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A LONG-TERM TERRORIST CAMPAIGN AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE:
THE ROLE OF ETA IN SPANISH POLITICS

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I hereby declare that this work contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. This thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, unless otherwise noted.

Abstract

The attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States gave a renewed impetus for the development of the studies of terrorism. These new studies, however, tend to focus exclusively on the Al Qaeda-type Islamic terrorism and forget that there are numerous historical cases of terrorism that are enlightening when we try to understand the phenomenon. In addition, the studies both before and after the September 11 attacks tend to leave aside one important element of terrorism, i.e. its political nature, or, more precisely, the impact it has on the politics of the country (or region, or the entire world).

The objective of this thesis is to assess how the presence of a terrorist group influences the the political life of the country and the discourse of the country's main political actors. For the purposes of this thesis, the case of Spain in its fight against the Basque separatist group ETA is taken as a situation to examine. The analysis is based on two assumptions which guide the outlook of the work: first, that we cannot assess the impact of terrorism on the political system without analyzing the discourse of the political actors and, second, that the discourse on terrorism is not created in a vacuum, but builds on the discursive elements that are present in the historical discourse of the country (culture, civilization), and, through the combination of these elements, allows us to understand the terrorist violence and provide it with meaning.

The investigation goes through three stages: the first chapter presents the main theoretical concepts and frameworks that are further used in the investigation of the role of the ETA violence in the country; then, the historical discourse on the nation and violence is studied in both Spain and the Basque Country; finally, the last two chapters examine in detail two crucial moments in reshaping of the discourse on violence, namely, signing of the Declaration of Lizarra and the electoral campaign of 2004. Here a particular emphasis is given on the influence that the events of March 11 had on the discourse.

Based on the findings of the investigation the following conclusions have been drawn: (1) democratic political actors take the elements available in the historical discourse for their respective discourse constructions; (2) democratic actors connect these different elements in the discourse according to their own needs. There are different types of logic (the logic of equivalence or the logic of difference) that can be employed in an attempt to hegemonize discourse and it is up to the democratic political actors which of them will be given priority to. However, the presence of violence often brings forth the "war frames", i.e. the logic of equivalence, where everyone who is not with us is against us. Finally, the constructed equivalential chains are not based on neutral political divisions, but represent the moral dimension and the moral choices between good and evil.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EA – *Eusko Alkartasuna* – Basque Solidarity party

EE – *Euskadiko Ezkerra* – Basque Left party

ERC – *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* – Catalan Republican Left

ETA – *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* – Basque Land and Freedom

HB(EH) – *Herri Batasuna (Euskal Herritarok)* – Unity of the People (We Basque People) Also referred to as Batasuna

IA – *Izquierda Abertzale* – Patriotic Left, the people sympathizing to the ideals of Basque independence, also the organizations belonging to this environment; in another interpretation – ETA environment

IU – *Izquierda Unida* – United Left

MLNV – *Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco* – Basque National Liberation Movement

PNV – EAJ/PNV – *Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea/Partido Nacionalista Vasco* – Basque Nationalist Party, further referred to simply as PNV

PP – *Partido Popular* – Popular Party

PSE-EE – *Partido Socialista de Euskadi-Euskadiko Ezkerra* – the Basque branch of the Socialist Party PSOE, later referred to as PSE

PSOE –*Partido Socialista Obrero Español* – Spanish Socialist Workers Party, later referred to simply as Socialist Party

UCD – *Unión de Centro Democrático* – Union of Democratic Center

Introduction

The attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States gave a renewed impetus for the development of the studies of the phenomenon of terrorism. The scale of the attacks as well as their spectacular nature, the reaction of the world's super power and the "war on terror" becoming the order of the day, made terrorism one of the most trendy topics in the field. Academic, journalistic and fiction production on the topic soared in the last five years and the amount of works flooding the libraries, book stores and web pages increased significantly in number, though not always in quality. Al Qaeda, once known only to the selected few, became one of the most famous organizations in the world, surpassing in fame any of the existing terrorists and non-terrorist organizations. Terrorism as a phenomenon suddenly appeared to be exotic and new, or, better said, if terrorism was not new, then at least what we were facing now was "new terrorism." (see, e.g. Simon, Benjamin 2000)

What seemed to be forgotten was that there were many instances when terrorist methods were used to advance one or another course of action, one or another idea, to protect against one or another type of policy. What seemed to be forgotten was that many phenomena have their roots in the past, follow similar patterns of development as analogous phenomena in history and that in order to understand some of the recent events it makes sense to revisit comparable situations in the past. Searching for these analogies can shed more light on the phenomena than trying to investigate them as something new. Examining these analogies allows us to better assess and evaluate the responses to problems and possible patterns of their development.

For the purposes of this work, I will look at the development of the long-term terrorist campaign from a historical perspective and attempt to find general patterns to use to understand the current terrorism. In addition, I will address an issue of the impact of terrorism on the political space, on the democratic political actors or the relations between them, which is often ignored in the literature.

The definition of terrorism is a source of one of the greatest controversies surrounding the subject. The debate on the issue is a longstanding one, but so far no common agreement has been reached on what exactly we mean by denominating some events as cases of terrorism or certain groups as terrorist organizations. My task here is not to go deeper into this controversial issue,[1] my concern is the discourse of terrorism in which naming has an important role. My interest is not in whether the designation of some groups as terrorist corresponds to some scientific criteria of what terrorism is, but more in what impact such identification has and how the presence of such groups shapes the field of political discourses in the country.

Most of the mainstream theories in terrorism research do not provide a sufficient answer to this question. They are mostly concerned with finding causal explanations for the phenomenon and, consequently, its prevention. However, my research did start with the analysis of the existing theories of terrorism. It might be useful to assess the problematique in this area of research in order to position better the current work in the theoretical field.

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[1] For a comprehensive discussion, see Schmid 1988, pp.1-38.

The upsurge of terrorist activities in the 1960s[2] generated a great concern and interest in the phenomenon. Since then, social scientists started spilling more ink than the terrorists themselves spilled blood in trying to understand the phenomenon, to paraphrase Alex Schmid (1988), but they commenced their work in a virtually void land. Terrorism as such, of course, was not an unheard-of phenomenon at the moment: the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution that brought the term into the political vocabulary also prompted numerous examinations of this form of violence and attempts to explain its occurrence. There were Russian revolutionaries of the 19th century who resorted to terrorist tactics at one point of their development; "national liberation" movements in Ireland, Israel or Algeria were incorporating terrorist tactics into their struggle for independence and a few other cases. Many researchers and intellectuals saw these struggles and the means employed as legitimate and understandable in the face of oppression that the countries were suffering from their colonial rulers, until the developments of the "urban guerrilla"[3] in the midst of the economically advanced and democratic states of Europe and North America started changing the attitude and brought up intensive discussions about the nature of the phenomenon, its causes and effects.

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[2] The end of the 1960s marks the beginning of the contemporary terrorist activities, an era that Lacquer calls the "age of terrorism" (Laqueur 1987). Several events of that time influenced both the increasing usage of terrorist tactics and the appearance of the word "terrorism" in the everyday language, especially in the media. These events: death of Che Guevara in 1967 which showed the shortcomings of guerrilla warfare, the student uprisings of the 1968 which had a similar influence on the view of impact of such type of revolts and the Six Day War of June 1967, which gave an impetus for an increasing use of the term "terrorism" by the Western media (see, for example, Guelke 1995, p.2-3).

[3] The term "urban guerrilla" to describe what in other places would be called "terrorism" was coined by Carlos Marighella, a Brazilian guerrilla leader and theoretician, and was widely used both in Latin America and in Europe of the 1970s. While with the first appearances of "terrorism" in the vocabulary of politics, it was used as a positive term (for Robespierre, terror was an indispensable companion of virtue in times of Revolution), the term soon invoked rather unfavorable connotations. Therefore, the last group to use "terrorists" as their own denomination was the Russian Narodnaya Volya of the 1870s-1880s, while the new violent actors of the 20th century, even when using similar methods, preferred other terms for self-description. The "urban guerrilla" became a useful denomination for such purposes.

These events prompted the rapid development of what could be called true "knowledge industry" on the topic and established, together with the governing elites, the principal frames of reference to use when discussing the phenomenon. Though the governments possess the monopoly of naming in the issue of terrorism, they also often turn to the scientists to support the denominations they propose and to design ways of combating it. The same way it happens to immigration, unemployment, poverty or trafficking, the scholarly research helps problematize the issue and structure our perceptions about the phenomenon. Thus, if we want to know what counts as terrorism and why terrorism is perceived as such an enormous problem, it is necessary to start from the examination of terror knowledge industry and how it develops the understanding of the phenomenon.

The initial theories analyzing this type of violence in the so-called developed world focused mainly on the extraordinariness of terrorism and the terrorists, attempting to explain the incidents of this violence by conspiracy theories and/or the psychopathological makeup of the people engaged in terrorist violence. These theories (while never losing their attraction in the popular culture and the pseudo-scientific lore) soon gave way to a more seriously grounded research and theories that tried to examine terrorist violence in its many places and means of apparition, and eventually managed to create within the framework of social sciences a corner for the studies of terrorism.

However, this situation was put to doubt by the events of the new millennium. The September 11, 2001 attacks in the US seemed to indicate a failure not only of the security services, but also of the theorists that were expected to predict and prevent them. The attacks of March 2004 in Madrid and of July 2005 in London have prompted new questions to the agenda – it appeared that the security services of the respective countries

paid more attention to the so-called "old" terrorist groups, ETA in the first case, and the IRA in the second, and somewhat overlooked the threat of Islamic terrorists. This brought up an excuse that the "new" terrorists were completely different from the old ones and that the theories were lacking that would be able to explain such events, their causes and effects. The "terrorologists" were put to blame here as well – a lack of prediction seemed to indicate a lack of theoretization.

There rises a natural question whether the occurrence of these attacks carried as much of a responsibility of the theoreticians of terrorism and their inability to explain and by so doing prevent the terrorist acts from taking place? Can "terrorology" in general be expected to act as a positivist science with its demands for the predictability of social events? What is the place of the study of terrorism both within the social sciences and in between the theory and practice, e.g. for the prevention of terrorist acts? These are some of the questions that should be addressed in discussing the theories of terrorism.

As it has been mentioned, the scientific qualities of terrorism research are often considered doubtful to such an extent that even the term "terrorology" is regularly employed in a negative or disdainful manner. There are several reasons for that: first, the aforementioned lack of scientific quality in a great part of terrorism research that relies so much on rumors, stereotypes and prejudices. Secondly, the topic itself is often considered to be that of the popular "entertainment" than a matter of serious political science, which should concern itself with more serious matters (e.g. parties and party systems). And finally, but importantly, the policy concerns of the majority of the leading figures in terrorism research make the scientific neutrality or critical viewpoint doubtful.

The first of these criticisms can be easily dismissed – though it is true that a lot has been written about terrorism and most of it belongs more to the sphere of fiction than to serious science, this does not warrant the claim that there are no serious theories of terrorism. The ones who claim that are perpetuating the prejudice in the same way as the people they are accusing. The second is also easily dismissed as whether we like it or not, it still remains a fact that terrorism is a phenomenon of great importance in political sphere, and thus has to be studied with the same concern as other phenomena of the kind. It is much more complicated to deal with the third matter. Long before the events of September 11 and the resulting "war on terror" there has been disquiet in the academic circles about the exclusive policy-orientation of the terrorism research. As, for example, Ronald Crelinsten once emphasized, a lack of quality in the studies of terrorism is often due to "narrow policy orientation on prevention and control." (Crelinsten 1987) This became even clearer after the events of September 11 and especially the current war in Iraq.

In this Second Gulf War the notion of embedded journalism entered to vocabulary to indicate a certain "court-journalism", characterized by a lack of neutrality and the view of the events from only one side, usually, the American or British military. In the same way recently a term of "embedded expertise" (Burnett, Whyte 2005) has been coined to talk about the academicians in the field of terrorism research that are closely related to governing circles and use their expertise to promote and encourage a certain policy agenda in the counter-terrorism sphere. The emphasis on effectiveness of a counter-terrorism campaign, according to these criticisms, leads to the lack of appreciation of the causes of terrorism, to the preferential treatment of the analysis of methods of combating

9

it and forgetfulness of the fact that terrorism is born *in the context* and that without understanding the contexts in which it is born it is hardly possible to work on its *prevention*.

The RAND-St. Andrews nexus is mentioned as an example of this "embedded expertise" in the field. The two most influential groups of terrorism research are closely connected to one another – the strongmen of RAND founded the St. Andrews *Center for Studies in Terrorism and Political Violence*; the members of both are editors of the two most important academic journals in the field: *Terrorism and Political Violence* and *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*; in addition, the two organizations maintain one of the most authoritative data bases of the terrorism incidents. (Burnett, Whyte 2005, p.8-10) Obviously, all of the above does not give any reason for worry, however, the relation of the two organizations with the respective governments and what might be seen as resulting from this relation methodological flaws both in the research focus (exclusively international terrorism and counter-terrorism measures) and in the actual data collection (e.g. to include even non-violent protests involving some "risk-groups" as terrorism[4]), is disturbing. Voice of reflexivity and criticism is lost under such circumstances; the effectiveness of the counter-terrorist campaign is seen as a superior aim, without considering its costs; and the resulting flaws in research downgrade the studies themselves.

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[4] In Burnett and Whyte two of such incidents are noted: the occupation of a German embassy in Athens by the Kurds in response to the police killing of a Kurdish youth in custody and a peaceful protest outside the Turkish National Airline office. (Burnett, Whyte 2005, p.10)
The flaws like this are often found in official databases of terrorism. For example, the attacks of pipelines in Colombia (or now Iraq) are always treated as "terrorism" in the American reports on terrorism. See, for example, Whitetaker, 2001.

Even if we agree that there is still a possibility of conceiving an idea of a neutral study of terrorism no matter what the real situation at the moment is, other doubts as to understanding it as a scientific discipline remain. It is questionable, for example, whether the terrorism studies can actually be viewed as a discipline because (the same regards, for example, area studies) they do not possess a unified methodology. What unites the different theories under the same name is just their focus on one of the phenomena – terrorism, which, in addition, is widely and differently defined in different studies. There is no common methodology, and the common focus of enquiry is vaguely defined. Furthermore, the subject is very narrow and the number of cases for analysis is very limited. All this creates strong doubts about calling terrorism studies a separate discipline. Douglass and Zulaika in their seminal work *Terror and Taboo* (1996) add to these doubts by arguing that idea of keeping terrorism as the focus of a field of study only works to perpetuate the already created image of terrorism as a tabooed category of discourse. Thus, they suggest that terrorism studies should be dismantled into separate pieces, the other fields of research to which various theories of terrorism are related.

It could be said, though, that an attempt to define terrorism studies as a discipline is more of a bureaucratic need than a scientific demand. Establishment of research centers and university departments might be easier when one is considering a discipline. However, the denomination of the area as a separate discipline or as an object of scientific enquiry does not change the quality of the theories created in the field and the fact itself that the subject of terrorism is studied from so many different angles may well be an advantage not a shortcoming of the field. Yet, this institutionalization of the terrorism research and the debates surrounding its position as a discipline (or not) should not escape attention as

it clearly shows how much this knowledge industry is entrenched in the contemporary world and how the scientific community adds to the securitization of terrorism.

If putting these various reservations about the value of "terrorology" and the possibilities to see it as a separate discipline aside, we still decide to pursue the quest of explaining the phenomenon, we would be dealing with some three sets of theories. Understandably, clustering of these theories is only a matter of convenience and different authors can use different constellations for their specific purposes. I would distinguish theories that try to examine causes of terrorism, in the first place, then move on to the ones that discuss the development of a terrorist organization and its inner dynamics, and finally, theories that examine the state responses to terrorism. This grouping is based on a narrower object of inquiry. Other possible classifications might include differentiations according to disciplinary affiliations of these theories (in this case we would have, for example, psychological, sociological, anthropological theories, etc.) or according to the methodology used (quantitative or qualitative methods, discourse analysis, etc.) or even according to the authors' aims (apologetic, explanatory, policy oriented, etc.). My own option for distinguishing between narrower objects of inquiry within the theories of terrorism goes in line with the idea that was discussed before – it is only the object of analysis that keeps those theories together.

We should consider first the analyses of the causes of terrorism. Attempts to find reasons for the birth of terrorist organizations in one part of the world or another, are at the forefront of the analytical approaches to terrorism. The questions why certain groups or individuals resort to violence to achieve their objectives, who are the individuals most

likely to make such a step and what are the conditions for their engagement in violence are issues that bother social scientists and sometimes policy makers.

It has already been mentioned that in discussing terrorism the temptation to succumb to the it-is-beyond-understanding or conspiracy explanations is rather easy. After all, so many definitions of terrorism insist that the perpetrators of these crimes have a pathological disregard for innocent lives. Can there be a better explanation to this than existence of a set of individuals with innate or acquired psychological disturbances that are all connected through an enlacing all world web of organizations that are themselves manipulated by an evil puppeteer? Probably the best example of such a "theory" is a book of Claire Sterling *The terror network: the secret war of international terrorism* (1981) that became popular in the circles of the American administration at the beginning of the 80s. Though extremely scantly grounded, such "theories" tend to resist all the attempts to uproot them, constantly resurging to claim their place at least in the popular understanding. As the former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs once claimed, "everything is possible in that world of darkness" (*El País*, 15 March 2004) and thus every explanation, no matter how improbable or ungrounded, can well find its audience.

More serious researchers are also concerned with the potentiality for terrorism and the individual motivations for joining the groups. The findings, however, differ significantly from those exposed by Sterling and those who share her ideas. On the micro level, concerned with the question of who and why engages in terrorism, numerous psychological research projects took place after the wave of terrorism in Europe withered away in the 80s. The results of the studies showed that those who were engaged in terrorist activities in Europe of the 70s were no different from other politically active

people. For example, as Franco Ferracuti writes, "Psychiatric studies have not identified any psychopathological characteristics common to the Italian left-wing terrorists" (see, Ferracuti 1998, p.60) that were under examination in his study, and the same findings were confirmed in case of (West) German leftist terrorists (Ferracuti 1998, p.60). Though certain "personality disturbances" are quoted in such studies (see, e.g., Post 1998, p.27) the general message is that those who engage in terrorist activities are "more like us than we ordinarily care to admit." (Rubenstein 1987, p.5)

Psychological theories also discuss the ways, in which individuals abandon the usual moral codes of behavior and turn to violence, the so-called "mechanisms of moral disengagement" that help an individual through "intensive psychological training" (Bandura 1998, p.163) to distance him/herself from the moral control of the society. These include ways of attributing blame, creating a positive image of oneself, the dehumanization of victims, etc. Such mechanisms also make it difficult to exit from terrorism, because the exit demands the replacement of a positive image of oneself (e.g. as a freedom fighter) by a negative one (e.g. murderer).

Other theories trying to explain a terrorist's behavior discuss the rationality of terrorist acts. For example, Martha Crenshaw emphasizes that engagement in terrorism comes after a calculation of costs and benefits.[5] Thus terrorism may be seen as a rational choice of the groups which fail to achieve their objectives by other means (terrorism is seen here as the last resort) and which want to compensate by their violent actions what they lack in numbers. (Crenshaw 1998) Ronald Wintrobe in his article "Can suicide bombers be

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[5] Among the former – a punitive governmental reaction, a potential loss of support and a possibility that the groups will be seen as elitist, among the latter – the power of terrorism to set agendas, possibility of creating a revolutionary condition and the same governmental reaction can be seen as beneficial as it would supposedly show the "true face" of the government.

rational?" tries to prove an even more difficult point – that suicide bombers are also perfectly rational individuals and that suicide bombings can be seen as a kind of rational activity that is "an extreme example of a general class of behavior in which all of us engage". (Wintrobe 2002, p.2) He maintains that in joining a terrorist organization (and here he takes inspiration from the analysis of the religious sects) an individual is giving up part of her autonomy to act according to her own beliefs in exchange for the solidarity. If the value of solidarity is high enough, it is rational for such an individual to commit a suicide for the cohesion of the group.

If, then, we agree with these theories arguing that the terrorists are as "normal" as most of us and that their decision to start a career in terrorism is a rational decision, the question arises what conditions prompt such a choice. In her classical work on the topic, Martha Crenshaw distinguished between two types of factors which encourage a rise of terrorism in certain societies: preconditions, i.e. factors that "set stage for terrorism over a long run," and precipitants – "specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism." (Crenshaw 2001, p.101) Within the former she distinguishes modernization and urbanization as general "permissive" preconditions for terrorism. In addition, she also mentions the society's view of violence against government as justified; the existence of concrete grievances; a lack of opportunities to participate in political processes; and the disaffection of the part of the elite usually because of the passivity of the masses. (Crenshaw 2001, p.101-105) A precipitating event, on the other hand, can be almost anything, but most often tends to be a violent reaction of the government against a broader movement with which the future terrorists identify. (Crenshaw 2001, p.105)

Most of the other theories on the causes of terrorism echo Crenshaw's ideas, adding more details to the picture. Thus, for Weinberg and Davis, as well as for Wilkinson, one of the most important "preconditions", to borrow Crenshaw's term, is the existence in the given society of a long tradition of resistance to the state and the existing order (Weinberg 1989, p.45), a historical memory of which may be said to be reactivated by a certain group in a particular situation. Sabino Acquaviva accentuates the existence of a "crisis of values" and the creation of a strong anti-culture (Acquaviva 1979) while Ehud Sprinzak stresses the process of delegitimation of the state. (Sprinzak 1998) For Donatella Della Porta (1995) the essential factor for the occurrence of terrorism is the reaction of government to the broad protest movement with which the future terrorists identify, the harsher the suppression of the movement, the more likely it is that a terrorist group will spring from it.

Martha Crenshaw emphasized that "[t]errorism as a process gathers its own momentum, independent of external events" (Crenshaw 2002, p.113) and often independent of the people that initiated it[6]. Thus, to gain some understanding of the dynamics of terrorism we should look at the path of development of terrorist organizations. Theories dealing with the subject emphasize similarities between a terrorist group and any other small group with its pressures of conformity and consensus and the provision of "a sense of belonging, a feeling of self-importance and a new belief system". (Hudson 1999, p.34) The most significant work in this field, to my mind, is that of Donatella della Porta (1995), who devoted her study to the German and Italian left-wing groups. While her theory also puts a lot of attention to the two other levels of the analysis – macro level

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[6] Probably the best example here would be Peru's *Sendero Luminoso*, a part of which continued its activities even after Abimael Guzmán, who was its sole most charismatic creator and leader, renounced violence and its objectives.

conditions and micro level reasons for joining violent clandestine groups – it is mainly concerned with the dynamics of terrorist organizations.

The study, based on Charles Tilly and Sydney Tarrow's protest cycles theory (Tilly 1994; Tarrow 1995) analyzes how a terrorist group is born from a wide protest movement. To put it in crude terms, the movements, such as those of 1968, gradually gather their force to reach the phase of highest mobilization. Subsequently, the enthusiasm withers away, leaving a surplus of activists and movement organizations that have to compete for their place within the movement and for the "scarce resources". At the same time, experience of violence from the state in the form of encounters with hostile police forces prompts some of these organizations to develop certain self-defense groups, whose goal it is to protect the movement from repression and the rivals (e.g. the radical neo-fascists in Italy). These groups adopt radical tactics in order "to become more competitive in the more violence-prone movement areas." (Della Porta 1995, p.112) Subsequently, these groups, "socialized in violence", follow the dynamics of their own, which leads them to more and more violent engagements, "deeper and deeper underground" (Della Porta 1995, p.115). This involves a variety of internal processes within the group, such as the adjustment of ideology, a change of self-image and the image of the enemy and even a change in language. Further on, these groups have to find a balance between the different interests that they might have, as, for example, between seeking to win supporters and find new recruits, a task that demands more openness and a need to protect the group. The terrorist groups exhibit many differences, which mainly stem from the character of the movements, from which they are born. However, these differences, the author notes, tend to diminish the longer they stay underground. (Della Porta 1995, p134)

Thus, whether we look at it as the dynamics of small groups or that of the closed (underground, outcast) societies, the development of terrorist organizations is not significantly different from the trajectories that the non-violent actors undergo. It could be even said that the actual violence plays little role inside the group. Here, as in ancient Rome, the barbarians and the fights against them remain outside of the gates.

The last sphere of inquiry which I would like to discuss here is that of state responses. As mentioned in discussion of terrorism as a separate discipline, it is mostly in the area of state responses that the terrorism studies have been attacked. It can be said that the research on terrorism in general has started from such "response" studies. The first books to be written on the issue, were those of the influential leaders of the British armed forces involved in the fight against insurgencies in Malaya, Kenya, or later on Ireland. The best known names here are those of Richard Clutterbuck and Frank Kitson. (Clutterbuck 1973; Kitson 1971) Strategies with little heed to the human costs (it is, for example, recommended to cut off food supplies for the populations that are suspected of supporting the insurgents) characterize these accounts, the main idea being that any insurgency can be toppled by military means. "[T]errorism can be and has been eliminated by a ruthless response to it, for power does ultimately lie with the government and its security forces." (Clutterbuck 1973, p.181) Supposedly, the author had to eventually rethink this idea, because what worked well in the "ruthless" setting of the colonial world did not seem to be as useful in a more spot-lighted area of Northern Ireland, where the same military strategies were attempted as in the colonial Malaya. (see, e.g., Von Tangen Page 1998) However, when such theories seemed to have been rather forgotten, the recent war in Iraq and the subsequent insurgency there revived some of these old theories of counter-

insurgency to be employed in the country. The aforementioned RAND-St. Andrews circle is closely connected with the counter-insurgency school, and the studies of the latter are well respected and used in the former (Morrison-Taw, Hoffman 1999), so that the same measures are often advocated in the recent war on terrorism. How problematic that eventually might be is well represented by the example of Northern Ireland: the increase of military pressure only allowed the movement to increase and gather strength, while the decline of the IRA and the "armed struggle" was more due to the change in circumstances and strategic political decisions than to the increased military pressure.

Neutral studies of the response to terrorism are more difficult to find, their findings are usually less optimistic than those of the "embedded" experts, and their works, to date, raise more questions than provide answers. Attempts to find a unitary way to fight terrorism have failed both in the works of "embedded" scientists and in those of the neutral ones – it appeared that there is no single recipe of how to handle terrorism. For example, "betrayal" strategies, where members of the organizations are given legal incentives to exit the organizations (receiving shorter sentences, etc.) worked very well in Italy, but proved a disaster in Northern Ireland and had only a partial success in Spain. Amnesty can sometimes be a solution (e.g. in Spain, it was argued that its absence lowered the chances of a democratic transition resulting also in ending terrorism), but in other cases it is a precipitated action (e.g. in France where amnesty given to the members of the Leftist *Accion Directe* only led them to rejoin the armed struggle).

However, the most problematic issues appear when we look deeper into the response agenda. For example, nobody has yet written a satisfying account on the contradiction between the counter-terrorism measures and legislation and the subsequent penal

treatment of the terrorism convicts. It has been noted is some works (Von Tangen Page 1998, Della Porta 1993) that the terrorism legislation with its draconic measures often results in the completely "normalized," to borrow the Northern Irish term, treatment of the convicts. Or, to put it in other words, while the political aspect of terrorism is very much emphasized in the period leading to capture and the trial of the suspects, it is inexistent in their subsequent treatment in jails. A contradiction that has not yet been solved and is very unlikely to be solved.

As it could be seen from the discussion of the main trends in research of terrorism, none of these seriously deal with the impact of terrorism on politics. Even those researchers, who do analyze to a certain extent the relations between the political actors and the terrorist groups, be they sympathetic or opposing (Weinberg, Pedhazur 2003, Crelinsten 1987), they do not seriously assess how these relations influence the political life and the relations between the political actors themselves. Significantly, they fail to answer how terrorism manages to achieve such a great impact on political system. Why is it believed or made believe (by the organizations themselves as well as their opponents) that these small groups of armed men and women can seriously disrupt the functioning of the state and even bring about its demise? In short, what is so terrorizing about terrorism?

In order to answer this question we have to start with a somewhat deeper examination of the phenomenon of terrorism, its underlying characteristics and through this investigation try to develop a framework for the analysis of its impact on the political system. What are those characteristics? Alex Schmid has distinguished a list of 22 elements that various authors would like to see in descriptions of the phenomenon. The three most important

are the following: violence – mentioned in 83.5%, "political" – in 65% and fear and terror in 51% of all the definitions (Schmid 1988, p.5).

In a very crude analysis, if we look at these three characteristics in light of the proposed discussion, we could say that "terror" and "fear" are, in fact, the elements that should be explained. "Violence" and "political" would become here the explanatory variables. Large-scale violence can obviously become a terrorizing force and would definitely demand all the attention of the governing bodies to deal with it. Mob violence or high crime rates become, at some point, not only concern for the police and other security forces, but demand political attention. However, not all violence merits the adjective "political" and, as we can often see, "political" is exactly the type of violence that gets most significant amount of attention. As Loren Lomasky writes:

> Every day innumerable people are victimized by violent assault or natural calamity. Only rarely do these events escape the back pages of local newspapers. Yet, when destructive activity dons garb we recognize as terrorism, it ascends to extraordinary prominence. (Lomasky 1991, p.87)[7]

One of the reasons for such a profound interest in the phenomenon is claimed to be its political nature. This aspect of terrorism can be seen from two different sides: first of all, it is often argued in different sources and appears as self-evident that terrorists have aims, which are by nature *political*. Secondly, it is suggested that terrorism has a political impact, or, to be more precise, requires a political response. These two features would distinguish it from a mere criminal activity and explain the attention given to the phenomenon.

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[7] After the events of September 11, 2001, such a statement might not appear to be justified, however, even now terrorism is more an exotic and extraordinary phenomenon than a daily experience for the most of the people in the world. As Immanuel Wallerstein noticed in relation to the attacks and their impact on the consciousness of the people in the United States, "[I]t has been frequently said that the world will never be the same again after September 11. I think this is silly hyperbole." (Wallerstein 2001). Many scholars emphasize that the idea of the "changed world" after the September 11th are somewhat exaggerated.

The "terrorist" groups definitely have political claims to make: this is what most obviously distinguishes them from mere criminals. As Lomasky writes, "[u]nless an individual or group represents itself as acting in the service of a political ideal or program, it will not be deemed terrorist" (Lomasky 1991, p.88). However, many researchers notice a significant discrepancy between the aims and the effectiveness of the terrorist means[8] to achieve them. Malcolm Deas, for instance, gives an example of a Colombian terrorist group M-19, kidnapped a Conservative politician, killed his bodyguards and claimed that they sought to "bring about the fusion of the armed forces, the M-19 and 'the people'." The author ironically writes that "[h]ow this miracle was to be precipitated by kidnapping Gómez will forever remain mystery." (Deas 1997, p.368) Such examples are pretty numerous. There was hardly any successful terrorist campaign, if the success of that campaign is measured by the results in relation to the proclaimed aims of the terrorists[9]. Furthermore, sometimes the responsibility of the attacks is not even claimed. As, for example, in the case of the most spectacular one, the September 11 – it was the government of the United States not the perpetrators themselves that attributed the actions to al Qaeda. Therefore, an important question arises: how to explain

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[8] Part of literature on terrorism tries to represent terrorism as a specific ideology. This idea, according to some authors, might be misleading. Terrorism can be used by the groups on both right and left of the political spectrum, for the nationalist and for various other reasons. Some of terrorist groups engage in a fighting between themselves not only against the state (e.g. in the Italian case, the Leftist and the Rightist terrorists were as much against each other as against the state). The differences in groups and in their goals do not allow to portray terrorism as an ideology. Furthermore, from its very appearance on the political scene during the French Revolution, it was understood as a neutral weapon. As Robespierre wrote: "When a despot governs by terror his stupefied subjects, he is right as a despot; overcome by terror enemies of freedom and you will be right as the founders of the Republic" (Robespierre 2000, p.297) However, what may allow one to speak of a general ideology of terror and to see all the terrorist organizations as belonging to the same ideological family is the fact that all of them are commonly aiming at subverting the state or the system of states.

[9] The terrorist actions used to further nationalist objectives sometimes have a success, but more often than not they do not give the wanted results. For the groups seeking to attain other types of aims, the statistics is even more unfavorable. While certain "modest" requests (such as releasing the prisoners) at times receive some attention, currently governments basically refuse to negotiate with terrorists.

such a discrepancy between the results and the persistence of the terrorist tactics? How to assess the fact that new terrorist groups are appearing on the scene while significant numbers of others before them have failed to achieve anything at all by the terrorist means?

Two main answers are possible to these questions. First of all, it could be claimed as some of the books on terrorism do, that those who commit terrorist acts are just insane. They are completely irrational and any attempts to understand their behavior fall within the field of psychiatry. The faults and refutations of this argument have already been touched upon when the micro-level theories of terrorism were discussed.

Secondly, even if we admit that terrorists are as rational as most of us, the question of the meaning of the claims made remains. Interpreting Wintrobe, for instance, we could say that political claims do not have a significant impact on the decision to engage in terrorist activity. If joining an organization is based on the quest for solidarity and the acts themselves have a role of securing cohesion of the group, the political demands made seem to play a secondary role. Such an idea is advanced in several other works as well. For example, Lomasky sees terrorist activities not as a manifestation of instrumental but expressive rationality. The "material" claims then should be seen as having a secondary importance.

However, Lomasky's claim that terrorists' actions might just be an expression of the solidarity with the movement from which they stem, or, more concretely, a support for certain ideas, is also somewhat shaky. First of all, what seems to be pretty obvious is that violence tends more to discredit the ideas than to give them prominence. Certainly, considering the sociological research made in this field, focusing on the development of

the terrorist organization from the wide protest movement (see, the aforementioned work of Della Porta 1995; also Sidney Tarrow 1991) these ideas do make sense. A group engages in a terrorist activity only after all the other means for getting attention to their political ideas are exhausted. Yet, as Schmid rightly notices, "the very fact that such a language of blood is used tends to preclude dialogue" (Schmid 1988, p.23) and terrorist tactics just shows that the ideas of the movement are in deep crisis, that it is actually dying. What, then, the terrorists try to achieve by engaging in their violent activities? And what else is *political* in these activities if the "material" claims they make are not that important?

Some hypothetical answers already from the margins of the political science research on terrorism can be provided, (most of which will be examined more deeply in Chapter I of this work). First, it could be argued that by making these claims the perpetrators of the acts attempt to create or to sustain what, following David Apter, could be called "a discourse community" (Apter 1997). The claims allow the possible sympathizers to identify with the expressed grievance and to adhere to the movement. However, the discourse itself (as well as the acts) go further than these claims, which are just a side effect of a long process of creation of a certain nearly mythical understanding of the events and happenings in the world.

What is important in this situation, then, is not the concrete "material" claims that are made but a certain worldview, which might be created already *prior* to the engagement in violent activities and remains relatively stable over time. While at the beginning of the engagement there can be a certain flux in the explanations and in the understanding of what is the essence of the movement, this worldview gets stabilized pretty quickly and

the further events are incorporated in this worldview through a certain "linguistic alchemy" (Apter 1997, p.11) while the whole setting actually remains the same. As Apter writes:

> [i]t is when events are incorporated into interpretative discourses embodied in discourse communities, that political violence not only builds on itself, but becomes both self-validating and self-sustaining (Apter 1997, p.11).

The future discourse, the claims made and communiqués produced are aimed exactly at maintaining this worldview and the "community", which is organized around it. As it does not change and does not develop in any direction, terrorist writings as well as their acts can be seen as an apex or, more exactly, a dead end of a radical discourse. It is the point when no deliberation is possible.

Now, if we agree that it is the worldview, not the concrete claims that are important, then terrorism itself might be seen as belonging not to the realm of the material politics, but to a kind of ritual plane. As most of the definitions of the ritual mention two elements – symbolic acts and concentration to the transcendentality, the relation with terrorism becomes pretty much apparent. Terrorism as well is made of symbolic acts and it is actually directed toward a kind of transcendental objectives, such as the creation of the community of the virtuous.[10]

One could claim that the whole process of *identity creation* is in fact a ritual process. And the identity creation could be one of the main tasks of the terrorist discourse. Therefore, it could be argued that the material claims have only a marginal importance in terrorist discourse while the discourse itself is concerned with *distinguishing clearly and surely between the "friend" and "enemy"* to use Schmittian terminology or, to create an identity for the community through difference, to use the terms of William Connolly (and many

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[10] About the understanding of terrorist acts as a ritual see, for example, David Moss, 1997.

others). This, it could be argued, is what makes terrorism political and political in Schmitian sense of radical politics, as a struggle between life and death as an attempt to distinguish "us" from "them".

Violence itself has a specific meaning in these situations. While many authors write about erased histories of the native people, certain groups within the Western societies[11], etc. terrorism and political violence in general might be seen as an attempt at bringing forth these histories. As Apter writes:

> In so far as a dominant history "erased" theirs, what is recounted is anti-history, a history obliterated by victors, the retrieval of which is itself a way of legitimating violence. The retrieving of revelatory past events provide authenticity and a certain resonance to present ones. (Apter 1997, p.17)

Here the meaning of terror as an *emotional construction* comes to the fore as well. The usage of the word "terror" indicates that one is dealing here with the strong emotion. Fear, of course, is the etymological meaning of the word and incitement of fear is definitely one of the aspects of terrorism. However, it could be argued that the violent actions attempt at more than creating fear in the camp of the enemy. Emotional cohesion can also be produced in the midst of the community in whose name the actions are made. This is how the French revolutionary terror is sometimes explained[12]; this is also how the sacrifices and victimization are explained in the theory of René Girard[13]. In these

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[11] There is a scholarly concentration of Western societies, while most probably the same processes can be found in others as well.

[12] Lyford Edwards, one of the classical theorists of revolutions, in his book *The Natural History of Revolution* claimed that terror appears in the societies where the public emotions have reached the highest point and its end is associated with the emotional fatigue. Other important ideas about terror as an program to contain emotions and keep them at the same level can be found in Lynn Hunt's book *Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution* (1984), in the collection of essays *La République et la Terreur*, edited by Catherine Kinzler and Hadi Rizk, etc.

[13] See, especially his *La Violence et le sacré* (1998). Girard's ideas can be successfully applied not only in the context of the French revolution, but also in the broader context of political and especially religious violence. A good example of such an analysis is the selection of essays edited by Mark Jurgensmeyer *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World* (1992), as well as a set of articles in journals like Anthropoetics (http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu See especially articles of Nils Zurawski "Girard in

theories, terror serves as a means to reproduce the moment of initial excitement at the foundation of the community, to externalize one's own fears, show the violence as coming from the outside of the community and thus purge the community itself from its violent inclinations.

When discussing the "political" demands of the terrorists it was claimed that there exists a huge gap between the claims themselves and the actual results that are achieved by using a terrorist tactic. One of the reasons for such a low result is the fact that the states do not pay that much attention to these demands. Currently there exists a consensus among the politicians that terrorists are not to be listened to and that in no way should the state give into the demands they make as this would only encourage the perpetuation of terrorist tactics. Not listening to what they have to say, the state nevertheless responds with as inflammatory rhetoric against the terrorists as the latter do against the state. Loren Lomasky, writing about the reactions of the state officials to the terrorist events, notes wondering that:

> One can hardly fail to note a disproportion between, on the one hand, the nugatory capacity of terrorist activity to disrupt political structures and, on the other hand, the fevered commentary it elicits. … Sober-minded persons of seasoned political judgment adopt near-apocalyptic tones when discussing the impact of terrorism (Lomasky 1991, p.96).

Some other authors, (for example Lasser 1987, p.33) also note and warn against the seemingly disproportional reaction of the state to the terrorist activity. The question is how to understand this reaction and how to assess these verbal storms addressed to the "terrorists"? This question will be closely related to the question of how to assess the

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Ulster" http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/ulster.htm and Andrew McKenna in "Scandal, Resentment, Idolatry: The Underground Psychology of Terrorism" in http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/resent.htm)

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political reaction to the terrorist activities and should help to understand better the dynamics of the engagement between terrorists and the state.

Again, some hypothetical arguments could be given here. First of all, considering the findings of the previous section, one answer just proposes itself – the reaction of the state can be understood in the same way as the creation of the terrorist discourse, in a sense, that it also follows the logic of Schmitian politics as an attempt to distinguish clearly between friends and enemies. Of course, the state has many more adversaries against which it can turn its eye and in relation to which it can create its own identity (see, for example, Campbell 1992). Terrorism here proposes itself as it attacks the fundamentals of the state, which have otherwise been accepted by the majority of the population. In this sense, again, terrorism may be seen as the "other" to the state through which it creates its own identity.

Furthermore, taking into account the distinction between different types of security proposed by Barry Buzan and others (see Buzan et al. 1998), terrorism presents itself as a paradigmatic *political* threat. A political threat here is understood as a threat to "internal legitimacy of the political unit which relates primarily to ideologies and other constitutive ideas and issues defining the state" or to the "external recognition of the state, its external legitimacy" (p.144).

The ideas of the Copenhagen School of security studies and the constructivists in international relations in general are indeed important in understanding the impact of terrorism. After all, according to the authors working in the field, the threat can only be considered important and as such a security issue, if it is entered into the political

discourse or as Buzan et al. write: "[s]ecuritization can … be seen as a more extreme version of politization." (Buzan et al. 1998, p.23)

In the discussions of terrorism, the issue is not only politicized, but also "securitized," which means that it is "presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure." (Buzan et al. 1998, p.24) And no matter whether we conceive it as a political or as a security issue, it becomes clear that terrorism is an issue because some securitizing actors (politicians) decide that it should be so and present it as exactly a security issue to the publics of their countries. In other words, terrorism is political, because a decision is made in the political sphere that it should be political. In order, thus, to see why terrorism has an impact on the political system, we have to ask who decides what is a political issue and why the ones who decide pay such attention to terrorism or just its particular manifestations.

The emotional aspects of terror are also apparent in the state's reaction. Terror, from its first systematic employment by the Jacobins in the French Revolution, was understood as a kind of "controlled fear" (see for example, Vovelle 1985, p.62). The aspects of this controlled fear are still visible in the reaction of the state to the terrorist problem. In this context terror should be understood not as a certain act or even a series of acts, but as a process in which the state might join the terrorists in producing a certain atmosphere or even uses them for that purpose. Terrorism tries to disrupt the normal time of politics, a return to the moment of the creation of the community and by that to change the principles of its creation. The state sometimes allows that suspension of real time and by

that gains the strengthening of the identity of the state, which during the normal time of politics is in a constant flux.[14]

The question remains whether there can be a different reaction of the state to the terrorist "problem"? According to Lomasky, for example, terrorism is important "because of what it *represents* and not just because of what it *brings about*" (Lomasky 1991, p.97, emphasis author's). Furthermore, what is most important under these circumstances and what makes a fight against terrorism so significant is that it is a "rejection of politics that would limit the domain of authorized violence" (p.100). As violence itself is "deplorable whatever its provenance … that is precisely the reason to be concerned to limit the number and variety of the sources from which it emanates" (p.99). Hermant and Bigo are also emphasizing that "what is at stake is in fact more of a symbolic order, of the political emotion, than of the rationality and instrumentality of the public politics" (Hermant, Bigo 2000, p.78). Thus, as the terrorists attack the foundational principles of any state (as the only source of legitimate violence) the strong reaction is very understandable. It seems then that there is no other way of coping with terrorists but the "inflammatory rhetoric" and the most serious police and military measures.

To quote Lomasky again: "[c]riminal activity operates within the interstices of the political order and is parasitic upon it" (p.100), while terrorism is seen here as attempting to destroy the whole system completely. This is what the author calls a nihilist attitude of the terrorists. This might be right, but it has more implications for the state itself, as terrorism by attacking the fundaments of the state tries to show that such a construction

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[14] "… just as the source of danger has never been fixed, neither has the identity which it was said to threaten. The contours of this identity have been the subject of constant (re)writing: not rewriting in the sense of changing the meaning but rewriting in the sense of inscribing something so that that which is contingent and subject to flux is rendered more permanent" (Campbell 1992, p.33).

as the state is actually arbitrary and the idea of it as a unique source of legitimate violence is arbitrary as well and, what is more important, it is parasitic upon the histories of the excluded.

There might be further differences in the reaction of the state to the terrorists. One of those differences can be seen in envisioning terrorism and the fight against terrorism as crime (and, consequently, the fight against crime) versus showing it as a war. As Hermant and Bigo write, an attempt can be made either to "criminalize [the] adversary denying him political status or to valorize him up to a point when it becomes quasi equal [and] with whom a war … has started" (Hermant, Bigo 2000, p.88). The question of envisioning terrorism as crime or war is very important in this context. Showing terrorism as a crime and negating the political stance of the terrorists puts the problem itself into a different security register, as it can no longer be presented as a "political security" threat. The discourse itself then should be significantly different from that when terrorism is presented as an outside violence threatening the very foundations of the state.

This discussion allows several observations. First of all, the authors writing on terrorism have focused on the search for the causes of the phenomenon and ways of fighting it to such extent that they do not devote sufficient attention to one of the very important aspects of the terrorism phenomenon, i.e. its impact in general and its influence on the political system in particular. Secondly, from the attempts to locate terrorism as a political phenomenon and through that to assess its importance influencing political systems surges a general idea that there is no other way to analyze this impact than by looking at the discursive constructions. Finally, the discourse on violence, the threat assessment and the discourse of securitization is not created in a vacuum, but is a part of

and should be assessed in relation to another, what I would call a *historical discourse*. This concept can be seen as similar to William Gamson's "general discourse", i.e. the developed through time understanding of what a certain state and the nation (or even civilization) is, how it should be perceived and how it should be related to. It is only in relation to this discourse that we can really understand why terrorism has an impact that it has on the political system.

Having raised these questions and having introduced these basic assumptions, it is necessary to consider them by looking at some specific example and seeing whether they could help us explain the impact of terrorism on the political system. For that purpose I have chosen the case of Spain in its fight with the Basque separatist group ETA. Spain is a very interesting case in this respect, as the organization, which has been in a steady decline throughout the last two decades still manages to have an important influence on the political life, it indirectly influenced every alternation in power since the consolidation of democracy and is still kept at the center of the political debate, its current operational and political weakness notwithstanding.

When we think of violence, war and terrorism it is more common to think about places outside Europe, primarily the Middle East. The conflicts of the old continent appear to be settled and the events in other regions have more influence on the experiences of violence than those of the inside. Therefore, the persistence of ETA is indeed puzzling. Even if we consider all the resurgent "old" terrorist groups that were born out of the movements of the 1960s, none of them gains such a prominence as ETA, none of them gets as much attention in the political sphere as this organization. In Spain, even the infamous Al Qaeda is overshadowed and virtually ignored in the debates on terrorism. But even more

so, ETA seems to overshadow most of other problems with which the state has to deal with. Many of the front-page headlines of the leading newspapers refer to ETA; the speeches of politicians constantly refer to the organization; the greatest rivalry between the two leading parties over the last three years has been the anti-terrorism policy. In the meanwhile, between mid-2003 and December 30, 2006, when a bomb in a parking garage of the Madrid Barajas airport killed two people, the physical presence of the organization in the forms of attacks was minor. This discrepancy between the actual attacks of the organization and its political importance is significant. And it is exactly this highly manifested discrepancy that makes the situation of Spain and ETA such an interesting case for analysis.

Thus, by using theoretical concepts of the different fields that are concerned with the study of a political discourse, this study will attempt to throw light on a set of issues: first of all, it contributes to the development of the studies of terrorism, which even though they became so increasingly popular in the recent years still do not pay enough attention to the impact of terrorism on the political field and the constellations of political forces within it. In addition, this study also contributes to the understanding of question of terrorism in Spain and the Basque Country. It must be said in this respect that the impact of terrorism on the Spanish political life has been continuously mentioned, but never was it assessed in a systematic manner and the ideas that were advanced in various books and newspapers are no more than sketchy. Finally, the chosen theoretical framework, which is outlined in Chapter I, establishes the connections between different ways of looking at the political discourse, adding to the elaborations of the framework for the analysis of discourse not only in case of terrorism studies, but in the general assessments of the issue.

The development of this study was based first on the intuition that in order to understand the importance of a terrorist organization in the country, it is necessary first of all to look at what political ideals and political issues are connected with its presence. In other words, why violence is perceived as political. This makes it necessary to look at the historical discourse of the country in order to examine what are the underlying characteristics of this discourse and where are the points, in which the connection between the political ideas and violence could be drawn. As ETA is a separatist organization, it would be possible to presume that the connection between its violence and the political field would be made in the sphere of the contested understanding of the nation. Thus, a part of this dissertation will deal with the specific understanding of the nation in both Spain and the Basque Country and through this try to assess the place of violence in the discourse.

In order to fully analyze and evaluate the impact of ETA in the Spanish politics, a two-pronged approach has been chosen: a combination of the analysis of the historical discourse and the in-depth studies of some important sets of events that have (or failed to) become turning points in the development of the discourse on violence and its relation to the nation. While the parts dealing with the historical discourse in general show how the understanding of the nation developed through time, the in-depth studies will examine how this understanding comes to be connected with violence and what is the result of such a connection on the political discourse of the actors and on the shape of the political space in general.

These ideas guide the structure of the work. First, I will look at the set of theories from the international relations, anthropology and discourse analysis in order to fill in the gaps

in the theoretical assessment of terrorism, the way it was presented in this introduction. The initial discussion will lead to the conclusion that theories of discourse are the most useful for the analysis of the impact of terrorism and, consequently, I will present the main ideas and theoretical concepts which will further guide this work.

Second, the Spanish historical discourse regarding the nation will be presented. Basing the analysis on the works of various scholars who examined the development of the Spanish nationalism throughout the two last centuries, the understanding of the Spanish nation in the historical context will be presented and its main characteristics assessed. I will argue that the understanding of the Spanish nation retained many of the characteristics of the "ethnic" nation and that this understanding gained expression both in the legal documents of the country (such as Article 2 of the Constitution) and in the discourses of the political parties.

The following part deals with the general development of the nation-state-violence discourse in the country after the transition to democracy and the positions of the main political actors on the relation between nation-violence-state. It will be argued that on the side of the Spanish political actors, the Socialist Party, PSOE, always retained a more pragmatic, more state-oriented position, while the conservative PP concentrated almost exclusively on the nation.

The fourth part presents the alternative to the Spanish Basque historical discourse and its development from the 19th century onwards and assesses the main characteristics of the Basque understanding of the nation. Most attention will be paid to the changes that birth of ETA brought to the development of the Basque nationalism and to the similarities and

differences between the main Basque political forces – the EAJ/PNV – the Basque Nationalist Party (later referred as PNV) and the radical Basque Left.

The next two parts examine in depth two situations which changed (or did not manage to) significantly the discourse of some of the most important actors. First of all, the signing of Lizarra declaration and the events preceding and following it, showing how violence and historical discourse on the nation are connected. The Lizarra declaration being one clear show of the Basque solidarity, it will be important to see how this unity of the Basques, is reconciled with the ETA violence. It will be argued that in this case, which proved to have a lasting impact for nearly ten years, the Basque democratic actors dealt with ETA in a double way, acknowledging both of its most important characteristics: that it is violent, but also that it still belongs to the Basque "house."

Another situation – the campaign for the general elections of 2004 and the subsequent crisis of the March 11 attacks in Madrid will provide a study into connection between the discourse on violence and the discourse on the nation on the Spanish side, primarily one of the principal political actors in the country – the Popular Party, PP. I will argue that the party's discourse was constructed through creation of the clear chains of equivalence in which one chain has the nation (and the party as its protector) at the core and the other chain subsumes all the opponents of the party. In this latter chain, the actual contestants for power in the state – the Spanish Socialists are substituted as an enemy by the "coalition" of forces, which is orchestrated by ETA, making from the elections not the contest between democratic actors, but between the PP and ETA, between protectors of the nation and those who try to destroy it.

Chapter I. Theoretical framework. Moving beyond "terrorology"

We stopped discussing the theories of terrorism with a suggestion that when investigating the phenomenon of terrorism and especially its impact on the political systems it is not enough just to concentrate on the "material" factors. Therefore, in order to answer why it has such an impact, we should move beyond the investigations done in political science and seek recourse in two different spheres of scientific enquiry – poststructuralist theory of international relations and anthropology. These theories, though using completely different methods of analysis, have some things in common: firstly, the dissatisfaction with the existing explanations of the events and actions existing in the mainstream theories of their respective areas of research. Secondly, the emphasis on "deconstructing" the official (state) discourse, by providing an alternative reading of the events and actions, either (like theorists of international relations are doing) re-discovering the plurality of ideas abandoned on the way to the Truth or (like the postmodern anthropologists) focusing on the voices of victims, "disarticulated and dispossessed" (Kurtz 2001), not accommodated in any official discourse. Thirdly and essentially, these theories are united by common theoretical starting points, mainly the Foucauldian speculations on the relation between power and discourse.

"Culture of terror" – anthropological explanation of violence

In his 1987 book *Shamanism, Colonialism and the Wild Man*, Michael Taussig coined a term "culture of terror" which is now often used in the anthropological works. In this study, the author was analyzing violence against the native Indians in the Putumayo river basin during the so-called rubber boom at the turn of the 20th century. At the time, the violence in the region reached such heights that the British Parliament was forced to send

a special envoy to produce a report on the atrocities committed in the area. In this report,

the envoy, Roger Casement, explains these acts of violence in terms of labor scarcity. As

"not rubber, but labor" (Taussig 1987, p.53) was scarce in Putumayo, the Peruvian

Amazon Company, monopolist in the region, resorted to violence to keep it under

control. Thus the excessive brutality was explained in economic terms. However, such an

argument goes against the facts that Casement presents, notes Taussig. Killing out a

supposedly scarce labor force does not seem to be an economically rational behavior.

Furthermore, to assess terror in these terms is, according to the author, to obscure "our

understanding of the way business can transform terror from a means to an end in itself"

(Taussig 1987, p.53). Thus, according to the author:

> Torture and terror were not simply utilitarian means of production; they were a
> form of life, a mode of production, and in many ways, for many people, not least
> of whom were the Indians themselves, its main and consuming product. (Taussig
> 1987, p.100)

Not a senseless end product, though, for in killing and maiming Indians, the rubber

stations' employees were "constantly reproducing their world over and over again against

the savagery on which their world depended and with which, therefore, it was complicit"

(Taussig 1987, p.107).

Thus, for Taussig, terror is a *cultural construct* (Taussig 2001, p.220), all encompassing

(everybody has to participate in its perpetuation) and functioning in a way of "mimesis

between the savagery attributed to the Indians by the colonists and the savagery

perpetrated by the colonists in the name of … civilization" (Taussig 1987, p.134). It is

"based on and nourished by silence and myth in which the fanatic stress on the

mysterious side of the mysterious flourishes by means of rumor and fantasy woven in a

dense web of magical realism" (Taussig 2001, p.213-214).

It might be argued that Taussig's theory is valid only for the state terror, however, to my mind, it can be applied to other situations of chronic terror as well, such as the ones produced by the prolonged terrorist campaigns. It is useful, because it puts accents in the places that are omitted in the mainstream theories on terrorism. It shows that Terror is much more than just violence that it is born of the dichotomies apparent in language and culture between the savagery and civilization, between good and evil, etc. Furthermore, terror is an attempt at an affirmation of oneself against the Other, born out of fear of the Other and nourished by that fear. Terror is an affirmation of who one is against what one is not. Finally, terror is, as its etymology shows, fear. Fear that is born out and sustained through the discourse, but which spills itself into very real and concrete actions. In the beginning there was the word, but action did follow pretty close.

Witches, heretics and other communists

Douglass and Zulaika, two other anthropologists, suggest looking at terrorism in a similar way as at the witch-hunt of the early modernity. At the first glance this might seem to be a completely faulty analogy, for, it could be said, both the terrorists and the acts they are accused of do exist, while the existence of witches is now considered to be an invention of a dark medieval mind. Looking deeper into the phenomenon, however, can provide some insight into the phenomenon of terrorism as well.

Zulaika and Douglass view terrorism in analogy with witchcraft as a "pervasive social phenomena that, on a close inspection, appear to be nothing but imaginary constructs deeply embedded in the culture of the times" (Douglass, Zulaika 1996, p.96). They are not claiming that acts, which are called "terrorist", do not exist, but that putting all those distinct acts under one category, that of terrorism, is as illusionary as putting under the

category of witchcraft the instances of bad weather, illness, etc. The events that both witches and terrorists are accused of have a reality of their own, but their interpretation has its momentum. It could be said that it is not the facts, but the reaction to them that matters. Witchcraft in the early modern age was, therefore, a pretty real phenomenon and one, which served certain social needs. The same, probably, could be said about terrorism. According to Darren Oldridge, for example, the accusations of witchcraft:

> … served two major functions for the people involved: it provided an outlet of anger in the situation of social conflict, and it offered an explanation, and possibly a remedy, for a misfortune that was otherwise hard to understand (Oldridge 2002, p.11)

In comparison, William Connolly claims that terrorism serves as a provision for "domestic constituencies with agents of evil to explain the vague experiences of danger, frustration, and ineffectiveness in taming global contingency" (Connolly 1991, p.207). Taking this into account, the analogy with witchcraft gains more grounding.

Furthermore, as witches combined the most fearful elements of the early modernity, in the same way terrorists combine those of our age. As there were persons who truly believed in witches' ability to conjure evil forces, so there are persons who believe they can change the world by their violent deeds today. Both could be used for siphoning a general feeling of insecurity and fear onto concrete persons. Both, also, could be used by concrete persons or groups to attain their objectives. The witchcraft was actually attempted on certain occasions, so is terrorism. Moreover, in witch-hunt, the same as in terrorism, the relationship of the phenomenon to the discursive practices is of high importance. Like in Taussig's analysis of the Putumayo terror (see above), the witchcraft of the early modern age was a cultural construction, deeply embedded in the understanding of the world as it existed at the time and serving a clearly designated

function for all the people involved – the inquisitors, the villagers affected by *maleficium*[15] and the witches themselves.

Getting closer to today, one could also consider the menace of the Communists during the period of the Cold War. This issue is given much consideration in the studies on international relations. Out of these, the most important work for my purposes is David Campbell's (1992) *Writing Security. United States foreign policy and the politics of identity*. This work is particularly useful for the investigation thus presented for it echoes in a sense the questions that Campbell explored in his work.

One of the main Campbell's concerns is the interpretation of danger and threat that shaped a foreign policy of the USA during, mainly, the period of the Cold War. Starting with the assumption of risk insurance, that "Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything *can* be a risk" (Campbell 1992, p.1-2), the author analyzes how the understanding of danger is constructed in the foreign policy of the United States and, consequently, how the latter helps to produce and maintain the identity of the state itself. For, Campbell claims:

> … discourses of 'danger' are central to the discourses of the 'state' and the discourses of 'man'. … the state requires discourses of 'danger' to provide a new theology of truth about who and what 'we' are by highlighting who and what 'we' are not, and what 'we' have to fear. (Campbell 1992, p.54)

Furthermore, these discourses exhibit a significant continuity throughout the time. Accordingly, in the foreign policy discourse of the United States of America, one can trace the same or similar images, metaphors and symbols used to describe the dangers that the state is encountering. The "myth of frontier" dividing the world into a civilized inside and the barbaric outside, the civilizing mission of the American people, all the

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[15] A harmful magic, the enactment of which was attributed to the witches.

imagery of wild west is transported from the inception of the first colonies in the New Continent to the current times. Thus, the Indians were replaced by Communists not only in the popular imagery, but also (and mainly) in the political discourses and the latter recently gave way to the terrorists, with the metaphors used remaining, however, more or less intact.

Therefore, what should be getting clear at this point is that it is through discourse that fear and threatening images of different phenomena are created. It is through discourse that such an image is sustained and perpetuated. It is then the discursive constructions that one should look at if one is to grasp the essence of such a phenomenon as terrorism.

In addition, nearly from its appearance on the stage as a modern phenomenon, terrorism was understood as a *symbolic violence*. For the first time this term was introduced in the studies on terrorism in 1964 by Thomas Perry Thornton and since then has gained a significant support among the researchers. In this vision, terrorism is understood as a certain type of activity, which, seeking to create a "general climate of fear", attacks certain symbolic facilities or chooses symbolic victims. As it is claimed, a murder of a concrete person can rarely provoke fear, but rather anger, a terrorist attacks a symbolic victim with which a part of the population can clearly identify. Thornton explains that by calling terrorism symbolic he does not mean that a kidnapping, a murder or a bombing happens "only symbolically and not in fact; rather, it means that the terrorist act is intended and perceived as a symbol" (Thornton 1964, p.77). For Douglass and Zulaika terrorism is to be perceived as a ritual behavior, thus, essentially, a symbolic phenomenon as well. This interpretation, then, explains to a certain extent the discrepancy between the acts the terrorists commit and the goals that they raise for themselves: being a ritual

behavior it means that here "the relationship between means and ends is not 'intrinsic', i.e. it is either irrational or not rational" (Douglass Zulaika 1996, p.83). However, it does not mean that the actions performed on the ritual plane are senseless. On the contrary, they have a very clear meaning and are enacted in order to:

- ➢ transmit the information on the "physiologic, psychological or sociological status" to the participants of the ritual (Rappaport 1973, p.406);

- ➢ transform the world on the metaphysical plane or to change the ontological status of the participants of the ritual by overcoming ambiguity, the "more-or-less" status of a person or a group (see, for example, Sørensen 1993);

- ➢ or to restore a pre-existing *status quo* of the society in response to the unwelcome changes in the world order (see, for example, Turner 1974).

Terrorist violence can be seen in each and every one of these descriptions of the functions of the ritual. The ritualized and symbolic elements of this violence explain to a great extent the fear that terrorism creates and also points to the elements in the construction of terrorism, which may not be easily graspable for the ones who do not participate in the field of discourses surrounding the violent act. As symbols can be perceived only within a certain field, taken out of which they lose all their meaning, it is necessary to look at the field that surrounds terrorism in order to understand how it works. This, again, indicates the need to examine the context of terrorism, the fears, threats and dangers that a concrete society or a group envisions for itself and their attempts to overcome these fears. The threats and dangers themselves, getting back to the authors mentioned in this chapter, should be understood as a cultural, discursive construct, thus, the terrorism itself should be analyzed via discourse.

One note should be stressed again, as there is often a misunderstanding involved when the idea of seeing a certain phenomenon from the perspective of discourse is put forward. Oftentimes the theorists of discourse are accused of trying to deny the existence of the actual facts. This might be especially true in the case of such a controversial object of analysis as terrorism. However, to answer such a challenge let me use David Campbell's words that run as follows:

> The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive condition of emergence. (Campbell 1993, p.9)

The insights of these theories have an undeniable importance for this work, Campbell's study provides a constant inspiration for this work and Taussig's work has a significant influence on the way we might see terrorism drama. The initial points that can be taken from these theories are that:

1) discourse matters;

2) discourse helps create the identities of the actors and through this creation shape their actions and interactions.

Therefore, in order to understand how terrorism works, we should look at the way the discourse of terrorism is shaped and how the identities of the actors are created through it. For that purpose, the insights from a couple of other areas of research should be useful.

Discourse, frames, identities

The two notions of "frames" and "discourses" have brought up some similar though methodologically as well as terminologically different approaches. All of them base their methods of investigation and theoretical developments on a set of assumptions. First of all, the same as the mentioned above theories in anthropology and international relations, on the importance of language in transmitting the interpretations of the events and consequently making them a part of the structures of thought, through which subsequent events will be interpreted. In a sense, all of them depart from an assumption that reality is a social construct (Berger, Luckman 1966). Furthermore, all of them are concerned with the constructions of identity of a collective actor. As Paolo Donati notes:

> … the formation of a collective actor requires the construction of a collective self: an 'identity', which is defined on the basis of the available cultural tools and, therefore, appears as a cultural construct through which the specific collective goal is also given meaning. (Donati 1992, p.137)

This common concern clearly connects the theories presented above with the analyses of frames and discourses as undertaken in the research on social movements, political discourse analysis, etc. The two notions of frames and discourses have produced somewhat different sets of methodological approaches, therefore here I will examine them separately. However, it should be remembered that the line separating the two is pretty blurred and the language is often used interchangeably (Johnston 2002, p.63).

Frame analysis

The concept of frame was introduced into social sciences by Gregory Bateson in his 1954 book *Steps to an ecology of mind* and entered the field of sociology mainly through the investigation of Erving Goffman's *Frame analysis* (1972). These concepts were adopted to the study of social movements mainly by David Snow and his associates (see Snow et

al. 1986, Snow and Benford 1988, Snow and Benford 1992, Hunt et al. 1994, etc.). Their

definition of frame, following the traditional conceptualization of the notion was that of:

> … an interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses "the world out there"
> by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences,
> and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment. (Snow,
> Benford 1992, p.137)

Following Snow and Benford (1992) the functions of frames can be divided into three

groups: *punctuation* – singling out a certain social condition, which is further defined as

"unjust, intolerable, and deserving of collective action" (p.137); *attribution* – which is

divided into two groups: diagnostic and prognostic, the first one "identifying culpable

agents" and the second one proposing action to be taken to redress the problem and

assigning responsibility for doing that; and *packaging* which allows to unite various

"events and experiences so that they hand together in a relatively unified and meaningful

fashion" (p.138).

Another important notion in this respect is that of the frame resonance. According to

Snow and Benford (1988), the mobilization potential of any framing depends on a set of

factors that are external to it. Those can basically be divided into two: "the internal

structure of the larger belief system or ideology" and "the extent to which the framing

effort is relevant to or resonates within the life world of potential participants" (1988,

p.205). They characterize the belief system as falling within the continuum of the

structures, on the one extreme of which we find those that are completely rigid,

depending upon one principle, with tightly interconnected elements. Viability of such a

system depends on one core element. On the other extreme we would find systems that

are completely flexible, depend on a number of principles that are related in "a highly

compartmentalized fashion", the change of one component in such systems does not

challenge the whole structure (p.205). The second element, the relevance of the frame for the participants, depends on three others: empirical credibility – i.e. how much verification the frame can get, how the actual events fit into it; experiential commensurability – i.e. how it relates to the experiences of the people involved; and thirdly, the narrative fidelity, i.e. that it corresponds to the "existing cultural narrations" (p.210).

Thirdly, Snow and Benford (1992) introduce the notion of "master frame", which is also an important concept for the current examination. The master frames of the movement are similar to the organizational frames, but they are more generic and "constrain those of any number of movement organizations" (p.138). Master frames also have the attribution function, but can differ in the "specification of blame" (p.138). The perform articulation function and in the manner in which they are doing it, can be distinguished into restricted and elaborated frames, of which the first are rigid and allow little interpretation and the second are more flexible and allow a greater range of interpretation. Finally, master frames differ in the mobilizing potency, which is similar to the idea of resonance of the frames discussed above.

These notions, especially the conceptualization of different levels of framings with which any movement organization is concerned is of great importance here. What can be suggested from the work of Snow and his colleagues is not only that the framing matters, but that there are different framings that have influence on the effect that the organizational frame will have. Three planes of frames can be distinguished this way:

1) the general belief system;

2) the movement master frame;

3) the organizational frame.

The concept of framing is also used in different fields of "cognitive science" (Johnson 1993), especially cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics. For the research to be undertaken here, some of the findings in these fields are of particular importance. For instance, the work on the functioning of metaphors, as examined in the works of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Lakoff, Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1990, Lakoff 1996). Being one of the essential parts of the frames through which we perceive the world, metaphors do not indicate the sameness between the two objects, one of which is described through another, but the *likeness* of one object to another. As Hayden White notes, metaphor:

> … functions as a symbol rather than as a sign: which is to say that it does not give us either a *description* or an *icon* of the thing it represents, but *tells us* what images to look for in our culturally encoded experience in order to determine how we *should feel* about the thing represented (White 1978, p.91, emphasis author's)

In a sense, metaphor could be said to operate in two ways, i.e. it highlights some of the elements of the object represented, but at the same time suppresses some other elements. Therefore, it frames the way we should perceive the object or subject. Lakoff notes:

> The frames are in the synapses of our brains – physically present in the form of neural circuitry. When the facts don't fit the frames, the frames are kept and the facts ignored. (Lakoff 2003, p.3)

Or, to put it otherwise, perceptions are based on the categories that "are already present in the perceiver's culture or memory", thus "[c]ognition is nothing more than re-cognition" (Donati 1992, p.141). These ideas emphasize the importance of cognitive linguistics for this work. As it deals with the conceptual frameworks of language, trying to find out what cognitive structures are present in our minds when we think and talk (in this case – about politics), this theory shows what we should look for, what we should pay attention to when we analyze the patterns in discourse and try to assess the importance of violence

in their constructions. One of such important elements was already mentioned – the metaphor. Another can also be added here – the so-called "common sense," which, according to Lakoff, shows clearly these subconscious patterns in thought that guide our thinking and our interpretation of events.

Schools of discourse analysis

In recent years there have appeared numerous works that take political discourse as their object of investigation. Most of these theories, however, are concerned with the micro-level analysis of separate texts and even when the context in which the text was produced is taken into account, they still devote most attention to the linguistic categories of those texts (see, for example, the investigations of the Critical Discourse Analysis School, Wodak Meyer 2001, Wodak 1996, Van Dijk 1998, 1985, 1993, Fairclough 1995, etc.). Some of the linguistic categories are of great importance for this project as well, but the concentration of these theories exclusively on linguistic characteristics is of little help for the macro-level analysis that I intend to undertake in this paper. Therefore, further theories that deal more with the macro-level discourses are discussed with a special focus on how they can be used for the analysis of the discourse of interaction between the actors of terrorist drama.

While most of the theories base their ideas on similar background theories (e.g. Gramsci on hegemony, Foucault on relations between power and discourse, the Frankfurt school, Derrida's deconstruction, etc.), they do develop different methodological frameworks and are concerned with somewhat different questions of investigation. Howarth distinguishes five trends within the political discourse analysis:

1) Positivists and empiricists. Frame analysis of the social movement research falls into this category.

2) Realists (Harré Madden 1975, Harré 1979, Harré, 1994, Parker 1992, etc.) that emphasize the material sources of discourse and try to look at the way that the discourses "reproduce and transform the material world" (Parker 1992, p.1).

3) Marxists (Althusser 1969, 1971, Pêcheux 1982, Žižek 1994) that view discourses as ideologies which help justify and make natural the unjust allocation of goods and power.

4) The aforementioned Critical discourse analysis school (Fairclough, Wodak, Van Dijk) sees the "mutually constituting relationship between discourses and the social systems in which they function" (Howarth 2000, p.4) and sees the role of the discourse analysis in examination of its dialectics.

5) Post-structuralists (Foucault, Derrida, Laclau, Mouffe). For them, "discourses constitute symbolic systems and social orders and the task of discourse analysis is to examine their historical and political construction and functioning" (Howarth 2000, p.5).

This distinction can be useful in order to classify the different theories of discourse analysis in politics, but it can hardly be exhaustive. Furthermore, the boundaries between the different schools cannot be drawn as sharply as Howarth suggests. For example, some of the researchers associated with the Critical Discourse Analysis school are also using certain suggestions of post-structuralist ones (see Jäger 2001). Howarth's own adherence to the post-structuralist theories seems to be shaping his view of the other schools of the discourse analysis.

In the social movements literature the frame terminology is often used interchangeably with the discourse terminology (see Donati 1992 as an example for that). According to Johnston (2002), this is a problem and the research design should always distinguish clearly between these concepts. However, while it does matter what kind of definition is given to the two concepts, Johnston's distinction is based on a specific understanding of discourse as a sum of "material" artifacts developed by an organization.[16] These "artifacts" are important sources for the investigation, but can hardly be taken to define the discourse as such. The definition that Donati is giving of a discourse as a "'language event' … the act through which ideative and symbolic constructs are actualized and made real in the human world" (Donati 1992, p.138) is clearer in denoting the meaning of the term.[17] In such an understanding, however, it is hard not to see a link between the two concepts, i.e. the concept of frames and that of discourses. The main differences in approaches that Johnston sees in the discourse and frame analyses are in the questions that the research asks (i.e. that frame studies "mostly describe collective action frames and their role in movement development" and the discourse analysis looks at "cultural processes and their effect on what gets talked about", Johnston 2002, p.72) and, methodologically, in that the discourse analysis looks closely at the texts and the framing one offers less reference to actual texts (Johnston 2002, p.72).

It seems that this distinction is made on a certain a-priori understanding of the two trends of the analysis. While it is true that a great part of discourse analysis approaches is

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[16] Johnston is taking Sewell's definition of discourse and sees it as "the sum total of 'manifestos, records of debates at meetings, actions of political demonstrators, newspaper articles, slogans, speeches, posters, satirical prints, statutes of associations, pamphlets and so on'" (Johnston 2002, p.67).

[17] It could be said that here a distinction between *sum* and *system* is what makes all the difference. In Johnston's definition discourse is seen as a sum of texts, that is, it does not suggest the links between those texts that make them into a coherent whole. In Donati's understanding, what matters is to see what the common features of all these texts are, i.e. what makes a discourse into a coherent whole, a *system*.

focusing on a small set of texts that are analyzed in depth, as we have seen, there are also different approaches, which take discourse to denote a larger system of practices that require a wider view, and the analysis of which, consequently, is not as concerned with singular texts as with the larger structures of meaning prevalent in the movement or the society at large. In that sense, the combination of the two approaches is not impossible and can often prove fruitful for the extensiveness of the analysis.

The two approaches presented here actually deal with the similar objects of investigation and often come up with similar ideas for their respective works. However, there is little contact on the theoretical level of these disciplines, and their adherents often show mutual suspicion for each other's projects. Thus, by putting the analyses of frames into the category of empiricist positivist approaches, Howarth is no longer interested in their findings, as his theory is set "against all forms of empiricism, idealism and realism" (Howarth 2000, p.132). In the same way Johnston is lamenting that most of the discourse analysis done in the literature on social movements is moving away from the causal explanations and suggests that the tendency should be reversed (Johnston 2002, p.88).

This mutual suspicion, however, does not inhibit the two trends in analysis to develop similar concepts. For example, the discourse theory as described by Howarth is very much concerned with the creation of "us" and "them" division (Howarth 2000, p.9). The same concern is expressed by the adherents of framing (see Hunt et al. 1994, p.194-196 on "boundary framing"). Attempts to hegemonize the discourse are one of the core subjects of investigation in the discourse theory. Hegemonic discourses and the attempts to resist them are also of concern for the framing analysis (see, for example, Snow Benford 1988, p.204). The discourse theory tries to show the inherent impossibility to fix

the identities in the discourse, a similar concern to show "weaknesses rather than the strength of ideologies: their ambiguities and gaps" (Donati 1992, p.139) exists in the social movement literature. Where the frame analysis argues for about "frame resonance" as a characteristic, which decides the acceptance of the interpretation by the subjects, the discourse theory also points out that the "acceptance of a discourse depends on its credibility" (Laclau 1990, p.66). In addition, they both are concerned with the relation between structure and agency, trying to find a precarious balance between the two (see Howarth 2000, pp.121-122 for the account of the discourse theory concern and Donati 1992, p.137 for social movement theorists). Finally, both the social movement theorists of frames and the discourse theorists of the Essex school look for support for their claims to the same authors – Antonio Gramsci or the Frankfurt school thinkers, or Clifford Geertz.

What then are the differences between the two? Is the gap between them so great that it cannot be bridged? The answer to the first question probably lies in the different starting points of the two approaches. The practical social movements research that begins with the dissatisfaction with the explanations of the events in the mainstream theories, relies more on the empirical data. It also starts from the more bottom-up perspective, first investigating the individual frames of mind and only then moving forward to analyze broader structures.[18] In contrast, the discourse theory is not concerned with the individual position. The whole society is its main level of investigation. The theory also starts from a more philosophical position, from the dissatisfaction with the existing accounts on the social relationships.

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[18] Consider, for example, the evolution of research of Snow and his colleagues. In their first works the concern was mainly with the individual framing, next, the importance of the "general belief system" was introduced and afterwards the notion of "master frame" appears.

The second difference, which stems from the first, is in the level of theoretization of the two approaches. Howarth is probably right in his critique of the empiricist approaches, such as the one used in the social movement literature, that the discourse analysis on which the researchers are working there is often too narrow and technical (Howarth 2000, p.5) in a sense that it does not search for the deep rooted philosophical explanations of the notions with which they operate. On the other hand, his self-critique also does hit the point – the discourse theory as developed by Laclau and Mouffe is often concerned more with the defense of their philosophical principles than with the analysis of concrete situations. Theoretical concepts are given priority so that the empirical data serve only as an illustration of some of the notions with which they operate.[19]

If these are the main differences, what does it suggest about the possibilities of bridging the chasm that separates the two different approaches to the analysis?[20] To my mind, it suggests that the conditions for that are pretty favorable. One of the examples of this could be the work of Stuart Hall, which is mentioned by Howarth as a brilliant example of discourse analysis and whose concepts find place in the works of the social movement theorists (see Howarth 2000, p.9-10 and Snow 1988, p.198). What could also be inferred from the differences that are noticeable in the two approaches is that the discourse theory is very much concerned with the integrity of its theoretical stance, trying to withstand the numerous criticisms that are directed to it. By so doing, it leaves little space for the actual empirical application of the concepts. However, it does allow for a range of

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[19] An example here could be Laclau and Mouffe's usage of the French Revolution and Chartism to illustrate their notions of logic of equivalence and difference (Laclau Mouffe 1985).

[20] Another question could be whether there is a need to do so. To my mind, however, it is pretty unfortunate that the theories that have similar concerns and can even be traced to certain similar theoretical backgrounds cannot find a ground for discussion. To date, the discussion between the different trends of the analysis has been really sparse.

methodologies that can be applied to investigate the problems that it is concerned with, making the connection between the different approaches possible. The social movements' theorizing on the frames and framing, on the other hand, is more concerned with the empirical investigations and has shown itself to be rather free to adopt the different concepts from other spheres of investigations (the aforementioned notions of Hall, can be one example, but framing itself is a concept borrowed from completely different area of scientific investigation), thus it can be compatible with certain notions in the discourse theory as well.

Identity connection

One of the connections between the two can probably be found in the matter of identity creation. Thus, for the pioneers of framing analysis Snow, Benford and others, framing is a way of understanding the identity processes of the social movements. For Howarth discourses are "systems of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and objects" (Howarth 2000, p.2). Furthermore, the idea of discursive construction of identity is also what connects these theories with the aforementioned works in anthropology and international relations, such as those of Zulaika and Douglass, Taussig and others. Campbell, as well, when examining the discourse of the foreign policy of the United States is trying to show, primarily, the creation and re-creation of the identity of the country, investigating how "foundational discourses – discourses about prior, primary, and stable identities – work to constitute the identities in whose name they operate" (Campbell 1992, p.25).

This is one of the ideas that all the discourse and frame analyses have in common – that identity is never a final product, its creation is an unceasing process. Thus, while from the

first glance it might seem that frames are static (as Lakoff's note on a fact being discarded, if it does not fit the frames, suggests), it is only a superficial observation. The identity creation is going on constantly and the shape it takes depends on a number of factors: first of all, most of the theories mentioned above agree on this point, on what can be called a *historical discourse* of a society in question, which is referred to in Snow and Benford (1988) as a "general belief system", or in Campbell as "foundational discourses". The discourse of the challengers according to all these theories would depend significantly on the initial starting point, i.e. the discourse prevalent in the society at the point of the appearance of the challengers themselves. How successful the challenger will be also depends greatly on finding the weak points of this structure and on presenting a plausible alternative to it.

The shape identity will take also depends on the interactions between various actors of that society. In that respect, frame analysis emphasizes the importance of the antagonists for the creation of movement identity and talks about the *boundary framing* as one of the essential frames that is used for the creation of the movement identity. In the same way, discourse theorists emphasize the importance of the antagonisms and creation of "us" and "them" distinctions to shape identities of the actors.

These two aspects of discourse are of fundamental importance to this project. They help to locate the principal point where we should search for the meaning of terrorism. They allow to take terrorism seriously as a cultural construct and to seek to understand the way it is being constructed through the interactions of discourses of participants, since it is in the discourses and in the way they create the identities of the protagonists that the phenomenon receives its meaning and is given a concrete content.

Discourse construction. Concepts and ideas

While many of the important ideas for this work have, obviously, appeared before, I would like to present the main concepts that will be used for further examination of the role of violence in the political discourse. Some of the theoretical notions, pertaining to the frame analysis have already been introduced. Here it is time to look at some of the concepts that are borrowed from the discourse theory.

First of all, it should be mentioned, that the aspiration of any discourse is to achieve *hegemony*. Howarth and Stavrakakis describe this process as an attempt "to construct and stabilize nodal points that form the basis of concrete social orders by articulating as many available elements – floating signifiers – as possible" (Howarth, Stavrakakis 2000, p.15) To put it in more simple terms, it is an endeavor to create an all-encompassing worldview, which would persuasively give meaning to all the events and actions taking place in the world.

Every political force attempts to achieve the situation where its discourse becomes hegemonic in a particular country (organization, movement, international system). They have, however, different ways of doing it. Laclau and Mouffe distinguish here two particular types of logic, which may be (consciously or not) used in the construction of (potentially hegemonic) discourse: the logic of equivalence and of difference. As Howarth and Stavrakakis write: "a project employing the logic of equivalence seeks to divide social space by condensing meanings around two antagonistic poles, [while] a project employing a logic of difference attempts to weaken and displace a sharp antagonistic polarity, endeavoring to relegate that division to the margins of society" (Howarth, Stavrakakis 2000, p.11). In other words, the logic of equivalence creates two

chains of discursive elements, all of which are in a sharp opposition between themselves and consequently one of the chains come to signify all the positivity and the other one – all the negativity inherent in the society. The logic of difference, on the other hand, tries to expand the political space and to integrate as many elements as possible into it. Thus, in the understanding of this theory, "the logic of equivalence is a logic of the simplification of political space, while the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and increasing complexity" (Laclau, Mouffe 1985, p.130).

Finally, the process itself, whether employing the logic of equivalence or that of difference, implies an organization of discursive elements into a coherent whole. Nodal points become of an extreme importance here. These discursive elements are described as "master signifiers" which are empty of meaning by themselves, but which, by intervening into a discursive field, full of floating signifiers, that are overflowing with meaning manage to attract them to themselves and to provide them with the "identity." (see, for example, Torfing 1999, pp.98-99) To put it in more simple terms, there are abstract words which mean different things to different people. Their meaning is, thus, floating. Then we have an "empty signifier" intervening. A signifier, which is another abstract term, but which, in fact, means nothing before it is put into a soup of the floating ones. This signifier then becomes a nodal point, which attracts the other elements in discourse and "fixes" their meaning in a sense that out of the many understandings that we might have of these terms, there is just one which is acceptable in that particular context.

In addition, no matter how much hegemony the discursive project achieves, some elements are still left outside of it. These elements represent what is called a "constitutive outside," i.e. those elements in discourse, which are completely antagonistic to the chains

of elements as represented in the discourse, but which are nevertheless necessary in order for that discourse to maintain its identity. "What I am" can only be understood by confronting "what I am not," and constitutive outside represents exactly this confrontational "other" which is necessary for the understanding of the self and at the same time is its opposite.

Even though all the discourses attempt to achieve hegemony and to provide a worldview which would allow interpretation of all the events taking place in the world, they cannot always domesticate some of the important happenings into their system. This leads to what is in discourse theory called a *dislocation* – "a destabilization of a discourse that results from the emergence of events which cannot be domesticated, symbolized or integrated within the discourse in question" (Torfing 1999, p.301). Dislocation puts a serious strain on the discourse which experiences it, leading to all kinds of attempts to domesticate it – either by changing the discourse itself to accommodate the fact or by reinterpreting the fact in such a way that it would fit the existing discourse.

Finally, it must be emphasized again that the discourse construction never takes place in absolute void. The discursive elements often exist in the discursive space and their interpretation by the political actors would resonate most with the people in general when this interpretation is closest to what is the "common sense" interpretation, according to cognitive linguistics. And that "common sense" interpretation is usually related to what is imbued into the minds of the people living in those societies as the essence of, among other things, their political system. (see, Lakoff 2002, p.4) I will call this "natural" interpretation the "historical discourse." Its development will be one of the major focuses of the coming three chapters.

Chapter II. Historical discourse. Spain: free, one and indivisible

Understanding of violence, threat and danger does not exist in a void, detached from other ideas, concepts and narratives. In order to assess the place of discourse of violence in the country and the way it is linked to the various issues eventually becoming an almost indispensable part of the general political discourse, it is necessary to look at the historical understanding of the Nation and the State as it travels from one generation to another, providing points of reference, the tropes, frames and metaphors through which to envision violence and the issues associated with it for intellectuals, politicians and the general public. The nature of discourse on the Nation and the State influences, it could be argued, both the alternative constructions (i.e. alternative is formed vis-à-vis the core historical discourse), the power of these alternative constructions (which would depend on the strength of the primary discourse and its ability to impose itself on these alternative ones) and the general vision of the challenges to the collective entity through understanding and defeating which the Nation and the State imposes, consolidates and asserts itself.

In this chapter, thus, I will analyze the troublesome creation of the Spanish national identity and the issues that haunted the public discourse in the country during this process. Three main periods will be distinguished here: the initial stage of nation-building throughout the 19th century, the culmination of confrontation between different visions of the nation and the state during the Spanish Civil War and Francoism and the period of transition, during which through the making of the Constitution certain ideas about the essence of the nation were passed on to democratic institutions. These three periods and

contributions that were made to the understanding of Spain and the Spanish will be considered in this chapter.

It is not the task of this work to analyze in depth all the aspects of the national identity creation in Spain throughout the centuries. The investigation of this chapter will thus be limited to certain important aspects of this identity that appear in relation to the contemporary discourse on violence. These concern mainly the inability of the Spanish nationalism to assert itself and become an overarching all-inclusive discourse on the nation; the idea of "two Spains" that comes to play a significant role in the country's politics throughout the 20th century; the importance of the experience of the Civil War; the idea of the "inward-looking" nationalism, personified by the particular role ascribed or self-ascribed by the military, which, since the beginning of the 20th century, has focused exclusively on defending the unity of the country against the rising peripheral nationalisms instead of protecting the country's borders from foreign invasions. These aspects will help us see how the "empty signifier" of the nation gets "filled in" with meaning, which is later on transferred from one generation to another.

Creating the Spanish identity: from Reconquista to the end of 19th century

One could see the beginnings of the modern image of Spain in the *Reconquista* and especially its interpretations of the 19th century. Ending in 1492 with the conquest of Granada, the last Muslim state in the Iberian Peninsula, and coinciding with the expulsion of the Jews from the territory of the contemporary Spain, *Reconquista* is the principal starting point of all the historical discourse on Spain.

For all the nationalist historians, *Reconquista* is seen as a central event in the creation of the "Spanish nation", or, as Philip Silver has put it "spiritual spinal cord of the Spanish

civilization" (Silver 1995, p.40), providing an image of continuity of the "Spanish nation" from the times of Visigoths to this day. This image is questioned by the revisionist historians[21], but is still shaping a large part of the Spanish nationalist discourse.

Two main elements of the *Reconquista* that influence the future centuries of the Spanish history to a great extent can be distinguished: the unity and homogeneity in Catholicism, which requires a complete eradication of all the other identities and an emphasis on the conquest as a state-building tool. In the 20th century these two ideas were explicitly used by the general Franco during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 (see, for example, Pelaz López 2002, Romero Salvadó 1999, pp.94-125, etc.).

After the *Reconquista* was completed, attention shifted from the external enemy to the internal one. With the fall of the last Caliphate and the expulsion of the Jews, the realm of Catholic monarchs still contained a great number of converts to Christianity, whose conversion was only skin-deep and thus deeply unsatisfactory to the organizers of the final take-over of the Muslim states, to their successors as well as to the authorities of the Spanish Church. The conquest thus turned from the outward to inward direction, leading to increasing persecution of the remaining *Moriscos* and Jews and giving more and more powers to the Inquisition.

The end of *Reconquista* coincided with the "discovery" of America and the beginning of the Spanish imperial expansion, which was seen as a continuation of the Spanish

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[21] For a summary of the research on the topic, see Silver 1995. According to these historians, the idea of *Reconquista*, at the core of which was the idea that the Asturian Kings were direct descendants of the Visigoth Kings of Toledo and thus had a rightful claim for the territory of the Iberian peninsula, illegally invaded by the Arabs, was invented by the chronicists of the King Alfred III. This claim has little historical ground, for actually, the territory of Asturias never belonged to the Visigoths and was fiercely (and successfully) fighting against their domination. However, such claim gave legal grounds for the King's expansionist policies. This idea of continuity from the Visigoth state to the present Spain was then adopted in the 19th century's nationalist tradition.

62

Christianizing mission. This mission both inside and outside of the country knitted together the Spanishness and Catholicism into a united whole, an image that will surge up again and again in the re-interpretations of the history of the country in the "modern" era. This was most explicitly articulated in the 1812 Cádiz Constitution, stating that "the Roman Apostolic Catholic religion, the only genuine one, *is and shall perpetually be* the religion of *all* Spaniards" (in Álvarez Junco 1996, p.90, emphasis author's). In the second half of the 19th century this idea found its place in the conservative nationalist ideology, which equated the Spanishness with Catholicism and, in the name of the latter, demanded absolute unity of the people under the patronage of the crown. In addition, as Álvarez Junco emphasizes, the portrayal of Spain that dominated throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth was that of *Mater Dolorosa*, a Catholic image of suffering mother (Álvarez Junco 2001).

At the dawn of the 19th century, Spain was one of the oldest political units in Europe that "inevitably generated one of the most firmly established collective identities of the Old Continent" (Álvarez Junco 1997, p.36). At the same time, it is important to note that until Enlightenment, the notion of "Spain" was basically inexistent. Instead there were "Spains", a conglomeration of kingdoms, each with its own juridical system, its own different social and political structures. (see, for example, Pérez Garzón 1999, p.61-63) What characterized the Spanishness at that time, thus, was far from national identity in the modern sense. It was based mainly on two types of loyalties: the loyalty to the Spanish crown and to Catholic religion. These loyalties could easily coexist with the more local level identities related to the medieval kingdoms that made part of this greater political unit (see, for example, Álvarez Junco 1997, p.36-37).

Thus, the most important marker in the construction of the modern Spanish identity, as in most of the countries in Europe, is the 19th century, the age of nationalisms. It is at that time that the politicians and intellectuals alike elaborated their most influential ideas upon the essence of the country and tried to impose one or another version of Spain.

The start, it seemed, could not have been better. A successful resistance to the invasion of Napoleonic armies (1808-1814) by popular resistance allowed for euphoric mythologization of that conflict, in which all the various aspects of the war (see, for example, Álvarez Junco 1994) were washed down to a singular interpretation of the events as the rising of people against the foreign assault. By interpreting it as a "War of Independence," the Spanish liberals gathering in the newly instituted Parliament (*Cortes de Cádiz*) made a step "to transform a resistance to an invasion into the [moment of] constitution of the nation" (Juliá 2004, p.29).

Consequently, this war became one of the main elements of the Spanish nationalist discourse throughout the entire 19th century. Its interpretation gave bases for the idea of the Spanish identity that remained unaltered throughout ages. Thus, the resistance of Zaragoza and Gerona to Napoleonic troops was nothing else than a "re-enactment of the heroic spirit of Numantia and Saguntum, the Celt-Iberian towns which confronted Carthagenian and Roman might" that represented a true *volksgeist* of the Spanish as it was "the 'People' who saved the fatherland, when the elites had abandoned it." (Álvarez Junco 1996, p.93) Such a concept of the nation, as a "historical body with an essentialist base" making "natural and immutable" the essence of the state, eventually gained predominance over the more civic concept of the same polity (Pérez Garzón 1999, p. 59). Throughout the 19th century, the liberal historiography traced the development of this

nation from Visigoths to the Catholic Monarchs and into their own times, maintaining even in the hardest times (such as the rule of "foreign" dynasty of Austrian Habsburgs) its freedom loving, independent spirit that showed itself so clearly in the *War of Independence*.

The liberal vision of the nation, thus, included the continuity throughout centuries; and a specific core – a product of "unique history, culture and geographic profile, from which derived a set of moral prescriptions for individual and collective life" (Álvarez Junco 1996, p.97). The existence of this nation, in consequence, had to "legitimize the construction of a nation-state" (Álvarez Junco 1996, p.97). According to Gerald Brenan, this idea that the "sovereignty emanated from the people" and "excitement about liberty" coming with it was the only novelty that the liberals brought to Spain (Brenan 1993, p.43). But even this idea combined with the insistence on the existence of the "Spanish soul" had far reaching consequences in its further elaborations. For the existence of a "one and unique" nation supposed a certain type of state and political structure. This unique spirit of a nation was hardly compatible with the existence of numerous kingdoms, juridical, political and cultural systems that characterized Spain before the 19th century. Whence the thrust towards centralization and unification of customs and laws, and an attempt to create a strong centralized state of a French revolutionary model.

However, such a promising beginning did not result in a successful national project. In fact, as it became clear by the end of the century, the Spanish liberal state "failed to invent tradition." (Shubert 1990, p.203) A lot of factors contributed to this, but primarily the fact that:

> Since 1814 Spain has participated in none of the major European conflicts. The country faced no external threats, no international enemies, and only a few, brief,

colonial wars, whose result, it should be noted, could only rarely be mentioned as source of pride. Spain, therefore, did not experience anything similar to Franco-Prussian war, or to the two World Wars in the twentieth century. Massive numbers of people were never called to arms and instilled with patriotic fervor.[22] (Álvarez Junco 1996, p.98)

Furthermore, in the course of the 19th century the country experienced two significant civil wars, the so-called Carlist wars (1833-1840 and 1872-1876). While there were no threats to the borders of Spain, which were established centuries ago (Álvarez Junco 1997, p.47), internally the liberal project of nation-state was continuously contested.

The primary resistance to the liberal narrative on the nation came from conservative, Catholic circles. During the first half of the century the conservative opposition to the liberal idea of a nation was expressed more in the traditional terms, inherent in the "pre-modern" loyalties, thus, while a slogan "God, Patria, King" worked as the main mobilizing force for the Carlists, "Patria" here was understood more as an aggregate of "God" and "King," as another expression of the old traditional loyalties to religion, the dynasty and local privileges (Álvarez Junco 1997, p.45). This situation changed by the middle of the century, when the conservatives started to elaborate their own idea of the Spanish nation. This conservative alternative reached its zenith in the work of Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo whose *History of the heterodox Spanish* (*Historia de los heterodoxos españoles*) of 1882 decisively crystallized the conservative views on Spain. Accordingly, the essential constituent of the Spanishness is Catholicism. With the continuous chaos in the political sphere and the governments unable to keep order, only Catholicism could act as a unifying force for the country (Juliá 2004, p.56-57), giving legitimacy to its rulers

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[22] One could say alternatively that the unity of the country was fragile enough so that the participation in these conflicts may well have brought up the disintegration of the state itself (see Alvarez Junco 1997, p.50). In recent historiography there has also been "a profound revision of a myth of failure as a leitmotif of Spanish history and historiography" (Burdiel 1998, p.894). These reservations notwithstanding, there is a general agreement that the Spanish liberal nation-building project did not manage to transform peasants into Spaniards.

and the essence to the Nation itself. The words of Menéndez y Pelayo are given most credit in expressing this side of the Spanish identity. In one of often quoted passages he wrote:

> Spain evangelizer of half the planet: Spain the hammer of heretics, the light of Trent, the Sword of the Pope, the cradle of St. Ignatius. This is our greatness and glory: we have no other. (translation in Carr 1982, p.355)

Both the Catholic conservatives and the liberals of the 19th century were concerned with the rebirth of the People, because both saw it as "corrupted in its true self" (Juliá 2004, p.52), but the ways of recuperating this true self were differing – for liberals the revival meant getting civic liberties, for conservatives, on the other hand, the revival meant coming back to the Catholicism and traditional monarchy. (Juliá 2004, p.52) While for the former the essence of Spain would be recuperated and fortified by taking it back to Europe, for the conservatives Europeanization of Spain is not a way to recover the true self of the nation, because, contrary to the belief of these "Europeanizers" Spain did not resemble the other nations of Europe. (Juliá 2004, p.51-52) Spain possessed a different spirit and the attempts of the "innovators" to prove otherwise resulted in calamities rather than positive developments. Here another idea that will have an enormous influence throughout the next century becomes apparent: there is one "true Spain" – Catholic Spain, everything else is a foreign imposture, the *anti-Spain*.

The differences between them notwithstanding, the liberal and conservative versions of Spain were not mutually exclusive. For example, the war of Morocco was equally exciting for both camps, producing to a great extent similar rhetoric (Álvarez Junco 1997, p.48) and eventually creating a kind of synthesized version of the nation's past and, consequently, its general essence (Álvarez Junco 1996, p.102).

"The Disaster", generation of 1898 and its enemies

The 19th century ended in a "Disaster" of 1898 with a loss of the last Spanish colonies – Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines to the United States. As Álvarez Junco emphasizes, this was not a disaster in economic or political terms, as the country recuperated pretty quickly from the losses of war. But it was seen as a disaster in ideological terms: first of all, the defeat was so humiliating as to invite the general self-blame and acceptance of the universal guilt – we are all guilty because of this disaster (Juliá 2004, p.89). Secondly, the people showed complete indifference to the failure, demonstrating the superficiality of national identity (Álvarez Junco 2001, p.587). Besides, according to Sebastian Balfour, while "the loss of the Spanish America had also been obscured by the domestic conflict which raged on and off during the nineteenth century" (Balfour 1996, p.108) during 1898 events the focus was on the overseas, and the "disaster" brought to surface the hidden "disasters" of the previous years. The "post-imperial crisis of identity" was thus much harsher and more hurting, as it accumulated the reaction to the events of the whole century.

Two more effects of this event should be mentioned. First of all, it created "centrifugal tendencies in conceptions of national identity" (Balfour 1996, p.113), heightening the tensions between the Spanish state and newly emergent Basque and Catalan nationalisms. The defeat of the Spanish army in the colonial wars, as Álvarez Junco emphasizes, led many in the peripheral elites to consider "abandoning the ship so obviously threatened with sinking" (Álvarez Junco 1997, p.55). Catalan regenerationalist movement began thriving in this period calling more and more to reconsider the structure of the Spanish state. Basque nationalism, as we shall see later, also started to impose itself. Secondly, it

left the military without a sense of purpose. With the wars over and the colonial expansion thwarted, it started shifting attention to the preservation of the unity of the country, a role to which it stuck throughout most of the 20th century. (Álvarez Junco 2001, p.601). Thus, the end of the 19th century fortified the orientation of the Spanish identity creation from the outside to the inside enemies, turning the eyes from the colonies back to the peninsula. An orientation, which will keep its vigor during the entire coming century.

One of the main features of the Spanish identity until the 19th century was its "deep-rooted xenophobia, primarily anti-English and anti-French" (Álvarez Junco 1994, p.90). the Spanish identity at the time was constructed contrasting it with that of English and French of whom the former were a long time rivals in the American colonies and the latter were supplying the "administrative-political and cultural model", which actually went against a great number of traditions of the Spanish state – "clerical influence, disdain from manual labor and the institutional diversity of the old kingdoms" (Álvarez Junco 1994, p.90). However, at the end of the 19th century neither English nor French were the main referents. Spain became "an "enemy-less" state and with the exception of the brief upsurge of anti-Americanism during the wars for Cuba and the Philippines, at the end of the 19th century Spanish nationalism oriented itself towards the defense against the internal threat and began to worry more about the internal enemies, real or imaginary, than about the external ones" (Núñez Seixas 1999, p.28). The loss of the last colonies significantly reinforced this process (Núñez Seixas 1999, p.87, Álvarez Junco 2001, p.601-602).

In addition to that, the Spanish nationalist discourse lacked a common project. The researchers (see, for example, Núñez Seixas 1999, p.30) emphasize that the main orientation of the Spanish nationalism was towards the past, towards glorification of the old times of the Spanish empire, without presenting any plan for common future. At the time, nobody threatened the existence of the Spanish state, thus the accentuation of the independence (such as in the glorification of the "War of Independence" of the beginning of the century), which was already secure, could not mobilize the masses. The lack of expansionist or other projects directed to the outside led, again, to the situation in which the Spanish national discourse became "purely reactionary" uniting "all those opposed to (liberal or social) revolution and, in the twentieth century, to Catalan and Basque autonomy" (Álvarez Junco 1996, p.103).

Within the intellectual elites, the colonial failure of 1898 gave birth to the so-called generation of '98, the most prolific intellectual effort to conceptualize the "Spanish problem" – the place of Spain in the world, the characteristics of its national essence, the meaning of its decline and remedies for that. These intellectuals, diverse in their particular interests, backgrounds and political stances, were united in their "painful" love for Spain.[23] As Álvarez Junco emphasizes, the reactions to the Disaster showed that the national project was working at least on the level of intellectual elites (Álvarez Junco 1997, p.54). After the century-long work of creating a feeling of a glorious *Patria*, the loss of the last colonies was traumatic enough. As Martin Blinkhorn writes:

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[23] It is actually not that easy to determine what are the conceptual boundaries of the notion of the "generation of '98," who is supposed to be included into this group. Joaquín Costa, who started his critiques of the Spanish state and society long before 1898 or José Ortega Y Gasset, who wrote his much later are supposed to be the main embodiments of this generation, though not belonging to it in terms of the timing of their work (see Carr 1982, p.528-529 or Ferrater Mora 2003, p.18-19).

> This picture of restoration of Spain as a nation whose governing elite clung to a fantasy of national greatness, inspired by her imperial past, and largely dependent upon her continuation as a colonial power, is central to any understanding of the malaise which was produced by the 1898 Disaster. (Blinkhorn 1980, p.10)

Spain, which suffered prolonged agony and degeneration, died in 1898. The imagery of death abounds in the first works after the Disaster, Unamuno is crying for its death, Costa affirms that the only thing to be done is to bury it and Pedro Dorado invites other nations to participate in the funerals (see, Juliá 2004, p.90-92).

However, even if dead, Spain had to be resurrected and here, as they were united in the diagnosis of the situation, the intellectuals of the movement diverged significantly as to what was to be done for the "regeneration" to take place. Again, the two currents can be distinguished: the Europeanization, the best expression of which was a call to "lock the sepulcher of Cid"[24] (see, for example, Durán Franco 1994, p.74) or an even stronger demand by Maeztu that the Spaniards "embrace the bourgeois-individualist values of Anglo-Saxon world." (Blinkhorn 1980, p.14)

Another current can also be distinguished: the so-called Hispanizers believed that Spain had specific values that it could offer to the world. Contrary to the materialist Europe, Spain had a "human depth" (Álvarez Junco 1997, p.55), spiritual values which made it distinct from other nations and which, in the end, could serve as a basis for the construction of a new empire, embracing Spain and the Spanish America and based on the spiritual links of not mundane material interests, political control or economic exploitation (see Blinkhorn 1980, p.15-16). Thus Unamuno developed the idea of "eternal and subterranean Spain" that can "be found in the hearts of Spaniards

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[24] It is not clear who was the first to coin the phrase. Blinkhorn attributes the call to 'triple lock the Cid's tomb' to Costa (Blinkhorn 1980, p.14), Ferrater Mora writes that to "lock the sepulcher of Cid" comes from Unamuno (Ferrater Mora 2003, p.64).

themselves" if they directed "their exploration inward to the core of the innermost self and there discover the permanent substructure underlying all historical events. For history, past or future, was the outer covering of the soul's purely internal rhythm" (Ferrater Mora 2003, p.69). This idea received significant resonance within the cultural circles of Spain and was used later on as well to emphasize the existence of this "Spanish soul," the rhythmic beat of which can be sensed throughout the centuries and into the future.

Even though, apparently, the Spanish intellectuals had little influence over the country's political life or the political choices of its leaders, their influence on the creation of the idea of the national character can hardly be underestimated. The ideas expressed by these intellectuals later on found their way into the political life serving not only as the background ideas that shape the country at the meta-political level, but also more concretely into the laws and regulations during the times of peace and into mobilizing battle slogans during the times of war. Some of these ideas need a particular emphasis here. One of them, the already mentioned thought of Unamuno about the essence of Spain, its soul.

However, while Unamuno, Costa and others made a noteworthy echo, the most influential of all the generation of 1898 was Ortega y Gasset. Three of the ideas that he popularized were to make an important impact on the future development of the discourse on Spain and the Spanish nation: the idea of the "*two Spains*," that of *nation as a destiny* and that of the *select minority* that was supposed to lead the inert masses. The last idea, probably the least important here – was often used as a justification of two dictatorships of the Spanish 20th century – those of Primo de Rivera and of Franco (see,

for example, Carr 1982, p.567 and p.648), but it does not add much to the understanding of the Spanish national historical discourse. The other two are more important as they resonate in the historical discourse throughout the century and shape, to a great extent, the understanding of the Spanish nation, its position in the order of the world and its relation with the various internal forces, such as peripheral nationalisms.

The metaphor of two Spains in Ortega's time was not a new one. Mariano José Larra was talking about them as far back as the beginning of the 19th century. "Here lies half of Spain, killed by the other half," he was writing (Juliá 2004, p.148). Menéndez Pelayo saw them caught in a constant fight "without mercy and compassion in irreconcilable fields and go on doing so, separated by the sea of blood and abysm of ideas" (Juliá 2004, p.147) For liberal Costa there were also two Spains: one legal and dead and the other real and alive (Juliá 2004, p.148), for Catalanist Miquel dels Sants Oliver the rivalry between Madrid and Barcelona also signified this divide between two Spains: "the young one and the tired one, the alive and the official one." (Juliá 2004, p.149) But it is Ortega who brought the phrase to its prominence when he declared:

> Two Spains, gentlemen, are intertwined in an incessant fight: one dead, empty, worm-eaten Spain and another Spain, new, industrious, aspiring, that reaches out for life. (Ortega 1983, vol.10, pp.266-267)

Later on, dealing with the "Spanish problem" in his *Invertebrate Spain*, Ortega describes the Spanish nation as a "historical project" and a "community of destiny." This historical project, started by the Castile in the 15th century, was what kept together the different parts of the country. (see Núñez Seixas 1999, p.84-85) This idea, though more rational than Unamuno's contemplation of the eternal "hidden" Spain, still belongs to the same mystical sphere as the latter, still envisages the historical essence of Spain, largely personified by Castile and sees in it an important historical project. This idea gained the

most significant influence during the Franco's reign, where it took its place of prominence through the reinterpretations of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the founder of *Falange* and a great admirer of Ortega's work. It will also be revisited during the process of transition from Francoism to democracy, though, again, to a large extent not in its original form, but in its Falangist interpretation.

Regeneration of the country was not a concern solely for the intellectuals of the generation '98. There was another trend in this project too – Catholic regenerationism. While regeneration of the country for the generation of 98 was to go through a dismissal of the old corrupt political, social systems and also the prevalence of Catholicism, the Catholic regenerationists saw the only possible revival for the country through getting back to its Catholic roots. The only Spain for them was "Catholic Spain of the sixteenth century." (Carr 1982, p.531) Militant Catholicism was the uniting myth for the adherents of this approach and the essence of the Spanishness was to be found in "principles of hierarchy and authority, centralism, crusading Catholicism, and intolerance towards divisiveness in thought or society." (Blinkhorn 1980, p.17)

While the secular intellectual elites were unable to impose their version of the Spanishness, this other version of the nation that raised its head as early as the middle of the 19th century managed to consolidate itself significantly. That this identity not only could survive but gain prominence in shaping the understanding of the nation is due to the fact that "this old collective religious identity was reformulated into a national identity to a great extent based on religion." (Radcliff 1997, p.310) This could happen for a number of reasons. First of all, contrary to France, Germany or England, the Catholic identity in Spain was not "diluted by the impact of Reformation and the religious wars"

(Radcliff 1997, p.310), there was no revolution, leaving religious identity basically intact throughout the centuries.

Thus, when the Conservatives started to contemplate the essence of the nation and to try to construct an alternative to the liberal vision of the state and the nation, they had this ready material waiting for them to be used. That could probably explain why it was exactly this vision of the country that gained the upper hand at the end of the 19th century, (Álvarez Junco 1996, p.100-101), why it had a stronger appeal, and why one of the reactions of the liberal elites after the 1898 crisis was a strong anticlericalism - "the years 1899-1909 would witness the most important anti-clerical wave in modern Spanish history" (Álvarez Junco 1996, p.105). The same would happen later during the times of the Second Republic, according to Pamela Radcliff, the anticlerical wave was so strong in this period, because "[a]s long as the Catholic symbolic universe dominated life of the Community, the Republic could never create an alternative "cultural frame" in which to legitimize its own authority" (Radcliff 1997, p.320).

George Lakoff discusses the "conceptual unconscious" elements in political discourses, arguing that the system of concepts used in everyday life is largely unconscious "not in the Freudian sense of being repressed, but unconscious simply in that we are not aware of it," making up for what is usually called the "common sense." (Lakoff 2002, p.4) Thus, politics is "about myth and metaphor and emotional identification" and hence requires the understanding of underlying values and a design of an appropriate language to talk about those values, which is something that Liberals tend to fail doing. They concern themselves too much with the "policy and interest group and issue-by-issue debate" that does not allow them to look deeper into the nature of politics. (Lakoff 2002, p.19)

The same could be argued about the Liberal and Conservative nation-building projects in Spain. The strength of this vision of the nation was largely due to its being embedded in the pre-existing culture of Catholicism and the monarchical allegiance that could be more easily translated to a new form of identification with the nation-state than the Liberal top-down approach or the later Republican "rational" identification with the Spanish nation-state.

From the First World War to Franco

The event of crucial importance for Europe in the beginning of the 20th century was, of course, the First World War. Spain remained neutral during this conflict and reaped the full harvest of its neutrality by exporting to both sides, developing its economy and experiencing unprecedented growth. However, this neutrality bore also a different fruit. As Francisco Romero Salvadó writes: "Ironically, a war in which Spain did not intervene was to alter decisively its contemporary history" (Romero Salvadó 1996, p.123).

The neutrality of the country during the war brought high tensions. Intellectuals saw Spanish participation in the war as a perfect opportunity to advance a nation building process, giving a certain impetus for its development "from below" (Álvarez Junco 2001, p.588). For the ruling elites, on the other hand, it was "a dangerous adventure with probably wrong friends." (Romero Salvadó 1996, p.126) In addition, it did not provide an opportunity for the army to participate in the external missions. Thus, the unity of *Patria* became the slogan of this inward looking nationalism, the salvation of *Patria* was invoked each time there was some turbulence in the country (the labor unrest or regionalist issues) and the safeguarding of Spain came to be regarded as the number one task of the army. (see, for example, Álvarez Junco 1997, p.58)

This mission of the army, the protection of Spain's internal cohesion, was invoked in the so-called *pronunciamiento* (military uprising) of Primo de Rivera in 1923 that started a seven-years long dictatorship. According to Romero Salvadó, this uprising meant a break with the past for now "[t]he army did not represent a particular political group but claimed to be above politics and just defending the sacred values of the nation" (Romero Salvadó 1996, p.130) However, this could be seen as the culminating moment of the twenty-years long reconsideration of the mission of the military, not so much as a break, but the point of arrival.

The dictatorship was greeted in the beginning with a certain relief by the intellectual elites as it promised true regeneration of the country and extinguishing those old corrupt forms of government that characterized the Restoration Spain. (Juliá 2004, p.175) The dictatorship itself was fashioned according to the ideas of some of the regenerationists. As was mentioned before, Ortega's select minority found a significant resonance with the supporters of the regime and Costa's call for the "iron surgeon" had no less appeal. (see, for example, Carr 1982, p.567)

An attempt to overcome the various tensions that characterized the Spanish society at the time, especially the peripheral nationalisms that were establishing themselves as significant political forces both in Catalonia and in the Basque Country (Galician nationalism was much weaker) resulted in the increasing emphasis on the unity of Spain and consequential policies: prohibition of the use of languages other than Castilian Spanish and a ban on the symbols of peripheral nationalities (Núñez Seixas 1999, p.93). These initiatives, however, had an opposite effect of strengthening significantly the

emergent peripheral nationalisms that got more cohesive in order to survive the pressure from the state.

The policies of Primo de Rivera were often so confused that soon even those who welcomed the arrival of the "iron surgeon" turned their backs on the dictator. Not only intellectual elites (only Maeztu supported the dictatorship till the end), but also the army and the old political elites started showing contempt for the dictatorship and its fall in the 1930 was more than welcome. (see Carr 1982, pp.581-591)

The Republic established in 1931, however, was short-lived. The problems it faced were enormous, the country was so fragmented and centrifugal tendencies on the ideological Left-Right and the national Center-Periphery axes were so great that keeping the country together not talking about implementing any serious projects was immensely difficult. Eventually, the end of the Republic came with the Civil War of 1936-1939, which still remains one of the primary markers of the Spanish historical memory.

The conflict had numerous dimensions. Anthony Beevor analyzes it through three dimensions: "right against left, centralist against regionalist, and authoritarian against libertarian." (Beevor 1982, p.7) Álvarez Junco puts it into four dimensions: international (both in terms of support and in terms of ideological affiliations), social conflict, the conflict between the city and the country and between the centralizing forces and peripheral nationalisms. (Álvarez Junco 1997, p.59-60)

Yet, as it happened with the War of Independence, this complex reality of the Civil War was simplified into binary oppositions. In a sense, it could be said that the struggle was between the "two Spains", two different ways of seeing the country. As Pamela Radcliff writes, the metaphor of two Spains in the Civil War:

> … should not be understood as a social reality, but as an organizing principle: that is, as an interpretative lens through which the contemporaries understood society in the thirties. (Radcliff 1997, p.309)

To put it differently, the Civil War was actually "the last of the clashes … between two idealizations of the nation that came from the 19th century, the progressive-liberal and national-Catholic" (Álvarez Junco 1997, p.62).

In a sense, both sides of the Civil War had the same cultural heritage on which to build their claims: for both the struggle was to save Spain, both invoked the same authoritative figures, the same historical episodes, like *Reconquista* and the War of Independence. (see Álvarez Junco 1997, p.61) But as some of the ingredients of the discourse were the same on both sides, it is the different understanding of the nation and a combination of this understanding with other ideas that produced different mélanges. The self-denominations of the two parts of the struggle are telling enough: the two sides were calling themselves the Republicans and the Nationalists.

On the side loyal to the Republic, there was a coalition that included a variety of forces ranging from Anarchists, Communists, Socialists to Republicans, Liberals and representatives of peripheral Nationalisms. Both the particular ideological stances of the forces of this coalition, such as Anarchists and Communists that were hostile to anything "national" and were more attached to progressive rationalism and cosmopolitanism (Álvarez Junco 1997, p.63), and the mere fact that they were so diverse made the loyalty to a particular idea of the nation hardly possible. Hence, what united them – and the name (the Republicans) that they chose clearly indicates that – was loyalty to a particular form of the state.

However, just like the 19th century liberals did not manage to produce a working national project for the country, so the Republicans both during the whole existence of the

Republic and after the start of the Civil War failed to produce a viable imagery and attractive ideology to draw people to its idea of the nation and the state. As Helen Graham writes:

> They failed to understand the need actively to take on the political and cultural task of 'making the nation', as a dynamic project *vis-à-vis* future. In consequence, they *only talked about the nation to each other* – that is inside the Cortes [the Spanish Parliament] – and even then it was a rather ossified discourse: '1492 and all that' (Graham 1996, p.136, emphasis author's)

This, of course, does not in any way imply that this lack of tradition was a reason why the Republicans lost the Civil War. Truly, the international climate and many other factors contributed to the doom of the Republic. Romero Salvadó calls its history "Chronicle of a Death Foretold." (Romero Salvadó 1999, p.112) However, it could also be said that this weakness of a project of "the nation" contributed to the difficulties of the Republic. The Republicans, on the one hand, relied on "the people" (*el pueblo*) as their main reference point and, on the other hand, "had no means of handling the transformation of an objectified, passive 'pueblo' into an historical subject in its own right." (Graham 1997, p.142)

This was not the case on the other side of the struggle. As Álvarez Junco writes, "the Francoists definitely knew better how to use the consequences of an intense social ethnicization of the previous thirty years." (1997, p.65-66) Their ideas were based on the most conservative regenerationist vision of the Spanish nation and state, sought to rebuild "the country's essentially Catholic self" by destroying the "cancer" of Leftism and bringing back to the glorious Spanish nation the Basque and Catalan defectors (Smith, Mar Molinero 1996, p.20). The discourse of Nationalists was full of such organicist metaphors. Like Primo de Rivera, the insurgents perceived a need of the "iron surgeon," so that general Millán Astray, the founder of Foreign Legion, claimed:

> On this day of the Spanish race one half of all Spaniards are criminals guilty of revolution and high treason. … Fascism, which is Spain's health-giver, will know how to exterminate both, cutting into the live healthy flesh like a resolute surgeon free from false sentimentality" (quoted in Beevor 1982, p.83)

In the same way general Sanjurjo declared that "only an operation can save Spain." (quoted in Beevor 1982, p.83) In this respect, Campbell writes, "central to the logic of socio-medical discourse is thus not the biological nature of disease, but a sense that disease is always from somewhere else." (Campbell 1992, p.98)

This was best exemplified by the idea of Spain and anti-Spain. The idea, as was mentioned before, comes from the 19th century conservative-Catholic idealization of the Spanish nation. However, during the Civil War "this rhetorical figure is converted into a tale of origins and promise of salvation" (Juliá 2004, p.289) and is narrated as a metaphysical and religious tragedy, "as an inexorable fate of a clash to death of two eternal and exclusive principles." (Juliá 2004, p.288) Furthermore, the rhetoric of "two Spains" so much elaborated by the Spanish intellectuals throughout the two centuries, got transformed here into the idea that there is actually only one Spain that is true, Catholic and civilized and that the other one is not only false Spain, but not Spain at all, "a negation, mixed up with atheism and barbarity" (Juliá 2004, p.290) that can have no other end but extermination. Even after the end of the Civil War, the rhetoric of Spain and anti-Spain remained powerful, and Spain – as Francisco Franco became dictator – remained divided into victors and the vanquished. (see, for example, Carr 1982, p.696, Preston 1990, p.33)

Another important element of the Francoist discourse were the thoughts of Ortega filtered through the speeches and writings of José Antonio (see, for example Carr 1982, p. 648 and Juliá 2004, p.334) For them, Spain was not so much of a state, but "the unity of

destiny in the universe", in which the "Castilian spirit was what best represented the Spanish soul, and the empire was the best synthesis of race and spirit of the crusade, which always pervaded the national history" (Pelaz López 2002, p.82). What the Civil War was about was thus the same as hundreds years ago during the reign of the Catholic Monarchs: the *Reconquista*, the natural expansion of Castilian spirit to all the corners of the Iberian Peninsula.

Thus, through Franco and his long lasting rule, the conservative version imposed itself as the only version of the Spanish nation. This version was anchored also in the laws that the dictatorship created. They postulated Spain as a "unity of destiny in the universe", "constructed by the past, present and future generations" written down in the *Law of the Principles of National Movement* (passed in 1958) and postulated the indivisible "unity between the men and lands of Spain" in the *Organic Law of the State* of 1966 (Suanzes-Carpegna 2004). In everyday politics, the Civil War divisions were kept alive by continuous insistence on the differences between Spain and anti-Spain by limiting the rights of the Republican supporters and, perhaps even more clearly, by a fervent and constant repression of the peripheral nationalisms who threatened one of the fundamental principles of the "true" Spain, namely, its unity based on Castilian language and culture. As general Eliseo Álvarez Arenas put it, "from Pyrenees to the dividing line of Gibraltar, Spain will be Spain and Spain only" (quoted in Richards 1996, p.159)

In summary of the discussion so far some points should be emphasized: first, during the nearly two centuries of the national construction in the country, the idea of national "we" came to be organized in contrast not to other nations outside the state, but to the newly emergent peripheral nationalisms. As neither the Spanish nor the peripheral nationalisms

were strong enough to impose themselves as the main discourse of the community, much emphasis was put on consolidating the discourse vis-à-vis the "enemy" creating two strong and distinctive equivalential chains. This consolidation, on the Spanish side, resulted in the creation of a cohesive understanding of the nation as based on the Castilian values, morality, culture and language personifying the essential difference of Spanish from the other nations. The nation, an empty signifier *par excellence*, became full of very precise meanings.

Transition to democracy and drafting of the Constitution

When Francisco Franco died in 1975 and Juan Carlos de Borbón was crowned the new King of Spain, a difficult process of transition from dictatorship to democracy began. Though in the beginning the opposition to the regime saw the crowning of Juan Carlos as the last attempt of the dictatorship to perpetuate itself, the King soon proved himself to be committed to change.

The most significant step in the transition was an adoption of the Law of Political Reform, passed in the *Cortes* in November and adopted by referendum in December 1976. This law paved way to what is often called "the spirit of consensus," (see, for example, Desfor Edles 1998, p.41-62) an agreement among the major political actors that the transition should take place peacefully and the new regime should be based on compromise. The three most significant ideas on which the transition was to be grounded include: the national reconciliation, *convivencia*, and a notion of the "new beginning." (Desfor Edles 1998, p.41-43) All of these ideas received their best expression in the naming of the whole process of transition as a "*Pacto con Olvido*" ("pact of forgetfulness", the translation from Romero Salvadó 1999, p.166). This phrasing means

that the transition was seen as "a historical present without a historical memory." (Sánchez Prieto 2001, p.156) As was mentioned before, Franco's state was based on a constant reminder of the Civil War and on the division of the society into winners and losers. With the prospect of change this scheme was to be reversed, the democratic forces opted for a seemingly complete break with the past, the memory of the Civil War, though constantly alive, was to be put behind and the new future to be based on national reconciliation. The "recollections of Spanish history profoundly affected interpretations of contemporary political reality," (Gunther et al. 1988, p.118) and the fears of the possibility of a new armed conflict in case the military and the extreme right were not appeased led to the consideration that an attempt to bring to the front the grievances of the losing side might result in a renewal of the conflict.

On the other hand, forgetting the events of the Civil War and the dictatorship created afterwards meant also that the winners keep their position and the losers theirs. A lack of appreciation for the struggle against Francoism is one of the problems that Spain still experiences (see Lacasta-Zabalza, 1998). Currently this movement for recuperation of memory is pretty strong and is expressed in, for example, attempts to discover the sites of mass graves of the victims of the Civil War and the dictatorship.[25]

Thus, since its very beginning, through Francoism and well into the transition to democracy itself, the Civil War has become more than a historical event, but a metaphor and the one of the main organizing experiences of political life. According to Blinkhorn,

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[25] These attempts to recover the past, however, are a source of a lot of controversy. Some fear that resurging of the wounds of the Civil War will prompt a new division in society. Their opponents respond that this is a way of restoring historical justice, because the dead among Franco's supporters received homage (*Valle de los Caidos* monument is probably the best example here) while the Republicans lay forgotten.

the Civil War "left such deep scars upon every aspect of the Spanish life as to make it all but impossible to discern any others." (Blinkhorn 1980, p.22) Juliá also writes:

> … this war with the extreme confrontation that divided the society in two and made impossible to encounter a neutral third or an arbiter, projected its appalling light on the previous period, transforming the image that generations of intellectuals invented from the beginning of the century to interpret their own time as a struggle between two Spains into the metahistorical key (Juliá 2004, p.288)

The brutality of the war and the strength of confrontation as well as the fact that the Civil War was kept alive throughout all the period of Francoism made it into a lens through which to look at both the past and the present. All the past became a presentiment of the War and all the future was to be organized with the fear that it will repeat itself. This was especially visible during the transition, hence, the adoption of the stance like the "pact of forgetfulness." Eventually, the "pact of forgetfulness" did not mean that the Civil War would be completely forgotten, but that its memory would be relegated to the fringes of the political discourse.

The optimistic view of transition, therefore, saw the process as coming over the division of the Civil War. But the memory of the Civil War, like the name of Herostratus, could not be eradicated that easily. The fact that it is evoked each time there is a tension in the Spanish politics tells that it still keeps functioning as one of the organizing principles of the Spanish political discourse and its importance can hardly be underestimated.

There are two ways of seeing the usage of the Civil War metaphor in the political discourse: first of all, the Civil War represents an extreme tension in the political field and also serves as a moral imperative for the alliances between the political forces. The examples of both ways of seeing it are numerous, to give here just a few: in November 2004, Iñigo Urkullu, the president of the Human Rights Commission of the Basque Parliament talked about the situation in the country as being similar to that of 1936 (*El*

País 23 November 2003); during one of the scandals that took place in autonomous region of Madrid in 2003, "a deputy of Partido Popular threw to the face of Socialist adversary the assassinations of the Madrid rearguard and a president of Autonomous Community reminded the "No Pasarán" of the Popular Front." (Tusell 2004, p.357) This way past violence is brought to being in the present to indicate the heightened tensions in the political environment.

Another approach to the Civil War is seeing it as an indicator of the possible coalitions or alliances and, even more so, of the *moral obligation* that the political forces have to take part in these coalitions. Thus, for example, Arnaldo Otegi, the leader of Batasuna, remarked on one occasion:

> One cannot share the path to the resolution of a democratic conflict, Mr. Zapatero, making a strategy together with the heirs of those who executed your grandfather. We, the ones who lost the war, are the ones who should construct the alternative politics for Euskal Herria. (*El País*, 30 May 2005)

The family background of the Prime Minister and the position of the PSOE during the Civil War in general here create a certain obligation for them to take part in the peace process. By expressing this, Otegi reproduces a clear dichotomy between the sides of the Civil War, putting the Right-wing PP to the side of Insurgents, and the PSOE, together with the Basque Nationalists, on the side of the Republic. This dichotomy, obviously, is not morally neutral at all. With reminding Zapatero that his grandfather died fighting on the same side as the Basque Nationalists, Otegi indicates that it is the duty of the Prime Minister to make a righteous choice in his partners. This demand is even stronger because it is not uttered as an appeal from one ally to another, but as an appeal from one victim to another.

What can also be seen from the statement of Otegi is that one of the main parties of the country – the PP – came to be associated with the winners of the Civil War and the future Francoist dictatorship, as the reference to "the heirs of those who executed your grandfather" indicates. During the rule of the PP (1996-2004) the Civil War often was brought out as a still alive political issue. Against the warnings of historians that the past cannot be seen as just black and white (see Juliá 2002, Jackson 2002) the reality in the political field was, as usual, simplified, the fuzzy divisions between the two sides and the motives of the people who took those sides were made clear-cut.

According to Juliá, after the PP came to power, it tried to go back to the liberal-conservative tradition of the period before the two dictatorships, while the Socialists "insisted on the existence of a certain umbilical cord that connected the Popular Party with the Francoism." (Juliá 2002) Therefore, both from the side of the Socialists themselves and especially from the heirs of the Communist party, the IU (*Izquierda Unida* – United Left) there often came demands that the government condemn the military uprising of 1936 and express the "moral recognition" (*El País* 20 November 2002) for the victims of the War and the dictatorship. The reluctance of Popular Party to both condemn the dictatorial regime and to pay homage to its victims (there were four attempts to demand that before 2002) (*El País* 20 February 2002) was seen as direct evidence of such a link. In November 2002, the party surprised everyone by accepting to condemn the coup d'état, to honor the victims of the regime and to reopen the communal graves of the supporters of the Republic. (*El País*, 21 November 2002) This gesture was conceived as a final point of the discussions about the issue, as a way of "leaving "the two Spains" out of political confrontation." (*El País*, 21 November 2002) However, this

has proven not to be the case. The initiative to pay tribute to the victims of Franco again brought up bitter polemics the following year after the law was approved. The then-ruling PP coined the initiative as a "revival of naphthalene," an attempt to go back to the past and to "dig out the remnants of hate". (El Pais 26 November 2003)

On the other side, there is a mistrust of the motives of the PP and its "spiritual" connections with Franco. Lacasta-Zabalza talks, for example, that there still exists an "invisibilized Spain of the losers." (Lacasta-Zabalza 1998, p.317) According to the author, "if it does not reject Francoism, Spanish nationalism cannot share anything or to compete with the anti-Francoism, declared with all justice by the peripheral nationalisms." (Lacasta-Zabalza 1998, p.347) Vincenç Navarro concurs with this judgment, arguing that because of the nature of the transition, which included an idea to forget all the grievances of the past years of the dictatorship, Spanish democracy is not complete and will only become such when "the official culture is anti-Francoist." (quoted in Valenzuela 2002)

Therefore, it could be argued that the Civil War imagery was never really overcome, no matter how much it was attempted to push it aside during the transition period.[26] In that sense, the break with the past has never been entirely completed. The other parties still view with suspicion the relation of the PP with the Francoist legacy. Therefore, the examples of its dubious policies are brought up to support the accusation that the party is still the "heir of Franco." The denial to provide monetary support for reopening of the mass graves of the supporters of the Republic (*El País*, 7 November 2002) or the

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[26] See Desfor Edles 1998 on the symbolization of the Civil War as a "profane" in contrast with "sacred" *convivencia*, i.e. peaceful coexistence

generous public funding provided to the private foundation of Francisco Franco,[27] during its years in office are all taken to be indicators that the party does not want to distance itself from the dictatorial legacy. Recently more polemic of this type has resulted with the action of the Socialist government to remove the statue of Franco from the square in Madrid. The PP reacted heatedly to this decision. Its leader, Mariano Rajoy asserted that by removing the statue the PSOE wants to "revive the past," therefore the current government is "irresponsible and breaks the spirit of transition," such acts "divide the Spaniards" and are a "product of ignorance." (*El País*, 17 March 2005; *El País*, 19 March 2005)

In summary, though the Civil War memory was pushed aside during the Transition process, it was resuscitated later on to keep living as one of the main metaphors and organizing principles of the Spanish political life. Getting back to the transition process, we should pay attention to the main document that was created during this period and which, in addition to providing the framework for the legal functioning of the democratic system, also creates a sense of a communal identity – the Constitution.

Drafting of the Constitution was a long and complicated process. It involved four stages: the drafting of the text by a parliamentary subcommittee (*ponencia*), deliberations over the project in the Committee of Constitutional Affairs, the discussions of the text in both Houses of the Parliament and finally, the referendum. It is not the task of this work to go into detail of this process, but it is important to make some points about its course and also about one of the essential articles of the Constitution, Article 2, which expresses the idea of the Spanish nation the best and is one of the main reference points in the debates

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[27] See, for example, *El País* 24 September 2003. According to Jackson: "Francisco Franco foundation whose admitted goal is to legitimate the uprising of July 18 [1936] and keep in the private possession documents that should be relocated to the public archives accessible to all the historians" (Jackson 2002).

over the relationship between the peripheral nationalists and the principal parties of the country.

There are several important aspects characterizing the process of drafting the Constitution that should be mentioned here. First of all, as most of the transition process, it was managed by an attempt to create a wide consensus on the issues discussed. However, the form that it took was not that of the deliberations of the questions in the parliamentary committee or subcommittee, but through the informal meetings of the major political forces, especially the center coalition the UCD and the PSOE. (Gilmour 1985, p.194)

Such a situation resulted in a rather easy settling of some very serious issues that haunted the Spanish politics from the times of the Second Republic, for instance, the articles on religion, and also made it possible for the later parliamentary debates over the text of the Constitution to go smoothly and without much passion. However, this situation also had some side effects: first of all, some of the important groups were excluded from the whole process and, consequently, left them largely dissatisfied with the results. The Basque PNV could probably be considered as the major "outsider" in this sense. The Basque representatives were excluded from the subcommittee that was supposed to draft the text of the Constitution;[28] they were significantly "marginalized" in the work of the parliamentary committee (Desfor Edles 1998, p.104), which it finally left after it became apparent that it was the secret meetings of the UCD and the PSOE that decided on major issues of the constitutional text (Heywood 1995, p.45). Eventually, the PNV presented more than 100 amendments to the text, from which all but two were rejected.

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[28] The subcommittee was composed of 7 members from which three belonged to the UCD, one to the PSOE, one to the PCE (Communist party), one to the AP (Popular Alliance, which later transformed into PP) and one to MC (Catalan Minority)

This exclusion of the Basque minority created a "democratic deficit, which will come out to light more than on one occasion during the parliamentary debates." (Bastida 1998, p.23) At the time of voting for the Constitution in the Parliament, the PNV decided to abstain and suggested the same for its voters in the referendum.

Arduous negotiations notwithstanding, certain aspects of the Constitution remained pretty controversial. Numerous researches have noted that the constitutional text in general "appears to be actually contradictory rather than just open to varying interpretations." (Heywood 1995, p.51) But probably the most controversial is Article 2 of the Constitution that expresses the national character of the Spanish state. This article reads:

> The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish [N]ation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions, which make it up and the solidarity among all of them.[29]

In his inspired book on this article, Xacobe Bastida analyzes in minute details the way the discussions over this article took place and the positions that different parties and their representatives adopted regarding the notions that were presented in this piece of legislation. He distinguishes between two blocks that had different interpretations of what the concept of the "Spanish nation" entails.[30] To the first one, the Francoist Right, the most important notion was that of the unity and indivisibility of the Spanish nation, while for the other parliamentary groups the grounding of the Constitution had to be based on the three elements of the same level of significance: "unity of Spain, solidarity between

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[29] Translation taken from http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sp00000_.html
Original text: "La Constitución se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas ellas." This translation misses the capital letter for the "Nation," which is given a lot of importance in certain researches as an attempt to strengthen the meaning of this term in comparison with that of the nationalities (see, e.g. Prieto de Pedro 1993, pp.175-176)
[30] There was another – more centrist position, which attempted to mediate between the two extremes, represented by the governing party at the time – the UCD.

91

its peoples and the right to autonomy for the nationalities and regions" (Bastida 1998, p.33).

During the negotiations each of the groups tried to impose the terms of the article in a way that would best reflect their respective understandings of the Spanish state and nation. Thus, for the Right, the introduction of the term "indivisibility of the Spanish nation" was of crucial importance and it was opposing strongly to mentioning of "nationalities" in the text. The Left and the Nationalists favored the term "Spain" over that of the "Spanish nation" and saw as indispensable the introduction of "nationalities." Again, like in many other cases during the negotiations over the Constitution, the text itself took form not during the discussions in the subcommittee, but somewhere in the cabinets of *la Moncloa* (palace of the President of the Government).[31] (Bastida 1998, p.45) And, while at the first glance it appears that everyone received what they wanted – the notions most important for each group were introduced – this is only a superficial assessment. As mentioning of "nationalities" was the *sine qua non* for the Left as well as, obviously, for the peripheral nationalists, the notion was put into Article 2 of the Constitution, but its meaning was undermined by the entry of the term "Spanish Nation" (Bastida 1998, p.42) instead "Spain" (Bastida 1998, p.46). As a result, according to Bastida:

> Unity of Spain has now the indivisibility as a feature of character; the Spanish nation – the insolubility. Cautions that AP proposed for captivating the concept of nationality, foreseeing its inevitable inclusion into the text of the Constitution are included with accuracy; this way the essential reinforcement of the unity of the

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[31] Bastida even argues that it is the "military pen" that formulated the article (Bastida 1998, p.52). The fact itself that the article came out in its complete form from the extra-parliamentary sources and was not seriously discussed afterwards is often forgotten by the other researchers (see, Bastida 1998, p.52-53 for an interesting commentary on some of such accounts). Heywood also maintains that "The challenge facing *ponencia*, therefore, was to create a state structure which moved away from the unitary conception of the Franco state, but which did not provoke the ire of the army" (Heywood 1995, p.49), from which the Article 2 results.

nation – which is common, indivisible and indissoluble fatherland, - devised as a shield against any interpretation which would put it in doubt, appears at this point with a rampant brightness. (Bastida 1998, p.47, translation mine)

The Francoist Right was still unhappy about the introduction of the term "nationalities", remarking, rightly, that the "nation" and "nationalities" were contradictory elements and that, as Manuel Fraga emphasized on one occasion: "To accept the concept of "nationalities" is, without a doubt, a time bomb for the national unity and strength of the State." (quoted in Edles Desfor 1998, p.120) From a different point of view, for Andrés de Blas Guerrero, whose admiration for the concept of the "Spanish nation" is explicit in his pages, Franco's dictatorship should be blamed first of all for the distortion of the liberal idea of the Spanish nation and the reinvigoration of resistance of the peripheral nationalisms, which, consequently, tried to "impose their points of view" and, being some of the main protagonists of the fight against the regime, managed to do so with putting the term "nationalities" into the Constitution (Blas Guerrero 2003-2004, p.770).

However, as Bastida notes, while formally the Nationalists and the Communists triumphed, essentially Article 2 was the victory of the Conservatives. (Bastida 1998, p.53) This was observed not only by the researchers looking retrospectively at the process of drafting of the Constitution, but also by the participants themselves. For example, one of the senators from the Basque EE[32] (*Euskadiko Ezkerra*) argued that the article sounds like the worst of Francoist rhetoric, "because, let's not deceive ourselves, here there is no common fatherland, neither is common fatherland dogmatically indivisible…" (quoted in Bastida 1998, p.59).

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[32] The EE had its roots in one of the factions of ETA – ETA politico-militar and at the time of the creation of the Constitution served as a political wing of this organization. See the Chapter IV for more details on this.

It could be argued then that the current structure of the state is based on somewhat schizophrenic ideas of the existence of the one and indivisible Spanish nation and within that nation the existence of various "nationalities", which are not perceived as fully national entities but cultural conglomerations sharing some common attributes. Thus, Basques, Catalans or Galicians are not really recognized as national entities. "Nationalities", then, have only historico-cultural differences between themselves, can never be constituted as "nations" and, according to some, do not even have their own "national" identity.[33] According to Enrique Álvarez Conde, the idea of "nationalities" in the Constitution can be interpreted in three different ways:

1) The interpretation that sees the nationalities as a concept, "not substantially different from that of the nation", which leads to an interpretation of Spain as a "nation of nations" and should take a form of a federal state.

2) Here the term "nationality" is treated the same as the term "region" and thus "does not represent a different sociopolitical reality" from that of the "region".

3) Theory of the cultural nations. Here the term "nationality" is seen as a middle way between the nations and regions, thus, a nationality is "a region qualified for the special cultural, linguistic and historical characteristics or an undervalued nation which does not yet have the conscience of being one and which lacks the possibility to become a State" (Álvarez Conde 2000, p.376-377).

As it can be seen, the second explanation is significantly different from the rest. It goes in a Francoist direction assuming that there are no different national identities within the

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[33] See, for example, Matías Múgica. "Cortar por lo sano" in El Pais, 25 March 2004, "The great majority of Basque population, including the nationalists, is today still basically Spanish and this is its real identity even if it is not expressed".

country than Spanish, the term "nationalities" as it appears in the Constitution is, for this interpretation, just a certain nuisance, which can be forgotten most of the time.

The other two explanations are different in their outcomes – the first one presupposes the idea of a federal state, while the third assumes that the current Spanish territorial system of Autonomous Communities best expresses the essence of the Spanish nation and state – but similar in their premises. Thus, according to Bastida, as there were such contradictions in putting into one article both the unity and indivisibility of the Spanish nation and the term "nationalities", which somehow also presupposes a national entity, the idea of "Nation of the nations" arose. This was also a contradictory idea but based on the distinction elaborated by Friedrich Meinecke that divides the nations into cultural and political. In this theory, the latter possesses the state and thus also sovereignty and in the former "the sovereignty is inexistent." (Bastida 1998, p.75) The nation in this understanding presupposes the state, and the nationalities here "are in an eternal vegetative *nasciturus* state that remains like a fetus, conceived but never born." (Bastida 1998, p.77)

Hence, even where the interpretation of Spain as the "nation of nations" takes the upper hand, the bottom line of this reasoning remains the same: the "nationalities" are distinct from "nations" as such, because they lack sovereignty and this lack cannot be filled in. Thus, for example, in recent debates on the change of territorial statutes, especially those of Catalonia and the Basque Country, one of the ideas is to introduce the notion of the Catalan or the Basque "nation". This expression, as the editorial of *El País* writes "is not … a synonym of a State, but an acceptance of reality. … the term fits in neatly into the

constitutional concept of Spain as nation of nations. … Only for the sovereignist and centralist schemes the nation is equal to the State." (Editorial *El País*, 13 June 2005)

Further problems are visible if we look at the understanding of the Spanish nation as such, the way it is provided in Article 2 of the Constitution. How is the distinction made between the nations, which can have the quality of sovereignty, and the others, which cannot? This distinction – and the majority of the "Fathers of the Constitution" subscribed to this theory – rests, basically, in the relation with the state. Thus, the nations that have states are political, because, "the idea of the state is previous to that of the nation" (Bastida 1998, p.75) and have sovereignty, while those who do not have the state, do not have sovereignty and thus are just cultural entities.

This conception would presuppose a more civic (*a la français*) concept of the nation, with the nation having a quality of "political" that is largely synonymous with the state. However, this is not what we see in the Spanish constitutional discourse. First of all, because the term the "Spanish nation" as opposed to "Spain" has a strong meaning. It is not an "empty signifier." The concept of the "Spanish nation" has a pretty precise content – "interpretation of 'Nation' is not in doubt" (Brassloff 1989, p.31) and the historical relation between this notion and the ideals of the Franco dictatorship are to a great extent self-evident. In Article 2 of the Constitution the "Spanish nation" also has a quality of "indivisible unity."[34] The resonance of such a quality with these ideals can hardly escape the eye and subsequently evoke all the other qualifications of the nation that the Francoist establishment reinforced, such as the importance of a Castilian spirit and, maybe, to an

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[34] "The initial synecdoche, with which we were presented – "The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation" – is neither innocent, nor a fruit of the effort of plastic perfectionism. Through this figure the Constitution is based on the nation through its one quality: the "indissoluble unity"" (Bastida 1998, p.59)

even greater extent, suppression of the peripheral nationalist demands. Thus, for example, Álvaro Xosé López Mira reminds that two thirds of the 20th century Spain was living under dictatorships, which forcefully tried to create a uniform Spanish nation, based on one language, one culture and one political apparatus (López Mira 2003/2004 p.740).

In addition, while the "Spanish state" can be conceived as a multinational entity, the "Spanish nation" is not, first of all, because it is not conceived in civic, but in ethnic terms. The distinction between these two types of the nations – ethnic and civic – should not be equalized with the mentioned before distinctions between the cultural and political nations, for the sovereignty argument here is replaced by the investigation of the origins. Both political and ethnic nations in this sense have the vocation of sovereignty and are related to the idea of the state, the difference between them being that in the political nations, the state comes before the nation and creates it from scratch and in the latter, it is the nation, which creates the state. Historically, thus, it would seem that Spain belongs exactly to the first category, for the nationalization project, albeit not very successful was undertaken here by the state, which had existed for centuries before the Spanish national identity was conceived. However, according to the way it was understood in the process of the Constitution making, *the nation* was seen as founding the state:

> … in the Constitution of 1978 … it is the Spanish nation which precedes its own constitutional norm, which is seen as a product of the will of the former: "The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation…" (Bastida 1998, p.154)

Furthermore, as one of the most influential theoreticians of constitutional law, Manuel García Pelayo remarked: "only the affirmation of the Spanish Nation as an entity underlying and transcending various generations and regional specifics can bestow

legitimacy to the totality, unity and indivisibility of the Spanish State"[35] (quoted in Bastida 1998, p.65)

It is not the state, thus, that has a quality of indivisibility, but the nation, and this understanding goes completely against the ideas that, for example, Basque nationalists (both the PNV and EE) were upholding during the drafting of the Constitution. The difference is fundamental – and this is one of the reasons why the Basque deputies felt so alienated from the constitutional process – their understanding of the Spanish state was based on different conceptual backgrounds, where instead of "unity and indivisibility" of the nation we find the pact-like nature of the contacts between the Basques and the Spanish Monarchy and instead of one Spanish nation there is an idea of a certain social contract between various territorial units of the country (following the medieval tradition of the Spanish Monarchy) and the state itself. (see, for example, Letamendia 1994, vol.2, p.81) Obviously, the Basque attempts to introduce such an understanding into the actual Constitution have failed miserably. The specter of a possible demand of independence (or self-determination) was too great to permit such an accord to be the basis for the constitutional project. Thus, the introduction of the term "nationalities," in the same way as recent attempts to change the wording of statutes by entering the Catalan and the Basque "nations" are conceived as "an acknowledgement of reality" and not a fundamental principle of the Spanish state.

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[35] This idea was upheld not only by the Francoist Right, but basically by all the political forces. The Socialists as well saw the "Spanish nation," not the state as a fundamental concept (Smith, Mar Molinero 1996, p.26)

Conclusions

In this chapter I have outlined the basic characteristics of the Spanish discourse on nation and the state as they were developed throughout the 19th and 20th centuries and finally embedded in the Constitution of the country in 1978. These basic characteristics provide a starting point of any discussion on the relation of violence to the overall political discourse in the country.

What could be seen from this part is that the intellectual creation of Spain and the Spanish nation was a problematic process. Throughout the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century there was no single vision of the Spanish state that would be able to impose itself as the one and only possible interpretation. Instead, there were two different alternatives – the Liberal idea, based on the French model and the Jacobin centralization and the Conservative-Catholic vision of the state as a diversity of regions united by the common allegiance to religion and Monarchy. The largely equal strength of these opposing ideations of the State and the Nation gave rise to the vision of "two Spains," confronting one another in an unceasing struggle. This vision proved to be extremely significant and is often evoked in the contemporary politics. This metaphor provides a good characterization of the creation of the Spanish nation throughout the two centuries.

Using the terms of Laclau and Mouffe, it could be argued that the Spanish hegemonization project throughout the last two centuries worked in line with logic of equivalence. Like in a paradigmatic case of logic of equivalence we see here constructed two chains of elements that work as constitutive outsides to one another. What belongs to the one chain is seen as completely antithetical to the elements of the other. As Torfing writes, in such a situation "our political actions will tend to be guided by the illusion that

the annihilation of the antagonistic force will permit us to become the fully constituted 'we' that we have always sought to be." (Torfing 1999, p.129)

While it is true that the same logic is applied in almost all nationalist discourses, which juxtapose the "us" against certain "them" and by so doing achieve the cohesion of the national identity, what is different in case of Spain is that the "them" are found not without, but within the country's borders. Since the end of the 19th century the Spanish national project has come to be focused on the alternative visions of the nation in the peripheries of the country and to see them as "the Other" of the Spanish nation, which replaced the English and the French "others" that were points of reference before.

This was especially visible during the Spanish Civil War and particularly on the so-called "Nationalist" side. The logic of equivalence works in such a way that it "constructs a chain of equivalential identities among different elements that are seen as expressing certain sameness." At the time of the Civil War such a chain was constructed putting on the one side the true Spain, with its Catholic roots and Monarchical affiliations, but also with its "Castilian soul" and the "unity of destiny in the universe" against everyone that stood to contradict this identity – the "alien" ideologies of Communism and Socialism, but also peripheral nationalisms, demanding their rights to the autonomy and undermining this vision of a unitary and indivisible nation. The threats to the nation in the years that followed will be considered through the same lens.

It has thus been noted that both the logic of equivalence and the elaboration of the idea of the nation as such was more successful on the Conservative side. Liberal and later Republican understanding of the nation was significantly diminished. Therefore, the idea of the Spanish nation, as based on religion and monarchy, but also on the Castilian

language and "Castilian" morality, unified and territorially indivisible managed to establish itself as the main vision of the nature of the Nation and the State. It could be said that the Conservative vision of the state and the nation gained more qualities of the "common sense" understanding than the Liberal rational model. Therefore, when the Conservative politicians currently invoke the "common sense" understanding of Spain, they are invoking exactly this conceptual framework, the concept of the nation as it is already embedded in the cultural heritage. And in the speeches of these politicians, grouped in the PP, the appellations to "common sense" are often heard. Thus, for example, arguing against the re-definition of Catalonia as a "nation" in the project of the new statute of autonomy Mariano Rajoy, the leader of PP, claimed that such a definition "goes against the Constitution, against what the majority of the Spaniards, the voters of the PP but also of the PSOE think, and against the logic and common sense." (*El País*, 22 June 2005)

The fact that Spain has not participated in any of the major military conflicts of Europe throughout this crucial period of the nation-state construction and, instead, experienced a number of civil wars, finally culminating in the bloodiest Civil War of 1936-1939, is interpreted as a major impediment on the build-up and consolidation of the national identity. These conditions resulted in a situation where the creation of the nation was undertaken not by contrasting it to the outside forces but by juxtaposing it to the internal enemies. The loss of the empire that brought to an end the outward mission of Spain also contributed to this process. As a result, the logic of equivalence is reinforced even more strongly.

As a consequence of the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939, the logic of equivalence was imposed as the state policy. As he became dictator, Francisco Franco did not allow the division between the "two Spains" to disappear from the political sphere, and the hegemonization of the political space took place by virtual elimination of the alternative by force. The brutality and the intenseness of the war, followed by the 40 years of dictatorship resulted in a situation where the Civil War became both a metaphor used to describe an extreme tension in the society and especially in the political field and one of the principal organizing experiences of the Spanish political life. The attempts to overcome this experience during the transition and the policy of national reconciliation have been successful only up to a certain extent, the Civil War still functions as both a metaphor for the social tensions and the reminder of the political allegiances.

The period of transition, though, can still be seen as the decisive moment for the understanding of the meaning of the State and the Nation as it is used in the contemporary political discourse. During the transition the principal moment was the creation of the Constitution and especially the phrasing of Article 2 of the Constitution that were analyzed at length in this chapter. In this Article, the essence of the Spanish nation comes to be embedded in the Spanish legal system. As the Constitution is a document that shapes the political life, that "forge[s] political order by expressing a shared national identity" (Desfor Edles 1998, p.102), the fixation of a certain vision of the nation in it provides both an understanding of the image of the nation in the political field and a reference point for further discussions on the national issues. Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution, schizophrenic at the first sight, both denying and permitting the existence of diverse national elements in the country, allowing three different

102

interpretations of the relations of the State and the nationalities that compose it, in a deeper analysis appears to be still the product of a more conservative vision of the Spanish nation. The nation is still conceived in pretty much ethnic terms in contrast to the more civic understanding, and the wording of the Article itself implies the existence of the eternal Spanish nation with its characteristics of unity and indivisibility, on which the Constitution itself is grounded. In this understanding the peripheral nationalities do not have any important place and the acceptance of their factual existence does not change the essential conceptual framework in which these nationalities are understood more as a "problem" than the constitutive elements of the State.

Such is the context in which the discourse of violence takes place and in relation to which it develops. In the next chapter we will see how the elements of historical discourse are used to accommodate violence in the post-transition period.

Chapter III. After transition. Using historical discourse to deal with violence

The last chapter dealt exclusively with the formation of the Spanish nationalist discourse and its accommodation of the violent past, mainly in the form of civil wars, and provided a structure within which the post-transition democratic re-deliberation, re-definition and re-shaping would take place. After transition, the main discursive elements are already present and ready to use. Everyone has their understanding of the nation – its boundaries, its enemies, its essence and its outside. All the political actors at the moment of transition adhere to some ideas about the nation and the state. Some are prepared to modify them according to the new realities. However, they can only alter the discourse on the nation in the ways that would resonate with the general public, which is influenced by the experience of the Civil War, dictatorship, transition, and permeated by the political ideas of intellectuals of two centuries. Also, importantly, the political actors have to provide a different interpretation of violence in the new context of democracy and change to accommodate in the discourse the image of the violent contenders of the previous regime. ETA (we will see its development in the coming chapter) has been present on the Spanish political scene since 1968, but has gained a special prominence in the period of transition. Thus, we need to assess how the democratic political actors use the elements in the historical discourse of the country to find a position for ETA in the map of political discourse of Spain. Different actors use different ways to accommodate this violence and the differences in their discourses can be illuminating in trying to understand the role that (terrorist) violence might play in the political discourse of the country.

Violence in transition: between terrorism and golpismo

During the discussion of the process of transition to democracy an important element that conditioned the form it took has been left aside, namely, violence. Violence has been present in transition in a number of ways – first of all, a constant threat of a violent overthrow of the nascent regime from the side of hostile elements in the Spanish army; secondly, the attacks of ETA, which increased its pressure on the establishment exactly in this period; and finally, in a form of overreaction of the police and other law-enforcement agencies to the various events in the country, such as demonstrations or worker strikes.

The approval of the military to the transition rested on three limits set to the reform: the Franco's Constitution was to be reformed, not completely abolished; the centralization of the state was to remain intact and the regions granted only a limited autonomy. Finally, the reform should extend only to the Socialist Left. (Share 1986, p.169) All of these initial reservations were eventually to be bypassed by the political leaders of the country. The old Constitution was replaced by a new one; the regions were granted pretty extensive autonomous powers (and that is especially true about Catalonia and the Basque Country) and not only the Socialists, but also the Communist party was legalized. According to Preston, breaking the word that he has given to the army about the keeping of the ban on the Communist party "earned Suárez a bitter hatred which was to dog him until his departure from the political scene in 1981." (Preston 1993, p.98)

However, considering the events and reactions to those events in the period, it becomes clear that it was the territorial question and ETA violence that had the greatest impact on the so-called *golpismo* (the military plotting to overthrow the newly established system). ETA was an organization with a Communist flavor and represented separatism, i.e. a

direct threat to the unity of Spain, which in itself was the main object of protection of the Spanish army. In addition, ETA at this period attacked almost exclusively the military establishment and personnel.

Thus, *golpismo* and the attacks of ETA worked in this period in a mutually enforcing manner creating a pressure for the newly established democracy. The Spanish law-and-order forces used the same methods as during dictatorship to deal with ETA suspect,[36] "proving" to the organization and its supporters that nothing has changed in the regime. For the Spanish military, ETA was the best example that things have gone wrong with the transition. Many commentators linked explicitly the military unrest and the "Basque conflict". (see, for example, an editorial *El País* on 1 March, 1981)

Therefore, the discontent of the military manifested itself through attempts to bring about the demise of the new regime by a military coup. The most serious of them was the seizure of the Parliament during the investiture of the new Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo on 23 February 1981, the so-called *Tejerazo*, named after one of the main organizers of the affair Antonio Tejero. Only a determined intervention of the King himself put a stop to an affair that was threatening to bring the country back to the brink of the Civil War.

Among the numerous outcomes of the attempted coup (which actually served to consolidate the new system bringing forth the mass support for democracy as demonstrated in the massive manifestations throughout the country after the coup was put down), the following have an importance here: first of all, the coup led to the

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[36] Examples of this are numerous, one of the most famous cases is that of Joseba Iñaki Arregi, an ETA member arrested in February 1981, who died as a consequence of the police torture. This episode, coming at the moment when Suárez resigned and a new Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo was negotiating support in the Congress for his minority government, "ruined hopes for a smooth transfer of power." The Prime Minister reached agreements with the CiU and other small parties for support and was about to do the same with the PNV, but at that moment Arregi's death put the PNV in a position where it could not agree on any support for the government (Preston 1993, p.194)

disbandment of ETA(pm)[37], which decided to renounce violence and concentrate on the political activities of its party *Euskadiko Eskerra*.[38] Secondly, there appeared a strong trend towards the redefinition of the role of the army with the government pushing strongly for the entry of Spain to NATO that was supposed to give a new mission for its military and to help it overcome the desire to interfere with domestic politics. (Preston 1993, p.205, Letamendia 1994, vol.2, p.410) Thirdly, there was an initiative to give the army a greater prominence in the antiterrorist struggle (which, according to Letamendia, was "more flamboyant than efficient" Letamendia 1994, vol.2, p.410). Finally, the coup brought up several legislative initiatives, such as the Law of the Defense of the Constitution (*Ley de la Defensa de la Constitución*, of 21 April 1981) that provided for the changes in the Penal Code of the country in the matters of the *golpismo,* but also terrorism, making the sentences for public support of terrorism or rebellion more severe and explicitly stating that a declaration of independence by any part of the territory would be considered an act of rebellion. (*El País*, 22 April 1981)

A second piece of legislation of considerable importance adopted as a consequence of the coup was the infamous Devolution Standardization Act (LOAPA – *Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico*) created in an agreement between the two principal parties in the Parliament: the UCD and the PSOE. The law was designed to slow down the process of transfer of powers to the regional governments and, first of all, to limit the demands of the so-called historical regions, especially Catalonia and the

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[37] ETA politico-militar. About divisions in the organization see the Chapter IV.
[38] This decision was possible also because of the reinsertion strategy for the prisoners who renounced violence that the government pursued at that point. However, this decision needed an ideological foundation, which was provided by the Tejero's attempted coup.

Basque Country.[39] The law took away some of the powers that were granted to the regions by the Constitution and ruled that the state laws be always prevalent over the regional law, including the Statutes of Autonomy, which was a direct contradiction to the established hierarchy of laws: the Statutes being pacted laws and approved in a referendum only had an inferior status to the Constitution itself. The peripheral nationalists appealed against this law to the Constitutional Tribunal, which ruled that 14 of its articles, i.e. more than one third, were unconstitutional. (Brassloff 1989, p.34, Heywood 1995, p.145)

While the first set of measures relating to the position of the military and its role in the anti-terrorist struggle had little impact and received little attention, it was LOAPA that brought forth most serious discussions and had the most significant political impact. LOAPA stood as an example that the coup was interpreted not so much as a result of the military's general dislike of the established political system (the participants of the coup themselves claimed to be "against the system," one of the assailants asserted to a journalist that "This is not against you, nor against anyone, it's against the system", see *El País*, 24 February 1981), but as a reaction to the process of devolution. Obviously, this process indicated a deviation from the accepted pattern of centralism and in a sense threatened the unity that was so precious to the armed forces. LOAPA, however, meant

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[39] The Constitution provided for the asymmetric federalist structure of the country, establishing two ways of granting autonomy: the fast track of Article 151 reserved it for the regions that had their autonomy statutes passed in the II Republic, i.e. Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, later Andalusia was added to this group and the so-called slow track through Article 143 through which the devolution to other created autonomies could take place. Navarre was an exception, its Statute (*Ley Organica de Reintegracion y Amejoramiento del Régimen Foral de Navarra* - Organic Law of Reintegration and Improvement of Navarre's Foral status) allowed it to join the "fast track" autonomies even though Navarre did not have a Statute before the Civil War. The so-called historical regions of the fast track have different competences from those of the slow track, it was considered that with time these competences would be equalized, but this usually incites a displeasure of the historical communities which think that such an equalization will drown their specificity.

that "as if the military, far from suffering the consequences of the coup's defeat, were enjoying the successful achievement of some of its ends." (Preston 1993, p.205)

The participants of the coup, their lawyers as well as supporters in the army made clear what reasons had caused their involvement in such an attempt, stating all the historical background for their intent – fervent love for Spain and patriotism, the tradition of military intervention into politics and the primacy of the Patria. (See Prieto 1982a, 1982b, 1982c) As one of the lawyers expressed himself:

> There were a lot of Constitutions in Spain, but some of them remained just books, just the printed words. There is something more important than books, and that is Patria. If someone said that before democracy there is only barbarity, I would say that before Patria there is nothing. (quoted in Prieto 1982a)

Thus, the coup was supposed to be following the two-centuries-old tradition of military intervention, where the officers are given a task to intervene if they see things going wrong in the country. In addition to that, the current Constitution was also invoked with its Article 8 stating that the task of the army was to secure unity and indivisibility of the country.[40]

During the trial Tejero and his associates stated that the coup had four tasks: to reform the Constitution, to freeze Marxism, to finish with terrorism and to stop the process of autonomies. (*El País*, 18 March 1982) While the first two tasks were not achieved, the coup had some influence on the way the anti-terrorist struggle was perceived and even greater on the development of the autonomous structures, as LOAPA has shown. Furthermore, while manifestations in favor of the Constitution throughout Spain (including Catalonia, as one of the most significant of the demonstrations, amounting an

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[40] Later, a number of officers referred to this article as to one of the justifications of the frustrated coup and as the trigger for the *golpistas*. They signed a letter that received a title of *Manifest of the Hundred*, in which they expressed support to the tried officers and their displeasure with the way the press treated the events. See, Manifest of the Hundred 1981.

estimated half a million participants took place in Barcelona) were massive, this was not the case in the Basque Country. As a consequence, Letamendia writes:

> The political parties and the opinion makers of the State begin to present the Basque nationalism as a whole not only as an instigator of an enormous risk that all the Spaniards ran, but also as having only lukewarm feelings towards the constitutional democracy. (Letamendia 1994, vol.2, p.408)

Thus *golpismo* became clearly linked to the "Basque problem." The subsequent measures undertaken in order to limit its impact are the clear examples of such an attitude. The Law on Defense of the Constitution, and especially LOAPA, can be seen in this respect as one of the best examples of how the violent pressures are linked with the "territorial problems". As a consequence of the coup (which had pretty mild repercussions for the officers involved), the ideological connection to ETA, an insistence on the quicker and more significant devolution process and the "lukewarm feelings" towards the Constitution, made the Basque political actors at large the Others, intrinsically linked with violence.

The PSOE government: protect the State, protect democracy

It is often considered that the Spanish democracy was consolidated and the transition over with the Socialist Party's entrance to government.[41] However, as it was shown before, this democracy was of a pretty precarious nature, balancing between the two extremisms – terrorism, on the one hand,[42] and *golpismo,* on the other. In addition, the

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[41] "There is a broad scholarly consensus that Spanish democracy was consolidated no later than the peaceful transfer of power to the socialist opposition after the October 1982 general elections" (Linz, Stepan 1996, p.108), even though the authors add that it could be seen as consolidated already after the trial of Tejerazo conspirators and their imprisonment (ibid.).

[42] It was not only challenged by the two ETAs, also strong was the presence of GRAPO – *Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre*, the First October Antifascist Resistance Groups, an organization that also sprang forth from the resistance to the Francoist regime. Officially Leftist, on some accounts with ties to the French *Action Directe* and the Italian *Brigate Rosse* (see Holmes, Burke 1995), it also had some strange relation with the Spanish security structures and the extreme Right. As Preston

Spanish economy was living difficult times and the initial euphoria about the change of regime was already wearing off. Thus, the incoming government, which received an unprecedented amount of support and crushed all the other alternatives,[43] came into a problematic heritage.

The PSOE, though, had all the cards in its hands to start handling these issues – the achieved absolute majority in the Parliament allowed it to deal with the problems adopting sometimes drastic measures. An attempt was made to appease the military by raising the salaries and increasing the military budget and to make sure that *golpismo* is driven out of the main considerations of the military. This was done through reduction of the military command staff, reshuffling of the staff members, reforming the Law on Defense, so that it stated clearly the supremacy of the Government over the military, providing that the Minister of Defense and the President of the Government had the direct control over the army (the Law entered in vigor on 7 January 1984).

The issue that proved very problematic for the Socialist government at the time was that of the membership in NATO. The PSOE came to power promising to leave the organization, which the country entered in May 1982. The NATO membership, contrary to the majority of other issues of transition, was not negotiated between the major parties and was basically an initiative of Suarez government. In addition, such membership broke with another long-standing Spanish tradition – neutrality.

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claims, the group's actions gave more advantage to the extreme Right than to the Leftist cause (see Preston 1996, p.207). The author maintains that GRAPO could have well been organized by the dissatisfied security forces that sought to destabilize the situation even more. Whether that was the case or not might never be known; however, GRAPO was a serious challenger over ETA's monopoly of the anti-state political violence in Spain, especially during the period of transition though it never influenced the political situation to the extent that ETA did.

[43] The PSOE received 40.82% of the votes and 177, or 50.57% of the seats, a result repeated only in the year 2000 by the opponent PP, receiving 45.24% and 182 or 53.29% of the seats respectively. Data from: http://www.congreso.es/

Having become Prime Minister, however, Felipe González reconsidered his position on NATO, among other things, believing that participation in the organization may create a new raison d'être for the Spanish military. The issue divided the Socialists themselves, as most of the party stuck to the idea of withdrawal. However, González put all his charisma in persuading both his party members and the citizens of the necessity of staying within the NATO. One of the arguments in favor of the organization was exactly that the permanence in the organization would limit the desire of the army to interfere in politics and would "defend the democratic stability" of the country. (Yáñez Barnuevo 1986) Eventually, a referendum on the issue was held on 12 March 1986. The supporters of continuing in the organization won and Spain remained in NATO.

All these changes of policies and initiatives were also influenced by the continuous presence of the "Basque problem" and the terrorism question kept looming large in the political panorama. In this respect the idea of Francisco Letamendia who thought that with the PSOE a move was made from "military" to "police nationalism" (Letamendia 1994, p.19) is useful. Such a move is the result of the work of two forces: first of all, an attempt at "denationalization" of Spanish armed forces, i.e., an attempt to take away from the army the idea of the guardian of the Spanish unity that caused so many problems in the past. This is achieved through the entry into NATO, which changes the purpose of the Spanish military by both subjecting it to the higher command in the organization and by giving it a different *raison d'être*. Second, the image of the internal enemy (primarily ETA) persists and is as strong as before, demanding more engagement from the other security services: police, *Guardia civil*, etc.

What we see in this situation is the "affective identification of the Socialist government with the security services" (Letamendia 1994, p.84) and the birth of "functional antiterrorism." (Letamendia 1994, p.21) This is the result not so much of the concern over the ideological unity of the Spanish nation and the need to preserve it, but of the identification with the Spanish state in its existing form leading to the creation of the discourse around the strength of the state, which also means an attempt to topple by all the existing means its enemy par excellence – ETA terrorism.

The essence of this "police nationalism" was probably best visible in the counterterrorism laws created in the period, such as the Law against the Armed Bands and Terrorist Elements (*Ley contra Bandas Armadas y Elementos Terroristas*) and the Plan ZEN (*Zona Especial Norte* – Special Northern Zone). Both documents were designed tackle ETA terrorism by legal and police means, and both were criticized on numerous counts: the law seemingly invited for torture by its provision to keep detainees *incommunicado* for ten days (*El País*, 3 February 1985); possibility to investigate the homes of suspected terrorists, to listen to their telephone conversations, etc. were declared unconstitutional by some of the opposing groups; and the law itself was termed a "legal monster" by some legal experts and politicians while according to others it represented a "masked state of emergency." (*El País*, 22 April 1985)

The plan ZEN was no less controversial. The idea of the plan was to advance counterterrorism struggle and to isolate ETA in the Basque lands. This document of 150 pages was received with great admiration from the conservative opposition and with great suspicion from the Basque political actors and numerous others. (*El País*, 20 May 1983) The plan was seen as insulting ("as if we had no proper name" one of the Basque

politicians was writing in Uriarte 1983); showed the "lack of political sensitivity" (Editorial *El País*, 21 July 1983) Also, most of the observers noted that the plan included "many police measures and very few political ones," (Marco Vizcaya, a parliamentarian of the PNV, in *El País*, 20 May 1983) and emphasized that the Basque Country already counted with the highest number of policepersons in the world and thus emphasizing that it is probably not because of the lack of the police that terrorism still thrived. (Uriarte 1983) As Fernando Savater wrote:

> The plan ZEN seems to be most worrying and not because one would be afraid that it would really finish off terrorism … but because of the fear that it will finish off everything except for terrorism, destroying first of all the possibilities of political dialogue in Euskadi, that rest primarily on the initiation of demilitarization of the Basque problem. (Savater 1983)

At the same time, in 1983, the GAL (*Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación*) appears on the scene.[44] This group that functioned until 1987 was dedicated to physical elimination of the ETA members. In this period the organization killed 27 people, some of whom (9 is the estimate) had no connection to ETA. The functioning of the GAL was called at the time the "dirty war" in reference to the same type (though definitely more widespread) practices in Argentina. Such a campaign of physical elimination of the enemy attempted by a democratic state left a serious stain on the democratic credentials of the governing socialists. The declarations of the party leaders with regard to the GAL affair, e.g. that the rule of law has to be defended "in the courts, and in the salons, but also in the sewers" (Woodworth 2001, p.217) became infamous. Admittedly, the GAL left its trace up to today. It was extensively used both in the election campaigns of 1993 and of 1996; it surged up from time to time in the speeches of politicians even afterwards. As Aznar, the

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[44] For the best account of functioning of the GAL, evidence gathering about the organization and the trials of the participants see Woodworth 2001. The Intelligence service CESID document deliberating pros and contras for engaging in dirty war actions can be found in González 1995.

former Prime Minister from the PP, once argued after his party's fall from power: "we have clean hands; we did not use quicklime to cover any assassination." (quoted in Pradera 2004) in reference to one of the crimes of the GAL.

With time, factual material that the security services were behind the GAL and that in fact it was organized from very high up in government ranks was accumulating and high figures both in the security services and in the government were apprehended for organizing GAL. The "GAL scandal" was dragging for nearly 15 years, but eventually most of those responsible for organizing the dirty war received punishment. However, the dirty war proved to be a perfect propaganda tool for ETA, it fell neatly into its strategic framework of the "spiral of action-repression-action" and as such it brought to the organization numerous new recruits. As the experts of ETA terrorism, Reinares and Jiménez, write: "Indeed, state-sponsored terrorism used to counter insurgent terrorism can be considered a major factor explaining why ETA has persisted beyond the democratic transition." (Reinares, Jiménez 2000, p.137)

Negotiations with ETA could also be seen as one of the elements of the "functional" or pragmatic antiterrorism. During the period of González government there were numerous attempts to negotiate with ETA, the longest negotiations taking place over two and a half years almost nonstop (between November 1986 and April 1989). They were called "conversations of Algiers" (*conversaciones de Argel*) otherwise also referred to as "political conversations." The name itself is very important here: during any negotiation the terrorist organization wants to reach some political concessions for the stop of violence, while the state wants to deal only with the technical aspects of dissolution of the organization without making any political commitments or allowing the terrorist

organization to be seen as a political actor (see, for example, Sanchez Cuenca 2001, p.110). The name chosen for the "negotiations" in Algiers, the "political conversations" leaves both sides with what they need: the content of the talk appears to be political, with what ETA is satisfied but being only conversations and requiring no serious outcome, they satisfy the State as well. (Sanchez Cuenca 2001, p.113)

Thus, in approaching the issue of negotiations the PSOE government was acting in accordance with its understanding of its position as the protectors of the state. Through these negotiations it attempted to limit the attacks of ETA and try to win time needed to topple the organization completely. Political aspects of these negotiations are actually left aside and they serve only a technical, functional purpose.

The antiterrorism laws, the plan ZEN, negotiations, also the GAL affair, tells about the PSOE position on the issue of violence and the state. The PSOE, thus, presents the most traditionally pragmatic view on terrorism in the Spanish politics. Like in other countries of Europe faced with the same challenge, it developed the views on terrorism as a law-and-order issue, which, being such, does not warrant deep connections with the political life. ETA terrorism appears here as a question to be solved, not as an ideology to combat, as a question that has to be left out of the political discussions as much as possible. This results in a particular construction of the discourse on violence where the state and the democratic politics becomes one nodal point, while (political) violence becomes its antithesis. Another result of such a view is also the aforementioned "lack of sensitivity." We will see with the PP government how emphasis is also put on the fight against ETA by the police measures, but at the same time the war is waged on the peripheral nationalists in their entirety. With the PSOE at the beginning of their term in office, the

view of fight against ETA represents not a crusade, but rather insensitivity and a lack of understanding of the "Basque problem."

In the case of the PSOE as in that of all the other political actors, we see how historical discourse itself shapes and guides the politics of the present. Here as well it could be argued that the adherence to the state, though present during the entire existence of the party, crystallized during the years of the Civil War to present the core idea. It should be remembered that during the Civil War, what kept the Republican camp together notwithstanding enormous differences between the forces, was loyalty to the existing state, the existing regime. In this period, the PSOE largely gave up its urges for revolution to adhere to the principles of the Republic. After the end of dictatorship and transition, this loyalty to the Republic transformed into the loyalty to the established democratic system, to the State itself.

It must be said, though, that the protection of the state resulted at least at one point in time in overzealous attempts to uproot ETA by undemocratic means. The idea of González to protect the Spanish democracy not only "in salons" but also "in the sewers" gave coverage to such an organization as the GAL, the existence of which threatened to ruin all the democratic credentials of the Socialist Party.

It should also be mentioned that the discourse of the party may differ to some extent from its policies and actions. Naturally, one of the reasons for that is the nature of the terrorist challenge as such. The combination of "the violent" with "the political" makes it very complicated for the ones trying to halt a terrorist organization to deal with the situation. Negotiations can sometimes prove to be a solution to the problem; however, they do not always bring the anticipated results. The fact that the government negotiates can

invigorate the organization and give it more confidence in its position as a proper political actor. In addition to that, the fact of negotiating itself seems to nullify the idea that violence and politics are antithetical. Probably for these reason the Spanish Socialists engaged from time to time in negotiations with ETA, and these negotiations more often than not were kept secret. Otherwise, they were not called negotiations.

An attempt to reconcile the possible policy of negotiations with the actual discourse where there is no negotiating with "the violent" can be seen in the recent idea of the "end of violence through dialogue" (*fin dialogado de la violencia*), which should take place after the complete disarmament of ETA. This statement captures several ideas: first of all, it presents itself as exactly the type of democratic discourse that Laclau and Mouffe mention by extending the chains of difference to the very limit, attempting to include even those who before (as the dialogue should take part only after the disarmament) brandished arms against the state. Second, even accepting it as a partner of conversation, the statement denies ETA the position of a political actor in its own right.

The essence of pragmatic antiterrorism, however, was crystallized not so much on the state level, but in the Basque Country with the appearance of the distinctive chains of the democrats vs. the violent. Considering this, it could be said that the logic of construction of the PSOE's discourse on violence was closest to that which Laclau and Mouffe labeled as a "democratic" discourse, based on discursive chains of difference, where an attempt is made to attract as many signifiers as possible, leaving only the ones that represent the pure "constitutive outside" as an opposite. No attempt is made to create a chain from these different opposites, what is violent is taken to be manifestation of itself, not of anything else, therefore, each of the episodes, organizations and people form a vision of

sporadic attempts to dislocate the democratic political discourse. What the political forces should do under these circumstances is to deny them this possibility by refusing to give in, but also by keeping up the present configuration of the signifiers in the discourse. However, this is not to say that the discourse of the PSOE is so much qualitatively better than that of the other political actors in the country. It is true that the party pays less attention to the deliberations of what the Spanish nation is and what its essence is, but it is also true that by leaving these questions unanswered it, first, subscribes to the already present view of the nation, which, as we saw, is not too accommodating with the other national realities within it; second, by refusing to engage into the discussion, it leaves too much space for the hegemonization of the interpretation of the nation of the Right. This particular interpretation will be discussed in the following pages.

The PP government: Protect the Nation

The PP, though, as its predecessor, came to the Palace of Moncloa at a difficult moment in terms of political violence. ETA was weakened, but it just changed its strategy, and the new one included primarily the attacks on the politicians of the Spanish parties. The PP itself suffered significantly from this change of strategy, its members becoming the first targets of the assassinations. In addition to that, even though it was a representative of the conservative Spanish nationalism inclined to diminish the strength of the peripheral nationalism as much as possible, it did not have the sufficient majority in the Parliament, in order to govern alone, and still had to rely on the peripheral nationalist parties. The courting of these forces led to some rather bizarre declarations of the Prime Minister Aznar, for example, that in private he sometimes spoke Catalan.

119

These signs of good will all but disappeared in the second year of the rule of the PP already. When ETA eventually broke the truce, the PP showed its regret that it was generous with the organization[45] by unleashing an offensive against it, its environment and the nationalisms as such. After the party won the second mandate at *Moncloa* (this time with the absolute majority) this offensive moved at its earnest.

The actions of the PP and the discourse it constructed around violence and the nation is discussed in detail in the two in-depth studies of this work – on the events of 11-M and on the treaty of Lizarra. Here, however, it is necessary to look at the broad discourse constructions that the party developed.

In the discourse of the PP, instead of the State, we find the Nation as the main focus and instead of the logic of difference we have a (war) frame based on the logic of equivalence. As we have seen before, the nation has been the main focus of the Spanish Right for the entire century. The PP inherited this focus and assigned to the Nation the central place in its discourse. The state here acquires only the secondary importance. The state can survive solely on the condition that the nation is healthy and safe. Thus, for example, the former Prime Minister Aznar motioned: "you cannot have a foreign policy if you are denying the existence of the nation." (FAES 2005[46])

The focus on the nation in the discourse of the party results also in a different configuration of the discourse on violence. Violence here becomes an antithesis not only of the democratic politics, but of the nation. What we see here is the use of the logic of

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[45] Signs of that generosity, in fact, were numerous – starting from the move of prisoners closer the Basque Country, the publicly expressed wish to negotiate and even the only moment when the Spanish government, through its own Prime Minister, called the ETA environment by the name it ascribed itself – the Basque National Liberation Movement.
[46] The FAES (*Fundación para el análisis y los estudios sociales* – Foundation for the social studies and analysis) is a think tank presided over by the former PP Prime Minister José María Aznar and thus expressing views that are close to a rather radical part of the ideology of the party.

equivalence to organize the discourse in two radical opposites. There are two chains here, which crystallized themselves most clearly during the electoral campaign to the Basque Parliament in 2001, and which were then labeled nationalists vs. constitutionalists. The name "constitutionalist" signifies here the loyalty to the established legal order, but also, we should remember from the previous discussions, the adherence to the established rules of the Spanish nationalism – the nation as one and indivisible. The PP, before this election already having established the idea of "constitutional patriotism" as one of its basic principles, imposed its notion of the Constitution on other political actors, creating a signification of the constitutionalist block not only as the support for the legal order, the constitutional framework as such, but as a support for a certain understanding of the Nation. This understanding, largely inherited from the traditional rightist discourse, where the nation is understood not so much in political, but in ethnic terms, with the Castilian spirit at its core, does not allow much fluidity in the interpretation of the concept. Condensing the meanings of the Constitution, the state, democracy and the political system around the concept of the nation, creates a rigid construction, which is coherent and logical in itself; but which does not tolerate any deviations.

Such a construction requires an opposite where everything that does not fit in the edifice so rigidly constructed could be dumped. Here, as the logic of equivalence dictates, a mirror chain is created, which, as the former signified all the good, comes to mean all the evil. The term used to describe this other chain – nationalist – might seem to be objective, after all, the ones that are lumped together into this group do not hesitate calling themselves nationalist, as, for example, the name PNV, i.e. the Basque Nationalist Party, itself tells. However, many terms do not have their own existence outside the discourse

and in the discourse of the PP the term nationalist acquired the meaning of pure evil. Obviously, with the nation as one and indivisible being the nodal point of the chain of "the good" in discourse, the preaching of an alternative nation can only be seen as anathema. In addition to that, the camp of those who are against the Spanish nation as one and indivisible includes ETA. Thus, the "evil" that this alternative chain represents gains a very concrete expression – it is violent. Hence, what we see in the discourse of the PP is a juxtaposition of the good adherents to the legal order, the constitutionalists and the evil, related to ETA, nationalists. One chain has as its nodal point the nation, the other – violence.

The nation is in danger because of the strength of the alternative chain, therefore, it has to be constantly vigilantly protected. As the understanding of the nation is such that very few other political forces fully subscribe to it, the party appears to be its sole guardian. And hence the guardian of the state as well, which is threatened with disintegration. ETA here becomes the embodiment of all the problems of the country: ETA was behind the project of the Catalan Statute, as one of the leaders of the party proclaimed, and then it would also be "paying a political price to ETA" to recognize the existence of the Basque and Catalan nations, as another told us on a different occasion. (see, *El País* 25 November 2005)

Consequently, the discourse on the nation becomes entangled with the discourse on violence. The presence of ETA is very helpful in that respect, because it sustains the idea that there is a constant threat to the nation and, in addition, allows to push out the demands of peripheral nationalists to the outside of political discourse. According to the PP, ETA violence is definitely related to the "territorial problems" and the "debate about

the territorial configuration of Spain is inseparable from the debate about terrorism against Spain." (Aznar 2005, p.4) In such a way, issues are being relegated outside of the political; the "territorial problems" become violence problems. Not only they should be excluded from the discussions on the political agenda, they are, to an extent, criminal problems, in the same way as ETA is a criminal organization. Pushing through the backdoor of the law threatening imprisonment to the Basque Lehendakari Juan José Ibarretxe when his famous plan of sovereignty was discussed is one of the best examples here.

Another example of this criminalization and also of the stretching of the understanding of "the violent" can be seen in the policies of tackling ETA during the years with the PP in power. I have in mind the decision to persecute most of the organizations of the environment of the radical Basque nationalism as making part of ETA. Indisputably, contrary to the Northern Irish case, where the Sinn Fein had a significant autonomy from the IRA, some of the organizations of the Basque nationalist environment have links with the armed organization and are probably doing its bidding. However, they are not engaging in violent actions *per se*. Some of them could claim to have only ideological affinity to ETA. By criminalizing these organizations the understanding of what is violent is widened significantly.

This understanding leaves the police and the judicial system to deal with the dissatisfactions in the political system. Such a situation is a logical outcome of the discourse construction. As violence is outside of the democratic and as any issues related to it are pushed out of the political field, it is exactly the problem that the security forces and the judicial system have to deal with. Violence does not express anything else but

itself, consequently, it should be emphasized, there is no conflict. The position of "no conflict in the Basque Country" follows logically from the construction of the discourse where violence is not representative of any political issues and where, in addition, it forms the nodal point of the discursive chain which should be annihilated. For in order to have a conflict, there should be contended issues and there should be accepted contenders. In the case of a construction of the discourse of the PP, the issues that might be disputed are relegated outside of political discourse and the antagonists themselves are presented as enemies to be eradicated. In this situation, obviously, the conflict is inexistent.

Also, the discourse of the PP is based on the logic of equivalence where the elements of one chain represent the "good" and those of the other "the evil." This construction results in an ethicization of politics, i.e. the choices that are made, are not morally neutral political alternatives, but the choices between good and evil. Currently, the leader of the PP regularly opens his arms and offers his embrace to the current Prime Minister Zapatero inviting him to "come back to consensus" personified by the Antiterrorist Pact, first, of course, admitting that he was wrong all along not to listen to the PP. There is only one true way in dealing with the situation and that true way is personified by the Populars.

To come back to the point of ethicization of politics, it must be said that this division into good and evil chains would not work, if it was based only on the understanding of the nation as presented by the PP. However, here the victims of terrorism come to play a significant role. Violence is entered into discourse through a combination of two elements: the violence itself is senseless, has no point and no meaning, but the deaths it

produces are meaningful. "They have not died in vain" – the result of senseless violence is a creation of martyrs and the reaffirmation of the nation. It is often emphasized in the literature on nationalism that the cult of the "fallen for the patria" constitutes a significant element in the consolidation of the idea and feeling of the nation. What is interesting here is that the victims themselves are not the ones who actively fought for the Patria,[47] but the ones who were innocent and were killed in spite of their innocence. As they died innocent, as they died for the nation (and at hands of the evil Other), their deaths give the moral meaning to the understanding of the nation itself. It is because of these deaths that the chains of equivalence where one is representing good and the other – evil can be constructed.

Here, however, a "morality play" comes on the scene. I borrow the term from the book of Robin Wagner-Pacifici (1986) analyzing the kidnapping and murder of the Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro by the *Brigate Rosse* and the public reactions surrounding these events from the perspective of social drama. In this book, through the examination of the statements of politicians, the media and the letters of the Prime Minister himself, written during the time of his imprisonment, the author shows clearly how the political elite of the country used the personal drama of Moro for their own purposes, how the figure of Moro as a person, as a human being has been transformed into that of Moro the martyr, who happily submitted himself to the tortures of his executors in order to reaffirm the validity of the existing political system. His letters written from the "people's prison" where he asked his colleagues to do everything possible to secure his release, his family's

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[47] The fact that the majority of victims of ETA are members of various security services: the army, the national police, the *Guardia Civil, Ertzaintza* is irrelevant here.

pleas were ignored and dismissed as fake and the real Moro was substituted by the image of Moro as a sacrificial victim, accepting of his death as a means to achieve greater good. We can see such a situation often repeating itself in Spain. The victims are stripped of any individuality and are presented as "typical" victims – not dying in vain and supporting the policy of destruction of ETA. If the reaction of the families is different, like in the case of Ernest Lluch's murder, the message receives "distrust and criticism" from the side of the government. (Mees 2003, p.160) When Ernest Lluch, a Catalan Socialist politician who was a supporter of the dialogue between the different political positions and an opponent of the PP, then in government, was killed by ETA, greatest tension evolved between the government and the family of the deceased. The Lluch's daughters decided not to attend the first rows of the demonstration against his death to evade the possibility that the Prime Minister would embrace them. (*El País*, 25 November 2000) This clash between the government and the family made Lluch an exceptional victim, which was better forgotten or subsumed into the army of the martyrs by becoming one of the names without any personality, another victim of ETA, another death on the road toward the national unity. Therefore, the PP would not attend the homage concert in San Sebastian in memory of the politician arguing that the concert has to be for all the victims and to distinguish one of them (especially the one like Lluch) is "immoral." (*El País*, 5 January 2001; *El País*, 3 January 2001)

Thus, victims support the existing chains of equivalence, they give meaning to the understanding of one chain as positive and the other one as negative, but because of that any "rebellion" in the victim camp has to be crushed. What the story of Lluch showed

was that the rigidity of the discourse of the PP does not allow any exceptions especially not in the field as sensitive as that of lending a support for its policies by the victims.

The new PSOE government

The way how the PP lost power in 2004 was described in detail in the chapter dealing with the events of 11 to 14 March. Before assuming office, the PSOE promised a lot of changes and many were already implemented. In its social policies, the PSOE can be seen as a typical Left-libertarian party. The changes of school curriculum to exclude religion from the classrooms, allowing gay marriages, liberalizing abortion laws can be good examples of this. In implementing these reforms the party was not made hesitant by the fact that there was a strong resistance of the Conservatives and the Church or that it would significantly change the legal and probably even social outlook of the country. In so doing, the PSOE claims, it only goes in line with the changes in the society itself, the society which claims to be Catholic but where the Church attendance is negligible, a society where the tolerance to different lifestyles thrives.

Each of these reforms was fiercely disputed by the PP and the relations between two principal actors in the Spanish politics ever since the elections of 14th March 2004 had probably never been as sour. The PP believed it had fallen from grace unjustly and most of its work in the opposition was concentrated on that, hence, the demands to keep the investigation into 11-M events open, always trying to find at least some, no matter how speculative, evidence that would tie ETA to the events and that would exonerate the former government from the accusations of having lied. Two governmental actions stirred up a particular rage of the PP, namely, the reforms of the Statutes of Autonomies, especially the Catalan Statute, and the proposal of the dialogued end to violence.

The reaction is understandable. After coming to power, the PSOE has shown that it does have its own opinion on the issues, something that the PP does not seem to be ready to accept. During the electoral campaign of 2004, as we shall see, the party tried to create the image of conspiracy of a "coalition," connected with ETA that was trying to destroy Spain. Coming to power of the Socialists and the reform of the Catalan Statute, followed later by a declaration of the "dialogued end to violence," appeared to confirm their fears.

However, these accusations can hardly be given any ground. First of all, because the PSOE does not question the existence of the one and indivisible Spanish nation. It tries to leave such questions aside, knowing that to deliberate on them would bring it to fight in the stronghold of the PP. But it inevitably had to do that because of the discussion of the Statutes. And in that discussion it appeared that even the emphasis on the idea of the "nation of nations" in Spain, ends with the same reaffirmation of unity and indivisibility of the Spanish nation.

Even though the Catalans were promised that their Statute would be accepted without much change if it were passed by a great majority in their own Parliament, this promise was broken and first (before the discussions about finances and the airports and other matters of the kind) it was broken on the Article 1 of the Statute which said "Catalonia is a nation." Suddenly, the very supportive Prime Minister remembered that "for the majority of the Spanish Spain is the only nation." (*El País*, 8 December 2005)

Therefore, the defining statement which said "Catalonia is a nation" was wrapped in a nice formula stating that "The Catalan Parliament in its wide majority expressing the feelings and will of the Catalan citizens defined Catalonia as a nation. The Spanish Constitution in its Article 2 recognizes national reality of Catalonia as that of a

nationality."(*El País*, 3 March 2006) Thus, in the manner as during the discussions of the Constitution the entry of "nationalities" into the text was successfully downplayed by the insistence on the primacy of the unitary and indivisible Spanish nation, so here the definition of Catalonia as a nation in such a statement only expresses a subjective point of view, not a legal reality.

The new PSOE government was trying hard to keep violence out of the territorial debate. It did not succeed in this endeavor because of the resistance from the side of the PP, which insisted that "the territorial debate is inseparable from the violence debate." The unwillingness of the Socialists to discuss the issue of the definition of the Spanish nation and related problems, and their willingness to see the changes in the Statutes as a simple technical matter, left the ground for these discussions in the hands of the PP and, as we saw so far, this political force has a very particular view of what nation is and how to deal with it.

This view and the attitude towards violence have been the two building blocks of the opposition discourse for the last three years. The position of violence itself has become part of the agenda of political discussions with the proposal of the Prime Minister to advance the "dialogued end to violence" and the declaration of ETA's "permanent" ceasefire, which facilitated the start of contacts between the governing party and the organization. However, the hopes of the solution of the problem of violence shattered first by the attack on Barajas airport on December 30, 2006 and the announcement of the end of the "permanent" ceasefire that came on 5 June 2007.

Conclusions

Violence was present during the entire existence of the new Spanish democracy. The attempts to accommodate that violence, to make sense of it have also been part of the discourse of the Spanish political actors throughout these years. As we have seen in this chapter and will see on other occasions later, these actors have different ways of constructing their discourse and ascribe different role to violence in their respective discourses.

As we have seen, the PSOE discourse is pragmatic; its construction is based more on the logic of difference, leaving violence as a constitutive outside. The discourse of PP, on the other hand, is based on logic of equivalence, where one chain of equivalence has nation as its nodal point. The party is represented as a guardian of that nation, while the chain itself embodies moral good. The other chain that is constructed has violence and ETA at its core, while peripheral nationalism comes to play a role in it as an element in the chain. We will see these elements in different configurations throughout the discussions of the particular events, but before expanding on them it is necessary to look at the constructions of the Basque historical discourse and the development of ETA.

Chapter IV. Alternative history – Basque nationalism and ETA

As could be seen from the chapter on the Spanish historical discourse, Spanish nationalism was not very successful in imposing itself. The failures of the Spanish state to consolidate the national identity in the end of 19th century gave birth to the alternative identities and alternative historical discourses. One of these, the Basque nationalist interpretation of history will be analyzed here.

First of all, though, a small note on the territory that would help to highlight certain characteristics of the Basque "conflict"[48] is needed. Thus, the Basque land is divided into two by the border between France and Spain, one of the oldest fixed borders of Europe. In the nationalist imaginary its territory consists of four provinces on the Spanish side of the border – Bizkaia (Vizkaya), Gipuzkoa (Guipuzkoa) and Araba (Alava), which now form an Autonomous region of the Basque Country (referred to as *País Vasco* or CAV – *Comunidad Autonoma Vasca*) and the separate state and autonomy of Navarre (Navarra in Spanish, Nafarroa in Basque) and three on the French side Lapurdi (Labour), Nafarroa Beherea (Basse Navarre) and Zuberoa (Soule). ETA and all the Basque nationalist movement was born in the Southern, Spanish side of the border, to that side we will pay most attention further on. The French Basque provinces, on the other hand, being poorer, more agrarian and, in addition, more Basque, however, never developed a very strong nationalist movement. Their assimilation to the Jacobinic French state and the more cohesive identity that the French state managed to impose on its citizens, made the national movement in the provinces pretty weak. Navarre is also a special case here, but its history is closely related to that of the other three provinces of the Spanish side and

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[48] "Conflict," as many other interpretations of the situation in the Basque Country, is actually a charged term with the Spanish political actors rarely accepting that there is a conflict at all.

will be discussed further. The fact that it is divided into three administrative systems, two distinct political systems and a number of legal subsystems, consequently, is one of the distinct features of the Basque national sphere.

In this chapter, the development of Basque historical discourse from its inception to the end of the 20th century will be discussed addressing the main points in the social imaginary of the Basque nationalist community. First, the origins of Basque nationalism in the movement for recuperation of traditional rights, lost during the civil wars of the 19th century will be exposed and the essential ideas of Sabino Arana, the founder of the Basque nationalism with the emphasis on distinction of Basques will be discussed. Arana created discursive boundaries of the Basque nation, putting distinctions between the Basques and other peoples of the Iberian Peninsula in terms of race, language and religion. His ideas, modified to a certain extent, continue to serve as a backbone of the hegemonic project of the Basque nationalism.

Next, the influence of the Civil War will be assessed. As in the case of Spanish historical discourse, the Civil War of 1936-1939 became one of the most important points of reference in the historical discourse, especially so because the conflict was followed by more than 30 years of dictatorship, which tried to repress any manifestations of Basque identity. However, this attempt achieved a result opposite from what it strove for. As Joseba Arregui stated: "Cánovas created Basque nationalism. Franco [helped it] spread roots to the lengths beyond imagination." (quoted in Tusell 2004, p.241) With the expansive and aggressive Spanish nationalism, throughout the history of the 20th century, the Basque nationalism closed into itself and managed to create a closed community whose main task was self-protection from the outside forces.

132

This emphasis on defensive changes with the birth of ETA. ETA brings in new ideas into the Basque nationalist community, such as emphasis on language instead of all the other criteria for Basqueness and also the idea of national liberation through armed struggle. Violence becomes not something to suffer, but also something to bring on the others. ETA eventually leads to the creation of even more exclusive community with the discourse completely based on the chains of equivalence, where what ETA represents is all the positivity and where anyone that goes against it represent all the negativity inherent in the political discourse, there remains just "one truth."

Finally, the Basque nationalist discourse after transition will be assessed. Here we will see how the PNV retains its ambiguous position with regards to the future of the Basque Country, at the same time trying to push through the idea of the "pact" between the Basques and the Spanish state. The attempts to push ETA to the side through the signing of the Pact of Ajuria Enea and the change in constructions of discourse on violence will be examined. The distinction between "democrats" and "the violent" is of particular importance here as it might show the move from the discourse based on the logic of equivalence to the expansive logic of difference.

From the "origins" to the Civil War

Basque nationalist historians were greatly aided in their task to create an image of exclusiveness of the Basque nation by a great amount of historical, genetic and linguistic data available on the region. Thus, according to investigators, the people in Basque Provinces have certain genetic traits that are different from the people of the surrounding area. Both the language, which is the only non Indo-European language with the unknown links to other languages of the world and the genetic code, seem to suggest that

the Basques are descendants of the Palaeolithic inhabitants of the Continent, the only remaining autochthonous inhabitants of Europe.

 The origins of the "Basque nation" are thus traced to the "times immemorial". Further on, again, Basque distinctiveness from their counterparts in the Iberian Peninsula shines through every page of history. The Basques appear never to have been conquered by any invaders of the region – Romans never crossed their lands, nor did the Visigoths or the Arabs, all of which stopped short of conquering the region. Even their belonging to the Spanish empire was pacted, not imposed, and the rulers of Spain had to swear to behold the rights of the Basques each time they acceded to the throne. Basques were, thus, in the recent imaginary, always different, never assimilated, always proudly on their own.

Another source of pride – the Kingdom of Navarre is considered to be the only state Basques ever had and the rule of Sancho the Great (999-1035) is the only time in history to see all the Basque lands united into one state. However, after his death, the Kingdom was divided between his four sons and its grandeur was lost. Navarre itself ceased to exist as a separate Kingdom in 1512.

Of course, again, like in the case of Spanish historical discourse, the Basque history can also be viewed somewhat differently. First of all, history of the Basques is very closely related to that of other parts of the Iberian Peninsula. One of the theories on the origins of the Castilian language trace its roots to the region of La Rioja and claims the current Spanish to be "Latin spoken by the Basques". The oldest texts in both Castilian Spanish and the Basque are found in the monasteries around Ebro River, a spot of interaction between the Vasconian tribes and the Roman conquerors. Later on Basques played an important role in the *Reconquista*, as well as the conquest of Americas; they were often

serving in the Courts of Castilian Kings. In 19th and early 20th century they took part in all the major intellectual movements of Spain, supplying some of the most famous intellectual figures, such as Miguel Unamuno, Pío Baroja, Ramiro Maeztu. In addition, neither during the times of the Kingdom of Navarre, nor later, until the 19th century a sense of a distinctiveness and unity existed between the different parts of the Basque lands. Even the language could hardly serve as a unifying factor as the numerous dialects spoken in the region were sometimes barely intelligible even for the people of a neighboring village. A lot of native Basque speakers have to learn the unified Basque (*Euskara Batua*) nearly as a foreign language.

The 19th century brought major transformations to the Basque Country, transformations, which significantly contributed to the development and fomentation of the nationalism in the region. First, the industrial takeoff of the region, which changed the outlook of the Basque society and brought a significant amount of immigrants from other parts of Spain. The second one (though as well closely related to the industrialization processes) was the loss of the traditional rights – *fueros* – at the end of the II Carlist war[49] (1876).

Primarily, the movement for recovery of the Privileges, according to many researchers was what prepared ground for the emergence of Basque nationalism (see Letamendia 1994, vol.1, p.133) as the *fueros* at the time were what made the four Basque Provinces (Navarre included) so different from the rest of the Kingdom.

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[49] The name of these wars derives from the name of the King Ferdinand VII's brother Carlos, a pretender to the throne and the leader of conservative faction. On the other side of the divide were those who supported the late King's daughter Isabella. However, what was on the first sight as a dynastic quarrel actually meant the fight between two different world-views: Conservative idea of the state with absolute monarchy and absolute Church and the Liberal idea, which meant limited powers of both.

These privileges conceded by the Crown to the people of Basque Provinces were extensive.[50] First of all, the so-called universal nobility, according to which everyone in the provinces of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa received the status of nobility by mere virtue of being born in the province. Secondly, the provinces retained their own budgets and their dues to the crown were minimal. Thirdly, the provinces were allowed to exercise free trade and the customs themselves were put on the borders with the rest of Spain. Fourthly, the inhabitants of the provinces were exempted from the military service outside their home lands, their duty was to keep their own land secure. The fifth important element of the regime of *fueros* was also important in the Middle Ages – exemption from torture of the inhabitants of the provinces and, related to this, separate civil, administrative and political law. Finally, the legal formula called *pase foral*, expressed by the sentence "I obey, but do not comply" (*Obedesco pero no cumplo*, in Spanish), which could be used in the situations when the piece of legislation that King wanted to enforce was seen as going against the foral laws. According to this theory, thus, only the laws that the *Juntas Generales* (the Parliament of the province) certified were in force in the provinces, so that the King appeared to be only a nominal ruler and all the laws were agreed upon by the Parliament itself.

However, in the end of the 18th century, the system entered into crisis. At the beginning of the 19th century, when the Spanish state started to "modernize" the administration of the country, meaning to unify its legal, political and economic arrangements, *fueros* came under fierce attack.[51] Newly rising Basque oligarchy, as well, saw in these rules remnants of the earlier times, which, in addition, were impeding the economic growth of the

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[50] Actually, all the provinces had different *fueros* and have developed different legal and political systems this, however, is often forgotten and the *Fuero Nuevo de Bizkaia* (of 1526) is used as a reference point.
[51] Catalonia also had its "fueros", but lost them much earlier – in 1716. (Conversi 1997, p.45)

region, standing as an obstacle for opening to the markets of the rest of the Iberian Peninsula.

Time for expression of this rivalry between two opposing ideas about the place of the region in the Spanish state came in 1833 when the first of the Carlist wars started. Though this was as much a "civil war" in the Basque Country as in the rest of Spain, i.e. it pitted the same Basques against one another, having the countryside support Carlos (who wanted to preserve the existing absolutist monarchy and rather loose political structure) and the big cities – the Liberals (who wanted to modernize the state in French fashion), it was also interpreted as a rising of the Basques for the defense of *fueros*. Thus, for example, in 1836 a French-Basque traveler Joseph Augustin Chaho interpreted the events as a kind of national liberation movement (de Pablo et al. 1998, p.21-23).

The first Carlist war ended in a stalemate. The Liberals were not able to re-conquer the countryside; the Carlist peasants were unable and unwilling to march against the towns. In 1839, thus, a war ended with a compromise, confirmed in a law of 25 of October, which in its Article 1 affirmed the existence of *fueros* of Basque provinces and Navarra, but that "without affecting the Constitutional unity of the Monarchy" (de Pablo et al. 1998, p.23).

This vague affirmation of the contrary principles in one Article (which we also saw in the discussion of the later Constitution of 1978) gave way to fierce discussions. Consequently, in 1841, just two years after the law was passed, the principle of "constitutional unity of the Monarchy" obviously prevailed over the "affirmation of the privileges" and the charter system started to be progressively abolished. The provinces were denied their free trade, a foral judicial system and the *pase foral*. Only the

exemption from military service and the proper budget remained. In addition, here appeared a crucial rift between the three Basque Provinces and Navarre, which negotiated for itself a new law of *Modification of fueros* and preserved it through future calamities. The other provinces were not that lucky.

However, it must be noticed that the situation was not as bleak as it was sometimes painted. Nor was it completely black-and-white. Among Carlists there were voices that also demanded a strong state and abolition of the privileges, while among the Liberals there were those who supported the traditional systems of the four provinces. With the help of these latter the Basque Provinces also got additional powers.

This ambiguous situation lasted to the Second Carlist uprising in 1872. This time, however, the victory of Liberals was obvious and with the law of the 21 July 1876, *fueros* were finally completely abolished. Again the Liberal Basque oligarchs managed to soften the blow by negotiating the so-called *conciertos economicos*, the arrangements, according to which the Basque Provinces continued to pay only a small sum to the Crown, the rest of the money left at their own disposal.

In a sense, like the Spanish "Disaster" of 1898, the defeat in Carlist wars was not as serious economically to the Basque Provinces. In addition, a part of the Basques themselves were on the side of the winners. The defeat, however, did distort the worldview. Abolition of *fueros* was considered as a disruption of long traditions of the four provinces, a unilateral break of the pact between the Basques and the Spanish Crown, in short, a betrayal. As a result, the movement to restore these rights that was born already after the first Carlist war fortified itself. It was based on the romantic views of the Basque past and was mainly directed to the reconstitution of the foral system and

the reintegration of the four provinces. The ideas of this movement were already close to nationalism. At the end of the second Carlist war, this movement became a refuge for remaining Carlists as well, in a setting that gave favorable grounds for developing of the nationalism itself. The attempts of Liberals to centralize the Spanish state and to unify it according to the French model, were failing; the bitterness of the inhabitants of the Basque Provinces about the consequences of this centralization was on its peak. In addition, and to agreement with Gellner's theory (see, e.g. Gellner 1983), the industrialization processes were destroying the traditional fabric of the Basque society by inviting significant amounts of immigrants to fill in the work places at factories of, primarily, Bilbao. The grievances waited to be articulated into a coherent whole and one man – Sabino Arana, soon undertook this job.

Sabino Arana is considered the father of Basque nationalism and the whole history of the Basque nationalist movement is closely related to his name. He was born in 1865, in a strongly Carlist family and himself was a dedicated Carlist up to 1882. Then everything changed. Basque mythology has it that his older brother, Luis, during a discussion on the Easter Sunday, convinced Sabino that "Euskal Herria[52] was the fatherland of the Basques" (Letamendia 1994, vol.1, p.136), because:

> … if Basques were Spanish, they would not have the right to claim privileges; if the contrary is true, if they are not, they lose the right to interfere into the affairs of Spain, but gain the power to demand that nobody interferes into theirs (ibid.)

This day of enlightenment of Arana is now celebrated as the day of Fatherland and it was a start of his apprenticeship into nationalism, which included Law studies in Barcelona from 1883 to 1888 and at the same time studies of the foral system, Basque history as

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[52] Euskal Herria means the land of Basque-speakers. In the Basque language at the time this was the only territorial reference. The word used to refer by the Basques to themselves was *euskaldun*, meaning a possessor or Basque language, *euskara*.

well as language, which, before his turn he did not even speak. The end result of this study was a publication of series of articles with which Arana stepped through the threshold separating cultural nationalism from political (de Pablo et al. 1998, p.7). In these articles, collected in 1892 in a compilation entitled *Bizkaia: for its independence*, he was describing "four glories of the history of the fatherland", four medieval battles in which people of the province were defending their freedom from the Castilian and Leonese conquerors, with the aim to show "the *real* history of Biscay and its antique independence" (in Letamendia 1994, vol.1, p.137, emphasis mine).

This changed the prevailing conception of the Basque history, substituting the so-called "pactism", i.e. the idea of the negotiated adherence of the Basque Provinces to the Spanish crown, by the "independentism". In this new vision, thus, the Basques were always free, never subdued by any foreign conquerors and zealously guarding their freedom throughout the ages. As is often in the nationalist conceptions of history, there was a *Golden Age* in the Basque history (the Middle Ages) in the past, the dark times (their highest point being the loss of ancient laws with the abolition of *fueros*) at the present and redemption somewhere in the future, when the old laws will be re-established, the Basque race and language saved from the foreign influences and all the Basque provinces will be finally united into one independent state.

Putting it simply, that was the conception of history that Arana developed through his writings during the last decade of the 19th century. History, however, was not the main building block of the Aranian nationalism. What mattered much more was the *race* and the recuperation of its purity, which was the only way to get back all those old laws and customs that made possible the *Golden Age*, because distinctiveness of the Basques was

not to be measured only by their ways of life, but primarily by the uniqueness of their genetic makeup. The PNV established in the 1895 by Arana himself, was supposed to promote all these principles. Thus, only the people with four Basque surnames (i.e. only the ones who had all four Basque grandparents) were initially accepted to the organization. This rule soon proved to be unfeasible, as it restricted the numbers of the party to a very small group of selected few thus impeding its chances in the elections. But the race as the primary denominator of Basqueness remained strong and Arana's nationalism was completely exclusive. This, for example, is well seen in an article entitled "Catalan errors" were he argues that Catalans are making a mistake of "Catalanizing" the foreigners by encouraging them to speak Catalan. This, according to him would not be acceptable to the Basques, "[b]ecause the purity of the race is as language one of the slogans of Biscay and if language can be restored if one has a good grammar and good dictionary, the purity of the race, when it is lost, is lost forever" (Arana in de Pablo et al. 1998, p.35-36)[53]

In addition, Arana's work outlined the main aims and ends of the Basque nationalist movement, putting forward an organization that had to make these ends come true and creating all that was needed for a nationalist movement to thrive: a coherent worldview, a

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[53] In his book on Basque and Catalan nationalism, Daniele Conversi is emphasizing the same elements in the two different nationalist movements that Arana stressed. Catalan movement developed in a cohesive, inclusive way, as what was "Catalan" was never a question. To the contrary, it was much more problematic to tell what is "Basque", so that the movement was bound to develop an "antagonistic identity", i.e. the one which "focuses more on the need to define one's own group by negative comparison to others, and by exclusion" (Conversi 1997, p.5). It is questionable how much it was the "objective" circumstances of the cultural difference between the two movements or the "human factor", i.e. the personality of Sabino Arana and his group that influenced the development of Basque nationalism to the direction that it took. It could be said though that the choice was an obvious one – there was more that made Basques as a group distinct from other groups in and around the region than what they had in common. The diversity of Basque region was and still is much greater than that of Catalonia, the administrative units more independent and the regional government weaker than in the latter. To solve this question, though, is not my task here. What matters more at present is the way Basque past and future was conceived by the nationalist leaders and the effects of this on the contemporary politics in the region.

set of values to defend, the symbols (such as the flag, *ikurriña* and the anthem); the territorial formula 7=1 or 4+3=1, i.e. the seven provinces should make up one state; a grammar of the language and finally, the political party.

However, in 1902 Arana published an article in which he changed his position from the demand of independence to the request of autonomy, "aspiring for the happiness of this country [the Basque Country] within the Spanish state" (Arana in de Pablo 1998, p.46-47). A year later Arana died and left his followers somewhat perplexed. He never explained the motives of such a sudden shift of position and the fact that the article was written while Arana was in prison added more to the suspicion about the "real" cause of such a change. The ambiguity thus came to the forefront of the Basque nationalist discourse: it could give the inspiration to radicals and moderates, independentists and autonomists. Thus, in 1906, when the first program of the PNV appeared, it was put in "nebulous formula of the complete restoration of the Fueros as its maximal aspiration" (de Pablo 1998, p.10), which allowed both the moderate, autonomist groups and the radical independentists cohabit together.

Another important element of Aranian worldview should be emphasized here – the role of the Church. The first of the slogans of new organization that Arana created was *Jaungoikua eta Lagizarra*, for God and Old Laws. The whole movement was closely related to Catholicism with special affectionate ties to Jesuit Order. According to Antonio Elorza, Arana in his youth was deeply influenced by the Jesuits the school of which he attended, thinking later to join the Order himself. The fact that the founder of the Order, Ignatius Loyola, was of a Basque origin (his original name – Iñigo López), as well as one of his closest aides and one of the most prominent missionaries Francisco Javier, is often

cited in the examinations of Basque nationalist movement. Jesuits' *raison d'être* as spiritual warriors, defending faith by sword was thus related to that of the Basques. It could, of course, take different forms – the faith of Navarrese Carlists, who marched in the forefront of general Franco's crusade or that of ETA fighters. Joseba Zulaika notices that ETA was constituted on the July 31, 1959, which is the day of Ignatius Loyola. According to him:

> … congruence between ETA's birthday and the feast of Saint Ignatius, founder of the Jesuits and prototype of Basque military man, betrays an intimate connection between the militants and the patron saint. In a profound sense, understanding him is understanding ETA men. (Zulaika 1988, p.334-335)

Thus, it is claimed that Arana got the ideas on how to organize his project from the works of Loyola, these included the necessity to diminish the political discussions about the aims within the party – once the primary cause is established, there is no need to get back to reconsider it; the organization is based on strict discipline, "justified by the military character of the confrontation with our enemy" (Elorza 1996, p.20). These elements to a great extent will characterize the party of Arana, the PNV, throughout its history and that will have their influence on the "armed organization" – ETA.

On the other hand, the role of religion should be emphasized, as for Arana it became not just one of the building blocks of his ideological setup, but the essential fundament, without which all the building would collapse. One of his slogans thus became: "We – for Euskadi and Euskadi for God" ("*Gu Euzkadirentzat ta Euzkadi Jaungoikoarentzat*") implying both the subordination of political views to the religious ones, but also the idea that "nationalism was a moral necessity, a duty of Christians" and the aim of politics (as we have seen also in the Conservative version of the Spanish nationalism) has to be not

gaining power or wining elections, but a social aim – Christianize the people. (Beriain 1997, p.154-155)

Religion, as language, served not only as a simple distinction of the Basques from the rest of the Spanish people, but also as a barrier from the immigrants. Euskera being notoriously difficult to learn was a natural barrier for the integration, but the religion as well, though nominally the same as in the rest of the country, served as a stumbling block as most of the immigrants came from the regions where religious practice was significantly less appreciated and the disaffection with the official religion much greater. (Conversi 1999, p.41 and n.29 in p.48). At the same time, most of the immigrants being workers, they were more attracted by Socialism and similar ideologies, which were hostile to religion.

Sabino Arana's party, the PNV, started to gain strength in 1898, when the group of Basque industrialist Ramón de la Sota joined it; the same year Arana himself was elected a member of the council of the province. In the first decades of the 20th century the party grew to become the major force in the three Basque Provinces, in Navarre it could not advance.

The party was still ambiguous about the place of the Basque Provinces within the Spanish state. It was moving back and forth independentist and autonomist positions according to the situation. And, not being able to stand clearly on the political issues, the party developed a network of groups and organizations that would promote national ideals and would make up for the lack of common denominators of the Basque culture. Thus, actually, the main aim of the party became "nation building", which included organization of its own, Labor Unions, gastronomic and mountaineering societies, song

144

and dance festivals and sports events at the same time maintaining that ambiguous political stance which allowed it to attract people with different views on the country's political future, but with the same views on at least the preservation of its culture. It was from its inception more of a movement than a party and this element helped it to survive through different dictatorships and repressions.

During Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, the PNV went underground and resumed its cultural activities, so that when the dictatorship ended in 1931, it surged up even stronger than before. The Second Republic that was established following the end of the dictatorship opened again the tensions about which road to take in its politics. The deeply conservative and devotedly Catholic PNV was suspicious of the anti-clerical and revolutionary forces that were on the side of the Republic. Its members walked away of the Parliament during the discussion of the Constitution, protesting against its anti-clerical character. The feelings, it must be said, were mutual. However, both sides seemed to have overcome their animosity as the leaders of the Republic extended the offer of autonomy to the Basques (the Catalans had received theirs already in 1932) and the PNV itself warmed up to the Republic.

At the time, the PNV was already at its strongest – it won the elections of 1931, 1933 and 1936 in all the three Provinces, again with the exception of Navarre, it also established itself even more firmly as a "politico-social mass movement or the party-community with the totalizing vocation, and organizes internally as an embryo of the state in the four Basque provinces" (de Pablo 1998, p.14). In 1933, the project of Basque Statute was voted favorably in the referendum of the three provinces and the text itself was also

approved by the Spanish Parliament in spring of 1936. Yet, at the time the Civil War was already knocking on the doors.

At this point one more note on the ideas on the nation, both inherited from Arana and developed after his death, is due, because these ideas and the political strategies used before the Civil War were to be of great influence in the next period of the Spanish democracy after 1975. As was mentioned before, numerous intellectuals of Basque origin participated in the creation of the Spanish nationalist discourse. Numerous other Basques actually felt themselves more related to Spain than to the new imaginary community that was being created. It was only in writing that everything seemed to be clear, Arana established the standards: race, religion, language, historical heritage and territory were all distinctive features of the Basque nation. However, reality proved to be more complicated than that. The cities did not speak the language, the intermarriages did "pollute" the race and the historical heritage, so much personified by the *fueros* was conspicuous by its absence.

The solution to the problem was curious enough. If there was so much lack of clarity as to what culturally would constitute the Basque nation, the "nationhood" itself came "to be defined in political terms" and consequently "party and nation became one." (Ross 1991, p.123) This idea persisted into our time with one of the significant determinants of "Basqueness" remaining not the language or race, or even religion, but what one votes for.

The Civil War

The Spanish Civil War divided the Basques as well. While Navarre, consequent in its choices, was one of the fiercest supporters of Franco's crusade, Alava also opted to back

the rebellion, the two remaining provinces remained true to the Republic. Already from the beginning of the war the Republican territory was divided into two and the loyal Basque Provinces thus remained cut off from the territories controlled by the Republican government.[54] They took this opportunity for advancing self-government creating a semi-independent state, publishing its own money, arranging its military defenses and even foreign policy. Contrary to the rest of Republican zone, the Church here retained its powers and there was no social revolution.

This semi-state existed only less than a year. Already in June of 1937 the troops of Franco marched into Bilbao and the Basque government moved to the exile. Even though very short in time, the Civil War left significant scars in the collective memory. Two events had especially strong meaning and long-term effects on the Basque consciousness: first of all – the bombing of Gernika, a sacred town of the Basques,[55] and the so-called pact of Santoña and its consequences. The pact of Santoña was a negotiated surrender of Basque troops to the Italian aides of Franco's forces.

After the fall of Bilbao, the Basques were not very eager to continue fighting for the Republic. Therefore, they tried to negotiate a separate peace with Italian troops. They would give away the weapons and for that the Italians would allow their political leaders to leave the country and would save lives of the soldiers. However, by the time that the Basque fighters surrendered and the British ships were prepared to carry them away from

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[54] They only had access to Cantabria and Asturias, two small provinces that did not survive much longer the determined attack of Franco's troops.

[55] Gernika is the capital of Bizkaia and symbolic capital of all the Basque lands, because according to the Basque lore from times immemorial, the Spanish Kings came to swear under the tree of Gernika to protect the Basque *fueros*. It was bombed on 26 of April 1937 by the German Condor Legion, which Hitler sent to help Franco's troops. It was one of the first systematic air strikes against the civilian population in history (another Basque town, Durango, was similarly attacked a couple of days before), which, after two and a half hours left 1654 people dead (out of the total population of around 6000) and the whole town in ruins.

the port of Santander, Santander has also fallen to Franco's troops, the port was closed

and the Basque combatants taken to prison. As Anthony Beevor writes:

> It was this dishonouring of the articles of surrender which the Basque ETA guerrillas advanced in later years as a reason why the Republic of Euzkadi[56] was still at war with the Franquist state. (Beevor 1982, p.170)

View of the situation on the side of the Republic was, probably, somewhat different.

Independent moves of the Basques, such as refusal to help other parts of the Northern

Front gave constant headache to the Republican leaders. The refusal of nationalist leaders

to destroy the metallurgic industry in Bilbao before its surrender was also interpreted as

something completely different from loyalty. These disagreements, however, could soon

be forgotten as all the Republican territories together suffered from Francoist repression.

The two Basque Provinces were declared "traitor provinces", the last remnants of the

former freedoms – the *Conciertos Economicos* – abolished and the expressions of

Basqueness forbidden.[57] The new Mayor of Bilbao, José Maria Areilza announced:

> Bilbao … has been conquered by the army … Bilbao is a city redeemed by blood … Spain, united, great and free, has triumphed. The horrible and sinister nightmare called Euskadi has fallen defeated forever. Vizcaya is again a piece of Spain through pure and simple military conquest. (translation in Woodworth 2001, p.30)

In the part on the Spanish historical discourse, the Civil War was also mentioned as one

of the strongest points of historical memory. The Civil War thus became an "original"

event (Zulaika 1988, p.34) in Basque historical memory. According to Zulaika, it was

organizing a significant part of local experience as far as the beginning of 1980s. The

author distinguishes 20 elements that characterize "war frame" in this experience

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[56] *Euzkadi* was the name that Sabino Arana invented for the Basque Country. His initial spelling of the word was with "z", however, later on the spelling was changed to "s". Beevor here is using an old version, which was actually used at the time of Civil War.

[57] Actually, the initial repression was less harsh here than in other parts of Republican territories, as Elorza explains, "Nationalists were people of order who maintained good relations with the Right in their villages" (Elorza 1996, p.31).

determining the way social relations are arranged and discourses are constructed. (Zulaika 1988, p.32-34) This war frame resembles closely the construction of discourse through the logic of equivalence. It is, actually, the logic of equivalence brought to its most radical form, where the two chains are literally at war, where the rigid constructions do not permit any deviances. In addition, these constructions are, as we saw from the discussions of the Spanish historical discourse, not only political, but also moral. Even the victory at war does not eradicate the rightness of the cause and it is only through the physical elimination that the complete destruction of the opposing chain and, consequently, the closure of discourse can be achieved.

Thus, the Civil War presented also a unique experience of violence for the national cause in the Basque Country. While the Carlist Wars did give an inspiration for the creation of Basque nationalism and Sabino Arana managed to find four glorious battles that the Basques have won during the ages, it was during the Civil War that the figure and image of a Basque soldier, a *gudari*, who fights for the freedom of Euskadi as his *Patria* and "who turns, *defensively*, through a struggle (*borroka-ekintza*) to the violent negation of the other" (Beriain 1997, p.162, italics author's) is created. Following this tradition, ETA members will present itself as the new *gudaris* and adopt the war-time anthem *Eusko gudariak gara* (We are Basque soldiers) as its own.

A couple of examples could be added in order to show that the experience of the Civil War as the primary and the most important political experience, which we already saw in the analysis of the Spanish historical discourse, persists also in the Basque Country. When the tensions arise in the political space, they still bring up accusations and symbolizations of the adversary that refer to the Civil War and the dictatorship. In the

chapter on the Spanish historical discourse I already mentioned a statement of Arnaldo Otegi[58], where the Popular Party is alluded to as an heir of one of the sides that perpetrated violence during the Civil War. On other occasions it would be directly called an "heir to Franco." An exchange of remarks in the Basque Parliament in the end of 2003 provides an interesting example of this. During the debate on the issue of the situation of prisons in the Basque Country, the heated atmosphere resulted in an exchange of insults between the Councilor of Justice in the Basque government Joseba Azkaraga and the president of the Basque PP Carlos Iturgaiz, with the former calling the PP the "legitimate heirs of Francoism" and the latter insinuating the same about the councilor's relation to ETA. In reaction to this, the Speaker of the Parliament from the PNV, Juan María Atutxa ordered that the last insult be taken out of the minutes, and after a protest of Iturgaiz, expelled the president of the PP from the Hall. (*El País*, 25 October 2003)

The exchange conveys a double play. On the one hand, it shows how in the circumstances of an extreme tension the two equivalential chains are constructed: *francoist* versus *etarra* (member of ETA). Both of these refer to violence and repression, but also have a double symbolical meaning for the parts involved. Mentioning of ETA brings forth the negativity itself, thus the reaction to this insult is stronger than to the insinuation of the PP being heirs to Franco. Here we can see the construction of Francoist vs etarra chains of equivalence, though on the republican side there was violence, but that violence was already so thoroughly exploited by Franco and his followers that the mention of it would resuscitate more the negative feelings towards Francoism than to the

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[58] To repeat it: "One cannot share the path to the resolution of democratic conflict, Mr. Zapatero, making a strategy together with the heirs of those who executed your grandfather. We, the ones who lost the war, are the ones who should construct the alternative politics for Euskal Herria." (see p.50)

perpetrators of that violence,[59] hence, ETA comes as a handy weapon for the other side to counter the "francoist" insult.

This way, we can see how repression helps to change the past – the Civil War becomes not a war between the Basques themselves, as was mentioned, two of the four Basque Provinces were actually fighting on the side of Franco, but the war between the Spanish and the Basques. According to Diego Muro, the whole discourse of the so-called Basque National Liberation Movement (MLNV, as the abbreviation goes in Spanish) is constructed around the understanding of the current situation of the Basque Country as a continuation of the war between the Basques and the Spanish, mainly, a continuation of the Civil War understood in these simplified terms. (Muro 2006) This confirms with the Zulaika's description of the war frame and goes according to the logic of the creation of the chains of equivalence as the theory of Laclau and Mouffe would have it. However, the statement of Otegi also conveys that the attributions to one or another side are not necessarily that rigid and can well change according to the political situation.

Birth of ETA to Transition

After the Civil War the Basque government and the leadership of the PNV went to exile. During the WWII they worked together with the Allied forces aiding to bring about the fall of Fascism and Nazism. It was expected that at the end of the war the allied powers would also destroy the last citadel of Rightist extremism, which was then Franco's Spain. However, soon the Cold War started, the enemies changed and Franco's strong anti-

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[59] On the other hand, the recent years have seen the appearance of numerous works which exploit the topic of violence on the Republican side during the Civil War, providing a kind of "revisionist history." These works, however, often lack scientific rigor and political neutrality and actually revive the Francoist interpretation of the Civil War. The best example here could be the works of Pío Moa (especially his *Myths of the Civil War*).

Communist stance made him a good ally in this new conflict. In 1953 an agreement was signed between Franco and the USA that provided the country with funds for recovery but also buried hopes of those who thought the Allied powers would work to diminish the dictator.

After nearly 20 years of struggle, this was the last blow for the Basque political leadership, which resigned itself to its fate and shifted its attention from opposition to the dictatorship to preservation of cultural values and passive resistance. Dictatorship's attempts to reduce to nothingness that distinctiveness of which the Basques were so proud, made this cultural resistance an important and strong point in the fight for survival.

However, what was seen as strengthening national culture for some, was considered a weakness by the others. For the youths growing in the "world of silence" (Letamendia 1994, vol.1 p.249) that the defeatism of the 1950s in combination with the repression of dictatorship created, such a stance was not acceptable. Already in 1952 a group of students established a journal *Ekin*.[60] The aim of this publication was "to study and critically reflect the past and present of the Basque nation" (Garmendia 1996, p.51). The group that developed around this periodical took the same name.

The concern for language and preservation of Basque culture that were the initial ideological points of the new organization were close to the aims that the PNV both in exile and in the underground has established. The new organization, however, seemed to provide a more elaborated position and way of action, especially for the younger generations impatient with the cautious stance of the PNV. Seeing these merits in *Ekin*,

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[60] *Ekin* means "to act" in Basque, while *ekintza* is "action". Action instead of the words was one of the mostly emphasized notions in this new organization.

the leadership of the PNV invited the group to give some lectures and provide guidance for its own youth organization EGI. However, such a merger was short-lived and in 1959 the group separated itself from EGI, taking with it a large part of the members of the latter and founding a new organization *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (Basque Land and Freedom), ETA.

At its inception ETA represented one of the faces of the Basque nationalism – a more radical one, more independentist, less prone to ambivalence. It was the militant face of this nationalism, which, however, from its inception brought some novelties to the Basque nationalist discourse. First of all, while the PNV was conservative and clerical, ETA adopted socialist ideas. Secondly, it opted for keeping the Church away from politics.[61] And thirdly, it changed the criterion for Basqueness from race to language thus opening the possibility for the immigrants to participate in the nationalist project. (see, for example, Jáuregui 1986, p.592-595)

All these changes were interrelated and were due to the fusion of the traditional Basque nationalist discourse with that of the incoming ideologies such as socialism and third-worldism. In 1961, when ETA celebrated its first Assembly it was still unclear about its ideological goals or the methods to adopt. What it wanted was "national liberation", but how to achieve it and what should come after that was unclear, thus, in its official bulletin *Zutik* (Stand Up!) it was advocating both the non-violent methods a la Gandhi and violence inspired by the processes in Algeria.

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[61] ETA was never hostile to the Church, though, because of the intimately tied relation it had with the nationalist movement (being throughout Francoism the only bearer of nationalist ideas alongside family) and because of the fact that ETA itself as well as numerous of its militants, had its origins in the environment closely related to the Catholicism.

In 1963-1964 these positions became clearer: Ludwig Krutwig's *Vasconia*, which was to become the Bible of the early ETA was published at this time and the II and III Assemblies of organization in which the third-worldist stance of ETA intensified took place. Krutwig's ideas on the nature of the struggle in Basque Country as well as the methods for this struggle gained orthodoxy status in these assemblies.

Krutwig, "Basque of German origin", influenced to a great extent by Frantz Fannon, declared the Basques a distinct nation, which was proudly defending its freedom through the ages (the medieval battles again appear as an example), but now is subdued by the colonizing power of Spain. They could be liberated only by arms, to establish a state based on both ethnic values, i.e. language, and socialist values of solidarity of the workers. The Basques, actually, always possessed the spirit of Communism, living in medieval times in communities based on the principles of solidarity, which were always opposite to those proclaimed by medieval Spain. Thus, in the Basque Country, actually, there was no "class war", as there were no classes. Industrial revolution changed this situation creating in Bizkaia a capitalist class that is not originally Basque and bringing in numerous immigrants workers, which the former exploits (Jáuregui 1981, p.189). Thus, for the nationalism worker struggle is something alien, as that of national liberation might be for the workers. But the same way as the solidarity ideals, imprinted already in the genes of the Basques, can well make part of the national liberation struggle, the workers may also adopt the struggle of national liberation and by so doing become a part of the Basque nation.

Concerning tactics, the book proposed the theory of action-reaction-action, which was quickly taken by ETA as its primary *modus operandi*. In its Theoretical Bases of Revolutionary Warfare, written in 1964, it gave this principle a clear shape:

> Suppose a situation in which an organized minority strikes material and psychological blows to the organization of the State, forcing it to respond and to violently repress the aggression. Suppose that the organized minority manages to escape repression, and that it falls on the masses. Finally, suppose that the minority manages to make rebelliousness instead of panic spread among the population, so that it helps and protects the minority against the State; the action-repression cycle is therefore ready to repeat itself with increasing intensity. (quoted in GEES 2003, p.2).

At the same time a definite rupture between the PNV and newly established organization took place. ETA accused the PNV to have become a collaborator of the colonizing forces and the latter responded with declaring ETA a Communist organization, full of slanderers and liars using "repulsive methods" (quoted in Jáuregui 1981, p.288). For the PNV, ETA creates division and confusion within the "patriotic society" (de Pablo et al. 1988, p.145), while for ETA the Basque Government in exile and the leadership of the PNV provided an object for vehement attacks. It was now a party to be dismissed from further consideration about the future of the country.

Thus, the realities of the Basque Country have changed and so have the main actors. Now ETA was taking over the ages-old Jesuit model, stating radically and clearly what it wants to achieve and that is the only possible means and ends of the revolutionary struggle:

> For us, as for a Crusader of the 10th century, our truth is absolute truth, that is, exclusive truth, which allows neither doubt nor opposition of any real or virtual enemies. Consequently, we are intransigent in our idea, our truth and our essential aims (*La Insurrección en Euzkadi*, p.31)

However, it was not that easy to agree on what those aims are supposed to be. Thus, already in 1966, ETA experienced its first schism. From the inception of organization, the

tension between Marxist and nationalist ideals in it was present. Therefore, most of the schisms were related to the lack of balance between these two elements of the discourse in the organization. During the early years of the organization, three main factions appeared: the so-called *obreristas*, i.e. supporters of the worker struggle and increasingly identifying themselves with the Leftist revolutionary movements of Europe at large; *culturalistas*, or the ones who accentuated traditional objectives of the Basque nationalism, especially the preservation of language; and finally, the *tercermundistas*, the third-worldists, who saw Basque liberation movement as a part of anti-colonial struggle and offered to leave the other debates on the structure of this state, etc. for the future (see, for example, Zulaika, Douglass 1996, p.246). The two of the latter took upper hand and the former were expelled, accusing them to be *"españolistas"*, i.e. lackeys of Spain. Organization, hence, adopted a more nationalist stance, getting back to the "vast family" of Basque nationalism, reconciling itself with the PNV (Letamendia 1994, vol.1, p.308). Krutwig's interpretations of Basque struggle for liberation were useful for this fusion between culturalists and *tercermundistas*, thus, further tension between the two remaining groups was not as harsh as with the *obreristas*. Some of the members left the organization and one truth remained as in aforementioned *Insurrection in Euskadi*.[62]

In the beginning, the invitations of ETA to armed struggle were more words than deeds. This changed in 1968, when in one day ETA claims its first victim and first martyr. The Rubicon was crossed.[63] And the reaction of the people was inspiring – throughout two

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[62] The expelled members founder their own organization ETA-berri, new ETA, but soon changed its name into *Komunistak* (the Communists) that was a clear definition of its ideological position.
[63] ETA already made some sporadic attempts to show itself disposed to actually pursue the armed struggle with the unsuccessful attempts to derail the trains in 1961, later on the more successful bombs in Bolueta and Eibar (villages in Basque Country), but it was not until the death of *Guardia Civil* José Pardines and subsequent death of his killer that the organization actually crossed the line.

months the masses in memory of the dead *etarra* (member of ETA) Txabi Etxebarrieta attract great masses of the Basques and ETA is starting to establish itself as "the only anti-francoist group, which practices armed struggle" (Garmendia 1996, p.357). Hence, the spiral of violence started. ETA revenged the death of their martyr by killing a policeman Meliton Manzanas, known as a sadistic torturer. The State responded with declaring state of exception and arresting hundreds of Basques.

At the same time ETA experienced another schism – a group of the leaders of the organization again started raising the questions on strategy and ideology that led to division during the Fifth Assembly. They decided to call on the VI Assembly to clarify these issues, themselves considering that the movement is too much concentrated on the issues of Basqueness. Another break was imminent as a powerful group of militants refused to participate in the VI Assembly. Both groups expelled one another from the organization, but from then ETA was divided into two: ETA(V) and ETA(VI).

In December 1970, a military court started to examine the case of so-called Burgos Sixteen, the people implicated in the murder of Manzanas. The start of the trial was met with demonstrations throughout Spain, strikes and violent confrontation with the police. Another state of exception was introduced, but the protests were impossible to stop. Spanish embassies were attacked, mass demonstrations took place in other European countries, and numerous intellectuals wrote petitions against Spain and in favor of ETA. The process reached its peak with the condemnation of the defendants, six of which received death sentences. Public outrage at the decision was so great and international pressure so strong that Franco himself had to interfere and change the immediate death sentences to thirty years in prison.

The defendants of Burgos trial became heroes, ETA was on its highest peak of popularity, but the two factions were still in war with one another. However, the scales were getting clearly more favorable to the ETA(V). In the beginning of 1971 the defendants of Burgos signed a letter attacking the schismatics of ETA(VI) and accepting authority of ETA(V). In 1972 ETA(VI) lost numerous of its militants who came back to ETA(V) and the organization dissolved itself a year later, the remnants of it joining Revolutionary Communist League (*Liga Comunista Revolucionaria*).

ETA(V), in contrast, resumed its armed activity, which culminated on 20 December 1973, when the organization managed to blow up the car in which Franco's Prime Minister and heir Admiral Carrero Blanco was traveling. This attack again raised ETA's popularity and is believed to be one of the reasons why after the death of dictator the process of transition could start.

In a year ETA experienced yet another, the most important of its splits. Again, the conflict arose between those who accentuated worker movement part of the organization's ideology and those who stressed more nationalist objectives. The former thought that with the assassination of Carrero Blanco and the imminent death of Franco, the future of ETA should be reconsidered. They wanted to change the structure of organization by combining political activity and military action and thus try to advance the goals of the working class. For the other part of the organization, the new situation was inspiring for even stronger military action with an attempt to force through Basque independence. The former took a name of ETA(pm) or ETA *politico-militar* and the latter that of ETA(m) or ETA *militar*. ETA(pm) emerged stronger from this split, but it soon dedicated itself more to non-violent popular mobilization. ETA(m), which committed

158

itself to the armed struggle soon got to its feet and lured away some more radical members of ETA(pm).

As it could be seen from this narration of the schisms of ETA, the organization developed in a rather typical way of underground communities. (see Della Porta 1995) Logic of equivalence resulting in complete war frames demand that there would be no disagreements, that there would be "one truth" which is adhered to by everyone. It could be said that the project of such groups as ETA is hegemonic, thus expansive, but also deepening, in a sense that it demands complete allegiance to this project from the ones who already sympathize with it. Violence plays an important role in this by keeping a level of alert and the emotional excitement at its highest. Like in the French revolution, thus, terror becomes not only directed at the external enemy, but is also used as a means to keep the emotional commitment to the "cause" always at the same level.[64]

Transition and Democracy

In November 1975, Franco dies and the process of transition to democracy starts. In the Basque Country, as in all Spain this was to have numerous implications. The transition was lived in the climate of radicalization. In the last years of dictatorship the two provinces Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa were put under regime of emergency countless times. ETA's killings continued and the reaction of the state got even harsher. Months before Franco's death the police was given special powers by the law passed in April and in August an Anti-terrorist Decree was approved, by which the sentences for terrorist crimes

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[64] Already one of the classical theorists of revolutions L.P. Edwards in his book *The Natural History of Revolution* claimed that terror appear in the societies where the public emotions have reached the highest point and its end is associated with the emotional fatigue. Other important ideas about terror as a program to contain emotions and keep them at the same level can be found in Lynn Hunt's book *Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution* (1984), the collection of essays *La République et la Terreur*, edited by Catherine Kinzler and Hadi Rizk, etc

159

are raised significantly, people accused to take part in such activities could now be held ten days *incommunicado*, etc. (Letamendia 1994, vol.1, p.409). These laws passed on to the new state as the transition took place. In addition, the police forces were inherited from Franco and their methods of work were hardly democratic, their ways of pacifying social protests involved mainly a dire use of force. (see, for example, Reinares 1999, Preston 1996) The interpretation of these facts in a great part of the Basque society was that the state has only changed its robes, while its essence remained the same.

According to Letamendia, this fact is one of the primary reasons why the Basques were the only ones that went completely against the way the process of transition was being made. The transition at the center was supposed to be a pacted one, mild and smooth, even the parties that at the beginning argued for radical rupture came to accept it this way. The Basques, on the other hand, came with different demands. The first is conditioned by ETA and by the repressive reaction to its actions by the state. ETA came out as a hero of the struggle against the dictatorship in the eyes of many, however, with the start of transition it was persecuted as before and many of its members were still in prison. The pro-amnesty movement was to blend all the different parts of the Basque nationalist movement into one, leaving no one indifferent. The demand that surged up with force at this time was to dissolve all the repressive forces of the regime or at least have them leave the territory of Basque Country. Another demand that united the ETA's environment and moderate nationalists was that of recognition of the Basques as a national entity.

All in all, in 1975 ETA raised its principal non-negotiable demands, which were supposed to be endorsed and argued for by all the organizations within the network, some

of them would have also been supported by the moderate PNV. It raised demands of political freedoms, of dissolution of repressive apparatuses of the state, of recognition of Euskadi "as a nationality with the full sovereignty over its interests and destiny," immediately establish the autonomy regime of the four provinces, etc. (*Informe No.2*, p.522)

The demands themselves were hard to meet, but especially so as the organizations of the Basque Left, *Izquierda Abertzale* (literally, patriotic left), i.e. ETA's environment themselves could not agree to create a common front to support them. The PNV here was more realistic and more prone to collaboration with the Spanish parties in order to achieve its objectives, an idea that was a taboo for the ETA.

The demands changed somewhat but the principal ones remained the same: amnesty for all the Basque political prisoners, legalization of all the parties, withdrawal of all the repressive apparatuses, primarily *Guardia Civil*, incorporation of Navarre and the right to self-determination. These five points made part of so-called KAS Alternative (*Alternativa KAS*) that set the preconditions for ETA ceasefire and for the participation of organizations of its environment in the first general elections. However, again, the Alternative was a short-lived compromise. When the transitional government of Adolfo Suarez declared amnesty for political prisoners, the parts of KAS split again in their positions: the ones related to ETA(pm) were thinking that this show of good will on the part of the state was enough for participation in newly established democratic processes, the ones related to ETA(m) had a contrary opinion. Consequently, in the first general elections of 1977, the ETA(pm) had its representatives in the coalition of Basque Left

(EE – *Euskadiko Ezkerra*), the part of ETA(m) did not.[65] The success of the party was partial – having only one representative at the Cortes it could not do much to achieve its objectives, but it gave certain visibility to the demands and created an alternative to moderate stance of the PNV. In addition, participation of Basque electorate in the elections was pretty high.

ETA(m) saw in this both the confirmation of its ideas that the parliamentary process was not the way to attain the fulfillment of its demands and the need to adapt to the changing environment by achieving electoral visibility. Thus, a broad coalition called *Herri Batasuna* (HB – Popular Unity) was formed. The HB was to become the principal actor of the Basque Left, with the EE shifting gradually to the more moderate position. ETA(pm) itself disbanded in 1982, the EE eventually merged with the Basque division of the PSOE to form the PSE-EE. ETA(m) remained again the sole violent actor and the HB monopolized the position of the Basque Left in the political arena.

ETA's military and political strength notwithstanding, the PNV still emerged as the strongest party in Basque politics. It also had a wider, more realistic view of the situation, realizing both that the participation in the process of democratic transition might bring advantages to the Basques and that certain demands of the more radical Basque Left are hardly possible to satisfy, considering the constellation of forces at the center of Spanish politics and strength of the Franco "old guard" and the army. However, even the PNV was frustrated by the proceedings of the first years of democracy. As it was mentioned,

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[65] Actually, the situation was more complicated. In fact, ETA(pm) political wing made decision to participate in the elections by itself, the armed organization was against this participation. After the success that the party had in these elections (it won 6% of the vote and sent one representative to the Spanish Parliament), ETA(pm) reconsidered its position, claiming now that it was the right decision, for in fact, "[a]bstention was reduced to a mere symbolic gesture, demonstrating the refusal by certain forces to participate in the electoral game, but apparently without offering an alternative solution to the people" (quoted in Irvin 1999, p.113).

the PNV was excluded from the elaboration of the first project of the Constitution, later on all but two from more than a hundred amendments that it proposed were rejected. Finally, the PNV's vision of the Constitution itself and its understanding of how the Spanish state should look like had almost nothing to do with the one that took shape during constitutional process. As Jordi Solé noted:

> The leaders of the PNV understood the constitutional process as an opportunity to obtain a "foral pact", that is, a formula, which would allow them to maintain the ambiguity on the topic on independence … and at the same time keep the juridical background of the sovereignty of Euskadi. (Solé 1985, p.103).

The PNV was thus keeping to its traditions: relation between the Basque Country and the Central authorities had to be horizontal, based on negotiation, as, supposedly, was the case in medieval times. The competences of the autonomies had to be as vast as possible, keeping up with the tradition of foral system and the setting should provide with preconditions for a possible exercise of self-determination, in the meanwhile keeping an ambiguous position as to whether independence would be a preferred option in such a situation. For the statist parties, on the other hand, as was mentioned already in the previous part, such an understanding of the nature of the Spanish state was out of question. Thus, as one of the officials stated: "There exists an absolute discord between the principles of the PNV and ours", i.e. those of the government. (*El País*, 21 July 1978)

The sentiments apparently were mutual, because frustrated by the lack of success of making the larger parties to adopt the amendments that it was proposing, the representatives of the PNV left the Hall before the final vote on the full text of the Constitution. The form of the Spanish state that the Constitution proposed was not

something that the PNV imagined, the Constitutional text failed to include its proposals[66], Navarre was left out of the future Basque Autonomous Region,[67] etc. When the time for the referendum on the Constitution came, the PNV did not have much doubt over what course to propose for its voters – abstention. The parties of ETA environment advocated an outright "no" as were the parties of radical right. In the end the referendum results in the Basque Country were as follows: 45% of the registered voters turned out to vote, from these 74.6% voted for and 25.4% against the Constitution[68]. In other parts of Spain in the meanwhile participation was 67.2% and the "yes" votes 87.87%.[69]

This quickly became part of the Basque political lore – the Basques showed themselves to be against the Spanish Constitution. It also created another ambiguity, for these numbers could well be interpreted in two ways – if one needs to show the acceptance to the Constitution, 75% of the Basques voted for (taking just the percentage of the voters who came to referendum), if rejection – favorable vote can be only 30% (taking the

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[66] With an exception of the notion that Civil Liberties should not be restrained during the State of Emergency in Article 116 and a change of text in Article 144, concerning the constitution of Autonomous Communities.

[67] One of the demands of both the PNV and the Basque Left was to have Navarre included into the future Basque Region, however, this was a taboo both for the Navarese and for the Francoists. From the onset, Navarre was a different case from the three other Basque provinces. While the former were incorporated into the Kingdom of Castile, the latter functioned as an independent Kingdom before the 1512 and as one of the kingdoms of Spain (which itself at the time was a joint venture of Castile and Aragon) afterwards. Geographically the province itself is divided into two – the mountainous north and the south which already belongs to the Castilian plane. In addition, this division is also ethno-linguistic – with the north Basque-speaking and the south almost purely Castilian. Furthermore, economically it was always more related to its southern neighbors of Aragon and Castile. The Basque nationalism was never very popular in the province. Carlism, which receded in the other three provinces (except for Alava where it remained on more or less the same level as Nationalism) was still strong there. (see, for example, Blinkhorn 1974, p.596-599) Navarre, thus, proud of its own distinctive identity was never very receptive of the Basque nationalist claims. During the Civil War it opted for the defense of religion and the state, following the old Carlist slogan and became the most ferociously supportive force for Franco. For that reason the old Francoist guard saw the possible incorporation of Navarre to the Basque Autonomous Community as an outrage. The political outlook of the province remains similar to this day: its pro-Spanish and anti-Basque nationalist stance and its idea of distinctiveness is strong and the rejection of any possibility of incorporation to the Basque Autonomy still stark. A good example of this could be seen in the recent debates on the possible outcomes of the dialogue with ETA as the Navarese fear that their autonomy will be sacrificed for the settlement of the conflict.

[68] See http://www1.euskadi.net/emaitzak/indice_c.htm

[69] http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/constitucion/cronologia/cronologia.jsp?anio=1978

proportion of all the registered voters).[70] Furthermore, in just a year, the Basque Autonomy Statute was proposed for the referendum. This time the negotiations with Central government were seemingly more successful and the referendum as well – 58.9% of voters have participated and 95% of those said "yes" to the Statute[71] with the Radical Left calling for abstention and the PNV for a favorable vote.

The Central Government worked hard to persuade the party to accept the statute, it understood that the repetition of the situation of referendum on the Constitution would be highly damaging to the relations between the Basque Provinces and the Central government and would significantly undermine the legitimacy of Spain in these provinces. The PNV had lukewarm feelings towards the main law of the newly formed autonomy – it was better than nothing (actually, it gave the Basques more rights than to any other Autonomy in the Spanish state), but it still did not admit the "original sovereignty of the autonomous entities" (Letamendia 1994, vol.2, p.300). However, it managed to maintain the appearance that the text is a result of an agreement between the "two sovereign wills" (Letamendia 1994, p.301). The legal grounds for such a claim would give the Additional Provision 1, which states that:

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[70] The level of abstention, obviously, can be interpreted in a number of different ways. For example, for Preston (1993) both the stance of the PNV and the actual level of abstention are the factors of the ETA's campaign. According to him, the PNV chose to be advocate abstention because "in the fevered atmosphere generated by extreme *abertzales*, the PNV did not want to be seen to be in agreement with the government" (Preston 1993, p.146) and the level of abstention itself "reflected, at least in small villages, an element of fear. Effectively, abstention calls had destroyed in rural areas the secrecy of the ballot since to vote at all implied a rejection of the *abertzale* parties' instructions." (Preston 1993, p.150). While these interpretations have some ground, they lack credibility. The first one, because it overlooks the PNV's own dissatisfaction with the Constitution, which was as much, if not more, based on the party's own ideology as on the pressure from the nationalist fringes. The second explanation is also faulty: the author himself mentions numerous times both the strong support enjoyed by ETA during the transition (as well as a pretty widespread feeling that nothing much has changed during the transition) and the high percentage of votes received exactly in these rural areas by the *abertzale* parties, especially the *Herri Batasuna*. That the voters in the Basque provinces decided not to go to the referendum because of the pressure from ETA and not their own considerations, thus, does not sound as a plausible explanation.

[71] See http://www1.euskadi.net/emaitzak/indice_c.htm

> The acceptance of the system of autonomy established in this Statute does not imply that the Basque People waive the rights that as such may have accrued to them in virtue of their history and which may be updated in accordance with the stipulations of the legal system.[72]

The Central government had a very negative attitude towards this Provision and certain other articles of the Statute (see Letamendia 1994, vol.2, p.303), however, finally, the personal negotiations between the leader of the PNV Carlos Garaikoetxea and the Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez gave fruit and the Statute was accepted by the Spanish Parliament.[73] According to Letamendia:

> This way in the imaginary of the PNV the Statute appears as an act between the sovereign wills, the national leaders that have signed the Pact are Garaikoetxea for the Basque nation and Suárez for the Spanish. For the traditional nationalism, the Statute as a Pact thus becomes the founding myth of the new autonomous legality. (Letamendia 1994, vol.2, p.308).

With the main documents regulating institutional arrangements in place, the process of institutionalization started. The PNV emerged strongest in 1980 autonomy elections and worked on designing the norms of the autonomous community. At the same time ETA(m) continued its violent activities and ETA(pm) was always weaker. In 1981 a frustrated coup slowed down the process of development of autonomy – the attack of the *golpistas* was seen as an attack against the Constitution and thus the members of the Parliament turn against anyone who is considered to be an opponent of the Basic Law, also the Basque nationalists. The PNV remains silent here, trying not to provoke anyone. The two parts of ETA are making their own interpretation of events: according to ETA(m), the coup attempt was fake and only served to strengthen more the armed forces,

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[72] http://www.euskadi.net/autogobierno/estatu_i.htm

[73] The possibility of breaking the negotiations was not very appetizing for the government itself, even though other plans of dealing with the Basque were considered, such as declaring the region under "state of siege" if the Statute is approved without the consent of the PNV and other Basque parties and the violence would take place. This would mean entry of the army into the territory of the Basque Provinces and would obviously just give more credit to ETA's claims that Euskadi was an occupied state.

according to ETA(pm), the massive demonstrations against the coup and for the protection of the Constitution show that the defense of the text might be the only way to deal with the future attempts to restore the dictatorship. Given a favorable policy on the part of the state (making possible the reinsertion of the members of the organization that renounce violence), next year ETA(pm) decided to disband.

From Ajuria Enea to Lizarra

While for the whole of Spain transition ended in 1982 with the election of Socialist Party, in the Basque Country, according to Ibarra Güell, this period should be extended up to 1988, the year of the pact of Ajuria Enea and the seeming marginalization of ETA (Ibarra Güell 1994, p.422). It could also be argued, that transition in fact never ended, because neither Constitutional process nor the subsequent events have taken out of the agenda what came to be called the "Basque question".

One of the events that led to the adoption of the pact of Ajuria Enea, was a schism within the PNV. The change in the environment supposed the need for the change in the party's politics and views, the PNV had to move from "resistance" to "co-governance" attitudes (Letamendia 1994, vol.3, p.66). However, this move brought up two different understandings of the meaning of Statute in the Basque politics: the one seeing it as "a distance to go within a long march of nationalism" and the other one looking forward to "'regenerating' the Statute" by exposing its essence as a negotiated pact of two sovereign wills and to use its Additional Provision 1 to demand the self-determination for the Basque people (Letamendia 1994, vol.3, p.80).

In addition, another conflict of ideas appeared in the way that the so-called "historical territories" i.e. the territorial entities with different "historical rights", were to be treated.

One part of the PNV supported the continuation or even enhancement of the role of "historical territories" – on the ideological grounds, because, as it was mentioned, it saw the "historical rights" as a fundament on which the whole idea of the Basque nation and sovereignty was built, but also on the pragmatic grounds, because the PNV fared very well in the provincial elections. Another part of the party saw things differently, wanting to advance new regional institutions and curb the powers of the provinces for more emphasis on the Basque government. (see, Ross 1991)

Tensions between these different understandings and the groups supporting them reached its peak in 1986. The supporters of the self-determination stance and of a more powerful regional government left the PNV and formed their own party *Eusko Alkartasuna* (EA – Basque Unity), exposing more radical positions than the old party, but still remaining within the mark of the Constitution. As Letamendia writes: EA "presented itself as a radical nationalism without violence, that is, like a Herri Batasuna without ETA." (Letamendia 1994, vol.3, p.80)

The schism left the PNV much weaker – the EA took away around 40% of its votes (the PNV received 23%, the EA – 15%, while in the previous election the joint result was 42%).[74] The crisis also strengthened HB, which takes away many votes coming from the traditional nationalist parties. In the 1986 elections to the Basque Parliament it gained 17.47% of votes, 3% more than in the elections to the Basque Parliament 2 years before. This was also the period of intense actions of the GAL, which undermines even more the

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[74] For these and further results of the Basque elections, see
http://www1.euskadi.net/emaitzak/datuak/indice_c.apl

legitimacy of the state within the radical nationalist community and which raised sympathies for ETA.[75]

In this situation, none of the parties, neither those of the state (the strongest state party PSOE was getting 23% of the vote), nor the nationalists had a necessary majority to form the government. Different coalitions were being considered, however, at the point the most reasonable choice appeared to be a coalition between the PSE-PSOE and the PNV, both of parties that were prone to work for the development of competences of Statute (at this time the PNV is clearly on its autonomist side of the scales). A representative of the PNV, José Antonio Ardanza became the Lehendakari and the Socialist Jesus Eginguren was elected president of the Parliament. In the meanwhile, the HB keeps getting more votes and ETA(m) engages in ever more bloody, less selective actions.[76] In these circumstances, the PNV proposes a pact for pacification of Euskadi in an attempt to marginalize ETA and to separate violence from any political objectives. The Pact, later known as *Pact of Ajuria Enea*, according to the name of the residence of Lehendakari where it was signed, is called an *Agreement for the Normalization and Pacification of the Basque Country* and was signed by all the parties with representation in Basque Parliament, except for HB. It rejects any use of violence, condemns terrorism, glorifies the Statute, calling for its full implementation[77], bows down before the Constitution and calls for cooperation with the Central government in the matters of terrorism, also stating that:

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[75] At this point the implication of security forces of Spain in the GAL is more rumored than proven.

[76] 19 of June 1987 attack on a supermarket in Catalonia is the bloodiest of ETA's acts. It claimed 21 lives and left numerous wounded. ETA claimed that it announced about the bomb, but the security forces did not listen, according to the police, though, the announcement came too late and it was not possible to evacuate the people and to deactivate the bomb.

[77] Many competences that the state had to transfer to the Basque Autonomy were not achieved at the moment, there still are 37 competences, the transfer of which is still in process.

any reference made in the Agreement to the political problems in the Basque Country, to the development of the Statute, or to the relations the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country may have with the Community of Navarre, may in no case be understood as an attempt to justify terrorism nor as a condition, compensation or exchange for the ending of terrorist violence, which lacks any kind of justification in this society. The Basque political parties' condemnation and rejection of ETA is based on the legitimacy conferred on them by their democratic, peaceful defense of the principle of self-government for our people.[78]

ETA interpreted this pact as an attempt to put it in a worse position before the negotiations that it is about to start with the government, in addition, it showed a sell-out of the PNV, who has finally showed its true face as a lackey of the powers in Madrid. For others, on the other hand, the Pact has a different meaning:

Agreement for Peace crystallizes the identification between the support for the Basque statutory frame and democracy, and will serve as evidence that traditional nationalism agrees to substitute an old dichotomy between the Basque and Spanish nationalists and to replace it with that, which socialists were offering since 1979 – between the "democratic" and "violent" Basques (Letamendia 1994, vol.3, p.135).

The Pact of Ajuria Enea gave frame for political development in Euskadi until 1997. ETA and its environment remained marginalized, the cooperation between the PNV and the socialists within the frame of Statute, continued. The years between signing of the Pact and the 1995 saw the change also in the discourse of the MLNV (the major change for the other parties was the differentiation between democratic and violent blocks) and consequently strategy of ETA that were to have a crucial importance on the future events. The Pact of Ajuria Enea is interpreted by the movement as a declaration of war on all of it, not only ETA. As all the other political forces except for the ones belonging to the ETA environment, signed the Pact, it became a sign that only ETA remained as a true patriot of the country, all the others becoming traitors and their democratic credentials are just the outer signs of distinction. ETA and the movement starts to talk about the

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[78] http://www.euskadi.net/pakea/pacto_i.htm

"political negotiations" (*negociación politica*) and the "will to dialogue" (*voluntad de diálogo*). The latter is apparently lacking in the other political forces and that is the reason why the "Basque problem" remains unsolved. In addition, the Pact is working to criminalize the movement and "has cultivated the politics of social clash and caused the [reappearance] of the *civil confrontation* within the Basque society." (López Vidales 1999)

Therefore, in 1995 after this process of development a new political and violent strategy is put into place. The first, the so-called Democratic Alternative (*Alternativa Democratica*) of ETA, to a great extent reiterated the demands put on the Spanish state (and to a lesser extent the French one) that were put forward in the KAS Alternative, without the emphasis on the socialism that was present in the first one, but with the same insistence on the necessity to negotiate some fundamental questions. Of course, ETA would do the negotiations with the Spanish state on behalf of the Basques, but at least there is an assertion of the need to give a word to the Basque people. This is something new, because the text is directed to two audiences: the government and the Basque people, dividing the questions into also two groups as the ones to be decided by ETA and the state (the territorial extension, etc.) and the ones to be decided by the Basques themselves (the internal arrangements of the future state)[79] Therefore, the Democratic Alternative can be seen as "an updated version of the 'KAS Alternative'" (Mees 2003, p.76), but was also something new, as here we see a different role of the attacks of ETA than before, as these attacks should serve as a pressure on the state to accept what the Basque parties and other political forces agree between themselves. (Sánchez Cuenca 2001, p.186)

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[79] See, Manifiesto de Euskadi ta Askatasuna a Euskal Herria, 20 April 1995.

The second, strategy of violence has also changed. Already since 1992, when all the leadership of ETA at the time was captured and the organization found itself at its weakest point, there is a presence in the Basque Country of the so-called *kale borroka*, a politicized street violence, designed as a Basque *intifada*. Since 1995, these events are given more form. In the document denominated *Oldartzen Report*, Batasuna emphasized the need to "pass to a new offensive phase" and "to accelerate the political process" (quoted in Mees 2003, p.77), which also meant the intensification of the street violence. In addition, ETA itself changed its targets from the security forces to the politicians, starting to attack the local council members of the two main Spanish parties – the PP and the PSOE. The assassination on 23 January 1995 of the councilor of the PP Gregorio Ordóñez is the first move in this new strategy. The PNV politicians are not touched, but their headquarters are constantly attacked by the youths practicing *kale borroka*.

This combination of the selective attacks on the politicians with the street violence was denominated by ETA as "extension of conflict" or "socialization of suffering" with the idea that "the consequences of the armed struggle should reach not only the military and the police, but should extend to all the society and especially the politicians." (Sánchez Cuenca 2001, p.182) Also, such attacks have a tremendous social impact and in combination with the acts of street violence created enormous instability, feeling of fear in the segment of the society and were designed to show clearly that the Basques were in war with the Spanish state. From 1995 to 1998 both the assassinations of the politicians

and the incidents of the *kale borroka* are rising exponentially[80] but so is the rejection of the people to violence.

All these developments in the organization and its environment have a certain impact on the stability of the Pact of Ajuria Enea. In addition, the discrepancies between the parties become apparent in the matters like "penitential politics, self-determination, relation of Euskadi with Navarre or the dialogue with the ETA environment." (*El País*, 22 February 1997) These discrepancies, always pushed aside, tend to surge up with more and more force. The main parties in coalition are drifting away in different directions: new governing party of Spain, the PP sees police work as the only way to get rid of ETA, concentrates on "police solution", on marginalizing completely the environment of ETA and proposes changes in the penitential politics, abandoning the policies for the reintegration of prisoners and cutting the possibility of leaving prison before serving the full sentence. On the other hand, the PNV as well as EA, are leaning towards negotiations with the HB to end violence. However, dialogue with the HB implies opening of the topics of self-determination and dispersion policies, which are taboo for the statist parties. The situation reaches an impasse. The attempts to go out of it eventually led to the signing of another pact that of Lizarra-Garazi, which had an enormous impact on the development of the Basque politics.

Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to outline the main trends in the development of the Basque nationalism, its understanding of the nation and the relation between the

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[80] In 1994 there were 287 incidents of the *kale borroka*, in 1995 the number rises to 924 and in 1996 to 1135, going down somewhat in the 1997 to 971 and later 489 in 1998, but this year is already a year of the Pact of Lizarra and the truce of ETA. (Numbers from Sánchez Cuenca 2001, p.185)

nationalist actors. As it could be seen from this discussion, Basque nationalism was not much more successful in establishing one and acceptable for all discourse on the nation, creating a situation where the political outlook of the Basque Country is extremely fragmented and numerous ideas on what is the Basque nation (or whether there is a Basque nation) and what should be its predicament in the world clash with each other.

Concluding this discussion, the essence of the discourse of the two main actors, the PNV and ETA, can be assessed. As we saw throughout this chapter, the PNV's discourse is famous for its ambiguity. Since the inception the party had a Janus-like ideology: on the one hand, sovereignist, inclined to achieve the independence of all the seven Basque provinces (or at least the four on the Spanish side); on the other, autonomist, trying to reach as much self-government as possible but within the Spanish state. This ambiguity results in the impossibility to create a thoroughly consistent discourse. On the one hand, being from its inception a kind of "party-nation" to use the expression of Chris Ross (1991), the PNV tries to establish its understanding of the Basque nation as the only one; on the other hand, this understanding varies even within the party itself.

Contrary to the Spanish parties discussed before, the PNV is much more influenced by the positions of other actors in the way it approaches the problems. The rigidity of discourse it uses depends significantly on the discourse that the government in Madrid uses. The aggressive stance of Madrid evokes the close of ranks around its most rigid, most independentist positions, as it could be seen from the situation between 2001 and 2004, with the *Plan Ibarretxe* being the best example of this discourse. The milder situation in Madrid, on the contrary, results in the adoption of a more autonomist position that is more open to the incorporation of different elements.

While it is not plausible to assume that by adopting these different positions the PNV uses different logics in the construction of its discourse, the rigidity of that discourse and the impermeability of its construction is greater in one case than in another. By adopting sovereignty as its main principle in policy, the party creates chains of equivalence where one chain has as its nodal point the divided Basque nation striving for independence and another chain represents the other nation and the state, an alien state because captured by the other nation. The solution of this situation then is to achieve the statehood for the Basques as well and to cut the cord that connects the two nations. On the other hand, the autonomist position, accepting the existing state as a political system in which the Basque nation would develop results in a less rigid discourse.

For the PNV, it is clear that there is violence, because there is a conflict, which is the principal reason why the motives of the perpetrators have to be taken into account. It is also an indication that a political solution to the situation has to be sought. There is a conflict between the Basques and the Spanish because of the unsettled issues in terms of the territorial arrangements and the lack of national recognition, but also there is a conflict between the Basques themselves. In fact, ETA is as much a symptom of a conflict between the Basques, as it is a manifestation of the conflict between the central authorities and those of the periphery.

Finally, ETA itself is understood in a double way – first, as violent, then as Basque. Violence is to be relegated to the outside of the political discourse, but at the same time, the ones who commit the violent crimes in the name of politics should be given a preferential treatment over the "ordinary" criminals. When they engage in their violent activities, they are criminals, but when they are sentenced, they are political prisoners, the

175

Basque prisoners. Therefore, the Basque government, presided over by *Lehendakaris* from the PNV during the whole existence of the Basque autonomy, gives monetary support for the families going to visit their imprisoned relatives, advocates the university education programs for the imprisoned ETA members, etc. Violence should be punished, but the motives for it should be taken into account.

If we talk about ETA, since the inception this organization has tried to establish itself as a political actor in its own right. Its violent activities were combined with the political ones. Sometimes, especially during the time of the dictatorship, these political activities were very prominent, the work in the society achieving a primary significance. This tension between violent and political actions caused the organization to split numerous times, showing the difficulty of reconciling these two trends. In addition, even when it is concentrated on the "propaganda by deed," it has a political agenda, its actions are combined with the communiqués expressing the political position, urging the political actors to adopt certain stance, persuading them to work on certain policies, etc.

ETA's discourse, which it expresses in its communiqués, internal bulletins and statements, is clearly based on the chains of equivalence. On the one hand, there is the Basque Country where seven provinces form one single entity. On the other, there are two oppressing states. The Basque nation is also understood in a rather mythical way, there is no conflict inside the Basque Country – there is just a conflict between the occupying forces and the Basque nation, which is represented by ETA. As these are totalitarian states, violence is the only way to liberate the Basque nation. Hence, in its discourse violence is most prominent coming from the side of the states and this violence shows the repressive character of these states. Violence of ETA itself is mainly defensive.

While the statements ETA makes are not taken in their face value and the influence that they have is more due to the way other political forces choose to use them, ETA appears to be more a symbol than a political actor. For the Basque nationalism:

> … ETA is as much a concept as a structure at this historical juncture, since ETA represents the crossing of a conceptual Rubicon for Basque nationalism in which the goal is total independence and that this justifies the means. Consequently, ETA's violence actualizes the most radical Basque separatist approach and thereby becomes a part of each Basque nationalist's consciousness (as well as that of his enemies) by entering into each actor's political calculation (if only to be rejected by many). (Douglass, Zulaika 1990, p.252)

Chapter V. Declaration of Lizarra[81] and national unity. There and back again

Already at the time of signing, the Declaration of Lizarra became one of the most controversially interpreted documents in the Basque politics. As the signing of the pact was accompanied by the first "indefinite" truce by ETA, its initial interpretation could not be divorced from the feeling of euphoria and of the possibility of the end of violence in the Basque Country. With the collapse of the truce, other interpretations gained much more ground. The Declaration of Lizarra, thus, can serve to illustrate another side of the discourse creation, a certain mirror image of the Spanish conservative discourse that is discussed in the section of the campaign of the General Elections 2004 and the 11-M. Here we can see how the dislocation of the political discourse leads to the creation of new frames of reference; how the consistent discursive frames and protagonist and antagonist identity fields are formed; how historical discourse is used in order to consolidate these fields; how the historical discourse is used in relation to the discourse on violence; and how the new political myths are created.

In order to show these elements of discourse creation in this chapter, first of all, the background of the Declaration of Lizarra and its follow-up – the indefinite truce by ETA will be presented and the "dislocative" effects of the events of 1997-1998 will be discussed. The Manifest of Forum of Ermua will be the first document to be examined here, followed by Plan Ardanza. These two documents provide an idea about protagonist and antagonist identity fields and other moves of discourse construction that will later be visible in the way that the political actors give meaning to the declaration of Lizarra.

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[81] Lizarra is the Basque name of a town in Navarre where the treaty was signed. It is also referred to as a declaration of Lizarra-Garazi, because first part of the meeting of Ireland Forum took place in Lizarra and the next part in the French Basque town of Garazi. Another name for this treaty is that of the Pact of Estella, as Estella is the name of the town in Spanish. Usage of the latter denomination often indicates an anti-nationalist position.

Next, the Declaration of Lizarra itself and related to this truce of ETA will be discussed, again focusing at the way the discursive frames are constructed in the documents. After the breakdown of truce, the situation in the Basque Country resulted in two different ways of interpreting the Lizarra document, which show to a large extent how discourse on violence and discourse on nation is related and how the political actors try to accommodate the new circumstances in their respective discourse constructions. Two principal ones will be discussed here: those of the PP and of the PNV. The chapter ends with the short description of the impact of the 2001 Autonomy elections on the Basque politics.

A short note on the period of discussion is also due here. Even though sometimes the more nationalist political analysts see the Declaration as a principal milestone of the current Basque politics, dividing it into the pre- and post- Lizarra politics, I will concentrate on the period between the 1997 – that contained some of the significant events the interpretation of which eventually led to the idea of the reconstitution of the national unity in the Basque Country – and 2001 elections to the Basque Parliament, which reinforced both the majority of the ruling PNV in the Basque parliament and showed the culmination of the politics of the blocks. After the 2001 elections, actually, the Declaration of Lizarra almost disappears from the nationalist discourse and is substituted by a series of different proposals and ideas: the *Plan Ibarretxe*, proposals of Batasuna at Bergara and later Anoieta, etc.

There: the changes in Basque politics 1997-1998

In 1997, the tensions around the Pact of Ajuria Enea accumulated, and even though in the beginning of the year the parties managed to have meetings as well as to insist on the

preservation of the Pact, the main protagonists of it were already drifting apart. The disagreements between the Socialists and the PNV, which were ruling together the Basque Country for almost a decade accumulated.[82]

Besides, in Madrid, the Conservative government of José María Aznar came to power in 1996. The PP could not govern on its own at the time and needed support of the peripheral nationalists to do so. However, even if it had signed the agreements with the PNV, the ruling party in Madrid did not really heed much the nationalists: the only two requests that the PNV made – for Euskadi to be represented at the European Institutions and for the return of the heritage taken away from the region during the Civil War – were soon forgotten. Therefore, with the pass of time, this agreement between the two parties turned out to be "absolute disagreement." (Tusell 2004, p.144) The PP transformed itself into the second largest party in the Basque Country, thus threatening the hegemony of the PNV and at the same time showed itself completely unscrupulous when it came to the conquest of votes. Also, while the party showed itself from the beginning very much concerned with strengthening the counter-terrorist policy, the PNV and other moderate nationalists increasingly felt that the government "was only interested in administering the problem of violence for its own political benefit, instead of trying to find a solution to it." (Mees 2003, p.104)

The events of July 1997 have a special importance here. They created both a different social atmosphere in the country, an enormous revulsion to terrorism and violence, but also had an important impact on the political situation. In the beginning of the month

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[82] The PNV-PSE alliance is often seen as a "natural" government of the Basque Country (see, e.g., Tusell 2004, p.144), the one representing both the nationalist and non-nationalist sides of the Basque society. However, this "natural" alliance, as many "natural" ideas, is rather new. For the long years of co-existence, the PNV and the PSE were more often rivals than allies. (see, e.g., Ross 1991)

Ortega Lara, a prison employee kidnapped by ETA 532 days before, was freed by the police. He was kept in inhuman conditions and the images of both the place he was held in for more than a year[83] and himself (at the end ETA left him to die from hunger) were shocking for the public and brought large demonstrations against the organization.

Only ten days after Ortega Lara was released, ETA kidnapped a young PP council member of the town of Ermua, Miguel Angel Blanco and demanded a move of all the Basque prisoners to the Basque Country within 48 hours. Obviously, such a demand was physically impossible to meet. Demonstrations for the release of Blanco brought millions to the streets, the demands to let him live came from all sides. Even the members of HB, such as Patxi Zabaleta (now a leader of another party of *Izquierda Abertzale* – Aralar) publicly insisted on Blanco to be released, some of the former members of the organization asked the same; one of the members of ETA imprisoned in Córdoba started a hunger strike in protest of his own organization's actions (*El País*, 14 July 1997); and one of the historical leaders of the organization, Antxon (Eugenio Etxebeste), tried to convince his "colleagues" to release the councilor.

ETA did not heed any of these demonstrations, requests or pleas and after 48 hours deadline passed Blanco was killed. As the demands organization made were impossible to fulfill, this was described as an "announced crime" or a "slow-motion crime" (*El País*, 13 July 1997) that for many meant that ETA moved from being an organization fighting for liberation to just a gang that was not interested at all in the opinions of the people it was supposed to be liberating. Therefore, the reaction to death of Blanco was fierce. Moderate nationalists for the first time condemned not only the killing, but also Batasuna

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[83] ETA usually kept its kidnapped hostages in the underground hiding place called *zulo*. These *zulos* can also be used for the weapon storage and are usually very small, 1x2 meters diameter and only 1.5 meter height.

181

as an accomplice of ETA for remaining silent in these days of enormous tension and justifying anything organization did. (*El País*, 13 July 1997) Demonstrations against the crime continued again bringing millions to the streets and the situation gave birth to what was called "spirit of Ermua," – a show of extreme solidarity with the victims, an extreme rejection of violence and, as Ludger Mees writes: "both a popular demand for ETA to stop killing, and to the policy-makers to start working seriously on a solution to the conflict." (Mees 2003, p.75)

Even ETA saw itself obliged to justify the killing by writing a communiqué in its entirety in Castilian Spanish, something that was very unusual. Even though the organization did not say anything substantially new in the text (government was to be blamed for the death of Blanco and the liberation of Ortega Lara before was just a fortunate strike which actually showed that it did not care about losing its prison employees), (*El País*, 24 July 1997) the fact itself that it was written in Castilian Spanish and directed to the "government and the Spanish public opinion" showed that even locked in its rigid discourse of liberation, ETA did see that its actions brought up rejection in the society.

However, the "spirit of Ermua" soon received a different interpretation from the initial one. The demonstrations against violence and ETA, the revulsion of the society and the politicians themselves against Batasuna for its actuation during July 1997, was seen by the governing party as a manifestation of revulsion against nationalism as such. This interpretation became especially prevalent in the organizations that spring forth after the July events, such as Forum of Ermua (*Foro de Ermua)* with more or less close ties to the PP (at least ideologically). In their discourse there appears a rather close identification of the moderate nationalists with the radical ones and the popular mobilization against

violence start to be used to discredit the ruling in the Basque Country PNV, its partner EA and the Basque nationalism in general.

In the beginning of 1998, the Forum of Ermua published a manifest, (Forum of Ermua Manifest 1998) which outlines the main ideas of the organization. The main ideas relevant here can be put forward as follows: there is a "fascist movement" in the Basque Country whose leaders are ETA and Batasuna and which tries to eradicate all the democratic rights and liberties of the citizens; political and institutional representatives of the Basque Country collaborate with this fascist movement and don't act with the necessary unity and determination against it, this way contributing to the deterioration of democracy in the region. The only way out of this situation is to act firmly against ETA, therefore, no political negotiations or agreements with the organization are acceptable and finally, "spirit of Ermua" should be strengthened in order to fight against the "Basque fascism" and to recuperate "not only the street, but also the voice" and fight "peacefully and forcefully against ETA and those who protect, promote and benefit from its totalitarian project."

The framework of Snow and his associates (Hunt et al. 1994; Snow, Benford 1988, etc.) could be useful to evaluate this manifest. The social movement represented by the Forum of Ermua defines rather clearly the protagonist and antagonist identity fields, points out the problems and solutions to them. The frame analysis talks about three types of framing that are used by most social movements in their discourse that are then related to three "identity fields." Thus we have diagnostic framing and antagonist identity field, prognostic framing and protagonist identity field and the motivational framing with a

183

relation to audience identity field (Hunt et al., 1994). We can see all these elements present in the manifest.

First of all, the diagnosis and antagonist identity field are identified in the first point of the manifest: there is an attempt to "seize the democracy" and "threaten our most essential liberties" and this attempt is made by a "fascist movement" of ETA and Batasuna and other organizations of their environment. In the coming points the general problem is identified as "deterioration of democracy" and there are also other antagonists who are working collaborating with "those who support and give air to fascism" and who are not "acting with necessary firmness" against this fascist movement.

Secondly, the protagonist here is not nominated by any name, only appears as "we" or, better said, in the forms of verbs, as in Spanish usage of pronouns is not necessary. Thus we see "we reject," "we believe," etc. In general, the protagonist can be seen as the intellectuals who form the new Forum of Ermua and share its diagnosis of the situation in the Basque Country and also the prognosis or "what is to be done" to change that situation. The prognosis itself thus rests on a few core principles: first, even though there were already pacifist groups in the Basque Country, the situation "demands new forms of opposition to Basque fascism." This strategy should be based on the civil rejection of ETA and "those who support it and benefit from its totalitarian project." Second, no political dialogue can take place outside the parliamentary arena and no agreements on the exigencies of ETA should be made.

The text itself is directed to the "Basque society" and the motivation for it is to "reach peace without sacrificing for it our liberty." (Forum of Ermua Manifest 1998) From then on, liberty and "lack of liberty in the Basque Country" become the central points of the

Right's discourse on the "Basque problem." This lack of liberty is due both to the pressure of ETA and, in addition to that, the lenience of the nationalist parties towards the organization.

We can see through this manifest how the Basque nationalism, both in its radical form and in its more moderate appearances becomes identified with the fascism and totalitarianism. Here, again, we see the logic of equivalence at work, as the two opposing groups are created: those who are fascists and their supporters and those who are against them and for the liberty and democracy, those who make treaties with them and support or benefit from their "totalitarian project" and those who oppose any relation with it. This way all the Basque nationalism started losing its democratic credentials and eventually was identified as "fascist" not only in its radical form (ETA and its allies), but also in its moderate form (the PNV and its associates).

This situation was well exploited by the ruling party in Madrid, which made such ideas its own. The revulsion to violence and ETA could be used in order to oust the PNV from the government in the Basque Country; the attacks on peripheral nationalisms were profitable in electoral terms. Thus, the fight against "Basque fascism" in its various manifestations became a priority.

It is important to note here also the position of the Socialist Party. The Socialists were also impressed by the demonstrations of the July 1997 and also felt the winds blowing against the nationalists. In addition, while in the mid-80s the party was close to wining enough seats in the Basque Parliament to form a government, during the 90s, its percentage of vote was getting smaller and smaller while at the same time the PNV was reinforcing its positions lost after the break-up with the EA. The PNV itself, at the same

time, saw the threat that the attack on the moderate nationalism constituted and thus the necessity to move beyond the previous agreements so that the ETA terrorism is eradicated.

Plan Ardanza. Testing ground?

Such is the situation in which the PNV finds itself in 1998. Attacked by the government and drifting away from the Socialists, the PNV started its rapprochement with the *Izquierda Abertzale*. The intensity of attacks of the certain circles against the PNV connecting it explicitly to ETA and at the same time increasing popular rejection of terrorism in July 1997, made the PNV realize that even if it went together with the so-called "constitutionalist parties" in the matters of terrorism it would still lose. A different approach was needed, the one that could allow the party to play on its strengths and allow it to preserve its position in the Basque Country. Therefore, what worked as a weakness of the party in the face of the accusations of the ideological affinity and thus the moral complicity with the ETA, could be exploited as a strength that would allow it to persuade the organization to stop killing, end the violence in the region and gain substantial ethical and political credit for doing so.

There were certain indications that such a strategy could work. In 1997 the PNV brought to the political agenda the issue of prisoners and dispersion policy. According to this policy the members of ETA are dispersed throughout the prisons of Spain and France. Initially this policy was designed with the motive of breaking cohesion of the so-called "prisoner collective" of the organization. However, by the end of 1990s it was already clear that this policy was not achieving its goals: the number of *etarras* choosing reinsertion has not risen and the control of the leadership was not really questioned.

(Mees 2003, p.103) At the same time, this policy created serious strains for the relatives and friends of the prisoners, as some of them have to travel over 4000 kilometers for a 20 min meetings that they are allowed to have. Thus, every death on the road to some close or remote prison, every suicide of a prisoner serves as an example of the "repression" of the government.

While before the issue was more that of the streets, the demonstrations against dispersion policy were pretty common and the issue itself was (and still is) a powerful rallying cry of the *Izquierda Abertzale*, it was now moved to the "proper" political agenda by the PNV. This was done both with the humanitarian reasons and some political ones. As a great majority of the Basque citizens was opposed to the dispersion policy and the demands to end it were frequent, the attempts to do so could gain points also in the political sphere. In addition, as Mees writes, "a shift in penal policy could be regarded by ETA as a confidence-building measure and was thus likely to bring about some response in terms of de-escalation by the paramilitaries." (Mees 2003, p.104) Thus, the PNV proposed a plan according to which the Basque prisoners would be moved back into the four prisons of the Basque Country and ten around it. It should be remembered that at the time, ETA kept as a hostage Ortega Lara, exactly because of the prison policy.

This proposal was finally rejected – it did not have the support from the two major Spanish parties, the PP declaring that with the plan the PNV was legitimizing ETA and bringing victory to the organization, (*El País*, 25 May 1997, *El País* 7 June 1997) and the PSOE considering it an error and stupidity. (*El País*, 21 February 1997) Neither was it supported by Batasuna and the "collective of the prisoners," which declared that the plan was insufficient. (*El País*, 14 February 1997; *El País*, 5 March 1997) Still, the discussion

of the prisoner issue brought together the PNV with the HB and showed that these two Basque parties can have some common points to stand together against the Spanish parties.

In addition, there seemed to be some indications that ETA and the HB would take an opportunity to go out of the political isolation and revulsion that the events of the July 1997 created. The new Directing Council of the HB elected in 1997[84] appeared to be more prone to negotiations and the attempts to find a way out of the impasse that the party put itself in with the *Oldartzen* report and increasing dependence on the armed organization.

Finally, there were signs that suggested that such collaboration is actually possible. One of the best examples of this possibility could be the development of the idea of the "third space." The concept has clear connections with the ideas such as the "third way" that shaped the attempts of the European Left to overcome its difficulties especially popularized by Anthony Giddens and the British Labor Party. In the Basque context, the third way was also understood as a certain search for a way out of the deadlock between the major political forces in the Basque Country. However, as it was born from the ideas close to the *Izquierda Abertzale*, its orientation was not as much towards overcoming the differences between nationalist and non-nationalist blocks, but was seen as "a political and social area of encounter between all those in favor of Basque self-determination by peaceful and democratic means." (Mees 2003, p.120) Or, to put it in more general terms, it was a space for all the Basque nationalists both in their moderate and radical varieties.

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[84] The entire "old" leadership of the party was imprisoned at the time for showing a video of ETA advocating its "Democratic Alternative." They were sentenced for seven years imprisonment and high fines for the "collaboration with an armed gang", a sentence was revoked in 1999 as the Constitutional Court considered that the punishment was disproportionate to the crime.

The peace movement Elkarri[85] was the strongest promoter of this idea, but it gained strength when the two nationalist trade unions (ELA, related to the PNV and LAB, related to HB) accepted the idea and started its symbolic promotion by the common appearances. This promotion which formed a certain "nationalist front" in the sphere of industrial relations was the best example that the connection between the two forms of the Basque nationalism could work.

In such an environment, the so-called Plan Ardanza was born. It was the first of the attempts to come up with a project for the political solution of violence in the Basque Country and could also be seen as a certain testing ground of the positions in the political space. It was presented on the 17 March 1998 at the meeting of the Pact of Ajuria Enea, but the contents of the plan were already known in advance due to their filtering to the press. (Mees 2003, p.111) The main points of the plan were the following: first, the goals of the plan are to reach an agreement on what is to be the end result of the "dialogued solution" (*salida dialogada*) of violence in the Basque Country and to see what can be done that "ETA would stop intervening into politics through the so-called 'armed struggle'" and that its environment would be integrated into the democratic politics." Also, there is an agreement that there has to be a "dialogued end" (*final dialogado*) of violence, but there is no agreement as to what that phrase means.

Secondly, the creation of a common understanding should be based on certain premises that were outlined in the text: ETA cannot be defeated by the police or military means, as the struggle against the organization that took place over 30 years, has shown. Also, it is

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[85] Born in the environment of the MVLN in 1992, Elkarri rejected all violence and was dedicated to the search for the peaceful political solution of the Basque conflict. It identifies itself as a "social movement for dialogue and agreement", seeking to contribute with concrete proposals to the solution of the Basque conflict. See, http://www.elkarri.org

not very plausible to expect that the HB would suddenly renounce what it sees as "thirty years of suffering and struggle" for no reason. Thus, even a political defeat is difficult to imagine. Accordingly, a push that could be interpreted as a "political incentive" allowing ETA and the HB "to justify themselves in front of their own people," is needed. Another premise was that a political dialogue could only take place with the cease-fire of ETA and at the same time, the talk is not about the agreement between ETA and the government, but between the legitimate political representatives. Such a dialogue should take place within the framework of the existing arrangements (the Constitution, the Statute), but should not take them as impassible limits (*límites infranqueables*).

Third, the dialogue would start only when ETA pronounces an indefinite ceasefire and announces this ceasefire not for some tactical reasons but as a show of commitment to peace. ETA itself, because of the nature of the organization, should not participate in the process, the HB should take that role. The other participants of the dialogue should be various Basque political actors. The Spanish state would be represented here by the local parties of the State level. Also, here:

> It should be accepted that the center of the problem is not the supposed confrontation of the State-Euskadi, in which ETA would play the role of the vanguard, representing the authentic popular will of the Basques, but that there is a disagreement in the Basque opinions over what we are and what we want to be (also, obviously, in relation to Spain) (Plan Ardanza, p.6)

Finally, the contents of the dialogue itself should revolve around the issue of "national question" or what model of the self-government is the best for the Basques. These contents of the dialogue should be "without the initial conditions" and "without limits of the results." An example of self-determination is given in this respect: "neither the recognition of right to self-determination could be the initial condition for the initiation of

the process, nor it could be excluded a priori as an eventual result of the consensus." (Plan Ardanza, p.7)

In this text we can see certain elements that later would shape significantly the Basque political discourse. Some of them already appear in the previous texts, e.g. "dialogued solution to the conflict" which is also established in the Pact of Ajuria Enea. Others are completely new. One of the most significant ones is a new definition of the conflict as that of the conflict between the Basques themselves. It is also important to note the idea of the dialogue without previous conditions and limitations as to the possible results. The plan is developed as a search of consensus of the main political actors in the Basque Country that would help answer the questions of what the Basque identity is and coming out of that, what political models are the most suitable for the Basques. In that sense, it could be argued that there are no clear antagonists here and the protagonists include all the democratic forces. The only one left out of the process would be ETA with its pretensions to represent the whole of the Basque people.

In that sense, then, the Plan Ardanza would function by creating a discourse based on chains of difference. But this was not the case. It built on elements of particular historical discourse of the Basques, which had nothing to offer for those who see themselves as Spanish. In addition, coming from the initiative of one of the leaders of the PNV, it did not resonate with the other political forces.

The plan was based both on the recognition of the situation of the Basque Country that the PNV was slowly developing during the 1990s[86] and on the lessons from the Northern

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[86] It was already mentioned that from its inception, the PNV had an idea of being the party-nation and thus the representative of the Basque identity. This conception started to change in the 80s and especially 90s giving way to the recognition of the plurality of the Basque society and consequently to the PNV's role in it not as a constructor of the Basque nation, but as a representative of a "region-state." (see, Ross 1991)

Irish peace process which also established the necessity of ceasefire as a condition for dialogue and the non-participation of the armed actors themselves in the search for the solution of the conflict.[87] Also, the plan tried not only to attract ETA and give it a "way out," but in so doing to stay within the constitutional framework and the rules established in the Constitution and the Statute.

This link to the founding documents, however, was not enough for the Plan to be acceptable by the Spanish political actors. As was mentioned already, the PP had its own ideas about the end of violence and the connection between terrorism and nationalism. The tough policies against ETA were politically profitable and so were the attacks against Basque nationalism. Even though it was hard to openly attack the peace proposal, the PP as well as the PSOE soon developed a set of arguments against the plan that showed it as an invalid idea. First of all, these parties saw the proposal as working with the formula "peace for more nationalism," which was unacceptable. Also, the idea that ETA cannot be defeated by the police and military means and that this was the reason to search for an agreement meant surrender of the democrats. Thirdly, if the end of violence would require modification of the Constitution and the Statute, this would also mean a victory for ETA. And finally, there is no role of the state in the entire proposal, and as both the state and the ETA are excluded from negotiations it is as if they are put on the same level. (see, Mees 2003, p.116)

With such arguments the Plan Ardanza was rejected and the tensions between the parties rose even more. This rejection for the nationalist politicians meant that the two largest parties on the Spanish scene were not really interested in the "dialogued solution" to violence and also that the Pact of Ajuria Enea has already outlived its days. (*El País*, 5

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[87] On the impact of the Northern Ireland peace process on Plan Ardanza see Mees 2003, p.114.

192

March 1998) The disagreements of the parties on the issues of peace, anti-terrorism struggle, completely different reading of the conflict and the disqualifications of nationalism that were often heard from the governing party, incited the PNV to look elsewhere for the possibilities to change the situation and to solve the problem of violence. If the state level parties were not interested in starting the peace process, then this process could be started by the nationalists themselves. As a result of this idea the Declaration of Lizarra was born.

Declaration of Lizarra and the truce of ETA

At the end of 1997, the first contacts between the HB and the PNV took place. After the failure of the Plan Ardanza, the PNV came to the idea that the peace in the Basque Country could only be constructed through the cooperation with the radical nationalists and intensified its contacts with HB. The latter also had its reasons to approach the PNV. At the moment it was already clear that the strategies used in the relation to the *Oldartzen* report not only did not give any fruits, but actually brought the party to the worst ever position. The 1997 became for Batasuna the "*annus horribilis.*" (*El País*, 20 September 1998)

HB's search for a new strategy resulted in its acceptance of the mentioned before "third space" idea as a guideline. (see, Mees 2003, p.134) Here, the "third space" idea received a rather clear meaning as an environment for the "construction of the nation," and a way of promoting self-determination. Put into political isolation, party eventually came to the idea that "we alone won't construct *Euskal Herria*" (quoted in Mees 2003, p.134, emphasis author's)

Not only the HB could hardly construct *Euskal Herria* on its own, but it was also pressured on all the fronts. The tough policies of the Madrid government towards terrorism started looming large not only above the heads of ETA militants but also around the entire environment of *Izquierda Abertzale*. The ruling committee of Batasuna was already in prison, there were some indications that certain moves were being made to illegalize the party as such. The HB desperately needed not only the new strategies, but also new allies. This way, the PNV stopped being the "lackey of Spain" and became a potential partner in national construction.

Yet, the encounter between these two political forces was only possible in the situation that was created during the summer 1997, as the PNV also started seeing reasons for approaching the HB. Both of these reasons were already mentioned: the assault of the governing party on the nationalism as such that put the PNV into a tight corner and created a strong need for peace in order for nationalism to survive; and secondly, the idea that the Pact of Ajuria Enea did not serve to bring in this peace and thus the distinction between the "violent" and the "democrats" (*violentos y democratas*) on which it was based, was outdated.

As a result of 12 secret meetings between the PNV and the HB that took place throughout the 1998 (20 September 1998) the two parties managed to agree on the main points of the possible cooperation. At the same time a final break between the Socialists and the PNV took place. During the voting of the reform of the guidelines of the Basque Parliament (work on this reform started 10 years before), the PSE proposed to enter into the guidelines the obligation for the deputies to swear an oath of allegiance to the Constitution. (*El País*, 30 June 1998) The PNV refused to vote for this part of reform

and, obviously, so did the HB. Because of this seeming agreement between the forces, the PSE decided to leave the Basque government.

With this move of the Socialists,[88] the necessity of an agreement became acute. The PNV was left in the Basque government together with EA, but without a necessary majority. The coming elections, planned for the autumn 1998, did not look too promising; no expectations could be made to reach the absolute majority, thus, the party would definitely need partners even if it won.

At this time, it could probably be said that peace became an asset. Only in the situation of non-violence could there be expected some positive results for the Basque nationalism. Thus, inspired by the developments of the Northern Irish conflict and the signing of Good Friday agreement, the creation of a Forum of Ireland, which was supposed to see the similarities between the two situations and eventually find ways of solution also to the Basque conflict, was proposed. On 12 September 1998, during the founding meeting of the Forum the members of the forum – representatives of the nationalist parties, labor unions and civic organizations[89] signed a declaration that was later to receive a name of Declaration of Lizarra.

The document contained two parts. In the first one, the reading of the Northern Irish peace process through the Basque lens was presented and the second had proposals for the solution of the Basque conflict. Reflections made were similar to those that appeared in Plan Ardanza. According to the declaration, the factors that facilitated peace in

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[88] There were some reasons to think that the PSE would not fulfill its threat and would still participate in the government, notwithstanding the fact that the PNV voted against the resolution. The party was already in a similar situation when the Basque Parliament voted for the acknowledgement of the right to self-determination. In addition, there was a sector of the party which was always in favor of seeking consensus with the moderate nationalism (see, *El País*, 1 July 1998) However, at the moment, the situation was already changed. The Socialists were not too much interested in staying with the PNV and the PNV already had its eyes on the "national construction" and possible peace process.
[89] The only Spanish-wide party represented at the forum was IU.

Northern Ireland were: first, acceptance of political nature of the conflict and the need to search for political solution; second, acceptance of the impossibility to achieve military victory over the adversary by both the government and the IRA; third, respect for all the existing traditions in the island; and fourth recognition of the right to self-determination. Consequently, in the Basque Country as well it should be agreed that:

> The Basque confrontation is an historical conflict of political origins and nature, in which Spain and France see themselves implicated. Its resolution must necessarily be political.

After this is accepted, a "political solution" is to be sought, through the process of negotiations and open dialogue, with no limiting conditions (like in Ardanza's plan) and in the "permanent absence of all expressions of violence" (which might mean not only from the ETA, but also from the government side). These negotiations should be open and global with "no limited agendas," respecting plurality of the Basque society and the word of the Basque people. In respect to the future scenario, the declaration reads:

> The resolution agreement will not contain closed scenarios or narrow specific conditions, but it will make possible an open framework where new formulas responding to the traditions and desires of the citizens of Euskal Herria to achieve sovereignty could have place. [90]

In this short but dense document, the same way as before, several important ideas can be distinguished. First of all we see here the state as antagonist. As the document took setup of the Irish peace process as a model to be followed closely, it put certain demands also on the state parties (such as acceptance of traditions and recognition of right to self-determination). Secondly, it claimed (an echo of this already appeared in the Plan Ardanza) that there is no possibility to militarily defeat ETA, which was also a certain criticism of the ideas of the Spanish government. Thirdly, differently from the Ardanza's

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[90] The English version of the text: Lizarra-Garazi Accord. 1998 in http://www.elkarri.org/en/pdf/Lizarra-Garazi%20Accord.pdf

196

plan, there is a mention here of the Spanish and French states. Even though in the statement provided there could be some resonance to the Ardanza's idea of the situation as a conflict between the Basques, a conflict at a root of which there is a Basque search for their identity, here the mentioning of Spain and France gives the saying a different tone, making it closer to the usual *Izquierda Abertzale*'s arguments of the existence of an unresolved conflict between the two states and *Euskal Herria*.

Secondly, a diagnosis that appears here is that of political conflict with "historical roots." Its definition itself also has certain similarities with the Ardanza's plan in that it claims "territoriality, who should make the decision, and political sovereignty" to be the "fundamental issues" that constitute the conflict's essence. These being the essential questions at a discussion table, it is clear to see that the states of Spain and France would have to see themselves implicated in the peace process. It is also an echo of dissatisfaction with the existing political arrangements. As it was discussed in Chapter III, the Basque political imaginary since its inception was strongly based on the idea of the 7=1, i.e. that the three provinces should belong to one political unit. Here we see one of the expressions of this element of historical discourse.

Third, the protagonists are most clearly visible in the space for signatures in the text: the Basque nationalist organizations with Elkarri and the IU in addition. And the prognosis is similar to that of other documents: it is not clearly defined what would come out of this process– the idea of "open scenarios" and "no limitations" in the dialogue leave freedom of interpretation. However, having in mind that the main questions to be discussed are territoriality, political agency and sovereignty, the solution of the conflict implies

significant change of the existing political arrangements and could even be seen to advance the idea of an independent state.

Finally, the audience of the text is the Basque society, which has to "have a word" in the decisions over its future. Motivation to respond to this call would be that it gives a chance for the Basque citizens to create that framework in which their desires "to achieve sovereignty could take place."

ETA was not oblivious of what was going on behind the closed doors in the offices of the HB and the PNV. It is often mentioned as one of the principal obstacles to the peace in the Basque Country, as well as an example of the difference between the situation in Northern Ireland and in Euskadi that the HB is totally dependent on the armed organization. (see, for example, Ortiz 1999) Contrary to the relation of Sinn Fein with the IRA, in the Basque Country the HB has almost no independence from ETA and all the political decisions about the strategies and tactics were either imposed directly by the paramilitaries or at least approved by them, thus, even though it did not actively participate in the process, ETA was also implicated in the development of Lizarra proposal. In some interpretations it was even the one which promoted the process.

Staying with the facts here, four days after the signing of Lizarra Declaration, the armed organization announced an indefinite ceasefire. In its long communiqué announcing the decision, ETA gives its reading of the situation. According to the organization, the *Euskal Herria* is faced with a unique opportunity to advance towards sovereignty, as a "new political phase" has started and the political forces realized that the idea of "autonomism" was outdated, it only created more divisions within the Basque society. The political forces saw that the institutions imposed on the Basque territories by the two states were

now obsolete and new ones needed to be created. The new consensus that was visible in the political space was based on the acceptance by "all the democrats" of "territoriality and self-determination" as the values in order to solve the conflict. Thus, to strengthen this new consensus and help the efforts to advance to the sovereignty, ETA decided to declare the ceasefire.

However, some parts of the ETA communiqué were not as euphoric about this new situation. The organization was "preoccupied" by the stances of the states of Spain and France so that it would stand guard of the process, keeping its commandos active and the weapons intact. In addition, it is not only the state side that the ETA would check, but also how the nationalist forces are behaving, thus, no agreements with the "enemies of Euskal Herria" would be acceptable. (ETA Communiqué announcing truce. 1998)

What ETA did with this communiqué was also to establish clear antagonists, protagonists and audiences. First, the antagonists presented in this communiqué are the same as in most of the others: the Spanish and French states which are oppressing the Basques. There is also another set of antagonists, enemies of the project of *Euskal Herria* that is indicated: the PNV, the EA, the ELA and other moderate nationalists that are not converted to the antagonists, but with whom the relation is still rather tense. The diagnosis is that "the situation in which our people live is grave" – "Euskal Herria is under the domination of two powerful states." In addition, after the death of Franco, the Spanish state managed to create more internal divisions in the Basques with the creation of two different autonomies that of the Basque Country and of Navarre. Finally, some of the political forces of the Basque Country took a wrong approach to the issue from the

beginning, trying to use the "legal framework" created after the transition. These parties now "understood the sterility and blindness of this divisive autonomism."

Euskal Herria or "the people" are the main protagonists of the imaginary scene that ETA presents in its communiqué. Their fight for independence takes an important place in the development of the argument. ETA itself also appears as a protagonist here, as it will keep observing the process and how well the other nationalist parties fulfill their duties and stay on the road of sovereignty, not that of a "blind autonomism." The prognosis is identified in a following manner: The events are opening a possibility to "make a decisive step towards independence" and "we should make sure that the political phase in front of which we stand would be that of sovereignty." The general vision of what should be the end result of the solution to the problems is rather simple: "Euskal Herria united, free and Basque-speaking." Therefore, the key points of the earlier documents, such as Democratic Alternative are reiterated: the solution will come when the antagonists will realize that conflict is political and that in order to create a democracy in *Euskal Herria*, it is necessary to accept the principles of "territoriality and self-determination." Finally, the audience is the political parties of the Basque Country that are called for to advance the sovereignty.

The "poisonous" points of the announcement notwithstanding and even though there were some people who doubted the intentions of the organization and that the situation would really lead out of the violence, the euphoria about the truce was great, three out of four Basques were disposed favorably towards negotiations with the HB and even Prime Minister Aznar showed a "cautious belief" in solving the problem of terrorism (Tusell 2004, p.152).

The coming elections of 1998 showed, however, that the "politics of the fronts" started (Tusell 2004, p.153). The HB[91] has increased significantly its share, taking some of the votes from the PNV, the PP also went up, with PSE going down.[92] After the elections, the PNV started negotiations with the socialists but these negotiations gave no fruit, therefore, the PNV formed a minority government acceding to power with the help of the votes of the HB. At the time of difficult negotiations for the forming of the government, ETA issued a communiqué which urged the nationalist parties to keep their commitment to the advancement of sovereignty of *Euskal Herria* and to "break agreements with those whose aim is to destroy Euskal Herria." (*El País*, 6 November 1998) And, in fact, the articles of Lizarra became the guidelines for the new government.

End of truce to the 2001 elections

While the truce lasted, the cooperation between nationalist forces seemed to grow and the perspectives for final achievement of peace appeared bright. On 9 of January 1999, just a week after inauguration of the new government, a demonstration for the Basque prisoners took place in Bilbao that could rival the ones of 1997 for the release of Miguel Ángel Blanco, (*El País*, 10 January 1999) two weeks later the PNV accepted the idea of the Assembly of the Basque municipalities (Udalbiltza) and it was established on 6 of February. (*El País*, 25 January 1999) ETA decided to announce that it prolongs the ceasefire, as the steps taken in the direction of the "national construction" were significant. (*El País*, 25 February 1999)

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[91] At the time the party was calling itself EH –*Euskal Herritarrok* – Basque People.
[92] The PNV received 28.01% of vote, the EA remaining at the 5.68%, the PP became the second force with 20.13%, the HB now the EH received 17.91 and the PSE 17.6%. In comparison with the previous elections, the HB rose the most, but the PP also rose significantly.

However, not everything worked favorably for the peace process. Already before the signing of the Lizarra agreement, ETA demanded the PNV and the EA to assume three essential goals: to create new institutions to represent all the parts of *Euskal Herria* and work towards the dissolution of existing ones; to work together with the friends of *Euskal Herria*; and to end all cooperation with its enemies (e.g. the PP and the PSOE).[93] Both parties signed the document that demanded these commitments, but with certain reservations, especially concerning the last one: the PNV and the EA told the paramilitaries that this break with the state-level parties was a long-term goal that, at the moment, could not always be heeded and thus "'if the defense of the Basque nation' required this solution, agreements with other parties could be borne in mind." (Mees 2003, p.145)

At the moment ETA seemed to accept the reservation. However, after it announced the ceasefire, ETA sent a letter to the PNV criticizing the party that it talked about "the new political process as if its only ingredient was the truce and its only aim was riddance of violence." (Mees 2003, p.146) In addition, in most of its numerous communiqués written during the time of ceasefire ETA was warning the PNV and other nationalist parties to keep their commitment to the construction of the Basque nation and to keep advancing towards the self-determination. Even though there were contacts at the time with the Spanish government in Zurich, the organization showed itself completely uninterested in those negotiations (see, *El País* 27 August 1999, *El País*, 28 August 1999, *El País*, 25 October 1999) and, contrary to other occasions, only focused on "guarding" the process of nation construction. (*El País*, 31 August 1999) The government itself made

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[93] This was expressed by ETA in its communiqué announcing the end of the truce. See, ETA communiqué announcing the end of truce in http://elkarri.org/pdf/comunicado_ETA_fin_tregua.pdf

contradictory passes towards the organization, on the one hand, accepting to negotiate the prison policies, allowing a certain move of the prisoners towards the Basque Country, and on the other hand, imprisoning some of the ETA members who prepared the Zurich meetings (José Javier Arizkuren, *Kantauri* was detained on 9 March 1999) or were even the interlocutors of the government in the negotiations (Belén González Peñalva on 25 of October 1999) and leaking the name of the Bishop Uriarte as a mediator for the meetings to the press (after this, the Bishop refused to mediate any longer between the two parts, see *El País*, 25 October 1999).

After the meetings with the government completely collapsed in August 1999, (*El País* 27 August 1999) the organization increased its pressure on the nationalist block to speed up the process of "national construction." When its proposals of a rather utopian character[94] (Mees 2003, p.152) were not accepted, ETA decided to end the truce and announced in its communiqué that it would restart its activities starting from the 3 of December 1999. In the text, the organization put all the blame for the end of the ceasefire on the nationalist parties, which apparently were sticking to the autonomist route, "adhering to the statutory route of Moncloa and not to the initiatives directed towards the construction of a new juridico-political context." (ETA communiqué announcing the end of truce)

The end of the truce opened and enforced the dynamics that was already becoming apparent in the 1997: the division between "the violent" and "the democrats" gave way totally to the division between the two blocks now denominated "the constitutionalists"

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[94] There was a demand to break with all the institutional arrangements and to attempt to call for elections to the all-Basque Parliament in all the Basque territories (both on the Spanish and the French side). Obviously, the PNV could not accept such a proposal, the success of which was unimaginable because the PNV had no legal grounds whatsoever to do so and also because there was no chance for such a proposal to have an acceptance of the public.

and "the nationalists." What was new was the impermeability of these blocks, the gap between which appeared to be wider than before. As a result, the Basque political system suffered "its deepest crisis since the restoration of democracy" (Mees 2003, p.155) – the institutions (starting from quite a few municipalities, finishing with the Basque Parliament and government) could not function, because neither of the blocks could reach sufficient majorities; discussion of the questions of importance gave way to the mutual discrediting of the opponents; accusations of betrayal became common place.

The nationalist parties were on a defensive here. Return to violence for the state parties meant complete discredit for the Lizarra agreement and its propositions and was constantly pointed to when "the proof" of all nationalist being related to violence was needed. In such a way, the anti-terrorism was related to the anti-nationalism. For example, the minister of the Interior Jaime Mayor Oreja was reiterating every now and then that the defeat of ETA can only come after the defeat of the "nationalist block" as such, because "the Pact of Estella on which the nationalist block is based gives political oxygen to ETA." (*El País*, 15 June 2000) For the PSOE, the PNV should just renounce the Lizarra, because by remaining in it, the party is "sharing the aims with those who support the violent." (*El País*, 10 December 2000)

What we see here especially in the discourse of the PP is not a simple attempt to find the guilty ones for the continuing violence and the break of truce, but a situation of metonymic sliding. Here the attempt is made to force into the minds the connection between terrorism and nationalism. The complete identification of the two is never fully achieved, but from now on, the talk on nationalism presupposes to a certain extent the talk about terrorism and vice versa.

To add the fuel to the situation, in May of 2000, ETA leaked the documents concerning the negotiations that took place with the PNV before and during the truce,[95] forcing another avalanche of accusations against the PNV and the EA. In general, the strategy of ETA after the breakdown of ceasefire seemed to be the one of pressure towards the PNV to take on the ideas that the organization was proposing and an attempt to keep the gap between the two blocks as wide as possible. (see, e.g. *El País*, 5 June 2000)

The same pressure that ETA seemed to be exercising on the PNV, the PSOE received from the PP. The attempts of the socialists to ease the tension in the country and to go back to the previous arrangements and to establish certain agreements with the PNV were coming under fierce attack from the side of the PP, (*El País*, 3 March 2000) which also showed itself interested in maintaining the "politics of the blocks."

Thus, the start of the new millennium brought up the highest tensions between the blocks and the period between the start of 2000 and the elections to the Basque Parliament of the 13 May 2001, was marked by greatest political clashes. The rhetoric of both blocks was changing and crystallizing itself around the new themes that were being developed in the previous period, bringing them to their logical conclusion (or the most radical form) in the campaign of 2001 Autonomy elections.

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[95] See *El País*, 8 May 2000. In the analysis provided here, it is claimed that by providing these documents ETA tried to drag the PNV and the EA into its strategy. It could be argued that this act served to severe even more the ties between the nationalist parties and the Spanish ones, fortifying the blocks and especially the gap between them. Also in *El País*, 7 May 2000, the disclosure of the documents on the part of ETA is interpreted here as one of the means in the struggle for the hegemony within the radical Basque nationalism.

Meanings of Lizarra 1. Radicalization of the PP discourse and appropriation of the "constitutionalist" front

From the beginning the so-called "constitutionalist" parties looked at the Declaration of Lizarra with suspicion. However, during the time when the truce of ETA was in place Lizarra was not much in the center of the agenda. After all, with the declaration the truce was achieved and there were hopes that the end of the organization is near. Only the Minister of Interior Jaime Mayor Oreja pronounced that it was a trap-truce, for the rest of the government, including the Prime Minister Aznar, truce seemed to give certain hopes to end violence. (see Tusell 2004) At the same time, there was a gradual deterioration of the relations between the PP and the PNV with the former adopting stronger and stronger antinationalist discourse. As it was mentioned, already the massive mobilizations for the release and later on against the death of Miguel Ángel Blanco were seen by the PP as a sign of the reaction against nationalism as such. After the break down of the truce, amidst the general disillusionment because of the return to violence, the attacks on the PNV became even harsher and the discourse even more based on the black and white distinctions, without any shades.

The part of this discourse was based on the historical Spanish discourse on the peripheral nationalisms as the major enemies of Spain. However, it reached rather unprecedented levels. While in the first legislature of Aznar, the PP could not be too vocal about the peripheral nationalists, because it was only through their support that the party had an absolute majority in the Parliament, after the new elections of 2000 when the sound victory of the party allowed it to govern on its own, it got back to the previous antinationalist constructions. The years 2000-2001 saw the fortification of this discourse

and its consolidation around the identification of ETA with the PNV in which Lizarra served as a best example and a perfect metaphor for the connection of this "axis of evil." The major (and unhidden) aim of the PP government when it assumed power anew in the 2000 has become to neutralize nationalisms. (see, e.g. *El País*, 1 May 2000; *El País*, 30 October 2000) For that reason, discrediting of the major nationalist parties was commonplace, but, even though Catalan nationalism was as much distasteful for the new government as the Basque, all the attention at the moment was concentrated on the latter.

On a level of discourse, there was a clear attempt to make connections between the PNV and the embodiments of the worst evils in the history. The PNV came to be purely demonized – for example, some of the journalists saw in their book the leader of the PNV as "some sort of re-edition of the Beelzebub." (Tusell 2004, p.237) Comparison of the PNV with all kinds of dictators was commonplace. One writer compared the EH to the Nazis and claimed that the PNV was "ready to follow the path of the German Right of the 1933." (Tusell 2004, p.237) The Prime Minister Aznar himself compared Euskadi to Serbia and the leader of the PNV Arzalluz to Milosevic. (*El País*, 3 May 2001)

In all these demonizations and accusations the Declaration of Lizarra seemed to play a very important role. As Ludger Mees writes:

> For the constitutionalist parties, 'Lizarra' has become an etymological *passé-partout* for the description of nationalist imperialism, the selling-out of democracy to terrorism, ethnic cleansing or the nationalist holocaust against non-nationalist Basques. (Mees 2003, p.163)

It made possible to establish connection between ETA and the PNV, to put the latter on the same ground as the former. With the Lizarra, the PNV showed that it has the same goals as ETA, therefore, thinking went, the PNV is also on the same ground as the armed organization and consequently, also "violent." Here the distinction between the

democrats and the violent that was present from the inception of the Ajuria Enea pact is still present, but it is transformed in such a way that the rejection of violent means is not enough to put one on the side of the democrats against the violent, there also has to be rejection of aims. Lizarra created a paradigmatic connection between violence and nationalism. All the nationalists share the same ends, *ergo*, all the nationalists are violent. For Aznar, for example, the PNV was responsible for "all the wrongs that happened in Euskadi since the move on the sovereignist path of the pact of Lizarra" (*El País*, 12 May 2001), that is, including the new ETA offensive, strengthening of *kale borroka* and such. At another occasion the Prime Minister emphasized that the Basque government "identifies itself with the ends of ETA even if it *says* not to share the means." (*El País*, 9 June 2000, emphasis mine) And there is no possibility to talk with the party because "it changed sides," i.e. instead of being with the "democrats" chose the side of the "violent." (*El País*, 20 May 2000) In such a way, in the interpretations of the state parties and the supportive intellectuals, Lizarra came to signify not a peace proposal or anything of a kind, but a "ruthless circumstantial alliance of the democratic nationalism and the spokesmen of terrorism" (Vidal-Folch, 2001)

In such a way, as it was mentioned, antiterrorism was also connected to antinationalism. For example, Jaime Mayor Oreja claimed that the counter-terrorist politics can only work when the "nationalist front" is neutralized. (*El País*, 15 June 2000) It is not only ETA that has to be defeated, but also the PNV, because the latter serves as a "breeding ground" for the terrorists, gives "political coverage" to ETA and resurrected the organization that was already dead. (*El País*, 2 September 2000; 22 January 2000) All this happened because the PNV signed the Lizarra Declaration.

In addition, as a result of the mobilizations of July 1997, another element in the discourse appeared and this element was to play an important role in the construction of political discourse: the position of victims. The PP started presenting itself as a representative of the victims and this position gained more and more importance overtime. Most of the victim organizations belong to the ideological influence sphere of the PP and their voice was becoming more and more important. When interpreting Lizarra, as well, victims were also used in order to discredit the Basque nationalists. One of the more common statements was that there are victims and the assassins, there are those who are with victims and those who are with the assassins and no middle ground in between. The attempts to find such a ground "only serve to legitimate the criminals," as the Prime Minister proclaimed at one occasion. (*El País*, 2 September 2000)

This way, the PP was attempting to link ethics with politics and to show some of the political options, in this case that of the Basque nationalism, as ethically evil and the position represented by the PP as morally right. This strategy reached its peak during the campaign of the Basque elections of the 2001, where, as Pérez Royo writes, "the Government has presented an exclusively partisan strategy as a moral imperative and, in consequence, as a democratic demand." (Pérez Royo, 2001) We already saw how the victim-connection served the PP to establish the moral chains of equivalence in the part dealing with connections between discourse on violence and discourse on the nation in Chapter IV, here is another example of such usage of victim connection.

The tension between the two blocks was strong enough as to invite the description of a situation through a war frame. "War frame" in the Basque Country was nothing new at the time, with violence constantly dividing the society into at least two parts. The Civil

War, as was mentioned numerous times, provided a paradigmatic war frame which kept influencing politics. For example, when the clashes between the PP and the PNV in the year 2000 were reaching highest points, the speaker of the PNV in the Parliament Iñaki Anasagasti urged the Prime Minister to be consequent with his actions and declare Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa the "traitor provinces" just like during the Civil War. (*El País*, 26 April 2000)

Later these divisions were woven into discourse by making clear-cut equivalental chains, which were metaphorized in the denominations of "nationalists" and "constitutionalists." Again, like in a typical war frame or any equivalental chain these two sides appeared to be mutually exclusive, both are presenting morally grounded positions and attempting to subdue one another by all means. Everything is subordinated to the two positions: either one is with the Statute and the Constitution in their current forms as defended by the PP or one is with ETA.

Even though all these denominations and accusations were more present in the Right and it was the one which was benefiting from the employment of the harsh attacks against the Basque nationalism, Socialists also summed up from time to time to such assaults. During the campaign of the elections to Basque Parliament, the PSE made an alliance with the PP with the purpose of pushing the PNV out of power and consequently its electoral campaign did not differ from that of the PP. (Tusell 2004, p.237) Some of the leaders of the PSOE expressed their different views or even uneasiness of combining forces with the PP, but in general, it was not their campaign. The "constitutionalist front" was appropriated by the PP and it was the interpretations of the PP that were having the most importance. Even the timid cheers on the side of the Socialists for the change within

the PNV were not tolerated on the side of the ruling party and the PSOE was often left in the position of a little brother who should be careful about when and what about it raises its voice. In the highly polarized environment that was promoted both by ETA's bombs and assassinations and, on a political level, by the governing party's attacks on the nationalism as such, the Socialist "middle position" was not a very viable option.

The PSE, though, has established one of the meanings of Lizarra that was to become one of the myths of the Declaration: the betrayal. With the Lizarra, the PNV betrayed the Socialists and went together with ETA. For example, representative of the PSE in the European Parliament Rosa Díez in a debate with EA leader:

> We felt that you cheated on us. We felt betrayed by you. … At the time when we were leaving [the Basque Parliament] with our bodyguards, you went to drink wine with those of HB. When our councilors go out of their houses protected, you go with the people who insult us, with those people who are in favor of killing us. (*El País*, 2 May 2001)

Even during the truce, but especially after the break of it and the return of violence, which was now so much directed against the two "Spanish" parties, Lizarra came to signify betrayal. Betrayal of the partners, but even more so, betrayal of all the democratic and human rights principles.

This betrayal of the "political partners" is rather understandable, though, because Lizarra also gave more force to another myth of the relations between ETA and the PNV: the myth of the family. The PNV behaves the way it behaves, because it belongs to the same family as ETA, if ETA is in trouble, the PNV is always giving it a hand and pulling it up. ETA is just one aspect of nationalism, a result of one schism within the "family of nationalism,"[96] but to paraphrase the saying, "a family is a family is a family," therefore,

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[96] There are quite a few examples of using the "nationalist family" metaphor to talk about all the nationalist organizations. See, for example, *El País*, 15 April 2001.

the PNV helps ETA and therefore, for the more radically minded, to defeat terrorism one has to defeat nationalism. This is not to say that the metaphor of the family is completely unfitting for denominating the PNV and ETA and the relationship between the two, but the problem here is the usage that has been made of it, trying to exclude the entire "family" because of the actions of "lost sons."

Meanings of Lizarra 2. Search for new discourse in the PNV

Notwithstanding the fact that it had indications that the truce may not last and that ETA was becoming disinterested in the process and pushing it to a direction that nobody could seriously think of taking, the PNV seemed to be unable to move from the line of discourse that was created with the Lizarra. It seemed to be unable to see that the break up of the agreements is permanent. Therefore, even after the first murder of ETA in the beginning of 2000 it only suspended the pact with the EH, "as if he [the *lehendakari*] was convinced that the radicals only needed time and a new opportunity to manifest their commitment to democracy." (Mees 2003, p.155)[97] When Batasuna did not only fail to condemn the assassination of a socialist deputy of the Basque Parliament Fernando Buesa together with his ertzaina[98] bodyguard (22 February 2000), but also decided to leave the autonomous Parliament (partially in March 2000, and then definitely in September 2000), among the shouts after each ETA attack not only against the organization, but also against the PNV, the party had to reconsider its position both towards the HB and

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[97] A cynical interpretation could be that the PNV did not want to break with the HB because it wanted to stay in power and without its support it was in a minority in the Parliament and with poor prospects of wining next elections because of the ETA behavior and that it was seen as a "family member" of the organization.

[98] *Ertzaintza* is the Basque autonomous police; *ertziana* is a member of that police force. In the beginning, when this police force was being created, ETA did not attack its members, reserving their blows for the state-level G*uardia Civil* and other forces. However, in the mid-nineties, with the *Ajuria Enea* agreement in force and with *Ertzaintza* becoming more and more involved in the counter-terrorism operations, the attacks against this force also became frequent.

212

towards the Lizarra agreement. At this point, Lizarra was already seen by the "constitutionalists" as an invention by ETA, in which the PNV was playing the game of the organization.

The break of the truce by ETA was experienced by the PNV as a dislocative event. Even though it had indications that this might well happen, the party based its discourse on a belief that ETA was serious in its commitment to the peace process and eventually will leave arms instead of starting using them again. It could be said that this was a wishful thinking, but with the signing of Lizarra agreement, with the severing of ties with the socialists (after elections of 1998, the PNV still wanted to have a coalition with the PSOE and in fact the best possibility for it seemed a government with the PSE, the PNV and the EH, but the PSE did not really want to get involved. Tusell 154-155), the party abandoned the ambiguity on which historically its discourse was based and opted for one, sovereignty, option. And the usefulness and possibility to implement this option did depend on the ETA keeping its word.

In addition, Lizarra agreement meant both for the PNV and for many other Basque nationalists not only a different political strategy, it had a strong symbolic meaning. In the Basque nationalist environment Lizarra meant a "reconstructed home/house" ("*casa reconstruida*" see, Martínez Montoya 1999; Sáez de la Fuente Aldama 2004), it was a "cornerstone of the future Basque national construction" (Letamendia, quoted in Martínez Montoya 1999, p.109) and a symbolic "founding event." (Zubero 1998) It thus became an example that the Basques could overcome their differences and create their national project together. ETA summed itself up to these hopes declaring that: "we have

to demonstrate them that we have the necessity, right, will and ability to organize our own home the way we want it." (ETA communiqué announcing truce)

The importance of the metaphor of the house for the Basque nationalism was not overlooked by the other political forces as well, only here to show disdain to the ideas presented by it. Thus, for example, Aznar once told that the Basque nationalism is "an isolated house and in ruins, a material for demolition" (*El País*, 18 March 2001)

In addition, the fact that it was signed in a Lizarra-Estella and later on the Saint Jean-Pied-de-Port, or Donibane-Garazi, in Basque, did not escape the eye of the observers. (De la Granja Sainz 1999) The selection of these places had a clear symbolic meaning. First of all, Lizarra was a host of the Assembly of Estella in 1931, which gave birth to the Statute of Estella. In this assembly the representatives of most of the municipalities in the Basque provinces (including Navarre) participated and even though the Statute they adopted was later rejected by the Spanish Cortes, this meeting still symbolized the Basque unity because this was the first and the last where all the Spanish provinces came together. The signing of the declaration in the French Basque Country incorporated also these territories in a common project, making it territorially wholesome.

Having in mind this symbolic meaning of the act, it is not difficult to understand why for the PNV it was painful to abandon the vision of a "reconstructed house" where everyone lives happily together, without violence and relying on dialogue in the "Basque decision framework." Even if there were voices to the contrary, Lizarra definitely was not a simple peace proposal with no additional meaning.[99] A dream of national unity and the "Basque

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[99] The leader of the PNV Arzalluz once told that "to Lizarra one neither enters nor leaves, because it is nothing else but a peace proposal." See, *El País*, 19 June 2000.

home" that went back almost to the creation of the PNV was even more important in its interpretation than the possible political gains.

The solutions of what to do with this vision, when it became clear that it is as far from reality as ever, were not coming easily and there were clashes within the party about how to deal with the situation. On the one hand, there were those who declared that the attacks of ETA "murdered Lizarra" and made it obsolete. On the other hand, there were voices that said that the "objectives of Lizarra are still in force," but their implementation is "congealed" for the moment.[100] The then-leader of the PNV, Xabier Arzalluz, who in his last years of the presidency of the party did not really seem to use his diplomatic skills too well, later declared that the PNV had a lot in common with ETA, had similar goals, but different strategies (non-violent in the PNV's case), again indicating the necessity of keeping alive the Lizarra agreement.[101]

So was Lizarra dead or not? Even within the PNV there were different interpretations of the meaning of declaration itself, therefore, there were differing opinions over whether it was to be still referred to or forgotten, interred, put aside. On the one hand, right after the announcement of the end of the truce, in the beginning of 2000, this line of keeping to the basic ideas of the Lizarra agreement and to the pro-sovereignty position was also put into the party's new program, which reconfirmed the PNV's adherence to the idea of self-

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[100] The first of opinion was expressed by the PNV's speaker at the Spanish Cortes Iñaki Anasagasti, the second by the official speaker of the party Joseba Egibar. See, *El País*, 14 August 2000.

[101] The statements of Arzalluz (made during the interview for Der Spiegel) on the PNV having something in common with ETA were later on contested by the other speakers of the party. Having in mind the attacks from the side of the "constitutionalist" parties that the PNV was suffering at the time, the moment was not at all opportune for such declarations. More on the situation see, *El País*, 17 November 2000.

The leader of the party was already notorious for making statements that would put the PNV in trouble, not using the properly "politically correct" language. For example, in one interview he mentioned that there is a higher prevalence of the negative Rh in the Basque Country. This statement deserved him a name of a xenophobe and racist. (*El País*, 5 November 2000). At the mentioned above interview he also claimed that the "Spanish in the independent Basque Country will be treated as now, for example, Germans in Mallorca." A statement which also shocked the Spanish political elite.

determination, but through peaceful means. (*El País*, 14 January 2000) In this sense, Lizarra meant the attempt to construct the "Basque house" which would be free from the impositions. On another hand, Lizarra was also connected to the peace process, it was not only a declaration that indicated a start of construction of the "Basque home," this home had also to be peaceful and constructed in "absence of all forms of violence." When it is taken in this sense, Lizarra agreement was definitely dead. There was no peace and ETA did not seem to be willing at all to give up its own personal struggle for the (maybe similar) goals.

These two conflicting interpretations would mark the PNV's position towards Lizarra. The first one, though, as was already mentioned, was more and more difficult to sustain because it ignored the violence and kept to the political project. The second one meant the necessity to reinterpret the party's position. Bid for sovereignty was not something alien for the Spanish political space, after all, the PNV's partner in the Basque government EA was openly pro-independent, as was the Catalan ERC. The Barcelona Declaration that the PNV signed in 1998 together with Catalan CiU and Galician BNG also had a sovereignist tint, but the presence of violence was seriously complicating things. ETA's return to violence and the reaction to that showed clearly how the political projects can be discredited by the presence of violence. Now the PNV shared a goal with the "armed organization," ETA not only directed all its communiqués during the truce to the PNV, but it also arranged its attacks after the end of the truce in such a way that would make life extremely difficult for the moderate nationalists, trying to push the party to abandon its democratic position and to opt for the radical implementation of its

program. Seen like this, the connection that the "constitutionalist" parties were making between the ETA and the PNV seemed plausible enough.

Thus, the party had to find its way from this association. The solution came not through some radical change in seeing things, but through the alteration of the language and tone. After the Basque Parliament was dissolved and new elections were called, the PNV presented itself as an island of moderation in the sea of hysteria created both by the ETA and by the PP government. Here, the PNV said what it was always saying: that it rejects violence and would defend human rights; that there has to be a political dialogue if there is any solution to the conflict; and that any decision taken by the Basques should be respected, thus keeping the basic ideas of the Lizarra document. The only modification albeit a significant one, was that the idea of national unity was already not seen as a good in itself, as something to be strived for at all costs. It was declared clearly that no votes of Batasuna will be accepted as long as it does not denounce violence in such a way going back to the division of "the violent and the democrats." ETA itself was shown as an organization which no longer has and certainly does not represent any political project and at the same time compassion and support for the victims was offered.

The party and especially the Lehendakari Ibarretxe managed to keep to a moderate tone amidst the calumnies and attacks from all the sides. In such a way, he "managed to create a public image of an honest person who would not only talk about the unity of the democrats against terrorism but tried to practice it by putting forward concrete proposals." (Mees 2003, p.161) In addition, he turned the electoral competition into a contest of two candidates: himself and the Basque PP leader Jaime Mayor Oreja who was

not very popular in the Basque Country,[102] among other things probably also because he tended to equate nationalism with terrorism and being tough on the latter (which was a popular move) tended to get too tough on the former as well (which was not so popular).

2001 elections

Even though the "constitutionalist" parties proclaimed that nobody should be afraid of the fact that the nationalists would not form the government in the Basque Country, it appeared that for many people such fears were valid. In the elections of the May 13, 2001, a record number of the Basque citizens voted (79%) and again gave victory to the coalition of the PNV and the EA, who increased their votes by 6%, while the votes for the "constitutionalist" parties rose only very slightly and Batasuna went down significantly – from 17% that it got in the 1998 elections only 10% remained. Many understood voting for the PNV as a call to save the *Patria*. The HB and ETA, also interpreted the results in such a way, but constantly added that the votes the PNV received were "borrowed" votes, the ones that belonged to the HB and were only temporarily loaned to the moderate nationalists. (*El País*, 19 May 2001, on ETA position – *El País*, 4 July 2001)

Now the politics of the blocks got milder. The PSOE understood that it does not gain much playing to the flute of the PP and started searching for its own way in the Basque politics. Already after the loss in the elections the leader of the PSOE declared that the PP should learn the lessons of that defeat and that it should not count with the PSOE to produce more tension. (*El País*, 20 May 2001) The results of the elections showed that

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[102] According to surveys, 34% of the Basques wanted Ibarretxe as *Lehendakari*, while only 6% preferred Mayor Oreja. The percentages of the parties were much closer to one another. Some of the surveys showed that there is a possibility for the PP and the PSE to get to power.

the hard policies only benefit the prospects of the PP. Even though Socialists remained clearly critical of the nationalist government, they now tried to distance themselves from the PP at least in the tone of their declarations and to present themselves as some kind of in-between of the PP and the PNV. (*El País*, 18 May 2001)

The same reduction of tension was not the game the PP wanted to play and that can well be seen in the analysis of the events surrounding the Madrid bombings of 11-M in 2004 and the subsequent general elections of the 14th of March. This is, however, a topic of another chapter.

Here, it is also important to note that in 2002 the new Party Law was passed, which implied outlawing of Batasuna. The majority of the people in Basque Country were against this banning, there were fears that violence would increase and the outlawing would give even more grounds to ETA's claims about the insufficiencies of democracy in Spain. However, in a year, when the sentence of Supreme Court finally did outlaw Batasuna, the reaction was not as strong as the pessimists declared and the nationalist parties themselves, according to Tusell, "have showed themselves to be pretty much in favor of the measure, even though would have it approved by the others" (Tusell 2004, p.301). By this measure and the constant pressure on the whole of the IA, the PP government managed to advance significantly in the struggle against ETA. As the environment itself was under constant pressure, it could not provide so much support for the armed organization, which was being more and more cornered. But it was the events first of the 11 September 2001, which created a general revulsion to terrorist means in the world at large and later those of the 11 March of 2004 that brought significantly different dynamics in the Basque Country.

The PNV changed somewhat its discourse, but it did stick to the more pro-independence position it was advancing with the Lizarra declaration. The proposal to modify the Basque Statute, the so-called Plan Ibarretxe[103] is the best example of this. This bold proposal was deeply based to the traditional idea of the PNV of recuperation of the rights that the Basques had under *fueros*. However, interpreted in the light of the "modern" standards, it could well have meant the advancement to independence. The plan contained such proposals as establishing of a certain "Basque citizenship,"[104] create links to the French Basque Country (*Iparralde*) and to Navarre;[105] create a separate Basque judicial system; establish foreign representations, especially at the European Union and basically minimize the competences of the state in the region. In general, the relations with Spain should be based on the "regime of the free association." In the previous parts it was mentioned that the Basque proposal for the Spanish Constitution of the 1978 envisaged a "pacted" nature of the Spanish state, a nature that was best represented in the old Basque *fueros*. Here we see this idea of the pact between the Spain and the Basque Country surge up again with all force.

From the beginning, the plan was attacked fiercely by the parties of the "constitutionalist" block, but was not even fully assumed by the associate of the PNV in the Basque government – the IU and was considered to be completely insufficient by the HB (mainly because it was created as a "reform" of the Statute of Gernika and not a pure rupture with all the legal framework of the Spanish state). The then-ruling PP even went to such

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[103] The official title of the document is "Proposal of the reform of the political Statute of the Community of Euskadi." See the text in: http://www.elcorreodigital.com/apoyos/documentos/planaprobado.pdf

[104] Such practices were already being implemented in some municipalities under the control of IA, which issued the so-called Basque IDs, which do not have any legal power, but are often used symbolically. E.g. during the court cases or on other occasions where the militants of the IA have to be identified, they tend to present the Basque IDs.

[105] According to the Spanish Constitution, no federations of autonomies can be created and their borders also cannot be changed without the consent of the *Cortes*.

lengths as to change the penal code in order to include there a clause that promised imprisonment for anybody who would declare a referendum without having proper authorization for that. This law was interpreted by everybody as directly targeting the Basque *Lehendakari*.[106]

In the voting of the Plan Ibarretxe in the Basque Parliament, though, it was not the moderate nationalists, but the former HB that took charge of the proceedings, giving three votes out of six in its disposal for the project and by doing so completely burying the Plan, as for the state parties it became completely unacceptable and showing the power it still had within the Basque institutions. The triumph of Ibarretxe here was rather bitter and it turned to a complete failure in the Spanish Cortes, where the plan was rejected without even much discussion. During the deliberations, thus, the Plan was presented as a personal project and a personal lunacy of the *Lehendakari*. Its provisions did not look convincing even to the majority of the Basques. During the discussion time, the surveys showed that the adversaries of the plan were being much more successful at convincing people about the flaws of the plan than the PNV was in advertising its good parts.

How could this failure be interpreted? First of all, one of the explanations could be that the *Lehendakari* gave too much significance to the fact that he won the elections of 2001 with such an elevated number of votes. In a sense, the leaders of Batasuna and ETA were right in pointing out that those were the "borrowed votes" which would go back to

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[106] The change itself was made disregarding the normal procedures. Instead of attempting to reform the Penal Code, a reform of which would need a greater majority in the Parliament, the party entered some additional articles into the Organic Law of Arbitration that was about to be approved in the Senate. Despite the outcry of the opposition (it was hard to see how the Arbitration was related to the criminal penalties in case of convocation of a referendum) the law was passed with only votes of the PP for its approval. See, *El País*, 4 December 2003. This law was revoked when the Socialists gained power in 2004.

Batasuna the moment that the threat to the nation in a form of possible loss of the government by the nationalists would disappear. Secondly, and that is related to the first point, the Plan Ibarretxe was designed and often presented as a personal project of the *Lehendakari*. As the HB was not participating in its creation it would never have accepted it, especially having in mind that it was still presented as a modification of the Statute of Gernika. For the "constitutionalist" parties this project was definitely going too far, therefore, it was no chance that they would support it. This was a project that was (again) directed exclusively to the nationalist community, but without a participation in its creation of other nationalist forces, no other merits that it might have had, could have saved it.

Conclusion

From the moment it was signed, the Declaration of Lizarra became a "constant reference" (Sáez de la Fuente Aldama 2004, p.171) for all the forces involved in the Basque politics and a source of continuous controversy. This controversy made explicit two completely different interpretations of the Basque situation and ETA violence. The "Lizarra experiment" led to the consolidation of these divergent positions, one based on the Basque, another on the Spanish nationalist tradition. As a consequence, the Declaration of Lizarra also came to signify completely different things for different people.

In discussing the path leading to the Declaration of Lizarra, two documents were given particular attention, one describing rather explicitly the Spanish-nationalist point of view – Manifest of Forum of Ermua – and the other, which represents more the Basque nationalist tradition and builds on elements of the Basque historical discourse. These documents already show the background of what is to come later. The Declaration of

Lizarra itself built significantly on the latter; and the attacks on the document and its signing parties after the collapse of the truce had a similar tone to the former.

For the "constitutionalists" Lizarra became a symbol of the "pact with the assassins," the betrayal of the highest values, it put the PNV almost at the same level as ETA and made it the accomplice of the armed organization, something that was already brought up in the Manifest of the Forum of Ermua, but which was given "solid evidence" with the Lizarra.

Therefore, the end of terrorism in Spain came to be associated with the demise of "nationalist front" as the distinction between means and ends gave way to the distinction between aims that are "democratic" and those which are not. Through metonymic sliding, a (yet imperfect) sameness between terrorism and peripheral nationalism was achieved. As the PNV shared the ends of ETA (which the signing of Lizarra showed), it was almost as much a terrorist as the later, providing a "breeding ground" for the ETA terrorism and, even if it did not participate in the terrorist actions themselves or exalt them the way Batasuna did, it was still to be left out of the "democratic" politics.

The created chains of equivalence (we will see them again on other occasions, specifically during the electoral campaign of 2004, as we already know, are not just a simple political division, but include moral imperatives. With the collapse of truce and the end of Lizarra national front, the option to support the PP in its way of fighting ETA becomes not a matter of political opinion, but a moral choice of a "decent man."[107]

The nationalist politicians looked at the situation through a different prism. The events of July 1997 and the rising association of the moderate nationalism with the radical one, which later on came to an almost identification of the PNV with ETA, made the former

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[107] The current leader of the party Mariano Rajoy likes to emphasize that his party represents all the "normal and decent" people.

aware of the discrediting effects that the ETA violence had on the ideals of nationalism as such. It was thought that in order for the nationalism to survive, ETA violence had to disappear from the scene. To achieve this, the PNV tried offer ETA the exit strategy by which it could move away from the path of violence without losing its face, creating an embryo of what would later become an idea of the "peace without victors or losers."

For such a strategy to succeed common denominators had to be found and these were encountered by going beyond the question of violence and, in the case of the PNV, also beyond the pragmatic politics, into the realm of symbolism and ideals where both the PNV and ETA had common ideas because they shared common roots. This allowed the birth of Lizarra, with all the symbolic meaning that was embodied in it, and the creation of a myth of a "reconstructed home/house" in which all the Basques could live without the presence of violence and by solving the problems of their identities through a peaceful dialogue.

Here, the symbolism of the places of signing the Declaration is important, as it seemed to reunite the seven Basque lands into one. Also, one should not overlook the ideas presented in the Declaration, e.g. the affirmation of the existence of the political conflict, which had lasted for 160 years (since the Carlist wars), as the *Lehendakari* Ibarretxe once proclaimed, (*El País*, 23 June 2000) the roots of which went to the inception of the Basque nationalism.

All this symbolism, however, made it extremely difficult for the PNV to change the course once it became clear that the project of national unity has failed as ETA returned to its armed struggle. Like in the discourse construction of the PP before the March 14, 2004, the discourse of the PNV was a weak one, relying too much on the "good will" of

ETA even when there were many indications that this will was exactly what was lacking. The success of the project of Lizarra depended exclusively on ETA keeping the truce, but the organization had its own ideas and at this moment was not prepared to leave the space for the democratic politics.

Thus, betrayal became one of the themes on the nationalist side. For ETA, the PNV betrayed the common project and did not do enough to advance the Basque independence. For the PNV, ETA betrayed and killed the entire project of the "common house" with its return to violence. These accusations from all sides and the imagery of the end of truce as the "end of the dream"[108] were to prevail in the Basque politics in the years to come, being especially strong before the autonomous elections of 2001, so that "Basque politics became extremely emotional, while the space for more rational, transverse policy-making, cutting across the established fronts, became narrower and narrower." (Mees 2003, p.155)

This division between the different actors of the Basque politics and the impossibility to find a common ground between the two assertive nationalisms was, in the end, the true victory of ETA. (see, e.g. Tusell 2000) However, it would never have done it alone. Only the clustering of all the political issues around the nodal points that were completely exclusive of one another by the legitimate political forces could achieve such a result.

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[108] See, Elso, 2000. Or Mees, 2003. The author has a chapter entitled "The End of the Dream."

Chapter VI. Electoral campaign of 2004 and the events of 11-M

The turn that the March 11 attacks have given to the country and the positions of political actors cannot be understood without appreciating the discursive position that the then-ruling Popular Party has taken during its reign and especially during the campaign for the general elections of 2004. This campaign can serve as a good example for the way terrorism discourse may work for the creation of the identity of political actors and also as an illustration of the various processes involved in "terrorism" creation. Thus, with this case several aspects of the political discourse can be made apparent: first, the way coherent discursive frames are created and consequently protagonist and antagonist identity fields (Hunt et al. 1994) designed, the possibility of resonance of the frame can also be realized. Secondly, the usage of historical discourse in the creation of these frames can be noted. And thirdly, the dislocative effects of the events of 11 March on this discourse analyzed.

Many points outlined before can be exemplified by this case: the relation between historical discourse and the discourse of violence; the linking of diverse problems to the problem of violence in order to discredit them all; the relation between structure and agency, i.e. how much personalities of concrete politicians matter in transformation of the political discourse; and, finally, the creation of new myths in the dislocated spaces of discourse.

Before starting the discussion, a note on the sources should be made. In this part of analysis I am using the speeches of the politicians of the ruling party during the electoral campaign between the 27 February and 10 March 2004, i.e. before the train bombings took place. The abstracts of these speeches can be found in the main newspapers of the

country. For this part, I was using the abstracts and extracts of speeches given in *El País* and *El Mundo*. As one of the newspapers has a more the center left leaning and the other has a more center right inclination, by taking both of them into account I was trying to diminish the bias that might be present in using such sources. For the second part of this investigation – the effects of the 11 March attacks, I am using the political rhetoric of the days between the 11 of March and the 14 of March, i.e. the day of the elections. And in addition to that, the speeches made in the commission of the 11 of March and on other occasions as well as the positions of the leaders of the party on the events will be used to see the way it was dealt with the dislocating effects of these events. These appearances provide an example of already consolidated positions about the meaning of the events that came to being during the three days between attacks and elections thus indicating the amount of change that can be noted in the discourse.

The background: **Caso Carod** *and the truce for Catalonia*

As it was emphasized, during the entire second term of the government of the PP, the tension between the governing party and the representatives of peripheral nationalists was growing. Already in the first term of the government of Aznar the ruling party identified democratic nationalism with terrorism, primarily by associating the PNV with ETA (Tusell 2004, p.157). In the beginning of 2004, the same process could be also transferred to Catalonia and even deeper to the inside of the Spanish national level politics.

The Catalonian elections of 16 November 2003 showed a certain decline of the CiU (Convergència i Unió[109]) coalition that ruled the region since the establishment of the

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[109] While it is usually referred to as one party, the CiU is actually comprised of two – the *Convergència democràtica de Catalunya* and *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya*.

autonomy.[110] The apparently immovable CiU still got the most votes, but not enough to secure it the government on its own. Catalonian Socialists (PSC)[111], a party that came out second in the elections, in this situation was faster to make a coalition with the Leftist and Independentist ERC and the Catalonian Greens (ICV), bringing about the first change in the regional government. The Socialist Party was especially euphoric about coming to government in what seemed to be a nearly hopeless region. The euphoria, however, did not last long. On the 26 of January the newspaper ABC has revealed that in the beginning of January the leader of the ERC, Josep Lluis Carod-Rovira, had a secret meeting with the leaders of ETA in Perpignan (France).

Even though the major political parties already agreed at the moment that no negotiations or contacts with ETA should be made, the leader of the ERC decided to undertake a personal initiative to try to persuade the organization to give up arms. This rather unrealistic initiative caused an avalanche in the politics of the country as the information about it appeared in the press.

This information gave a double weapon to the PP:[112] first of all, it was helpful to strengthen the idea of the alliance of all nationalisms and, hence, the violent character of

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[110] The party lost 7.12% compared with the previous elections of 1999 and got 10 seats less (went down from 38.05 to 30.93% and from 56 seats to 46). Catalan Socialist Party gained the majority of the votes cast (31.17%), but gained 4 seats less than CiU. In this situation it was up to the ERC with its 16.47% and 23 seats to determine the outlook of the new Catalan government. On the election results see: http://www.elpais.es/comunes/2003/eleccionescataluna/index.html
The elections were meant to mark the beginning of a new era also because the leader of CiU who became the symbol of Catalan politics, Jordi Pujol, retired after 23 years of serving as an undisputed leader of Catalonia.
[111] The Partido Socialista Obrero Español functions more like a coalition than a centralized party with the regional party branches having proper names and considerable autonomy in their decisions.
[112] There were strong motives to suggest that the information itself leaked from the Moncloa Palace, the residence of the president of the government. The information that appeared in ABC was identical to the one that the Central Intelligence Agency (CNI) provided to the Prime Minister's office. The leak supposedly gave the security services a huge discontent, being detrimental to the proceedings of the anti-terrorist fight. (See, for example, *El País*, 29 January 2004) The general view was that the government used the information of the secret services with partisan ends.

all of them. The ERC and especially its leader became identified as "friends of ETA", the ones that give air to the organization by negotiating with it. Secondly, it also gave a weapon to use against the PSOE – the refusal of president of *Generalitat* of Catalonia, socialist Pasqual Maragall, to break with the ERC was presented as a breach of the Anti-terrorist Pact. The situation in which the PP lumped together the socialists and the nationalists was by no means new. As Tusell writes, already before coming to power, the party wanted to show that "socialists and nationalists forms some sort of conglomerate, that coincides in fundamental ideas and which they did not hesitate to vigorously demonize" (Tusell 2004, p.138). The Carod-case just seemed to prove the point they were making throughout the years.

When the crisis was already calming down and the situation seemed to be solved – with Carod out of the Catalan government, but the coalition between the PSC and the ERC maintained, - ETA itself came to the aid of the ruling party, announcing a partial truce for Catalonia. Actually, the announcement seemed to fall so well into the hands of the PP, that the Basque *Lehendakari* Juan José Ibarretxe claimed that ETA was doing the electoral campaign for the ruling party (*El País*, 19 February 2004) and an analyst Juan Goytisolo wrote that "ETA gave the PP the such a New Year present about which it could not even dream". (Goytisolo 2004)

In its communiqué, ETA claimed what the PP pretended: that the struggles in Basque Country and Catalonia were the same, listing the similarities between the two peoples, the necessity to fight for the self-determination of both of them and basing its decision to announce the truce on the "honest, active and generous solidarity that the process of the

liberation of the Basque Country received from the Catalan people". (ETA Communiqué announcing truce for Catalonia)

This way ETA for all the democratic political forces presented itself (again) as a force of rupture, this time influencing the political sphere without a shot or a bomb. It managed to create a rift between, this time, Catalonia and the rest of Spain. The Catalans became as traitors for the rest of Spain, adding this to the general mistrust of Catalonia because of its economic force in the country, and especially the political situation since 1989, when the governments of the country had to rely on the parliamentary support of the major Catalan nationalist force CiU (Tusell 2004, p.185).[113] Socialists themselves were put into an even worse position as most observers noted, for it could not rely on such loyalty in the whole of Spain as the ERC was enjoying in Catalonia.[114]

It was not only ETA, however, that made this rift possible. The impact that the announcement of truce had on the political world in the country cannot be explained without referring both to the general discourse on violence prevalent in the country, and the stance of the PP as the only force that keeps country together and the only party that is seriously committed to the maintenance of unity and stability of the country. The positioning of the Right as the guardians of essence of Spain of its "unity of destiny in universe" was nothing new, as could be seen from the discussion of the vision of Spain

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[113] This support for the central governments, actually, was not viewed as favorably in Catalonia. The decline of the party in the 1996 and 1999 elections is often explained by the rejection of the voters to the support of CiU for the national parties in government.
See, for example, http://www.elpais.es/comunes/2003/eleccionescataluna/escenario_electoral.html
However, this support made part of a larger strategy of CiU at the time, which consisted mainly of support provided for the government in exchange to certain benefits for Catalonia and was actually one of the important elements of the general institutional stability of the country.
[114] The Socialists themselves were accused to be accomplices of terrorism. (see *El País*, Comunidad Valenciana, 19 February 2004)

through time. As it could also be seen, the PP in government brought back this idea and put it to the extreme.

The situation would not have fallen better into any other type of discourse, as ETA itself was perfectly aware. One of the internal bulletins of the organization (*Zutabe,* no.100, see *El País* 20 February 2004) argued for the possibility of using ceasefires for the political purposes. Having in mind that the organization usually possesses of a good capacity for the analysis of the political environment of the country, this truce can be interpreted (as it was interpreted by several analysts – see Subirats 2004, Editorial *El País* 19 February 2004) as not so much a military ceasefire, but as a political bomb. There were voices even accusing the organization of working for the electoral campaign of the ruling party.[115] A statement, which might have had some truth in it. According to Javier Pradera, ETA functions according to a "catastrophic logic" of "the worse, the better." (Pradera 2004a) As the political situation in the Basque Country during the rule of the PP deteriorated to the extent of threatening the *Lehendakari* with prison, and presumably would not have gotten better through the next mandate of the party, it promised more popular discontent in the region and consequently more support for the independentist claims of the organization.

Would the situation have been different if it was clear that the ruling party would stick to the letter of Anti-terrorist pact that demanded no political use of terrorism? The answer is probably positive, however, the government showed itself disposed even to use security services in order to discredit the Catalan Nationalists and through them the Socialists in the wake of March elections. It was thus obvious that it would not resist the temptation to

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[115] Basque *Lehendakari* Juan José Ibarretxe accused ETA of "helping the electoral interests of PP", see *El País* 19 February 2004. This was also expressed by some political analysts. See, for example, Gil Calvo, 2004.

use such a gratuitous weapon against their opponents. Furthermore, the whole situation was falling so neatly into the historical Civil War frame of the coalition of "reds"[116] and the separatists. At this point, though the analysts were seriously warning against the false historical analogies, the spirit of the Civil War was revived.

This connection was made even stronger by the presence of ETA at the foreground of the events. As the memory of violent events is persistently strongest, the connection between one violence and another is also not difficult to make. This way the historical memory worked to bring forth the old frames to the front of the political struggle.

Framing processes

These were thus the circumstances in which the electoral campaign for the general elections has started. Not so much useful for the investigation of a historical discourse as such, an investigation of framing processes can be helpful in analyzing concrete discourses concerning certain specific issues. In this case, electoral campaign of the ruling party in Spain can be explored in this manner. The framing theory here can be effective in structuring the different elements of the campaign discourse that can further on be related to the general historical discourse and the anti-terrorist discourse itself. With the help of description of these framing processes it can be seen how the construction of the issues relates to the creation of identity of the participants and to the shape of the political field as such.

In the social movements' research three types of framing are distinguished: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. These in turn relate to three "identity fields" (Hunt

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[116] The threat of coalition of "reds" frame was already used in the discourse of the year 2000 elections after which the PP received an absolute majority. This time, separatists could be added to the whole discourse to complete the frame.

et al. 1994): protagonist, antagonist and audience identities. In addition to that, a notion of "frame resonance" (Snow, Benford 1988) is important as it shows how successful any frame can be in the circumstances. The relation of the proposed frames to the personal experiences of the audience has a great deal of importance for the outcome of the electoral appeal. Further on, the electoral campaign of the then-ruling party PP will be analyzed using these notions, first examining the diagnostic framing and the creation of an antagonist identity field, then moving on to discuss the prognostic framing and the protagonist identity field, subsequently to move on to motivational framing and the audience and finally the frame resonance.

Diagnostic framing and the antagonist identity field

According to Hunt et al. the diagnostic framings "not only serve the obvious function of attributing blame, they also facilitate the construction of both protagonist and antagonist identity fields." (Hunt et al. 1994, p.198) In the case of 2004 electoral campaign of the PP, we can look at the two important elements in the diagnostic framing – the identification of the concrete actors as adversaries and the creation of a problem field that both identifies the issues that are most significant in the discourse and shapes the image of the opponent.

Starting from the problem map, some major topics can be identified. In this case, the issues raised concerned mostly situation that the adversary government would create if it were allowed to win elections. This situation was depicted through identifying a series of threats and risks that the country would face had the PP lost the elections. These can be grouped into three groups: threat to prosperity, threat to national unity and the threat of terrorism, all the three in one way or another related to each other.

The economy during the rule of the PP advanced significantly and the economic situation was usually evaluated favorably.[117] What the party in government invoked for the coming elections, then, was the threat to this reached prosperity. However, this threat, while sometimes directly related to the former rule of the PSOE (1982-1996)[118], more often was related to the general instability that will be in place had the PP lost the power. Thus, according to the outgoing president of the government Aznar, "it cost a lot of work to reach the levels of prosperity that Spain has reached in order to put at risk its stability." (Aznar, *El Mundo*, 3 March 2004)

The instability that would characterize the future government in the eyes of the ruling party would stem from two factors: first of all, it will be a coalition and the parts of this coalition "will not defend the general interest of the Spanish, each of them will defend their own interests." (Rajoy, *El País*, 8 March 2004) Secondly, some of the parties in this coalition have separatist ideas, putting at risk the unity of Spain, so that "the triplet of Zapatero, Carod-Rovira and Llamazares is not an alternative, but a risk for the integrity of the country." (Aznar, *El Mundo*, 3 March 2004) This threat to the unity of the country was perceived as one of the main issues at stake in the elections, if not the main one. For example, in an interview for the *El País* one of the leaders of the party Javier Arenas claimed that the main issue of elections was unity of Spain. (*El País*, 25 February 2004) The outgoing president of the government Aznar also often used his usual apocalyptic tones when talking about the issue, for example: "we need a solid majority, because there are people who want to destroy Spain." (Aznar, *El País*, 2 March 2004)

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[117] Barometer CIS of October 2003 showed the difference of 0.7% between those who saw the situation as good or very good and those who saw it as bad or very bad (25.2 versus 24.5%), a difference, which was much greater at other points of the rule of PP.

[118] One of such direct references – that the adversaries of the PP will "return Spain to the unemployment, waste of money and corruption." Rajoy, *El País*, 10 March 2004.

Finally, the topic of threat of terrorism (of ETA), the most prominently present in the campaign, in the antagonist identity field got associated with the lack of commitment of the PSOE to the anti-terrorist struggle. Case of Carod, of course loomed large in this sphere, prompting such statements as "José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero is not qualified to rule Spain because he has not broken ties with those that want to do away with the state policy against terror by talking with terrorists;" (Aznar, *El Mundo*, 2 March 2004) "if he was committed to the antiterrorist Pact, he would never make agreements with the terrorists nor those who want to make agreements with terrorists" (Aznar, *El Mundo*, 3 March 2004) or "Some of those that go in the same coalition with ZP [Zapatero] did not vote for the Law on Parties or the banning of Batasuna." (Rajoy, *El País*, 5 March 2004)

The general elections in Spain usually determine which of the two largest parties – the PP or the PSOE – in coalition with other smaller parties or on its own will form the government of the country. Therefore, the usual adversary to look at in case of the PP is the Socialist Party and its candidate for the post of the Prime Minister (president of the government). In the electoral campaign of the 2004, an attempt was made to transform this reality in a way that Socialist Party would completely disappear from the created political map. Thus, in the first days of the campaign, the candidate of the PP to the presidency of the government, Mariano Rajoy, rarely mentioned the name of his adversary, often referring to him as a "mister dressed in black with a polka-dot tie" (Rajoy, *El País*, 28 February 2004) or just "that other." (Rajoy, *El País*, 1 March 2004) Another way to diminish the importance of the PSOE was negating it as a political adversary altogether. Thus, from the beginning of the campaign, the statement is made:

"My electoral adversary is not the PSOE. Neither, of course, its leader. My electoral adversary is a coalition." (Rajoy, *El País*, 1 March 2004)

The idea behind, shaped already by the outcome of the Catalan elections but influenced most by the subsequent meeting of Carod with the ETA was put into extensive use during the campaign. This idea echoed the notion of what the elections were about – the unity of Spain. To make this a credible claim, the PSOE was not a useful electoral adversary. Instead, the move was made to nullify the importance of the Socialist Party and its leader. Claiming that Zapatero was weak and did not have any electoral programs in the substantial matters, such as economy, model of the state or the anti-terrorism, in almost every electoral meeting the leaders of Popular party moved on to discuss the "coalition partners" of the Socialists. That way the PSOE disappeared from the scene and other actors were placed on the pedestal.

Most commonly mentioned, was, as could be presumed, the ERC and its leader Carod-Rovira. For the sake of coherence, the IU was also added, to reinforce the frame of the red-separatist threat. Other actors also received their place in the coalition, such as the Basque PNV[119], even though the ties between this party and the PSOE were much more difficult to prove, so that it was often left aside. At the times when it was used, it did reinforce the idea of the threat to the unity of Spain by evoking the *Plan Ibarretxe*. In addition, the PNV could also take its honorary place in the coalition through another "member" which in the discourse of the PP was present even in its absence –ETA. Thus, for example, for one of the leaders of the party, Jaime Mayor Oreja, ETA is behind both the ERC and the PNV: "the movie of breakup … is already written. Its scriptwriter is

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[119] At a certain point the leader of the IU, Gaspar Llamazares claimed that the PNV could make part of the governing coalition, a statement that was quickly taken by the PP. However, the statement was made on March 9, leaving the party little time to elaborate more profoundly about this.

ETA and the main actors are ETA, the PNV and the ERC."[120] Or another way of connecting, this time associating the PSOE, the ERC and ETA: "It is an indignity that the allies of the PSOE sat together with the same assassins that put the bomb of Hipercor to kill Spanish and Catalans." (Trillo, Minister of Defense, *El País*, 7 March 2004)

To sum it up, in the discourse of the PP during electoral campaign, the actors are connected between themselves in the following way:

$$ETA = ERC = PSOE = IU$$

$$\mathrel{\|_\mathrm{L}} PNV$$

As it can be seen, all roads lead to ETA, which is one actor (and problem) that unites all the elements in a nearly "metaphorical unity", to use the expression of Torfing. The only problem that could be seen separately and attributed to the possible bad management of the PSOE – the economy was little accentuated on its own, even in this case making a clear connection between the future of institutional instability in the country and the threat to its prosperity. Another great theme – the threat to the unity of the country, could not have such a serious prominence if it was not associated with the possibility of violence, an association were ETA clearly plays the most prominent role.

Let's look now in more detail at how these different elements were linked. An association between the elements of discourse can be achieved by the metonymical sliding of meanings and this is one of the most important processes in the expansion of a "hegemonic project" (Laclau, Mouffe 1985, p.141). The final result of this development is a creation of hegemony "based on a metaphorical unity" (Torfing 1999, p.113). In

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[120] Mayor Oreja, *El País*, 28 February 2004. The PNV intensively demonized throughout the years of the rule of the PP and the presence in the public space of the so-called *Plan Ibarretxe*, that was considered to be a move towards the Basque independence by the main parties, made this demonization even stronger. As Mayor Oreja continued his speech, it appeared that the scenario of ETA consists of "two plans; plan Ibarretxe and plan Carod Rovira, that are two simultaneous plans just with distinct formats" (ibid.).

other words, the creation of hegemony takes the following form: first the meaning is displaced from one element to another through the metonymic sliding, then these meanings are condensed into one or few elements of the discourse that as a result, become a nodal points capturing and containing all the other elements in the discourse. [121] Looking at this process in the electoral discourse of the ruling party, one can see how the different elements of the problems are associated in a way that creates a strong unity among them. Thus, for example, the economic future of the country and the threat to the reached prosperity was directly associated with the Socialists' lack of "vision of the state". The two elements most often went hand in hand: "Zapatero is playing with the basic rules of coexistence and with the prosperity of Spain" (Aznar, *El País*, 2 March 2004) or "The same as happens to them with the model of Spain, they are completely incapable of arriving to an agreement of what they want to do with the economy." (Rajoy, *El País*, 27 February 2004) The threat to the model of the state and the threat to the stability of the country come to be associated with the threat to economic progress. Next the threat to the stability is associated with threat to unity, thus the separatism and, naturally, with the certain actors that embody this threat – primarily the PNV and the ERC. To add to this the problem of antiterrorism and we get a pretty much full picture, as through the problem of "lack of commitment to the antiterrorism" the threat of ETA comes clearly into light. The association between these elements can be put into a graphical form as in diagram 1.

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[121] Umberto Eco writes in the same vein about the relations of metonymy and metaphor: "This type of metonymic substitution is no different from the process Freud called "displacement." And just as condensation is involved with the process of displacement, so is metaphor involved with these metonymic exchanges. See, Eco 1986.

Diagram 1

Furthermore, as not only the problems but also the actors that are associated with these problems are noted, ETA comes to play an even more important role. The ERC connection is the most important here. It both links the two sets of the problems – separatism and lack of commitment to antiterrorism and provides a connection between the adversary and the "terrorist" organization. Taking the link of associations: the the PSOE pacts with the ERC which pacts with ETA, the underlying message seems to be that if you do not vote for the PP, you vote for ETA taking part in the Spanish government. In addition, ETA has long since become an embodiment of separatism and threat to the unity of the Spain. Therefore, in the discourse constructed during the electoral campaign of the 2004 of the PP, it was ETA that occupied the position of the nodal point in the discourse, providing a metaphor for all the ills of the country.

Let's elaborate on that. Why is it ETA that becomes the nodal point in the discourse of the PP during the electoral campaign? According to Laclau and Mouffe, nodal points are the "privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying chain" (Laclau, Mouffe

1985, p.112), their role is to create a coherence in the discourse by capturing the diverse elements that float in the "discursive field" or, to put it otherwise, to create the "metaphoric unity," a condensation of the meaning in one element as the final result of the displacement of meanings through metonymic sliding. An association of the diverse elements of electoral discourse of the ruling party into a single unity, as it could be seen from the discussion above, is hardly imaginable without the presence of master signifier of ETA in the discourse.[122] The actors received their identity through connecting them to the organization and the general experience of danger and instability was condensed in the image of ETA. "Lack of commitment to the antiterrorism" frame had the clearest connection to the organization, but another significant topic – that of the threat to the national unity could also be subsumed under the metaphor of ETA, as the experience of separatism during the entire democratic existence of the country was most powerfully connected to the experience of ETA's violence.

This experience also gave life to the discursive frames taken from the Civil War. The idea of coalition of "reds and separatists" that resuscitated collective memory of the past got a much stronger meaning when associated with the continuous violence of the present. Through evoking ETA's violence the link was made between the historical frames and the present ones and the discourse itself gained a nearly hegemonic fullness.

*Protagonist identity field, prognostic and motivational frame*

As it could be imagined, the prognostic frame followed closely the diagnostic frame discussed here. As the diagnosis itself was related to the future (what will happen if the

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[122] "Threat to prosperity" frame may have a life of its own, however, it was related to the other problems mainly through insisting on this threat as a consequence of the institutional instability. The direct remarks to the economic problems of the rule of the PSOE were limited in their frequency.

coalition wins) not to the present problems, the prognostic frame followed these ideas just with a different sign in front of them. Thus, if the coalition is defeated and the party gains absolute majority once again[123], the economic progress will continue, anti-terrorist policies will be as strong as before and even the territorial problems of the country will be solved (see diagram 2).

Diagram 2

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                    Coalition defeated, PP won elections

              Stability defended
                                        Anti-terrorist policies as strong as before
                                            leading to the final demise of ETA

   Economic progress
      continues
                        Territorial problems solved
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The same way as it used to do before, the party positions itself as unique guardian of the unity of the country, of the Constitution and the sole political force truly committed to antiterrorist struggle and seeking the demise of ETA. Accordingly, one can envision the final shape of the discourse of the party during the electoral campaign. The attempt to create a hegemonic discourse through dividing the social sphere into two parts resulted in two almost paradigmatically equivalential chains. As it was mentioned, the politics of confrontation marked the style of the leadership of the party throughout its years in power and especially in the second mandate, these equivalential chains were further elaborated

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[123] The coalition of the adversaries was juxtaposed to the absolute majority government of the party. The argument that this way the party will not be conditioned by anybody and would be able to fulfill its electoral program, though, was seen also in a different light by political analysts. After the absolute majority rule of the PP, the party in government alienated its potential supporters to such extent that "they would sell very expensively the agreement with Rajoy", see Prego 2004b.

during the electoral campaign to include on one side the peripheral nationalists and the socialists and to relate all of these actors to the ETA, and on the other side have the PP with its concerns for the victims of terrorism, commitment to antiterrorism and the protection of the Constitution. Thus, the motivational framing and the audience identity can also be imagined: voting the PP means being with "victims not with the assassins", being a patriot of the Constitution and being a part of the saviors of Spain. One would vote for the government that is the only one that in "the anti-terrorist policy and the economic policy, has a program, has clear ideas and knows what it has to do." (Rajoy, *El País*, 4 March 2004)

These ideas, also reproduced parts of historical heritage, this time probably more related to the experience of transition on the part of the Right. For example, the far right newspaper *El Alcázar* wrote before the first free general elections:

> We don't pact with the enemies of Spain and the Spanish people. Nor do we pact with those who make politics a dangerous game of opportunism without concern as to the destiny of Spain and her well-being that with so much sacrifice and effort was conquered for the Spaniards" (quoted in Desfor Edles 1998, p.62)

The similarity between these statements and the rhetoric of the campaign of the PP for the general elections can hardly go unnoticed, the ideas that Francoist Bunker used back in 1977 were still valid for electoral campaign more than two decades later.

Frame resonance

How strong this motivation would be depends on how clearly these ideas relate to the experience of the people, or in terms of Snow and Benford, how does the frame resonate, how credible are the threats and the associations between them and how serious is the posture of the party itself as a positive "hero". Some of these elements could be perceived already from the previous discussion, such as the relation between separatism and

242

violence. However, obviously, these frames did not "resonate" the same way in the different parts of the society.

For a frame to resonate, three conditions have to be fulfilled, the frame has to have empirical credibility, experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity (Snow, Benford 1988, p. 208). What we need to see now is thus how are these conditions met in the case of the analyzed electoral discourse.

Some analysts argued that the strategies of the two parties concerning the elections were based on the calculation that the absentees from the voting are the Leftist voters, therefore, the strategy of the PSOE was evolving around trying to get them out of their homes on the day of elections and what the PP needed was "that they do not move." (Prego 2004a) To achieve the latter, the accent on the economy that was doing well during the years of the PP would have sufficed in addition to a discrete tone in talking about the opponent. This choice, however, was followed only in the first days of the campaign, soon giving way to the usual confrontational tactics.

The 2004 campaign actually followed the frame of that of 2000 in a sense that the party "wrapped itself up in the national flag and the Constitution, using its artillery against the nationalists". Such a posture "could have been spontaneous, but also cold and calculated, because further on it was always returned to", that way the party moved away from the center, but was able to collect the votes of the traditional Right (Tusell 2004, p.190).

This position, however, alienated numerous others. The surveys published in the major newspapers on the 4th of March showed that the constant attacks on Carod Rovira just strengthen the position of the ERC and that of the Catalan Socialists while producing some damage to the PP itself. (*El Mundo*, 4 March 2004) The attempt to hold on to the

votes of "traditional Right" can hardly provide the full explanation of this behavior. During 8 years in office, the PP already reputed itself as a defender of the values dear to this group. Making some changes in the rhetoric would not have seriously alienated this group. Still, the general style of confrontation took over during the campaign and the party was unable to resist temptation to charge against the peripheral nationalists and their potential allies in the Socialist Party. The ETA connection fitted so neatly into the earlier frames that there was hardly a way to have it otherwise. In this sense, one event that happened during the electoral campaign gains particular importance – the arrest of a commando of ETA in Cañaveras (Cuenca province).

On the 28th of February the *Guardia Civil* intercepts the so-called "caravan of death" prepared by ETA, a minivan with 536 kilograms of explosives heading to Madrid. The event, naturally, soon prompted a heated political debate. The ruling party charged once more against the leader of the ERC – the minister of Interior, Ángel Acebes claiming that Carod "should be satisfied that the attack would have taken place in Madrid, not in Barcelona;" (*El Mundo*, 1 March 2004) and against the PSOE – with the outgoing president of the government once again insisting that Zapatero cannot be the Prime Minister, as he has not broken the pact with ERC.

This time the other side of the political struggle struck back: the idea of ETA attacking in Madrid after the announced truce in Catalonia, according to them, fell too neatly into the discourse of the PP and in addition to that, the circumstances of the arrest were pretty obscure.[124] Thus, Juan Carlos Rodríguez Ibarra, one of the Socialist leaders, the president

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[124] There were some factors in the arrest that were somewhat suspicious: first of all, the last weekend of February when the minivan was intercepted saw heavy snowfalls making most of the roads difficult to pass. The question was thus raised how "the minivan could cross without any problems half of the peninsula to be detained, curiously, in Cuenca" (Joseba Azkarraga, the Basque councilor for Justice in *El Mundo*, 2

244

of Extremadura, accused the PP of overusing the discourse on terrorism to such an extent that people start to doubt the operations of *Guardia Civil* and the police. (*El Mundo*, 3 March 2004) Actually, the attacks on the peripheral nationalists and the ERC with its leader in particular, have divided the political sphere to such an extent that negotiation with ETA appeared not to be such a bad thing. After all, as popular idea held it, Carod did achieve truce even if only for Catalonia.

This is not to say that such statements undermined the perceived importance of ETA threat. Terrorism was still perceived to be one of the greatest problems of the country,[125] the organization often erupted during electoral campaigns and in addition had a certain "obsession" for organizing a significant attack in Madrid (*El País* 1 March 2004), a fact that will later on be used to a great extent to justify the attribution of March 11 to the Basque organization. However, the threat of ETA being great as it was did not really imply that the organization permeated all the political forces, except for the PP or that the Socialist Party was much less committed to the antiterrorist struggle than the ruling party was. The general perception was that the constant overuse of the antiterrorist discourse and the Carod case was not reaping any fruits for the ruling party, on the contrary, its positions were weakening because of that. (*El Mundo*, 4 March 2004) Which is probably to suggest that the empirical credibility and experiential commensurability of these

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March 2004). The second question concerned the arrests themselves. The minivan was preceded by another car that was supposed to check whether the road was clear, both the van and the car were driven by the so-called "legals" of ETA, i.e. the people that were not yet in the lists of the police. Because of the slippery road, the first car that had neither explosives not firearms on board, had an accident and when the police arrived its driver declared himself to be a member of ETA. After this incident the minivan and its driver was also arrested, neither of them offering any resistance, both declaring to be members of ETA. Such a turn of events, left a lot of eyebrows raised.

[125] For example, in the survey of *Instituto Opina* of the 6 March 2004, terrorism was considered greatest problem by 37.3% of the respondents, second only to unemployment (57.6%).

statements was not really high or that the people were getting somewhat repulsed by the overuse of the antiterrorist discourse in the campaign.

The continuous use of this discourse despite its limited utility could hardly be explained otherwise than by reference to the general style of leadership in the Popular Party and the narrative employed throughout its years in office. This narrative did work, sometimes better, sometimes worse, but already proved itself to be an indispensable part of the party's worldview. It can thus be claimed that the whole system of discourse had a "narrative fidelity" element (i.e. the declarations were perfectly consistent with the party's statements made before, consistent with the created worldview) that is a necessary element to make a frame resonate.

The threat to the unity of the country had a certain empirical credibility element. For example, the *Plan Ibarretxe*, though not very much debated during the campaign was present in public space. This plan was commonly perceived as independentist and separatist. Carod's party was also viewed with suspicion, but the question itself did not gain much prominence in the minds of the people of the rest of the country and only strengthened the position of the ERC in Catalonia switching on the defensive mechanisms. The same as the attacks on the PNV mobilized the nationalists voters both in the 2001 Basque elections and in the campaign of the 2004 elections.

Experiential commensurability element of this part of discourse, however, was not very strong. The invocation of the Civil War frames had a certain resonance, but that particular event was so distant from the current situation that it hardly had any influence in the decisions of the people. This element actually got stronger after the elections, but we need to keep here to the chronological order.

To sum it up, the discourse was following basic lines outlined throughout the PP years in office, the lines which themselves to a large extent made part of the historical discourse. Thus, the narrative fidelity of the whole structure was high enough. The threat of ETA had an experiential commensurability and the empirical credibility aspects making it a strong pillar on which to build the whole discourse. And though the attempts to implicate the PSOE in the connections with the organization were not viewed as trustworthy, here the party could capitalize on its achievements in economics and antiterrorist struggle to make the future with the Socialists look more dubious. Truly, these two elements mattered most for the people making the claim of the PP a pretty strong one.

Experience of dislocation. From 11-M to 14-M

However, the events of 11 of March and, more concretely, the subsequent investigation threatened to shatter this scheme to pieces. Between 7.34 and 7.45 that day a series of explosions in the trains of environs of Madrid result in the largest terrorist attack in Spain, leaving, as it will be known afterwards, 192 people dead and thousands injured. In the first hours after the events nobody seemed to doubt who was responsible for the massacre. The first political leader to appear before journalists, the Basque *Lehendakari* Juan José Ibarretxe at 9.30 that morning condemned the attacks and claimed that the terrorists "are writing their last pages" (*El País*, 12 March 2004) clearly implying ETA. This statement was later often used by the PP as an example to the point that everybody at that time thought that ETA organized these attacks.

The president of the Government of Spain, José María Aznar, at 10 am, decided to organize the manifestation the next day, 12 of March with the slogan "With victims, with the Constitution, for the defeat of terrorism", by this also clearly insinuating the

authorship of ETA.[126] At that point there is no evidence whatsoever as to who could have planted the bombs. The judgment of the government here was based on the associative thinking – as was mentioned before, ETA was trying to produce an attack in Madrid of large proportions and during the Christmas of 2003 even was prepared to put bombs on the trains. On the other hand, and this is what puzzled most the investigators of the case, there were certain elements that did not match. First of all, that meant ETA had a commando in the capital of the country (as the director of *Guardia Civil* asserted to his colleagues, "if it was ETA we can all hand in our resignations right now" Santiago López Valdivielso, quoted in *El País*, 13 March 2005). Second, that would have meant a complete change of strategy on the part of organization: there was no usual phone call to announce about the bombs, the explosives used were extremely powerful and the attacks themselves obviously sought as high as possible number of deaths.

These initial doubts of the experts notwithstanding, the government insisted the author of attacks was ETA, basing its claims not so much on the facts, but on the likelihood. It continued to insist on this authorship even when the facts suggesting different authorship where piling up: already at 10.30 on the March 11, the spokesman of Batasuna claimed that ETA cannot be implicated in the attacks and they must have been a work of "Arab resistance." (Otegi *El País*, 12 March 2004) Furthermore, Batasuna condemned the attacks which it never did with those of ETA. However, when the minister of Interior first time appeared to talk to the media at 13.15, he indicated that "unfortunately this time

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[126] The behavior of president of the government is interesting in this sense: in the private talks with the politicians and the heads of the main media he insisted that there should be no doubt about the authorship of the attacks, calling them personally to communicate this (the head of *El País* decided to change the main heading of the special edition of the newspaper from the "Terrorist massacre in Madrid" to "The massacre of ETA in Madrid"). On the other hand, in his official declarations there was no mention or even allusion to the Basque separatists, leaving many somewhat perplexed.

ETA succeeded in achieving its objective" when all the evidence he had to support this claim were just a guesswork. ETA as "the principal line of investigation" idea will be maintained until the night from 13 to 14 of March.

During the time leading to the demonstration of Friday, 12 of March, more and more indications were pointing out different way,[127] so that the main slogan of the demonstration became not so much the one implied by the government ("with victims, with the Constitution"), but more "who was the author?" This question was not a simple issue of knowing the truth about the perpetrators of the attacks. It also implied certain responsibilities for the government. Therefore, if it was ETA, demonstration was what it was, but if it was not (and there were already more people believing it was not), the demonstration was also a demonstration against the government.[128]

Further events just painted the picture in stronger colors. While the facts started pointing out to a different direction, the government still insisted on having ETA as the main path of investigation. Thus, on Saturday 13 March, just an hour before two Indian and three Moroccan citizens with supposed ties to Al Qaeda were arrested, the Minister of Interior still insisted, "ETA should be priority line".

What should be the explanations of such a behavior? One of the first explanations should be the discourse that party constructed during its term in office and especially for the

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[127] A minivan, which contained detonators, the rests of dynamite and the cassette with verses of Koran, was found in the morning of 11th next to the station of Alcalá de Henares. In the evening a group calling itself Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades, a group linked to Al Qaeda, claimed responsibility for the attack sending the message to a London based newspaper. During the night between 11 and 12 a sports-bag with the bomb inside was found among the things of the victims. Deactivating the bomb it appeared that the dynamite used was not the usual of ETA. Finally, ETA itself called the Basque television and the newspaper *Gara* to claim that they had nothing to do with the attacks.

[128] For example, Pablo Ordaz quotes one of the participants in the demonstration asking his friends "but this mani[festation] is against ETA or against PP? I don't understand anything" His friend's response was "The point is that if finally it appears to be Al Qaeda, the responsibility will be that of Aznar for getting us into a war which nobody wanted" (Ordaz, 2004)

electoral campaign. As we have saw in the previous part, this discourse relied heavily on the threat of ETA as the main threat facing Spanish society. In that sense the created discourse was considerably weak, as it depended too much on that one particular element. The construction was so closed in itself (as we saw, all the pathways leading to ETA) that there was no place in it for a different type of threat in the form of radical Islamism. In that sense, the 11-M and especially the fact that the "domestic" group did not perpetrate the attacks had a serious dislocative effect. This fact just did not fit anywhere in the scheme.

Furthermore, the investigation of the events of 11 March, leading more and more in a direction of the Islamist terrorism, brought out some skeletons from the cupboard. First of all, of course, the war in Iraq and lack of attention to the threat of Islamist terrorism.[129] However, in addition to that also the other crises, which the government managed in a less than satisfactory manner: such as the *Prestige* and the *Yak-42* catastrophes[130] and

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[129] The attack against House of Spain in Casablanca, on May 16 2003 showed that Spain was in the eye of the Islamic militants. In addition, some of the communiqués of Al Qaeda talked about the necessity to recover the *Al Andaluz*. The three Moroccans arrested already on Saturday after the attacks had links to the group that committed Casablanca attack. Therefore, the precedents of the Madrid bombings could have pointed not only in the direction of ETA, but also that of Al Qaeda, that there latter were not taken seriously has more to do with the ruling party's constructed discourse than with the factual reality.

[130] Sinking of the oil tanker *Prestige* next to the coast of Galicia on 19 of November 2002, created a greatest ecological catastrophe after Chernobyl, all the way during the crisis government was largely insisting that there was no problem and there will be no oil slick. Soon it appeared that the oil contaminated all the northern cost of Spain, especially hitting the Galician coast. In addition to the bad management of the crisis (the ministers were not where they were supposed to be during the whole crisis, the army was employed in only more than 2 weeks after catastrophe and the help of other countries was denied while the oil expanded to threaten greater and greater territory), there was a bad management of information – first it was argued that the tanker would not sink, then that there would be no oil slick, later, when the tanker sank it was argued that fuel gets consolidated, to the contrary of the information provided by other countries (France and Portugal), see "Diario del desastre" in *El País* 3 December 2002 and Tusell 2004, 324-328.
The Yak-42 catastrophe on 26 of May 2003 in Trabzon, Turkey, cost lives to 62 Spanish soldiers returning from deployment in Afghanistan. As a result of this tragedy Spain lost nearly a double number of soldiers than US in the war of Afghanistan, but it also revealed incidents of mismanagement of information. First of all, there were numerous complaints about the state of the aircraft, information that was concealed from the parliamentary investigation. Secondly, almost all the dead soldiers were badly identified and, when given over, the families were told they could not open the coffins, it was claimed that no DNA tests exist when

where there was a general suspicion of mismanagement of the information if not outright manipulation. Naturally, the worldwide prominent case of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was also remembered. Hence, the two themes that took great prominence in the last days before the elections were the war in Iraq and the suppression of truth.

The opposition to the war in Iraq in Spanish society was one of the highest among all the countries both the ones which participated in the war and the ones that did not. Multitudinous demonstrations were taking place against the war before it started and the public generally viewed it very negatively. The investigation of 11-M pointing more and more to the direction of Islamic radicalism brought out this issue to the forefront. It was expressed probably in the clearest way in the March 12 demonstration in Barcelona, in which the governmental banner "with victims, with the Constitution …" was supplemented by many more slogans against the war. The idea that was put in the center of attention was that the 11-M was a bill for the photo of Azores, i.e. for the personal ambition of Aznar, that the Spanish people have to pay.

Foreign policy decisions did not have serious prominence in considerations and assessments of threat for the Spanish politicians. In the case of war in Iraq, as well, these considerations seem to have been overlooked. According to Tusell, talking about entering this war, "In Spain, the questions of foreign policy have less relevance than in other places and its influence for the internal politics is minimal" (Tusell 2004, p.335). In fact, the unpopularity of the decision to go to war was really considerable[131], but the

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they existed, etc. The political responsibilities that the opposition demanded were washed away by the government, the same that happened in the case of Prestige.

[131] In January 2003, 61% showed a complete rejection, 24% support on the condition that the UN accepted the war, by March the war was rejected by 91% and 86% thought that this war will bring no advances in the war against terrorism. The common opinion was that Spain was not threatened by Iraq in any way and that getting into such a war would only worsen the relations with the Arab countries.

government did not bother try making it more acceptable. The public was put in front of the fact and without a possibility of appeal.[132] However, after the initial upsurge of the sentiments against the war, it seemed that the public does not put too much emphasis on the acts of government in this sphere, so that the next municipal elections did not show any punishment for the government. Probably, at the moment the calculation of the government that the public will not take into too much consideration the decision in foreign policy area was right. During the campaign for the general elections of the 2004, the question of Iraq was completely eluded by the ruling party and used only in a limited way by the opposition (which had to spend considerable time trying to oppose the accusations of the government in the spheres of territorial and antiterrorist policy).

With the attacks of 11-M and piling up indications that Islamic radicalism was to blame, war in Iraq came to the front of the public opinion. But for the government there was hardly a way to incorporate the authorship of a fundamentalist group in its discursive constructions. Obviously, the connection between these bloody events and the war in Iraq could not favor the ruling party at all, it gave more ground for those who were accusing it for making "a pact with death" in 2003.[133] Furthermore, the initial idea that it was ETA did favor party's chances for reelection. This calculation did not escape the public opinion so that the government's management of information created a general perception that the government is hiding information.[134] As was mentioned, such a bad management of information occurred also before in such cases as *Prestige* catastrophe and *Yak-42*. This time an attempt at manipulation was even more perceivable. In addition

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[132] As Tusell writes, after a certain moment, Aznar "completely washed his hands from the public opinion and the Parliament … what he said he did not do and what he did, did not say" (Tusell 2004, p.338).
[133] Ignasi Guardans, one of the leaders of CiU, quoted in Tusell 2004, p.338.
[134] For example, "Until Monday [after elections] the truth for them is of no avail" in Ordaz, 2004.

to mentioned factors, such as declaring the culpabilities without serious facts at hand, there were such occasions as minister of foreign affairs writing to the embassies for them to argue for the authorship of ETA and exercise diplomatic pressure in relation to that, the appeal to change the prepared declaration of UN to include the name ETA (later on Spanish government had to apologize for this); or the minister of Interior alluding 59 times ETA and only 5 times Al Qaeda in his appearances. (*El País*, 28 July 2004)

The ruling party tried hard to cling to its previous discourse and to make it workable in these new circumstances, however, the (unspoken) discourse of its opponents,[135] linking war in Iraq with the March 11 attacks and accusing the government of open lies and manipulation was gaining the upper hand. Therefore, 14-M elections brought a change in the government of Spain, ousting the ruling party from power and giving a (largely unexpected) victory for the socialists.[136]

With the attacks taking place only 3 days before the elections, the ruling party had no time to incorporate these events into its discursive constructions. To put it bluntly, the authorship of Al Qaeda had no meaning in its scheme of reasoning, going against the principal points of the discourse. The answer prepared for all the questions related to the

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[135] It was agreed that no political meaning would be given to the events and all the parties cancelled their electoral meetings and renounced to talk about the political meaning of the events. However, the "street" opinion was getting more and more important at the same time and the links between the protest against war in Iraq and the intransigent position of the PSOE against the war resurfaced. Furthermore, all the parties could hardly keep their promises in such a tense situation, so that the demands for government to disclose the information came also from the side of the politicians.

[136] A week before the elections the surveys showed about 4% difference between the two parties (predicting 42% for the PP and 38% for the PSOE, *Instituto Opina* 6 March 2004). On 14 March though, the PSOE gained 43.27% and the PP 37.81% with the participation rising to 77.22% (second highest, lower only than the 1982 elections which gave absolute majority to the PSOE). It could be argued that what actually happened was what the PP feared already before the attacks of 11 March – that the potential absentees would come out to vote and would vote Socialists. Thus, the participation in the elections was much higher than previously predicted and the increased percentage of the votes achieved by the PSOE compared to the predictions of the surveys was directly proportional to the difference in participation between the 2004 and 2000 elections. See also: Hidalgo, 2004

war in Iraq was used also to answer the questions of the Islamic connection: as "intoxication" and the attempt to divert attention from the "real" issue.[137]

Therefore, what started as a "promising" campaign that would eventually discredit completely both the peripheral nationalists and the socialists ended in turning against the ruling party. The government of Aznar tried to use the 11 March attacks as if it was the assassination of Miguel Angel Blanco.[138] The slogan chosen for the manifestation is telling in this sense: "with victims and with the Constitution for the demise of terrorism" used all the aspects of the historical discourse and its relation to the violence discourse that were elaborated during the rule of the party. It has been noted that "PP government related constitutional immobility to the antiterrorist struggle". (Editorial *El País*, 6 March 2005) In addition, as was mentioned before, it tried to appropriate the voice of the victims acting as a singular exponent of the victims' will and their suffering. All these aspects of the discourse did not work in face of the new type of threat coming from the outside of the country and not only from the outside of the Constitutional system. The attacks thus reversed the created "moral order": the ruling party instead of acting as "the voice of victims" became "assassins,"[139] and even more: by insisting against all odds that it was ETA that perpetrated the attacks the government, paradoxically, created a positive image for the organization finally reversing the ordering of the subjects.[140] It is a telling fact that

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[137] For example, Acebes talking about the claims of Otegi that ETA has no implication in the attacks: "any intoxication by the miserable people in order to divert attention from the real goals and the ones responsible for this tragedy is unacceptable" (*El País*, 12 March 2004). The minister was using nearly the same words during the electoral campaign claiming that the ones who accuse the PP of electoral use of terrorism just want to "divert attention from the ones who gave ETA the stage" (*El País*, 1 March 2004)

[138] See, for example, *El País*, 13 March 2005. On the impact of the assassination of Blanco, see the chapter on Declaration of Lizarra.

[139] During the Friday, 12 of March demonstrations in Barcelona, but also in the Basque Country, the shouts "assassins" were directed towards present leaders of PP.

[140] General fear in the Basque Country and to the lesser extent in Catalonia (before it was getting clear that ETA was not to be blamed) was of the possible reaction against the Autonomy. The PP government

the party lost most spectacularly in the regions which it tried so hard to demonize – Basque Country and Catalonia.[141]

To conclude, the events of March 11 had a serious dislocative effect on the discourse of the ruling party. In the definition of dislocation we read that it "refers to the emergence of an event or a set of events, that cannot be represented, symbolized, or in other ways domesticated by the discursive structure – which therefore is disrupted." (Torfing 1999, p.148) This is clearly visible in the situation between 11 and 14 of March in the discourse of the then ruling party. The possibility of authorship of Al Qaeda disrupted seriously the frames created before shifting attention from the historical frames of the coalitions of "reds and separatists" and to the integrity of the state coming from the peripheral nationalisms to the worldview based on two completely different issues: war in Iraq and deception.[142] In the end it appeared that the government's frame did not "resonate" and this second one gained prominence fortifying itself not only before the 14 of March, but also after. What would have been the outcome of the elections had the government managed to incorporate the facts (showing the authorship of Al Qaeda) to its discourse and not trying to deny their reality, is now only a matter of speculation. However, what could be said with a considerable firmness is that the party would not be so much

already showed no hesitation in adopting harsh measures against the peripheral nationalists (such as the change of Penal Code to include a prison sentence for convocations of "illegal referendums" clearly directed against the Basque *Lehendakari* Juan José Ibarretxe), it was feared that the attacks of such a magnitude would provide grounds for even harsher treatment in these two regions. Continuing to insist on ETA when the facts started pointing the other direction caused a backlash against the government combined with the somewhat favorable attitude towards the organization ("our guys would not have done it").

[141] In Catalonia the party received only 15.53% falling 7.26% from the last elections, in the Basque Country the difference between the two elections was the most spectacular with the PP falling 9.46%, receiving only 18.8% of the votes.

[142] According to Ernesto Ekaizer, it is to a big extent "one lie, that of the [weapons] of mass destruction on another that ETA caused the massacre, without any proof" that caused the ruling party's fall from power (Ekaizer, 2004). Furthermore, this manipulation was more and more obvious reaching extremely high levels the day before elections; even the public television RTVE changed its evening program to show a movie on ETA.

conditioned by these events as it still is. Now we can look how it dealt with this dislocation after the hectic days of 11 to 14 March.

Dealing with dislocation

The general elections resulted in a change in government, but have not closed the issue of the 11 March, especially not for the PP whose fall from heaven was just too abrupt.[143] The PSOE was also influenced by the statements especially popular in the foreign press that claimed it had gained power by terrorist means and the cowardliness of the Spanish citizens, but its credibility and general worldview was not as shattered as the one of the loosing party. After all, it was the PP who had to deal with the accusations of hiding the truth and manipulation, accusations of lack of foresight and demands for political responsibilities. Instead of being in the forefront of the fight against terrorism the party found itself to be a villain of the antiterrorist struggle.

The dislocated space, according to discourse theory, can be sutured by creating new myths, which provide lenses for viewing the events and which may subsequently evolve into a "social imaginary."[144] Myths, like frames have their resonance aspects, which mainly determine whether they will manage to work on suturing the dislocated space completely or would provide a very partial reading of the situation.

Discourse of the PP after 14 of March was very much concentrated on creating such a myth, a reading of the events of 11 to 14 March that would be different from the prevalent in the political space. Three events had to be domesticated here – accusations of

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[143] Tusell (2004) calls the two legislatures of the PP "purgatory" and "heaven", in the first one it had to rely on the support of other minor parties in order to govern, in the second one having the absolute majority it could more or less do what it pleased. Furthermore, the surveys predicted that even if it did not stay in heaven, at least it would fall only to the purgatory.

[144] Myths create "a new objectivity by means of rearticulation of the dislocated elements." A successful myth neutralizes these dislocations completely and becomes a "social imaginary," an unquestionable, accepted by (almost) all the society, way of looking at the world. See Laclau 1991.

manipulation, of lack of political foresight and the loss of elections. These factors were dealt with in a following manner: there was no lack of foresight, no manipulation and the elections were lost because of an unfair play of the others. This reading is pretty much visible in the political speeches of party leaders (and especially its honorary president, José María Aznar) following the elections and was most clearly exposed during the work of the parliamentary commission that was created to assess the events of 11 March, the circumstances that led to these events and the acts of authorities as well as political forces after the events.

First of these factors – the lack of foresight – received the least attention both on the side of the opponents of the party and consequently in the party's discourse as well. The fact itself that the attacks of such magnitude could take place demanded certain investigation of what went wrong in preventing this from happening (after September 11 attacks in the US a parliamentary commission was also created to investigate the facts and acts). The hardliners (mainly the former Minister of Interior Acebes) in the party refused to accept any such criticism, but it was not taken to be an attack on the integrity of the party and the security services by other respondents in the commission.[145] The main fight concerned more political issues: manipulation and elections, both closely related to one another. Solving these issues, among other things, had clear implications for the recreation of integrity of the discourse of the party that was so violently shattered by the

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[145] The former secretary of the state for security even admitted that actuation of security services in certain areas of investigation of Islamic terrorism as well as that of stealing dynamite that was later used in the attacks from the Conchita mine in Asturias was "neither efficacious, nor inefficacious, it was absurd." (Cortes generales. Sesión núm. 31, 18 November 2004, p.31) The chief officers of security forces in addition admitted that there was excessive confidence in the fact that there will be no attacks on the Spanish soil and the whole fight against Islamic radicalism was somewhat wrongly directed.

events of 11-14 March. They had to recreate reason for keeping ETA at the forefront of the political enemies and prove consistency of other elements of the discourse.

The claim that there was no manipulation or lying involved in the governmental management of information after the attacks of 11 March meant to demonstrate that ETA was implicated in one way or another. In addition to restoring the reputation of the party, establishing such a connection would also confirm the validity of party's discourse before the elections, would confirm that ETA was and still is the source of all the problems. This would mean, essentially, that nothing has changed in the political situation and the discourse of the party is as valid as before. Finally, it would show that by not voting the PP in the elections, the citizens of Spain made a mistake, a question that was often reiterated in the actuation of the party following the March 14. Thus the two ideas were closely interconnected: one said that ETA was still the focus of attention and the government never lied and another that the terrorists have won and no government can now be free from such an influence.

These ideas are still most clearly expressed by the former president of the government José María Aznar, who still has considerable influence within the party. They show one of the attempts to deal with the situation of dislocation and the one, which still has the upper hand in the party. While the ex-president of the government made a lot of speeches especially outside of Spain[146] claiming the terrorists have won not so much by the 11 of March, but with the turn of electoral outcome on the 14th, there are two instances that best represent the discourse of the leader in relation to the March 11 and its implications: the

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[146] The former president of the government proposed his view on almost any occasion he had of talking outside of Spain, among numerous examples, in Moscow he claimed that the relationship between Al Qaeda and ETA is not discarded by the police (*El País* 19 October 2004), giving lectures in the United States "terrorists have won on 11 M" (*El País*, 22 September 2004).

appearance in front of the Commission of 11 March (November 29, 2004) and the video that the FAES, a think tank presided over by Aznar, issued on the 30 March 2005 to give account of the events between 11 and 14 March 2004.

Aznar's interpretation of the events could be reconstituted in a following manner: what we know about are only the material authors of the attacks (which are Islamists), but there are the intellectual authors that "shouldn't be searched for in remote deserts or the far away mountains." (Cortes Generales. Sesión núm. 34, 29 November 2004, p.13) Because all the terrorisms are the same and in the end have connections between them, so it is that the connection between ETA and Al Qaeda is an "incontestable fact." (Cortes Generales. Sesión núm. 34, 29 November 2004, p.6)[147] Therefore, these two organizations and their mysterious "intellectual author" have decided to make an attack. "The terrorists not only had the intention of causing as great number of victims as possible, but also to turn over the electoral result." (the phrase repeated at least on four occasions, see: p.13, 33, 33, 36)

The war in Iraq had no importance in the attacks, because they were being prepared already before the war started. After the event happened, the government was working hard to detain all the authors of the attacks and provided all the information it had at its disposal "in real time" (p.18), but there were "others who gave disinformation," (p.50) those "others" being the Socialists and the independent media of *Cadena SER*. Even more so, they were well prepared to use the attacks for electoral purposes, were lying, accusing unjustly the government for the events and disrupting the day of reflection before the elections by organizing the protests in front of the headquarters of the party throughout

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[147] Actually this "incontestable" fact was greatly contested by the investigation itself, which, to the moment, found no connections between the two organizations.

Spain.[148] The FAES video went even further to suggest that Zapatero has long ago had in mind the strategy of blaming the government for any potential Islamist attack in the country. (FAES 2005) On 14 March, then, the terrorists have attained their objectives, getting the change in the government that they wanted.

After the defeat in 1993 elections, the PP pushed hard for investigation of the ties between the PSOE and the GAL. After the defeat in 2004, elements of this rhetoric are revoked as well, like Aznar claiming "we have clean hands, we did not use quicklime to cover any assassination."[149] This resuscitation of the GAL was supposed to be a background against which the involvement of Socialists in the events between 11 and 14 of March should be judged. However, the period between 11 and 14 of March saw also a number of false analogies, like those of ETA's engagement that made the claims of the party less credible, even when we do not consider the facts that the investigation itself discovered.

Therefore, the unfortunate events of 11 to 14 March 2004 were entered into the discourse under the caption of "conspiracy". The idea around which the whole discourse still turns is the involvement of ETA. Obviously, if that can be demonstrated, other pieces would fall into right places, the same way it would be demonstrated that the government never

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[148] On Saturday, 13 March, there were around 5000 people gathering in front of the headquarters of the PP in Madrid, but also in Barcelona and other cities with the slogans "before going to vote we want the truth." The information about these gatherings was transmitted through mobile SMS. While it was a personal initiative of one of the protestors, it was blamed on the PSOE. The leader of the party admitted his error in not condemning these manifestations when they were happening. The protests in front of headquarters of the PP were soon given priority above anything else that happened between 11 and 14 of March, it was those demonstrations on which the whole discourse on 11-M was centered. This went in line with the previous acts of the government, as Tusell writes describing the crisis of *Prestige*, in this case as well, the behavior of the government was characterized by "… denial of accepting any responsibility and independent investigation and obsession for trying to find political conspirators between the protestors." (Tusell 2004, p.324)

[149] Aznar in the Congress of PP, quoted in Pradera, 2004b. The reference was made to the murder of two ETA militants whose bodies with the signs of torture and murder were found some years after their death buried in the quicklime. The investigation connected these deaths to the GAL, to the *Guardia Civil* of Gipuzkoa and the Socialist government itself.

lied and even had a transcendental knowledge about this involvement, that what took place after the attacks was indeed a conspiracy against the government and that Socialists indeed won as a result of the "antidemocratic pressure." (FAES 2005) While factual as well as logical fallacy of these arguments is pretty visible,[150] the ideas have a lot of appeal within the party ranks. They suture the dislocated spaces of the discourse and give it back its former shape. All the while the party is trying to make sense of its loss of the elections and, seemingly, this is the only strategy it came up with in order not to look as a villain. It is thus a telling fact that not only the hard-liners of the party, but also its moderate leaders welcomed the speeches of Aznar in the commission. The truth, according to the party, is not known yet and is hidden somewhere waiting to be revealed, that is why there is a need to have the parliamentary commission working longer than earlier planned. The need to find some connection between the terrorists and between terrorists and the parties is still present.[151] The idea seems to be that only finding these connections and finally establishing itself as the Righteous that was wronged, can the party move on.

As one of the leading political analysts in the country Antonio Elorza wrote some time before the elections:

> … the relief to have Aznar retiring notwithstanding, only a period of political reflection from opposition can restore the PP to a condition of a center-right party properly speaking. The authoritarian temptation was excessive in the last four years." (Elorza 2004)

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[150] After all, the investigation never found any implication of ETA in the events and the whole idea that all the terrorisms are the same is somewhat far fetched and completely not grounded and the logic presented for the explanation of the facts seems to be seriously flawed – e.g. the terrorists had no interest in the war in Iraq and actually did not care that much about who is in the government, but still were seeking the electoral change.

[151] There are all kinds of theories that explain these connections within the PP and that are from time to time submitted to the public sphere. When the "intellectual authorship" of ETA did not seem to work, there was a move made to implicate the Socialists in the robbery of the explosives in Asturias, etc.

261

However, that is only possible if the dislocation created by the 11 to 14 of March is overcome, if a new discourse emerges from the ashes of the old one. Yet, this process does not seem to take place and the only way of filling in the dislocated spaces is sticking to the previous ideas and adding to them a magic realism of conspiracies, "terrorist internationals"[152] and "everyone against us" claims.

The PP, as Soledad Gallego-Díaz writes, has "two faces," (Gallego-Díaz 2004) the hard-liners represented by the honorary president Aznar and general secretary of the party Acebes and more moderate sector mainly represented by the current leader of the party Mariano Rajoy. However, the more moderate sector has shown itself throughout all this time to be unable to take the upper hand, so that the party is left with the "only strategy." (Gallego-Díaz 2005) Furthermore, this strategy seems to be getting stronger and stronger, so that the PP "not only keeps anchored in the political discourse of José María Aznar, but progressively, in more and more radical tones makes it its own." (Pérez Royo 2005) The loss of elections and the change of leadership was a good opportunity to change the message, however, that opportunity seems to have been missed and the party is still trapped in its old constructions.

Conclusions

From what has been said above, several conclusions can be made. In the introduction of the chapter some general points, which have been made visible in the discussion above, were outlined. First of all, what is illustrated by the above discussion is the logic of construction of the particular electoral discourse, which is based on the elements of the

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[152] This was the idea mockingly raised in several papers discussing José María Aznar's propensity to speculate about the ties between the different terrorist groups ("the honorary president of the PP should start defending the existence of a Planetary Terrorist International governed by a secret board of the style of Elders of Zion" Pradera 2004c)

historical discourse and in which the problems addressed have more to do with the state identity issues than with mundane concerns. Both this interest in the state identity issues and the main elements that were used to frame the issue and to describe the opponents were not new, but made part of historical discourse of the Right throughout almost entire century. Those ideas are mainly of threat to the unity of the nation and the existing coalition of "reds and separatists" recreate the historical frames of the "two Spains."

In addition, the form it took was a thorough relation of the historical and violence discourse that through metonymic sliding creates the nodal point, which in turn appears as a condensation of all the issues into one element. Thus, we see how the Socialist Party as an adversary in the elections is replaced by a coalition and the coalition itself comes to signify instability, threat to prosperity and increased threat of terrorism. In an even bolder move the coalition comes to be associated with ETA. In the discourse of the former ruling party, the organization came to symbolize the "constitutive outside," a force, which through negation of the self allows the identity of the self to be constructed. Also, as Apter claims, "By treating acts of violence as ingredients of narrative, and as well a basis for logical projection, the myth, the moral and the logical intertwine" (Apter 1997, p.16) The discussion above shows the PP becoming like a "discourse community," convincing itself and others of its righteousness.

This construction of discourse, though, appeared to be a weak one. Based almost exclusively on one element, it was badly equipped to give significance to different acts, performed by different actors, as we saw on March 11 and the following days. In some other cases, supposedly, the authorship of the attacks would not matter that much, however, when the discourse on violence substitutes all the other issues present in the

political field, its importance becomes overwhelming. Different authorship means different problems, different issues at stake and also different discursive configurations for dealing with them.

What we see after the March 11, then, is an attempt to accommodate these events, to deal with the dislocation in the discourse. However, this attempt does not take place by reforming the discourse. ETA still retains its centrality, while the adjustment takes place only by entering myths regarding 11-M, the myths that have dubious weight as they are so much based on the conspiratorial theories.

It is ironic that ETA has played a part in discrediting almost all of the democratic governments of Spain. The Socialist government was so deeply implicated into the GAL scandal that its democratic credentials were deeply shattered. The PP government in its reaction to March 11 events and the continuous attempt to incriminate the organization was punished in the elections of March 14. This can serve as a good example of how the "terrorist" organization can influence the political life of the country, the relations between the political actors and the shape of the political sphere itself. Violence during the electoral campaign of 2004 was made present in the political sphere, in spite of the fact that no "actual" violence was taking place. It is a good example of how the discourse serves in defining and redefining what violence is. Not the acts, but the actors come to be judged as violent. Consequently, everything that an actor does or says comes to be seen as violent and, as a result, discredits everything that it touches. With violence the issues that the actor addresses or that are associated with it, the other actors that can in one way or another be linked to it, are put to the outside of the political space and by relocating

them to the outside, the conflict is dismissed as nonexistent, the actors as unreliable and the events as senseless.

The last question addressed here is the relation between structure and agency. How much the conscious choice and how much a structural obligation determines the forms of the discourse? The strategies of the PP throughout its years in office have been determined to a large extent by its president José María Aznar. The confrontational tactics of thinking in terms of two blocks, or the equivalential logic of hegemonic constructions were his common trademarks. The frames themselves were created by voluntary usage of the elements available in the historical discourse. As Laclau writes, it is because of dislocations that freedom exists (Laclau 1990, p.44), but it is also clear that this freedom can be used both for changing and for reaffirmation of the structure. In the case of PP, we see that this change has not been achieved despite the dislocation and what we see after March 11 is more of the same. It is true that the creation of the discourse (even when it is created from readily available material) and continuous adherence to it depend on the actor's will. However, it is equally true that once created, the discourse sets limits to the future action compelling the actor to comply. As Pérez Royo writes, for politicians it is easier to rectify what they do than what they say. (Pérez Royo 2005)

Conclusions

The aim of this thesis was to examine how terrorism had been constructed in the case of Spain and the Basque Country and to make an inquiry into its impact on the Spanish political life and the Spanish political system. I have started this endeavor with two assumptions: first, that we cannot assess the impact of terrorism on the political system without analyzing the discourse and, second, that the discourse on terrorism is not created in a vacuum, but builds on the discursive elements that are present in the historical discourse of the country (culture, civilization), and, through the combination of these elements, allows us understand the terrorist violence and provide it with meaning.

Thus, conclusions from this investigation are as follows: first, we have seen that democratic political actors do take the elements available in the historical discourse for their respective discourse constructions. Secondly, the democratic actors choose how to connect these different elements in the discourse according to their own needs. There are different logics to be employed in the attempt to hegemonize discourse and it is the choice of democratic political actors to which of them to give priority. However, the presence of violence often brings forth the "war frames", the logic of equivalence, where everyone who is not with us is against us. Finally, the equivalential chains that are constructed are not based on neutral political divisions, but represent the moral dimension and the moral choices between good and evil.

Throughout the paper we saw how the historical discourse was created and how the presence of (ETA) violence was given meaning within it. Attempts to domesticate violence became part of the general struggle to hegemonize the discourse, even, as could

be seen from the discourse of the PP, its essential element. In such a way, violence became a necessary part of the identity of all the actors.

All this violence comes from the outside and the boundaries of the community are thus easily established by locating the frontier of these attacks. For the PP, for example, as we saw in the discussion, violence is not only ETA, but also the peripheral nationalism in its entirety. During the electoral campaign of 2004 this comes to include the PSOE and almost all other political actors in the country. The dislocation in this discourse produced by the March 11 attacks and their aftermath did not encourage the party to reconsider this construction of identity, but, on the contrary, reinforced it by linking ETA, Al Qaeda, peripheral nationalists and ruling Socialists into one great conspiracy to oust the party from power. In this sense, the PP came close to creating what Apter calls a "discourse community" whose truths are non-negotiable and impossible to negate and which is closed on itself from all the (hostile) world. Similarly for ETA and its environment, the Spanish state represents violence which is agglutinating the community and against which it is pitied.

The discourse of the PNV and the PSOE is somewhat different in this respect, but they also use violence to build a wall between themselves and the other actors. In the Socialist discourse violence eventually becomes the "constitutive outside" which creates the identity of the actor by representing a pure alternative to it. For the PNV the situation is even more complicated because it has to divide ETA into two parts – one of which is "Basque" and the other, which is "violent."

Discourse based on the logic of difference might not be a panacea for solving the issue of terrorism, but it is clear that violence comes to play a much more important role in

politics if it is entered into discourse through the centuries-old frames of (civil) war. The logic of equivalence demands eradication of the conflicting chain and this eradication can only be achieved through the physical annihilation of the "enemy," which in democratic societies, of course, is not an option. What is necessary, then, is political will to change the discourse from the confrontational construction of chains of equivalence to the expansion through the logic of difference. Here is where the importance of the political actors comes in.

Discourses are structures, and the studies of discourse are based on structural investigations. However, as Laclau writes, there is a space for the intervention of the human agency and that space is opened when the discourse enters into crisis with the emergence of dislocation. (Laclau 1991, p.39) In this context, another of the important point must be mentioned, namely, that if we wish to find a cure for terrorism, it is necessary that the scholarly researchers focus their attention on these moments of a possible change, i.e. on the moments of changes in the structural conditions that facilitate the emergence of terrorism. In fact, many studies of terrorism define in great detail the causes of the phenomenon and put too little emphasis on these special moments when the reversal of the trend becomes possible.

This should be the focus of the democratic political actors as well. However, this opportunity to change the discourse has rarely been attempted. It is more often the reaffirmation of the old discursive constructions (even if they sometimes take rather fantastic forms) that is a result of dealing with the dislocation. Thus, the moment of freedom is lost and an opportunity to change the course of events is neglected. The

attempt to domesticate violence and to keep its meaning intact becomes one of the essential parts of perpetuation of terrorism.

I argue that this does not necessarily have to be the case. What is needed is determination to resist a temptation to go the easy way of conquering a part of a social space by excluding the other part and an attempt to find common points in the discourses. This is true about the Spanish political actors, and also the Basque, and it is true about ETA itself, but especially its *alter ego* – Batasuna. So far, the projects created to eradicate violence all end up in the limbo, all seem to be boiling down to the reaffirmation of the same ideas that existed throughout at least two centuries of the construction of nationalism; all just reconfigure the elements within the discourse, not managing to expand it to the other parts of the divided society. We saw this most clearly in the discussions of the events leading to the adoption of the Declaration of Lizarra. Both proponents and opponents of the Basque "national front" were using the strongest rallying points from their historical legacy to create solid and coherent discourse. However, on both sides, this discourse resonated only with the supporters of their ideals and was seen as something alien and hostile by the others. The society remained strongly divided between the two camps, each of them enclosed in their own robust worldviews without any possibility to bridge the abyss between them. Here, as in many other cases, the logic of equivalence has clearly won.

According to Laclau and Mouffe, one of the characteristics of the hegemonic discourse is that it is always an attempt and never reality. The society is too complex and the people in it too diverse to achieve a complete hegemonic project. There is, however, a possibility to expand it to such an extent that it would make alternative discourses completely

269

marginal. According to the authors, it is the task of democratic discourse to achieve such a state of affairs, and this can only be done by expanding the discourse through the logic of difference.

However, what is achievable through the pragmatic politics and the reasoned approach, is hardly achievable in the situation, where discourse is created according to the logic of equivalence as a conflict between good and evil with the moral imperatives to support the former against the latter; where the issues are not seen anymore as those of interests and goals, but rather as those of the very survival of the political community in its (perfected) form. Here, the presence of anti-state violence heightens the level of emotionality in politics, produces a greater sense of threat and results in a certain "culture of terror" where violence, threat of violence and the fear of it entangle the entire society. Here, the real violence produces discursive violence and becomes "the form of life" helping to constantly reproduce the world (Taussig 1987, p.100,107) Violence, thus, becomes one of the main elements of discourse production not only for the terrorist organization, but also for the democratic political actors, as we saw happen with the PP.

It must be stressed that all attempts to achieve hegemony of discourse mean not only an effort to create an intellectual and political, but also moral leadership in the society. We saw how the aggressive hegemonizing discourse is identifying good and evil with the political options. Here, through the appeal to compassion with victims, the political choices are dressed in the robes of morality. The choices to be made are not the neutral political decisions, they involve choosing sides in the eternal struggle between good and evil.

In this work particular attention was paid to the case of Spain, but the same framework of analysis can be applied to other situations as well. For example, in Italy, where the *Brigate Rosse* caused as much havoc in the 1970s and received as much attention as ETA did in Spain, an ideological connection between the terrorist organization and the Communist party, in the beginning, helped to discredit the latter and to question its position in the political system. Here, the same as in the Spanish case, three levels of discourse construction were observed: the historical discourse (the idea of Italy created in *Risorgimento)*, then the creation of the alternative discourse and, finally, the changes in the alternative discourse that were brought by the violent organization.

While it is true that the myths and heroes of *Risorgimento* made Italian nationalism much stronger than that of the Spanish, it is also true that forging the "Italian nation" was not a completely successful endeavor either. One of the key figures of the Marxist thought, Antonio Gramsci, for example, considered that "despite legal unification, Italy was far from being a politically or culturally unified nation" and further on reflected on "how the Italian State might be reconstructed on a truly popular foundation" (Bellamy, Schecter 1993, p.1). Gramsci's alternative discourse, thus, rose from the reconsideration of the just-established historical discourse of Risorgimento – the idea of "making Italians" is constant in Gramsci's thought. Thus, as Bellamy and Schecter note, "outing forward his mature ideas Gramsci also employed the language of the Italian political tradition, assimilating Marxist concepts into its framework" (Bellamy, Schecter 1993, p.137).

Similarly to the situation in Spain, where ETA was born out of the dissatisfaction of the youth with the old PNV, which they regarded as too-lenient towards the state policies, in Italy, the *Brigate Rosse* sprang from the same dissatisfaction with the old Communist

271

position towards the "fascist" state. Violence became part of the identity of this group, but it also came to play a significant role in the political system, although used in a different way than in Spain. The initial attempts to discredit the Communist party by associating it with terrorist organizations led to their fast dissociation from any violent actions and even the entire ideology of the radicals as well as to attempts to draw a distinction between the violent and the peaceful Communist subculture. The discourse here, which was initially constructed through the chains of equivalence, ended in a logic of difference, where only the violent were left to occupy the space of the constitutive outside. However, the moral discourse had a significant impact, and the presentation of the situation in terms of good and evil was prominent enough. (see Wagner Pacifici 1986) In addition, it is possible to transfer this framework for the analysis of the current violence of the Islamic fundamentalists, especially its discursive constructions after the September 11th attacks, and the different attempts to domesticate these events in a new discourse. The ancient rivalry between the West and the Islamic world might provide a basis for the historical discourse. Then the alternative history of Islam would be an important element in the examination, while its radical reinterpretation in the works of fundamentalist clerics and writers would serve as a background for the object of this inquiry.

If we look at the events themselves and their construction, we can see, for example, how Islam was established as the great Other of the Western civilization and also the modest attempts to hegemonize the discourse on terror through the democratic chains of difference, leaving only the violent outside of the political space. Statements that Islam by itself is not violent and should not be held responsible for the works of some "lost

sons," soon gave way to the historical rhetoric of the Crusades. It is interesting to see how these two different ways of discourse construction are interacting through time, however, as we saw in the case of the Spanish political discourse, the logic of equivalence establishes itself more easily than the logic of difference. After all, what we are dealing with here are the "war frames," and war frames, as could be remembered, demand the full allegiance (if you are not with us, you are against us) and do not allow any deviations. These, however, are all milestones for the future projects.

To conclude, eventually, terrorism, as all other social phenomena, receives meaning only within certain discourse. Terrorism can be a political issue, it can be an issue of security, it can be no issue at all, depending on the configuration of the political forces and their interpretation of the events. Not the most powerful, but the most persuasive interpretation wins in this case, and, it could be added, the one which wields best the elements that the historical discourse provides. Terrorism has been part of the general Western security discourse for more than a century. Starting with anarchist attacks and ending with the fundamentalist bombs, this discourse is not likely to disappear. In fact, with the counter-terrorism becoming "global governance" (Crelinsten 2007), it is likely to spread and fortify itself. Thus, even though there might not be a way to reverse such a trend, it is necessary for scientific community to analyze and criticize its format, primarily, by showing its true impact on the political life, the political system and the political community as such. This work, I hope, provides at least a small contribution to this process.

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