure of ethnic issue salience was entered, as well as two variables about the evaluation of the main ethnic party (the PHC). One of these variables was a continuous performance rating (dissatisfaction), while the other a dummy capturing whether the respondent considered that another ethnic party would be needed in Slovakia. An

interaction was also included, between the continuous dissatisfaction variable and ethnic issue salience. The second model (5) tests the effects of these variables when also sociodemographic controls are introduced. Finally, model 6 is the most parsimonious model with the best explanatory and predictive power. The models are presented in table 5.1.2.

Table 5.1.2. Logistic regression models for nonparticipation (Slovakia)

		model 4	model 5	model 6
ethnic issue salience [a)]		1,163	1,153	1,153
dissatisfaction		1,176***	1,176***	1,188***
interaction: dissat*salience		2,243**	2,163*	2,347**
need for another ethnic party		0,960	1,127	
education			0,623***	0,638***
age			0,825	
gender (woman)			1,289	
language used in family			2,414***	2,260***
type of locality (urban)			1,298	1,091
% of Hungarians in loc. (2001)[b)]			1,154	
Constant		0,007***	0,008***	0,006***
classification table predictions	vote	98,4%	97,2%	97,1%
	non-vote	22,0%	21,3%	25,5%
	total	86,8%	85,9%	86,3%
Cox & Snell R^2		0,138	0,163	0,170
Nagelkerke R^2		0,241	0,286	0,297

* 0,05<p≤0,1; ** 0,01<p≤0,05; *** p≤0,0l

a) the standardized values of the variable have been used, because although the variable can theoretically take values between 0 and 1, actually the minimum value is 0, the maximum 0,42, the mean is 0,2203, and the standard deviation 0,05373. Consequently a change of one unit would have been uninterpretable.

b) the standardized values of the variable have been used, because the non-standardized values yielded an odds ratio of 1,006, which is hard to interpret, given that the independent variable is measured in percentages. The standard deviation of the variable is 25,99%

In model 4 dissatisfaction with the main ethnic party and the interaction proved to be significantly related to the outcome. This supports the third hypothesis: contrary to the Romanian data, here the combination of high ethnic issue salience and a negative evaluation of the main ethnic party increases the likelihood of non-voting. On the other hand, ethnic issue salience on its own is not significant, neither is the second indicator of attitudes toward the PHC, the need for an alternative ethnic party. Consequently hypothesis 1 is only partly supported, as only satisfaction with the PHC has an effect. The explanatory power of this model is moderate, but much better than that of its equivalent for Romania (Nagelkerke R^2 is

0,241 here, while for model 1 it was 0,174). The model also does a pretty good job in predicting the outcome: 22% of the non-vote is correctly predicted.

Model 5 shows that the hypothesized association represented by the interaction term is significant also in the presence of controls, though its significance decreases to $p \leq 0,1$. Moreover, the direction of the effect of the dummy about the need for another ethnic party changes, the association becomes positive, which is in line with the expectations, but it remains non-significant.

This model also shows the effect of education, which is similar to the impact of political knowledge in the Romanian data: being better educated decreases the likelihood of non-participation (education was not significant in the Romanian data when political knowledge was also present in the model). From the other sociodemographic controls only the indicator for assimilation (language used in family interactions) is significant. The less Hungarian is spoken in the family, the higher the likelihood that the individual will not vote. This was not expected and the variable also had no effect in the Romanian data.

The amount of variance explained is higher than in the previous model (Nagelkerke R^2=0,286), while the accuracy of predicting the outcome of non-vote is only slightly lower (21,3%). However, this decrease in accuracy calls for the removal of some variables. The resulting model 6 is the most parsimonious possible. It contains only ethnic issue salience, dissatisfaction with the PCH, the interaction of the two, education, language used in family and type of locality. In terms of explanatory power is better both previous models (Nagelkerke R^2=0,297), and it is able to predict correctly 25,5% of non-participation.

QCA

Romania

Five variables were employed in the qualitative analysis of nonparticipation of ethnic Hungarians in Romania: the salience of ethnic issues and the two indicators of the evaluation

of ethnic parties: distrust and dissatisfaction. Political knowledge and trust in majority parties were also included, mainly to evaluate the other paths which can produce non-participation: general political disillusionment and low interest in politics. The resulting truth table is presented in table 5.1.3.

Table 5.1.3. QCA truth table for nonparticipation in Romania

Row	salient	dissat	dtrsteth	informed	dtrstro	sufficient for non-participation	n	consist	outcome 1
1	0	1	1	0	1	1	32	0,594	19
2	0	0	1	0	1	1	99	0,495	49
3	0	1	1	1	1	1	5	0,400	2
4	1	1	1	0	1	1	5	0,400	2
5	0	1	1	1	0	0	5	0,200	1
6	1	0	1	0	1	0	7	0,143	1
7	1	0	0	1	0	0	15	0,133	2
8	0	1	0	1	0	0	8	0,125	1
9	0	1	0	0	1	0	44	0,114	5
10	0	0	0	0	1	0	322	0,112	36
11	1	1	0	0	0	0	10	0,100	1
12	0	1	1	0	0	0	11	0,091	1
13	1	0	0	0	0	0	35	0,086	3
14	0	1	0	0	0	0	40	0,075	3
15	1	0	0	0	1	0	33	0,061	2
16	0	0	0	0	0	0	229	0,057	13
17	0	0	0	1	0	0	48	0,021	1
18	0	0	0	1	1	0	60	0,017	1
19	0	0	1	0	0	0	24	0	0
20	1	0	0	1	1	0	19	0	0
21	0	1	0	1	1	0	8	0	0
22	0	0	1	1	1	0	6	0	0
23	1	1	0	0	1	0	6	0	0
24	1	1	0	1	0	0	4	0	0
25	1	1	1	1	1	0	3	0	0
26	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0	0
27	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	0	0
28	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	0	0
29	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
30	1	0	1	0	0	–	0		0
31	1	0	1	1	0	–	0		0
32	1	1	1	0	0	–	0		0

The table shows the five conditions, the outcome (the intention not to participate), the number of cases displaying the particular combination of conditions (n), the consistency of each combination with the outcome and the number of cases that display the outcome of 1

(non-voting) for each row. There is some limited diversity in the data, three logical combinations have no equivalent (marked by –).

Charles Ragin warns that consistency scores should be as close to 1 (denoting perfect consistency) as possible, and that consistency scores below 0,75 indicate that it is difficult to maintain that a subset relation exists, even a very rough one (Ragin, 2006: 3). Unfortunately none of the consistency scores is close to 1, not even to 0,75. However, considering that only 13,2% of the valid responses from the data indicated the intention of not participating (the undecided were excluded), even a consistency of 0,4 means the triple of this value, and indicates that the presence of a certain combination of conditions produces non-participation much more consistently than others. Based on this reasoning I considered all rows with a consistency of at least 0,4 as possibility leading to nonparticipation.

The standard truth table algorithm analysis yielded the following results:

Table 5.1.4. QCA solution for possible non-participation (Romania); consistency threshold: 0,4.

	raw coverage	unique coverage	number of cases covered	number of cases uniquely covered	consistency
DTRSTETH*DTRSTRO*informed*salient+	0.475524	0.342657	68 of 143	49 of 143	0.519084
DTRSTETH*DTRSTRO*informed*DISSAT+	0.146853	0.013986	21 of 143	2 of 143	0.567568
DTRSTETH*DTRSTRO*salient*DISSAT	0.146853	0.013986	21 of 143	2 of 143	0.567568

solution coverage: 0.503497 (72 cases out of 143)
solution consistency: 0.510638 (72 out of 141)
lowercase letters denote the absence of a condition, and uppercase letter the presence. * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

The solution consists of three terms. Nonparticipation is likely if evaluation of all parties is negative (the voter does not trust either the ethnic or the majority parties), ethnic issues are not salient, and the person is not politically knowledgeable, OR if the person evaluates all parties negatively (both distrust and dissatisfaction for the ethnic party and distrust in Romanian parties) and is not knowledgeable, OR if she does not regard ethnic issues as salient and evaluates all the parties negatively.

The consistency of all solution terms is above 0,5, meaning that more than the half of the cases displaying any of these combinations of conditions also display the outcome. The

solution covers over 50% of the cases displaying the outcome (72 out of 143), and its consistency is 0,51, as 72 out of the 141 cases implied by the solution are non-participants.

Distrust in all parties (both ethnic and majority) is present in all the terms, while low salience, low political knowledge and dissatisfaction with the ethnic party all appear in two out of the three combinations. The fact that all the parties are evaluated negatively indicates a disillusionment with politics in general, not only unhappiness with the ethnic party. Furthermore, low salience of the ethnic issue and low political knowledge may also indicate disappointment with politics or no interest. The solution thus provides no support for the hypothesis that high ethnic issue salience combined with a negative evaluation of the ethnic party may produce non-voting. As a matter of fact, from the 16 combination with high ethnic issue salience only one has a consistency equal to the threshold, while 7 have a consistency of 0 and 3 are logical remainders.

As all three solution terms contain a negative evaluation of the main ethnic party, and two of them also the condition of low ethnic issue salience (covering 51 cases of 143 /35,66%/), at first sight the result might seem in line with hypothesis 1. Yet the vast majority of these persons (49) also scores low on political knowledge, and all covered cases share negative attitudes toward all parties. Consequently it is very likely that these persons are apolitical people, who are not interested in politics or are disillusioned with politics in general. Low salience of the ethnic issue is associated with non-participation only inasmuch as it is characteristic of the politically not interested.

Regarding the 3 rows of logical remainders in the truth table, it is not reasonable to adopt the assumption that these would have produced the outcome, neither to re-run the analysis with simplifying assumptions, as both would imply treating at least some of these rows as displaying the outcome. These rows all stand for subsets of the combination which is relevant for hypothesis 3: they all display high ethnic issue salience, distrust in the ethnic

party but also trust in majority parties. The only other row with this combination covers just two cases, none of them displaying the outcome. Consequently, assuming that any of these combinations of conditions, if present in the data, would produce the outcome, would mean that the support for the hypothesis is derived completely from a counterfactual, while the single piece of existing evidence indicates exactly the opposite.

Consequently no evidence for the third hypothesis could be found with the QCA method either on the Romanian data. The results rather duplicated the findings of the regression models: As none of those who intend to stay at home on election day attributed high salience to ethnic issues (regardless of their membership in other conditions), the expected relationship between high ethnic issue salience and non-participation received no support. Concerning the first hypothesis QCA yielded somewhat different results than logistic regressions: low ethnic issue salience appeared in two of the solution terms. However, ethnic issue salience seems to be associated with non-voting only as a result of the fact that apolitical non-voters do not attribute importance to the ethnic issue (and probably issues in general).

Slovakia

The qualitative analysis of the Slovak data yielded less complex truth tables than those for Romania, as only 4 conditions were included: the two indicators of attitudes toward the PHC, salience of ethnic issues and education (as a proxy for political knowledge). The truth table is reported in table 5.1.5. As an effect of the inclusion of fewer variables, limited diversity did not pose problems to the analysis.

In the first step only the rows with consistencies higher than 0,66 were coded as possibly leading to the outcome of non-voting. This resulted in a very simple solution, combining the presence of dissatisfaction, high ethnic issue salience and the opinion that another ethnic party would be welcome (reported in table 5.1.6.).

Table 5.1.5. QCA truth table for nonparticipation in Slovakia

row	salient	dissat	otherhun	educated	n	sufficient for non-participation	consist	outcome 1
1	1	1	1	0	7	1	0,714	5
2	1	1	1	1	9	1	0,667	6
3	0	1	1	0	17	1*	0,412	7
4	0	1	0	0	31	1*	0,387	12
5	1	1	0	1	10	1*	0,300	3
6	1	1	0	0	11	1*	0,273	3
7	1	0	1	1	8	1*	0,250	2
8	0	1	0	1	33	1*	0,242	8
9	0	1	1	1	13	1*	0,231	3
10	0	0	1	0	14	1*	0,214	3
11	1	0	1	0	7	0	0,143	1
12	0	0	0	0	218	0	0,138	30
13	1	0	0	0	61	0	0,082	5
14	0	0	0	1	153	0	0,059	9
15	1	0	0	1	52	0	0,058	3
16	0	0	1	1	15	0	0	0

* only included as displaying the outcome in the second model (consistency threshold 0,2).

Table 5.1.6. QCA solution for possible non-voting (Slovakia); consistency threshold 0,66.

	raw coverage	unique coverage	number of cases covered	number of cases uniquely covered	consistency
DISSAT*SALIENCE*OTHERHUN	0.110000	0.110000	11 of 100	11 of 100	0.687500

solution coverage: 0,110000 (11 of 100)
solution consistency: 0,687500 (11 of 16)
lowercase letters denote the absence of a condition, and uppercase letter the presence. * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

The consistency of this solution is high, as both rows which were coded as 1 had high consistencies. The solution perfectly supports hypothesis 3. The individuals displaying this combination of characteristics are not apolitical non-voters, who fail to participate because of not being interested in politics, but persons who seem to care, but are not satisfied with the way the main ethnic party represents their interests. However, the solution coverage is very low, only 11 cases of non-voting out of 100 displaying this combination of conditions. Consequently the analysis was also performed with a very low threshold

Table 5.1.7. QCA solution for possible non-voting (Slovakia); consistency threshold 0,2.

	raw coverage	unique coverage	number of cases covered	number of cases uniquely covered	consistency
DISSAT+	0.470000	0.340000	47 of 100	34 of 100	0.358779
salient*OTHERHUN*educated+	0.100000	0.030000	10 of 100	3 of 100	0.322581
SALIENT*OTHERHUN*EDUCATED	0.080000	0.020000	8 of 100	2 of 100	0.470588

solution coverage: 0.520000 (52 of 100)
solution consistency: 0.339869 (52 of 153)
lowercase letters denote the absence of a condition, and uppercase letter the presence. * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

The solution from table 5.1.7. is more complex, but perfectly interpretable. The first solution term consists of a single condition, dissatisfaction with the main ethnic party. It covers 47 cases of non-voting out of 100 and 34 cases are covered only by this term. This shows that over one third of the nonvoters are dissatisfied with the main ethnic party. However, whether behind this negative evaluation there is a specific dissatisfaction with the main ethnic party or rather a disillusionment with politics in general is hard to tell (the solution implies combinations in line with both possibilities). Consequently it would not be correct to rush and affirm that one third of the non-voters stay away because they feel that the PHC does not represent them properly and they see no alternative, but for some persons it is reasonable to assume this.

The second solution term combines low ethnic issue salience, the need for another ethnic party and low education. Though low ethnic issue salience and low education is also characteristic of the apolitical, the fact that these persons would welcome another ethnic party makes it more probable that this category consists of individuals disillusioned with the PHC. This solution term covers 10% of the non-voters and provides an exclusive explanation only for 3 cases.

Finally, the third term combines high ethnic issue salience, the need for another ethnic party and higher education. This combination is very similar to the solution of the previous, more consistent model, and provides evidence for the third hypothesis. The presence of higher education indicates that these individuals are interested in politics, and their desire to see another ethnic party hints the same. Unfortunately the value of this evidence for hypothesis 3 is somewhat reduced by the very low coverage of the term: only 8% of the non-voters display this combination. However, this last term has the best, though still relatively low consistency of all three: 47% (8 out of 17) of those who display this combination of characteristics are non-voters. The consistency of the other two solutions is lower: 36% of the dissatisfied are

non-voters, and 32% of those combining low ethnic issue salience with the desire to see another ethnic party and low education. The overall consistency of the solution is also low (52 non-voters from 153 implied cases). The whole solution can account for 52% of non-participation.

The QCA results confirmed that the combination of high ethnic issue salience and negative attitudes toward the main ethnic party may lead to non-voting. The fact that dissatisfaction with the main ethnic party is conducive to absenteeism also provides some evidence for the first hypothesis. However, it is not possible to differentiate between those dissatisfied persons who care about politics and those whose dissatisfaction reflects complete disillusionment with politics. The combination of low ethnic issue salience and the need for another ethnic party is in line with the alternative explanation put forward after the hypotheses. If ethnic issues are not important, but another ethnic party would be welcome, then the new ethnic party should not deal only with ethnic issues.

When comparing the results from the two countries, the most stringent finding is that the combination of high ethnic issue salience and a negative evaluation of the main ethnic party does not lead to non-voting in Romania, but produces the outcome in Slovakia. This may look as mixed evidence for the hypothesis, but, as I will argue at the end of the data analysis, this is perfectly interpretable in light of the findings for crossover voting and voting for fringe ethnic parties.

Otherwise, the data from Romania and Slovakia also revealed some common points. The salience attributed to ethnic issues is not related significantly to the likelihood of participation. Conversely, the evaluation of the main ethnic parties matters for participation. The more positive the evaluation of the main ethnic party, the less likely that the person will not vote. However, as the results from Romania showed, a positive evaluation of *any* party

decreases the chances of non-voting. Consequently if a negative evaluation of the main ethnic party is observed, the task is to decide whether this indicates that the person has negative attitudes only in relation with that specific ethnic party, or has a negative opinion about politics in general. Sometimes the other characteristics of the person may help decide this, but sometimes not.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, the evidence from the Slovak data shows that non-participants are not necessarily apolitical people or individuals who are generally disillusioned with politics. Some ethnic Hungarians clearly do not vote because they are unhappy with the main ethnic party but see no better alternative for the representation of their interests.

The analysis also yielded information about the effect of other variables. Most importantly, higher political knowledge or better education is inversely related to the likelihood of non-participation. This generally holds across democracies, and ethnic Hungarians are no exception.

5.2. Crossover voting

Logistic regressions

Romania

The hypotheses about crossover voting asserted that low salience of ethnic issues, and a positive evaluation of majority parties would increase the likelihood of engaging in crossover voting, as well as a negative impression about the competence/performance of the ethnic party.

Similarly to the analysis of participation, multiple models were constructed. In model 7 the variables measuring ethnic issue salience, trust in the main ethnic party and dissatisfaction with the it were entered. The interactions employed in the analysis of nonparticipation were also entered into the model, to test whether the combination

hypothesized to lead to non-voting could produce a different outcome from the expected. The results (presented in table 5.2.1.) show that only trust in the ethnic party has a significant effect, being associated negatively with crossover voting. This supports the first hypothesis. However, none of the other variables have any effect, and neither have the interactions. The non-significant nature of the interactions is also in line with the expectation that the combination of high ethnic issue salience and negative attitudes toward the ethnic party does not lead to crossover voting. So, although hypothesis 3 regarding non-voting was not supported by the data from Romania, at least this particular combination of causes did not lead to the not expected outcome of crossover voting either.

Table 5.2.1. Logistic regression models for crossover voting (Romania)

		model 7	model 8	model 9
ethnic issue salience		1,004	1,109	1,108
dissatisfaction		1,174	1,214	1,217
political knowledge			1,117	1,107
trust in DAHR		0,364***	0,271***	0,266***
trust in majority parties			2,801***	2,848***
interaction: dissat*salience		0,965		
interaction: distrust*salience		0,974		
interaction: trustro* low salience[a)]			1,239*	1,239**
age			1,001	
gender (woman)			1,211	1,210
education			0,924	0,915
language used in family			1,307*	1,310*
type of locality (urban)			0,463***	0,494***
% of Hungarians in loc. (2002)[a)]			0,955	
importance of representation			1,172	
danger of losing representation			0,857	0,844
Constant		2,738*	0,511	0,583
classification table predictions	vote	97,2%	98,6%	98,9%
	non-vote	9,6%	25,7%	25,4%
	total	84,2%	87,6%	87,8%
Cox & Snell R^2		0,081	0,181	0,182
Nagelkerke R^2		0,141	0,317	0,318

* 0,05<p≤0,1; ** 0,01<p≤0,05; *** p≤0,0l

a) to compute the interaction the scale of the variable measuring ethnic issue salience was inverted, so that a high value on the interaction stand for low salience attributed to ethnic issues and high trust in parties of the majority.

b) standardized values of the independent variable were used. Standard deviation: 34,55%.

Model 8 included all the variables that were entered also in Model 2. The interaction of the salience of ethnic issues with trust in majority parties was included too, with the aim of testing the second hypothesis, that low salience of ethnic issues and positive evaluation of majority parties would increase the likelihood of crossover voting.[31] The results show that only the two variables measuring trust are significantly related to crossover voting: increased trust in the ethnic party reduces the likelihood of voting for Romanian parties, while higher trust in majority parties increases its likelihood. Neither ethnic issue salience, nor dissatisfaction with the ethnic party have any effect. However, the interaction between ethnic issue salience and trust in majority parties proved to be significant too, and in the hypothesized direction. Low salience of ethnic issues combined with high trust in Romanian parties increases the likelihood of crossover voting. Consequently, the second hypothesis was supported by the data. This finding goes against the alternative explanation that ethnic issue salience does not matter for the voting behavior of ethnic Hungarians, as low importance attributed to ethnic issues increases the likelihood of voting for majority parties.

From the sociodemographic variables only language used in family interactions and type of locality had an impact on the vote. The coefficients of language usage indicate that as expected, assimilation increases the likelihood of voting for Romanian parties. The type of locality is also important, voters from urban areas voting with lower probability for Romanian parties when other variables are kept constant. This is contrary to the expectations, as inhabitants of rural areas are usually regarded as voting in a more orderly manner. Age, education and gender[32] did not prove to be significantly related to crossover voting, neither did the ethnic composition of the locality.

[31] The interactions from model 7 were also tried along the new one, but did not have any impact.
[32] I also tried an interaction of gender with language spoken in the family, to test the assumption that women living in intermarriages are more likely to vote for Romanian parties as a consequence of the party preference of the spouse. However, the interaction term was insignificant (results not reported).

Model 9, similarly to Model 3, retains only those variables which were either significant or contributed to explanatory power. Age, the percentage of Hungarians from the locality and the control variable regarding the importance of representation have been removed in order to obtain a more parsimonious model, which also does almost as well in terms of explanatory power as Model 8, with a Nagelkerke R^2 of 0,318, and 25,4% of the crossover vote predicted accurately.

Slovakia

The logistic regressions about crossover voting in Slovakia are presented in table 5.2.2. Into the first model (10) the same variables were entered as into model 4 for non-participation. The interaction between ethnic issue salience and dissatisfaction was included too, to test whether the combination of high ethnic issue salience and a negative evaluation of the main ethnic party is related to crossover voting. The expectation was that it should not be.

Table 5.2.2. Logistic regression models for crossover voting (Slovakia)

		model 10	model 11
ethnic issue salience[a)]		0,499***	0,602***
dissatisfaction		1,089***	1,070**
interaction: dissat*salience		0,395	0,307*
need for another ethnic party		3,104**	3,590**
education			0,748
age			1,183
gender (woman)			0,645
language used in family			7,144***
type of locality (urban)			2,763**
% of Hungarians in loc. (2001)[b)]			2,183***
Constant		0,010***	0,001***
classification table predictions	vote	99,8%	99,8%
	non-vote	7,9%	22,2%
	total	94,0%	95,0%
Cox & Snell R^2		0,074	0,123
Nagelkerke R^2		0,198	0,330

* p<0,1; ** 0,01<p≤0,05; *** p≤0,0l

a) the standardized values of the variable have been used, because the non-standardized values yielded an odds ratio of 0,000, which is uninterpretable. The standard deviation of the variable is 0,05373.

b) the standardized values of the variable have been used. The standard deviation of the variable is 25,99%

All three variables turned out to have a significant effect on the likelihood of crossover voting. Ethnic issue salience is related negatively to the support of majority parties, which is in line with the expectations. Likewise, the effect of both measures about the attitude toward the major ethnic party was in the hypothesized direction: dissatisfaction increases the likelihood of casting a vote for majority parties, as well as the fact that the respondent believes that there is a need for another ethnic party. The interaction term did no prove to be significant.

Model 11, which also included the sociodemographic controls shows slightly different results. While all the variables which were significant in the previous model remained significant (only for dissatisfaction p increased above 0,01), when sociodemographic characteristics were controlled for the interaction became significant too, though only below the 0,1 level. This indicates that the combination of high salience attributed to ethnic issues and a negative evaluation of the PHC may also lead to crossover voting, not only to non-participation. This is not in line with hypothesis 3, as voting for majority parties was excluded on the ground that they do not deal with the ethnic issues which are deemed so important by these voters. However, non-voting seems to be more probable, given the stronger effect of the interaction term for that outcome.

The lack of a measure about attitudes toward the majority parties did not enable the proper testing of hypothesis 2 by means of an interaction term as with the Romanian data. However, the fact that low ethnic issue salience increases the likelihood of crossover voting is in line with both hypotheses 1 and 2, while the similar effect of the negative evaluation of the hegemonic ethnic party supports hypothesis 1.

From the sociodemographic variables language spoken in the family is strongly related to crossover voting: those who also use Slovak in family interactions are much more likely to vote for Slovak parties. This is similar to the findings from Romania. Regarding the type of

locality, contrarily to Romania, urban residents are more prone to vote for majority parties. This is more in line with my expectations than the finding from Romania, as rural voters usually vote more in a more ordinate fashion for the ethnic party. The percentage of Hungarians living in the locality was also found to be related to crossover voting. Surprisingly the likelihood of crossover voting is higher where the proportion of Hungarians is higher.

Model 11 predicts 22,2% of the crossover vote correctly. Its explanatory power is similar to that of the best model (9) for Romania (Nagelkerke R^2=0,330). The removal of any variable takes away from the power of the model, consequently a more parsimonious model is not possible with these data.

Once again the logistic regressions yielded contradictory results for Romania and Slovakia. While in Romania high ethnic issue and a negative evaluation of the main ethnic party was not associated with crossover voting, in Slovakia it was. Before drawing further conclusions the QCA findings should be interpreted too.

QCA

Romania

The relationship of the relevant conditions with the likelihood of crossover voting was also investigated with QCA. The same five variables were introduced into the model as for participation. The truth table is reported in table 5.2.3.

The consistencies for crossover voting were higher than those for non-participation. Consequently in the first step I coded only those rows as displaying the outcome of crossover voting which had a consistency of at least 0,9, as there was a clear gap below this value, the next consistency being 0,57. This resulted in the solution from table 5.2.4.

Table 5.2.3. QCA truth table for crossover voting in Romania

row	salient	dissat	dtrsteth	dtrstro	informed	n	sufficient for crossover vote	consist	outcome 1
1	0	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	2
2	0	1	1	0	0	6	1	1	6
3	0	0	1	0	0	20	1	0,900	18
4	1	1	0	0	0	7	1*	0,571	4
5	1	1	0	1	1	2	1*	0,500	1
6	0	0	1	0	1	2	1*	0,500	1
7	1	1	0	0	1	3	1*	0,333	1
8	0	1	0	0	0	29	1*	0,310	9
9	0	0	1	1	0	32	1*	0,281	9
10	1	0	0	1	1	17	0	0,235	4
11	0	0	0	0	0	182	0	0,192	36
12	1	0	0	0	0	23	0	0,130	3
13	0	1	1	1	0	9	0	0,111	1
14	0	0	0	0	1	39	0	0,103	4
15	1	0	0	1	0	28	0	0,071	2
16	0	0	0	1	1	54	0	0,056	3
17	0	0	0	1	0	252	0	0,052	13
18	0	1	0	1	0	29	0	0,034	1
19	1	1	0	1	0	6	0	0	0
20	1	0	0	0	1	12	0	0	0
21	0	1	0	0	1	3	0	0	0
22	0	0	1	1	1	3	0	0	0
23	1	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0
24	0	1	0	1	1	6	0	0	0
25	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
26	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
27	1	0	1	0	0	0	–		0
28	1	0	1	0	1	0	–		0
29	1	0	1	1	1	0	–		0
30	1	1	1	0	0	0	–		0
31	1	1	1	0	1	0	–		0
32	1	1	1	1	0	0	–		0

* only included as displaying the outcome in the second model.

Table 5.2.4. QCA solution for possible crossover voting (Romania); consistency threshold 0,9.

	raw coverage	unique coverage	number of cases covered	number of cases uniquely covered	consistency
salient*DTRSTETH*dtrstro*informed+	0.205128	0.153846	24 of 117	18 of 117	0.923077
salient*DTRSTETH*dtrstro*DISSAT	0.068376	0.017094	8 of 117	2 of 117	1.000000

solution coverage: 0.222222 (26 cases out of 117)
solution consistency: 0.928571 (26 out of 28)
lowercase letters denote the absence of a condition, and uppercase letter the presence. * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

The solution can be expressed in a more reader-friendly way as

salient*DTRSTETH*dtrstro*(informed+DISSAT) → CROSSOVER

Low ethnic issue salience, low trust in the ethnic party and high trust in majority parties are present in both solution terms, perfectly supporting the first and the second hypotheses. However, a caveat is necessary: because the rows combining high ethnic issue salience, a positive evaluation of majority parties and low trust in the DAHR have no equivalents in the data (rows 27, 30 and 31 from the truth table), limited diversity makes it impossible to say whether high issue salience paired with negative evaluations of ethnic parties and positive evaluations of majority parties would result in crossover voting or not. Assuming that they would not lead to the outcome would once again be equal to relying on a counterfactual. There is evidence that low ethnic issue salience combined with positive attitudes for the majority parties consistently leads to crossover voting, but we have no proof that high ethnic issue salience would not produce the same outcome.

The consistency of the solution terms is very high, and the overall consistency is very good too, 93% (26 out of 28) of those who display one of the combinations of features is a crossover voter. However, consistency comes at the cost of coverage. The first solution term covers about 20% of the crossover voters (24 cases), and about 15% on its own (18 cases). The second term covers only 8 cases (6,8%) and its unique coverage is very low, only 2 cases. The solution overall covers only 22% of the crossover voters (26 cases out of the 117).

In order to explore other possible paths leading to crossover voting, I re-ran the model with a lower threshold. All the rows with a consistency of at least 0,25 were coded as displaying the outcome of crossover voting. The following solution was obtained:

Table 5.2.5. QCA solution for possible crossover voting in (Romania); consistency threshold 0,25.

	raw coverage	unique coverage	number of cases covered	number of cases uniquely covered	consistency
salient*DTRSTETH*dtrstro+	0.230769	0.076923	27of 117	9 of 117	0.900000
DISSAT*dtrsteth*dtrstro*informed+	0.111111	0.111111	13 of 117	13 of 117	0.361111
salient*dissat*DTRSTETH*informed+	0.230769	0.076923	27 of 117	9 of 117	0.519231
SALIENT*DISSAT*dtrsteth*INFORMED	0.017094	0.017094	2 of 117	2 of 117	0.400000

solution coverage: 0.435897 (51 cases out of 117)
solution consistency: 0.495146 (51 out of 103)
lowercase letters denote the absence of a condition, and uppercase letter the presence. * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

The new model covers 43% of the crossover voters (51 of 117) at the cost of much a lower consistency: less than half of the cases implied by the solution are crossover voters. The first and the third solution terms are very similar to the solution from the previous model. The first term actually implies the entire solution from the previous model. The second term is similar too, the ethnic party is evaluated negatively again (though only the performance rating is low, trust is not), attitudes toward Romanian parties are positive, and political knowledge is low. The only novelty is term four, which indicates that crossover voting is possible also when ethnic issues are regarded as salient, if the ethnic party is evaluated negatively (moreover, only the performance rating is negative here, trust is not low), and the individual is politically knowledgeable. This finding is related to the third hypothesis, providing proof that the combination of high ethnic issue salience and negative evaluations of the ethnic party may lead to crossover voting, which was excluded on the basis that majority parties do not deal with ethnic issues. To summarize the results of the analysis up to this point, it seems that the combination of conditions from the third hypothesis leads rather to crossover voting than to non-participation. However, the coverage of this last solution term is very low (only 2 cases displaying this configuration of conditions), so the empirical relevance of this finding is not too high.

The relationship between ethnic issue salience and crossover voting revealed by both methods, despite of all the caveats and shortcomings, indicates that the alternative explanation does not hold. The salience of ethnic issues may not matter for participation, but it matters for vote choice: low importance attributed to these issues increases the likelihood that the voter will support a party of the majority.

Slovakia

For Slovakia the truth table is once again simpler, as only four variables were included in the analysis: ethnic issue salience, dissatisfaction with the PHC, need for another ethnic party and education. There was no limited diversity in the data, all rows had equivalents in reality. The truth table is reproduced in table 5.2.6.

Table 5.2.6.Truth table for crossover voting in Slovakia

row	salient	dissat	otherhun	educated	n	sufficient for crossover voting	consist	outcome 1
1	1	0	1	0	5	1	0,600	3
2	1	1	1	0	3	1	0,333	1
3	1	0	1	1	9	1*	0,222	2
4	1	0	0	0	32	1*	0,156	5
5	0	1	1	1	7	0	0,143	1
6	0	0	1	1	14	0	0,143	2
7	1	0	0	1	29	0	0,138	4
8	0	0	1	0	12	0	0,083	1
9	0	0	0	0	204	0	0,054	11
10	0	1	0	0	63	0	0,048	3
11	0	0	0	1	147	0	0,034	5
12	0	1	0	1	52	0	0,000	0
13	0	1	1	0	6	0	0,000	0
14	1	1	0	1	7	0	0,000	0
15	1	1	0	0	9	0	0,000	0
16	1	1	1	1	3	0	0,000	0

The truth table for crossover voting yielded less consistent rows than for participation. Only one combination of conditions produces the outcome in the majority of cases (high ethnic issue salience, need for an alternative ethnic party, and low education). Though ethnic issue salience simplifies from the solution (as shown in table 5.2.7.), the fact that the first row of the truth table has the highest consistency provides some evidence that the combination of conditions which was expected to lead to non-participation may also lead to crossover voting. Though only 2 cases of the 3 covered by the row are crossover voters, the QCA results, similarly to the logistic regressions, show that that the third hypothesis excluded the possibility of crossover voting incorrectly. However, if also the second most consistent row (0,33) is considered to produce the outcome of crossover voting, high ethnic issue salience disappears from the solution because of Boolean simplification.

Table 5.2.7. QCA solution for possible crossover voting (Slovakia); consistency threshold 0,32.

	raw coverage	unique coverage	number of cases covered	number of cases uniquely covered	consistency
DISSAT*OTHERHUN*educated	0.105263	0.105263	4 of 38	4 of 38	0.500000

solution coverage: 0.105263 (4 of 38)
solution consistency: 0.500000 (4 of 8)
lowercase letters denote the absence of a condition, and uppercase letter the presence. * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

Because of the very low coverage of the solution the analysis was repeated with a very low consistency threshold (0,15). Such a low value can only be justified with the goal of identifying as many combinations of causes as possible which may produce the outcome.

Table 5.2.8. QCA solution for possible crossover voting (Slovakia); consistency threshold 0,15.

	raw coverage	unique coverage	number of cases covered	number of cases uniquely covered	consistency
DISSAT*salient*educated+	0.210526	0.131579	8 of 38	5 of 38	0.216216
DISSAT*OTHERHUN*educated+	0.105263	0.026316	4 of 38	1 of 38	0.500000
DISSAT*salient*OTHERHUN	0.131579	0.052632	5 of 38	2 of 38	0.357143

solution coverage: 0.289474 (11 of 38)
solution consistency: 0.224490 (11 of 49)
lowercase letters denote the absence of a condition, and uppercase letter the presence. * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

A solution term with better coverage emerges in this second analysis: dissatisfaction with the main ethnic party, low ethnic issue salience and low education. This might stand for the politically not interested, but theoretically also for those who have a better opinion about majority parties and consequently are not totally disillusioned with politics. However, no measure is available for attitudes toward majority parties, so this term which covers 21% (8 of 38) of the nonvoters cannot be interpreted more precisely. Finally, the last term combines dissatisfaction with the main ethnic party, low ethnic issue salience and the need for another ethnic party. This provides evidence for the first hypothesis. However, the fact that low ethnic issue salience is present together with the need for another ethnic party shows that these persons would not expect an ethnic party to deal exclusively with ethnic issues. This is a piece of evidence for the alternative explanation. Nevertheless, this term covers 4 cases from 38, and offers an exclusive explanation for only one, so its empirical relevance is low. The new solution is not much better in terms of coverage than the previous. It provides explanation for

11 cases of crossover voting out of 38. But its consistency is very weak: only 11 from the 49 implied cases are crossover voters.

The results from both countries revealed that the combination of high ethnic issue salience and a negative evaluation of the main ethnic party may lead to crossover voting. While the logistic regressions for Romania concealed this, the evidence being derived solely from the QCA results, for Slovakia both the logistic regressions and QCA revealed this relationship. Consequently the expectation that individuals regarding ethnic issues as important would not vote for majority parties turned out to be wrong.

Regarding ethnic issue salience there are differences between the findings from the two countries. In Slovakia ethnic issue salience is negatively related to the support of majority parties, while in Romania there is no association. However, low salience of ethnic issues combined with high trust in Romanian parties increases the likelihood of crossover voting, consequently this difference is not irreconcilable.

The evaluation of the ethnic party is significantly related to crossover voting in both datasets, negative attitudes increasing the likelihood of supporting majority parties. The attitudes toward majority parties also make a difference, higher trust in them being positively related to the likelihood of crossover voting. However, this association could not be tested for Slovakia because of the lack of appropriate variables.

From the sociodemographic variables language used in family interactions is significant in both countries. Those who also use Slovak or Romanian in family are more likely to vote for majority parties. This makes perfect sense as these persons are closer to being assimilated into the majority. The type of locality is also significant in both countries, but the results are contradictory: in Slovakia, urban voters are more likely to support majority

parties, while in Romania voters from rural areas. Political knowledge or education are insignificant in both countries, in line with the expectations.

5.3. Supporting fringe ethnic parties

The third possible outcome, voting for fringe ethnic parties was tested only on data from Romania, as in Slovakia no alternative Hungarian political organizations were active by the time of data collection, consequently it was not possible to indicate such organizations as party choice. In Romania there was a fringe party available, the Hungarian Civic Union. The HCU appeared as the result of a split within the DAHR, when members of the internal opposition (the radical wing) left the party in 2003. Eventually the HCU could not contest the 2004 elections, as its members failed to register the party. Though not unforeseeable, this failure was not evident when the survey data was collected, consequently it was possible to analyze the support of this minor party.

Logistic regressions

I hypothesized that high salience of the ethnic issue and a negative evaluation of the major ethnic party increases the likelihood of non-participation or of voting for fringe ethnic parties. The first possibility (nonparticipation) was not supported by the results from Romania, though evidence for the relationship with crossover voting was found in both countries. Model 12 is meant to test the likelihood of the last possible outcome, voting for a fringe ethnic party, and consequently, it contains exactly the same variables and interactions as models 1 and 7.

Model 12 shows that the increased salience of the ethnic issues, as well as dissatisfaction with the DAHR increase the likelihood of voting for the HCU. Conversely, trust in the DAHR is inversely related to the outcome. The effect of all three variables is significant, and the interaction between distrust in the DAHR and ethnic issue salience is

significant too. Only the interaction of dissatisfaction and ethnic issue salience had no significant effect on vote choice. All the significant relationships are in the hypothesized direction. Consequently, there is strong evidence for the second possible outcome predicted in the third hypothesis. Based on the results for all possible outcomes the conclusion is that in Romania high ethnic issue salience combined with a negative evaluation of the main ethnic party increases the likelihood of voting for fringe Hungarian parties. Furthermore, this combination is not related to non-voting, but crossover voters display these characteristics.

Table 5.3.1. logistic regression models for the support of fringe ethnic parties (the HCU in Romania)

		model 12	model 13	model 14
ethnic issue salience		1,394***	1,277**	1,337***
dissatisfaction		2,096***	1,867***	1,985***
political knowledge				
trust in DAHR		0,673*	0,660	,660*
trust in majority parties			1,328	
interaction: dissat*salience		0,909		
interaction: distrust*salience		1,502**	1,599**	1,461**
age			1,002	
gender (woman)			2,473**	
education			1,045	
language used in family			0,533	
type of locality (urban)			1,855	
% of Hungarians in loc. (2002)[a)]			1,354	
importance of representation			1,410	
danger of losing representation			0,587	
Constant		0,024***	0,009***	0,029***
classification table predictions	vote	99,9%	99,9%	99,9%
	non-vote	7,9%	8,1%	10,5%
	total	95,5%	95,6%	95,7%
Cox & Snell R^2		0,056	0,071	0,055
Nagelkerke R^2		0,176	0,225	0,173

* 0,05<p≤0,1; ** 0,01<p≤0,05; *** p≤0,0l

a) the standardized score was used. Standard deviation is 34,55%.

To test whether these relationships hold also when other effects are controlled for, all the variables were entered into Model 13, except for political knowledge, which would have produced a spurious relationship (see footnote 25). In the presence of controls trust in the DAHR loses significance, but dissatisfaction, ethnic issues salience and the interaction

between distrust and salience remain significant, providing further support for the third hypothesis. From the control variables only gender is significant, a finding that is difficult to interpret and might be due to chance, given the low number of HCU voters.

Finally, model 14 is the most reduced one, and at the same time the best in terms of predictive power. It only differs from Model 12 in the absence of the interaction between distrust in the ethnic party and ethnic issue salience. Though significant in Model 13, gender was removed too, as its presence only decreased predictive accuracy (results not reported). This last model is able to explain less than the model with all the controls (Nagelkerke R^2=0,173), but its predictions are more accurate, accounting for 10,5% of HCU voters. Consequently I consider this model to best fit the data, as the R^2 measures may be increased by the introduction of any variable, regardless of whether they really have an effect. The point is that the simplest model (the one for the hypothesized relationship) does the best job in predicting the support of the HCU, and controls do not really add or change anything.

To sum up, based on the logistic regressions, from the two possible outcomes expected in hypothesis 3 for the combination of high ethnic issue salience and negative evaluations of the major ethnic party, the second turned out to be more realistic. Voters who regard ethnic issues as highly salient but have negative attitudes toward the major ethnic party are not likely to stay at home, and while they might engage in crossover voting, most probably they will cast their votes on a fringe party which has no chances to enter the parliament. This finding shows again that the alternative explanation according to which the salience of ethnic issues should not matter is not supported.

QCA

The only difference between the QCA model constructed for voters of HCU and those for the other outcomes is that political knowledge was not entered into the model (see footnote 25). Consequently, I included the four variables which were also included in the

previous models: ethnic issue salience, trust in the main ethnic party and in majority parties and dissatisfaction with the main ethnic party, and also introduced education, as a proxy for political knowledge. The truth table for the analysis is reproduced in table 5.3.2.:

Table 5.3.2. QCA truth table for possible voting for fringe ethnic parties (Romania)

	salient	dissat	dtrsteth	dtrstro	Informed	n	sufficient for suporting HCU	consist	outcome 1
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1,000	1
2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1,000	1
3	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	1,000	2
4	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	0,667	2
5	0	1	1	1	1	7	1*	0,286	2
6	1	1	0	0	1	8	1*	0,250	2
7	0	1	1	1	0	6	0	0,167	1
8	0	1	1	0	1	7	0	0,143	1
9	0	1	0	0	1	22	0	0,136	3
10	0	1	0	1	1	17	0	0,118	2
11	1	0	0	0	1	28	0	0,107	3
12	1	0	0	0	0	11	0	0,091	1
13	0	1	0	1	0	22	0	0,091	2
14	0	0	1	0	0	12	0	0,083	1
15	0	0	1	1	0	16	0	0,063	1
16	0	0	0	0	1	112	0	0,036	4
17	0	0	0	1	0	190	0	0,021	4
18	0	0	0	0	0	115	0	0,017	2
19	0	0	0	1	1	122	0	0,016	2
20	0	0	1	0	1	11	0	0,000	0
21	1	0	0	1	0	19	0	0,000	0
22	0	1	1	0	0	5	0	0,000	0
23	1	1	0	0	0	4	0	0,000	0
24	0	1	0	0	0	12	0	0,000	0
25	1	0	1	1	0	2	0	0,000	0
26	1	1	0	1	0	2	0	0,000	0
27	1	1	0	1	1	6	0	0,000	0
28	1	0	0	1	1	26	0	0,000	0
29	0	0	1	1	1	21	0	0,000	0
30	1	0	1	0	0	0	–		0
31	1	0	1	0	1	0	–		0
32	1	1	1	0	0	0	–		0

First I coded only those rows as displaying the outcome which had a consistency of at least 0,66. The solution is reported in table 5.3.3.

Table 5.3.3. QCA solution for possible voting for fringe ethnic parties (Romania); no simplifying assumptions, consistency threshold 0,66.

	Raw coverage	unique coverage	number of cases covered	number of cases uniquely covered	consistency
SALIENT* DTRSTETH* DISSAT*DTRSTRO+	0.108108	0.054054	4 of 37	2 of 37	0.800000
SALIENT* DTRSTETH* DISSAT*EDUCATED+	0.081081	0.027027	3 of 37	1 of 37	0.750000
SALIENT*DTRSTETH*DTRSTRO*EDUCATED	0.081081	0.027027	3 of 37	1 of 37	0.750000

solution coverage: 0.162162 (6 cases out of 37)
solution consistency: 0.857143 (6 out of 7)
lowercase letters denote the absence of a condition, and uppercase letter the presence. * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

All the solution terms contain high salience of ethnic issues. The same holds for distrust in the main ethnic party, the DAHR. Dissatisfaction with the DAHR appears in two of the terms, and middle or higher education is also present in two terms. These findings are in line with the results of the regressions and provide further evidence for the third hypothesis. The first term also contains low trust in Romanian parties, while the second and third terms require that the person finished at least high school. While the condition of low trust in Romanian parties is not surprising, the effect of education was not expected, as no relationship was found in the logistic regressions. The finding indicates that the more educated are more likely to vote for the HCU.

By adopting simplifying assumptions in the analysis (logical remainders treated as don't care cases), the solution gets even more simple. Such a simplifying assumption could be justified by the fact that all three missing rows combine high salience of ethnic issues with a negative attitude toward the main ethnic party on at least one dimension, their peculiarity being that they allow for trust in Romanian parties. The requirement of low trust in majority parties would be justified by the fact that the solution term containing this condition has the best raw coverage, 10,8% (4 persons out of 38). Notwithstanding this, I re-ran the model with the simplifying assumptions. The new solution is reproduced in table 5.3.4.

Table 5.3.4. QCA solution for possible voting for fringe ethnic parties (Romania); with simplifying assumptions, consistency threshold 0,66.

	raw coverage	unique coverage	number of cases covered	number of cases uniquely covered	consistency
SALIENT *DTRSTETH*DISSAT +	0.135135	0.054054	5 of 37	2 of 37	0.833333
SALIENT*DTRSTETH*EDUCATED	0.108108	0.027027	4 of 37	1 of 37	0.800000

solution coverage: 0.162162 (6 cases out of 37)
solution consistency: 0.857143 (6 out of 7)
lowercase letters denote the absence of a condition, and uppercase letter the presence. * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

Now the solution can be rewritten as SALIENT*DTRSTETH*(EDUCATED+DISSAT), which is reminiscent of the previous solution, but simpler. The salience of ethnic issues and low trust in the main ethnic party are still present in both terms, while being more educated or dissatisfied with the party represent equivalent third conditions.

The consistency of the solution terms and of the whole solution is good for both models, above the 0,75 indicated by Ragin. However, this comes at the expense of coverage. This is due to the fact that the number of the cases from the rows with high consistencies was very low (a total of 6 cases out of 37 were covered by rows with a consistency higher than 0,66). Consequently I decided to employ a lower threshold too. I recoded all rows with a consistency of at least 0,25 as displaying the outcome, and re-ran the model without any simplifying assumptions.

Table 5.3.5. QCA solution for possible voting for fringe ethnic parties (Romania); no simplifying assumptions, consistency threshold 0,25.

	raw coverage	unique coverage	no. of cases covered	no. of cases uniquely covered	consistency
SALIENT *DTRSTETH*DISSAT+	0.135135	0.054054	5 of 37	2 of 37	0.833333
SALIENT*DTRSTETH*EDUCATED+	0.108108	0.027027	4 of 37	1 of 37	0.800000
SALIENT*DISSAT*dtrstro*EDUCATED+	0.081081	0.054054	3 of 37	2 of 37	0.333333
DISSAT*DTRSTETH*DTRSTRO*EDUCATED	0.108108	0.054054	4 of 37	2 of 37	0.400000

solution coverage: 0.270270 (10 cases out of 37)
solution consistency: 0.454545 (10 out of 22)
lowercase letters denote the absence of a condition, and uppercase letter the presence. * stands for logical AND, + stands for logical OR.

The new solution adds two terms, which cover an extra 10% (4 more cases), but at the expense of almost 40% consistency. Two new combinations appear. The third term requires trust in Romanian parties, along with high salience, negative performance rating for the ethnic

party and better education. This is hard to interpret but it may hint to the fact that the person is basically trusting political parties, despite her negative evaluation of the main ethnic party. The fourth term is somewhat different, it does not contain ethnic issue salience, but indicates a negative evaluation of all parties in general and better education. The presence of better education makes it implausible that the person is not interested in politics, so this combination may stand for voters who are disillusioned with all parties and would support this fringe party because of being a new political actor.

Unfortunately, the coverage of this solution is still very low, and further lowering the consistency threshold would make no sense. Despite this shortcoming, two of the three solution terms which included the combination of high ethnic issue salience and a negative evaluation of the ethnic party consistently produced the outcome, consequently the conclusion can be drawn that the hypothesized combination leads to supporting fringe ethnic parties very consistently. However, almost three quarters of the support of the HCU is not covered by the solution, which indicates that there are myriad other combinations of conditions which can lead to voting for this fringe party.

To conclude, QCA confirmed the results of the logistic regressions regarding the support of the fringe party. Salience of the ethnic issues is strongly related to supporting the HCU, jus as negative evaluations of the main ethnic party. A similarly negative attitude toward the majority parties did not emerge as strongly as the former two conditions. Better education also turned out to be conducive to supporting this fringe party, though not expected based on the logistic regression.

5.4. Summary of results

Three hypotheses were subjected to scrutiny, making use of both logistic regressions and QCA. The first posited that high salience attributed to ethnic issues and positive evaluation of the major ethnic parties should be associated with decreased chances of both

non-participation and crossover voting. The evidence yielded by the analysis is mixed. In Slovakia the expected effect of ethnic issue salience was supported by the data regarding crossover voting only, and in Romania for neither of the outcomes. It follows that the salience of ethnic issues is not important for participation. This makes sense, as members of ethnic groups may go to vote also because of interest in other issues. At the same time, ethnic issues are important for vote choice. Low ethnic issue salience increased the likelihood of crossover voting on its own in Slovakia, while in Romania its combination with positive attitudes toward majority parties was associated with the willingness to engage in crossover voting, as predicted by the second hypothesis. This could not be tested on the Slovakian data as no indicators of attitudes toward majority parties were available.

Positive evaluations of the ethnic party indeed decrease the likelihood of non-voting, so this part of the first hypothesis is supported. The same is true in relation to majority parties, a finding in line with the second hypothesis. Consequently it is possible to generalize: positive evaluations of any party decrease the likelihood of non-participation.

According to the third hypothesis, high ethnic issue salience combined with negative evaluations of the main ethnic parties would increase the likelihood of both non-participation and voting for fringe ethnic parties, but would not lead to crossover voting. The results did not confirm the expectations. While voting for fringe parties is best supported by the findings, both other outcomes are possible. In Romania only the possibility of crossover voting was proved by the QCA results, but for Slovakia both methods yielded evidence for both non-voting and crossover voting.

As no fringe ethnic parties could be chosen in Slovakia, the most important conclusion of the data analysis can be formulated as it follows: the combination of high ethnic issue salience and negative evaluation of the main ethnic party is less likely to lead to non-participation, nor to crossover voting, as long as an alternative ethnic party is available, even

if that would be unable to enact ethnic policies, having no chances to pass the representational threshold. However, if no such alternative is available, these members of the ethnic group will chose between non-participation and crossover voting.

The findings also indicate that the salience attributed to ethnic issues plays a role in voting behavior. First, the analysis about crossover voting showed that the lack of salience attributed to ethnic issues may lead to turning away from the main ethnic party. Second, ethnic issue salience is even more important for the support of fringe ethnic parties, but this time the withdrawal of support from the major ethnic party stems from the exactly opposite reasons: because of being evaluated as representing this very important issue improperly. Based on these facts one can infer that the alternative explanation does not hold, although it is true that ethnic issue salience does not have an impact on the decision to participate. Ethnic issues might not be the priority for all members of the ethnic group, probably not even for the majority, but it is clear that ethnic issues are very important for *some* voters. To formulate it in the words of Philip Converse, there is evidence for the existence of an issue public for the ethnic issue, as the vote choice of some members of the ethnic group is clearly influenced by the salience attributed to ethnic issues. In more everyday words, these persons could be called "radicals", who expect the ethnic party to deal exclusively with ethnic issues, and evaluate it according to its performances regarding these issues. The QCA findings also showed that most of them are interested in politics (more educated), and some of them have a very bad opinion only about the main ethnic party, but not about political parties and politics in general. Their vote is an act of protest against the performance of the major ethnic party, which they do not support, despite being the only party which would be able to enact some policies related to the ethnic issue. Of course, the number and proportion of these individuals is another question. In the analyzed database only 4,7% of the voters (38 persons) intended to vote for the HCU.

6. Conclusions

This paper explored why some ethnic Hungarians do not vote for the major ethnic parties standing for the community, namely the *Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania* and the *Party of Hungarian Coalition* in Slovakia. Based on theories of ethnic mobilization and on the literature of valence issue voting a model was proposed, its main argument being that members of ethnic groups do not automatically support ethnic parties, but their voting behavior depends on the salience attributed to ethnic issues and on evaluations of the ethnic party and of the majority parties. A crucial component of this evaluation is whether a party is perceived as being able to represent the issue considered salient, which was grasped by the performance/competence ratings attributed to the parties.

Three hypotheses were derived from the model, and tested with logistic regressions and QCA. The first predicted that positive evaluations of ethnic parties, as well as high ethnic issue salience should be negatively related to both non-participation and crossover voting. The results were equivocal. Only limited evidence was provided by QCA for the relationship between low ethnic issue salience and non-participation. Low salience of ethnic issues seems to be related to participation only inasmuch as apolitical individuals do not regard ethnic issues (and very probably other issues) as salient. However, low ethnic issue salience was found to increase the likelihood of crossover voting in Slovakia, but not in Romania, where only its interaction with the evaluation of majority parties was significant.

In contrast with ethnic issue salience, the evaluation of ethnic parties is related to both non-voting and crossover voting. Multiple indicators were employed to measure attitudes toward parties, and most of them displayed significant associations with both outcomes, in the expected direction.

The second hypothesis expected that a combination of positive evaluations of majority parties and low ethnic issue salience would be conducive to crossover voting. This was

confirmed by the Romanian data, but could not be tested for Slovakia as no appropriate indicator was available. Positive evaluations of majority parties also decrease the likelihood of non-voting, so it may be generalized that positive attitudes toward any party are positively related to participation.

The third hypothesis referred to the question which was most interesting for me: to the electoral behavior of those who regard ethnic issues as very important, but have a negative evaluation about the way in which the main ethnic party represents them. I expected that these persons would not engage in crossover voting, as no majority party can be associated with the ethnic issues, at least not positively. Consequently, these persons were expected to vote for fringe ethnic parties or to abstain. The results did not confirm the expectations. Voting for fringe ethnic parties emerged as the most likely outcome in Romania, but both other outcomes turned out to be possible on the Slovak data, though only crossover voting in Romania.

The fact that the dataset from Slovakia contained no option for choosing a fringe ethnic party is very important in this sense. The Romanian data showed that high ethnic issue salience and a negative evaluation of the main ethnic party most consistently leads to voting for fringe ethnic parties. Some of these voters may also vote for majority parties, however, when fringe parties are not present, non-participation also emerges as a possibility.

The paper also aimed to identify the other factors which may have an impact on voting behavior. Political knowledge and education were found to be associated with a decreased likelihood of non-participation, and not related to crossover voting. Moreover, a considerable part of the supporters of fringe ethnic parties were found to be more educated, which is due to the fact that attributing salience to an issue requires some political awareness.

Other variables which proved to be significant were the language used in family interactions, employed as a measure of assimilation. Though this was related most importantly to crossover voting, some evidence was found in Slovakia that assimilation is

related not only to an increased likelihood of supporting majority parties, but also to staying away from the polls. The percentage of Hungarians living in the locality was also related to both outcomes. While in Romania willingness to participate is higher where the proportion of Hungarians is higher (in line with election results), no association was found with crossover voting. Conversely, in Slovakia a rather unexpected result emerged: the likelihood of voting for majority parties increased with the percentage of the Hungarian population. The type of locality was also related to crossover voting, but the results from the two countries were contradictory. In Slovakia, urban voters were more likely to support majority parties, while in Romania voters from rural areas. Type of locality did not matter for participation. From the other sociodemographics one more finding is worth mentioning, namely the lack of effect of age. Contrarily to the expectation, older people are not more likely to participate.

Despite the very tentative alternative explanation that the members of ethnic groups expect the ethnic parties to deal with all issues, not only with those related to ethnicity, the results confirmed that ethnic voting can be conceived of as of issue voting, because ethnic issues matter for the vote choice of members of ethnic groups. On one hand, low salience attributed to them increases the likelihood of crossover voting. On the other hand, there are some voters who attribute very high salience to these issues, so high, that they expect more on this than what is provided by the main ethnic party, the only political actor which is able to enact policies related to these issues. These individuals may are the radicals, and they constitute what could be called in the words of Philip Converse the "issue public" for ethnic affairs. So, the alternative explanation, according to which issues cannot be categorized as ethnic and nonethnic, as all are part of the everyday problems of the people, cannot be generalized to the whole electorate. The indicators created on the basis of ethnic issues had an effect on the voting behavior of ethnic Hungarians. It may be true that most members of the ethnic group expect the party to deal with all the problems, but certainly a thin stratum is

concerned primarily with the issues pertaining to ethnicity. To put it more precisely: there is a distinct public for ethnic issues, but this does not consist of the ethnic group at large, but only of the radicals from the community. The ethnic issue being an easy issue only means that almost everyone can form an opinion on it, but only a smaller group bases its voting decisions on this opinion.

Though the research was conducted on ethnic Hungarians, and the contexts from Romania and the Slovak Republic may be specific, there is no reason to believe that the results are idiosyncratic, and they may apply to other ethnic groups as well. However, this requires testing the model on data for other communities too.

The research has its own limitations. First, it was restricted to national level elections, extending it to local elections would provide very valuable insights, and would also enable a comparison across different election types. Second, the data some of the indicators used in this paper were really last-resort proxies, better quality data could provide more conclusive findings. Third, the empirical relevance of the findings is limited, in the sense that it was only tested whether certain conditions were related to certain outcomes, but how frequently they really do produce those outcomes in reality could not be assessed. Fourth, the results (particularly those about non-participation) would be more valuable if comparable with the behavior of the majority. Finally, the results from the two countries are not comparable either, due to the very different questionnaires which compelled me to use different measures for the same concept and even to leave out some variables from one country.

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APPENDIX 1. Descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the analysis

Romania

Intention to participate (undec=missing)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	vote	942	80,7	86,8	86,8
	stay away	143	12,3	13,2	100,0
	Total	1085	93,0	100,0	
Missing	System	82	7,0		
Total		1167	100,0		

reported voting intention (crossover voting) (2)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	RMDSZ	653	56,0	84,8	84,8
	crossover	117	10,0	15,2	100,0
	Total	770	66,0	100,0	
Missing	9,00	397	34,0		
Total		1167	100,0		

Support of fringe ethnic parties: voting for the HCU

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	other	774	66,3	95,3	95,3
	HCU	38	3,3	4,7	100,0
	Total	812	69,6	100,0	
Missing	System	355	30,4		
Total		1167	100,0		

trust in DAHR

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	not at all	109	9,3	9,5	9,5
	don't trust	122	10,5	10,7	20,2
	trust	636	54,5	55,5	75,7
	totally trust	278	23,8	24,3	100,0
	Total	1145	98,1	100,0	
Missing	System	22	1,9		
Total		1167	100,0		

Descriptive Statistics - trust in DAHR

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
trust in DAHR	1145	1,00	4,00	2,9459	,85313
Valid N (listwise)	1145				

Distrust in the DAHR - QCA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	trust	936	80,2	80,2	80,2
	distrust	231	19,8	19,8	100,0
	Total	1167	100,0	100,0	

trust in Romanian parties (maximum)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	not at all	490	42,0	43,0	43,0
	don't trust	215	18,4	18,9	61,9
	trust	385	33,0	33,8	95,7
	totally trust	49	4,2	4,3	100,0
	Total	1139	97,6	100,0	
Missing	System	28	2,4		
Total		1167	100,0		

Descriptive Statistics - maximum trust in Romanian parties

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
trust in Romanian parties (maximum)	1139	1,00	4,00	1,9939	,97010
Valid N (listwise)	1139				

Distrust in Romanian parties (minimum) - QCA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	trust	462	39,6	39,6	39,6
	distrust	705	60,4	60,4	100,0
	Total	1167	100,0	100,0	

Descriptive Statistics - Dissatisfaction with the DAHR

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
dissatisfaction	1167	,00	5,00	1,8233	,92667
Valid N (listwise)	1167				

Dissatisfaction with the DAHR - QCA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	satisfied	967	82,9	82,9	82,9
	dissatisfied	200	17,1	17,1	100,0
	Total	1167	100,0	100,0	

score on informedness about politics (1 - low, 6 high)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1,00	19	1,6	1,6	1,6
	2,00	403	34,5	34,7	36,3
	3,00	279	23,9	24,0	60,3
	4,00	267	22,9	23,0	83,3
	5,00	117	10,0	10,1	93,4
	6,00	77	6,6	6,6	100,0
	Total	1162	99,6	100,0	
Missing	System	5	,4		
Total		1167	100,0		

Descriptive Statistics - informedness about politics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
score on informedness in about politics	1162	1,00	6,00	3,2504	1,25689
Valid N (listwise)	1162				

political information/knowledge - QCA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	not informed	973	83,4	83,4	83,4
	informed	194	16,6	16,6	100,0
	Total	1167	100,0	100,0	

salience of ethnic issues (0 - low, 6 - high)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	,00	755	64,7	64,7	64,7
	1,00	195	16,7	16,7	81,4
	2,00	67	5,7	5,7	87,1
	3,00	107	9,2	9,2	96,3
	4,00	14	1,2	1,2	97,5
	5,00	19	1,6	1,6	99,1
	6,00	10	,9	,9	100,0
	Total	1167	100,0	100,0	

Descriptive Statistics - salience of ethnic issues

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
salience of ethnic issues	1167	,00	6,00	,7378	1,25953
Valid N (listwise)	1167				

Salience of ethnic issues - QCA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	not salient	1017	87,1	87,1	87,1
	salient	150	12,9	12,9	100,0
	Total	1167	100,0	100,0	

Importance atributed to being represented in parliament

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	important	980	84,0	84,6	84,6
	indifferent	163	14,0	14,1	98,6
	not important	16	1,4	1,4	100,0
	Total	1159	99,3	100,0	
Missing	System	8	,7		
Total		1167	100,0		

perceived danger of losing parliamentary representation (0 - none, 3 - high))

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	,00	713	61,1	61,1	61,1
	1,00	279	23,9	23,9	85,0
	2,00	156	13,4	13,4	98,4
	3,00	19	1,6	1,6	100,0
	Total	1167	100,0	100,0	

Descriptive Statistics - Age

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
age of respondent	1164	16,00	91,00	47,4321	18,12633
Valid N (listwise)	1164				

Gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	male	551	47,2	47,2	47,2
	female	616	52,8	52,8	100,0
	Total	1167	100,0	100,0	

Descriptive Statistics - education

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
education	1162	1	10	5,08	2,018
Valid N (listwise)	1162				

Education - QCA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	lower than high school	613	52,5	52,8	52,8
	high school or more	549	47,0	47,2	100,0
	Total	1162	99,6	100,0	
Missing	System	5	,4		
Total		1167	100,0		

language spoken at home

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	only Hungarian	1067	91,4	92,0	92,0
	some Romanian	25	2,1	2,2	94,1
	both	49	4,2	4,2	98,4
	mostly Romanian	9	,8	,8	99,1
	only Romanian	10	,9	,9	100,0
	Total	1160	99,4	100,0	
Missing	System	7	,6		
Total		1167	100,0		

Rural-urban

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Rural	572	49,0	49,0	49,0
	Urban	595	51,0	51,0	100,0
	Total	1167	100,0	100,0	

Descriptive Statistics - percentage of Hungarians in the locality

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
pndmg04	1167	6,4	100,0	58,505	34,5553
Valid N (listwise)	1167				

Slovakia

reported intention to participate (undecided as missing)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	vote	561	72,8	84,9	84,9
	stay away	100	13,0	15,1	100,0
	Total	661	85,7	100,0	
Missing	System	110	14,3		
Total		771	100,0		

reported voting intention

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	PHC	565	73,3	93,5	93,5
	crossover	39	5,1	6,5	100,0
	Total	604	78,3	100,0	
Missing	System	167	21,7		
Total		771	100,0		

Descriptive Statistics - dissatisfaction with the PHC

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
dissat	771	,00	32,00	17,8949	7,04388
Valid N (listwise)	771				

Dissatisfaction with the PHC - QCA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	satisfied	591	76,7	76,7	76,7
	dissatisfied	180	23,3	23,3	100,0
	Total	771	100,0	100,0	

Descriptive Statistics - salience of ethnic issues

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
salience of ethnic issues	769	,00	,42	,2203	,05373
Valid N (listwise)	769				

Salience of ethnic issues - QCA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	not salient	582	75,5	75,7	75,7
	salient	187	24,3	24,3	100,0
	Total	769	99,7	100,0	
Missing	System	2	,3		
Total		771	100,0		

Another Hungarian ethnic party would be needed in Slovakia

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	669	86,8	86,8	86,8
	yes	102	13,2	13,2	100,0
	Total	771	100,0	100,0	

education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	elementary	221	28,7	28,7	28,7
	vocational training	227	29,4	29,4	58,1
	high school	201	26,1	26,1	84,2
	college	122	15,8	15,8	100,0
	Total	771	100,0	100,0	

Education - QCA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	low	448	58,1	58,1	58,1
	middel or high	323	41,9	41,9	100,0
	Total	771	100,0	100,0	

agegroup

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	between 18 and 34	241	31,3	31,4	31,4
	between 35 and 55	284	36,8	37,0	68,4
	older than 55	243	31,5	31,6	100,0
	Total	768	99,6	100,0	
Missing	System	3	,4		
Total		771	100,0		

gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	male	366	47,5	48,0	48,0
	female	396	51,4	52,0	100,0
	Total	762	98,8	100,0	
Missing	System	9	1,2		
Total		771	100,0		

rururb

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	rural	361	46,8	47,5	47,5
	urban	399	51,8	52,5	100,0
	Total	760	98,6	100,0	
Missing	System	11	1,4		
Total		771	100,0		

language used in family interactions

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Hungarian	664	86,1	87,6	87,6
	both	83	10,8	10,9	98,5
	Slovak	11	1,4	1,5	100,0
	Total	758	98,3	100,0	
Missing	System	13	1,7		
Total		771	100,0		

Descriptive Statistics - percentage of Hungarians in locality

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
percentage of Hungarian population in 2001	771	1,70	95,40	60,0704	25,99886
Valid N (listwise)	771				

APPENDIX 2. Correlations between independent variables and multicollinearity tests

Correlations between the independent variables in the logistic regressions in the Romanian data

Correlations

		trust in DAHR	trust in Romanian parties (maximum)	salience of ethnic issues	score on informedness in about politics	perceived danger of losing parliamentary representation	imprepr2	dissatisfaction	Utolsó elvégzett iskolája
trust in DAHR	Pearson Correlation	1	,156**	,032	,145**	-,062*	-,267**	-,343**	-,044
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,274	,000	,037	,000	,000	,140
	N	1145	1133	1145	1141	1145	1139	1145	1140
trust in Romanian parties (maximum)	Pearson Correlation	,156**	1	,071*	,169**	,072*	-,156**	-,074*	,167**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,017	,000	,015	,000	,013	,000
	N	1133	1139	1139	1136	1139	1135	1139	1134
salience of ethnic issues	Pearson Correlation	,032	,071*	1	,192**	,126**	-,050	,036	,163**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,274	,017		,000	,000	,086	,219	,000
	N	1145	1139	1167	1162	1167	1159	1167	1162
score on informedness about politics	Pearson Correlation	,145**	,169**	,192**	1	,165**	-,181**	-,030	,301**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000		,000	,000	,303	,000
	N	1141	1136	1162	1162	1162	1157	1162	1157
perceived danger of losing parliamentary representation	Pearson Correlation	-,062*	,072*	,126**	,165**	1	,056	,105**	,140**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,037	,015	,000	,000		,058	,000	,000
	N	1145	1139	1167	1162	1167	1159	1167	1162
it is not important to have representatives in parliament	Pearson Correlation	-,267**	-,156**	-,050	-,181**	,056	1	,220**	-,087**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,086	,000	,058		,000	,003
	N	1139	1135	1159	1157	1159	1159	1159	1154
dissatisfaction with the DAHR	Pearson Correlation	-,343**	-,074*	,036	-,030	,105**	,220**	1	,090**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,013	,219	,303	,000	,000		,002
	N	1145	1139	1167	1162	1167	1159	1167	1162
Education	Pearson Correlation	-,044	,167**	,163**	,301**	,140**	-,087**	,090**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,140	,000	,000	,000	,000	,003	,002	
	N	1140	1134	1162	1157	1162	1154	1162	1162

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Collinearity statistics for the independent variables of the logistic regressions in the Romanian data

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	536,942	52,238		10,279	,000		
	trust in DAHR	-9,671	12,493	-,024	-,774	,439	,889	1,125
	trust in Romanian parties (maximum)	5,006	10,743	,014	,466	,641	,927	1,078
	salience of ethnic issues	-14,460	8,193	-,054	-1,765	,078	,940	1,064
	score of informedness about politics	24,336	8,766	,091	2,776	,006	,829	1,206
	perceived danger of losing parliamentary representation	-,359	13,083	-,001	-,027	,978	,944	1,060
	it is not important to have representatives in parliament	26,489	25,807	,032	1,026	,305	,887	1,128
	education	-1,567	5,372	-,009	-,292	,771	,864	1,158

Correlations between the independent variables in the logistic regressions in the data from Slovakia

Correlations

		education	salience of ethnic issues	szívesen látna egy másik magyar pártot	dissat
education	Pearson Correlation	1	,136**	,060	-,029
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,097	,417
	N	771	769	771	771
salience of ethnic issues	Pearson Correlation	,136**	1	,073*	,052
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,044	,150
	N	769	769	769	769
need for another ethnic party	Pearson Correlation	,060	,073*	1	,270**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,097	,044		,000
	N	771	769	771	771
dissatisfaction with the PHC	Pearson Correlation	-,029	,052	,270**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,417	,150	,000	
	N	771	769	771	771

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Collinearity statistics for the independent variables of the logistic regressions in the data from Slovakia

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	395,064	41,563		9,505	,000		
	salience of ethnic issues	49,296	151,704	,012	,325	,745	,976	1,025
	need for another ethnic party	4,742	24,730	,007	,192	,848	,920	1,087
	dissatisfaction with thePHC	-,102	1,188	-,003	-,086	,932	,924	1,082
	education	-8,055	7,774	-,038	-1,036	,300	,976	1,024